

1 THE INQUIRY RESUMED ON TUESDAY, 29TH SEPTEMBER 2026 AS
2 FOLLOWS:

3
4 CHAIRMAN: Good morning, Mr. Greaney.

5 MR. GREANEY: Good morning.

09:32

6
7 APPLICATION FOR A RESTRICTION ORDER BY MR. GREANEY:

8
9 MR. GREANEY: Could we begin by thanking both you, Sir,
10 and all Core Participants for attending this hearing at
11 9:30, the purpose was to avoid delaying a start to the
12 evidence at 10:00 a.m.

09:32

13
14 As a result of co-operation between all concerned it's
15 unlikely that we will need any more than five or ten
16 minutes at the most to deal with the issue.

09:33

17
18 The issue arises in this way: The intention of the
19 Inquiry Legal Team, Sir, as everyone knows, is to play
20 two police radio transmissions during the course of
21 Chapter 3. The first transmission to be played today
22 in Part 5 of Chapter 3 is a broadcast over the RUC net
23 by PC Millar at 2:35 p.m. on the 15th, informing units
24 on the ground of the existence of a bomb threat.

09:33

25
26 The second transmission, which is to be played we
27 expect on Thursday, in Part 6 of Chapter 3 is a
28 broadcast, contemporaneous with the explosion capturing
29 the seconds both before and after the explosion and a

09:33

1 number of speakers can be heard in that particular
2 recording.

3
4 As, Sir, you and all Core Participants know, we, the
5 Inquiry Legal Team, received a letter yesterday from 09:34
6 the Omagh Bomb Inquiry Police Support Group. That
7 group, as its name suggests, is a group set up to
8 support officers affected by the Omagh bombing. It's a
9 group that emerged, as we understand it, out of an
10 organisation known as MAPS, military and police support 09:34
11 of West Tyrone. MAPS applied for, but was declined,
12 Core Participant status, essentially, on the basis that
13 its interests and those of its members were represented
14 by PSNI.

15 09:34
16 In substance, that letter of 28th September represents
17 an application for a Restriction Order under Section 19
18 of the Inquiries Act 2005. It does not seek to prevent
19 the playing in the hearing of the radio transmissions
20 that I have described, so all present in this room will 09:35
21 hear them.

22
23 what, instead, it seeks to prevent is those
24 transmissions being contained on the YouTube feed
25 either as broadcast or as retained subsequently on the 09:35
26 website. And it seems to us, Sir, that the letter
27 raises that application on a reasoned basis connected
28 with a risk of harm to those whose voices can be heard
29 in the transmissions.

1 what is sought by the applicants is technically
2 achievable and moreover, Sir, is achievable without
3 causing disruption to your process. And, moreover, it
4 will not prevent the families who watch these
5 proceedings on the feed from doing so and from
6 listening to the transmissions.

09:35

7
8 Nonetheless, what is proposed represents a departure
9 from Section 18 of the Act and from the principle of
10 open justice, albeit, it seems to us, only to a very
11 limited extent. And, Sir, it will require the making
12 of a Restriction Order in our view.

09:36

13
14 Sir, you, of course, very familiar with the provisions
15 of Section 19 and the circumstances in which such an
16 order can be made. But those circumstances include if
17 the public interest supports the making of a
18 Restriction Order, having regard to any harm that can
19 be avoided by the restriction. And, as we've said
20 already, a risk of harm has been identified if the
21 transmissions are broadcast over YouTube and remain on
22 YouTube, and it seems to the Inquiry Legal Team that
23 that risk can be avoided by the Restriction Order
24 sought.

09:36

09:36

25
26 Sir, I can indicate that no Core Participant objects to
27 the making of a Restriction Order in the terms sought
28 and no submissions either way have been made by the
29 media notwithstanding that they were aware that this

09:36

1 application had been made.

2
3 And in all of those circumstances, it seems to the
4 Inquiry Legal Team that the order sought is one that it
5 would be proper for you to make

09:37

6 CHAIRMAN: Can I just be clear, Mr. Greaney, the effect
7 of the order would be that the radio transmissions
8 would not be heard on the YouTube record of the Inquiry
9 proceedings?

10 MR. GREANEY: That is the effect. So, those who are
11 watching live on YouTube would not hear the
12 transmissions, they would see the transcript of what
13 was being said and, moreover, the YouTube feed which
14 can be accessed subsequently and for all time, that
15 would not contain the transmissions themselves but
16 would contain the transcript of what was said.

09:37

17 CHAIRMAN: But Core Participants who were observing the
18 proceedings on the live-link provided to them --

19 MR. GREANEY: Yes.

20 CHAIRMAN: -- would hear and see just what we do?

09:37

21 MR. GREANEY: Exactly.

22 CHAIRMAN: Yes, all right, thank you.

23
24 RULING BY THE CHAIRMAN

25
26 CHAIRMAN: well, in the absence of any opposition I'm
27 content to make that order.

09:38

28 MR. GREANEY: Thank you very much. And Mr. Suter will
29 draw that order up over the course of the day. Again

1 Sir, can I thank everyone for attending so early, but
2 we'll now invite you to rise until 10:00 a.m. when we
3 will resume the evidence.

4
5 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED BRIEFLY AND RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:

09:38

6
7 CHAIRMAN: Good morning, Mr. de la Poer.

8 MR. DE LA POER: Good morning, Sir. Seated in the
9 witness box is Detective Chief Inspector Ivan Gault.

10 He will be our final witness for Part 4 and he has been 09:58
11 called to assist with issues relating to Aughnacloy. I
12 wonder if, before we go any further, he might be sworn.

13 CHAIRMAN: Good morning, Mr. Gault.

14 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Sir.

09:59

15
16 DCI IVAN GAULT, HAVING AFFIRMED, WAS QUESTIONED BY
17 MR. DE LA POER AS FOLLOWS:

18
19 1 Q. MR. DE LA POER: we'll begin please with your full name
20 and rank, please?

09:59

21 A. I'm temporary Detective Chief Inspector Ivan Gault.

22 2 Q. And Detective Chief Inspector, you are being called to
23 assist with the Aughnacloy area on 15th August, is that
24 right?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

10:00

26 3 Q. And the context for this, as we heard yesterday, is
27 that at 13:29, both the bomb and scout car phones used
28 a cell site located in Aughnacloy; that's right, isn't
29 it?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 4 Q. We'll begin with my topic 1, background. Now, you
3 weren't in service in 1998, is that correct?

4 A. That's correct.

5 5 Q. Did you join the PSNI in 2010? 10:00

6 A. I did.

7 6 Q. Giving you 16 years' service as at 2026?

8 A. That's correct.

9 7 Q. Did you join the PSNI's inquiry team in June of 2026?
10 A. I did. 10:00

11 8 Q. And at the time that you joined that team, did you
12 become aware of a Rule 9 request from the Inquiry in
13 relation to details relating to Aughnacloy?

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 9 Q. And were you also aware of a second request in July of 10:01
16 2026?

17 A. Yes.

18 10 Q. And as a result did you lead a team to seek out answers
19 to those questions?

20 A. I did. 10:01

21 11 Q. And you have produced, on behalf of PSNI, a corporate
22 statement that runs to 86 pages on this topic, is that
23 right?

24 A. That's correct.

25 12 Q. A total of 257 paragraphs? 10:01

26 A. That's correct.

27 13 Q. And although you headed up a team, have you done your
28 best to satisfy yourself that the content of the
29 statement you provided is accurate?

1 A. Yes, I have.

2 14 Q. And, therefore, can you attest that to the best of your
3 knowledge and belief it is true?

4 A. Yes.

5 15 Q. In due course, the entirety of that statement is going 10:02
6 to be published on the Inquiry website, but what that
7 means for us today, Detective Chief Inspector, is that
8 we can be efficient just focusing on particular areas
9 of it. But, the full content will be available to all.
10 So that's topic 1. Let's turn immediately to topic 2, 10:02
11 and the heading for this topic is "arrangements at the
12 Aughnacloy RUC Station."
13

14 Now, in August 1998, was there an RUC Station based at
15 Aughnacloy? 10:02

16 A. There was, yes, it was located in the Dungannon Road.

17 16 Q. Was that RUC Station decommissioned in 2011?

18 A. It was.

19 17 Q. And, as such, it doesn't stand as it did back in
20 August '98? 10:02

21 A. No, it does not.

22 18 Q. What I'm going to do is just bring up a part of the
23 Inquiry's presentation here just to see if we can
24 identify the Dungannon Road, I'm sure you will be
25 broadly familiar, can I just ask for nine minutes and 10:03
26 29 seconds of the EPE to be shown from Part 4, that
27 will come up on our screens. [Presentation played].
28 What we can see here, Detective Chief Inspector, is
29 that the Monaghan Road, which starts at the bottom

1 centre and runs, as we look at it here, diagonally from
2 left to right up towards the centre; do you see that?

3 A. I do.

4 19 Q. And you can see where the approximate point of the
5 Border crossing is marked with that red camera? 10:03

6 A. Yes.

7 20 Q. And in terms of the road layout, is it your
8 understanding that the A5, the Monaghan Road, when it
9 reaches that road that is running vertically or
10 approximately vertically, turns left and goes on up the 10:03
11 screen?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 21 Q. And the Dungannon Road, I'm sure you'll take from me if
14 you don't know for yourself, is the road which starts
15 below that junction and effectively heads approximately 10:04
16 horizontally off to the right?

17 A. Yes, it is.

18 22 Q. And so, this road layout, I'm sure you will agree, will
19 become relevant to the assessment of whether the bomb
20 and scout car are likely to have travelled past the RUC 10:04
21 Station; do you agree?

22 A. I do agree, yes.

23 23 Q. In fact, and again you may not have this detail to hand
24 but you can take from me, was the RUC Station based off
25 the map, so it was further out of town than we can see 10:04
26 on this map?

27 A. It is difficult to tell from the map in question. If
28 it would assist the Inquiry, I do know we have an
29 Exhibit IG1 which would show a more defined position of

1 the RUC Station in Dungannon Road.

2 24 Q. I don't think we'll need to bring that up now. I think
3 the point really is this, that the RUC wasn't right on
4 the junction, it was some distance up the Dungannon
5 Road? 10:05

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 25 Q. And that is sufficient for our purposes bearing in mind
8 the answers that you are shortly to give. We'll leave
9 that up on screen to help provide context.
10 10:05

11 So, did you and your team responding to the Inquiry
12 request investigate whether the RUC Station had CCTV?

13 A. Yes, we did.

14 26 Q. And did you establish that there were in 2011, nine
15 static cameras and one pan, tilt and zoom camera? 10:05

16 A. We did.

17 27 Q. And was that the best you were able to do in terms of
18 what may have been the position in 1998, in other words
19 you know what the position was at decommissioning, it
20 may have been the same earlier but it's unlikely to 10:06
21 have been better?

22 A. Yes, that's correct. The plan that we discovered was
23 dated in May 2011 but we were unable to uncover any
24 plan or details or special plans from the relevant
25 period in 1998. 10:06

26 28 Q. Bearing in mind the trajectory of technology, do you
27 think it would be reasonable inference that the
28 arrangements in 1998 are unlikely to have been more
29 comprehensive than they were in 2011?

1 A. Yes. In 2011 we understand that there had been plans
2 actually to upgrade the camera system, so it was our
3 understanding that the infrastructure in '98 was due an
4 upgrade so, therefore, it would more likely have less
5 capability in 1998 than it would in latter years. 10:06

6 29 Q. So, with that uncertainty, albeit that there may be an
7 inference to draw in mind, let's just briefly consider
8 the position in 2011. We have those cameras. Were you
9 able to establish whether they had any recording
10 functions; in other words whether the images captured 10:07
11 on CCTV camera were laid down on tape for later
12 viewing?

13 A. We were unable to confirm that.

14 30 Q. And so might it be the case that in 2011 those cameras
15 existed principally for real-time security around the 10:07
16 RUC Station?

17 A. Yes, that is very probable because the station cameras,
18 particularly in RUC Stations would predominantly have
19 been used for purposes of station security,
20 particularly given its location and its proximity to 10:07
21 the Border.

22 31 Q. And you have gone further than 2011 in the sense that
23 you have sought to familiarise yourself with cases that
24 might have involved CCTV in the Aughnacloy area?

25 A. Yes, that's correct. We have done so. There were a 10:08
26 number of attacks in the Aughnacloy area where there
27 was no footage available.

28 32 Q. There was no footage available from the RUC Station as
29 exhibits in any of those cases that you could see?

1 A. That's correct.

2 33 Q. And, again, is one inference from that, that's because
3 there was no recording function?

4 A. Yes, that would be correct.

5 34 Q. Now, in terms of the likely route of the bomb car, 10:08
6 we've got our map on screen, what is the PSNI's
7 assessment having considered this about whether the
8 bomb car and scout car were or were not likely to have
9 gone past the RUC Station on Dungannon Road?

10 A. It was unlikely that the bomb car would have transited 10:08
11 through Dungannon Road, because, as we understand, the
12 crossing point from the Republic of Ireland into
13 Northern Ireland would have potentially transited
14 through Monaghan Road. As we understand it, the Border
15 was very porous, there was other opportunities to 10:09
16 cross. But if the vehicle was to cross into Northern
17 Ireland using the Monaghan Road or even the Ravella
18 Road, it is very unlikely that it would have proceeded
19 down Dungannon Road, because that's not the most likely
20 route to Omagh. If the vehicle was to transit the 10:09
21 Monaghan Road it would most likely proceed in a
22 westerly, a northwesterly direction towards Omagh Town
23 which is main A5 route towards Omagh, therefore, with
24 he map on the screen, if the vehicle had transited the
25 Monaghan Road, it would most likely turn left and move 10:09
26 in a position away from the RUC Station, which is
27 located on the Dungannon Road.

28 35 Q. You also add in your statement a comment about the
29 experience of the RUC and PSNI about whether those

1 engaged in terrorist activities tended to drive right
2 past RUC Stations as they did so or avoided them if
3 they could?

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 36 Q. And was the experience of the RUC and PSNI that, 10:10
6 generally speaking, terrorists would try to avoid
7 driving straight past stations that they weren't
8 planning to have anything do with?

9 A. Yes, they would do their best to try and avoid the
10 security forces if they were transiting through a 10:10
11 particular area. So, particularly given the location
12 of the RUC Station on Dungannon Road, we believe it
13 would be very unlikely that they would, you know, take
14 that route to deliberately drive past the police
15 station. 10:10

16 37 Q. Now, there's one more matter to clear up in relation to
17 the RUC Station itself. Can you confirm that within
18 the contemporaneous investigative material, on its face
19 there appears to have been references to seizing CCTV
20 from the RUC Station? 10:11

21 A. Yes, that's correct. There are references that would
22 give an impression that the footage was from Aughnacloy
23 RUC Station.

24 38 Q. And have you investigated those references and if you
25 have, what conclusions have you reached about them? 10:11

26 A. Yes, we've investigated those and we can conclude that
27 they appear to have been taken from the Aughnacloy
28 permanent vehicle checkpoint which at the time was
29 manned by the MoD because, you know, there's one

1 exhibit in question which was subject to -- was
2 significant to the investigation and the analysis by
3 both the RUC and latterly supporting our research and
4 supporting the Inquiry, we have viewed that footage and
5 we confirm that it would have been most likely taken 10:11
6 from the Aughnacloy PVCP.

7 39 Q. If we just break that down a little bit. So, there's a
8 particular exhibit that is described on its face as
9 having been seized from the RUC Station, point 1, do
10 you agree? 10:12

11 A. Yes, that's correct.

12 40 Q. At point 2, when you have viewed that, it appears, in
13 fact, to have been from the permanent vehicle
14 checkpoint CCTV?

15 A. Yes, that would be correct. 10:12

16 41 Q. And that was how it was treated during the Omagh
17 bombing investigation?

18 A. Yes.

19 42 Q. Is that correct?

20 A. That's correct. 10:12

21 43 Q. And so, recognising that you were not responsible for
22 recording it as being from the RUC Station, are you
23 able to offer any explanation as to why an officer may
24 have recorded that exhibit in that way?

25 A. Unable to do so. The assessment might be that the 10:12
26 officer had seized the footage at Aughnacloy RUC
27 Station, therefore, they may have referenced it as we
28 seized the footage in Aughnacloy. But, we cannot
29 confirm why that terminology was used on the exhibits

1 at that time.

2 44 Q. So, if we put all of these things together does it come
3 to this: Firstly, it is the PSNI's assessment that
4 it's unlikely that the vehicle would have passed the
5 RUC Station? 10:13

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 45 Q. Secondly, if it did, it is unlikely that the RUC
8 Station would have had any facility to record that
9 passing?

10 A. Yes. 10:13

11 46 Q. And, thirdly, and in any event there is no evidence
12 that you have established that any CCTV from the RUC
13 Station was regarded as being of use to the Omagh
14 bombing investigation?

15 A. Yes, that's correct. 10:13

16 47 Q. That, Detective Chief Inspector, is topic 2.
17

18 Topic 3: working arrangements with the MoD. Now, you
19 are aware that yesterday we heard from Col. MacMullen?

20 A. Yes. 10:14

21 48 Q. And we heard about the VENGEFUL system which was an MoD
22 system?

23 A. Yes.

24 49 Q. Does PSNI, having seen what Col. MacMullen has said in
25 his statement, agree with the characterisation of that 10:14
26 VENGEFUL system by Col. MacMullen?

27 A. Yes, we do, but I would respectfully just, you know,
28 make the point that it is a Ministry of Defence own
29 system so insofar as what has been, you know,

1 demonstrated by the MoD in terms of its capability,
2 we're very much reliant upon the Ministry of Defence
3 for that functionality.

4 50 Q. But from your point of view, bearing in mind the
5 interaction with the PSNI, you've seen nothing to lead 10:14
6 you to conclude that that wasn't an accurate
7 characterisation of the system?

8 A. No, we have not.

9 51 Q. So, in those circumstances, bearing in mind that you
10 understandably defer to Col. MacMullen, I just want to 10:15
11 identify certain statements that you make in your own
12 statement about this. So I'm going to start on
13 page 19. I'll just help you navigate through this,
14 because you're managing an awful lot of information
15 there, Detective Chief Inspector. At paragraph 83, 10:15
16 commenting upon that VENGEFUL system as far as the
17 police is concerned, can you confirm that the PSNI's
18 position is that it was not created as an investigative
19 tool for the police?

20 A. Yes, that's correct. From the MoD's own assessment and 10:15
21 our research, we can establish that it was an MoD
22 system that was established in mid to late 1970s and it
23 was a database which was designed by the Ministry of
24 Defence, it was not designed for the RUC, nor was it
25 designed as an investigative tool. 10:16

26 52 Q. Secondly, and you deal with this at your paragraph 104,
27 page 24, was it the position that although it wasn't
28 designed for the police it was possible for the RUC to
29 request such footage?

1 A. Yes.

2 53 Q. Or such material?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 54 Q. We'll be clear here, the VENGEFUL data is in fact
5 what's on the database as opposed to the CCTV that it 10:16
6 might be based on?

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 55 Q. And would that request for VENGEFUL data be to the CVI
9 office?

10 A. Yes, that's correct, an RUC officer would have had to 10:16
11 make the request via the CVI office who in turn made
12 the request of the Army.

13 56 Q. The third point is, just to see what you can add and
14 I'm here looking at your paragraph 111, to
15 Col. MacMullen's assessment, which amounted to this I 10:17
16 believe, that it's likely that automatic functionality,
17 so ANPR as we would call it now, was in place in August
18 of 1998, that was his assessment, likely, albeit he
19 conceded that there were factors pointing in the
20 opposite direction. What's the PSNI's assessment, 10:17
21 having reviewed that footage and taken it in as part of
22 the investigation?

23 A. It appeared to us that the footage -- there were
24 inconsistencies with how it may have interrogated a
25 particular vehicle registration mark or how it might 10:17
26 have, you know, used a different camera at certain
27 times. It may have transitioned from one camera to
28 another very quickly. There were brief periods of
29 pause, you know, the hold was for different times. It

1 appears that there may have been some form of
2 automation but we cannot -- we do not know for certain,
3 because at that time as we know, from what we
4 understand, the camera systems, particularly at the
5 PVCP were also due an upgrade and any form of 10:18
6 automation was also in its infancy, but so we cannot
7 say for certain, but on reviewing the footage given how
8 it transitions through different camera positions and
9 how it holds certain vehicle registration for brief
10 periods and, you know, it stops and starts and it's 10:18
11 quite irregular, it would appear that there may have
12 been some form of automation.

13 57 Q. And so, does it come to this; PSNI broadly agrees with
14 Col. MacMullen's cautious conclusion that it is likely
15 to have involved automation? 10:19

16 A. Yes, that would be correct.

17 58 Q. Next in terms of Col. MacMullen's assessment of
18 limitations, I'm here looking at paragraph 119, just to
19 help you navigate, Detective Chief Inspector. He told
20 us that there was limitations to the system, and was it 10:19
21 your experience, reviewing that footage, acknowledge,
22 of course, that you will have a 2026 bias in terms of
23 the sort of expectations you have about modern
24 technology, but that there were limitations with that
25 system? 10:19

26 A. Yes, there were. There were limitations in terms of
27 how it captured the vehicle registrations as they
28 transited through. The footage might pause. There
29 were also issues where it may have changes in perhaps

1 the weather may have caused the footage to -- the
2 cameras to transition through different locations. It
3 was apparent that, you know, as we say it was a 1998
4 system, yeah, there would have been issues in terms of
5 what footage it was able to capture given the
6 technology at the time.

10:20

7 59 Q. One of the features that was identified by
8 Mr. Safranauskas who gave evidence yesterday, and
9 perhaps you can speak to this from your own experience,
10 was he pointed out that when the camera was on hold,
11 the counter time continued indicating that traffic, if
12 it was there on the road, would continue to pass the
13 camera but wouldn't be captured because it was on a
14 still of whatever image it was paused on. Was that
15 your experience too?

10:20

10:21

16 A. Yes, that was a feature of the cameras and the video
17 footage that when it was on hold then it was unable to
18 continuously record any traffic that would have been
19 passing through the VCP at that time.

20 60 Q. So, we will move on, please, to my topic 4. You were
21 asked by the Inquiry about what arrangements, if any,
22 that you could see from the materials available to you
23 there may have been for stopping vehicles at the PVCP,
24 is that right?

10:21

25 A. That's correct.

10:21

26 61 Q. And here we're picking up at paragraph 129 and onwards.
27 That's on page 30, if that helps. The first point is
28 that there was no manned military presence at that
29 checkpoint in August of 1998, is that your

1 understanding?

2 A. That's my understanding, yes.

3 62 Q. So far as the RUC is concerned, as we can see from our
4 map, some short distance away on Dungannon Road there
5 was an RUC Station which was manned with RUC officers, 10:22
6 is that right?

7 A. That's correct.

8 63 Q. You deal with this in your statement but can you
9 confirm that, as everybody would expect, both the
10 police and the Army had legal powers at the time to 10:22
11 stop vehicles if there was a justification under the
12 legislation?

13 A. Yes, that's correct. It was under Part II of the
14 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996.

15 64 Q. And you were asked specifically about whether there 10:22
16 would be resources available to perform that stop, your
17 answer was that if there was a planned stop your
18 expectation was that that would be adequately resourced
19 based on the risk assessment and the objective of the
20 operation? 10:23

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 65 Q. So, that's a planned stop. Did you see any evidence
23 from the material that was available to you in relation
24 to whether the RUC had a rapid deployment force, for
25 example, able to mobilise if a particular vehicle was 10:23
26 seen on a camera as it went through?

27 A. In terms of what we researched for the Aughnacloy
28 Rule 9, that was not something that we would -- it was
29 not a particular research topic of this Rule 9. It is

1 something that we could take away, if required, to do
2 some further research, some wider research. What I can
3 say with respect to the actual Rule 9 response is that
4 we did not see any evidence -- we were unable to
5 uncover what resources there were in Aughnacloy on the 10:24
6 day. We wanted to understand more about the RUC
7 Station but we understand it was a small typical
8 village station of the day. It would not have been
9 significantly resourced but we were unsighted in terms
10 of what the RUC presence was in Aughnacloy in August 10:24
11 1998.

12 66 Q. Thank you very much, indeed. We'll reflect on the
13 answer that you've given there and whether we need to
14 see if any further research needs to be done by you.
15 And thank you very much for your offer to do so. 10:24
16

17 We're going to move on to topic 5. This is the CCTV at
18 the permanent vehicle checkpoint. And we just remind
19 ourselves so that we're absolutely clear about this,
20 Detective Chief Inspector, we are here talking about 10:25
21 cameras owned by the military, is that right?

22 A. That's correct.

23 67 Q. And they were not cameras that were under the control
24 of the RUC at the time, is that correct?

25 A. Yes, that's correct. 10:25

26 68 Q. And nor were they, so far as you have been able to
27 ascertain, cameras which the RUC had any feed to in
28 real-time?

29 A. Yes, that's correct.

1 69 Q. But bearing in mind the Omagh bombing investigation, I
2 think you are able to tell us that the RUC, in that
3 investigation, familiarised itself with the capability
4 at the checkpoint and established that there were at
5 least 11 cameras? 10:25

6 A. Yes, that's correct, the RUC were able to establish
7 that. They were also able to establish that some of
8 the cameras, you know, were focused on vehicular
9 traffic, whilst others would have been focused
10 predominantly on security of that VCP. 10:26

11 70 Q. So, some cameras did not, bearing in mind where they
12 were pointed, serve the purpose of monitoring traffic
13 flow?

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 71 Q. I think there was also a feature that you established 10:26
16 about the way that the cameras appeared to operate,
17 those that were focused on the traffic flow during the
18 day as opposed to during the night?

19 A. Yes, that's correct. The day-time footage tended to
20 focus on single camera whereas the night-time footage 10:26
21 would have rapidly transitioned through the various
22 cameras at the PVCP. We can only assume that was
23 perhaps for some form of security reasons.

24 72 Q. So, at night, the inference, obviously you weren't
25 responsible for that arrangement but having viewed it 10:27
26 and applied your experience to it, the inference is
27 that at night the principal function of the CCTV
28 appears to have been for security, whereas during the
29 day those cameras that were focused away from the road

1 tended not to be utilised, whereas the ones focused on
2 the road were?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 73 Q. Now, at paragraph 156, you list the various cameras,
5 and bearing in mind that we have footage from one of 10:27
6 them still on our screen, we'll run through them. So,
7 were there three cameras which were described as
8 cameras 1, 2, and 3?

9 A. Yes, that's correct.

10 74 Q. Were there then a series of eight cameras which were 10:27
11 given the designation PVCP ANC running 1 through to 8?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 75 Q. I think you found, from your review of the footage that
14 was available to you, that camera 8, with the
15 designation PVCP ANC only appeared briefly? 10:28

16 A. That's correct, it rarely featured in any of the
17 footage recorded and, where briefly, it was only for
18 25 minutes. In its entirety it was only 27 minutes
19 long.

20 76 Q. Now, in terms of the format of the footage when you 10:28
21 received it, did it play through in real-time where a
22 second of recording was a second of watching time or
23 was it in some other form?

24 A. No, the footage that was received -- well, the footage
25 that was received by the RUC at the time played at an 10:28
26 accelerated speed. That was how it was provided by the
27 Army in 1998. It was not subsequently sped up by the
28 RUC or the PSNI.

29 77 Q. I think you considered in your paragraph 163 why this

1 might be the case, and does the explanation lie in the
2 way that VHS videotapes were designed back in 1998?

3 A. Yes, that's correct. From what we understand the one
4 VHS tape, E-190 as it was referred to back then would
5 have held 180 minutes of footage. Each of the three 10:29
6 cassettes that were provided to the RUC contained
7 approximately 24 hours of footage, therefore, you had
8 24 hours of footage being relayed on a three-hour tape.
9 So, that would explain why it was provided to the RUC
10 in that medium. 10:29

11 78 Q. Now, when considering that footage - and we're here not
12 necessarily focused upon 15th August but the wider
13 picture that was available to you - were there
14 occasions when towards the end of the footage, for
15 example, material from earlier days suddenly appeared 10:30
16 on the recording?

17 A. Yes, that's correct. That was apparent that the
18 footage may have -- it appeared as if the footage had
19 finished and then it suddenly gave small periods which
20 were of an earlier date. The PSNI cannot explain those 10:30
21 skips in dates or times. That's how the footage was
22 received from the Army. It may be that the recordings
23 existed on the video prior to those dates that were
24 seized. It may just have been a function of the actual
25 recording capability at the time but we cannot say for 10:30
26 certain.

27 79 Q. Was it also the case, as it appeared to you and your
28 team reviewing it, that the tapes may have been reused,
29 so earlier footage may have been recorded over?

1 A. That was our assessment, yes.

2 80 Q. And, therefore, where you have footage for a particular
3 day and at the very end it skips back to an earlier
4 day, might the explanation be that that is legacy
5 footage from the earlier recording? 10:31

6 A. That's certainly how it appeared.

7 81 Q. Now, we're going to turn to just focus on the footage
8 that was seized, and here we're moving forward in your
9 statement please, to paragraph 187. That's on page 51.
10 So, if we just try to understand the arrangements. Was 10:32
11 the first footage that was seized from Aughnacloy in
12 the investigation on the TSO exhibits?

13 A. Yes, they were, yes, in terms of the Aughnacloy
14 investigation.

15 82 Q. In fact, I know I'm moving you around here, but you can 10:32
16 perhaps see that most clearly on page 41 of your
17 statement. So, those were seized on 17th August 1998?

18 A. Yes, that's correct.

19 83 Q. Those are the first in time that were seized, so that's
20 just two days after the attack? 10:32

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 84 Q. There were then seized further recordings, I think the
23 next in time is ACJ1 which appears towards the bottom
24 of your page 42, that was on 24th August 1998?

25 A. Yes, that's correct. 10:33

26 85 Q. And then, finally, the two EB exhibits seized on 2nd
27 September 1998, which appears in the table above?

28 A. Yes, correct.

29 86 Q. Now, if we just look again at the footage on the

1 screen, that camera which shows the northbound
2 carriageway on the 15th, are you able to confirm that
3 that is from TS02, so in other words the footage that
4 was seized on 17th August?

5 A. I'm sorry, I'm just confirming the timings. Sorry, are 10:33
6 we suggesting that the footage is from TS02 that's on
7 the screen?

8 87 Q. Yes. If you're uncertain there's absolutely no
9 encouragement at all to guess, we can confirm it
10 separately but our understanding is that TS02 contains 10:34
11 the northbound footage from 15th August covering the
12 period 1:00 till 2:00?

13 A. Yes, that's correct. I'm struggling to make out the
14 timings on the camera. But it's ANC2, which was
15 consistent with that camera because, as we know, TS02 10:34
16 was all of the footage that was northbound on the day
17 so, yes, that would be correct.

18 88 Q. As far as TS02 was concerned, I think there was a
19 technical issue with the providing of that but as is
20 apparent from the fact that it formed part of 10:34
21 Mr. Safranauskas presentation, the Inquiry now has all
22 of the footage that the PSNI seized, is that right?

23 A. Yes, that's correct, we have provided a schedule to the
24 Inquiry.

25 89 Q. And we heard from Mr. Safranauskas about his own 10:35
26 independent analysis and the conclusion which I can
27 repeat now, which was that he agreed with the viewing
28 assessment by the Omagh bombing investigation of the
29 period that he focused on, so that evidence was given

1 yesterday?

2 A. Yes.

3 90 Q. So, we move on to topic 6, which relates to the
4 investigation into the CCTV and here I'm picking up at
5 your paragraph 197. Having looked at the records from 10:35
6 the investigation, and it's, perhaps, most easily
7 summarised here, as you do in your statement from the
8 McVicker Review, that there was deputy SIO policy
9 decision on 16th August to make an early priority the
10 seizure of CCTV tapes? 10:36

11 A. Yes, that's correct, there was.

12 91 Q. So, that is the day after the attack and the day after
13 that policy decision, Aughnacloy footage was seized,
14 including the footage that we have on our screen, TS02?

15 A. Yes, that's correct. 10:36

16 92 Q. Now, in terms of the seizure of that footage, have you
17 been able to discern whether or not that was the only
18 Border footage that was seized in that very early stage
19 of the investigation, or whether there were a number of
20 other Border points which were the subject of the same 10:36
21 treatment?

22 A. It's my understanding that, as was emphasised by the
23 McVicker Report, that CCTV footage was an early
24 priority for the investigation. We wanted footage from
25 both security forces and any commercial premises. 10:37
26 There were, at one stage, referred to 52 locations as
27 possible Border crossings where the investigation team
28 sought footage and, indeed, obtained CCTV footage. We
29 also understand, as part of that investigation, at one

1 stage the number of vehicle registrations that were
2 available to the team were significant. At one point
3 in that three-day period I believe the RUC had
4 identified almost 49,000 vehicle registration marks.

10:37

6 In terms of how they prioritised the actual Border
7 locations, I am unsighted to that, because that would
8 have been part of the original investigation
9 methodology.

10 93 Q. Would you expect that that policy approach at the early 10:37
11 stages to which were the locations that were to receive
12 the earliest attention, that that may be something
13 available in the records that you can take away and
14 research for us?

15 A. Yes, I'd be happy to do so. 10:38

16 94 Q. Thank you very much, indeed.

18 Just staying with the McVicker Review here; that
19 comments on the fact that a total of 237 CCTV tapes
20 were seized, is that right?

10:38

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 95 Q. And that a video team comprising three uniformed
23 officers was set up to view the videos seized?

24 A. Yes.

25 96 Q. Again, you detail, in your statement, the work of those 10:38
26 officers but there were very many, many hours of
27 footage which were reviewed and the subject of viewing
28 logs by those officers, is that correct?

29 A. Yes, that's correct. As we understand, there was

1 significant quantities of CCTV footage seized, as I've
2 outlined, from both security forces, establishments and
3 from commercial premises all in the relevant area in
4 relation to Border crossing points.

5 97 Q. If I can just move you forward, please, to your 10:39
6 paragraph 230, you pull together a summary of all of
7 the detail that appears before, which, as I say, will
8 be published, but perhaps you could just deal with us
9 now with the summary that you have provided as to the
10 way in which the investigation laid out its key 10:39
11 findings in relation to vehicle movements?

12 A. From our analysis of the key findings and, again, this
13 was wider than the Aughnacloy Rule 9. So, we did look
14 at what CCTV was available. And it was apparent that
15 sighting of the bomb car on videos in Omagh and we 10:40
16 understand that from the previous sequence of events
17 statements where it was explained that footage was
18 provided from a Texaco petrol station. But the bomb
19 car was not observed in any CCTV footage travelling
20 through any Border crossing point or any point close to 10:40
21 the Border.

22
23 It was also acknowledged, and we've covered the
24 original investigation in both our findings, that we
25 believe it's possible the bomb car did not cross the 10:40
26 Border at the location where there was CCTV, that is
27 it's possible that it passed through a PVCP such as
28 that at Aughnacloy, but it wasn't captured on camera,
29 equally, it's possible that it did not -- we are unable

1 to, obviously, confirm that. That is the summary of
2 the key CCTV findings of our research.

3 98 Q. And was there also an action within the investigation
4 to ask for the VENGEFUL system to be checked to see if
5 that database had had recorded on it either number 10:41
6 plate, i.e. the original number plate or the cloned
7 number plate?

8 A. Yes, that's correct. There was early coordination
9 between the RUC and MoD to interrogate the VENGEFUL
10 database. 10:41

11 99 Q. And you have also, as part of your work, checked the
12 Inquiry Legal Team summary that has been prepared in
13 relation to CCTV and are you able to confirm that those
14 summaries are accurate?

15 A. Yes, we have confirmed that those summaries are indeed 10:41
16 accurate.

17 100 Q. Thank you. Just one more topic to deal with under your
18 heading, "Missing Footage." So, the first question is
19 this, Detective Chief Inspector: From the material
20 seized by the investigation, do we have -- 10:42
21 CHAIRMAN: Detective Chief Superintendent.
22 MR. DE LA POER: Inspector, I believe.
23 THE WITNESS: Inspector, Sir.
24 MR. DE LA POER: That was an unexpected promotion.
25 CHAIRMAN: Yes, my fault, sorry. 10:42

26 101 Q. MR. DE LA POER: I beg your pardon. Detective Chief
27 Inspector, I'm saying it now myself, you were asked to
28 consider whether or not there was complete and
29 uninterrupted recordings from all of the cameras in

1 relation to the material seized by the RUC
2 investigation, weren't you?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 102 Q. And you were asked to consider specific examples of
5 what might be described as "missing footage"? 10:42

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 103 Q. And in terms of missing footage, one of the examples
8 that you looked at covered a period of 20 minutes or
9 so, from 15:31 to 15:15, this is your paragraph 253,
10 and that relates, so that we're all clear, to the 10:43
11 Exhibit ACJ1, so it's not relating to the period of the
12 northbound carriageway that we've been talking about
13 earlier because that's in TSO2, and was it identified
14 that there was a lengthy period of about 20 minutes
15 where there wasn't continuous recording? 10:43

16 A. Yes, that's correct, that was the southbound traffic,
17 and the reason for the pause was not established in the
18 investigative material. We cannot say if that was as a
19 result of what may -- or a positive action from
20 somebody operating the system, or whether, as we 10:44
21 discussed earlier, whether it was unintended glitch in
22 some form of automated ANPR-type system. That --

23 104 Q. But -- I'm sorry, I interrupted.

24 A. I'm sorry, that's how the footage was received by the
25 RUC. 10:44

26 105 Q. So, let's be clear about what type of missing footage
27 this might be. This isn't just a blank screen or the
28 camera stopping and then re-starting, there is an image
29 on screen, is there, with the hold reference on it?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 106 Q. And the reason it might be described as "missing
3 footage" is because it is of such a length of time that
4 it is highly unusual?

5 A. Yes, that's correct. It's on pause for some almost 10:44
6 22 minutes on the screen. And on the screen it does
7 show the hold function, which was a result of, as we
8 understand it, the camera footage at that time when it
9 was on the pause.

10 107 Q. So, that is the first that you talk about. You also 10:45
11 deal, in your paragraph 256, with a viewing log about
12 EB3. So, again, this isn't our TSO footage that's on
13 our screen, where it says "fault in tape," is that
14 right?

15 A. Yes, and that's another example of a different 10:45
16 definition of missing footage. You have missing
17 footage in a sense that there's a pause, as was
18 outlined from the earlier exhibit but, equally, within
19 this exhibit there was no picture, for whatever reason,
20 and it appeared to be some form of fault within the 10:45
21 tape.

22 108 Q. Next, you considered the ACJ1 footage, that this time
23 with the time period 13:38 to 14:17 hrs, that's at your
24 next roman paragraph, do you see that?

25 A. Yes. 10:46

26 109 Q. So, we'll be clear about this; this is the southbound
27 carriageway, so not the northbound carriageway, during
28 the period 13:38 to 14:17 hrs on 15th August?

29 A. Yes.

1 110 Q. And was there any recording at all for that period?
2 A. There was no recording and it's something that our
3 inquiry team checked against the original cassette.
4 There was also a copy of the tape made in the same
5 period and, again, that was identical in that it had 10:46
6 the same fault, and it cut out at 13:38 hrs.
7 Unfortunately, we have no explanation for this, it is
8 how the footage was received at the time.

9 111 Q. Just consider the potential relevance of the two time
10 periods that we have considered, the first, the hold 10:47
11 period, so this is for the southbound carriageway at
12 sometime around 3:30 and following?
13 A. Yes.

14 112 Q. So, that is around the time, in the most general sense,
15 that the cell site indicates that the two phones, 585 10:47
16 and 980 would be travelling back into the Republic of
17 Ireland, is that right?
18 A. Yes, that's correct, southbound traffic.

19 113 Q. We don't have a gap we just have a hold period during
20 that time? 10:47
21 A. Yes.

22 114 Q. And then in relation to the other footage that we've
23 just considered on ACJ1, this is the southbound
24 carriage 13:38 to 14:17, well, is your understanding
25 that there is nothing that the investigation would 10:47
26 regard as likely to be significant on that footage
27 because it's pointing towards vehicles travelling into
28 the Republic of Ireland at that time?
29 A. Yes, that would be correct, the relevant period would

1 have been the footage from 15:31 to 15:51 as opposed to
2 that rear footage that we have discussed in terms of
3 the footage cutting out.

4 115 Q. One more example of missing footage I'd like you to
5 consider, you deal with Detective Chief Superintendent 10:48
6 Anderson's report of 25th August 1998, something that
7 is mentioned in your statement, is that right?

8 A. Yes, that's correct.

9 116 Q. I'm not going to ask for it to come on screen but if
10 everyone wants to know the INQ I am talking about, it 10:48
11 is 003873. And this morning when we met before you
12 came into the hearing, I drew your attention to a
13 particular sentence in that report that I told you that
14 I was going to ask you about?

15 A. Yes, that's correct. 10:48

16 117 Q. Let's just set the context for what that report is
17 talking about. That report deals with a number of
18 matters but so far as viewing footage is concerned it
19 deals with an anonymous witness who told the police
20 that about 1:30 she passed through the Aughnacloy 10:49
21 checkpoint; that's right, isn't it?

22 A. That's right, yes.

23 118 Q. And because she gave the RUC her registration plate, a
24 check was done as to whether her vehicle could be seen
25 passing through? 10:49

26 A. Yes.

27 119 Q. And, in fact, whatever it is that that witness says
28 that she saw, we know that that must have been at
29 13:58, so just before two o'clock, because that is when

1 her vehicle passed through?

2 A. Yes, that is when it was captured on the cameras at
3 Aughnacloy PVCP passing through going in the northbound
4 direction at 13:58 hrs.

5 120 Q. So, let's just set her evidence in the context of what 10:50
6 we know was happening, I don't expect you to have this
7 information at your fingertips, but I'm going to bring
8 it up on screen. If we could move forward in our
9 presentation, please, to 11:51. [Presentation played].
10 So, here that's a counter time, we can see what is 10:50
11 happening at the time that that particular eyewitness
12 was passing through the Aughnacloy checkpoint, this is
13 timed at 13:57, and we can see that the scout car,
14 which is the 585, is using the cell site at Omagh
15 College, all right? 10:50

16 A. Yes.

17 121 Q. So, we know that that means that the scout car is
18 within 5 kilometres of Omagh College because that's the
19 range of the mast at just before two o'clock?

20 A. Yes, that's correct. 10:50

21 122 Q. And so whatever that witness saw one minute later, it
22 can't have been anything to do with the scout car
23 because that's just outside or in Omagh at that time,
24 do you agree?

25 A. Yes, I would agree with that. 10:51

26 123 Q. And if we move forward, please, to counter time 12:10,
27 we can see the position is reversed, the 980 is using
28 the Omagh College mast at nine minutes past two, do you
29 see that?

1 A. Yes.

2 124 Q. And that, therefore, we know that the bomb car is
3 within 5 kilometres of Omagh College, that's what the
4 cell site tells us in terms of the interpretation.
5 Now, the journey time from Aughnacloy through to Omagh 10:51
6 is about 30 minutes, isn't it?

7 A. Indeed. There was a reconstruction, as I believe, in
8 the early stages of the investigation, where an officer
9 drove that potential route from the vicinity, it would
10 have been in close proximity of the VCP to Omagh Town 10:52
11 Centre, particularly Market Street, it took them 42
12 minutes, I believe, to get there, and it's a distance
13 of approximately 20 miles.

14 125 Q. 30 minutes may, in fact, be on a very good run?

15 A. Yes, 30 minutes would be on a very good run. 10:52

16 126 Q. At all events, the time between that witness passing
17 through the checkpoint, which is timestamped at 13:58,
18 whatever that witness saw, it can't have been the bomb
19 car, based on the cell site analysis, because in the
20 ten minutes between the two, there just wouldn't have 10:52
21 been time to get within 5 kilometres of Omagh, do you
22 agree?

23 A. Yes, it's very unlikely that that would have been the
24 bomb car.

25 127 Q. It may, as a matter of physics, be almost impossible in 10:52
26 a vehicle?

27 A. Yes, I accept that.

28 128 Q. So, all of that is just setting the scene for that
29 witness, obviously coming forward in good faith to do

1 her best to help the investigation but we have the
2 benefit of this further investigation. But it's
3 important that we set that evidence in context. So
4 let's come to my question which is the last part of
5 this last topic. What Detective Chief Superintendent 10:53
6 Anderson says is that as part of the review of that
7 witness's evidence, that the camera covering the
8 vehicles leaving the permanent vehicle checkpoint was
9 switched off at relevant times, that's the description;
10 is that right? 10:53

11 A. I'm aware of that, yes.

12 129 Q. That is a record made by somebody else on 24th August
13 1998?

14 A. That's correct.

15 130 Q. And my question really is, is that, sitting there now 10:53
16 today, something that you are able to assist with or
17 will you need some more time to investigate that?

18 A. I would need more time. That is an area of research
19 that was not conducted as part of this Rule 9 and as
20 you're aware, some of the investigative steps that was 10:54
21 taken as part of that original investigation we'd be
22 unsighted to, so a message such as that we would need
23 to do further research.

24 131 Q. And would you agree that that research is going to need
25 to try and involve identifying which camera it is that 10:54
26 might capture the vehicles leaving the PVCP?

27 A. Yes, that is an area that we would need to focus on
28 but, equally, there may be limitations with that
29 because, you know, as I have exhibited within my

1 statement, a number of our team, our officers did
2 conduct some analysis of the MoD cameras and it is
3 their assessment that the camera positions are correct
4 but, equally, it's an officer's report and officer's
5 assessment, it would take sometime to perform that
6 analysis and, equally, it may never be entirely
7 conclusive.

10:54

8 132 Q. Well, it is perhaps something that we can leave for
9 now, therefore, Detective Chief Inspector potentially
10 to return to by way of a formal request.

10:55

11
12 The final question I have for you relates to
13 paragraph 257. At paragraph 257, you deal with whether
14 in your review of all of the material that you looked
15 at in relation to the wide-ranging requests that there
16 were made to you about Aughnacloy, whether you saw that
17 there was any evidence of suspicion being raised about
18 human interference with the recordings that do exist?

10:55

19 A. There is no evidence to raise any suspicion that there
20 was any interference. If such an allegation was made
21 it would, obviously, be subject to criminal
22 proceedings, a criminal investigation.

10:55

23 133 Q. But in terms of the contemporaneous material, you
24 haven't seen anything to indicate somebody saying
25 within the RUC or PSNI investigation, 'I'm concerned
26 that from what I've seen this may have been tampered
27 with'?

10:56

28 A. I believe there's no evidence to raise that suspicion.
29 MR. DE LE POER: Detective Chief Inspector, thank you

1 for answering my questions. I understand Mr. Foster,
2 who has permission to ask questions, may have some
3 more.

4
5 DCI IVAN GAULT WAS QUESTIONED BY MR. FOSTER, AS
6 FOLLOWS:

10:56

7
8 134 Q. MR. FOSTER: Detective Chief Inspector, I've just a
9 couple of questions. Yesterday Col. MacMullen referred
10 to the Special Military Investigation Unit; are you
11 familiar with that?

10:56

12 A. I have limited knowledge of it, but I am familiar with
13 it from some of the research we did in responding to
14 the Rule 9 response, yes.

15 135 Q. There's no reference to it in your statement?

10:56

16 A. There's no reference to it in my statement but I am
17 aware that it would have been part of some of the
18 supporting documentation that would have been looked at
19 from the original HOLMES account.

20 136 Q. And what's your understanding of its purpose?

10:57

21 A. I've very limited knowledge of that, but my
22 understanding is it was there to assist, this is a
23 Ministry of Defence capability but I understand it was
24 there to assist their data analysis and to provide
25 information to both the RUC and the Ministry of Defence
26 on request.

10:57

27 137 Q. Are you aware at the time did the RUC make any enquiry
28 as to that unit?

29 A. I am unable to confirm that within the remit of our

1 Rule 9 response. As I've outlined, there was
2 correspondence between the RUC and I know there was
3 reference to the SMIC as it was known, but I don't know
4 the scope or the arrangements, nor whether there were
5 any formal arrangements between the RUC and that 10:58
6 organisation at the time. I'm unable to confirm that
7 because, as I say, it was beyond the context of our
8 Rule 9 response.

9 138 Q. Sorry, Detective Chief Inspector, you said you can
10 confirm that? 10:58

11 A. No, I can't confirm that.

12 139 Q. Perhaps, with the permission of the Inquiry, that could
13 be something that could be confirmed?

14 A. Yes, certainly, certainly. It is something that we
15 could take away and conduct some further research, if 10:58
16 it's helpful.

17 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Foster, can I be clear about what it is
18 that you want confirmed? You've asked the Detective
19 Chief Inspector whether there was a contact between the
20 RUC and the Special Military Investigation Unit at that 10:58
21 time, but I'm not sure what you mean by at that time.

22 140 Q. MR. FOSTER: Yes, Chair. Detective Chief Inspector,
23 could you confirm if there were any enquiries made at
24 that time in relation to any movements of vehicles, in
25 and around 13th, 14th and 15th August? And what the 10:59
26 scope was, what was being covered within that period?

27 A. Yes, certainly. As I understand the from research in
28 the Aughnacloy Rule 9, there was liaison and
29 co-operation between the RUC and Ministry of Defence

1 and, equally, as we know, the VENGEFUL database was
2 interrogated. I am unclear in terms of what the
3 conduit was for that information to be extracted from
4 the Ministry of Defence at that time. So, it is clear
5 from what I have seen in terms of the investigatory 10:59
6 notes that, you know, vehicle registration within the
7 relevant period were sent to the Ministry of Defence
8 and then the information came back again, but I'm
9 unable to confirm which unit may have interrogated the
10 system on behalf of MoD to provide that to the RUC. 11:00

11 141 Q. I'm just going to refer to you one other topic, it's in
12 relation to the seizure of the videotapes. You have
13 referred to seizing, I think you refer to six by 24 for
14 the tapes that are around Aughnacloy for 13th, 14th and
15 15th August, isn't that right? 11:00

16 A. Yes, that's correct.

17 142 Q. Now, at paragraph 169, you state that TS01, TS02, TS03
18 was seized on 17th August 1998?

19 A. Yes, that's correct.

20 143 Q. And that EB4 and EB5 and ACJ1 -- sorry, AB4 and AB5 11:00
21 were seized on 2nd September?

22 A. Yes.

23 144 Q. And ACJ1 was seized on 24th August?

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 145 Q. Now, later at 187, you refer to enquiries being made of 11:01
26 the military and, in particular, at page 187 and 188.
27 At the top of page 52 at 8552, the query is:
28
29 "To obtain videos from watchtowers in South Armagh

1 relating to logs..."

2 And it gives the log number. And in the subsequent

3 paragraph it states:

4

5 "A8692 to obtain any video evidence or operational 11:01

6 archive material from the watchtowers in South Armagh

7 for August 1998."

8

9 Now, in both of those paragraphs, in the first one, the

10 result for this action was dated 2005 and the second 11:02

11 one is dated 2003. Did anybody proffer anybody

12 explanation why there was such a delay in obtaining

13 that video footage, or did you make an enquiry why it

14 took so long?

15 A. Sir, I didn't make any enquiries in relation to that. 11:02

16 Our objective was to facilitate a specific response to

17 the Inquiry and to provide disclosure of materials

18 held. We are not in a position where we are

19 investigating the previous inquiry, therefore, this is

20 a product of our research and this is what we are able 11:03

21 to summarise in relation to what CCTV was seized from

22 the Army at that time.

23 146 Q. Can I ask, Detective Chief Inspector, in our own

24 experience, do you find that strange that it took so

25 long to request? 11:03

26 A. I would be -- I do not know the circumstances at the

27 time in relation to the original investigation. I'm

28 not experienced in dealing with this level of

29 investigation. I would, therefore -- I'm reliant upon

whatever investigation or whatever materials we can find at that time and I'm sorry I'm unable to offer an explanation.

147 Q. Thank you. Now, the final point here, you've made reference to the McVicker Report and the reference to 237 videos were seized. If I can refer you, there's a paragraph within the McVicker Report, and I suppose in a way it's an anomaly with what I've just asked you, because at paragraph 630, it states:

11:04

"The investigation team seized had in excess of 60 videos from various military establishments around the province. Unfortunately, a number of other E Department/Army videos in South Armagh were not handed over to the investigation team and were the subject of viewing by Army personnel. It is conceivable that the Army personnel viewing these videos did not have sufficient knowledge of the investigation to carry out this task competently. It is not apparent that the Army viewing included anything other than viewing these videos for the bomb car. No record could be found as to what suspect vehicles were viewed for, or as to the whereabouts of these videos that pertained."

11:04

11:04

11:04

And my, question Detective Chief Inspector: Did this form part of your enquiry and when you carried out your statement in regard the 60 videos that were obtained and, in particular, in relation to the videos that were not handed over to the investigation team?

11:05

1 A. Sir, the scope of the statement was very specifically
2 research to the questions that were posed. The actual
3 material held, in terms of how we provide that to the
4 Inquiry, there is methodology there in terms of how we
5 would key word search, and how we were reliant upon 11:05
6 original materials and repositories. In terms of, you
7 know, recommendations from Mr. McVicker, that's not
8 something that we would have pursued within our
9 research. We have a methodology that we employ to
10 ensure that we can assist the Inquiry and disclose all 11:06
11 material that can later be tested for relevance. In
12 terms of what was and was not captured or collated at
13 that time, unfortunately, I'm unable to assist you with
14 you.

15 148 Q. I would just point out, that wasn't a recommendation, 11:06
16 that was a finding from the McVicker Report. And so
17 you're not in a position to confirm whether or not
18 those Army videos were actually handed over at any
19 stage, even to present day?

20 A. I would need to take that away and conduct further 11:06
21 analysis because, again, that is now in a period where
22 the investigated been reviewed by a senior officer and
23 we would need to see what the outcome of that was,
24 because when we research this information or we looked
25 to research to see what material we had found, we're 11:06
26 not looking at relevant time periods in that we're not
27 looking at was it the consequence of a subsequent
28 review that this material became available. When we
29 conduct our research it's about key word searches, it's

1 about interrogating HOLMES, it's about trying to
2 ascertain what material presently exists. I would be
3 unable to provide you with a timeline to say that well,
4 within the original investigation this product suddenly
5 became available. That's just unfortunately beyond the 11:07
6 scope of our research.

7 149 Q. well, perhaps again with permission of the Inquiry,
8 that is something that perhaps you could look at in
9 terms of the whereabouts of the videos that weren't
10 handed over to the investigation team? 11:07

11 A. Yes, certainly.

12 MR. FOSTER: Nothing further, Chair. Thank you.

13 MR. DE LA POER: We're very grateful indeed to
14 Mr. Henry who's been keeping a careful eye on things, I
15 can see he indicates he has no questions, Sir. I have 11:08
16 no more questions. Do you have any questions for the
17 Detective Chief Inspector?

18 CHAIRMAN: No. Thank you.

19 MR. DE LA POER: In those circumstances, I wonder
20 whether he may be released and I wonder if this would 11:08
21 also be a convenient moment to take a morning break?

22 CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you very much for your evidence,
23 Mr. Gault.

24 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Sir.

25 MR. DE LA POER: would 25 past be convenient? 11:08

26 CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you.

27
28 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED BRIEFLY
29

1 THE INQUIRY RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:

3 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Greaney.

4 MR. GREANEY: Sir, thank you. We're moving now from
5 Part 4 to Part 5 of Chapter 3. Part 5 will cover the
6 period of the warning calls up until the minute prior
7 to the detonation of the bomb. So, in other words,
8 we're going to be dealing with the period from 2:29
9 p.m. to 3:03 p.m.

11:32

11 In the witness box, at the start of evidence dealing
12 with Part 5, is Prof. Heather Hamill and I will ask
13 that she is sworn, please.

11:32

14 CHAIRMAN: Good morning, Prof. Hamill.

15 THE WITNESS: Good morning.

11:33

17 PROF. HEATHER HAMILL HAVING BEEN AFFIRMED, WAS
18 QUESTIONED BY MR. GREANEY AS FOLLOWS:

20 150 Q. MR. GREANEY: Tell us your full name please.

11:33

21 A. Heather Hamill.

22 151 Q. And are you a professor of sociology at the University
23 of Oxford?

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 152 Q. And for now over two decades in what areas of academia
26 have you worked?

11:33

27 A. So, I've been working on the sociology of violence,
28 paramilitarism, informal systems of governance
29 extra-legal governance and trust.

1 153 Q. And has your work combined ethnographic field research,
2 historical analysis, along with interviews with members
3 of paramilitary organisations, community activists,
4 journalists and security personnel?

5 A. Correct. 11:34

6 154 Q. And what has your research been focused upon please?

7 A. So, my research has been focused upon issues of trust
8 and on policing and informal justice by paramilitary
9 groups and, more recently, on the use of code words in
10 the Northern Ireland conflict. 11:34

11 155 Q. Obviously, the principal reason you're here today is to
12 help us with code words.
13

14 Now, you've used the term, and I've used the term
15 "paramilitary groups" a few times now and we just need 11:34
16 to understand what you mean by that so there's no
17 misunderstanding.
18

19 Last week, we heard evidence from Dr. John Morrison,
20 who is an expert in violent dissident republicanism - 11:35
21 and there's no particular reason why you would be aware
22 of the content of his evidence - but he described how
23 the term "paramilitary organisation" or group, is
24 broader term than terrorist group but the activities of
25 a paramilitary group would generally be expected to 11:35
26 include, but not be limited to, terrorist activity.
27 would you subscribe also to that definition?

28 A. Yes, I would.

29 156 Q. Has your research examined the role of paramilitary

1 groups in policing and informal justice during what you
2 describe as the Northern Ireland conflict?

3 A. Yes.

4 157 Q. And you have published on that particular topic?

5 A. Yes. So, I published a book called The Hoods: Crime 11:35
6 and Punishment in Belfast on that topic.

7 158 Q. And to focus in on the principal issue of your
8 evidence, your research has involved significant
9 research into the use of code words by terrorists?

10 A. Yes, that's correct. 11:36

11 159 Q. And, indeed, you were the author of the chapter on code
12 words in a publication by the Oxford University in
13 2024?

14 A. Yeah.

15 160 Q. The overall publication, so the book was entitled 11:36
16 Fight, Flight, Mimic: Identity Mimicry in Conflict?

17 A. Yes.

18 161 Q. So, the broad focus of that book was the concept of
19 mimicry in conflict?

20 A. Yes. 11:36

21 162 Q. And mimicry is a term you will see a number of times, I
22 know. What is mimicry in conflict?

23 A. In this context we understand mimicry to strategic
24 manipulation of behaviour, appearance or signals in
25 order to pass off as being an individual or a member of 11:37
26 a group, other than that which you are, to some
27 strategic advantage.

28 163 Q. So, it's my word, but, essentially, pretending that you
29 are something that you are not?

1 A. You are not, yes.

2 164 Q. So, a loyalist terrorist organisation pretending to be
3 a republican terrorist organisation --

4 A. Yes.

5 165 Q. -- to achieve some aim. And we'll maybe see some 11:37
6 examples of that as we go through your evidence. But
7 we were dealing with the book and the chapter that you
8 were the author of, was entitled The Code Word
9 Conundrum in the Northern Ireland Conflict.

10 A. Yes. 11:37

11 166 Q. Next please, the instructions that you received from
12 the Inquiry Legal Team. Were your instructions to
13 provide expert evidence on the subject of coded
14 warnings in the Northern Ireland conflict?

15 A. Yes. 11:38

16 167 Q. Were you asked do so with specific reference to the
17 origins of coded warnings, their purposes and usage?

18 A. Yes.

19 168 Q. And to consider their application, their use in the
20 period leading up to the Omagh bombing on 15th August 11:38
21 1998?

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 169 Q. And you were asked, in particular, or specifically, to
24 deal with a coded warning that we know was used on at
25 least four occasions by the Real IRA, namely, "Martha 11:38
26 Pope"?

27 A. Yes.

28 170 Q. So, those were your instructions.

29

1 Next, I'm going to ask you to turn to page 4 of your
2 report and paragraph 2.1. And I should have said that
3 the report, the version of the report that I am dealing
4 with is your supplementary report of March 2026, so
5 this is a report that you updated by way of highlighted 11:39
6 text, having received comments from the Core
7 Participants. The INQ reference is INQ 041313. And we
8 will be looking at some tables from within your report
9 on the screen as we go along.

10
11 So, as I said, I'm now at paragraph 2.1: Methodology
12 and data. And the findings that you will be presenting
13 in your evidence, on what methodology and data are they
14 based please? 11:39

15 A. So, they're based on primarily a content analysis of 11:39
16 newspaper articles dating between 1973 and 2011, where
17 I searched for incidents that contained information
18 about a coded warning in advance of an attack by
19 paramilitary organisation or armed group in the context
20 of the Northern Ireland conflict. 11:40

21
22 In addition, I examined some other documentary evidence
23 specifically that of The Birmingham Mail's internal
24 telephone log book which they kept between 1971 and
25 1992. 11:40

26 171 Q. I'm just going to ask you to pause for one moment. The
27 archival content analysis that you carried out, based
28 upon the newspaper - and I'm sorry if you've mentioned
29 this already - but did that identify 332 incidents were

1 code words had been used?

2 A. Yes, it did. Yes.

3 172 Q. Sorry, I interrupted you. You were telling us about
4 The Birmingham Mail's internal telephone logbook?

5 A. Yes. So, I examined that and that contained 4,001 11:40
6 recorded threatening calls. So, with both the
7 newspaper archive and The Birmingham Mail internal
8 logbook I coded that information according to evidence
9 of a code word being used, what the code word might
10 have been, the type of incident and the organisation to 11:41
11 which the attack was attributed.

12 173 Q. I'm just going to ask you to pause again for one
13 moment. And so, you mentioned, I think, that The
14 Birmingham Mail's internal telephone logbook contained
15 4,001? 11:41

16 A. 401.

17 174 Q. 401, that's just what I wanted to check. And, based
18 upon the newspaper archive and based upon The
19 Birmingham Mail's internal telephone logbook, did you
20 feel you had a substantial body of material upon which 11:41
21 you could at least start to conduct your work?

22 A. Yeah. So, it's a substantial body of material but it
23 is a selected sample of incidents that were reported in
24 the press. It's not based upon an entire sample of all
25 incidents during the time period. 11:42

26 175 Q. And so, this, I believe, is something you're keen
27 should be understood, that there exists nowhere, so far
28 as you are on notice to it, at any rate a database of
29 all attacks or attempted attacks that took place during

1 the course of The Troubles. And even where there is
2 data relating to an attack or attacks, the absence of
3 information within that data about a code word doesn't
4 mean that there wasn't a code word, it just means that
5 one wasn't recorded. And, in particular, where you are 11:42
6 looking at material which is many, many years old, so
7 dating back to 1973, it might make it less likely that
8 all of the original data that was available was
9 available to you?

10 A. That's correct, yeah. 11:42

11 176 Q. And you regard it as important that that should be --

12 A. That should be understood, yeah.

13 177 Q. We're, of course, going to be particularly looking at
14 attacks by violent dissident republican terrorists in
15 1997 and 1998. And is it the position that the amount 11:43
16 of data and the quality of the data, unsurprisingly,
17 because it is more recent, is more forceful than in
18 relation to data from the 1970s?

19 A. Yes, that's right.

20 178 Q. I'd ask you to break off again. So, we know about the 11:43
21 documentary material that you had access to, did you
22 also conduct some interviews?

23 A. Yes, I conducted interviews with a number of different
24 individuals including former members of the IRA and the
25 UDA, serving and retired police officers from the RUC, 11:43
26 PSNI and Metropolitan Police, and former members of
27 Military Intelligence and Special Branch and
28 journalists with firsthand experience of receiving
29 coded warnings.

1 179 Q. And did those interviews provide you with important,
2 even if general contextual information?

3 A. Yes. They didn't provide incident-specific evidence
4 but they provided a very informative and helpful
5 information about the broader context within which 11:44
6 these calls were received and understood.

7 180 Q. Did you also carry out a comparative analysis?

8 A. Yes. So, all of the sources that I reviewed were
9 cross-referenced in order to look for recurring
10 patterns and how the coded warnings were being created, 11:44
11 transmitted and verified. So, no conclusion is based
12 on any single source.

13 181 Q. And you tell us at page 5, responsibly, that there are
14 limitations on the materials available to you, and what
15 are those limitations? 11:44

16 A. So, the primary limitation is, as I said, that the data
17 is mostly derived from open source material, so this
18 evidence is inevitably partial and may also, at times,
19 be inconsistent because it reflects both the secretive
20 nature of the organisations involved at the time, the 11:45
21 nature of partial reporting, the passage of time and
22 the broader security and policing context in which the
23 events occurred. And, in particular, I have not had
24 access to, or viewed any internal RUC policies or
25 procedures as they relate to the use of code words. 11:45

26 182 Q. Thank you. Is it the position that notwithstanding
27 those limitations, which you have correctly drawn to
28 our attention, you have felt able to reach firm and
29 reliable conclusions about the issues we'll be

1 exploring in your evidence?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 183 Q. And, indeed, you felt sufficient confidence to publish
4 a very well-regarded chapter in an Oxford University
5 book on that very topic? 11:46

6 A. Yes.

7 184 Q. So, I'm going to ask you next to turn back a page to
8 page 4 - and happily there won't be a lot of jumping
9 around in your report - and I'm going to ask you to
10 begin the substance of your evidence with an overview 11:46
11 of what a coded warning is, what the origin of those
12 warnings was, and what their intended purpose or
13 purposes were. And so if you could just take us
14 through the paragraph, first of all, under there and I
15 will ask you to pause from time to time, no doubt, to 11:46
16 ask further questions.

17 A. So, coded warnings emerged as a distinctive feature of
18 the Northern Ireland conflict. They are
19 communications, typically a telephone call, in which
20 the caller purporting to represent a paramilitary group 11:46
21 included a word or a phrase that became associated with
22 that paramilitary group in their communication warning
23 of an imminent attack. Typically, a bomb attack that
24 involved some kind of economic target where civilians
25 might be caught up in the attack. 11:47

26 185 Q. So, I'm just going to ask you to pause just to make
27 sure we've understood. So, it is, obviously, a
28 possibility that a terrorist makes a call, says. 'I am
29 a member of the Provisional IRA and there is a bomb in

1 this particular location which is timed to detonate in
2 X an amount of time,' and sometimes that would be the
3 effect of the warning calls, there would be no code
4 word. But sometimes a code word was used and in your
5 assessment, based upon your research, what was the 11:48
6 terrorist thinking behind the inclusion of that extra
7 piece of information?

8 A. So, the code word had four primary functions; the first
9 was prevention of civilian death. So, the code word
10 was included in the communication as an additional 11:48
11 piece of information that was intended to authenticate
12 the call that it actually came from the paramilitary
13 group itself.

14
15 The second function was related to legitimising the 11:48
16 organisation and the call and so it enabled the groups
17 to both assert responsibility for their actions and
18 also to project their power to supporters and opponents
19 alike.

20 11:48
21 The fourth function was deceptive, as it relates to the
22 issue of mimicry and this is a way in which rival or
23 enemy armed groups, or even unaffiliated members of the
24 public, could sometimes use code words in order to
25 mimic paramilitary organisations, so to make a call to 11:49
26 make it look as if it came from a particular
27 organisation.

28
29 And then, finally, code words were used in order to

1 disrupt. So, they were used to heighten the threat of
2 hoax warnings, for example, which were used, of which
3 there were many, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s,
4 where these calls could cause a huge amount of economic
5 damage, a huge amount of disruption. They could force 11:49
6 evacuations and they could also disrupt the activities
7 of the security services.

8 186 Q. And, indeed, you indicate they could cause enormous
9 economic damage and later you're going to tell us of an
10 example of three calls which together are thought to 11:50
11 have caused economic loss within England of a quarter
12 of a billion pounds?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 187 Q. So, four functions, obviously not all four functions
15 would be in play in relation to every call, it might be 11:50
16 one or it might be more than one, but those four:
17 (1) prevention; (2) legitimisation; (3) deception; and
18 (4) disruption?

19 A. Yes.

20 188 Q. Was there any sense in which those who were giving a 11:50
21 code word were saying, 'Listen, this is real, I am
22 really a member of a group within this group'?

23 A. Yeah. So, there is evidence of the code word being
24 part of a message where the caller was genuine but the
25 message was false, so that's the case of a hoax call. 11:51

26 189 Q. Yes.

27 A. But also cases where the caller was just false. So,
28 where an individual or another group was not who they
29 were purporting to be.

1 190 Q. Yes. And what you tell us in your report is that the
2 open source records, to which you've had access, do not
3 indicate what proportion of attacks were preceded by
4 warnings, nor how many of those warnings included code
5 words? 11:51

6 A. That's correct. So, it's impossible to know what
7 proportion of warnings contained code words.

8 191 Q. We'll later return to something that I said a little
9 earlier, the nearer we get to August 1998 the clearer
10 the data becomes because if my memory is correct, of 13 11:51
11 attacks that were clearly attributed either to the
12 Continuity IRA or the Real IRA, it was known that in at
13 least ten of those cases there were code words used?

14 A. Yes.

15 192 Q. Although not the same code words always. 11:52

16
17 Now, back to page 5 please and still dealing with the
18 overview. Over time, did both republican and loyalist
19 terrorist groups use coded warnings?

20 A. Yes. 11:52

21 193 Q. And so, within the republican terrorist groups were
22 coded warnings used by the Provisional IRA?

23 A. Correct, yes.

24 194 Q. By the Continuity IRA?

25 A. Yes. 11:52

26 195 Q. By the INLA?

27 A. Yes.

28 196 Q. By Óglaigh na hÉireann?

29 A. Yes.

1 197 Q. And, most relevantly for our purposes, by the Real IRA?
2 A. Yes.

3 198 Q. Were they also used by loyalist terrorist groups?
4 A. Yes.

5 199 Q. And, in particular, which groups within that category 11:53
6 used them?
7 A. The Ulster Volunteer Force, the Ulster Defence
8 Association, sometimes under the banner of the Ulster
9 Freedom Fighters, and the Red Hand Defenders.

10 200 Q. Now, next we're going to delve into some of the history 11:53
11 of coded warnings. Is there evidence predating 1966 of
12 the IRA using code words to refer to their actions?
13 A. Yes. So, during the 1956 to 1962 Operation Harvest
14 campaign, guerilla campaign, the IRA signed off their
15 statements with "JJ McGarrity," "JJ McGarrity, Dublin." 11:54

16 201 Q. So, this was a very early form of code words being
17 used?
18 A. Yeah.

19 202 Q. And as we move on in time, do we see, for example,
20 well-known figures within the republican movement using 11:54
21 pen names for their publications, and so on?
22 A. Yes. So, in a series of articles in Republican News,
23 An Phoblacht, which were authored by Gerry Adams and
24 depicted his life in prison, he signed those off using
25 the name "Brownie". 11:54

26 203 Q. And having used the words "JJ McGarrity" historically,
27 from 1971 onwards, was there experience of the
28 Provisional IRA using the name "P O'Neill" in its
29 statements, and so on?

1 A. Yes.

2 204 Q. So, what is the relationship between these examples of
3 individuals or organisations utilising a name separate
4 from the description of their terrorist name, and the
5 use of coded warnings? 11:55

6 A. I think it's a tradition of using a term to identify
7 yourself and authenticate yourself using a term that
8 wouldn't necessarily be publicly known.

9 205 Q. When was the first recorded use of a code word during
10 the course of The Troubles? 11:55

11 A. So, in 1966 the Ulster Volunteer Force used the term,
12 the name, "Captain William Johnston".

13 206 Q. And in what context did they use that name?

14 A. So, they used that name in a statement in which they
15 declared -- in which they said: 11:56

16

17 "From this day, we declare war against the IRA and its
18 splinter groups. Known IRA men will be executed
19 mercilessly and without hesitation."
20 11:56

21 207 Q. So, we're in 1966, and is what happened that someone
22 purporting to be from the UVF made a telephone call to
23 The Belfast Telegraph newspaper?

24 A. That's correct.

25 208 Q. And then read out that statement that you've told us 11:56
26 of, and used the name "Captain William Johnston"?

27 A. Yes.

28 209 Q. And as a result, what were code words acting as at that
29 point in time?

1 A. So, initially they were markers of identity as a way to
2 demonstrate authorship of the message and subsequent
3 actions that the message related to.

4 210 Q. And did the value, insofar as it's appropriate to use
5 that word in this context, of code words become 11:57
6 apparent to other terrorist organisations?

7 A. Yes. So, very quickly thereafter, other groups,
8 including the Ulster Defence Association, and the
9 Ulster Freedom Fighters, as well as the IRA started to
10 adopt code words of their own. 11:57

11 211 Q. And did they become, whilst not universally used,
12 commonplace across terrorist organisations in Northern
13 Ireland?

14 A. Yes.

15 212 Q. So, by the 1970s and 1980s, as you say in the report at 11:57
16 page 6, code words had become an established part of
17 paramilitary communication?

18 A. Yes, correct.

19 213 Q. And based upon data from the archive that you had
20 access to, as you've told us there were 332 recorded 11:58
21 incidents involving the use of code words between 1973
22 and 2011?

23 A. Yes.

24 214 Q. And would it be reasonable, do you think, to conclude
25 that there are likely to have been more incidents in 11:58
26 which there were code words used than that figure?

27 A. Yes, I think there might, yes.

28 215 Q. So that would be a bare minimum?

29 A. Yes, very conservative number.

1 216 Q. A very conservative number. Is it possible to identify
2 any period during which such incidents, so the use of
3 code words peaked?
4 A. Yes, so according to my data the frequency of incidents
5 peaked between 1992 and 2003. 11:58
6 217 Q. Does the data indicate whether one particular terrorist
7 group tended to use code words more frequently than any
8 other group?
9 A. Yes. So, the IRA tended to use code words more than
10 any other group. Again, in my dataset, 35% of the 11:59
11 incidents where a code word were used were attributed
12 to the IRA.
13 218 Q. And much later, 15% attributed to the Real IRA?
14 A. Yes.
15 219 Q. With loyalist terrorist groups represented but at much 11:59
16 lower percentages?
17 A. Yes.
18 220 Q. Over time, did the utility of code words by terrorists
19 become eroded?
20 A. It did become eroded, primarily because of their use in 11:59
21 hoax calls. So, again, in my dataset, a significant
22 proportion of the calls that were made that included a
23 coded warning were actual hoax calls, so there was no
24 incident or there was no explosive device associated
25 with the warning. 12:00
26 221 Q. And as you tell us, the IRA made extensive, deliberate
27 and strategic use of hoax warnings that included code
28 words in order to disrupt transportation systems in
29 England, inflict economic damage, divert the attention

1 of security forces and test the response of security
2 forces to a potential attack?

3 A. Yes.

4 222 Q. Does data available to you provide anything to enable
5 us to understand the scale of the extent of such hoax 12:00
6 calls?

7 A. Yes. So, in 1992 for example, the British Transport
8 Police received 1,600 hoax calls over a 12-month
9 period.

10 223 Q. Was it the experience that after actual incidents, so 12:00
11 after an actual attack or attempted attack, hoax calls
12 tended to spike?

13 A. Yes, they did.

14 224 Q. And is there a particular example of that that you're
15 able to explain to us? 12:01

16 A. Yes, so after an IRA bomb detonated at Victoria Station
17 in London in February 1991, British Rail and the London
18 Underground received 85 hoax calls thereafter.

19 225 Q. Of the IRA's reported use of code words, is there data
20 to indicate what percentage were issued as warnings for 12:01
21 real bombs as opposed to hoaxes?

22 A. Yes. In my dataset, 58% of the IRA's use of code words
23 related to warnings for real bombs or explosions, while
24 14% were later identified as being hoaxes.

25 226 Q. So, overall, as perhaps was indicated by you earlier, 12:01
26 does the available evidence show that the IRA made the
27 greatest use of code words?

28 A. Yes.

29 227 Q. With their use spanning both genuine and hoax warnings?

1 A. Yes.

2 228 Q. With most incidents involving pre-attack warnings
3 relating to explosive devices?

4 A. Yes.

5 229 Q. And you make the self-evident point that that pattern 12:02
6 is consistent with the IRA's position as, as you put
7 it, the principal armed group responsible for bombings
8 during The Troubles?

9 A. Yes.

10 230 Q. As the Peace Process emerged and advanced in the mid to 12:02
11 late 1990s, what happened?

12 A. So, then we see dissident republican organisations such
13 as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA adopting the
14 practice of using code words.

15 231 Q. And did they employ them in the same manner as the 12:02
16 Provisional IRA had previously done?

17 A. Yes. They used them primarily in issuing warnings of
18 potential bomb threats in areas where civilians might
19 be at risk and to claim responsibility for attacks.

20 232 Q. Does the material available to you, the open source 12:03
21 material available to you indicate the way in which the
22 security forces treated code words?

23 A. Yes. So, this comment is based on open source material
24 and I have not had access to internal policy documents
25 of the security forces, but, in my view, they regarded 12:03
26 code words as one factor in their assessment of
27 threats, and that they would weigh them alongside other
28 details contained in the call such as the caller's
29 accent, their gender, and the consistency of the

1 message with known paramilitary patterns.

2 233 Q. Now, to bring us nearer to current times. Following
3 the Belfast Good Friday Agreement in April 1998, as
4 terrorist attacks decreased in number did, logically
5 and inevitably, the use of code words decrease as well? 12:04

6 A. Yes.

7 234 Q. At least in relation to attacks or attempted attacks?

8 A. Yes.

9 235 Q. But did a practice develop of code words being used in
10 a different way connected with a different form of 12:04
11 criminality?

12 A. Yes. So, there emerged a number of incidents in which
13 individuals purporting to represent the IRA used code
14 words in attempts to extort money from businessmen or
15 in other forms of criminality. 12:05

16 236 Q. And are there actual examples of that that you're able
17 to draw to your attention?

18 A. Yes, there are a few examples which are listed in the
19 report.

20 237 Q. We're on page 7 now? 12:05

21 A. On page 7, yeah.

22 238 Q. Bottom paragraph.

23 A. Yes.

24 239 Q. Tell us about those examples, please?

25 A. So, in one example two former IRA prisoners were 12:05
26 accused of attempting to extort £120,000 from
27 businessmen by sending menacing letters invoking the
28 IRA's name to demand money. And in a number of other
29 incidents in Northern Ireland, local media documented

1 criminals claiming the identity of being dissident
2 republicans targeting construction firms for protection
3 money. And then in 2022, in 2022, someone called
4 Sean Doherty told a robbery victim, "I'm in the IRA,"
5 during a violent incident for which he was later
6 sentenced. 12:06

7 240 Q. And those are particular examples but do they reflect a
8 wider pattern identified in official enquiries and
9 policing assessments?

10 A. Yes. So, the Independent Reporting Commission noted 12:06
11 that both genuine and impersonated paramilitary groups
12 remained active in Northern Ireland and were involved
13 in extortion and intimidation of businesses and
14 individuals. And, similarly, the Organised Crime Task
15 Force also have recorded cases of individuals claiming 12:06
16 to be republican paramilitaries in order to engage in
17 racketeering and coercive control.

18 241 Q. Thank you. We find within your report a table that
19 sets out the evolution of the use of code words. And
20 it's helpful to place that on to the screen. So, this 12:07
21 is INQ 041313, page 8, Table 1, please. So, this will
22 then just draw the strands together in relation to
23 history. Thank you very much indeed, that's excellent.

24
25 So, 1960s to early 1970s, initial use of code words as 12:07
26 identity markers by armed groups.

27
28 Then expansion in the '70s and '80s with code words
29 widely adopted by terrorist groups. Used in warnings,

1 responsibility claims or denials in public statements.
2 And, also, used as partial anti-mimicry mechanisms.
3 So, does that mean a way of demonstrating that we are
4 really who we claim we are?

5 A. Yeah, a way of authenticating themselves. 12:08

6 242 Q. We have that peak and, indeed, hoaxes within the 1990s,
7 with an increasing usage, especially by the IRA with
8 code words used for both genuine and hoax warnings.
9 Dissident republicans begin adopting them. And then we
10 have the decline of the code words as terrorist 12:08
11 activity declines, but the increase in their use in
12 more general criminality following the Belfast Good
13 Friday Agreement?

14 A. Correct.

15 243 Q. Thank you very much, indeed, we can take that from the 12:08
16 screen.

17

18 Page 9 next of all, please. And you're going to help
19 us with a question of how coded warnings were made.
20 So, the actual practicality of what happened when a 12:09
21 terrorist decided there was going to be an attack and
22 this warning needs to be made.

23

24 So, between 1966 and 1998 how were coded warnings
25 commonly delivered? 12:09

26 A. They were delivered by telephone, in particular, via a
27 public telephone box.

28 244 Q. And was the fact that the caller had to make the call
29 from a public phone box something that the data and

1 materials indicate was capable of causing delays?
2 A. Yes, for a number of reasons. First of all, actually
3 finding a phone box could take time, especially in
4 remote or busy areas. Second, some phone boxes might
5 be broken or out of order which meant that the caller 12:09
6 then had to look for another one. Other people might
7 be using the phone when the call -- and so the caller
8 had to wait for it to become available. And, also,
9 just travelling between locations and the chosen phone
10 box could also cause delay. 12:10

11 245 Q. So, the warning might be delayed for the simple reason
12 the person with the job of giving the warning couldn't
13 immediately access a working, private or available
14 telephone?

15 A. Yes. 12:10

16 246 Q. Was it the practice of terrorists to systematically
17 contact the same organisation or individuals when
18 issuing warnings?

19 A. No, I don't have any evidence of the same individuals
20 or organisations being contacted systematically. 12:10

21 247 Q. And on the contrary, what does the data indicate?

22 A. So, the data indicates a wide variety of recipients.
23 In my data I identified 14 categories of recipients,
24 including media organisation such as radio, television
25 and newspaper, offices, charities, and also named 12:11
26 individuals.

27 248 Q. And the distribution of those calls on your dataset was
28 what?

29 A. So, 29% of the calls were made to newspapers; 14% were

1 made to television stations; 10% were made to radio
2 stations; and 3% were made to the Samaritans.

3 249 Q. And did it seem to you that such organisations were
4 often selected because they would have people generally
5 available, often 24 hours a day, able to answer the 12:11
6 telephone?

7 A. Yes. So, the presence of receptionist or telephonist
8 24 hours a day would seem to me to increase the
9 likelihood of that organisation or business being
10 called. 12:11

11 250 Q. Because another problem might be leaving, on one side
12 the phone box issue, that the organisation you called
13 just doesn't pick up --

14 A. Yes.

15 251 Q. -- and so the warning can't be left? 12:12

16 A. Yes.

17 252 Q. Now, I don't know whether you're aware but there is
18 evidence in relation to the Omagh bombing, that steps
19 were taken ahead of the actual warning calls being made
20 to check that the organisations that were to be called 12:12
21 were open and taking telephone calls?

22 A. I didn't know that.

23 253 Q. That would seem to be a connected issue to the one that
24 you just described?

25 A. Yeah. 12:12

26 254 Q. Is there anything to be said about the people who
27 commonly made those calls?

28 A. So, again from the evidence that I've collected, those
29 making the calls were commonly male, often associated

1 with paramilitary groups, not necessarily members
2 themselves but certainly people who perhaps had not yet
3 come to the attention of the security services. So,
4 that would make them less likely to attract notice.

5 255 Q. So, that might be the position and indeed might often 12:13
6 be the position but wouldn't always be the position?
7 A. Wouldn't always be the position.

8 256 Q. And, of course, it would be vitally important that the
9 person making the warning call was within the circle of
10 knowledge and, therefore, someone trusted by the group 12:13
11 of terrorists carrying out the attack?
12 A. Yes.

13 257 Q. And so, would not ever be just some random person who
14 happened to have had no previous contact with the
15 security services? 12:13
16 A. Not that I'm aware of.

17 258 Q. I mean that would seem logical. Would the individual
18 making the call always have direct and intimate
19 knowledge of the attack itself?
20 A. No, I think -- no. The individual making the call may 12:13
21 not have known about the attack beyond the actual
22 wording of the message that they were being asked to
23 deliver.

24 259 Q. So, they would be given some wording, told to read that
25 out, but beyond that they may have no actual knowledge 12:14
26 of the mechanics, location and so on of the attack?
27 A. Yes.

28 260 Q. So, again, that might often be the position but not
29 always the position. But there is a particularly stark

1 example of a person making a warning call, on one view
2 having not only not detail knowledge of the real
3 circumstances of an attack but incorrect knowledge of
4 the circumstances of an attack?

5 A. Yes. So, the bomb that was planted in Warrington on 12:14
6 20th March 1993, the warning call that was received
7 relating to that incident stated that the device was
8 actually placed outside a chemist shop, a Boots Chemist
9 shop in Liverpool, not in Warrington, which is 16 miles
10 away. 12:15

11 261 Q. And as a result, were steps made to clear the Boots
12 shop in Liverpool, not in Warrington?

13 A. Yes.

14 262 Q. And tragically the bomb detonated and two children were
15 killed in Warrington? 12:15

16 A. That's correct.

17 263 Q. Have some individual journalists maintained that they
18 had a special relationship with terrorists that was
19 facilitated by code words?

20 A. Yes. So, Henry McDonald who wrote for The Guardian and 12:15
21 Brian Rowan from The Belfast Telegraph have both
22 written about and claimed to have a special
23 relationship with individuals that was facilitated by
24 code words.

25 264 Q. But, generally speaking, was that not the position? 12:15

26 A. Generally speaking, that was not the position.

27 265 Q. So that usually, more than usually, staff working for
28 the outlets called, such as newsrooms or the
29 Samaritans, didn't have that kind of relationship?

1 A. No.

2 266 Q. They would just be the person who happened to pick up
3 the phone?

4 A. Yes.

5 267 Q. As indeed happened in relation to each of the three 12:16
6 warning calls made in relation to Omagh.
7

8 So, next, was it the position that there were
9 officially-recognised coded warnings by the police or
10 other State bodies that you were aware of, so in other 12:16
11 words their State body had a list that they could refer
12 to know whether or not this was the RUC or other
13 organisation, and could see whether or not this was a
14 code word that was truly attributed to a particular
15 group? 12:16

16 A. So, to my knowledge there was no officially-sanctioned
17 list of code words that was shared between paramilitary
18 organisation and State agency, whether it be the police
19 or another security agency.

20 268 Q. But nonetheless, throughout the course of The Troubles 12:17
21 did certain code words come to be associated with
22 terrorist organisations?

23 A. Yes. So, if a code word was repeatedly associated with
24 a genuine warning, then that information obviously
25 would become known within the police and security 12:17
26 services and become directly associated with that
27 particular organisation.

28 269 Q. And so, the IRA, as you told us, used the longstanding
29 nom de guerre or code word, "P O'Neill"?

1 A. Yes.

2 270 Q. They used "Double X" to warn of the Birmingham pub
3 bombings in 1974?

4 A. Yes.

5 271 Q. And I should, perhaps, have elicited from you at the 12:17
6 very beginning of your evidence that it's the position,
7 I think, that you gave expert evidence to the recent
8 inquests, fairly recent inquests into the deaths in the
9 Birmingham pub bombings --

10 A. Yes, I did. 12:18

11 272 Q. -- in relation to code warnings. And other code words
12 also became associated with the IRA, "Michael Collins"?

13 A. Yes.

14 273 Q. "Easter Rising"?

15 A. Yes. 12:18

16 274 Q. "Kerrygold"?

17 A. Yes.

18 275 Q. And "Óglaigh na hÉireann"?

19 A. Yeah.

20 276 Q. And the UFF, have they used a particular code word 12:18
21 since the beginning of The Troubles?

22 A. Yes, they've used the word "Captain Black" since the
23 beginning of The Troubles.

24 277 Q. And the UDA?

25 A. The UDA have used "The Ulster Troubles," "Crucible" and 12:18
26 "Titanic" as code words.

27 278 Q. And to bring the focus back to the issue for us, the
28 Real IRA?

29 A. Sorry.

1 279 Q. So forgive me, used of course "Martha Pope"?
2 A. Yes.

3 280 Q. At least four times, and other code words as well,
4 those being?
5 A. Those being "Óglaigh na hÉireann," "Mardi Gras" and 12:19
6 "Francie."

7 281 Q. And, as we know, Óglaigh na hÉireann was mentioned
8 during the course of one of the warning calls in
9 relation to Omagh; "Martha Pope", of course, was used
10 in all three. "Mardi Gras" was used in the attack at 12:19
11 Market Square on 30th April 1998, I believe; and
12 "Francie," the attack at Portadown on 23rd February
13 1998.
14

15 And we have, within your report, at Table 2, a digest 12:19
16 of the code words that we've just run through. I will
17 ask for it to be put on the screen but I won't read it
18 out. So this is the same INQ, Ms. Montgomery, page 11,
19 Table 2. Thank you very much.
20 12:20

21 As I've said, that's a digest of evidence that you've
22 given already.
23

24 So, to draw all of this together; did the recipients of
25 warning calls have access to any official master list 12:20
26 of code words?
27 A. Not to my knowledge, no.

28 282 Q. And, to your knowledge, having regard to the
29 limitations that you've told us about, what was the

1 process or method of verification of a code word?

2 A. Primarily whether it had been linked to a previous

3 authentic incident, an incident where there had

4 actually been a device found or an explosion. Other

5 details were considered such as whether the caller's 12:20

6 voice was recognised and whether the details given in

7 the call aligned with intelligence information and

8 assessments gained from other sources.

9 283 Q. We can take that from the screen, thank you very much.

10 12:21

11 was it your understanding that non-State organisations

12 of the sort you've described, the Samaritans and news

13 bodies, that they would receive lists of coded warnings

14 that might be given?

15 A. I have not seen any evidence where those non-State 12:21

16 organisations would have received that information.

17 284 Q. Have you seen, in the materials that you had access to,

18 information that indicates whether coded warnings were

19 used for particular types of attack?

20 A. Do you mean specific coded warnings or coded warnings 12:21

21 in general?

22 285 Q. Yes, specific coded warnings. So, I'm at page 12, (vi)

23 of your report?

24 A. No, I haven't seen that they were -- sorry, I

25 apologise. They were used to forewarn of bombs and 12:22

26 they were used against, especially whenever those

27 attacks involved economic targets with a potential for

28 civilian casualties. They were also used to claim and

29 deny responsibility for actions, and also to sign off

1 on any policy statements or communications that the
2 organisations wanted to make public.

3 286 Q. So, there were particular circumstances in which they
4 might more commonly be used than others. Were there
5 circumstances in which the data indicated that coded 12:22
6 warnings were tended not to be given?

7 A. They would not be given in attacks against any security
8 personnel, politicians, any Government attacks,
9 anything where an element of surprise was required,
10 essentially, to carry out an assassination. 12:23

11 287 Q. And that, perhaps, is for an obvious though terrible
12 reason that if you intend to kill a particular
13 individual or individuals you would want them to have
14 the least notice of that intention possible?

15 A. Yes, correct. 12:23

16 288 Q. I'm now page 13, (viii). You've explained the concept
17 of mimicry to us, and were coded warnings used as a
18 form of mimicry?

19 A. Yes, they were.

20 289 Q. And in what circumstances? 12:23

21 A. So, again, as they related to a hoax call, so if an
22 organisation wanted to cause some form of disruption or
23 distraction they would, essentially, deliver a message
24 in order to pass themselves off, pass the call off as
25 being genuine and pass the information off as being 12:24
26 genuine.

27 290 Q. And over the course of the history of The Troubles,
28 were there examples of one terrorist organisation
29 pretending to be another terrorist organisation?

1 A. Yes. So, even right back with the use of the early
2 code words, as soon as they became publicly known we
3 saw incidents amongst loyalist paramilitaries, for
4 example, of them using code words in order to pass off
5 as being a different organisation. I would say, 12:24
6 though, a lot of that information is hard to verify
7 because there is a lot of claims and counterclaims
8 around particular incidents.

9 291 Q. But, there is some open source material, which, subject
10 to the caveat that you have just expressed, indicate 12:24
11 that one terrorist organisation would carry out an
12 attack and then use the code word associated with
13 another terrorist organisation with the aim of that
14 other organisation getting the blame for it?

15 A. Yes, that's right. 12:25

16 292 Q. Next (ix), you've told us already that there were
17 occasions upon which a hoax would be sought to be given
18 extra credibility by the use of a code word. And what
19 is your assessment of why that would happen?

20 A. In order to cause maximum disruption. So, in order to 12:25
21 give the warning a sense of urgency and authenticity,
22 which would cause the police and security services to
23 act in order to cancel events, close roads, set up
24 cordons, et cetera, which would disrupt people's lives
25 and businesses. 12:26

26 293 Q. And that, we understand from the report, might be done
27 for a number of reasons, so as to cause economic
28 damage?

29 A. Yeah, to cause economic damage. To monitor the

1 response of the security services. To provide
2 intelligence, for example, on what routes the police
3 might take in the event of an incident. To assess
4 response times and personnel deployment. Vehicle use,
5 cordon sizes and also the involvement of the Army, the 12:26
6 circumstances under which the Army might get involved,
7 and this information could then inform future
8 operations.

9 294 Q. So, tactical reasons for making a hoax call?
10 A. Yes. 12:26

11 295 Q. And just a few examples. An example of economic loss
12 is the one that I mentioned earlier?
13 A. So, yes, in April 1997 the IRA issued three bomb scares
14 in England in quick succession, and the result of that
15 included the postponement of the Grand National horse 12:27
16 race, and was estimated in total to cost about
17 £250 million of lost revenue.

18 296 Q. And an example of a different tactical aim?
19 A. So, there was an example of an aborted IRA escape from
20 Crumlin Road Prison in Belfast in which a digger was 12:27
21 used to breach the prison wall, and this was
22 facilitated by a series of hoax threats across Belfast
23 which were designed to overstretch the security forces
24 and distract them away from the prison escape attempt.

25 297 Q. Does the information indicate that the use of a code 12:27
26 word would or would not heighten the perceived urgency
27 of a response to a warning?
28 A. So, in the evidence that I collected, particularly
29 interviews with former security personnel, they

1 emphasised that all warnings of imminent attacks were
2 treated with equal seriousness as the consequences of
3 dismissing a warning were too severe. But the use of a
4 code word might heighten the perceived urgency of a
5 warning, but that it's evidence of authorship only in 12:28
6 conjunction with other information.

7 298 Q. Now, we're going to turn in a moment to your evidence
8 about the use of coded warnings by dissident republican
9 terrorists but there's just one final topic to deal
10 with, which is whether you have come across, in the 12:28
11 course of your research, examples of terrorists taking
12 particular steps to ensure that a warning was taken
13 particularly seriously. Does my question make sense?

14 A. Yes, it does. So, in the London Docklands bombing
15 which is referred to as the Canary wharf bombing on 9th 12:29
16 February 1996, the IRA took particular steps to ensure
17 that that warning was received and passed on. So,
18 90 minutes before the explosion a call was made to
19 John Murray, who was a reporter at RTÉ, and that call
20 was made by someone who John Murray knew and recognised 12:29
21 their voice as being a member of the IRA.

22 299 Q. So, 90 minutes before?

23 A. 90 minutes before, yeah.

24 300 Q. A call to a particular individual, a senior journalist
25 by someone known to that journalist and known to be a 12:29
26 terrorist?

27 A. Yes.

28 301 Q. And that was the warning call in respect of the bombing
29 that brought an end to the 1994 ceasefire?

1 A. Yes, that's right.

2 302 Q. Occurring on 9th February 1996?

3 A. Yeah.

4 303 Q. And it was your view that the combination of elements
5 within that call that we've drawn attention to made the 12:30
6 warning both credible and emphasised its urgency?

7 A. Yes. So, the fact that it was made to somebody who
8 would recognise the voice, would recognise the person
9 as being a member of the IRA, that it was made
10 90 minutes before the explosion and the statement was 12:30
11 signed "P O'Neill," which was, obviously, a name so
12 strongly associated with the IRA. And additional calls
13 were also made to The Irish News as well using a
14 different code word, the code word "kerrygold".

15 MR. GREANEY: Thank you very much. I'm just going to 12:31
16 ask you to bear with me for one moment whilst I check
17 something. [Short pause]. Sir, I'm told that we're
18 fine to go on until one o'clock, so long as you're fine
19 to go on until to one o'clock.

20 CHAIRMAN: Yes, of course. 12:31

21 304 Q. MR. GREANEY: Thank you very much. So, dissident
22 republican terrorists. In 1997/1998, there were two
23 particular violent dissident republican terrorist
24 groups that were active, so the Continuity IRA and the
25 Real IRA. We don't need you to go into the history of 12:32
26 their development, we've heard from Dr. Morrison about
27 that and we'll hear much more from him in due course.

28

29 Now, you observe at page 15 of your report, and

1 obviously we are going in later chapters to be
2 exploring, in considerable depth, which attacks were
3 and were not carried out by these groups in '97 and
4 '98. But you draw attention to five incidents
5 involving explosive devices attributed in 1997 to the 12:32
6 Continuity IRA and you observed in three of those
7 warnings were issued, is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 305 Q. And what were those three attacks?

10 A. The first one was on 31st July 1997 which was an attack 12:32
11 on the Carrybridge Hotel in County Fermanagh; the
12 second was on 16th September 1997, an attack in
13 Markethill; and on 20th November 1997 an attack on
14 Belfast City Hall.

15 306 Q. I'm not going to ask you about hoax calls, but in 1998, 12:33
16 page 16, you draw attention to 13 incidents in which an
17 explosive device was planted and where that incident
18 was attributed either to the Continuity IRA or the Real
19 IRA?

20 A. Yes. 12:33

21 307 Q. And when you say "attributed," you're referring either
22 to a claim of responsibility or some attribution of
23 responsibility on a different public basis?

24 A. Yes.

25 308 Q. And then of those 13 incidents in 1998 how many of them 12:33
26 were preceded by a warning call?

27 A. Ten.

28 309 Q. So, this is really the point that we were making
29 earlier, the two of us, that nearer the time that we

1 are dealing with, and indeed at the very time that
2 we're dealing with, the data appears rather more
3 reliable and extensive in relation to the nature of the
4 attack and whether there was a warning call?

5 A. Yes. 12:34

6 310 Q. And those incidents, those 10 incidents were which?

7 A. On 6th January 1998, an attack in Banbridge; on 24th
8 January 1998, an attack on the River Club in
9 Enniskillen; on 20th February 1998, attack in Moira; on
10 23rd February 1998, an attack in Portadown; on 30th 12:34
11 April 1998, an attack in Lisburn; on 16th May 1998, an
12 attack in Armagh; on 24th June 1998, an attack in
13 Newtownhamilton; on 13th July 1998, an attack in Newry;
14 on 1st August 1998, an attack in Banbridge; and on 15th
15 August 1998, an attack in Omagh. 12:35

16 311 Q. I believe, but I'll be corrected over lunch if I'm
17 wrong, that each of those incidents you've identified
18 in 1997 and in 1998, is on our list of previous
19 incidents in the updated provisional list of issues.
20 And of those 10 incidents in 1998, the attack at 12:35
21 Lisburn on 30th April, the attack at Newry on 13th
22 July, the attack at Banbridge on 1st August and the
23 attack in Omagh all involved the use of a common code
24 word, namely, "Martha Pope"?

25 A. Yes, correct. 12:35

26 312 Q. So, a code which is inextricably linked with the Real
27 IRA.
28
29 Now, in your report you provide, at Table 3, data about

1 the outcomes and use of warnings attributed to
2 dissident republicans. And what you explain is that of
3 those 13 attacks in 1998 - and tell me if I've
4 misunderstood - the devices exploded in eight of the
5 cases and were diffused or the subject of a controlled 12:36
6 explosion in five of those cases?

7 A. Yes.

8 313 Q. Now, next - and I'm not going to cover every single
9 line of your report - but next it's relevant to
10 understand the number of warning calls made in respect 12:37
11 of attacks. And you've sought to illustrate the number
12 of warning attacks in relation to the incidents between
13 1997 and 1998 in your Table 4, is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 314 Q. So, I'm going to ask that Table 4 be placed on the 12:37
16 screen, it's the same INQ reference, and the page is 17
17 and over to 18. So, these are the 13 incidents, '97 to
18 '98, in respect of which there was a warning call, is
19 that correct?

20 A. Yes, that's correct. 12:37

21 315 Q. So, Carrybridge, two warning calls?

22 A. Yes.

23 316 Q. Markethill, one?

24 A. Yes.

25 317 Q. Belfast City Hall, one? 12:38

26 A. Yes.

27 318 Q. The first attack at Banbridge on 6th January '98, two?

28 A. Yes.

29 319 Q. The River Club at Enniskillen, unspecified but

1 apparently on the data multiple?

2 A. Yes.

3 320 Q. Moirá, 20th February '98, unspecified?

4 A. Yes.

5 321 Q. Portadown, four? 12:38

6 A. Yes.

7 322 Q. Lisburn, you were provided with information within a

8 statement of Detective Chief Inspector Billingsley, I

9 will give the INQ reference, it's INQ 013685, about a

10 total of 15 warning calls, five to The Irish News, 12:38

11 three to the Belfast City Hospital, five to Samaritans,

12 one to UTV and one to the Bank of Ireland?

13 A. Yes.

14 323 Q. Later on in your report we're going to see that you

15 deal with the content of 10 of those 15 but it would 12:39

16 appear that there are a very substantial number of

17 warning calls in relation to the attack at Lisburn?

18 A. Yes.

19 324 Q. At least ten?

20 A. At least ten. 12:39

21 325 Q. And as many as 15. In Armagh, two.

22 A. Yes.

23 326 Q. Newtownhamilton, two?

24 A. Yes.

25 327 Q. Newry Courthouse, four. And then for the second 12:39

26 Banbridge attack, which caused extensive injury and

27 property damage, three and, as you say, four attempted

28 calls?

29 A. Yes.

1 328 Q. And then for Omagh, three calls?
2 A. Yes.
3 329 Q. About which we're going to hear much later this
4 afternoon and I suspect now into tomorrow.
5
6 Now, you were asked whether you were aware of the
7 existence of any evidence of more than three warning
8 calls having been made by the gang of terrorists who
9 carried out the Omagh bombing?
10 A. Yes. 12:39
11 330 Q. And you have drawn attention to two documents that you
12 were provided with and we won't need to have these on
13 the screen, INQ 001039, which refers to several coded
14 warnings which could be consistent with three warning
15 calls? 12:40
16 A. Yes.
17 331 Q. And then INQ 001040, which is an Army document, a WIS
18 rep, so a weapons intelligence report, in which an
19 officer is seeking to draw together various information
20 into a summary. And that refers, anomalously, to 12:40
21 "there were at least four coded warnings to various
22 agencies" and it's only right that you've drawn
23 attention to that. But is it the position that that
24 apart, the body of evidence indicates that there were
25 only three warning calls made by the Real IRA that day? 12:41
26 A. Yes, that's correct.
27 332 Q. So, we have that one example that stands apart,
28 otherwise all of the information is consistent with
29 that proposition?

1 A. Yes.

2 333 Q. So, the position would seem to be that there was no
3 consistency in relation to the number of warning calls
4 that were given in relation to different attacks?

5 A. No, no consistency and no pattern. 12:41

6 334 Q. From, as low as one?

7 A. Yeah.

8 335 Q. To as high as?

9 A. 15.

10 336 Q. 15, or certainly double figures. 12:41

11

12 Now, next topic, the amount of time between the warning
13 call and the detonation or intended detonation and
14 whether that time was consistent across the period
15 starting in 1997 and ending on 15th August 1998. In 12:42
16 simple terms - I'm now at your page 19 - was the amount
17 of time given between the warning and detonation
18 consistent?

19 A. No.

20 337 Q. And, indeed, overall was it inconsistent with the data 12:42
21 suggesting that there was no consistent warning
22 duration with shorter advance notices tending to result
23 in greater casualties?

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 338 Q. And, in a sense, I'm going to invite you now to agree 12:42
26 to something which is no more than common sense; but
27 the shorter the period of warning you give the more
28 likely the detonation is to occur?

29 A. Yes.

1 339 Q. And, indeed, we're going to come on to look at, the
2 less specificity there is in relation to the location
3 of the bomb, on the face of it, as a matter of logic,
4 the more likely it is to detonate?
5 A. Yes. 12:43
6 340 Q. So, I'm going to ask that we put on the screen your
7 Table 5 please, so same INQ reference, page 20. So,
8 this is your table described as time elapsed between
9 first warning call, where there was more than one
10 warning call, and detonation or disposal in relation to 12:43
11 those 13 incidents. We don't have information in
12 relation to all of them. But Carrybridge the period is
13 unspecified. Markethill, 45 minutes?
14 A. Yes.
15 341 Q. Belfast City Hall, specified. The first Banbridge 12:44
16 attack, 20 minutes?
17 A. Yes.
18 342 Q. The Enniskillen attack, about two hours?
19 A. Yes.
20 343 Q. Moira, 10 minutes? 12:44
21 A. Yes.
22 344 Q. Portadown, 40 minutes?
23 A. Yes.
24 345 Q. Lisburn, 40 minutes?
25 A. Yes. 12:44
26 346 Q. In respect of the 16th May '98 Armagh attack, the bomb
27 was discovered 20 minutes before the warning?
28 A. Yes, that's correct.
29 347 Q. Newtownhamilton, 49 minutes?

1 A. Yes.

2 348 Q. Newry Courthouse, 30 minutes?

3 A. Yes.

4 349 Q. Banbridge, about 20 minutes?

5 A. Yes. 12:45

6 350 Q. And Omagh, we know that the first warning call was
7 2:29 p.m., and the bomb detonated at 3:04 p.m., so 35
8 minutes?

9 A. Yes.

10 351 Q. Now, the next issue that you can help us with - I'm now 12:45
11 at page 21, thank you - is the extent to which there
12 was consistency across the warning calls, still the 13
13 that we're talking about, about the intended target
14 and, in particular, whether that information was
15 correct. And overall what did the data demonstrate 12:45
16 about that issue?

17 A. So, again, there was not exact -- the same information
18 was not given out with every call, but we can see with
19 respect to the attacks in Lisburn, Banbridge, Armagh
20 and Omagh, this evidence shows warnings in these cases 12:46
21 specified a street location, nearby landmarks or
22 premises, and in some of the cases even the make and
23 colour of the vehicle involved. These details were
24 generally accurate, although in the Lisburn case
25 actually a follow-up corrective call was made in order 12:46
26 to clarify some of the information. For the
27 Enniskillen River Club bombing --

28 352 Q. I'm just going to ask you to pause for a moment --

29 A. Okay.

1 353 Q. -- because there is a table we can be put on the screen
2 that is helpful, this is Table 6 please. Please carry
3 on with your summary.

4 A. Then for the Enniskillen River Club bombing in January
5 1998, the press reports confirmed that the warning 12:46
6 explicitly mentioned the River Club which proved to be
7 accurate. However, in the Portadown and
8 Newtownhamilton incidents in February and June
9 respectively, the open source information does not
10 produce the wording of the calls and so in those 12:47
11 particular cases the accuracy is inferred from police
12 evacuations and the location of the explosions rather
13 than direct information that was contained in the call.

14 354 Q. And as we go through that table, which is a little
15 difficult to read on the screen, I'm sorry for that, 12:47
16 the overall conclusion that you came to is that, to the
17 extent there was data available - I'm at the top of
18 page 23 - there was a pattern that you regarded as
19 clear, save in the case of Omagh --

20 A. Yes. 12:48

21 355 Q. -- of the calls generally providing accurate
22 information about bomb locations?

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 356 Q. So, generally speaking, accurate information but that
25 most certainly did not happen in relation to the 12:48
26 warning calls relating to the Omagh bombing?

27 A. Yes.

28 357 Q. In some instances however, Banbridge No.2, and
29 Newtownhamilton, the warnings were issued too close to

1 detonation to allow a safe evacuation?

2 A. Yes.

3 358 Q. This is really the point that we were looking at
4 earlier, that the longer the time and the more accurate
5 the information, the greater the chance that detonation 12:48
6 will not occur?

7 A. Yes.

8 359 Q. If one of those components is not present, the chances
9 of the detonation increase significantly?

10 A. Yeah. 12:48

11 360 Q. I'm not going to ask you about whether the warning
12 resulted in the attack being thwarted, because we've
13 addressed that already, or the identity or
14 characteristics of the persons making the calls. What
15 I am going to ask you about is the persons or 12:49
16 organisations to whom warnings were made over this
17 period that we're considering.

18

19 So, this is (viii) on page 23, and it is Table 7.

20 [Short pause]. Thank you very much. I think some text 12:49
21 might have been cut off at the top there. 16th
22 September 1997, that's the Markethill attack, telephone
23 call from that phone box.

24 A. Phone box, yeah.

25 361 Q. They're all calls from telephone boxes, aren't they? 12:50

26 A. Yes, they are.

27 362 Q. Because that was the tactic that was in use at that
28 time. So, Markethill, call to BBC Belfast with the
29 police thereafter notified?

1 A. Yes.

2 363 Q. The first Banbridge attack to a radio station and to
3 the Samaritans, with the police being notified?

4 A. Yes.

5 364 Q. The River Club attack, a call to a Catholic priest, not 12:50
6 specified whether the police were notified?

7 A. Yes.

8 365 Q. Attack in Moira, the recipient of the warning call
9 unspecified and whether the authorities were notified,
10 unspecified? 12:50

11 A. Yes.

12 366 Q. The Portadown attack, the warning call to the newsroom
13 in Belfast and possibly The Belfast Telegraph and
14 whether the police were informed, not specified.
15 Lisburn, on 30th April 1998, I've indicated the 12:51
16 information about that already, numerous recipients of
17 the warning calls, The Irish News, Belfast City
18 Hospital, Belfast UTV, the Bank of Ireland in Lisburn,
19 and the police were notified directly by the recipients
20 of the warnings. The attack in Armagh on 16th May '98, 12:51
21 the Samaritans were notified, as were the police. No
22 information about either in relation to the attack in
23 Newtownhamilton, or in relation to the attack in Newry
24 Courthouse. In relation to Banbridge, the warning call
25 to the police, so that they were the very recipients of 12:52
26 the call. And the position in Omagh, as everyone knows
27 very well, UTV and the Samaritans with the people
28 receiving those calls notifying the police, as indeed
29 we will hear this afternoon.

1 Now, next, you were asked to consider the wording of
2 the coded warnings that were used. And we see your
3 analysis at pages 25 to 27, indeed 28, of your report
4 and at the very end of your evidence I'll get you to
5 confirm the accuracy of your report so that it can be 12:53
6 placed on to the website and anyone can read that
7 analysis. What I'm not going to do is to invite you to
8 read through everything that you understood as to the
9 content of each call, but what I will invite you to do
10 is to educate us with the benefit of your comparative 12:53
11 analysis, which we find at page 28 please.

12 A. Yes. So, across the Lisburn, Armagh, Banbridge and
13 Omagh incidents there are recurring elements in the
14 warning calls. There's the use of code words, so
15 variations on "Martha Pope". References to the IRA or 12:53
16 Óglaigh na hÉireann, and broadly accurate locations,
17 although, obviously, we've discussed the detail on
18 Omagh was not accurate. But they vary in terms of the
19 detail and the tone and structure. So, Lisburn
20 featured the highest volume of calls and the most 12:54
21 consistent content, whereas the calls made in relation
22 to the Armagh incident were very brief and minimal.
23 The calls relating to the Banbridge attack showed a
24 progression of specificity across the three calls. And
25 in the case of the Omagh warnings, although they were 12:54
26 consistent in terms of the code word and general
27 location, they were limited in terms of the actual
28 detail as compared to the other incidents.
29

1 collectively, the warnings demonstrate no standardised
2 format, but do reflect attempts to convey threat
3 information in advance of the detonation.

4 367 Q. would it be reasonable to say that they commonly also
5 contained attempts to achieve authentication? 12:55

6 A. Yes, through the use of "Martha Pope" and also by
7 stating "this is the IRA," or "Óglaigh na hÉireann".

8 368 Q. And sometimes, in particular during the Lisburn calls,
9 referring to previous attacks that --

10 A. Yes. 12:55

11 369 Q. -- they maintained they had been responsible for,
12 including Portadown and Moira --

13 A. Yes.

14 370 Q. -- which we know there had been attacks. The final
15 topic that I'll ask you about - and I will conclude my 12:55
16 questioning, therefore, before lunch - relates to the
17 code word that you have just told us about, and it's
18 the use of the Code word "Martha Pope" in at least four
19 attacks attributed to the Real IRA. And we all know
20 the answer to this question but nonetheless I'll ask 12:56
21 it, is Martha Pope a real person?

22 A. Yes, she is.

23 371 Q. And who is she?

24 A. So, Martha Pope was an American political aide and
25 diplomat who was closely associated with the Northern 12:56
26 Ireland Peace Process. She served as senior adviser
27 for the Northern Ireland peace negotiations between the
28 4th January 1995 and July 1998 working for
29 Senator George Mitchell who at the time was chairing

1 the multi-party talks that led up to the 1998 Belfast
2 Good Friday Agreement.

3 372 Q. So, she was a person working in support of something
4 that the Real IRA vehemently opposed?

5 A. Yes. So, she was closely linked to the USA's role in 12:56
6 promoting peace and in brokering the Belfast Agreement?

7 373 Q. And do you assess that the code word "Martha Pope" was
8 chosen deliberately by the Real IRA?

9 A. Yes, I do. It was, in effect, making a political
10 statement rejecting the Peace Process that she was part 12:57
11 of.

12 374 Q. Then, finally, it may well be relevant for us to
13 understand whether the code word "Martha Pope" had
14 become public knowledge at an early stage of its use so
15 that it might have been adopted by others, or whether 12:57
16 it was a code word that remained personal to the Real
17 IRA. So, could I ask you when did you in your research
18 first identify public reporting of the use of a code
19 word "Martha Pope"?

20 A. On 16th August 1998. 12:57

21 375 Q. So, after all of the, at least four attacks in which it
22 was used?

23 A. Yes.

24 376 Q. Including Omagh. Thank you very much. Now, that
25 concludes my questioning. So I just want to establish 12:58
26 one thing with you; you have provided, most recently,
27 your supplementary report which runs to 35 pages and is
28 dated March 2026?

29 A. Yes.

1 377 Q. Is that report true to the best of your knowledge,
2 information and belief?
3 A. Yes.
4 378 Q. And would you like that to form part of your evidence
5 to the Inquiry? 12:58
6 A. Yes.
7 MR. GREANEY: well, thank you very much indeed. That
8 concludes my questioning. As I've told you already
9 when we spoke before you went into the witness box,
10 certain Core Participants do have permission to ask you 12:58
11 questions but I suspect, Sir, that will best be done
12 after lunch at two o'clock.
13 CHAIRMAN: Yes.
14
15 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH AND RESUMED AS FOLLOWS: 12:59
16
17 CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Greaney.
18 MR. GREANEY: Good afternoon, Sir. As a result of the
19 evidence that has been given so far by Prof. Hamill, of
20 the advocates who had permission under Rule 10 to ask 14:05
21 questions, only one still wishes to ask questions.
22 Sir, that advocate is Mr. McGowan of the Fox Law team
23 and we would ask him to ask questions at this stage,
24 please.
25 CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. McGowan. 14:05
26
27
28
29

1 PROF. HEATHER HAMILL WAS QUESTIONED BY MR. MCGOWAN AS
2 FOLLOWS:

3
4 379 Q. MR. MCGOWAN: Good afternoon, Prof. Hamill.

5 A. Good afternoon.

14:05

6 380 Q. I'm asking questions on behalf of the Core Participant
7 group represented by Fox Law and I'm going to ask you
8 about three brief areas of questioning. The first
9 relates to the significance of code words to the UK
10 State authorities and, in particular, the process for
11 recognising code words. And what you've said in your
12 report and what you've said in your evidence this
13 morning was that to your knowledge there was no
14 officially-sanctioned system of coded warnings. So, I
15 want to draw your attention to a document, and I can
16 give the reference, if it could be brought up on the
17 screen, INQ 039383, at page 1. Now, this is an article
18 from The Independent newspaper dated 30th March 1997.
19 And in that article, the writing is quite small, but
20 what it says in the article, and I am referring to, in
21 particular, to the bottom of the first main paragraph.

14:05

14:06

14:06

22
23 "The procedure has long been established. The codes
24 change periodically by agreement between the
25 Provisionals and the security forces: both sides
26 realise that failure of communications would be
27 catastrophic."

14:06

28
29 Then if it was possible to zoom into the paragraph at

1 the bottom of the screen. There's no particular need
2 to read that out but the point is that it goes through
3 and describes a sort of process by which code words
4 potentially came to be officially-recognised code
5 words.

14:07

6
7 So, this article is effectively saying that there is a
8 procedure and that it has been long established. If
9 that is the correct, does that suggest that the UK
10 authorities would treat the use of a recognised code
11 word as something of particular significance, if a
12 coded warning was received?

14:07

13 A. So, aside from this article I am not aware of any
14 procedure and I have not seen any evidence from any
15 internal policy or set of procedures from any State
16 agency or State organisation. So, that's the first
17 thing. And then in answer to your question, it is my
18 view that a code word was considered alongside other
19 information, including other forms of intelligence that
20 would have been known at the time. And whilst the
21 presence of a code word might have heightened the sense
22 of urgency around a warning, it was not definitive
23 proof that the warning was genuine or that the warning
24 came from the organisation it purported to come from.

14:07

14:08

25 381 Q. Okay. well, I think what I want to do is -- then that
26 brings me on to my second question and I want to bring
27 you to another INQ that goes to the significance that
28 was placed by the UK authorities on the use of a
29 recognised code word. The INQ, is 030671, page 7, if

14:08

1 that could be brought up on the screen. And this is
2 Section 28 of the RUC Code regarding major incidents.
3 The section in particular that I'm referring to is
4 sub-paragraph (c) in the middle of the page there.
5 what that says is:

14:09

6
7 "Accordingly, if there are grounds for believing that a
8 bomb scare call is genuine..."

9
10 And the example that is given is a recognised code word
11 has been used.

14:09

12
13 So, as you've said, the use of a code word is a factor
14 that's weighed alongside other factors, but I think
15 there are probably two ways that that can be viewed.
16 On one view it could be that it's a factor which has
17 equal weight with other factors, and you've referred to
18 other factors in your report such as accent and
19 consistency with paramilitary patterns and factors like
20 that. But another view could be that it's, although
21 it's one factor it's a factor that carries particular
22 weight and our understanding is that your evidence is
23 that it's a factor that carries and carried particular
24 weight with UK State authorities, is that fair to say?

14:09

14:09

25 A. I think it's fair to say it carries some weight, but
26 because, first of all, not all warnings, genuine
27 warnings contained code words and also warnings of hoax
28 calls contained code words. Again, I would say that
29 whilst it carries some weight, it's difficult without

14:10

1 having sight of or evidence of internal policies and
2 procedures and training what actual weight a code word
3 would have carried.

4 382 Q. Yeah. But certainly the internal policies and
5 procedures can give further information or further
6 clarity to that issue of the precise weight that was
7 given?

14:10

8 A. Yes. Yes, thank you.

9 383 Q. And that brings me to my final question which is in
10 relation specific use of the "Martha Pope" code word
11 and to its use in 1998, because in your report and in
12 your evidence this morning you had referred to it being
13 used in three incidents in Lisburn on 30th April 1998,
14 in Armagh on 16th May 1998, and in Banbridge on 1st
15 August 1998, as well as in Omagh. Our understanding is
16 that it was used in earlier incidents prior to 30th
17 April 1998 and that it is possible, or even probable,
18 that it was used in additional incidents throughout
19 1998 and I'm going to bring you to three documents that
20 underlie that understanding. So, the first is
21 INQ 013783 at page 1, and this is a police document
22 showing the sequence of warning calls for Lisburn on
23 30th April 1998. It hasn't come up on screen yet. And
24 so the section that I'm referring to in particular is
25 the "words spoken" section. If it was possible to zoom
26 in on that. Thank you.

14:11

14:11

14:11

14:12

27
28 And so the word spoken in that call on 30th April:
29

1 "Have you got a pen ready?"

2
3 And then:

4
5 "Outside the Bank of Ireland and St. John's Shop, code 14:12
6 word is 'Martha Pope.' We have planted car bomb in the
7 past. You will know it."

8
9 So, the inference that we have taken from that is that
10 certainly the caller on this occasion, when using the 14:12
11 code word "Martha Pope" indicated they had planted car
12 bombs in the past and had an understanding that the
13 security forces would be aware of that particular code
14 word from other car bombs in the past. What I'm going
15 to do is I'm going to go through each of the INQs and 14:13
16 then just put the question.

17
18 The next reference is 016839 at page 2. And it's
19 really from lines 6 to 13 of that transcript. This is
20 the transcript of evidence from a police constable in 14:13
21 relation to an incident in Newry.

22 CHAIRMAN: What is this, we're looking at, Mr. McGowan?

23 384 Q. MR. MCGOWAN: This is transcript of evidence from a
24 police constable in the Hoey trial in relation to an
25 incident in Newry on 2nd April 1998. And what is 14:13
26 stated there is on 2nd April, so it refers to the
27 incident on 2nd April.

28
29 "At approximately 15:58 hrs I received a telephone call

1 from a person who identified himself as Myles, one of
2 the Samaritans in Newry. He reported that he'd just a
3 call from a male caller with a southern accent who
4 quoted the code word 'Martha Pope' and stated, 'There's
5 is a bomb on the red bridge outside Newry and it's
6 failed to go off.' I informed the control room of the
7 call and entered it on the Command and Control log
8 under 0429, dated 2nd April 1998."

14:14

10 So, that's again, slightly more definitive that it was
11 used on 2nd April. Then the final reference is 029487,
12 page 11 specifically, if that's possible. Thank you.
13 This is a police report in relation to the Omagh,
14 Banbridge and Lisburn bombs. The section that I'm
15 referring to in particular is section 3 of that
16 starting "code word." And what's stated there is:

14:14

14:15

17
18 "Code word 'Martha Pope' was used throughout all three
19 of these incidents..."

14:15

20
21 That's Omagh, Banbridge, and Lisburn.

22
23 "...and was furthermore seen to be common theme
24 throughout most of the dissident republican incidents
25 during 1998, the only variances in 'Martha Pope' are
26 due to misunderstandings on the part of recipients due
27 to accent and brevity."

14:15

28
29 So, what we are taking - and the reason I've brought

1 you to these documents and what we're taking from this
2 is that certainly the code word was used on 2nd April
3 1998, that it would have been a recognised dissident
4 republican code word by April 1998 and it's possible or
5 probable that it was used in additional incidents,
6 additional dissident incidents throughout 1998; do you
7 agree with that understanding?

14:15

8 A. Based on the evidence that you've shown me, yes.

9 385 Q. Thank you very much. And my final question is just,
10 are there other sources that potentially could be
11 checked to identify other incidents in which the
12 specific code word was used?

14:16

13 A. So, to my knowledge there are no other open source
14 sources so it would have to be sources that would have
15 to be made available from the police or the security
16 and intelligence agencies active at the time.

14:16

17 MR. MCGOWAN: Thank you very much. That's my
18 questions, thank you. Thank you, Sir.

19 MR. GREANEY: Sir, unless you have any questions for
20 the Professor, that will conclude her evidence.

14:16

21 CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Prof. Hamill.

22 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

23 MR. GREANEY: Sir, what is going to happen next is that
24 we will continue with Part 5 and Mr. de la Poer will
25 recall Mr. Safranauskas and they will continue to go
26 through the Electronic Presentation of Evidence. And I
27 anticipate that during the course of the afternoon we
28 will hear recordings of the reports made by those who
29 had received the warning calls to the police. So, Sir,

14:16

1 I'm suggesting we don't have a break at this stage but
2 we just carry on. So I'll ask the Professor if she
3 wouldn't mind leaving the witness box and
4 Mr. Safranauskas if he would please return to the
5 witness box.

14:17

6 CHAIRMAN: Yes. Mr. de la Poer.

7 MR. DE LA POER: Sir, thank you. As Mr. Greaney has
8 just made clear, we are going to hear some audio this
9 afternoon. Can I make this clear: The first three
10 pieces of audio will be the audio from the reports of
11 the warning calls, so from the civilians to the police
12 reporting what they had been told. Those will come
13 first and they were not the subject of the ruling that
14 you made this morning, Sir. By contrast, the fourth
15 piece of audio will be the subject and is the subject
16 of your ruling. When we reach that stage, Sir, I'm
17 proposing that we pause for a period of up to
18 40 seconds just so that if there is anybody in the room
19 who wishes to stand up they can begin to do that and
20 obviously we will wait for them to complete that before
21 we play on.

14:18

14:18

14:18

22 CHAIRMAN: Yes, of course.

23 MR. DE LE POER: Thank you, Sir.

24
25 MR. MARK SAFRANAUSKAS (RECALLED) WAS FURTHER QUESTIONED
26 BY MR. DE LA POER AS FOLLOWS:

27
28 386 Q. MR. DE LE POER: Mr. Safranauskas, you're still under
29 oath and we are now at the halfway stage of the four

1 presentation of events that you have created for
2 Chapter 3, is that right?

3 A. We are, yes.

4 387 Q. We have, between us, completed Part 3 and Part 4 and
5 we're about to embark on Part 5? 14:19

6 A. Yes.

7 388 Q. And as we are at that halfway stage, we're just going
8 to, between us, recap on some of the assumptions that
9 are being applied here. These were explained by
10 Mr. Greaney over a week ago now and again when you and 14:19
11 I introduced attribution.

12

13 Point 1, can you confirm that all of the attributions
14 made at this stage are provisional?

15 A. They are, yes. 14:19

16 389 Q. Point 2, that they are all subject to later evidence
17 that the Inquiry may receive?

18 A. I agree.

19 390 Q. Point 3, that in relation to individuals who are in
20 cars, the approach of the Inquiry Legal Team is that if 14:19
21 the person to whom it is attributed to happened to be
22 sitting next to the person who was making the call,
23 that attribution is not wrong, it is merely incomplete
24 because it does not include the speaker?

25 A. Correct. 14:20

26 391 Q. And, finally, that all of these attributions form part
27 of the Inquiry's investigation under which we are
28 operating a working hypothesis?

29 A. That's right.

1 392 Q. So, we'll turn next before we commence the review of
2 the timeline just to, through you, correct a mistake
3 that I made earlier. Can you confirm that I led
4 DCI Gault into error when I suggested to him that the
5 footage that you had included in your presentation was 14:20
6 from TS02, in fact, it was - thank you very much indeed
7 Mr. Suter - it was from TS03?
8 A. It was, yes.
9 393 Q. So, that is an important correction in terms of the
10 exhibits. Finally, we're going to have the assistance 14:21
11 of Ms. Briggs who is going to help us with the Inquiry
12 Legal Team summary.
13
14 So, let's start, please, by opening up the timeline to
15 page 27 for those who have it in hard copy. For those 14:21
16 following electronically, those INQ 0491121 or 049563
17 and we are going to commence at row 217. Do you have
18 that, Mr. Safranauskas?
19 A. I do, yes.
20 394 Q. We can see that we are now at 14:29 with a voice call? 14:21
21 A. Yes.
22 395 Q. That the voice call is coming from McGeough's
23 Crossroads, Newry Road, Forkhill?
24 A. That's right, yes.
25 396 Q. And it was a call to an Ulster landline? 14:21
26 A. Yes.
27 397 Q. Let's just see the presentation for this.
28 [Presentation played]. We'll pause it there,
29 Mr. Safranauskas. We can see McGeough's Crossroads

1 towards the top right-hand corner?

2 A. We can, yes.

3 398 Q. And we can see another location indicated here the
4 Loyes Crossroads?

5 A. Yes. 14:22

6 399 Q. And have you plotted those locations and provided us
7 with 'as the crow flies' measurement between the two of
8 them?

9 A. I have, yes.

10 400 Q. We can see from the roads on the map that there isn't a 14:22
11 direct road in the sense that one that goes straight
12 between two points, that represents the shortest
13 distance between the two points?

14 A. Correct.

15 401 Q. We can see you've indicated 3.2 miles and 1.2 miles for 14:23
16 the point to point, so the first being driving distance
17 the second being as the crow flies?

18 A. Yes.

19 402 Q. We're concerned here with McGeough's Crossroads, is
20 that right? 14:23

21 A. Yes.

22 403 Q. Which is the first entry at 217. So, we can play on
23 please. [Presentation played]. Pause there. On this
24 more zoomed out map we get a better sense that
25 McGeough's Crossroads is relatively close to the Border 14:23
26 with the Republic of Ireland?

27 A. It is, yes.

28 404 Q. And you're indicating with the beacon in the top
29 right-hand corner where the call is going, namely to

1 UTV?

2 A. Yes.

3 MR. DE LE POER: And I'm going to just turn over now to
4 Ms. Briggs, as I will do repeatedly over the course of
5 this, for her to add some further information in 14:24
6 relation to this.

7 MS. BRIGGS: Thank you. Sir, in her statement to the
8 RUC dated 19th August 1998, Margaret Hall stated that
9 on Saturday 15th August 1998, she was employed by UTV
10 as a programme assistant. Her job entailed answering 14:24
11 the phones and doing administrative duties in the
12 newsroom. She had started work at 12:00 midday and she
13 said that at 2:32 hrs, she received a phone call in the
14 newsroom via the switch Board. She said: "Hello,
15 newsroom." She described hearing a male voice with a 14:24
16 northern country accent which she said she found
17 difficult to make out. She said:
18
19 "At first I thought this man was some sort of nutcase."
20 14:25
21 She described saying "what" to him several times in an
22 effort to make him speak more clearly. She described
23 hearing him say:
24
25 "Bomb, courthouse, Omagh Main Street, 500lb explosion, 14:25
26 30 minutes."
27
28 She said that she typed those words into the computer.
29 She described how she could not make out any complete

1 sentences he was saying. She stated she got the
2 impression that the caller was very nervous. She asked
3 him for a code word which the caller gave to her. She
4 said that at first she thought he said Malta Pope which
5 she questioned. He then said spelling it out, "Martha 14:25
6 Pope" and then he said, "IRA, Oglanhan." And I'll
7 return to that in a moment, Sir.

8
9 She said that she thought he spelt that out as well.
10 That pronunciation, Sir, that's based on the spelling 14:26
11 in the statement IRA, Oglanhan O-G-L-A-N-H-A-N. It may
12 be, Sir, that Ms. Hall heard "Óglaigh na hÉireann."

13
14 She described how at that point the phone went dead and
15 right away she dialled 999 and informed the police of 14:26
16 the call. And we will, Sir, hear that momentarily?

17
18 And As confirmed by DCI Billingsley, that call was in
19 fact made at 2:29, as we can see from the presentation.
20 And the billing record was obtained from the PCB, the 14:26
21 public call box, Sir.

22
23 In a further statement dated 18th May 1999, Ms. Hall
24 said that she was unable to recall the caller's initial
25 words as she found him so difficult to understand 14:27
26 because of his accent. She described typing into her
27 computer "Martha Pope" and "IRA, Oglanhan." She said
28 that she spelled out IRA Oglanhan as it sounded. She
29 said that she was unable to recall if the caller spelt

1 this for her as well, but that she was certain that the
2 spelling in the computer was her own spelling, and this
3 wouldn't have been important to her at this time she
4 said.

5
6 Thank you, Sir.

7 405 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Mr. Safranauskas, we move from this
8 warning call made by one of those on the plot to UTV to
9 row 218, a call by the 430 red handset provisionally
10 attributed to Liam Campbell to the answering service
11 for that phone?

12 A. Yes.

13 406 Q. And we can see recorded there that no cell site is
14 available for this call?

15 A. No.

16 407 Q. And this will become apparent later in the
17 presentation, we might want to put a cross-reference to
18 row 215 that we looked at yesterday, which is a call
19 involving Liam Campbell that took place at 14:19?

20 A. Yes.

21 408 Q. So, that's the preceding call to this one, some
22 11 minutes earlier?

23 A. Yes.

24 409 Q. So, we'll come back to that because you've compiled to
25 us an overview presentation of the movements of this
26 phone as recorded on the cell masts that it was using,
27 but for now we will continue, please, with row 219 and
28 we can play on the presentation.

1 [Telephone call played].
2
3 MS. BRIGGS: Sir, during the course of his evidence to
4 the Coroner, Constable Mullan said on 6th September
5 2000, that "the code word did certainly strike a cord 14:30
6 with me as being similar to one which had been used in
7 a previous attack some couple of weeks prior to the
8 Omagh bomb." The Inquiry, Sir, understands this to be
9 a reference to the attack in Banbridge on 1st August
10 1998. Constable Mullan agreed, during his evidence, 14:30
11 that it was treated as a genuine bomb scare and he said
12 that he connected the word with the Real IRA.
13 410 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Continue please going back to the red
14 430 phone?
15 A. Yes. 14:31
16 411 Q. Row 220 we now have a text message. Just pausing it
17 there please hopefully when we have got the beacons
18 both visible. [Presentation played]. We can see that
19 this text message was sent by an unknown number but it
20 was received by the 430 phone? 14:31
21 A. Yes.
22 412 Q. We can see the time at 14:30:33 and at that time the
23 430 is using a cell site at Camlough Hill?
24 A. Yes.
25 413 Q. And that is 3340. You have also indicated for us the 14:31
26 approximate location of McGeough's Crossroads, is that
27 right?
28 A. Yes.
29 414 Q. That's the slightly higher of the two overlapping red

1 beacons?

2 A. Yes.

3 415 Q. And also of the Loyes Road Crossroads --

4 A. Yes.

5 416 Q. -- we are going to come to very shortly? 14:31

6 A. Yes.

7 417 Q. That is row 220. Let's move on, please, just to record

8 the next event. [Presentation played]. Here, we are

9 dealing with an internal RUC call, is that right?

10 A. It is, yes. 14:32

11 418 Q. Pause there for a moment. The sequence is this: The

12 warning call is made from McGeough's to Margaret Hall?

13 A. Yes.

14 419 Q. Margaret Hall calls RUC, Belfast and speaks to

15 George Mullan, the Constable? 14:32

16 A. Yes.

17 420 Q. George Mullan then calls from RUC, Belfast to the Omagh

18 Station and answering his PC William Hall?

19 A. That's right, yes.

20 421 Q. We can see that that occurred at 14:31? 14:32

21 A. Yes.

22 422 Q. So, this is the first notification received in Omagh of

23 the bomb threat?

24 A. In Omagh, yes.

25 MS. BRIGGS: Sir, Constable William Hall's statement 14:32

26 recorded that on the day of the bombing he was on duty

27 in Omagh Station and he was detailed as the Station

28 Duty Officer, which meant dealing with members of the

29 public calling at the station or telephoning the

1 station, and other police stations making enquiries.
2 He said that sometime around 2:30 he recalled taking a
3 phone call from Belfast Regional Control telling him of
4 a bomb warning that they had received relating to Omagh
5 Town. He said that he could not recall verbatim what 14:33
6 the man understood to be Constable Mullan told him, but
7 as the message was relayed he made notes of the salient
8 points in a notebook. Constable Hall said the notes he
9 made were "ADIV, UTV, Main street, court, 500, Martha
10 Pope". 14:33
11
12 Constable Hall stated that he recalled the operator
13 explaining to him that the code word was one used in
14 Banbridge earlier in the month when a bomb did explode.
15 14:33
16 And, Sir, in relation to Constable Mullan, he said
17 during his evidence to the Coroner on 6th September
18 2000, that he advised whoever he spoke to at that time,
19 Constable Hall, that this code word had been used some
20 two weeks previously during a bombing in Banbridge. 14:34
21 423 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Turn away for a moment from those
22 internal RUC communications back to the call boxes,
23 this time Loyes Crossroads --
24 A. Yes.
25 424 Q. -- which is our row 222. This is timed at 14:31. So, 14:34
26 this is the second of the two call boxes?
27 A. Yes.
28 425 Q. This is a call made approximately 120 seconds after the
29 call that was made from McGeough's Crossroads?

1 A. Yes.

2 426 Q. And we know that the driving distance between the two
3 is such that it would be physically impossible for a
4 person to travel between them in that time?

5 A. Exactly that, yes. 14:35

6 427 Q. So, is the inference that this must be a second person
7 at the Loyes Road Crossroads?

8 A. Correct, yes.

9 428 Q. And this is a call again to Margaret Hall at UTV as it
10 turns out? 14:35

11 A. Yes.

12 MS. BRIGGS: In her 19th August 1998 statement,
13 Ms. Hall stated that after she put the phone down from
14 speaking to police there was another call on the line -
15 this call, sir. She said that she answered that call 14:35
16 and she spoke to the same male voice. She stated that
17 she would say that this call came in at 2:35. She said
18 that the male said, "Martha Pope, 15 minutes, bomb,
19 Omagh Town." She stated that she immediately cut him
20 off and, again, phoned the police by dialling 999 14:36
21 informing them of the second call. And that will be
22 played, shortly, sir.

23

24 And we know, sir, that the warning call was in fact
25 made at 2:31 p.m. as reflected by the billing records. 14:36
26

27 Ms. Hall said that she received no further calls from
28 this individual. She said that from his voice "I would
29 put this male in the 50 to 55-year-old bracket" and she

1 said that the phone line, as far as she could recall,
2 was crackly.

3
4 In another statement she gave to the police on 18th May
5 1999, Margaret Hall said during the second call she 14:36
6 partially typed the warning on to the computer. She
7 also stated that she was unable to pinpoint the origin
8 of the man's accent only to say it was definitely not
9 Belfast.

10 14:37
11 In her evidence to the Coroner's Court on 6th September
12 2000, Ms. Hall said that the accent she heard was not a
13 southern accent. She said it was a very thick accent,
14 "I had difficulty in making him out. I actually
15 thought afterwards that he had something covering the 14:37
16 phone."

17
18 She agreed that his voice sounded muffled. She said
19 that she thought her first conversation with the caller
20 took maybe one minute. She said that between the first 14:37
21 and second call she received there was a period of
22 two/three minutes. She also said that this was the
23 first time she received a warning call with that code
24 word used. She also agreed that she believed the first
25 caller was the same person as the second caller. 14:37

26 429 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Mr. Safranauskas, just draw out a
27 potential difference over and above the location from
28 those calls separated as they were by the distance that
29 you've told us: In that first call to Margaret Hall

1 the time period given was 30 minutes, do you agree?

2 A. Yes.

3 430 Q. whereas in this second call, which may be capable of
4 supporting the contention that it's a different person
5 calling this time, even though only two minutes had 14:38
6 elapsed, the warning period had contracted to
7 15 minutes?

8 A. That's right, yes.

9 431 Q. So, we move forward please to our row 223 which is the
10 third of the warning calls. This one from the 14:38
11 McGeough's Crossroads --

12 A. Yes.

13 432 Q. -- to the Omagh Samaritans?

14 A. Yes.

15 433 Q. Remind ourselves that like UTV, Omagh Samaritans had 14:39
16 been called during the test call sequence?

17 A. It had, yes.

18 434 Q. And that that was diverted to the Coleraine
19 Samaritans --

20 A. Yes. 14:39

21 435 Q. -- where it was answered by a person giving the name
22 Hilary?

23 A. That's right, yes.

24 436 Q. Let's get this sequence clear in our heads. The first
25 call from McGeough's Crossroads at 2:29, this one, two 14:39
26 minutes later?

27 A. Yes.

28 437 Q. Do you agree?

29 A. I do.

1 438 Q. To a different location?

2 A. Yes.

3 439 Q. And approximately concurrent with this call is the call
4 from the second crossroads, namely Loyes Crossroads,
5 that one going to UTV?

14:39

6 A. Correct.

7 MS. BRIGGS: Hilary's statement to the RUC dated 15th
8 August 1998 recorded that she was known as "Hilary" and
9 was a volunteer worker within the Samaritans at
10 Coleraine. She described that on the day of the
11 bombing at 2:34 she received a telephone call in the
12 Coleraine office from a male caller. We know, Sir,
13 that the call was in fact made at 2:31 from the call
14 record.

14:40

15 14:40

16 Hilary said that the male caller gave her the following
17 message, "Am I through to Omagh?" Hilary replied, "no"
18 and informed the caller that he was through to
19 Coleraine. Hilary said that the caller then continued
20 saying: "This is a bomb warning." She said that the
21 caller stated that it was going to go off in the centre
22 of Omagh in 30 minutes' time. She asked if there was a
23 code, she said that the caller gave a code, "which I
24 couldn't make out." She said she actually asked him to
25 repeat it three times but she said she still couldn't
26 make it out. She asked the caller to spell it, she
27 said that he did so and she spelt it back to him and he
28 agreed that it was correct. She asked him to clarify
29 whereabouts in Omagh as she didn't know the town and he

14:40

14:40

1 said, "Main Street, about 200 yards up from the
2 courthouse." She said that the caller hung up and she
3 said that she immediately telephoned the police using
4 999. And we will again shortly hear that, Sir.

14:41

6 Hilary stated: "I did not pick up any distinct accent
7 from the caller but I can say that he sounded sober and
8 I would say that the caller was neither old nor very
9 young and he spoke with quite a gentle voice." She
10 said that the telephone system did not operate a caller 14:41
11 display nor did it have the 1471 facility. She said:
12 "The only reason his call could have come to Coleraine
13 are if he dialled the direct line or if he dialled our
14 24-hour number, which is a central number which
15 automatically diverts calls to any office, or, finally, 14:42
16 his call to our Omagh office was diverted to Coleraine
17 as we cover calls to Omagh every Saturday until
18 2:00 p.m. and for some reason today the diversion was
19 not lifted at 2:00 p.m."

14:42

21 She said that she had made Detective Constable Devine
22 aware of the code word used. Detective Constable
23 Devine's statement said that Hilary gave him the code
24 word, "Martha Pope."

14:42

26 In her evidence to the Coroner's Court on 6th September
27 2000 Hilary said in relation to street names that the
28 caller said, "200 yards from the courthouse, High
29 Street, the Main Street." She said: "I do not know

1 Omagh so I assume High Street is the Main Street." She
2 said she told the police High Street and she stated,
3 "as far as I remember he said it was 200 yards from the
4 courthouse in the High Street." She also said that she
5 thought this was her first warning call.

14:43

6 440 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Before you press play,
7 Mr. Safranauskas, can I just make very clear that we
8 are about to hear the second recording. This is not
9 subject to your ruling today, Sir, which means it
10 should be broadcast, it does not need to be muted.

14:43

11
12 We're at row 224, we're at 14:31 and before we play on
13 let's just connect some dots. This is Margaret Hall
14 calling PC Wesley Francis. If we turn back to row 222,
15 we see that that second call came into Margaret Hall,
16 the second one that she had received from the Loyes
17 Crossroads and she is now relaying it to RUC Regional
18 Control where she speaks to PC Wesley Francis?

14:43

19 A. Correct.

20 441 Q. If we, can in those circumstances, play on now.
21 [Telephone call played]. Mr. Safranauskas, we're going
22 to move to Omagh and our row 225. [Presentation
23 played]. Just pause it there for a moment please. We
24 are looking at our row 225, it's 14:32, an internal
25 communication within the Omagh RUC Station, is that
26 right?

14:44

27 A. Yes, that's right.

28 442 Q. Again, if we just keep a finger in where we are, but
29 move back to row 221, we can see that PC Mullan from

14:45

1 Belfast called PC Hall in Omagh and this is PC Hall
2 notifying PC Martin Millar?

3 A. Correct.

4 443 Q. We're going to see, in due course, that it is PC Martin
5 Millar who receives the information about the later 14:45
6 warning calls as well before making the broadcast?

7 A. That's right, yes.

8 MS. BRIGGS: Sir, Constable Hall said in his statement
9 that on finishing the telephone call with Belfast
10 Regional Control, Constable Mullan, the entry at 221, 14:46
11 he said that he immediately telephoned the
12 Communications Room in Omagh, that's this call, and
13 informed the operator of the contents of the call he
14 had received. And, Sir, we will return to
15 Constable Millar's account and others shortly. 14:46

16 444 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Next, row 226, we're going to play in
17 a moment but I'm going to make this clear, that this
18 next piece of audio is not subject to the Restriction
19 Order, so it can be played, it does not need to be
20 muted. But we can see that this is the call from 14:46
21 Hilary at the Samaritans in Coleraine to PC Gary Murphy
22 at the Coleraine RUC communications centre. Again, if
23 we just take a step back, we will see that Hilary
24 received the called from the public call box at row 223
25 and she is now relaying that to the RUC? 14:47

26 A. That's right, yes.

27 MR. DE LE POER: So, we can play this and it can be
28 broadcast. [Telephone call played].

29 MS. BRIGGS: During his evidence to the inquest, Sir,

1 on 7th September 2000, Constable Murphy said that he,
2 at that time, had no knowledge of the meaning of
3 "Martha Pope," which he said was the code word given to
4 him.

5 445 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Row 227 concerns an internal RUC call, 14:49
6 this is PC Wesley Francis. We can see that PC Wesley
7 Francis received at 224 the information from
8 Margaret Hall about the second warning call?

9 A. That's right, yes.

10 446 Q. He PC Francis calling or contacting from Belfast, 14:49
11 contacts the Omagh RUC Station and provides information
12 to PC Martin Millar?

13 A. Yes, that's right.

14 MS. BRIGGS: Constable Francis' statement said that on
15 ending the 999 call he received from Margaret Hall he 14:50
16 immediately telephoned Omagh Communications to give
17 those further details. Constable Francis said he did
18 not know who he spoke to but he relayed the man in
19 Omagh Communications what he had been told, that the
20 same caller had phoned the UTV newsroom and given the 14:50
21 code word "Malta" or "Martha Pope" and that the bomb in
22 Omagh Town was now going to go off in 15 minutes.
23 Constable Francis said that the communications man -
24 that's PC Millar - informed him that they had a car
25 already responding to the initial call. And again, 14:50
26 Sir, we'll return to Constable Millar's account
27 shortly.

28 447 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Indeed, we stay at row 228 with
29 Constable Millar who, at this stage, so after he has

1 been notified of two warning calls, contacts Sergeant
2 Philip Marshall also of the Omagh RUC Station. Play on
3 and Ms. Briggs will help us with some detail.
4 [Presentation played]. Just pause there. You have
5 indicated the location of the bomb car which, by this 14:51
6 stage, as we saw yesterday, was parked outside
7 SD Kells?
8 A. Correct, yes.
9 448 Q. That's in our bottom right-hand corner?
10 A. Yes. 14:52
11 MS. BRIGGS: Sir, in his statement dated 18th August
12 1998, Sergeant Philip Marshall said that on the day of
13 the bomb, at approximately 2:30, he was in Omagh RUC
14 Station when he was informed by the communications
15 officers, Constable Millar and Reserve Constable 14:52
16 McNally that they had received a report of a bomb
17 scare. Sergeant Marshall said it was alleged that a
18 bomb had been planted in the Main Street at the
19 courthouse and that a code worded been given. He
20 described instructing the communications officers to 14:52
21 task two mobile crews to go immediately to the scene
22 and commence clearing the area.
23 449 Q. MR. DE LA POER: We are going to see, Mr. Safranauskas,
24 as we play on the presentation, to the next entry which
25 is 229 on our timeline -- 14:53
26 A. Yes.
27 450 Q. -- that having contacted Sergeant Philip Marshall,
28 PC Millar is involved in another communication, this
29 time from the Coleraine RUC Station?

1 A. Yes.

2 451 Q. So, again if we look back up to where we were, row 226,
3 Hilary contacted PC Gary Murphy?

4 A. Yes.

5 452 Q. And now PC Gary Murphy, within a very short period of 14:53
6 time, is contacting PC Martin Millar who is now
7 receiving notice of the third warning call?

8 A. That's right, yes.

9 MS. BRIGGS: In a statement dated 20th May 1999,
10 Constable Murphy said that on the end of his 999 call 14:53
11 received from Hilary at Samaritans, he immediately
12 telephoned Omagh Communications. He said that
13 initially he was ringing a wrong number but then did he
14 get through to the Communications Room. He said that
15 he didn't know who he was talking to but he gave them 14:54
16 the message as he had received it. He said that the
17 person - that's Constable Millar - informed him that
18 they had already been informed of similar calls.

19 453 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Mr. Safranauskas, we're now
20 approaching the stage where we are going to have the 14:54
21 broadcast, which is the subject of a Restriction Order.
22 Before we do we're going to consider the Command and
23 Control log?

24 A. Yes.

25 454 Q. So, we will just press play please. [Presentation 14:54
26 played]. 14:33. would you like to just draw our
27 attention, please, to what we are looking at here?

28 A. So, this is the first logging of the bomb warning call
29 from Margaret Hall or Maggie from UTV saying there:

1 "Male caller to UTV bombing to go off in 30 minutes
2 near the courthouse Main Street. 500lbs, code word
3 Malta Pope." And then it goes on to say, "no
4 organisation mentioned here."
5 455 Q. If you'd like to just, treading carefully, 14:55
6 Mr. Safranauskas, move us on to the next entry.
7 [Presentation played]. We are now zooming into Omagh,
8 if you'd like to just pause it there please. Thank you
9 very much, indeed. Sir, can I just make clear that
10 we're about to play the broadcast of PC Martin Millar, 14:55
11 which was subject to your Restriction Order. The audio
12 will continue to play right now so everybody can hear
13 but the effect of that Restriction Order is that the
14 contents of that transmission, so far as the audio is
15 concerned, will not be broadcast, so in the hearing 14:56
16 room we will hear it, however, anybody outside the
17 hearing room will not hear it and that will be achieved
18 by the volume being muted during the duration of it,
19 however the contents of that warning call will, forgive
20 me that, radio transmission, will be visible on the 14:56
21 screen as the transcript is recorded. So, we'll just
22 move forward now and we're going to hear, aren't we,
23 Mr. Safranauskas, PC Martin Millar's first radio
24 transmission referring to the bomb threats and I
25 repeat, because it's important we get this right, that 14:56
26 that audio is not to be broadcast outside of this room.
27 [Telephone call played].
28
29 Mr. Safranauskas, that concludes that radio broadcast.

1 A. It does, yes.

2 456 Q. Are we going to now see timed at 14:36 another Command
3 and Control entry?

4 A. We are, yes.

5 457 Q. And let's take us to that, and identify please for us 14:58
6 what we are looking at?

7 A. [Presentation played]. So, we're now looking at the
8 fourth line down, stating the second call received at
9 UTV newsroom, the time now giving a 15-minute warning.
10 And it now states: "The caller stated he was IRA". 14:58

11 458 Q. Finally, details passed to Omagh by landline?

12 A. That's right, yes.

13 459 Q. So, next we have an entry at 14:37, this is PC George
14 Mullan, PC Mullan is the recipient of the first call
15 from Margaret Hall, is that right? 14:59

16 A. Yes.

17 460 Q. That's our row 219, and here we have him calling her
18 back?

19 A. Yes, that's right.

20 MS. BRIGGS: Sir, Constable Mullan in his 18th May 1999 14:59
21 statement said that he contacted Maggie at UTV to
22 ascertain from her if they could activate their 1471
23 system in relation to the origin of the bomb call, but
24 she informed him that they were unable to use that
25 facility. He said, "it was 2:37 when that happened" 14:59
26 and he made an entry on the computer log to that
27 effect.

28

29 Sir, if I can now go to Constable Millar's account, as

1 I promised that I would. Constable Martin Millar's
2 first statement of 9th September 1998 recorded that on
3 the day of the bombing he was detailed by
4 Sergeant Marshall to Communications. At 2:32 he said
5 he received a call from FIC Belfast - that's Force
6 Information Control - via the Command and Control
7 Terminal reporting that a bomb warning had been
8 received at UTV stating there was a bomb in Main Street
9 Omagh, around the courthouse and that it would go off
10 in 30 minutes.

15:00

15:00

11
12 He said that he informed Sergeant Marshall of those
13 facts and we've heard about that earlier, Sir. That's
14 entry 228 on the timeline.

15:00

15
16 Sergeant Marshall instructed him to task the mobiles to
17 clear the area.

18
19 His second statement of 3rd December 1998 outlined the
20 same facts, in particular, that the message received by
21 him via Command and Control reported that Maggie in UTV
22 had received a bomb warning from a male person "bomb to
23 go off in 30 minutes near the courthouse, Main Street,
24 500lbs, code word Martha Pope." He said that no
25 organisation was mentioned.

15:01

15:01

26
27 In his statement of 9th September 1998,
28 Constable Millar then went on to say that at 2:33 he
29 received another bomb warning via the Command and

1 Control Terminal from Coleraine RUC Station stating
2 that Samaritans in Coleraine had received a phone call
3 stating that there was a bomb in Omagh Town Centre near
4 the courthouse, 200 yards. The code word "Martha Pope"
5 was given. Constable Millar said that he was made 15:02
6 aware that the same code word was given when Banbridge
7 Town Centre had been damaged by a bomb earlier that
8 year. He said that he relayed that information to the
9 call signs clearing the area. And we have, Sir, heard
10 that. 15:02

11
12 In his second statement of 3rd December 1998 he said
13 that he became aware of the same coded warning being
14 used in Banbridge via a phone call from Force Incident
15 Control. He also said that he told call signs to pay 15:02
16 attention to Land Rover-type vehicles or cars which
17 appeared to be heavily laden.

18
19 He described how over the next half hour he received
20 various radio transmissions for car checks. 15:02

21
22 In his third statement dated 26th May 1999 he described
23 how there was another communications officer working
24 with him, Reserve Constable McNally which he said was
25 the norm. He said that on the day of the bomb 15:03
26 Reserve Constable McNally had gone for his lunch at
27 around 1:45 leaving him as the sole operator. He said
28 that at 2:34 he received a message via the Atlas
29 Command and Control computer system about the bomb

1 warning saying: "Bomb to go off 30 minutes near the
2 courthouse, Main Street, 500lbs, code word Malta Pope."

3
4 He said that he was unable to recall receiving the
5 initial warning, the initial warning by telephone by 15:03
6 Belfast Regional Control but he said it was possible
7 that the telephone call was received by someone else
8 who would happen to be in the Communications Room and
9 would have answered the phone as he had been engaged in
10 some other task. 15:03

11
12 He said that at the beginning of the incident he could
13 not recall who, if anyone, was in the Communications
14 Room with him. He received the telephone call at
15 2:32 hrs which he described as having been recorded by 15:03
16 the computer as well as all the entries he made to the
17 log.

18
19 He went on to describe informing Sergeant Marshall, by
20 telephone, as we've touched on already, which he said 15:04
21 was the first thing he did on receiving the 2:32 call,
22 and then receiving the call from Coleraine
23 Communications regarding the Samaritans warning call.
24 He said that he informed the Coleraine operator that he
25 had already received a similar warning from Belfast 15:04
26 Regional Control. The operator informed him that he
27 would send the details down via Command and Control
28 anyway.
29

1 He also described that in and around the same time he
2 received a further telephone call from Belfast Regional
3 Control with the operator informing him that UTV had
4 received a further warning now, giving 15 minutes for
5 the bomb to go off and the same code word had been used 15:04
6 when the bomb exploded in Banbridge.
7
8 Constable Millar said that he relayed this information
9 via radio to call signs.
10 15:05
11 He said that after another five to 10 minutes Reserve
12 Constable McNally returned to the Communications Room
13 and took over the responsibility of the radio
14 transmissions leaving him free to update the Command
15 and Control system as the incident progressed. 15:05
16 461 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Mr. Safranauskas, would you like to
17 play on to our next entry please. [Presentation
18 played]. Pause it there please. So, we're here
19 dealing with row 232?
20 A. Yes. 15:05
21 462 Q. The time please, Mr. Safranauskas?
22 A. 14:37:52.
23 463 Q. Duration of this call?
24 A. 17 seconds.
25 464 Q. This is by the red phone, 430, provisionally attributed 15:06
26 to Liam Campbell, to the pink phone, 971, provisionally
27 attributed to Peter Campbell?
28 A. That's right, yes.
29 465 Q. If we just remind ourselves, if the Inquiry's working

1 hypothesis is right that the operator of that red 430
2 phone is acting as a liaison with those who went to
3 Omagh and making or coordinating warning calls, then
4 this call to the 971 pink phone is within six minutes
5 of the last of those calls? 15:06

6 A. That's right, yes.

7 466 Q. And indeed within eight minutes of the first of those
8 calls?

9 A. Yes.

10 467 Q. 233, if we move on please. We're going to come back to 15:06
11 the cell site in a moment. [Presentation played].
12 Here we have a Command and Control entry which inserts
13 between rows 233 and 234, just take us to the relevant
14 parts of this, I think we can see this relates to the
15 warning call that went to Hilary? 15:07

16 A. It does, yes. And it states that bomb warning was
17 received at the Samaritans Centre Coleraine with the
18 effect that a "bomb was going to go off in Omagh Town
19 Centre near the courthouse (200 yards)," again the code
20 word given was "Marta Pope." 15:07

21 468 Q. This is the digital record of the information that's
22 coming in being stored at an understandably short lag
23 from when it's actually received?

24 A. Correct, yes.

25 469 Q. Let's continue please with what is happening at 14:38. 15:07
26 [Presentation played]. Back to the red phone, here at
27 row 233 we have an answer phone check?

28 A. Yes.

29 470 Q. And the Mullyash Mountain cell site is used for the

1 purpose of that call?

2 A. Yes.

3 471 Q. Once that answer phone is checked for a period of
4 22 seconds, almost immediately we see an incoming call
5 to that same red phone? 15:08

6 A. We do, yes.

7 472 Q. This is our dark blue 585 scout car phone?

8 A. Yes.

9 473 Q. Let's just pick out some of what we've seen. That
10 phone was last seen using either College or Pigeon Top, 15:09
11 is that right?

12 A. Yes, it was.

13 474 Q. And here we can see now that a cell site at Cranlome
14 was being used some distance away from Omagh?

15 A. Yes. 15:09

16 475 Q. That's the blue beacon near the top of the page for
17 585?

18 A. Yes.

19 476 Q. And the red 430 phone provisionally attributed to
20 Liam Campbell is using the Mullyash Mountain cell site 15:09
21 to receive this call?

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 477 Q. And this is a 10-second call?

24 A. Yes.

25 478 Q. So, again if we just consider the working hypothesis; 15:09
26 the scout car phone 585, and 980, the bomb car phone,
27 travelled to Omagh, we'll hear from Dr. Tart but this
28 may be consistent with them having moved away from
29 Omagh having parked the car sometime around 20 past or

1 25 past two. We're about 15 or so minutes on from
2 that, do you agree?

3 A. I do, yes.

4 479 Q. And to the south and to the east the sell mast --

5 A. Yes. 15:10

6 480 Q. -- that handles that call. Concurrently, we see the
7 red 430 provisionally attributed to Liam Campbell, that
8 is using a cell site which, again, is very close to the
9 Border?

10 A. Yes. 15:10

11 481 Q. And it is to the west of the cell sites that were being
12 used around the time of the warning calls?

13 A. Yes.

14 482 Q. I think what you have done next, Mr. Safranauskas, to
15 try and pull all of this together for the 430 handset, 15:10
16 is you're going to show us the sequence of calls which
17 cut between the Part 4 that we saw yesterday and
18 Part 5, sometime around the time of about 2:20 through
19 to about 2:40, so that we can see the cells that that
20 phone was using to handle all of those calls? 15:11

21 A. The cells coupled with the phones that it was actually
22 in contact with as well.

23 483 Q. And I think the final data point will be the location
24 of the public call boxes?

25 A. Correct. 15:11

26 484 Q. So, let's just walk us through this now?

27 A. Okay.

28 485 Q. We're going back in time, just to recap, to bring us
29 back up to date so that we can see the sequence?

1 A. Yes.

2 486 Q. All of this taking place north of Dundalk?

3 A. Yes.

4 487 Q. The 2:10 call, that's with the scout car phone
5 provisionally attributed to Seamus Daly at a time 15:11
6 shortly before the bomb car parks?

7 A. Yes.

8 488 Q. And we can see the Clermont Carn cell site being used?

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 489 Q. That cell site located just south of the Border? 15:12

11 A. Yes.

12 490 Q. Okay. Play on please. [Presentation played]. We can
13 then see, if we just pause there, that by 14:19, that
14 red phone has received the 58-second/59-second call
15 from Man A, Patrick 'Mooch' Blair? 15:12

16 A. That's right, yes.

17 491 Q. And that is being handled, so far as the 430 handset,
18 by the same Clermont Carn cell site?

19 A. That's right, yes.

20 492 Q. Now, you have brought up, at this stage, it's just come 15:12
21 up, just off the centre the red beacon for the location
22 of McGeough's Crossroads?

23 A. Yes.

24 493 Q. Which is from the location of the first warning call?

25 A. Yes. 15:12

26 494 Q. If we pause there. At about the time of the first
27 warning call we can see that the 430 handset is now
28 being handled by Camlough Hill?

29 A. Yes.

1 495 Q. And that is a location closer in distance in terms of
2 the cell mast and the call box, do you agree, than the
3 previous one?
4 A. Yes, yes.

5 496 Q. And it is further to the west if we were to move across 15:13
6 the screen?
7 A. Correct, yes.

8 497 Q. Keep going please. [Presentation played]. Pause
9 there. We see that you have added in the next piece of
10 information here, the Loyes Crossroads, that's just off 15:13
11 centre and below the McGeough's Crossroads, do you
12 agree?
13 A. I do, yes.

14 498 Q. So that warning call going from 14:31 Loyes Crossroads
15 marked on the map near Silverbridge? 15:13
16 A. Yes.

17 499 Q. And we know that there is a second warning call from
18 the McGeough's Crossroads?
19 A. We do, yes.

20 500 Q. You've marked that. Here, 14:37, that call involving 15:14
21 the pink 971 Peter Campbell phone. If you JUST press
22 on a second you'll see location right on the Border
23 there?
24 A. Yes.

25 501 Q. Very much to the straight west of Camlough Hill? 15:14
26 A. Yes, that's right.

27 502 Q. And between those two cell masts we see that there are
28 those two public call boxes?
29 A. That's right, yes.

1 503 Q. Then continuing, the Mullyash Mountain being used also
2 to handle the Seamus Daly provisional attribution 585?
3 A. Correct.
4 504 Q. And that is when that handset is using the cell outside
5 of Omagh to the south and to the east of Cranlome? 15:15
6 A. Yes.
7 505 Q. Do we see that the cell mast - and this doesn't reflect
8 their coverage areas, that's not what's to be
9 understood from this - they form an arc, their physical
10 locations around the top of those two public call 15:15
11 boxes?
12 A. Yes, that's what can be seen, yes.
13 506 Q. We'll hear from Dr. Tart about what we might make of
14 all of this, but that brings together all of the data
15 that we've looked at across Part 4 and 5 for 430? 15:15
16 A. It does, yes.
17 507 Q. Thank you very much, indeed.
18
19 [Presentation played]. So, we now go to 14:39, not in
20 our timeline but just inserted here the Command and 15:16
21 Control log, we've got an entry there, "details passed
22 to Omagh Comms by telephone"?
23 A. Yes.
24 508 Q. Again, a slight but understandable lag between the
25 action and the record of that being inputted into the 15:16
26 computer?
27 A. Yes, and to finish it, it's just linking all the
28 incidents together.
29 509 Q. And do you see that within standard police work that

1 where a person identifies that there are connections
2 between events that the incident number of one is put
3 in the log of the other so that cross-referencing can
4 take place?

5 A. Yes, that's exactly it. 15:16

6 510 Q. That's what we're seeing here?

7 A. Yes.

8 511 Q. If we move forward please, we're going to move now to
9 the military.

10 A. Yes. 15:17

11 512 Q. [Presentation played]. Just pause there, Lisanelly
12 Barracks marked by you?

13 A. Yes.

14 513 Q. Relative to the courthouse?

15 A. Yes. 15:17

16 514 Q. The time is 14:40?

17 A. Yes.

18 515 Q. And let us see this contact, I think, between Captain
19 Peebles and Major John Rupert James?

20 A. Yes. 15:17

21 MR. DE LE POER: We're going to hear from
22 Captain Peebles tomorrow but before we do we have some
23 further summary to provide by way of context to what is
24 on screen.

25 MS. BRIGGS: Sir, the Inquiry's statement of 15:17
26 Captain Peebles dated 24th October 2025 recorded he was
27 the Company Operations Officer of A Company at the time
28 of the bomb. He confirmed that he kept the
29 watchkeeper's Log on the day of the bomb which he said

1 would have been rewritten at the end of the shift to
2 account for shorthand notes, memo notes or scraps of
3 paper which recorded what was occurring.

4
5 He said that prior to the warning he recalled a routine 15:18
6 quiet Saturday morning with nothing significant to
7 report from the night watch. In his statement, he
8 described what was recorded in the Watchkeeper's Log.

9 He said that at 2:40 p.m. the Intelligence Cell
10 verbally informed the Operations Room that the RUC had 15:18
11 received a bomb warning in Omagh Town. He said that
12 the Intelligence Cell was located next to the Battle
13 Group Operations Room and they were told in person. He
14 said that he believed, at this stage, that the

15 Intelligence Cell stressed that the RUC was 15:18
16 significantly concerned but he said there was, to use
17 his words, "very little more than that" and that the
18 Intelligence Cell had, he said, "nothing else to give"
19 him. He said his reaction was to ask for as much
20 information as possible. 15:19

21
22 He said that Major Rupert James, the Officer Commanding
23 of the Company was informed. He said in his 2025
24 statement interpreting the log, that he would have
25 phoned Major James. He also said how the brigade were 15:19
26 informed of what was known either by himself or by
27 phone as well as other subordinate locations being
28 Lisnaskea and Clogher Operations Room who were told
29 there was a bomb threat. He also described taking a

1 number of other actions such as phoning the Commanding
2 officer's house and speaking to his wife who he
3 informed there had been a bomb warning and he said that
4 he needed to speak to the Commanding Officer as soon as
5 possible. He said that the Commanding Officer was then 15:19
6 paged. And we'll hear more from Captain Peebles
7 tomorrow, Sir.

8 MR. DE LA POER: I'm conscious that we've been going
9 for an hour and 20 minutes and we didn't take a break
10 between this witness and the previous one and I just 15:20
11 wonder whether that will be a convenient moment?

12 CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think it would be.

13 MR. DE LA POER: Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN: It's 3:20, Mr. de la Poer, what time would
15 you suggest we reconvene? 15:20

16 MR. DE LA POER: I think if we reconvene at half past,
17 we should finish in good time today.

18
19 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED BRIEFLY AND RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:

20
21 CHAIRMAN: Mr. de la Poer.

22 MR. DE LA POER: Thank you, Sir.

23
24 MR. MARK SAFRANAUSKAS WAS CONTINUED TO BE QUESTIONED BY
25 MR. DE LA POER AS FOLLOWS:

26
27 516 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Mr. Safranauskas, our next entry, if
28 you can play on from this, this was the notification
29 from Captain Peebles to Major James?

1 A. Yes.

2 517 Q. [Presentation played]. We're going to see another
3 internal contact within the Army?

4 A. We are, yes.

5 518 Q. So, pausing there please. Sergeant Adam Modd, an 15:33
6 ammunition technical officer, in other words, the
7 person with expertise in bomb disposal, received a
8 notification at 14:40, he was based in Lisanelly
9 Barracks?

10 A. Yes. 15:33

11 519 Q. What I can say here, and I'll address this to
12 everybody, that the Inquiry Legal Team have done a
13 comprehensive summary of much of the detail surrounding
14 the internal communications within the Army and how it
15 was passed up the chain of command, we're not going to 15:34
16 go through that together, Mr. Safranauskas, it will be
17 published on the website, Sir, and we know that as it
18 is published it will form just as much part of the
19 evidence as anything said in this hearing room. But,
20 we're going to move on, please, from Sergeant Modd's 15:34
21 notification to what is going to be the focus of much
22 of tomorrow, so if we could move on please
23 Mr. Safranauskas. So this is the Daily Occurrence
24 Book, it was being operated by 1 QLR at Lisanelly
25 Barracks, is that your understanding? 15:34

26 A. It is, yes.

27 520 Q. As I say, we're going to hear firsthand evidence about
28 this tomorrow, but we're going to move to the entry
29 that is recorded as being 14:40?

1 A. Yes.

2 521 Q. And that, as we can see, is given the serial number
3 386, which has just moved off the slide there, but it's
4 386, isn't it?

5 A. It is, yes. 15:35

6 522 Q. We can see the entry reads, "15 August '98, 14:40 hrs"?

7 A. Yes.

8 523 Q. It says, "RUC net and in this version that's underlined
9 in red?"

10 A. Yes. 15:35

11 524 Q. And then it reads as follows, "overheard on RUC net:
12 'RUC HQ Belfast have received warnings over bombs in
13 several towns province wide, including Omagh. The
14 Omagh bomb is believed to be in the area of the
15 courthouse. It is believed to be in the region of 15:35
16 500lbs. It was a Banbridge-type code word warning'."

17

18 So that's how the entry reads. There is more text to
19 the right, isn't there?

20 A. There is, yes. 15:36

21 525 Q. I wonder if we just play on there. [Presentation
22 played]. It may be in fact we just need to take it
23 back slightly, Mr. Safranauskas, before we have the
24 zoom-in, just so that everybody can see the context.
25 There we are, thank you very much indeed. So we can 15:36
26 see some more text, if you could just indicate where
27 that is in the right-hand column?

28 A. Yes.

29 526 Q. We're going to hear about some of that as well and we

1 just note at this stage nothing more, that the serial
2 above, 385, is dated 15th August?

3 A. Yes.

4 527 Q. There is then a time written?

5 A. Yes. 15:36

6 528 Q. I'm not going to attempt to interpret that now, it may
7 be contentious, it may not be. We then see a VENGEFUL
8 reference and we can see that's in a different coloured
9 pen and what appears to be different handwriting, the
10 entry appears to relate to 15th August 1998 at 15:37
11 15:21 hrs?

12 A. That's right, yes.

13 529 Q. So that's handwritten above, and below serial 387, we
14 can see that is timed at 15:05?

15 A. Yes. 15:37

16 530 Q. So a minute after we know the bomb detonated, and there
17 is an entry, "Lance Corporal Thompson"?

18 A. Yes.

19 531 Q. And "large bomb has exploded, location unknown."

20 A. Correct. 15:37

21 532 Q. And we are going to hear from witnesses tomorrow who
22 are going to seek to assist the Inquiry in relation to
23 that serial 386 entry, and one of those that we are
24 going to hear from, not tomorrow but on 8th October, as
25 is currently scheduled, will be Lance Corporal 15:37
26 Thompson?

27 A. Okay.

28 533 Q. But for now we'll move on, please, from the Daily
29 Occurrence Book, which is our entry 237. And having

1 seen it zoomed in for one more time, we'll see the next
2 event in the sequence. [Presentation played]. So,
3 pause it here please, Mr. Safranauskas. We know that
4 there was a telephone call from PC Martin Millar to
5 Sergeant Philip Marshall, that was at 14:32, our 15:38
6 row 228, is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 534 Q. We know then at our row 230, there was the radio
9 broadcast from PC Martin Millar?

10 A. Yes. 15:39

11 535 Q. And now -- and we haven't given it a specific time
12 because it takes place over a number of minutes,
13 doesn't it?

14 A. It does, yes.

15 536 Q. You have created a presentation of the deployment of 15:39
16 police officers into and around Omagh Town Centre?

17 A. I have, yes.

18 537 Q. And you have done this by reference to their witness
19 statements and call signs?

20 A. Yes. 15:39

21 538 Q. You were assisted, I think, by the PSNI sequence of
22 events statement as you built this presentation?

23 A. I was, yes.

24 539 Q. So, we're just going to see a record in this
25 presentation of that deployment? 15:39

26 A. Yes.

27 540 Q. A final point before you press play, we see the
28 courthouse just to the left of centre, we see "High
29 Street" mentioned to the right as labelled there, that

1 then turns into Market Street and towards the bottom by
2 the Campsie Road junction we see SD Kells where, at
3 this time, the bomb car is parked?
4 A. Correct.
5 541 Q. We'll play on please. [Presentation played]. So, just 15:40
6 pause as we go so that everybody can keep up with this
7 information. You've identified the call signs - by
8 call signs we mean the LO70 or LO71?
9 A. Yes.
10 542 Q. And the individuals attributed to that call sign? 15:40
11 A. Correct.
12 543 Q. We know from their witness statements and other
13 evidence where it was that they deployed?
14 A. Yes.
15 544 Q. Obviously, we recognise they're not static, they're 15:40
16 moving but you have indicated a location that they were
17 concerned with?
18 A. Yes, that's right.
19 545 Q. So, keep building please. LO19. LU70. Further
20 officers up on the High Street part of the one-way 15:41
21 system around the courthouse?
22 A. Yes.
23 546 Q. Then you have given an indication plotting where you
24 understand those officers were?
25 A. Yes. 15:41
26 547 Q. You've also marked the location, as you understand it,
27 of police cordons using the yellow symbol?
28 A. Yes.
29 548 Q. We have one there, one there, and one at the end of

1 High Street and Bridge Street?

2 A. Yes.

3 549 Q. So, we move on from 238 to consider 239. We're going
4 to play this as a pair with 240, we'll just deal with
5 the information here first. So, we have the 15:42
6 provisionally attributed Oliver Treanor 406 pale blue
7 phone to the red 430 Liam Campbell phone?

8 A. Yes.

9 550 Q. We have cell site information for the red phone, it had
10 previously been over towards the Border, as it ran 15:42
11 north-south near where we see the word "Castleblayney,"
12 is that right?

13 A. I believe it was Mulliyash Mountain, the cell site, yes.

14 551 Q. Exactly. Now, some ten minutes or so later it is using
15 the cell site at Clermont Carn? 15:42

16 A. Yes, that's right.

17 552 Q. We haven't included any of the cell site data for 406?

18 A. No.

19 553 Q. I said they're a pair, let's play on. [Presentation
20 played]. We can see that less than three minutes later 15:43
21 we see the Town Glass mobile telephone?

22 A. We do, yes.

23 554 Q. That is also contacting the 430 red Liam Campbell
24 phone?

25 A. Yes. 15:43

26 555 Q. This contact, we can see, is for a minute and 36
27 seconds?

28 A. Yes.

29 556 Q. And we have the same physical location for the cell

1 site, Clermont Carn --

2 A. Yes.

3 557 Q. -- for the 430 phone. Now, I've described them as a
4 pair. If we can, perhaps, keep our finger in page 29
5 and turn back to rows 191 and 192. We see as part of 15:43
6 the sequence of test calls at 191, so earlier in the
7 day at the time that the bomb car and scout car were
8 under way on their journey, that there was a call to
9 the Town Glass landline from Barney's Filling Station
10 followed in short order by a call from the same call 15:44
11 box to that purple 144 phone that we've just been
12 looking at?

13 A. Yes, we do.

14 558 Q. So, there is a pairing of calls involving that 144 in
15 terms of the test calls. Now, if we keep, again, our 15:44
16 finger in page 29 which is where we were looking and we
17 turn forward to row 289, we're here foreshadowing what
18 we are going -- forgive me, 289, that's on page 34.
19 We're going to again see a pair of calls, I'm
20 describing them as a pair, they are separated in time 15:45
21 by about seven minutes, we can see that same pale blue
22 phone, Oliver Treanor contacting the Peter Campbell 971
23 on the provisional attributions?

24 A. Yes.

25 559 Q. And then a short time later that Town Glass 144 phone 15:45
26 contacting Liam Campbell?

27 A. We do, yes.

28 560 Q. So, there our focus is just to track the usage of 144
29 and just have a look at the calls that are being made

1 around the same time. We can see that the other
2 numbers being contacted around that time when that 144
3 is the Peter Campbell phone and the 430, you will see
4 also potentially involved the 406 pale blue phone and,
5 of course, the Town Glass landline? 15:46

6 A. Yes.

7 561 Q. Those are the phones that seem to be in use between our
8 key individuals and attributed numbers and, of course,
9 we know, don't we, that Oliver Treanor is strongly
10 associated with Town Glass as indeed is Liam Campbell 15:46
11 and Peter Campbell?

12 A. Yes, that's right.

13 562 Q. Let's go back to where we were, which was page 29 and
14 we have -- play on please. [Presentation played]. So,
15 here you have returned to the deployment that you 15:46
16 previously indicated but you've added in the
17 information we see in row 241, namely that Inspector
18 Johnston informed that John Street, George Street, High
19 Street, Market Street had been cleared and sealed off?

20 A. Correct, yes. 15:47

21 563 Q. That's the information we see at row 241 timed at
22 14:58?

23 A. Yes.

24 564 Q. So, we are here six minutes away from the detonation?

25 A. Yes. 15:47

26 565 Q. We next have a call from Inspector Johnston to
27 Superintendent William Baxter?

28 A. We do, yes.

29 MR. DE LE POER: That's timed at 15:02 and Ms. Briggs

1 is going to be able to help us with a little further
2 detail in relation to that.

3 MS. BRIGGS: Sir, in relation to both that entry and
4 the entry at 241, Inspector Johnston's RUC statement
5 said that he was the Duty Inspector on the day of the 15:47
6 bomb. He was made aware, at approximately 2:40 hrs, of
7 a report of a bomb scare at Omagh Courthouse. He said
8 that he immediately went to the Communications Centre
9 and spoke to Constable Millar and Reserve Constable
10 McNally. He was informed then about the warning call 15:48
11 from UTV which was placed at the courthouse with a
12 30-minute warning and he was told that a code word had
13 been used. He said that he ascertained at that stage
14 that a number of mobiles had been tasked and a
15 clearance operation had commenced outside the 15:48
16 courthouse. He said that he directed that personnel
17 from all of the outstations report to Omagh RUC Station
18 and that the military be informed.

19
20 He then went on to describe keeping in touch with the 15:48
21 call signs on the ground. For example, he described
22 tasking Sergeant Salters, L2 Unit to assist
23 Sergeant Marshall with the evacuation. And he said,
24 Sir, that at 2:58 hrs he was informed that John Street,
25 George's Street, High Street, Bridge Street and Market 15:49
26 Street had all been cleared and sealed off and that all
27 vehicles in John Street had been accounted for. That's
28 entry 241, Sir.

1 He described being informed by Constable Millar of a
2 second warning being received concerning a bomb being
3 planted at the courthouse. He described telephoning
4 Superintendent Baxter and telling him of the reports of
5 a bomb at the courthouse in Omagh, and he stated that 15:49
6 the area around the courthouse had been cleared.
7 That's entry 242, Sir.

8
9 And, finally Sir, Superintendent Baxter. He gave a
10 statement dated 15th September 2000 and he also 15:49
11 provided an Inquiry statement dated 24th October 2024
12 which was read into evidence, Sir, during Chapter 1 on
13 18th February 2025. His statement recorded that he was
14 the sub-divisional commander of Omagh sub-division and
15 he was off duty at the time of the bombing. He said 15:50
16 that at approximately 15:02 he received a telephone
17 call from Inspector Johnston who related that a
18 15-minute bomb warning had been received shortly after
19 2:30 in relation to Omagh Courthouse and the area was
20 being cleared. Superintendent Baxter said that he 15:50
21 advised Inspector Johnston to ensure that a full
22 evacuation was completed before terminating the call.
23 Thank you, Sir.

24 566 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Mr. Safranauskas, we have one last
25 entry to deal with. I'm going to provide a warning in 15:50
26 relation to what we're about to see in case there's
27 anybody in the hearing room or watching who doesn't
28 want to see this photograph. This is a photograph, can
29 you confirm, that the witness evidence suggests was

1 taken about five minutes before the moment of
2 detonation?

3 A. It was, yes.

4 567 Q. It is a photograph which shows the position of the bomb
5 car? 15:51

6 A. Yes.

7 568 Q. Parked, as it was, on the road outside SD kells?

8 A. Yes.

9 569 Q. And it has, as its subject, a man in a yellow top with
10 a child on their shoulders? 15:51

11 A. Yes.

12 570 Q. So, I just pause for a moment to ensure that everybody
13 who is in the room here has an opportunity to leave, if
14 they wish to, and anybody watching this feed to step
15 away. So, if we play on please. [Presentation 15:51
16 played]. Pause when the photograph comes up. So, just
17 pausing there, Mr. Safranauskas, we can see to the
18 right-hand side of the image right in the foreground is
19 the bomb car on its cloned plates, MDZ 5211?

20 A. We can, yes. 15:52

21 571 Q. The person taking the photograph is looking down Market
22 Street towards the Campsie Road junction?

23 A. Yes.

24 572 Q. And the road extending beyond the junction is Campsie
25 Road? 15:52

26 A. That's right, yes.

27 573 Q. So, if we use this photograph as a means to understand
28 some of the evidence that we've heard. The evidence
29 from the Martins had them driving towards the camera

1 from that Campsie Road following the bomb car?

2 A. Yes.

3 574 Q. And it had them turning off while the bomb car moved
4 straight ahead?

5 A. That's right, yes. 15:52

6 575 Q. And there, of course, we won't go over it, there exists
7 a question in the evidence about whether it continued
8 up Market Street and went around the courthouse, were
9 Mr. Bridge found to be reliable, or whether it pulled
10 straight over to the location that we see here? 15:52

11 A. Yes.

12 MR. DE LE POER: Thank you very much indeed. We can
13 conclude this presentation now. The details around
14 that photograph from part of the Inquiry Legal Team
15 summary. 15:53

16

17 Sir, can I indicate that that concludes the evidence of
18 the presentation for Part 5. As you know, and has been
19 said a number of times, tomorrow is going to be focused
20 principally on military witnesses both corporate and 15:53
21 eyewitness, and we'll also hear from a witness from the
22 PSNI, all dealing with entries made within the British
23 Army contemporaneous documentation. But, for now, can
24 I invite you, please, to rise until 10:00 a.m.
25 tomorrow? 15:53

26 CHAIRMAN: And the other radio communication which was
27 the subject of the order in discussion this morning,
28 will that be played tomorrow?

29 MR. DE LA POER: That will not be played tomorrow, that

1 will be played as part of Mr. Safranauskas's
2 presentation on Thursday. So, we will not be playing
3 that tomorrow and it will come with the same warnings
4 that we dealt with today. But yes, that will not be
5 played tomorrow, that is for Thursday.

15:54

6 CHAIRMAN: Shall we sit again at ten o'clock tomorrow.

7 MR. DE LA POER: Yes, please.

8
9 THE HEARING ADJOURNED UNTIL WEDNESDAY, 30TH SEPTEMBER
10 2026 AT 10:00 A.M.

15:55

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