

Detainees under escort:
Inspection of escort and removals to

Sweden and Romania

by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

13 October 2020

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Glossary of terms

We try to make our reports as clear as possible, and this short glossary should help to explain some of the specialist terms you may find. If you need an explanation of any other terms, please see the longer glossary in our 'Guide for writing inspection reports', available on our website at: <http://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprisons/about-our-inspections/>

Dublin Convention

Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third country national or a stateless person.

Rule 35

Rule 35 of the Detention Centre Rules requires a medical practitioner to report to the Home Office on the case of any detainee whose health is likely to be injuriously affected by continued detention, may have suicidal intentions or may have been the victim of torture.

Personal protective equipment (PPE)

Safety equipment including masks, aprons and gloves, worn by frontline workers during the COVID-19 pandemic. This term also refers to protective equipment worn by staff undertaking control and restraint.

Social/physical distancing

The practice of staying two metres apart from other individuals, recommended by Public Health England as a measure to reduce the transmission of COVID-19.

Waist restraint belt and leg restraints

A waist restraint belt is a form of restraint applied to a detainee's waist and which restricts their arm movement. In the secure position, the detainee's wrists are held tightly to their hips with no possibility of movement. The restricted position allows the detainee some limited movement of their arms. Leg restraints are used to hold the detainee's legs tightly together.

Fact page

Departure airport

Stansted Airport

Destination country

Sweden and Romania

Destination airport

Stockholm and Bucharest

Escort contractor

Mitie Care and Custody

Number of detainees escorted

13

Number of escort staff

Eighty-seven travelled from the immigration removal centres, of whom 66 joined the flight.

Health care staff

Four travelled from the immigration removal centres, of whom three joined the flight.

Length of journey

11 hours 15 minutes (maximum)

Introduction

This is the second overseas removal we have inspected since the start of the pandemic. Ten Romanian detainees were removed to Bucharest. In addition, three detainees were removed to Stockholm under the Dublin Convention, a European Union (EU) law that determines which EU member state is responsible for considering an asylum claim and allows member states to transfer asylum seekers to the responsible state.

Almost all the Romanian detainees were content to fly. This contributed to what was a relatively straightforward operation, and much of it went smoothly. However, better coordination of the operation could have reduced the long time that detainees from Brook House had to wait on vehicles at Stansted Airport before boarding their flight.

In Brook House, there were concerns about safeguards for detainees booked on the flight. In some cases, important assessments of vulnerability were not ready by the time of the flight, and a few detainees complained of difficulties in accessing legal representation.

As we have seen before, a large number of staff accompanied a relatively small number of detainees, and staff worked in some confined spaces. This, and the need to exercise physical control in some cases, sometimes made social distancing impossible. However, adherence to health and safety procedures was better than in our previous inspection.

We saw detainees generally treated with courtesy, but there were times when individuals were still identified by a number only in their presence. Interpreters were present throughout the operation, for the languages spoken by most detainees, and this greatly facilitated fair and effective management and support of detainees. However, interpreters were not always used when needed.

Managers were expecting some resistance. A few of the detainees scheduled to be on the flight at times became very distressed, but these incidents were generally handled well. Restraints were applied only where necessary and there was good use of de-escalation techniques.

Disembarkation went smoothly at Stockholm. At Bucharest, detainees were not disembarked one by one, the process was fairly rushed and the sole female detainee was not let off the aircraft in good time before the men.

Overall, we found some improvements during this inspection, and hope that they are sustained and built upon during future flights.

Charlie Taylor

HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

November 2020

Section 1. Summary

- I.1** Sixty-six escort staff removed 13 detainees to two European cities on an Airbus A330, although a larger number had been on the original list. The operation went reasonably smoothly. However, better coordination of the operation could have reduced the long time that detainees from Brook House had to wait on vehicles at Stansted Airport before boarding their flight.
- I.2** The staff briefing at the muster point was better than at the last inspection. Staff were reminded that detainees might be under stress and vulnerable because of their impending removal. They were also given clear instructions about infection control measures, including the use of personal protective equipment (PPE; Glossary of terms).
- I.3** Detainees were removed from three immigration removal centres: Brook House, Colnbrook and Yarl's Wood. Custodial staff in Colnbrook did not wear face coverings, although most practised social distancing (see Glossary of terms). In Brook House, the use of face coverings from the point at which centre staff began to collect detainees from their rooms was good, but those gathered in the reception area before the operation did not socially distance or wear a face covering.
- I.4** The large number of escort staff present at various stages of the operation made social distancing impossible and was sometimes intimidatory. However, the use of face coverings by escort staff throughout the operation was better than in the previous inspection, with most staff wearing them, although there were still a few lapses. Face coverings were offered to detainees at regular intervals and almost all wore them.
- I.5** There had been some incidents of actual self-harm in the preceding days at Brook House, which were triggered by the impending removal. One detainee travelled on an assessment, care in detention and teamwork (ACDT) case management document for detainees at risk of suicide or self-harm. Documentation suggested that detainees on an ACDT case management document had received reasonable support.
- I.6** Centre staff at Brook House assembled control and restraint teams for two detainees who they considered might refuse to leave their rooms. Both became agitated, but good de-escalation techniques meant that use of force was not necessary.
- I.7** The treatment of detainees throughout the operation was mostly calm and controlled. Most detainees were quiet and compliant during the operation. The presence of interpreters throughout assisted with de-escalation, but they were not always used promptly when needed.
- I.8** Some detainees were clearly distressed. On the coaches and on the plane, several escorting staff attempted to establish a good rapport with these detainees in particular.
- I.9** Waist restraint belts (see Glossary of terms) were used for two detainees. One was also placed briefly in rigid bar handcuffs, and pain was applied to gain his compliance when he became violent. A third detainee was placed in handcuffs before leaving the escort van at Stansted Airport. In all cases, use of restraints followed a refusal to comply with instructions and followed patient attempts at de-escalation.
- I.10** One detainee was carried onto the aircraft and this was managed safely. Force was used on the aircraft to seat this detainee, and one other. In one of these instances, several staff issued instructions to the detainee at the same time, and staff were slow to call for an interpreter.

Restraints were removed relatively quickly after the aircraft had taken off and did not need to be reapplied.

- I.11** Sufficient food and drink were provided during the journey. Drinks and meals were available on the aircraft.
- I.12** In Brook House, there were concerns about safeguards for detainees booked on the flight. Some complained of difficulties in accessing legal representation, and because of delays in the preparation of Rule 35 reports (see Glossary of terms), some were not ready by the time of the flight. The Home Office provided the escort with a risk assessment, contained in the flight manifest, for all detainees before the operation, but this provided scant information about detainees who were vulnerable. Unlike in our previous inspection, there was a Chief Immigration Officer surgery on the aircraft.
- I.13** Disembarkation went smoothly at Stockholm. At Bucharest, detainees were not disembarked one by one, the process was fairly rushed, and the female detainee was not let off the aircraft in good time before the men.

Section 2. Notable positive practice

We define good practice as: innovative practice or practice that leads to particularly good outcomes from which other establishments may be able to learn. Inspectors look for evidence of good outcomes for detainees; original, creative or particularly effective approaches to problem-solving or achieving the desired goal; and how other establishments could learn from or replicate the practice.

Examples of notable positive practice in this report

- 2.1** Good efforts were made to de-escalate situations in which detainees were agitated and non-compliant, so that use of force and of restraints was minimised. Where restraints were applied, the need to keep them in place was kept under review and they were appropriately removed soon after the aircraft took off (see paragraphs 4.11 and 4.23).

Section 3. Background

- 3.1** All inspections carried out by HM Inspectorate of Prisons contribute to the UK's response to its international obligations under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). OPCAT requires that all places of detention are visited regularly by independent bodies – known as the National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) – which monitors the treatment of and conditions for detainees. Escorts are included in this remit. HM Inspectorate of Prisons is one of several bodies making up the NPM in the UK.
- 3.2** The Home Office immigration enforcement directorate chartered the aircraft. Mitie Care and Custody was the escort contractor. The operation was inspected from the point at which detainees were collected from the immigration removal centres (IRCs). An inspector attended the initial staff briefing at Spectrum House, near Gatwick Airport. We also visited Brook House and Colnbrook IRCs the day before the operation, to interview detainees who were due to be removed and to look at documentation relevant to their care before removal. We interviewed six detainees in Brook House and nine at Colnbrook. We were not made aware of the removal of a female detainee from Yarl's Wood IRC and were therefore unable to inspect her collection and transport to the airport.
- 3.3** Thirteen detainees were eventually removed. The youngest detainee was 19 and the oldest 58 years of age. The female detainee was 22 years old. Those transported from Brook House were being removed under the Dublin Convention (see Glossary of terms), to Sweden. They were from Eritrea, Afghanistan and Kuwait (a Bidoon). The detainees from Colnbrook and Yarl's Wood were Romanian ex-prisoners and were being returned to their home country.
- 3.4** Escorts arrived at Brook House at 1.35am. The first detainee boarded an escort vehicle at 1.50am, and the last at 2.35am. The vehicles left Brook House at 2.55am and arrived at Stansted Airport at 4.20am.
- 3.5** Escorts arrived at Colnbrook at 2.30am. The first detainee boarded at 2.50am, and the last at 5am. The vehicles left Colnbrook at 5.20am and arrived at Stansted Airport at 6.30am.
- 3.6** The female detainee was escorted from Yarl's Wood at 3.45am and arrived at Stansted Airport at 5.25am.
- 3.7** Boarding began at 6.50am. The aircraft took off at 7.50am and arrived at Stockholm at 10am. The onward flight to Bucharest arrived at its destination at 2.05pm. Two inspectors travelled on both legs of the flight.
- 3.8** The longest journey from an IRC to the destination country was 11 hours 15 minutes, for a detainee in Colnbrook. The female detainee's journey took 10 hours 25 minutes. The longest journey from Brook House was seven hours 50 minutes.
- 3.9** We also reviewed the documentation for three previous flights to European destinations. In the first flight, on 1 October 2020, one detainee was removed to France by seven escort staff. In the second, on 6 October 2020, 12 detainees were removed to Germany and Hungary by 60 escort staff. In the third, on 8 October 2020, 14 detainees were removed to Lithuania by 54 escort staff.

Section 4. Safety

Preparation and departure from removal centres

Expected outcomes:

Detainees are escorted in safety and due regard is given to individual needs and risks. Removals are conducted in accordance with law. Security and good order are maintained through proportional operational arrangements and force is only used as a last resort.

- 4.1 The Home Office stated that detainees were given relevant information about their removal via a leaflet on first detention and during a Home Office induction at Brook House. However, the six detainees we interviewed at Brook House in advance of the operation all said that they had not been informed about what would happen during the removal, or what would happen when they arrived in Sweden. Some complained of difficulties in accessing legal representation at Brook House.
- 4.2 There were weaknesses in the identification of detainee vulnerability in Brook House, which had a bearing not only on whether certain detainees should have been detained, but also on whether there were grounds for deferring their removal. We interviewed three individuals who had told health care staff that they had been tortured. However, owing to a backlog of work, it was taking 13 days to offer detainees an appointment with a GP to conduct the Rule 35 assessment (see Glossary of terms). Detainees with removal directions were not prioritised for an assessment, and the three detainees we saw all had an appointment booked for after they were due to fly.
- 4.3 The Home Office subsequently informed us that a Rule 35 report may raise a barrier to removal, but not an outstanding Rule 35 assessment. We were told that, in such cases, the Home Office 'may engage' with the individual to establish whether they need help in making any further representations. We did not consider this to be a sufficient safeguard, and, in any event, it was not reflected in local Home Office practice in Brook House. Despite the three Rule 35 appointments having been made several days before, no enquiries were made of the detainees until after we informed the local Home Office team of the outstanding appointments. Removal directions were subsequently cancelled in all three cases following the submission of further legal representations. Our review of documentation for recent flights showed that at least one detainee had been removed before the date fixed for their Rule 35 assessment. We have subsequently been informed that processes in Brook House have been strengthened.
- 4.4 The Home Office provided Mitie Care and Custody with a risk assessment, contained in the flight manifest, for each detainee before the operation, but this provided scant information about detainee vulnerability. In one case, it was noted that the detainee had 'mental health problems', but there was no further information to help inform escort staff how the detainee should be treated.
- 4.5 Documentation provided to escort staff attending Colnbrook stated that one detainee had a personal emergency evacuation plan (a plan in which IRC staff document arrangements for the emergency evacuation of detainees with disabilities). Several of the escort staff did not know what this was and could not therefore take account of it in their management of the detainee.
- 4.6 We interviewed nine Romanian detainees in Colnbrook on the day before their removal. They had all recently been transferred there from prison. Seven of the nine were content to

return to Romania. They had all been given information about their removal, and no significant concerns were raised.

- 4.7** At the start of the removal operation, there was a briefing for all escort staff at the muster point in Spectrum House, near Gatwick Airport. It was given by the senior security officer for the flight. Staff were given clear instructions about infection control measures, including the use of personal protective equipment (PPE; see Glossary of terms). They were reminded to wear face coverings and to socially distance where possible. They were also reminded that detainees might be under stress and vulnerable owing to their impending removal. They were told that a guiding hold would be needed for all detainees when boarding the aircraft and were reminded to record any incidents or use of force. It was expected that detainees would be disruptive. Staff were instructed that restraints, once applied, could be removed only with the authority of the senior security officer.
- 4.8** Custodial staff in Colnbrook did not wear face coverings, although most practised social distancing (see Glossary of terms). Several of the custodial staff who gathered in the reception of Brook House before the operation failed to socially distance or wear a face covering. However, the use of face coverings from the point at which Brook House staff began to collect detainees from their rooms was good.
- 4.9** In both centres, the process to collect detainees and hand them over to escorts was reasonably efficient, and better than in the last inspection. Discharge areas were cramped and made social distancing difficult, and we did not see it attempted. Even where detainees were cooperative, several escort staff gathered around in very close proximity to them, which was intimidatory and unnecessary.
- 4.10** All detainees were handed over to the custody of an escort manager. We observed clear communication from the manager, who ensured that detainees were informed of the process and understood what was happening. Detainees in Colnbrook were informed that they could make telephone calls on the journey to the airport, on a mobile phone supplied by the escort; those in Brook House were not told this. Documentation indicated that one detainee was subsequently offered a call at Stansted Airport but was unable to make it because his contacts book was in his luggage, which had already passed through airport security.
- 4.11** Centre staff at Brook House assembled control and restraint teams in full PPE for two detainees who they considered might refuse to leave their rooms. Both became agitated, but good use of de-escalation techniques meant that use of force was not necessary. These detainees were handed over to the custody of escorts on the wing where they and other detainees slept, rather than in the normal discharge area. The first detainee was still agitated when he was handed over to escort staff, but because of further good de-escalation by the escort manager, restraints were not needed; this detainee was walked onto the van which took him to Stansted Airport. The other detainee became very agitated when in the custody of escort staff. After patient efforts to de-escalate the situation, a waist restraint belt (see Glossary of terms) was applied, with arms in the restricted position (see paragraph 4.20). There were far too many people watching the handover process, without contributing to it.
- 4.12** Force was used to place one Colnbrook detainee on an escort van. He was placed in a waist restraint belt in the secure position and in leg restraints (see Glossary of terms). He was carried onto the escort van. Rigid bar handcuffs were applied briefly to one of the detainee's wrists in the van when he attempted to bite escort staff; pain was applied to his wrist until he complied (see paragraph 4.21).
- 4.13** Documentation suggested that the collection and transport of the female detainee from Yarl's Wood took place without incident.

Recommendations

- 4.14 Rule 35 reports should be prepared and responded to promptly. Priority consideration should be given to detainees with removal directions.**
- 4.15 Risk information and vulnerabilities, including for detainees with disabilities, should be effectively communicated to escort staff.**
- 4.16 When detainees are moved within the IRC, the risks should be managed without the distracting presence of large numbers of other people. (Repeated recommendation 4.10)**

Safeguarding adults and personal safety

Expected outcomes:

Detainees are escorted in safety with due regard for their vulnerability. Security and good order are maintained through proportionate operational arrangements and force is only used as a last resort.

- 4.17** The sheer number of escort staff present at various stages of the operation often made social distancing impossible. On the whole, it was not attempted, even where it would have been possible. However, the use of face coverings by escort staff throughout the operation was better than in our last inspection, although there were some lapses. Face coverings were offered to detainees at regular intervals and almost all wore them. We did not observe detainees being offered hand sanitiser. Staff wore PPE, masks and gloves while taking detainees onto the aircraft.
- 4.18** All phases of boarding and alighting from the aircraft were filmed, and this had been explained in advance to the detainees. The area around the plane was not secure, and guiding holds were used on every detainee while boarding, in line with instructions.
- 4.19** There had been some incidents of actual self-harm in the preceding days, involving two Brook House detainees and triggered by their impending removal. Both detainees had been placed on an assessment, care in detention and teamwork (ACDT) case management document, and one subsequently travelled on this. ACDT documentation was completed well and suggested that both detainees had received reasonable care.
- 4.20** Force was used on three detainees. Incidents were generally handled well, with good use of de-escalation techniques in the IRCs. Two detainees who had been placed in waist restraint belts before leaving their IRC remained restrained until after they boarded the flight. The first case involved a detainee from Brook House (see paragraph 4.11). He walked onto the escort van following good use of de-escalation techniques. Some force was needed to board him on the aircraft. After boarding, he became very agitated, and force was required to seat him and prevent him headbutting the seat in front of him. At this point, several staff were issuing commands to the detainee at the same time, some in raised voices. One officer repeatedly told the detainee that an interpreter would be provided when he calmed down. An interpreter was subsequently asked to help (see paragraph 5.9), but this was not done early enough. His waist restraint belt was subsequently removed when it was safe to do so, relatively soon after take-off. By this time, he had been restrained for six hours.
- 4.21** A waist restraint belt was applied to a detainee who refused to board an escort van in Colnbrook (see paragraph 4.12). The belt was applied in the secure position. Leg restraints were applied shortly after and the detainee was carried onto the van. While in the van, rigid bar handcuffs were applied briefly to his wrists when he attempted to bite escort staff, and

pain was applied (see paragraph 4.12). Clear and calm instructions were given throughout the episode. The detainee refused to board the aircraft and was carried on safely. Restraints were removed relatively soon after take-off. The restraints were applied with sufficient justification. In total, he was restrained for four hours 30 minutes. Throughout this time, the waist restraint belt was in the secure position, and for much of this time he was kept in leg restraints.

- 4.22** A third detainee was placed in handcuffs when his escort van arrived at Stansted Airport because he refused to board the aircraft. He was then walked safely onto the aircraft and some force was required to seat him. This was handled well.
- 4.23** Evidence of individual risk justifying the use of restraints was recorded in all three cases. Use was kept under review, and restraints were removed relatively quickly after the aircraft had taken off and did not need to be reapplied. However, better coordination of the escort could have reduced the time that one detainee spent in restraints (see paragraphs 4.20 and 5.4).
- 4.24** Use of force paperwork was completed for all incidents and recording was generally reasonable. However, our review of documentation for three previous flights raised some concerns. Use of force was not always adequately justified, and there was insufficient documentation of the care provided to detainees. Paperwork suggested that interpreters were not always used when restraints were applied, so we could not be satisfied that sufficient attempts had been made at de-escalation. In one case, documentation suggested that a detainee was held in restraints for three hours before an interpreter was used. In another case, a detainee was placed in restraints because it was thought that he would refuse to board the aircraft. When an interpreter was subsequently used, the detainee confirmed that he would walk onto the aircraft, which he did.
- 4.25** Documentation suggested that the collection and transport of the female detainee from Yarl's Wood took place without incident.

Recommendations

- 4.26** **Practical measures for the prevention of infection should be clearly communicated and followed. (Repeated recommendation.)**
- 4.27** **Interpreters should be used promptly to help de-escalate situations, before the use of force is needed, whenever possible.**

Section 5. Respect

Physical conditions and property

Expected outcomes:

Detainees are escorted in decent physical conditions and individual needs are addressed.

Detainees are treated with humanity and respect.

- 5.1 Crisps, biscuits and a bottle of water were offered to each detainee soon after boarding the coach, and sandwiches and chocolate bars were also available. Water was offered again during the coach journey. Drinks and meals were served on both legs of the flight.
- 5.2 Detainees were able to use the toilet on coaches and on the flight. However, the toilet door on the aircraft was wedged slightly ajar. Although pillows and blankets were not routinely offered to detainees, flights were short and largely taken up with food service; one detainee who said he was cold was offered a blanket.
- 5.3 Detainees' property was generally dealt with and accounted for efficiently. Where concerns were raised by detainees about their property, escort staff listened to them and worked well with IRC staff on this.
- 5.4 Brook House detainees, one of whom was in restraints throughout the period, were held on escort vehicles at Stansted Airport for two and a half hours before boarding the plane. Escorts arrived at Brook House an hour earlier than in Colnbrook to collect just three detainees. The Brook House escorts arrived at Stansted Airport over two hours before the escort from Colnbrook.

Recommendation

- 5.5 **Escorts should be coordinated, to minimise unnecessary wait times.**

Respectful treatment

Expected outcomes:

Detainees are treated with respect by all staff. Effective complaints procedures are in place for detainees. There is understanding of detainees' diverse cultural backgrounds.

Detainees' health care needs are met.

- 5.6 Escort staff at the IRCs treated detainees in a calm and relaxed manner, although at times too many gathered in close proximity to compliant detainees (see paragraph 4.9).
- 5.7 The paramedic checked temperatures and reviewed medical notes for those who were identified as having medical needs. Each detainee had his temperature taken with a non-contact forehead thermometer and recorded before leaving the IRC. Throughout the removal, paramedics were available. They gave out prescribed medication or paracetamol where required, and responded to any medical need, including checking for injury following the use of restraint techniques.
- 5.8 On the aircraft, three staff were seated around most detainees: one to the side, one in front and one behind. We observed staff introducing themselves, and asking the detainees their

names and how they would like to be addressed. On the coaches and on the plane, several escorting staff attempted to establish a good rapport with their detainees, particularly those who were distressed. At most times, staff were quiet and respectful of detainees' situation.

- 5.9** There were Arabic and Farsi interpreters at the IRC and on the aircraft, which helped greatly with the operation. However, they were not always used promptly when needed (see paragraph 4.20 and recommendation 4.27). In another instance, a paramedic saw an Arabic-speaking detainee complaining of back pain, without an interpreter being present. Our review of paperwork for three previous flights also suggested that interpreters were not used when needed (see paragraph 4.24).
- 5.10** When boarding the aircraft and being called up to disembark at the destination airport, detainees were identified by calling out their manifest number only. This was clear and brief, and benefited the immigration officials holding the manifest lists. However, it would have been more respectful to use detainees' names as well as the number.

Recommendation

- 5.11 Detainees should be referred to in their hearing by name, and not by a number alone.** (Repeated recommendation 5.11)

Section 6. Preparation for reintegration

Expected outcomes:

Detainees are prepared for their arrival and early days in the destination country. Any unacceptable behaviour in destination countries is appropriately challenged.

- 6.1** We were told that all detainees were given a general information leaflet about charter removal flights. Detainees being removed to Sweden told us that they had been given no information on what would happen when they got there, or on support groups in Sweden. Unlike in our previous inspection, there was a Chief Immigration Officer surgery on the aircraft. All detainees were given two sets of face covering before disembarking from the flight.
- 6.2** The handover of detainees to the receiving immigration staff went smoothly at Stockholm. However, at Bucharest, detainees were not disembarked one by one, the process was fairly rushed, and the female detainee was not let off the aircraft in good time before the men. On arrival at the two destinations, the Chief Immigration Officer conferred with the receiving immigration staff, and medical notes were handed over.

Section 7. Summary of recommendations

Recommendations to the Home Office

Preparation and departure from removal centres

- 7.1** Rule 35 reports should be prepared and responded to promptly. Priority consideration should be given to detainees with removal directions. (4.14)
- 7.2** Risk information and vulnerabilities, including for detainees with disabilities, should be effectively communicated to escort staff. (4.15)

Recommendations to the Home Office, Serco and Mitie

Preparation and departure from removal centres

- 7.3** When detainees are moved within the IRC, the risks should be managed without the distracting presence of large numbers of other people. (4.16, repeated recommendation 4.10)

Security, order and personal safety

- 7.4** Practical measures for the prevention of infection should be clearly communicated and followed. (4.26, repeated recommendation 4.21)

Recommendations to the Home Office and Mitie

Safeguarding adults and personal safety

- 7.5** Interpreters should be used promptly to help de-escalate situations, before the use of force is needed, whenever possible. (4.27)

Physical conditions and property

- 7.6** Escorts should be coordinated, to minimise unnecessary wait times. (5.5)

Respectful treatment

- 7.7** Detainees should be referred to in their hearing by name, and not by a number alone. (5.11, repeated recommendation 5.11)

Section 8. Appendices

Appendix I: Inspection team

Deri Hughes-Roberts	Team leader
Maureen Jamieson	Inspector
Rebecca Mavin	Inspector
Scott Ellis	Inspector
Kam Sarai	Inspector

Appendix II: Progress on recommendations from the last report

The following is a list of all the recommendations made in the last report of our last inspection of an overseas escort (France and Germany, 12 August 2020). The reference numbers at the end of each recommendation refer to the paragraph location in the previous report. If a recommendation has been repeated in the main report, its new paragraph number is also provided.

Safety

Detainees are escorted in safety and due regard is given to individual needs and risks.

Recommendations

When detainees are moved within the IRC, the risks should be managed without the distracting presence of large numbers of other people. (4.10)

Not achieved

Practical measures for the prevention of infection should be clearly communicated and followed. (4.21)

Achieved

Respect

Detainees are treated with respect for their human dignity and the circumstances of their detention.

Recommendation

Detainees should be referred to in their hearing by name, and not by a number alone. (5.11)

Not achieved

Preparation for reintegration

Detainees are prepared for their arrival and early days in the destination country. Any unacceptable behaviour in destination countries is appropriately challenged.

Recommendation

Detainees being removed should be offered an opportunity to speak to a chief immigration officer during the flight. (6.5)

Achieved