

1 THE INQUIRY RESUMED ON WEDNESDAY, 30TH SEPTEMBER 2026
2 AS FOLLOWS:

3
4 CHAIRMAN: Good morning, Mr. Greaney.

5 MR. GREANEY: Good morning, Sir. You will recognise 10:01
6 the witness in the witness box who was last before us
7 on Monday of this week, it is Colonel Peter MacMullen.
8 Good morning, Colonel.

9 THE WITNESS: Good morning.

10
11 COLONEL PETER MacMULLEN, HAVING BEEN RECALLED, WAS
12 QUESTIONED BY MR. GREANEY AS FOLLOWS:

13
14 1 Q. MR. GREANEY: As you will appreciate, you remain sworn.
15 This morning we're going to ask you to help us with 10:01
16 three topics which are, to some extent, connected. And
17 those three topics are; (1) British Army resources in
18 the area of Omagh on 15th August 1998; (2) the actions
19 of the British Army in the period from the first
20 warning call at 2:29 p.m. -- 10:01

21 A. Yeah.

22 2 Q. -- up until just before the explosion, so we're going
23 to cut off at 3:03 p.m. and we have been calling that
24 Part 5 of Chapter 3, as I believe you will appreciate.
25 And then, thirdly, I'm going to seek your help with a 10:01
26 topic that I will describe as the Daily Occurrence Book
27 and the watchkeeper's Log, and I understand that you
28 will know what I'm talking about when I use that
29 particular phrase?

1 A. Yeah.

2 3 Q. Now, the statements of yours that we will be using
3 today are as follows; as I indicated on Monday, you
4 gave a total, I think, of eight statements. We'll be
5 using your witness statement that deals with issues of 10:02
6 resourcing and deployment, I think you call it the
7 sequence of events statement. That's the statement
8 dated 6th November 2025, so it's your second statement.
9 And the INQ reference for that statement is 035229.

10

11 Secondly, we will be dealing, again, with your main
12 statement, namely the statement dated 11th November
13 2025, which has the INQ reference 015715. That, in
14 fact, was your third statement. And we may also need
15 to deal, to a very limited extent, with a statement you 10:03
16 provided dealing with the Daily Occurrence Book which
17 is dated 15th May of this year, INQ 041364 and that is
18 your fourth statement. So, that, I hope, provides
19 people with something of a structure for the day.

20

21 There is a lot for us to get through today, Colonel,
22 five witnesses and much evidence, so that requires the
23 two of us to be efficient in the evidence that I'm
24 going to invite you to give.

25

26 So, first of all, can we deal with the issue of British
27 Army resources on 15th August 1998. And I'm going to
28 invite you to begin, please, in your 86-page statement,
29 so the third statement, at page 29, paragraph 10.1. 10:03

1 I'll give you a moment to find that. There is, I warn
2 you, going to be a good dealing of jumping around
3 between different statements today.

4 A. Yeah, I'm happy, I'm there.

5 4 Q. What was the command structure overseeing military 10:04
6 operations in County Tyrone between 1st December '97
7 and 15th August '98?"

8 A. The area of responsibility was commanded by 8th
9 Infantry Brigade and that was commanded by
10 Brigadier Simon Young. The Deputy Commander was 10:04
11 Colonel Colin Heron, he was actually on that day in
12 command because Brigadier Young was on leave. The
13 Commanding Officer of the Omagh area was Lieutenant
14 Colonel David James who was Commanding Officer of 1st
15 Battalion Queen's Lancashire Regiment. There were 10:05
16 other units in and around that area but those are,
17 essentially, the key components that we're referring
18 to.

19 5 Q. As you told us on Monday, the resident battalion for
20 Omagh was the 1 QLR or the 1 Queen's Lancashire 10:05
21 Regiment?

22 A. Correct.

23 6 Q. Overall, was the objective of 1 QLR over that period of
24 time to conduct CT operations - I'm now at
25 paragraph 11.1? 10:05

26 A. Yes.

27 7 Q. So, that would be counter-terrorism operations?

28 A. Correct.

29 8 Q. "To support the RUC in counter-terrorism in order to

1 assist the RUC in restoring normality".

2 A. Correct.

3 9 Q. So, the role of the British Army was to support the
4 RUC. In achieving those two objectives, which we
5 agreed on Monday were intentioned, first of all 10:06
6 countering violent dissident republican terrorism
7 whilst at the same time achieving the restoration of
8 what is described as normality?

9 A. Correct.

10 10 Q. Next, please, will you go to your sequence of events 10:06
11 statement. So, this is the second statement that you
12 gave and it's the statement dated 6th November 2025.
13 Sir, if you need me to repeat the INQ numbers as we go
14 through this please just let me know.

15 A. No, I'm happy. 10:06

16 11 Q. So, if I invite you to go to paragraph 12 please?

17 A. Yeah, there.

18 12 Q. And you explain that the Omagh Battalion at the
19 relevant time was seven subunits?

20 A. Yeah, so whilst the 1 QLR Battalion itself consisted of 10:07
21 four, it was augmented to support operations in a
22 particularly large area. So, you have elements of the
23 fourth reserve were the Queen's Own Highlanders
24 Company, and you also had elements of the Royal Irish
25 Home Service Battalions, 4 Royal Irish under command at 10:07
26 that time of the Commanding Officer of 1 QLR.

27 13 Q. At paragraph 13, you tell us what the Daily Occurrence
28 Book explains but before we get to that; what was a
29 Daily Occurrence Book in 1998?

1 A. So, the Daily Occurrence Book sits --I suppose, in
2 terms of, you have elements of record keeping, daily
3 occurrence books traditionally sat into the
4 intelligence cells and they were a record of
5 intelligence, low-level intelligence-based information, 10:07
6 not necessarily a verbatim record of every event that
7 was taking place but events of note were recorded in
8 them in a chronological sequence. It's an old double
9 entry book, used in lots of environments in terms of
10 the military from guard rooms to intelligence cells. 10:08
11 It's a record but not every event would be taking place
12 under a Watchkeeper's Log in a different sequence to
13 it.

14 14 Q. Right. So, you've just mentioned Watchkeeper's Log and
15 we're going to be looking at examples of the Daily 10:08
16 Occurrence Book and the Watchkeeper's Log in due
17 course. You might as well explain, at this stage, what
18 the Watchkeeper's Log is, please?

19 A. So, in the Ops Room, separate to the Intelligence Cell,
20 you'd have a Watchkeeper's Log which was a record of 10:08
21 all critical events that -- all events that were taking
22 place, sort of literally as a patrol left, as a patrol
23 returned, any events that happened whilst they were
24 away and doing stuff like that would be recorded in
25 that. Slightly different for the Radio Operator's Log 10:09
26 which would be literally a radio check and a
27 communications check, so everything in sort of minute
28 detail but of the minutiae rather than the sort of
29 critical information. So, you're trying to tier

1 information in here. So, you have a System's
2 Operations Log, or radio. You have a watchkeeper
3 events that are taking place on the ground and a Daily
4 Occurrence Book which is separate and takes place
5 probably recorded in a separate room which is all about 10:09
6 intelligence collection information.

7 15 Q. I'm just going to make sure that I've understood what
8 you've told us there, there was quite a lot of
9 information in there. So, the Daily Occurrence Book is
10 kept for a particular purpose which is linked to 10:09
11 intelligence?

12 A. Yeah, low level.

13 16 Q. And you would expect that book in 1998 to have been
14 kept in what location?

15 A. In the Intelligence Cell which would be separate from 10:09
16 the Operations Room.

17 17 Q. So, a completely separate room?

18 A. Yeah, I mean down the corridor, I think, in certain
19 many cases.

20 18 Q. We're may be jumping ahead and we will come back to 10:10
21 this in due course, but in the Intelligence Cell where
22 that book is kept, or you would have expected it to
23 have been kept, is that a room in which a soldier or
24 soldiers would have been listening to the RUC radio,
25 often called the RUC Net? 10:10

26 A. Yes.

27 19 Q. So, that is one location and one type of documentation.
28 who would you have expected to be, if it was one person
29 - and maybe it wasn't - to have been responsible for

1 making entries in the Daily Occurrence Book?

2 A. There would have been a duty collator, depending on
3 time of day, sequence, this is an enduring 24-hour
4 operation, so there would always have been somebody on
5 duty, a junior non-commissioned officer, so Lance 10:10
6 Corporal or Corporal who would have been listening and
7 recording information in there. So, there would have
8 been presence in the Intelligence Cell permanently, and
9 that would have been augmented during working hours by
10 the intelligence officer and the assistant intelligence 10:11
11 officer and other members of staff within there.

12 20 Q. And the Lance Corporal that you've just described,
13 would you have expected making entries in that Daily
14 Occurrence Book to have been their sole job or would
15 they have been doing other things alongside that? 10:11

16 A. It's hard to turn around and say sole, but I think
17 keeping that logbook up to date would have been an
18 important part of what they were doing. I can't tell
19 you the exact details of what were going on in that
20 cell at that time and whether there were other things 10:11
21 tasked of them.

22 21 Q. We understand that, but it's just helpful to have the
23 benefit of your experience. We're going to come back
24 to this topic in a short time, I hope. We then have
25 the Watchkeeper's Log. The Watchkeeper's Log is not 10:11
26 kept within the Intelligence Cell but is kept within
27 the Operations Room?

28 A. Correct.

29 22 Q. The Watchkeeper's Log, and it might be apparent in the

1 description, the upkeep of that would be the
2 responsibility of what person?

3 A. So, a junior officer who would have been -- a junior
4 officer or a senior non-commissioned officer, depending
5 on the time and place, and what resources were 10:12
6 available, but it was a person of responsibility. He
7 would have manning the net, the radio net and
8 communications systems on behalf of somebody, not
9 necessarily in an executive role, but certainly in a
10 position of authority. And they would have kept that 10:12
11 record as an accurate record of events that were taking
12 place at that time.

13 23 Q. And would you expect that to be a running log?

14 A. Yes.

15 24 Q. And, as a result, to be contemporaneous? 10:12

16 A. Correct.

17 25 Q. And you said that the person keeping that log would be
18 listening to communications systems; are you talking
19 about Army communications systems or police
20 communications systems, or both? 10:12

21 A. I would imagine there would have been a set of radio
22 nets they were operating in. It depends on the scale
23 and the size of operations rooms. The responsibility
24 of the record would have been of a net and a radio
25 system that he was keeping rather -- and so, sorry the 10:13
26 radio operator would focus on whichever net they were
27 listening to. The watchkeeper would have been drawing
28 on information from other sources of information in
29 that area as well.

1 26 Q. Daily Occurrence Book, Watchkeeper's Log and you
2 mentioned a radio log or I think you gave it a
3 different description as well?

4 A. Radio Operator's Log, radio log, it's the technical
5 detail, this radio was working, this call sign said to 10:13
6 this call sign check whether the microphone was
7 working, et cetera.

8 27 Q. So, this would not be a log that you would expect to
9 record narrative detail of a particular event?

10 A. Functionality. 10:13

11 28 Q. Functionality. We can, perhaps, park that particular
12 record to one side. Obviously, we're going to be
13 hearing from those who were there on the ground on 15th
14 August, and so what you're doing at the moment is
15 giving us a summary, at a high level, of what you have 10:14
16 expected the position to be?

17 A. Correct.

18 29 Q. So, that we can understand where to slot your evidence
19 in. In all events, that was an important departure for
20 one moment from what I was asking you about, which was 10:14
21 the issue of resources on 15th of August. And I'm in
22 your second statement, the 11-page statement of 6th May
23 and at paragraph 13.

24

25 So, you state there: 10:14

26

27 "On 15th August the Daily Occurrence Book logged call
28 signs multiple strength, 12 people, E10A, 12C and 13C
29 were on patrol in the Greencastle area."

1 Could you please interpret that for us?

2 A. So, this would have been a series of local patrols in
3 and around the area, the Echo ones or Alpha platoon
4 commander's patrol. Just by delineation you can pick
5 it out. I think these probably are most likely to be 10:15
6 base security patrols, because there was no active
7 patrolling in and around Town Centre or town of Omagh
8 itself because of a threat and the position it was
9 occupying. But would you have had a series of patrols
10 around the base checking for mortar attacks and any 10:15
11 other security or threat risks.

12 30 Q. And it continues:

13

14 "The C Company, 1 QLR patrol report notes various
15 taskings including sighting list, and car trawl report 10:15
16 in the vicinity of Greencastle conducted on 14th August
17 1998."

18

19 A. Yeah.

20 31 Q. Is there an interpretation you can provide? 10:15

21 A. Patrols on the ground would have been collecting
22 information on vehicles that they passed and building
23 up an intelligence picture of what was -- they would
24 have been seeking the sort of identification of what
25 was the normal and the presence of the abnormal and 10:16
26 building up a pattern. So, this was just a standard
27 process of any report patrol on the ground. They would
28 be collecting information all the time. A car trawl is
29 simply walking along this road, what cars were parked

1 there. Is that the standard thing, does it compare
2 against a series of other patrols and similar cars, et
3 cetera, or is there something abnormal that's turned up
4 which you say is that of interest.

5 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Greaney, just before we move on, could I 10:16
6 check something with you, Colonel. You were explaining
7 just a moment or two ago about the various patrols
8 which were given designations E10, A12C, and 13C. I
9 wasn't just entirely clear if you were explaining that
10 they were security patrols likely to be around the base 10:16
11 or whether they were also in the town?

12 THE WITNESS: I doubt they would have been in the town
13 of Omagh itself, Sir, because Omagh Town itself was not
14 patrolled. Most of them would have been -- if they're
15 in proximity of the base they would have been base 10:17
16 security.

17 CHAIRMAN: I think we've picked that up slightly
18 incorrectly then in the transcript. Line 29, we've
19 recorded that there was active patrolling in around the
20 town, I think that should be. You think that should 10:17
21 be...

22 THE WITNESS: There would not have been active
23 patrolling in and around the town of Omagh. Around the
24 camp perimeter there would have been patrols for base
25 security. 10:17

26 32 Q. MR. GREANEY: To be fair to you, that is what you said
27 the first time around. So, certainly speaking for
28 myself I hadn't understood that, so I want to be clear
29 about it. We see from your statement that there were,

1 over the course of the period from 11th to 15th August
2 a number of patrols which, on the face of it, are
3 described as being "in Omagh," but is what you are
4 saying to us that we should not understand that that
5 involved soldiers actually being within the town, that 10:18
6 they are likely to have been in the Omagh area more
7 generally?

8 A. Yeah. I mean, Lisanelly Barracks is in the town so
9 there would have been soldiers in the proximity but
10 this is not going up and down the High Street, this is 10:18
11 not a presence that you would feel at that time in
12 other locations where you would see soldiers wandering
13 through a city centre or a town centre, that wouldn't
14 have been taking place in Omagh at that time.

15 33 Q. That's extremely helpful to know, because, as I said, 10:18
16 speaking for myself that wasn't apparent.

17
18 So, when we see in your statement that the Daily
19 Occurrence Book records that on the morning of 15th
20 August 1998, there was one patrol conducted in Omagh by 10:18
21 1 QLR, it was a ground defence area GDA patrol, we
22 should not understand that that involved soldiers, as
23 you say, walking down Market Street?

24 A. No.

25 34 Q. At the top of page 5, you summarise the patrols that 10:18
26 were conducted, as you put it, in and around Omagh
27 between 11th and 15th August and I think in total there
28 were nine over the course of that period of time.
29 would that have been a reduction in the number of

1 patrols that would have been seen in that area at the
2 height of The Troubles?

3 A. It's hard to turn around and say there was definitely a
4 reposturing at that time but, equally, patrolling --
5 patrolling based on threat rather than patrolling for 10:19
6 patrolling's sake. So, in terms of tasking of this, it
7 would have been if there was a specific threat or a
8 requirement to go somewhere, patrolling would take
9 place. So, if you take out with the local defensive
10 patrols within that, those would have been targeted 10:19
11 areas in order to keep their presence on the grouped,
12 responding to areas where there had been previous
13 interest or something along those lines. So, possibly
14 - and there was an active principle to remove from
15 areas where great inconvenience in city centres, et 10:20
16 cetera would have taken place. Not necessarily
17 relevant here in Omagh, because I don't think -- from
18 my understanding, Omagh was not a place where patrols
19 would regularly take place in the town anyway. So, in
20 terms of that rhythm and number, possibly reduced, but 10:20
21 they're targeted due to threat and direction. And I
22 think there's a difference and I differentiate
23 somewhere in between what was the RUC patrolling
24 mechanism which was policemen, bobbies on the beat-type
25 patrolling. And what the military were doing, rather 10:20
26 than patrolling for patrolling's sake, you're
27 patrolling for an affect.

28 35 Q. So, I believe I've understood what you've told us but I
29 just want to make sure. And we're talking about things

1 which are probably more relevant to Chapter 5 but let's
2 just set the scene as we were doing on Monday as well.
3 Patrolling for the sake of patrolling maybe remained at
4 a level which was similar to the level that it had been
5 during the course of The Troubles, even during the 10:21
6 Peace Process in 1997 and 1998?

7 A. With awareness about where and what disruption, it
8 would take place. I think that was the key bit in
9 terms of the overarching direction. Be cautious about
10 how the deliver the effect on the ground to minimise 10:21
11 inconvenience for people.

12 36 Q. So, that was exactly what I was going to make certain
13 I'd understood next. So, the level of patrolling for
14 its own sake may be constant but the visibility of that
15 patrolling and the extent to which it caused 10:21
16 inconvenience for the civilian population, that was the
17 difference that was in play by August 1998?

18 A. Yeah, that was definitely the commander's intent from
19 GOC Northern Ireland very clear and explicit in terms
20 of that. And that led from how helicopters were used, 10:21
21 how vehicle patrols were used and just tone. So,
22 effect remains the same, monitor and manage delivery in
23 a sympathetic way.

24 37 Q. And the point, I think, you were making was that maybe
25 that wasn't so much of an issue in Omagh but across 10:22
26 Northern Ireland as a whole that was the scenario that
27 was developing over the course of '97/'98?

28 A. Yes, correct.

29 38 Q. What I was supposed to be asking you about was

1 resources and deployment, but that is a helpful
2 diversion.
3
4 I am, next, going to turn to the response of the Army
5 on 15th August and bear in mind that we're talking, at 10:22
6 the moment, about the response to the warning calls,
7 not the response to the explosion.
8
9 So, were you asked where the nearest bomb detection and
10 diffusing capabilities were in Omagh on 15th August? 10:22
11 A. Yes.
12 39 Q. What was the answer to that question?
13 A. So, there was an Ammunition Technical Officer
14 detachment, an ATO team in Lisanelly Barracks.
15 40 Q. And Lisanelly Barracks, now I think decommissioned, at 10:23
16 the time it was off the Gortin Road in Omagh?
17 A. Correct.
18 41 Q. Which was about a kilometre from the centre of Omagh?
19 A. Correct.
20 42 Q. And so as you told us just a short time ago, very near, 10:23
21 indeed, to the centre of Omagh Town. And was the ATO
22 detachment placed on, as it was put, notice to move at
23 2:40 p.m. on the 15th?
24 A. Correct.
25 43 Q. And why was it placed on notice to move? 10:23
26 A. On receipt of the bomb warning, it was an automatic
27 reaction for assets that were likely to be in support
28 of that and the ATO detachment was the Bomb Disposal
29 Render Safe Capability for the whole of Northern

1 Ireland in terms of -- that was the provision, a
2 military provision was to deliver that."

3 44 Q. The term "notice to move" would seem to indicate that
4 it doesn't involve immediately moving?

5 A. No, it's getting ready to do so. There's a series of 10:24
6 graduated responses depending on the timeframe you're
7 given, that there's a slightly formulaic -- an
8 immediate notice to move would see them sitting with
9 all their kit on, the engines running, ready to drive
10 out, five minutes, they can stand outside the vehicles 10:24
11 and, so on, as it decreases down to different stages.
12 But, effectively, from that point onwards with a bomb
13 warning in that location, their notice to move was
14 increased and they were ready to go.

15 45 Q. And you've used the term "immediate notice to move," is 10:24
16 that in fact what the ATO detachment was placed on?

17 A. From recollection I think so, and if not, I would
18 imagine speaking to, and having read the statements
19 from Sergeant Modd at the time, that they were,
20 effectively, ready to go at immediate notice. 10:24

21 46 Q. And as you say in the statement, that had involved
22 getting all equipment ready, the soldiers being dressed
23 in the correct equipment and starting the engines of
24 their vehicles?

25 A. Correct. 10:25

26 47 Q. So, bearing in mind they were only kilometre away from
27 the centre of Omagh, they could have been there within
28 a very short period of time indeed?

29 A. They could have been. To where was the question.

1 48 Q. Exactly. And that's what I'm going to ask you.
2
3 They'd been placed on notice to move or immediate
4 notice to move and were ready to go immediately. Did
5 the ATO detachment ever move prior to the detonation of 10:25
6 the bomb?
7 A. No.
8 49 Q. why not?
9 A. There was no incident control point set up and there
10 was no request from the RUC at that stage for the ATO 10:25
11 to arrive. In terms of the sequencing and we'll
12 probably get on with that --
13 50 Q. We will.
14 A. -- is this idea you were still confirming and clearing
15 the situation rather than actually sending somebody in 10:25
16 to effect a render safe procedure.
17 51 Q. You've just used terms that have technical meaning that
18 we'll get to in one moment. But you said along the way
19 of your answer that there was no request from the RUC
20 for the ATO to arrive. And should we understand from 10:26
21 that, that the policy or protocol that was in force at
22 the relevant time involved the ATO generally deploying
23 only following a request from the RUC?
24 A. Yes. I think you probably could expand that to in all
25 those locations in terms of on-scene commander having 10:26
26 the request and sending somebody to it. They're ready
27 for that stage of the operation to take place. But
28 yeah, the RUC were the on-site and they did not request
29 for the ATO at that stage, and that was in line with

1 policy.

2 52 Q. And had there been a request, would the ATO have
3 deployed to Omagh?

4 A. Yes.

5 53 Q. In 1998 was there a document called "The Northern 10:26
6 Ireland Tactical Aide-Memoire?"

7 A. Correct.

8 54 Q. Was that often referred to as TAM or T-A-M?

9 A. TAM, yeah.

10 55 Q. The TAM. And you deal with this in that second 10:27
11 statement at page 2, but in fact you probably deal with
12 it more fully and clearly in the 86-page statement, so
13 the third statement, at page 19, so this is 19 of 86.

14 A. Yeah.

15 56 Q. So, first of all, what was the TAM? 10:27

16 A. The tactical aide-memoire was a series of
17 decision-making CRIBs that existed for pretty much most
18 events that took place, operations in Northern Ireland.
19 It's standard military set of documentation. This was
20 a specific set relating to Operation Banner that had 10:27
21 been developed over the years and it had various
22 annexes, depending on different situations and
23 different events in time. So, it's a helicopter
24 checklist in terms of, you know, when you're taking off
25 you flick through it so you can follow it and in times 10:28
26 of pressure, you know, you can follow a set sequence --

27 57 Q. Yes.

28 A. -- without having to try and remember automatically
29 something.

1 58 Q. So, it's quite literally a set of aide-memoire?
2 A. Correct.

3 59 Q. Containing documents dealing with a variety of
4 scenarios in bullet points?
5 A. Yeah. 10:28

6 60 Q. So that under pressure you can immediately, if you need
7 to, remind yourself of what is to be done. And was
8 there a section dealing with explosive ordnance
9 disposal?
10 A. Yeah. 10:28

11 61 Q. EOD?
12 A. Correct.

13 62 Q. And what is EOD?
14 A. So, the reaction of that in terms of what is it, an
15 explosive ordnance disposal, so that's threat of a bomb 10:28
16 or something along those lines. So, anywhere where you
17 would consider there to be threat of an explosive
18 device, you would be instantly going to that element of
19 the TAM.

20 63 Q. Have you produced two versions of the EOD section of 10:29
21 the TAM?
22 A. Yes.

23 64 Q. One dating back to 1990 which is red in colour?
24 A. Correct.

25 65 Q. And one dating back to 2002 which is white in colour? 10:29
26 A. Yeah. We haven't been able to find the exact one for a
27 period of time in the case, but this was an iterative
28 document that kept on being refreshed on a regular
29 basis. And I think you can identify that there is a

1 continuity between both those two things that would
2 indicate --

3 66 Q. That's exactly where I'm going. Let's put those on the
4 screen so that we know what you're talking about.
5 Could we have on screen INQ 034848, please. And page 2 10:29
6 of that document. [Short pause]. So, this is the 1990
7 iteration, the red version and it's dealing with EOD
8 action?

9 A. Correct.

10 67 Q. And the part I'm going to draw attention to is: 10:30
11
12 "Immediate response: Normally an IED incident in an
13 urban area (e.g. an explosion, discovery of an IED or
14 an accredited warning).
15 10:30
16 EOD drill: Confirm, clear, cordon and control."
17
18 And a little earlier you used the word, I think,
19 "confirm," were you using that word in the context of
20 this document? 10:30
21 A. Correct.

22 68 Q. Let's jump forward in time and in the document to, I
23 think it's probably page 6, please. It's the first
24 white page. And the formatting is different, as is the
25 font. But we can see that the content of what I have 10:31
26 just read out is replicated in the 2002 version?

27 A. The four Cs is an enduring principle.

28 69 Q. And the point is that both the 1990 version and the
29 2002 version are essentially the same?

1 A. Correct.

2 70 Q. I'm not going to pretend I've checked every word, but
3 in their essential parts they are identical, are they
4 not?

5 A. Correct. 10:31

6 71 Q. And does that mean that you infer that they both
7 represent the position as it existed in 1998?

8 A. Correct.

9 72 Q. So, the drill would have been confirm, clear, cordon
10 and control; could you explain what each of those terms 10:31
11 means please?

12 A. Confirmation is either a visual confirmation or an
13 accredited bomb warning that would indicate that
14 something is there, let's say -- and then yeah, it's a
15 simple as that. It's quite hard to turn around to 10:32
16 identify exactly type, scale et cetera within that, so
17 the confirmation piece is a relatively broad term
18 within it. But then you're straight away into
19 clearing, to create a safe distance from which to
20 operate and to keep people safe. You are then 10:32
21 establishing a cordon to prevent people entering that
22 place. You then manage and the control and access of
23 that area.

24 73 Q. Those are four sequential stages?

25 A. Correct. 10:32

26 74 Q. Of those four stages which one of them, if any of them,
27 did the ATOs at Lisanelly reach on 15th August?

28 A. The ATOs didn't. So, the confirmation would have
29 been -- in the case of this incident, the confirmation

1 would have been an accredited bomb warning, and from
2 that point onwards a point of clearance would have
3 taken place to establish from where the accredited bomb
4 warning took place, was given, a secure location to
5 cordon and then control it. So, you're very quickly -- 10:33
6 the assumption is that an accredited bomb warning is
7 confirmation. And as the clearance would have been
8 taking place a continued look for something else that
9 might have confirmed it. So, I think you can hear in
10 the radio traffic on the RUC Net at the time, it's look 10:33
11 out for vehicles that are weighed down, a 500lb bomb so
12 it would be low in the axles, there would be something
13 suspicious about a vehicle, et cetera. But that would
14 have been taking place at the same time as the
15 clearance is taken. You're trying to create a safe 10:34
16 zone as quickly as possible, and remove people from the
17 area of the threat.

18 75 Q. I just want to try and map this onto the events of the
19 15th August. So, an accredited, as you put it, bomb
20 warning is confirmation? 10:34

21 A. An element of confirmation, yeah, it's all incremental.

22 76 Q. And we know that at 2:29 there was a bomb warning call
23 which contained a recognised codeword, "Martha Pope."
24 Was that sufficient for confirmation in accordance with
25 the EOD action? 10:34

26 A. Yes.

27 77 Q. And so, from the point of confirmation, who, on 15th
28 August, held responsibility for clear, who held
29 responsibility for cordon and who held responsibility

1 for control?

2 A. At that time it would have been the RUC, because they
3 were the forces on the ground at the moment conducting
4 that operation. So, the ATO would have been turning up
5 to conduct a render safe procedure to deal with an 10:35
6 identified explosive device. At that stage, the exact
7 location of where this bomb was not given. So you had
8 to work to the last point of confirmation, which was
9 the only point of confirmation they had at that stage,
10 which was the accredited bomb warning and the location 10:35
11 that was given, and then creating a safe point from
12 that to operate.

13 78 Q. And so, does this take us back to the protocol that
14 existed at the time, as you explained earlier, that
15 until you had a request from the RUC to attend, the 10:35
16 responsibility for these four sequential stages rested
17 with the RUC?

18 A. Correct. In fact, the responsibility for those
19 probably would not have rested with the ATO at any
20 stage. His job as a technician was to render safe the 10:36
21 material, the on-site commander or the commander,
22 whether that be a soldier or a policeman would still be
23 operating to these four Cs.

24 79 Q. And, so, is where the ATOs come in, in particular, at
25 Stage 4, namely control? 10:36

26 A. No -- yes, but once it was under control they would be
27 going forward to render safe procedure. But the
28 control piece is about controlling access to the site,
29 controlling, monitoring it, to keep it safe.

1 80 Q. So, not controlling the device, controlling the
2 environment?
3 A. Correct.

4 81 Q. So, in a sense, the ATO comes into the situation after
5 confirm, clear, cordon and control have all been 10:36
6 achieved?
7 A. Yes, it could but could arrive at any point within that
8 on request of doing so, but is unlikely to go to a
9 point until there is a known, you know, we know exactly
10 where the bomb is. Because, effectively, what you're 10:36
11 doing at that stage is you are entering the danger zone
12 in an unknown area.

13 82 Q. Obviously, we know in the event the ATOS did not deploy
14 because there was no request for them do so. You will
15 appreciate, I'm certain, that the bereaved families and 10:37
16 survivors are keen to understand what the ATOS could
17 have brought to bear had they been deployed to the
18 scene before the explosion. That's perfectly
19 understandable that that question is posed. And are
20 you able to put yourself in those shoes and to help us 10:37
21 with what the ATOS would have done if they had been
22 deployed immediately to the scene and had been there
23 for a period before the explosion?

24 A. I can give you a very broad brush but the technical
25 details are probably best coming from an Ammunition 10:37
26 Technical Officer.

27 83 Q. Yes.

28 A. But the essence is that they would have to have a known
29 site by which to go into an area in order to render

1 safe. They would have only approached manually if
2 there was a direct threat, an imminent threat to people
3 in order -- and the only way they could render safe was
4 by approaching into the danger area manually. So, you
5 couldn't evacuate an area, you hadn't been able to 10:38
6 conduct the clearance and you had to go forward and do
7 stuff. And that's where the bomb suit and approach
8 taken place, because at every stage the idea is you're
9 not entering the danger area until -- and you're not
10 putting a person into the danger area, you're clearing 10:38
11 from the danger area and then you're doing an approach
12 with a technical means, once you identify the location
13 of the bomb it provides.

14 84 Q. So, the making a difference in terms of diffusing the
15 device as a matter of ordinary logic is dependent upon 10:38
16 the location of the device being identified. And
17 you've said to us that in terms of the equipment and
18 the techniques available to an ATO, well, that's not
19 something that you feel qualified to express a view
20 about? 10:38

21 A. No, but there there's no bomb detection material other
22 than a visual piece to it. There was no mechanism by
23 which they were going to find something other than
24 knowing where it was.

25 85 Q. You've anticipated what I was going to ask you about 10:39
26 next, which is that a member of the public might
27 imagine that an ATO, they're on the scene, could be
28 better equipped either by way of experience or by way
29 of equipment to locate the vehicle containing the bomb.

1 And are you able to express a view about that?

2 A. They wouldn't have gone into the area until we've
3 actually identified a location. If you had the ability
4 to clear from a point and create a safe zone, then the
5 approach would then subsequently, once the safe zone 10:39
6 has been done, with a technical system, a robot or
7 something along those lines, a remote system to
8 identify and examine something. But they would, at no
9 stage, be placing a person into the danger area until
10 you've identified a single point by which you can act 10:40
11 upon it, is my understanding of what the ATO drills
12 would have been. Those refinement of that you'd get
13 exactly from an expert, a technical expert.

14 86 Q. I've understood that and we will take that evidence in
15 the spirit in which it is intended, and having regard 10:40
16 to your expertise as you described it on Monday. But
17 insofar as anyone may have the impression that the ATOs
18 if deployed, would have brought particular skill or
19 equipment to bear in locating the car containing the
20 bomb, that is not a realistic proposition? 10:40

21 A. Correct, it's not realistic at that stage.

22 87 Q. Let's move on with the British Army response on 15th
23 August. I'm going to invite you to turn to page 47 of
24 your main statement, the 86-page statement and
25 paragraph 38-1. 10:40

26
27 was military activity in the days leading up to 15th
28 August 1998 consistent with the orders under which the
29 military was then operating?

1 A. Correct, there were some wider realignment in order to
2 deal with what was, I think, probably at that time the
3 Apprentice Boys Parade up in Londonderry, from 8th
4 Brigade which was the coordinating authority for that
5 area. But, effectively, the operations in and around 10:41
6 Omagh would have been unaffected with those
7 ground-holding troops in that area.

8 88 Q. Did the role of the Army on 15th August continue to be
9 to support the RUC in countering terrorism within the
10 RUC northern region in order to assist the RUC in 10:41
11 restoring normality?

12 A. That is correct.

13 89 Q. Let's go next to your second statement, so your
14 sequence of events statement and to paragraph 14. This
15 is the statement of 6th November 2025. So, 10:42
16 paragraph 15, page 5. When was the British Army,
17 according to documentation, first made aware of a
18 threat to Omagh?

19 A. The bomb warning at 14:40 that's recorded in the
20 Watchkeeper's Log. 10:42

21 90 Q. So, that is the log kept in the Intelligence Cell?

22 A. Yeah.

23 91 Q. And that's the log that we will turn to look at in
24 further detail in due course. And over the page at
25 page 6, does the Daily Occurrence Book -- 10:43

26 CHAIRMAN: Sorry, can we be sure about that. I may
27 have made an error in my note keeping earlier, where is
28 the Watchkeeper's Log kept?

29 THE WITNESS: In the Operations Room, Sir.

1 92 Q. MR. GREANEY: So, I had a misunderstanding. I had
2 understood you to say - and maybe you'd be reminded of
3 the position from your statement - that we were talking
4 about two different types of document in two different
5 places, first of all the watchkeeper's Log in the 10:43
6 Intelligence Cell which was a room separate from the
7 Operations Room where the watchkeeper's Log was kept?
8 A. So, we framed it as the first entry that we've seen, so
9 what's obviously been picked up in the Intelligence
10 Cell is from the RUC Net, they've come down to the Ops 10:43
11 Room and said, 'This has happened, we have received a
12 bomb warning,' and that is then entered into the
13 watchkeeper's Log as the accurate entry. So, that's
14 the first time in the sequence of events that we see it
15 written down. 10:44
16
17 My understanding, when you then look at it, they've
18 picked it up from the RUC Net in the Intelligence Cell.
19 So, the record is in the watchkeeper's Log because it's
20 effectively an immediate action, it's a recurring 10:44
21 action so they'd moved to whoever is on duty, the
22 intelligence collator has moved to the Ops Room. would
23 be my understanding of how that's written and that
24 sequence of events, and where the information is
25 collected from. 10:44
26 93 Q. This will be my fault. So, let me just see if I can
27 bring some clarity to bear, because I haven't achieved
28 that so far. The Intelligence Cell at Lisanelly
29 Barracks, is the Intelligence Cell in a room separate

1 from or together with the Operations Room?

2 A. Separate.

3 94 Q. So got we've two separate rooms --

4 A. Yeah.

5 95 Q. -- in the building. And the Daily Occurrence Book, 10:45
6 would that be expected to be kept in the Intelligence
7 Cell or in the Operations Room?

8 A. Intelligence Cell.

9 96 Q. And that the watchkeeper's Log, in which room would you
10 expect that to be kept? 10:45

11 A. Operations Room.

12 97 Q. I think, Sir, probably your note was correct but this
13 part of the statement does bear further examination.
14 So, what your statement reads is:
15 10:45

16 "The British Army was first notified of a threat to
17 Omagh as follows:
18

19 1 QLR Watchkeeper's Log denotes notification at 14:40.
20 'Bomb warning on RUC' means the Intelligence Cell in 10:45
21 the 1 QLR Ops Room monitored the RUC radio network and
22 picked up this broadcast. The watchkeeper recorded
23 this in the log."
24

25 So, a natural reading of that might indicate that the 10:46
26 Intelligence Cell was in the Operations Room?

27 A. I think this is just as our understanding of the
28 events. So, we've dealt with this as just leading
29 through the information that we've got, we haven't

1 actually spoken to anybody in the watchkeeper's who was
2 there at that time.

3 98 Q. Yes.

4 A. So, I think the statement just reflects what we
5 understood to be accurate at that moment in time. The 10:46
6 actual location of each of these room became more
7 evident as more questions were asked about the
8 separation between the two of these things.

9 99 Q. I think I'm understanding. So, we have the soldier in
10 the Intelligence Cell hearing what has happened over 10:46
11 RUC Net, there is an entry made in the Daily Occurrence
12 Book, somehow that information reaches the watchkeeper
13 who is in the Operations Room; and have I understood
14 that you're suggesting that someone has moved from the
15 Intelligence Cell to the Operations Room in order to 10:47
16 give information to the person in the Operations Room
17 to make a record in the Watchkeeper's Log?

18 A. Yeah. My assessment would be they moved first to pass
19 the message to the Operations Room and then
20 subsequently filled in the Daily Occurrence Book. 10:47

21 100 Q. Right.

22 A. Because that's where the control of the operation would
23 take place, so that seems a likely sequence of events.

24 101 Q. That makes sense. But the person hearing that is in
25 the Intelligence Cell, goes to the Operations Room, a 10:47
26 separate room, and you assess, then come backs and fill
27 in the Daily Occurrence Book?

28 A. One hopes that would be the natural sequence of events.

29 102 Q. It may be that other witnesses will cast more light but

1 that, to you, would seem the sensible thing to have
2 happened.
3
4 And you observe the entry in the Daily Occurrence Book
5 and it says: 10:48
6
7 "Held in Ops Room and managed by the Intelligence
8 Cell..."
9
10 That probably also represents the understanding at that 10:48
11 time which has developed?
12 A. Correct.
13 103 Q. "...also denotes HQ Belfast have received warnings over
14 bombs in several towns province wide, including Omagh.
15 The Omagh bomb is believed to be in the area of the 10:48
16 courthouse, it's believed to be in the region of 550lb.
17 It was a Banbridge-type code warning?"
18 A. Correct.
19 104 Q. That phrase, "have received warnings over bombs in
20 several towns province wide, including Omagh" is 10:48
21 obviously one that we will need to look at closely.
22
23 Now, you've already told us about the initial response
24 of the ATO and we don't need to go back over that, but
25 has there been prepared, at your direction, a timeline 10:48
26 setting out the events between 2:29 and 3:03 p.m.?
27 A. Correct.
28 105 Q. And I'm going to ask that that be placed onto the
29 screen, albeit it has been incorporated into our

1 Electronic Presentation of Evidence. This is
2 INQ 035228. So, the first page just indicates how the
3 document is to be understood. I'm not going to go all
4 the way through that, given the time. Could we go to
5 page 2, please. An explanation of the terms utilised. 10:49
6 Page 3, please. And so, there we see at page 3 an
7 indication at 14:40 the bomb warning and the various
8 steps taken?

9 A. Correct.

10 106 Q. 14:45, further information from the RUC. "14:50: QRF 10:50
11 ready to deploy," what does that mean?

12 A. A quickly action force, so those troops that were held
13 at reduced readiness able to respond to an incident. I
14 think in this case it was a multiple, which would then
15 incrementally have increased as more troops came 10:50
16 online.

17 107 Q. Then: "14:55: OC C Company in Ops Room," the OC
18 being?

19 A. The Company Commander of C Company.

20 108 Q. "Brief given to include bomb warning. RUC confirm bomb 10:50
21 warning with codeword. 15-minute warning, vehicle
22 borne IED 500lb not yet located. Neighbouring CS"?

23 A. Call signs. So, this is spreading the information,
24 it's cascading the information as widely as possible.

25 109 Q. "Neighbouring call signs informed, RUC do not require 10:51
26 military assistance yet."

27 A. Correct.

28 110 Q. And so, should we understand this to mean that over
29 that period of time between 14:40 and 14:55 there was

1 dialogue between the Army and the RUC in which the Army
2 were seeking information?

3 A. Correct.

4 111 Q. And seeking to ascertain whether there was a request
5 for it to deploy to Omagh? 10:51

6 A. Yeah, I think that's fair.

7 112 Q. Then at "15:00 hrs, C Company and Rover Group." Rover
8 Group?

9 A. The headquarters element of it, so, the Land Rover
10 Group, so what would be the command elements of it 10:52
11 ready to go.

12 113 Q. Getting ready to deploy to assist RUC."

13

14 And then: "1503," so the end point of Part 5, "CO"?

15 A. The Commanding Officer, David James, is now in the Ops 10:52
16 Room.

17 114 Q. By that stage he had reached the Ops Room himself?

18 A. Correct.

19 115 Q. Then if we go over the page, we can see that pages 4
20 and following deal with the explosion and the 10:52
21 subsequent actions of the British Army to go to the
22 scene in order to provide assistance?

23 A. Correct.

24 116 Q. We can take that from the screen please. Along with
25 the steps that were taken to place the quick reaction 10:52
26 force on immediate standby, is it your understanding
27 that soldiers within the Operations Room immediately
28 tasked a Gazelle helicopter to fly over the town?

29 A. Yes.

1 117 Q. And was that done in fact in order to ascertain the
2 seat of the explosion once that had happened?

3 A. I think the tasking initiated originally to support the
4 operation as it's developing and by the time it arrives
5 on scene the explosion has gone off and then we have a 10:53
6 series of events where they're trying to seek
7 confirmation of where the location is and I think
8 illustrates the difference between where it was
9 reported and where it actually went off.

10 118 Q. So, your understanding is that alongside the other 10:53
11 steps to get people ready to deploy immediately, a
12 helicopter was deployed to the area and as it arrived
13 the explosion actually took place?

14 A. Yeah. So, effectively the Army is, at this stage,
15 teeing up as many resources as they can to help and 10:53
16 waiting for a point by which they can enter the
17 situation helpfully. And I think the only thing which
18 I would add to that sequence is this idea that arriving
19 too early or in a developing situation without knowing
20 where the command points are, where the control 10:54
21 locations have been established, not necessarily
22 helpful.

23 119 Q. In a moment we'll turn to the Daily Occurrence Book and
24 associated materials. Is there any indication or any
25 other information that was passed to the British Army 10:54
26 from the RUC, the media or the public or any other
27 source about the threat to Omagh between 14:29 and
28 15:03?

29 A. No.

1 120 Q. And on your assessment, is there anything to indicate
2 that the initial reaction of the British Army was other
3 than in accordance with the policies and procedures
4 that existed at the time?
5 A. Nothing, it was exactly in line with the policies and 10:55
6 procedures.
7 121 Q. Now, the balance of the second statement that you gave
8 deals with the actions of the Army after the explosion
9 had taken place, which is outside the scope of the part
10 that we're currently considering but we have your 10:55
11 statement dealing with those events and I won't be
12 asking you about them today.
13
14 what I want do next is to turn to the Daily Occurrence
15 Book and then associated materials that we have in fact 10:55
16 more than touched upon already. And I'm going to ask
17 that we have on the screen, please, INQ 034854, this is
18 the Daily Occurrence Book. INQ 034854, page 2 please.
19 So, we can see what the book looks like, it's a hard
20 copy book. 10:56
21 A. Correct.
22 122 Q. And in the top left-hand corner we can see the date
23 that it covers from 3rd July 1998 to 17th October 1998?
24 A. Correct.
25 123 Q. So, a period covering the Omagh bombing. And it is the 10:56
26 Daily Occurrence Book for 1 QLR and the 4th Royal
27 Irish?
28 A. Correct.
29 124 Q. Could we go next please to page 4 of the INQ. This is

1 page 89 of the book itself. And we'll first of all
2 just understand what the columns are. The serial
3 number, is that describing a person or just the entry
4 number?

5 A. An entry number. 10:57

6 125 Q. The date and time is self-explanatory, as is "reported
7 by," that, presumably, is the person who is making the
8 entry or the source of the entry?

9 A. Correct.

10 126 Q. The details of the occurrence, so a narrative 10:57
11 description of what is thought to be worth noting is
12 provided?

13 A. Correct.

14 127 Q. The action that is taken, if action has been taken?

15 A. Correct. 10:57

16 128 Q. Then the signature of the duty NCO or duty RPO, what
17 does that tell us?

18 A. So, the signature of the people -- the RPO is an
19 indication that this is a book that would take place,
20 operate in a guard room, so it would be a regimental 10:57
21 policeman, a duty soldier in a normal barrack
22 situation. It's a utilitarian book.

23 129 Q. And then the final column is cut off slightly,
24 unfortunately.

25 10:57

26 "Initial [something] OC and supervision."
27
28 Is that a column that provides a more senior officer
29 with an opportunity to make their contribution?

1 A. Correct.

2 130 Q. Serial No.379 is something which is -- well it looks
3 like it is sellotaped into the book?

4 A. Correct.

5 131 Q. And it's from 122 Intelligence Brigade and you do 10:58
6 explain what that is in your main statement, could you
7 summarise that in a couple of sentences please?

8 A. So, that's a generic threat message that has come out
9 from I think 122 Intelligence Section from 8 Brigade,
10 so it's the intelligence section in support of 8 10:58
11 Brigade, and it's a threat message relating to
12 potential incendiary devices to be used.

13 132 Q. And we can see exactly what it says: "Threat message,
14 14th August..." so the day before the bombing.
15 "...1998 at 1250 hrs. 32 CS movement." 10:59
16

17 So 32 County Sovereignty Movement, the political wing
18 reputed of the Real IRA. "Incendiary attack." "INT,"
19 intelligence, presumably?

20 A. Yes. 10:59

21 133 Q. "INT indicates that a dissident republican group is in
22 possession of a supply of incendiary devices for use
23 against commercial targets in Northern Ireland."
24

25 I suspect you've answered my next question over the 10:59
26 course of what you've just said, but should we
27 understand that this was being recorded in this book
28 because it was a threat specific to Omagh, or was it a
29 threat that was more general to Northern Ireland?

1 A. No, this is generic threat message that goes out and
2 indicates the state of a dissident republican threat
3 continuing, that we spoke about on Monday.

4 134 Q. Indeed, have you seen this very entry in other places
5 relating to other geographical locations? 10:59

6 A. Yeah. So, there is another Daily Occurrence Book entry
7 which is from, I believe, the Intelligence Cell in
8 Strabane which has the same, it's a slightly different
9 format, it's handwritten into the book but effectively
10 it's the same message at the same time. 11:00

11 135 Q. Now, page 6 next, please. We're going to look at
12 serial 386. Could you enlarge that please? So, just
13 the bottom quarter of the page. Thank you very much.
14 So 386, "15th August 1998, 1440 hrs, RUC Net," so
15 that's the RUC radio system? 11:01

16 A. Correct.

17 136 Q. "...overheard on RUC Net RUC HQ Belfast have received
18 warnings over bombs in several towns province wide,
19 including Omagh. The Omagh bomb is believed to be in
20 the area of the courthouse. It's believed to be in the 11:01
21 region of 500lb, it was a Banbridge-type codeword
22 warning."
23

24 And I'm sure you will find it easy to understand why
25 that is of interest and indeed concern to certainly 11:01
26 some, if not many, Core Participants?

27 A. Yes.

28 137 Q. And it's the reference in particular, to "warnings over
29 bombs to several towns province wide." And there are

1 obviously, a number of potential explanations for that;
2 one is that the person who has recorded it has
3 accurately recorded something that he heard over the
4 radio, namely, that there were warnings relating to
5 devices not just in Omagh but in several towns. That 11:02
6 is one possibility. Another possibility is that the
7 soldier has overheard a message of several warnings but
8 relating to a single bomb in a single town, namely
9 Omagh, and he has misunderstood and there may be other
10 explanations as well. Have I made myself clear so far 11:02
11 at least?

12 A. Yeah, and I think the imminent nature, the proximity of
13 or the location of the Ops Room and having to, I would
14 imagine an imminent threat, hearing a message, going to
15 the Ops Room, briefing the Ops Room, returning, that's 11:03
16 taken a couple of minutes to write an entry into that
17 logbook, so one would hope that the sequence was as
18 such. I think have a separation in which events can,
19 et cetera, change an interpretation quite easily I
20 think. 11:03

21 138 Q. So, I believe what you're saying to us is that your
22 assessment and obviously you weren't there on the
23 day --

24 A. No.

25 139 Q. -- and you're just bringing your expertise to bear, 11:03
26 your assessment is that what in fact has happened here
27 is that the soldier has overheard a message about three
28 warning calls, all about a bomb in Omagh and in the
29 time it's taken to pass that information on, some form

1 of misunderstanding has developed?

2 A. Yeah, I think so. I think that's the most credible
3 explanation.

4 140 Q. I mean, have you seen evidence anywhere else of there
5 being warnings on 15th August about bombs in any town 11:04
6 apart from Omagh?

7 A. No, and we've checked every source available that we
8 have, every intelligence report, everything in terms of
9 any of the other brigades or issues around Northern
10 Ireland at that time and there's no other evidence that 11:04
11 would support other locations being identified at that
12 particular moment in time.

13 141 Q. And has that formed part of your assessment that what
14 we are reading here is a mistake as opposed to being an
15 accurate record of something that was passed over the 11:04
16 RUC Net?

17 A. Yeah, and this is human friction at a point of high
18 tension.

19 142 Q. I just want to understand a little bit more about, not
20 the narrative but the form of this message. So, the 11:04
21 entry was made by Lance Corporal Thompson from whom I
22 believe we'll hear on 8th October which is I think next
23 Thursday, and he will no doubt, help us in relation to
24 this. "123 Int informed," and that's the 123
25 Intelligence Section and what was that at the time? 11:05

26 A. I think that probably might be 122, it depends on where
27 it is. I can't remember if it was transposed from the
28 previous one. That would have been their immediate
29 sequence. So the Intelligence Cell would be reporting

1 up to the Brigade Intelligence Cell in a separate line,
2 and that's what they're doing, they're sharing that
3 information.

4 143 Q. So "watchkeeper informed," and we're going to keep a
5 look at the watchkeeper's Log in a moment. That is the 11:05
6 person in the Ops Room?

7 A. Correct.

8 144 Q. And the watchkeeper at the time was an officer,
9 Captain Peebles from whom we'll hear later on today.
10 "Warrant Officer 2 Brisco informed"? 11:06

11 A. He was the Assistant Intelligence Officer, sometimes
12 referred to as the A10, just as an abbreviation.

13 145 Q. "IO," so intelligence officer informed?

14 A. Correct.

15 146 Q. And the intelligence officer at the time was 11:06
16 Captain Hodgson from whom again we will hear.
17 "Corporal Mitchell aware"?

18 A. Yeah.

19 147 Q. "RUC now checking," perhaps, "now checked and securing
20 area," is that how you read it? 11:06

21 A. Yeah, I think so. I think that's an explanation of the
22 clearance and the four Cs taking place.

23 148 Q. And then underneath that it appears to be written,
24 possibly in a different handwriting, "ETB?"

25 A. East Tyrone Battalion, a set of information for 11:06
26 another -- a roulement battalion that would have been
27 working out of Dungannon, so in the same area but
28 they're sharing information and they're probably
29 passing it to their intelligence cells.

1 149 Q. Under neither that, "Armagh?"
2 A. Yeah, another military location, and the same at
3 Cookstown would be my assessment of what that
4 abbreviation is. They're all outstations and military
5 locations. 11:07
6 150 Q. And the "C'Town" being Cookstown, as you've just told
7 us. Well, thank you for doing what you can in relation
8 to that entry. Just before we leave the document, I
9 would want to note two other serials.
10 11:07
11 So 387, timed at 1505 hrs perhaps.
12
13 "Lance Corporal Thompson, duty collator" has noted that
14 "a large bomb exploded, location unknown"?
15 11:07
16 A. Correct. I think that probably accounts for why some
17 of the other information on the right-hand side is sort
18 of curtailed at that point, overtaken by events.
19 151 Q. What I want to go to next is the entry which is just
20 above 386, which is 385. And I just want to note, I 11:08
21 don't know to what extent you will be able to help or
22 not help. 15th August 1998, there is then a time
23 given, which difficult to discern, perhaps, whether
24 it's 1321 hrs or 1521 hrs?
25 A. Yeah. I mean I think, given a sequence of things, I 11:08
26 think that's a biro on a page creating 13:21 which
27 could easily be transposed. Having looked at this, I
28 think what's happened is, this is a pretty standard set
29 of messages and he followed through in the rest of the

1 Daily Occurrence Book about sightings of people of
2 known interest that have come through from VENGEFUL,
3 and it has not necessarily been completed all the way
4 through, something has stopped whoever is entering, I
5 think it's probably Corporal Thompson's writing on the 11:09
6 left-hand side and the events -- as it was being
7 collated, what you had was the bomb warning that has
8 come in. It's then been paused whilst that's happened
9 and then somebody has then subsequently gone, okay we
10 need to update and infill that report. And they've 11:09
11 read across and I can easily see the transposition
12 between 13:21 and 15:21 if somebody is just filling
13 this in subsequently. And I think that's created
14 anomaly that sits in here. But I think that's just the
15 friction of handwritten notes and a biro. 11:09

16 152 Q. So, we see that the time is given, I'm not going to
17 read through it, the actual entry is irrelevant. We
18 know what VENGEFUL is from your evidence earlier in the
19 week. This is information that has come from VENGEFUL
20 and that has been inputted into the Daily Occurrence 11:09
21 Book. And we see the time is given in three locations,
22 the second column in, 13:21 or 15:21, and then in the
23 body of the text we see in the first line the time is
24 given, again 13 or 15:21. And then the penultimate
25 line, again, the time is given which different people 11:10
26 perhaps could have different ways --

27 A. That's a different date, though.

28 153 Q. That's a later date?

29 A. That's an earlier date. It's turned around saying --

1 154 Q. You're quite right.

2 A. -- it's an intelligence tracking of on individual.

3 155 Q. You're quite right, Colonel. So, it appears in those

4 two locations, the first line and also in the second

5 column. So, there are obviously a number of 11:10

6 explanations for this. One is that it is 13:21 and it

7 fits the chronology because it comes before the bomb

8 warning and the bomb explosion. If it is 15:21, then a

9 gap has been left for it to be made for some reason, or

10 the entries are not contemporaneous. And I just want 11:11

11 to understand what you believe has happened. Your

12 assessment is that the entry has started to be written

13 as the bomb warning has come in, has been paused. The

14 bomb warning has been written lower down to leave a

15 gap, is this what you are postulating, and has then 11:11

16 been completed at some later stage?

17 A. Correct.

18 CHAIRMAN: Can I just be clear as to how you're reading

19 this, Colonel MacMullen. There are different columns,

20 of course, there's the date and time column and details 11:11

21 of occurrence column.

22 THE WITNESS: Correct, yes, Sir.

23 CHAIRMAN: In the date and time column there's some

24 entry in blue pen.

25 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 11:11

26 CHAIRMAN: And then in the details of occurrence

27 there's entry in black pen.

28 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think a separate person has dealt

29 with that.

1 CHAIRMAN: Yeah. And how are you reading the date in
2 the detail of occurrence section? 15th August?
3 THE WITNESS: 15th August '98 and 1521 hrs.
4 CHAIRMAN: 15:21.
5 THE WITNESS: Yeah, that I'm reading -- sorry, on the 11:12
6 date and time, so in blue I'm reading --
7 CHAIRMAN: No, in the black?
8 THE WITNESS: In black I am read that go 15 August '98
9 at 15:21. Looking at that, I believe that's just a
10 transposition error of the blue writing, just -- 11:12
11 CHAIRMAN: You mean somebody has seen the blue writing
12 when they came to enter the details of occurrence
13 section and read it as 15:21?
14 THE WITNESS: Absolutely.
15 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 11:12
16 156 Q. MR. GREANEY: So you told us earlier that the
17 expectation is that this document would be
18 contemporaneous?
19 A. Yeah.
20 157 Q. And so chronological in order. And it will be 11:13
21 chronological if the entry 385 in the second column is
22 timed at 13:21 because 13:21 is obviously before 14:40.
23 I just want to make sure that I'm clear, because if I'm
24 not others may not be, but what you are postulating is
25 that the person with the blue pen has written "385" in 11:13
26 the first column, has written "15 August '98 and
27 1321 hrs" in the second column?
28 A. Yes.
29 158 Q. That as that is happening, the bomb warning is coming

1 in or comes in shortly afterwards or at any rate before
2 the entry is completed?

3 A. Yeah.

4 159 Q. It then becomes more important to complete the entry
5 relating to the bomb warning than to finish off the 11:13
6 entry relating to the VENGEFUL --

7 A. Correct.

8 160 Q. -- sighting. That a gap is left for the VENGEFUL
9 sighting to be entered at a later stage?

10 A. Correct. 11:14

11 161 Q. The bomb warning entry is made at 14:40 and at some
12 later stage someone has come back to complete the
13 VENGEFUL entry at that stage they have made a mistake
14 and they have read 13:21 in blue handwriting as 15:21
15 which is then written in black in the body of the text? 11:14

16 A. Yeah. And I think the style of the book itself has an
17 important part to play in this. Whereas the Daily
18 Occurrence Book, there is an element in this context,
19 the Intelligence Cell, that it's been used as basic
20 intelligence analysis. So, that VENGEFUL report would 11:14
21 have come in. There would then have been a check where
22 was that individual previously sighted, and you can see
23 the comment made, which is comment/element of very low
24 level assessments of is there anything different about
25 this person being there? So this isn't -- it's not an 11:15
26 entry or a book that the style would be an
27 instantaneous response and information put into it,
28 it's somewhere where you're building up an intelligence
29 picture on it. The instantaneous response and

1 recording of stuff sits separately in the Watchkeeper's
2 Log.

3 CHAIRMAN: What I'm not immediately understanding I
4 think, Colonel, is why the VENGEFUL entry at 13:21
5 would be broken off by anything that occurs more than
6 an hour later? 11:15

7 THE WITNESS: I think, as I said Sir, I think VENGEFUL
8 entry would have come in, there would have been an
9 element of analysis that had to take place within that.

10 So, they would have had entry. They would have gone,
11 'When have we seen Patrick Nugent before and this
12 vehicle?' And they would have been searching through a
13 database in order to find that information. So, I
14 don't believe that this information had arrived and it
15 would have been instantaneously put into the book. 11:16

16 There would have been some work done to deliver the
17 analysis which is the comment section of that. And
18 that follows, if you look back through the book, in
19 terms of the type of information that takes place in
20 the Daily Occurrence Book. It's stylistic and the use
21 of the book. I think that's why there's a gap in time. 11:16

22 162 Q. MR. GREANEY: Let me see if I can just draw this into a
23 set of propositions so that your position can be
24 understood by everybody.

25
26 what is happening at 1321 hrs is not the entry being
27 made, but 13:21 is the event occurring?

28 A. Yeah. It might be the entry, I can't tell, but I mean
29 I think from the way that reads it looks as though

1 that's when the sighting took place and that's how it's
2 ben entered into it. It could have taken place
3 simultaneously, I'm not so sure.

4 163 Q. But on your hypothesis, at 13:21 the event is taking
5 place. The event is then the subject of degree of 11:17
6 analysis or investigation?

7 A. Yes.

8 164 Q. So, that the actual entry starts to be made at a time
9 after 13:21 and nearer to 1440 hrs?

10 A. I think that's highly likely. 11:17

11 165 Q. And that's because 13:21 is the time of the event, not
12 the time of the entry. As that is starting to be done,
13 the information about the warning call is passed, that
14 is the priority, the gap is left for this to be filled
15 in, in later, and priority is then to fill in the 11:18
16 information about the warning calls?

17 A. Correct.

18 166 Q. Someone then goes back later and writes the narrative
19 out and transposes 13:21 to 15:21?

20 A. Correct. 11:18

21 167 Q. So, I think have I now understood your position
22 correctly?

23 A. Yeah, exactly that.

24 168 Q. Which is your assessment based not on experience at the
25 time but based upon your review of all of the materials 11:18
26 and your understanding of how these things tend to
27 work?

28 A. Correct.

29 169 Q. Now, next and connectedly can we turn to the

1 watchkeeper's Log, please. And to INQ 034853. And
2 page 2 of that document please. Can we enlarge page 2
3 so that we can read the text please? So, again, this
4 is not the relevant page but it will help us to
5 understand. Log sheet, security classification. 11:19
6 Formation Unit 1 QLR, the log keeper's rank and name
7 given. The date here, 13th August 1998. And then the
8 sheet number is given?

9 A. Correct.

10 170 Q. This is marked to be sheet No.1. We then have serial 11:19
11 which again is that the entry number?

12 A. Yeah.

13 171 Q. The time is given, there is then a column "to," what
14 does that mean?

15 A. Who the information is being passed to and at that 11:20
16 stage it's this is logging on the information rather
17 than a location.

18 172 Q. "From," who the information has come from?

19 A. Yeah.

20 173 Q. And there is then a column which is headed "event," and 11:20
21 is that the place that you would provide some narrative
22 detail of what information is being passed from X to Y?

23 A. Correct.

24 174 Q. And then a column "for action"?

25 A. Yeah. 11:20

26 175 Q. And a column for the initials of the person making the
27 entry?

28 A. Correct.

29 176 Q. Could we go next to page 9, please. If we can leave it

1 like that actually. We can see this is a page relating
2 to 14th August?

3 A. Yes.

4 177 Q. And it comes to an end with entry 023 at 11:00 p.m.
5 precisely? 11:21

6 A. Correct.

7 178 Q. And we can see that the person who is keeping the log
8 has started the entry the next day at 001 and has then
9 thought better of it, is that correct?

10 A. Correct, yeah, new page. 11:21

11 179 Q. And thinks new day, start on a new page?

12 A. Correct.

13 180 Q. That's what that would be consistent with?

14 A. Yes.

15 181 Q. Can we go to page 10 please next and enlarge it? We 11:21
16 can see that at entry No.1, this is page No.1, we can
17 see that serial one at 2 o'clock in the morning, Colour
18 Sergeant McLeaney?

19 A. Yeah.

20 182 Q. He has initially been the log keeper and he has made an 11:22
21 entry then entry No.2 at 8:00 in the morning perhaps as
22 a new shift starts, Captain Peebles, "TO"?

23 A. Takes over watchkeeper duties.

24 MR. GREANEY: So, at that stage we know that
25 Captain Peebles is the watchkeeper. 11:22

26 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Greaney, can I just ask you, before we
27 go any further, just how you think we're doing for
28 time? It's already getting on for 11:30?

29 MR. GREANEY: Yes. We're going a little slower than I

1 had hoped we would go, Sir, yes.
2 CHAIRMAN: Should we break at this stage or later?
3 MR. GREANEY: It might be sensible to take a break at
4 this stage because we are coming on to the detail of
5 this. So if we could have a 15-minute break please. 11:23
6 CHAIRMAN: Yes.
7
8 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED BRIEFLY AND RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:
9
10 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Greaney. 11:41
11 MR. GREANEY: Thank you, very much, Sir.
12
13 COLONEL PETER MacMULLEN WAS CONTINUED TO BE QUESTIONED
14 BY MR. GREANEY AS FOLLOWS:
15 11:41
16 183 Q. MR. GREANEY: So, just to recap where we'd reached. We
17 were looking at the watchkeeper's Log for 15th August?
18 A. Yeah.
19 184 Q. So, this is the log that is maintained in the
20 Operations Room? 11:42
21 A. Correct.
22 185 Q. A room separate, as you now understand from the
23 Intelligence Cell. We had observed that at 8:00 a.m.
24 that day, Colour Sergeant McLeaney had ceased to be the
25 watchkeeper and that role had been assumed by 11:42
26 Captain Peebles?
27 A. Correct.
28 186 Q. We see that from entry No.2. So, I'm going to simply
29 turn next to page 11, please, so the following page.

1 And this is sheet No.2. And could we enlarge, please,
2 entry 13. It should say, serial 13. And so, this is
3 an entry which is timed at 1440 hrs. So the same time
4 as the principal entry that we were scrutinising in the
5 Daily Occurrence Book? 11:43

6 A. Yeah.

7 187 Q. In which the bomb warning relating to province wide was
8 recorded. And here the entry reads, "bomb warning on
9 RUC," and that final word is difficult to read but?

10 A. "Means." 11:43

11 188 Q. "Means," that's what we thought. And does that have
12 some technical meaning?

13 A. It's, you know, whatever their system that they're
14 using, it's referring to RUC radio net.

15 189 Q. So far so consistent, this entry is shorter than the 11:43
16 entry in the Daily Occurrence Book. And it isn't
17 specifying a threat to a number of towns but it
18 records, in general terms, the information "bomb
19 warning on RUC means," okay?

20 A. Correct. 11:44

21 190 Q. As I have said so far so consistent and so far so good.
22 But we need to turn to page 12 next, because this is
23 where an issue develops that we need to have a better
24 understanding of, I hope, by the end of today. And
25 could you go to... yes, here we are. Could you 11:44
26 enlarge the top third of that page, please? we need
27 the sheet number and date in as well, please. So, just
28 starting a little higher up. I said this is where an
29 issue develops and I just want to be clear about what I

1 mean in relation to that.

2

3 So, first of all, this is an entry which is still

4 relating to 15th August, do you agree?

5 A. Correct, yes. 11:45

6 191 Q. And in the top right-hand corner we can see that in

7 sheet number, the final digit, well it may appear as if

8 3 has been overwritten another number?

9 A. Possibly, yeah.

10 192 Q. Well, let's look at page 13 so that you can better 11:45

11 understand why I've made that situation. Obviously, I

12 don't know for certain, I wasn't there, but it may be

13 thought that there has been some overwriting. So, if

14 you can just enlarge the very top of that page, please.

15 And maybe the evidence is starting to develop that 11:46

16 there has been overwriting, does that look to you as if

17 a "4" has been overwritten with probably a "2"?

18 A. Correct.

19 193 Q. We see this as we go through the document, but we'll

20 look at just another page, page 14, and then we'll go 11:46

21 back to page 12. And that may look as if a 3 has been

22 converted to a 5?

23 A. Yeah, I think that's fair.

24 194 Q. So let's just go back to page 12. Enlarge that same

25 part. [Short pause]. Now we've looked at those three 11:46

26 pages it looks as if midway through 15th August, at one

27 stage at least, a decision has been made to mark a

28 sheet which would naturally have been sheet 3 as

29 sheet 1, so effectively a new log is being created?

1 A. Yeah. I think this is an element of reacting to a
2 major incident and then just creating a sequence that
3 followings through naturally from that.

4 195 Q. You've probably jumped quite a long way, way ahead.
5 But I think it's not unhelpful. I think what you're 11:47
6 suggesting to us is that what is happening at this
7 stage is that there is being created are a fresh log
8 which is dedicated to one topic, because that topic is
9 so important, namely the fact that there has been a
10 bomb warning and then a detonation within Omagh? 11:47

11 A. Correct.

12 196 Q. And what I'm going to do is to look with you, whether
13 there is evidence to support that proposition as we go
14 through this. And it's going to take a little bit of
15 time, but we need to deal with this painstakingly. 11:48
16 Just looking from the sheet numbers, it looks as if a
17 decision has been made for a reason, one would expect,
18 to restart the log on 15th August. And when we look at
19 where it has been restarted, and when we look at the
20 serial there is further support for the proposition 11:48
21 that a new log has been created because we have not
22 serial 14, as I think would naturally follow but we
23 have serial 1?

24 A. Correct.

25 197 Q. And the time that is given is that time again 14:40, to 11:48
26 the Ops Room from INT, again, intelligence?

27 A. Correct.

28 198 Q. "RUC have received a bomb warning in Omagh Town."
29 okay?

1 A. Correct.

2 199 Q. So, the event that is now being recorded in serial 1 is
3 not precisely what has been recorded in serial 13,
4 which is bomb warning in general terms, it is now being
5 specified in the narrative "RUC have received a bomb 11:49
6 warning," and the added information is that it is in
7 Omagh Town; does that make sense?

8 A. Yes, it does.

9 200 Q. I'm going to explain in a minute the issue that seems
10 to arrive out of this that you need to help us with. 11:49
11 And the action that is given is, does that mean "ground
12 Quick Reaction Force stood to"?

13 A. Yeah. Guard Quick Reaction Force.

14 201 Q. Guard reaction force. And then "OMA OOB"?

15 A. Omagh, out of bounds. 11:50

16 202 Q. We're going to see, when we come on to look at what may
17 be a carbon copy of this page, that those words "OMA
18 OOB" have been added after the carbon copy has been
19 removed. And do you have any idea of why that might
20 be? 11:50

21 A. No. There's probably an element of recollection and
22 stuff being put in there subsequently to try and
23 counter what actions took place each time. So, I think
24 this is probably Captain Peebles trying to identify, in
25 the heat of the moment, what were the other actions 11:50
26 that took place at a certain time, I remember one of
27 those things was that Omagh was put out of bounds.
28 Okay. Does this go in initially? And he subsequently
29 put it in. I think he will be able to address the

1 sequencing a little better.

2 203 Q. Absolutely, but that seems to you to be a sensible
3 explanation, that subsequently he has recalled that
4 Omagh was made out of bounds and so he has jotted that
5 down on the top sheet once the underlying sheet has 11:50
6 been taken out. That's helpful. Thank you.
7

8 "OC," officer commanding?

9 A. Yes.

10 204 Q. "C Company informed." Can you make sense of after 11:51
11 "informed?"

12 A. No.

13 205 Q. Is the final line, "brigade informed?"

14 A. Correct.

15 206 Q. Let me express what is a concern that I believe is 11:51
16 experienced by some, which is, we have in the Daily
17 Occurrence Book a reference to warnings relating to a
18 number of locations, not just to Omagh. And we've
19 looked at that already and you've given your
20 explanation. We then have the first entry at 14:40 in 11:51
21 the Watchkeeper's Log which refers to a bomb warning
22 and doesn't specify a particular location or locations.
23 Is this making sense so far, yeah?

24 A. Correct.

25 207 Q. Then once the log is restarted, the first entry relates 11:52
26 to the same time, 14:40, but now, in distinction from
27 the entry made in the Daily Occurrence Book, the
28 warning is stated to have been a warning in relation to
29 Omagh with no reference to any other locations, okay.

1 So I hope this line of reasoning --

2 A. Yeah, I follow the logic, yeah.

3 208 Q. And you've already given your explanation for the Daily
4 Occurrence Book, namely that the search of all of the
5 records have provided no support for the proposition 11:52
6 that there were warnings relating to any other town
7 other than Omagh on 15th August. So, you think that a
8 mistake has been made in the heat of the moment?

9 A. Fair.

10 209 Q. But the concern that arises out of the sequence that I 11:52
11 have just described to you is this, I think and please
12 don't understand I am adopting it, I'm putting this to
13 you so that we can explore it. The options - and I'm
14 going to provide two which appear stark, there are
15 others, they can be explored - but the options are, 11:53
16 well, one, is that history is being rewritten to
17 indicate that bomb warnings which related to a number
18 of towns related just to Omagh Town, so that would be
19 the sinister explanation. Another explanation may be
20 that Captain Peebles, recognising that something 11:53
21 enormous has happened, simply started a fresh log,
22 okay. So can you understand why I postulate those two
23 possibilities?

24 A. Yeah, I can see the flow of logic that would take you
25 to both. 11:53

26 210 Q. And you might describe that second possibility as the
27 administrative possibility. So, we have the sinister
28 possibility and the administrative possibility. So,
29 in --

1 A. I think you can throw a third in there, which is just
2 there's an operational focus that this is the
3 watchkeeper focusing on operations in Omagh. So, you
4 could take it to another point which is a bomb warning
5 somewhere else is of little or no relevance to this 11:54
6 operation and this Operations Room and they're focusing
7 as well, which I think is an element of decision-making
8 that could have taken place as well.

9 211 Q. I don't think you're describing anything very different
10 from my administrative possibility. 11:54

11 A. No.

12 212 Q. So, that is to say that Captain Peebles is identifying
13 a good reason why there needs to be a new and separate
14 log dealing with this situation?

15 A. Correct. 11:54

16 213 Q. So, I've described it as the administrative
17 possibility, you're describing it as the operational
18 reality but we're talking about the two possibilities.
19 So, we need to see whether you can help us in
20 identifying which of those two possibilities is 11:55
21 correct. And the first thing I just want to confirm
22 through you is that, obviously, we have been looking at
23 a single document which contains both of the entries
24 relating to 14:40, okay? And so, the 14:40 entry that
25 refers to bomb warning and 14:40 entry on the new log 11:55
26 relating to bomb warning to Omagh Town. So, a single
27 document that contains both. And can you confirm that
28 that document which contains both of those two things
29 was provided by the Ministry of Defence as an

1 attachment to your corporate witness statement?

2 A. Correct, yes.

3 214 Q. So, if there is a sinister explanation for this, it
4 would follow that the Army has retained the document
5 that contains the evidence of it and that the MoD has 11:55
6 provided it to the Inquiry through you?

7 A. Yeah, we've given all variations of this.

8 215 Q. Yes.

9 A. The other thing I'd probably note at this stage is,
10 this isn't evidential, this is not a policeman's 11:56
11 notebook in this whole process, this is a record of
12 actions that are taking place in an Operations Room at
13 the heat of a moment. So, there are other points of
14 friction to add into this and we're not -- I think,
15 sometimes in a context like this there's a perception 11:56
16 that this is a record that is utterly infallible.
17 Human factors and a bomb going off are playing in this
18 whole process.

19 216 Q. So, point 1 is that this was retained and handed over
20 to the Inquiry. Point 2 is that you're describing a 11:56
21 situation of high tension where people are making
22 decisions under pressure and perfect record keeping
23 isn't necessarily to be expected?

24 A. Yeah.

25 217 Q. Or realistically to be expected? 11:57

26 A. I think so.

27 218 Q. So, the third thing I just want us to focus on is, can
28 you just focus with me for a moment on where the text
29 appears within the relevant boxes here because we're

1 going to compare and contrast it with something else
2 that we're going to be looking at.
3
4 So, restricted an incident appears very much within the
5 lines of the, I said box, it's rectangle, do you agree? 11:57
6 Log keeper Captain Peebles well within the box, the
7 date and sheet number within the box. And we see this
8 as we go through that page; do you agree with me?
9 A. Yes.
10 219 Q. I'm going to ask that it would be good if we could put 11:57
11 the screen and compare and contrast but we can't, so
12 let's just retain a memory of what we're looking at
13 there and go to a document which is INQ 013164 please.
14 The first thing to note, can you see, is that someone
15 has written along the top of that, "Omagh Town bomb log 11:58
16 file." And would that indicate that someone at least
17 thought that this was a log sheet which was focused
18 upon what occurred in Omagh on 15th August?
19 A. Yes.
20 220 Q. As opposed to a more general watchkeeper's Log dealing 11:59
21 with any number of incidents?
22 A. I imagine it's been extracted for a file.
23 221 Q. And I want to consider with you what this may be. The
24 handwriting, in many respects, with some additions that
25 we'll look at with Captain Peebles, including "Omagh 11:59
26 out of bounds" but taking those out, the text is
27 identical to the text in the other version that we
28 looked at?
29 A. Yes.

1 222 Q. And what would you understand this to be?
2 A. My assumption, this is the flimsy copy, the log sheets
3 were carbon copies, there is a second - I can't
4 remember how many there were, but it's certainly the
5 subsequent -- it's the impression copy on the carbon 11:59
6 copy, and my assumption is that this was taken and
7 extracted into a file that was kept or prepared for the
8 actual incident itself. So, somebody has removed it
9 from the log sheet pile and put it into a separate
10 thing, hence the copy element of it. 12:00

11 223 Q. So, I don't know whether such a thing even exists any
12 more, but during the 1990s when photocopiers existed
13 they would have no doubt been extremely expensive, a
14 common way of achieving a copy of a document was to
15 have a top sheet, a piece of carbon paper and then 12:00
16 another sheet underneath so that what was written on
17 the top sheet would be replicated on the bottom sheet?

18 A. So, from recollection, there wasn't necessarily a need
19 for a carbon piece on these things, it did it
20 automatically and under each sheet, however many down, 12:00
21 there was a piece of cardboard that was inserted in
22 order to prevent it going all the way through the
23 notebook.

24 224 Q. I'm not going to explore with you how technically that
25 was achieved, but this was a system whereby one would 12:01
26 write on the top piece of paper and a copy or copies
27 would be created underneath that top page?

28 A. Yes.

29 225 Q. Although perhaps more faintly written than on the top

1 page?

2 A. Correct.

3 226 Q. And is that what we appear to see here, that it is more
4 faintly written?

5 A. Yes. 12:01

6 227 Q. So that's one thing that is indicating that this may be
7 the kind of carbon copy that you believe it was. And
8 I'd invited you earlier to look at the way in which the
9 writing was within the boxes. And we saw on the copy
10 we were looking at that it was well within the boxes 12:01
11 and not crossing over the lines, and do we see
12 something different here?

13 A. Yeah. This is indicative of another sheet slipping
14 slightly underneath.

15 228 Q. And is that the kind of thing which did happen in those 12:01
16 days?

17 A. Yes.

18 229 Q. Do you have a high degree of confidence that this is a
19 carbon copy of the top sheet that we looked at?

20 A. Yes. 12:02

21 CHAIRMAN: It pretty much tells us that at the time,
22 doesn't it, Colonel, although it says carbonless, it
23 says:

24

25 "Note: Carbonless. Do not use carbon, insert backing 12:02
26 plate."
27

28 So, it's as you were describing. It's not a copy
29 system using carbon inserts, it's simply a plate at the

1 back and the pages themselves are capable of being
2 imprinted onto it.

3 THE WITNESS: Correct, Sir.

4 230 Q. MR. GREANEY: Sorry, Sir, that's been staring me in the
5 face and I hadn't noticed it. You have, to say the 12:02
6 least, a very high degree of confidence that this is
7 what you described to us earlier?

8 A. Yeah.

9 231 Q. Can we see, now we look at it, that not only has
10 Captain Peebles apparently started this afresh with a 12:02
11 new serial number, but he has also started it afresh
12 with a sheet number?

13 A. Yeah.

14 232 Q. "001." And at some stage someone has crossed that out
15 and written "003," do you see that? 12:03

16 A. Yeah.

17 233 Q. And then if we go to page 2 of the INQ please, we there
18 see the "4" written over the "2" that we looked at
19 earlier. And if we carry on further, just look at one
20 more page. "5" written over the top of "3," do you see 12:03
21 that?

22 A. Yeah.

23 234 Q. So, does it seem to you that what has occurred is,
24 indeed, as you were telling us earlier, that
25 Captain Peebles has made a decision to start a fresh 12:04
26 log dealing with a fresh and extremely important
27 incident?

28 A. Yes, and one of the sheets -- the sheets have been
29 removed and then subsequently that annotation, as

1 opposed to carbon copy amendment, has been manually
2 amended on each one of the carbon copies to reflect the
3 same changes that take place elsewhere, probably
4 because the underlying sheets have gone by that stage
5 or taken separately. 12:04

6 235 Q. Someone at some stage has changed the 1, 2, 3 in the
7 new log, to be 3, 4, 5 and therefore to follow on
8 sequentially from the earlier entries for 15th August?

9 A. Correct.

10 236 Q. And, so, at some stage, does it appear to you that 12:04
11 someone has taken steps to ensure that the new log
12 formed part of the existing log?

13 A. Yeah, I think there's probably an element of trying to
14 marry things up. Different people looking at it,
15 possibly. I don't know whether it's the same person or 12:05
16 whether Captain Peebles subsequently after the incident
17 tried to marry stuff up, or whether it's one of the
18 members of staff trying to marry stuff up and create an
19 accurate record.

20 237 Q. To your mind, would the fact that someone within the 12:05
21 Army took steps to ensure that there was a single log
22 for the 15th which incorporated the new log, would that
23 be consistent or inconsistent with an attempt to
24 rewrite history and conceal the truth of what had
25 happened? 12:05

26 A. No, I think this is just ordering a set of sequences
27 and making it follow naturally, I don't think there's
28 anything suspicious in it at all.

29 MR. GREANEY: well, Colonel, thank you very much indeed

1 for helping me with my questions. As you appreciate,
2 others have questions as well.

3
4 Sir, I'm going to invite Mr. Kane to pose his questions
5 on behalf of those he represents. And I understand
6 that he would prefer to ask his questions from a seated
7 position.

12:06

8 CHAIRMAN: Yes, Mr. Kane.

9
10 COLONEL PETER MacMULLEN WAS QUESTIONED BY MR. KANE AS
11 FOLLOWS:

12:06

12
13 238 Q. MR. KANE: When did you first become aware of the 14:40
14 Daily Occurrence Book entry 386 which was written by
15 Lance Corporal Thompson in the Daily Occurrence Book?

12:06

16 A. I couldn't tell you an exact date. When the Rule 9s
17 came in and we started getting through this
18 information, I think I found the Daily Occurrence Book
19 sitting separately in the archive, personally, when I
20 was going through stuff. So, a year ago, sorry, I'm at
21 a guess on that one.

12:06

22 239 Q. Did you ever bring its contents to the attention of any
23 public authority, either the Army authority, RUC, PSNI
24 or just to the ILT?

25 A. We presented it to the Inquiry rather than anything
26 else. No, there was no requirement to do anything
27 other than that, I don't believe.

12:07

28 240 Q. And that would be in keeping with a duty of candour,
29 wouldn't that be correct? In terms of what you've

1 discovered. The point has been made that there's no
2 attempt to hide anything by virtue of the fact that the
3 Army have disclosed this?

4 A. Correct.

5 241 Q. That would be in keeping with a duty of candour, which 12:07
6 one would expect and hope from the MoD, isn't that
7 correct?

8 A. Yes. Since we've found something we have shared it and
9 we've tried to do that with everything that we found.
10 There's a complexity. A lot of these documents sit in 12:08
11 our archive that is -- it's mandraulic at best in terms
12 of finding this information. So, we apologise if we
13 get it out of sequence in some of the stuff but it is
14 absolute best effort to get the information to the
15 Inquiry. 12:08

16 242 Q. You have been able to find whether or not this entry in
17 the Daily Occurrence Book at 386 concerning plural
18 bombs plural in towns province wide in Northern Ireland
19 on the day of Omagh bomb, you have been able to find,
20 in your searches, whether that entry has ever been 12:08
21 brought to the attention of any senior investigating
22 officer in charge of either an RUC team or a PSNI team
23 investigating the Omagh bomb?

24 A. No, I couldn't tell you whether that information had
25 been shared previously, but it doesn't relate to any 12:08
26 other information that we have found, it's sort of, if
27 you like, it's the outlier in everything that we've
28 identified so far.

29 243 Q. You have provided, through agreeing with various

1 comments made by Mr. Greaney in an attempt to try and
2 explain this to the families whom I represent, by
3 saying, that essentially all of this arose out of, to
4 quote what I think you said, "the friction of high
5 tension"?

12:09

6 A. Yeah, I think that is highly likely.

7 244 Q. Where did the friction of high tension come from?

8 A. I would imagine sort of hearing a bomb warning and then
9 transmitting that information or passing that
10 information on. So, I think it's sort of the events
11 leading up to that moment in time. I think from a
12 quiet Saturday afternoon to accelerating quite rapidly
13 into what was a grim environment, I think added to that
14 tension.

12:09

15 245 Q. You see, would you agree with me that the entry at
16 14:40 in the Daily Occurrence Book, the entry is timed
17 at 14:40 in the two Watchkeeper Logs, being timed at
18 14:40 was not within the friction of tension of the
19 atrocity which occurred in Omagh, it was all 20 minutes
20 at least, beforehand?

12:10

21 A. So, the event coming in, yes, I can't tell you exactly
22 the point at which they wrote the information but I
23 would imagine - and I think you can see this by the
24 sequence in the Watchkeeper's logs - that there's a
25 trigger of events. So, as soon as the warning came in,
26 there's an acceleration of activity that takes place in
27 around it, which I think would have heightened the
28 atmosphere, I can probably refrain that to being
29 friction but, I think, definitely the atmosphere

12:10

12:10

1 changed from a quiet Saturday afternoon to something
2 slightly different.

3 246 Q. But at 14:40 a warning was received - bomb warnings
4 were received on a regular basis were they not, at that
5 time and for years beforehand by professional soldiers, 12:11
6 trained, I would suggest to you, to remain clam and
7 carefully write down what they heard?

8 A. Yeah, I think that's fair.

9 247 Q. Have you come across significantly different versions
10 of watchkeeper Logs before in your long experience in 12:11
11 the Army?

12 A. A difference between what? I mean in terms of --

13 248 Q. We've two different versions of the same log?

14 A. This is talking about, sorry, just confirm this is
15 talking about the watchkeeper's Log rather than -- 12:11

16 249 Q. The watchkeeper's Log, yes. The other is the Daily
17 Occurrence Book. The Watchkeeper's Log, we have two
18 different versions of the same --

19 CHAIRMAN: I'm not following what you mean by that
20 Mr. Kane? 12:12

21 MR. KANE: By 034854, and then 013164.

22 CHAIRMAN: Why are you calling them different versions?

23 MR. KANE: Well, they purport to cover the same
24 periods.

25 CHAIRMAN: One's a carbon copy of the other, is it not? 12:12

26 MR. KANE: Well, that's a very interesting examination,
27 Chairman, and I think whenever that examination is
28 carried out, away from the heat of the present
29 situation, it'll be a very interesting exercise to see

how carbonisation is purportedly working in these circumstances.

CHAIRMAN: well, we need to understand what it is you want the Colonel to focus on. We need to understand what you mean by "two different versions."

12:13

250 Q. MR. KANE: Very well. If we could put up on screen 034853 and page 0012. [Short pause]. Now, if you could look at the bottom, if you could just highlight the bottom half of that page and, in particular, the right-hand side. And you can see some writing down there at the bottom. "Inspector Johnston," I think it says. You can see to the left-hand side there's an entry "CO in Ops Room" which has been scored out and the word "incident" written in on top.

12:14

If we could go then to 013164. And go to 0001. [Short pause]. If we can highlight the bottom right-hand corner, we can see the three boxes which I highlighted as showing text, they are now blank?

12:14

A. Yeah, I think that's fair. I think there's definitely a case, and I said before that the carbon case appears to have been removed for another incident or something else, and then additional information has been added as it's found. I think probably, if you look at it, there's a sequence where the Ops Room tape is running and they're probably reviewing that and adding what actually did happen at that time. Because at this stage we definitely have a moment of tension, lots going on, clearance is taking place. And I think

12:15

12:15

1 you'll probably find that they're retrospectively
2 adding extra information in based on whatever they can
3 remember at that moment. So, I don't think its
4 unrepresentative. And to go back to your original
5 question have I seen instances similar to this of 12:16
6 documents being added to, Ops Room logs? Yeah,
7 absolutely. Again, what I said to Mr. Greaney, it's
8 not a legal document, it's just trying to capture the
9 information that's available at the time.

10 251 Q. Well, can I ask you, were these - and the Chairman, I 12:16
11 think, has touched on this - there still exists indeed,
12 and were these documents but are commonly called
13 self-carbonising?

14 A. Yeah.

15 252 Q. A type of document that used to be if you went to 12:16
16 purchase an item in the shop, they tore off the top
17 copy gave it to you and kept the bottom copy?

18 A. Yeah.

19 253 Q. So, what you write on the top goes through to the next
20 and, indeed, if there's a third copy, it'll go through 12:17
21 to that, isn't that right?

22 A. Yeah, it could be in these ones, I don't know, whether
23 that's been retained. I can't remember whether that
24 was a thing that took place in these log sheets or were
25 they just a double one. 12:17

26 254 Q. And, again, the entry at 14:55 on page 1, that's before
27 the bomb has gone off, isn't that correct?

28 A. Yeah.

29 255 Q. And, therefore, the friction upon which you rely hasn't

1 really occurred and the enormity -- well, the first of
2 all, the fact that the bomb has gone off, and,
3 secondly, the enormity of the bomb's effect, that's not
4 known at that time?

5 A. I think there's a slight conflation. When I refer to 12:17
6 "the friction," I think it's passing that information
7 of the initial stuff that I spoke to about, so from the
8 Daily Occurrence Book into the Ops Room. I think this
9 is -- you're probably best placed to ask
10 Captain Peebles who conducted this stuff, at what stage 12:18
11 the log sheets were separated, et cetera. But I think
12 it's as more information has become available it's been
13 added to the original top copy, is all I can imagine.
14 As you correctly identify, this carbon copy looks like
15 it's been removed from that sequence, whether that's -- 12:18
16 I can't tell you why.

17 256 Q. During your assessment and overview of the Army
18 documentation in preparation for today, have you seen
19 any note anywhere indicating an explanation made at the
20 time for these various differences? 12:18

21 A. No, but we have submitted everything. So, you've got
22 both elements of it so I'm not so sure -- we haven't
23 sought that explanation either. But the fact that we
24 have every variation of the copy I think gives an
25 indication of the sort of, we're willing to expose 12:19
26 everything to you and there's nothing to hide in that
27 sequence.

28 257 Q. I appreciate, Chairman, I have a time limit, can I have
29 two further questions very quickly? And can I ask you,

1 you made reference today about having checked the Daily
2 Occurrence Book for Strabane?

3 A. Correct.

4 258 Q. Now, I stand to be corrected, that does not appear to
5 have entered into relativity, do you have the INQ 12:19
6 number for that by any chance?

7 A. Not to hand but it is in relativity. I mean, it's
8 certainly on the Egress system that I've been given and
9 it was something that has been submitted. It shows a
10 handwritten entry of the incendiary, a warning relative 12:19
11 to everything else.

12 259 Q. And was that for 15th August?

13 A. I thought that was the 14th.

14 260 Q. Are there any other Daily Occurrence Books for 15th
15 August which you have looked at? 12:20

16 A. Yes. There are none that relate or reflect anything to
17 do with the Inquiry. There were Daily Occurrence Books
18 kept across the whole province, but none of them relate
19 or identify any additional information that we've
20 disclosed. So, anything that we have found that 12:20
21 relates directly to this or the timeframe, and against
22 the parameters the Inquiry presented to us, and I think
23 probably more, that we've submitted into it.

24 261 Q. But you have seen them and they exist?

25 A. Yes. 12:20

26 262 Q. And, finally --

27 A. They're not extensive though. I couldn't guarantee you
28 that I have a Daily Occurrence Book retained for every
29 unit every location across the 10,000 troops that were

1 deployed in 1998 I'm afraid.

2 263 Q. Can I ask on a completely separate issue, the Lisanelly
3 Barracks Operations Room incident tapes have been
4 provided to the Inquiry but tape 1, both parts 1 and 2
5 of tape 1 appear to be missing? 12:21

6 A. Yeah.

7 264 Q. Can you assist as to where those fairly crucial first
8 recordings are, have been, were last seen, located?

9 A. Sadly, not.

10 265 Q. Or can you give any assistance? 12:21

11 A. No, we found those in the regimental museum of Duke of
12 Lancashire's Regiment, the antecedent regiment from the
13 Queen's Lancashire Regiment in Preston and they
14 submitted them to us. But we didn't have -- it was
15 missing tape 1 throughout. We've gone back to them, 12:21
16 we've checked everywhere else, we do not have sight of
17 that and nobody knows where that tape went.

18 MR. KANE: Chairman, thank you very much, indeed.

19 MR. GREANEY: Sir, can I thank Mr. Kane for being
20 respectful of the Rule 10 process and the time 12:22
21 allocated. And I'm next going to ask Mr. Southey to
22 pose his questions on behalf of those he represents
23 please.

24

25 COLONEL PETER MacMULLEN WAS QUESTIONED BY MR. SOUTHEY 12:22
26 AS FOLLOWS:

27

28 266 Q. MR. SOUTHEY: Thank you, Colonel, I don't think I'm
29 necessarily going to be very long. The first thing I'd

1 like to ask you about is about the evidence you gave
2 about the ATO attending and what the role of the ATO
3 was. And if I understood it correctly, and correct me
4 if I'm wrong, in summary your evidence was the ATO
5 wouldn't have detected a bomb, they would have been 12:22
6 there to work on a bomb once it was known about, is
7 that right?

8 A. Yeah, their aim is to render safe a known device.

9 267 Q. Yeah. Can I bring up on screen INQ 013130. It's
10 page 8 of that, it's the statement of Paul Hollinshead 12:23
11 from Defence Science and Technology Lab. You'll see in
12 relation to that, I think it's the third bullet
13 point -- it's the second last bullet point on the page
14 under 2.2, he talks about effectively research in
15 relation to military equipment for detection. The 12:23
16 question I've got was, ignoring the ATO for the moment,
17 because I think you've addressed this in relation to
18 the ATO, but more generally did the Army have capacity,
19 potential compass technical capacity to detect bombs?

20 A. You're stepping out of my basic infantry knowledge 12:24
21 quite rapidly into this space, but it would be a
22 question better addressed to a technical expert, which
23 we can provide and we can get that information for you.
24 But I don't think readily available at the time on the
25 ground, and certainly not within the sequence of events 12:24
26 that took place relating to 15th August 1998.

27 268 Q. The second question was going to follow, and you've
28 probably answered this, even if there was capacity, was
29 it available in Omagh?

1 A. No, and it goes back down to the point I made earlier
2 to Mr. Greaney, we still, in the timeframe available
3 you would be putting a person into the danger area as
4 opposed to clearing somebody, clearing everybody out of
5 the danger area. I think that's the really important 12:25
6 narrative to remember about the explosive ordnance
7 disposal sequencing, et cetera. The only time somebody
8 would be placed in there is if the bomb disposal
9 officer had to go there because somebody couldn't be
10 moved and that was a set of decision-making that would 12:25
11 take place, a very specific set of circumstances. It
12 didn't apply there.

13 269 Q. Can I move to a separate area? Can I have brought up
14 on the screen INQ 041598 and page 3 of it. This is the
15 log, it's one of the two logs that deals with the 12:26
16 intelligence regarding incendiaries.

17 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Southey, can we just be clear. There's
18 a lot of terminology floating around, are we looking at
19 the Watchkeeper's Log or the Daily Occurrence Book?

20 270 Q. MR. SOUTHEY: It's the Daily Occurrence Book. 12:26
21 A. This is Daily Occurrence Book for Strabane.

22 271 Q. I was going to say it's the one from Strabane, as I
23 understand it. It's one of two examples. If you go to
24 the bottom of the page, it's slightly difficult to
25 read, but if you go to the bottom of the page, it's the 12:26
26 second last entry on the page, it's the one -- it links
27 back to the other -- there's another entry in the Omagh
28 one which is the typed entry about a threat about
29 32 County Sovereignty being in possession of incendiary

1 devices. The first question I wanted to ask about
2 this, and I understand, just to put it in context
3 firstly, that both this entry and the one you also saw
4 from the Omagh Daily Occurrence Book, they're the same
5 effectively piece of intelligence, is that right? 12:27

6 A. They are the same threat message, yes.

7 272 Q. In the left-hand column on this one though, which is
8 why I wanted to raise it, it says it's reported by RUC
9 SBN, does that imply it was RUC Special Branch?

10 A. Assumption would be Special Branch North, Northern 12:27
11 Region.

12 273 Q. Okay, that's helpful. Then in terms of the actions,
13 just as we've got this open, the actions are said to
14 include "Omagh intelligence informed." That,
15 presumably, implies this may well have been the source, 12:28
16 effectively, of Omagh, Omagh's entry?

17 A. Could be, I wouldn't necessarily assume that Strabane
18 would be the point where information was fed in. I
19 think this is -- if anything, I would say that it
20 probably came from 122 Intelligence Section and it went 12:28
21 out and that's just a slight misrepresentation that
22 these are the places that know about this threat
23 message rather than being informed by the Strabane,
24 which would have been low level outstation.

25 274 Q. Right, okay. That's helpful. In terms of the message 12:28
26 and generally, is there anything you can say about the
27 sort of significance of this, why, effectively, it's
28 been recorded and what it was anticipated the Army
29 might do about it?

1 A. I think this is a generic threat message that was
2 coming through. There's probably examples of them
3 throughout the Daily Occurrence Books. It's to do with
4 a very different type of threat. A low-level
5 incendiary device, this is something that's put into a 12:29
6 pocket of a coat in a clothing shop, set fire,
7 disruption. It's indicative of the enduring and
8 continuing threat that we spoke about on Monday from
9 dissident republican groups and the fact that the
10 Army's position was still to react and prepare and be 12:29
11 aware of this.

12 275 Q. Now, changing topic a little bit again, in your
13 corporate statement, which is the one that's
14 INQ 035229, at para 14 and 15, you describe something
15 that's described in various logs and elsewhere, 12:29
16 sorry -- it's page 5 and 6 of it.

17 A. Yeah, I have it.

18 276 Q. You describe the Army becoming aware of the threat at
19 14:40. Sorry, I actually think it's the timeline
20 statement. I hope you've got the correct document from 12:30
21 the INQ number because I think I confused myself.

22 A. Sure. I'm on INQ 035229.

23 277 Q. Yes, that's the correct INQ number. And you describe,
24 effectively, the Army becoming aware of the threat,
25 14:40. As we read this - and I just want to check that 12:30
26 this is correct - the way in which the Army first
27 became aware of the threat was because it overheard
28 this on RUC radio. There wasn't, if you like, someone
29 from the RUC calling up or doing something along those

1 lines directly and saying, 'Army, you need to be aware
2 of this threat,' is that right?

3 A. No, from my understanding looking at the sequence of
4 events and the information that came in, it was
5 overheard initially on the RUC Net by the Intelligence 12:31
6 Cell, passed and then subsequently reconfirmed as the
7 situation developed from the Ops Room.

8 278 Q. Yeah.

9 A. It would be worthwhile asking whether there was an RUC
10 Net also in the Ops Room, I'm not sure of that, but I 12:31
11 think subsequent people in here might be able to help
12 you with that.

13 279 Q. Okay. In terms of sort of supply of information, was
14 there, as far as you're aware, any sort of standard
15 protocol or policy about sharing of communications? 12:31

16 A. I can't find written policies about this, but the very
17 presence of RUC radios inside the barracks, at whatever
18 point, I think indicates that there was no -- there was
19 no restriction in terms of that and no caveating on
20 that control of information that flowed as it went 12:32
21 within it.

22 280 Q. The next question I was going to ask, essentially, was,
23 as far as you're aware, was that arrangement with RUC
24 radios, was that in one sense a sort of formalised
25 arrangement so that there was that sharing of 12:32
26 information, or was it an informal practice that had
27 developed?

28 A. A 30-year campaign, and I think much of what developed,
29 developed informally. I think, in terms of, if we were

1 to do this now there would be Memorandum of
2 Understanding and somebody would be charged for it, at
3 some stage, I'm sure. But I think, at this stage, it
4 was things developed over time. We have certainly not
5 been able to find any distinct documents that identify 12:32
6 parameters by which information, technology, et cetera
7 was shared, it happened. I can't tell you whether it
8 was formal or informal. My gut would say that it
9 developed over time and became formal.

10 281 Q. I mean, sort of linked to that and in one sense this 12:33
11 may be primarily a question for somebody else, but as
12 far as you were aware, did the Army sort of know that
13 the RUC were aware that their radio transmissions were
14 being listened to by the Army?

15 A. Yeah, they would have been. So, at every stage there 12:33
16 would have been liaison officers, I think we call them
17 RUCLOs, - RUC liaison officers - in places, and so
18 would you have had that knowledge of it. And at each
19 level there were different points of contact within it.
20 So, it was openly shared organisation. 12:33

21 282 Q. Okay. Final topic. Can I go to sorry, INQ 0044255.
22 This is the transcript of the recording made by
23 Lieutenant Colonel James in 2000?

24 A. Yeah.

25 283 Q. I'll wait for it to come up on the screen. Can I go to 12:34
26 page 6 of it first. [Short pause]. And I think in
27 that, towards the bottom of the page I think, he
28 describes, if I've got it right, he describes the blast
29 happening. And then if we can go over to the next page

1 at the top of the page, first entry, he appears to
2 describe the tape recorder being started following the
3 explosion, because, obviously, there was major
4 incident. Would that have been normal that there
5 wasn't, if you like, a continuous tape running at all 12:35
6 times?

7 A. No, this is -- I mean, and we're talking very basic
8 technology, this is one of those classic L square
9 boxes, you had to press two buttons to make it record
10 and turn the tape over at the end and it wouldn't 12:35
11 necessarily do it automatically. In most Ops Room
12 there would have been a tape recorder just to cover off
13 that stuff. So, at the height of the moment, in the
14 heat of the moment when information was being passed
15 there was a record being kept. 12:35

16 284 Q. So, that was the purpose of the tape recording, it was
17 to cover the heat of the moment, it wasn't a routine
18 form of record keeping?

19 A. No. Again, I go back to the point about it's not
20 evidential, this is just to gather information. 12:35

21 285 Q. Okay. And I think you've explained it can't be
22 located, is that right?

23 A. No. We have tried everything to try and find that and
24 it just doesn't exist.

25 MR. SOUTHEY: I think that covers everything, thank you 12:36
26 from my point of view.

27 MR. GREANEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Southey. And
28 next, Sir, Mr. Toal has Rule 10 permission to ask
29 questions.

1 COLONEL PETER MacMULLEN WAS QUESTIONED BY MR. TOAL AS
2 FOLLOWS:
3

4 286 Q. MR. TOAL: Thank you. Colonel, when I asked you some
5 questions on Monday, you undertook to have a look at 12:36
6 that issue. Can you confirm whether the minor roads
7 either side of Aughnacloy were in fact operational at
8 the time in 1998?

9 A. I can't confirm it, but looking at open source
10 material, looking at the ground and looking at mapping 12:36
11 at the time, it would appear that from 1994 John Major
12 made a statement, turned around and said the Border
13 should be made open, and subsequent information would
14 indicate that it was. Looking at the ground itself,
15 you look at some of the locations in and around there, 12:37
16 they clearly would have been open. So, I'm pretty
17 certain that there would have been alternate routes in
18 and around the vicinity of Aughnacloy.

19 287 Q. That's very helpful, thank you. By 1998, the governing
20 principle was one of RUC primacy with the Army 12:37
21 operating in support of the police; yes?

22 A. Correct, and that had been done so for some time.

23 288 Q. And Army resources ordinarily would only be deployed in
24 response to a direct request from the RUC?

25 A. Correct. 12:37

26 289 Q. And was that still the position where urgent assistance
27 may have been needed? And if we use the Omagh bomb as
28 an example. A bomb warning comes in with an extremely
29 short period of 30 minutes, could the Army have used

1 its own initiative to deploy into town?

2 A. Yes, I suppose so, but I think probably the point which

3 I would make - and I made earlier - is this idea that

4 there's a cautious balance between helping and

5 hindering at that stage. Flooding the area with more 12:38

6 people, troops or whatever they are, there's still more

7 people coming into an area, clogging up routes coming

8 down from Lisanelly Barracks don't necessarily help the

9 situation. Quite a lot of policemen on the ground,

10 they're all clearing from it. So I wouldn't expect, 12:38

11 looking at this with hindsight, but I don't see how

12 extra military manpower at that time would have helped.

13 Quite possibly it would have hindered.

14 290 Q. Okay. Now, there is a record at 14:55 which states:

15

16 "RUC do not require any military assistance yet."

17

18 A. Yeah.

19 291 Q. You have viewed that?

20 A. Yeah. 12:38

21 292 Q. Does the word "yet" suggest to you that the military

22 assistance had already been considered or discussed

23 with the RUC?

24 A. Yeah. I think somebody would have posed the question,

25 whether it is the watchkeeper or the RUC Liaison 12:39

26 Officer, at some stage somebody has posed the question

27 with it, whether that's an immediate response to do you

28 want any Army call signs on the ground, not yet, thanks

29 out. Or it had been a more considered response, I

1 can't tell.

2 293 Q. So, that would be a normal thing to happen in those
3 circumstances; the Army would proactively approach the
4 RUC and ask do you need our help?

5 A. Yeah. I think, as with all of this information sharing 12:39
6 and operational sharing, it's a very flat structure
7 when something like this happens and everybody is
8 pitching in.

9 294 Q. Because just picking up on something that Mr. Greaney
10 raised with you about the experience of ATOs, in your 12:39
11 opinion would it have been useful for ATO input to,
12 perhaps, advise the police as to the potential bomb
13 radius of a 500lb bomb?

14 A. No. I think the police would have been perfectly aware
15 of that. They've set out in the radio communications, 12:40
16 clearance distances and movements about it and
17 everything was about it, and where the cordon locations
18 were set up and done, when you look at the ground
19 they're all out of line of sight from where the bomb
20 warning came in. Granted, they were on the same street 12:40
21 where the bomb eventually went off, but where the
22 ground rose and falls along the High Street, all of
23 those cordon locations are perfectly acceptable and
24 within the bounds of what we would operationally plan
25 anyway. And this was a force that was experienced and 12:40
26 set to dealing with these events as a matter of course
27 anyway. So, there was nothing, I don't think, that
28 would have been added by ATO at that stage.

29 295 Q. Even in circumstances where the police officers on the

1 ground were openly saying in the communications we need
2 as many men here as possible?

3 A. I can't tell in that -- I'll refer you back to my
4 earlier thing where I turn around and go that's great,
5 but how do you coordinate and control that? There 12:41
6 is -- as a commander there's a point of friction in
7 that where you had to make a decision whether you're
8 adding value or are you actually hindering the
9 situation and clearance operation.

10 296 Q. Yes. Can I please just return to the serial 386 12:41
11 please, just so that I can help myself and those I
12 represent understand your explanation about that.

13 A. Sure.

14 297 Q. Could we possibly have that document up again please.
15 MR. GREANEY: This is INQ 034854, page 6. 12:41

16 298 Q. MR. TOAL: Now, the rewriting of entries is a matter of
17 some concern to the victims that I represent and it's
18 just to give you a further opportunity to help us
19 understand what you're saying about that. And I'll
20 just wait now, the document is up. So if we look in 12:41
21 particular at the entry 385?

22 A. Yeah.

23 299 Q. Do I understand you to be saying that the time beside
24 it at 15:21, you think that's 13:21?

25 A. Yes. 12:42

26 300 Q. Right. And you think that as the person filling out
27 this notebook has been writing that it must have been
28 at 1440 hrs, or shortly thereafter, and they've
29 abandoned that entry and started to write the entry

1 below?

2 A. I think in that timeframe. So the sighting report on
3 VENGEFUL has taken place at 13:21. The information has
4 come in, somebody has looked at it and in the time from
5 the sighting and 14:40 that's the period of time by 12:42
6 which that information has been digested, analysed at
7 some stage, I just think it's been overtaken by events.

8 301 Q. Okay.

9 A. It's not an instantaneous writing in the book.

10 302 Q. Okay. I don't wish to be too forensic about this, but 12:43
11 if you look at the left-hand column you can see the
12 No.3 obviously, "385" and you'll see that the 5s
13 actually look like an "S" the way that this person in
14 particular writes them; can you see that?

15 A. Yeah, yeah. 12:43

16 303 Q. And the 5 that you now contend might be a 3, does in
17 fact also look like an S in the same style as writing a
18 5?

19 A. Yeah, yeah.

20 304 Q. Okay. And I want to just go on down to entry 400 12:43
21 please, which is two down. [Short pause]. Yes.
22 Earlier, I think whenever you gave evidence you
23 mistakenly said that the person who was the subject of
24 that entry was a person called Patrick Nugent but it
25 looks like Plunkett Nugent to me. 12:44

26 A. Could have been, yeah.

27 305 Q. So, if you look at entry 400 and this is 16th August,
28 we again have this person Plunkett Nugent and the last
29 line please.

1 "Last sighted in Aughnacloy on 15 August at 1605 hrs."
2
3 How would you explain that discrepancy?
4 A. I'm not so sure it's discrepancy, is it? Because it
5 doesn't relate to either of the timeframes. Could he 12:44
6 have been sighted in Aughnacloy at that time.
7 306 Q. Right. But the sighting of him is recorded as 13:21
8 on?
9 A. A sighting of him, yes.
10 307 Q. Well, would there not then be a subsequent sighting 12:45
11 written to into this book for 16:05?
12 A. Could be. I mean is that not it? Sorry, I'm guessing
13 on this one, but it's a record of where they're
14 sighting this man in and around the location. So, what
15 information and where that sighting report has come in 12:45
16 from, doesn't stand the test of time. Whether that's a
17 VENGEFUL, as we've seen earlier, or that's a physical
18 sighting of him as the incident is progressing or prior
19 to it, I don't know, it could have been from anywhere.
20 308 Q. Okay. But you'll certainly agree with me that the 12:45
21 information appears to be inconsistent on its face,
22 yes?
23 A. The timeframes, yeah. It's not something that I have
24 examined or followed through.
25 309 Q. Okay. Well, in terms of that serial 386 and just going 12:46
26 from your answer earlier, can I just ask you how that
27 came into existence at all? And by that, I mean help
28 us understand why the Army Intelligence Cell was
29 independently monitoring RUC traffic? Was that routine

1 practice?

2 A. Yes, I think so. I mean there would have been a radio
3 in there and they would have had it on. I mean, yes.

4 310 Q. And are you sure that the Army had the express
5 permission of the RUC to do that? 12:46

6 A. I can't confirm either way on that one, but I can't
7 imagine that we got hold of a radio from a police by
8 nefarious means, so I can imagine it was given to us by
9 the RUC.

10 311 Q. Well, you have come across any formal arrangement under 12:46
11 which that monitoring took place?

12 A. No.

13 312 Q. No.

14 A. No, as I said earlier, I think this is -- the
15 difficulty is we haven't been able to find formal 12:47
16 agreements on anything. I think this is slightly more
17 indicative of a developing operation over years rather
18 than anything other than what we would represent now
19 which included a formal acknowledgment that you had a
20 piece of equipment and you were allowed to use it in 12:47
21 certain parameters.

22 313 Q. Okay. Well, perhaps, if we just keep the INQ that is
23 on the screen and go to the cover page of the book
24 please. Now, this is obviously the book that the
25 entries are written into and we have a person listening 12:47
26 to the RUC Net?

27 A. Yeah.

28 314 Q. They write the entries into this book?

29 A. Yeah.

1 315 Q. Now, the title on this page, can you just explain "INT
2 eyes only," is that intelligence eyes only?
3 A. Yeah.
4 316 Q. So, if there was this open and transparent agreement
5 with the RUC why is it that the content of those 12:48
6 messages are written into a book with the warning on
7 the front cover that says "intelligence eyes only?"
8 Does that not suggest that this was being secretly
9 listened to and recorded as intelligence?"
10 A. No. 12:48
11 317 Q. It doesn't?
12 A. No.
13 318 Q. And the book kept separate from the Operations Room?
14 A. That -- I think the intelligence aspect of it and the
15 analysis, where we turn around and say the sighting, I 12:48
16 can't remember which one it is, where you have the
17 VENGEFUL sightings and then subsequent 386, where it
18 turns around and says this is assessed and this is
19 where it comes from, that is never low-level
20 intelligence and so this wouldn't be publicly shared. 12:49
21 But the source information, which in this case is the
22 radio net is not covert intelligence-gathering in any
23 means.
24 319 Q. Yes. well, to the best of your knowledge --
25 A. Analysis. 12:49
26 320 Q. Sorry. To the best of your knowledge did the RUC
27 listen in to Army-to-Army communications?
28 A. I don't know, you're going to have to ask a policeman.
29 321 Q. well, is that something that the Army would have

1 permitted?

2 A. I can't see why they wouldn't have. Mightily bored
3 they would have been. I mean, you know, there's an
4 awful lot more people going on, an awful lot more radio
5 communications taking place, I'm not sure there was a 12:49
6 capacity or an intent do so on behalf of the RUC. But
7 I just don't know the answer to that question, I'm
8 sorry.

9 322 Q. But, again, no formal agreement that you have come
10 across in your research? 12:50

11 A. No.

12 323 Q. For either body to listen in on the other's
13 communications?

14 A. Nothing that I have found.

15 324 Q. And because of that lack of formalised arrangement, it 12:50
16 was all very ad hoc?

17 A. It existed and whether you could define that as ad hoc,
18 I mean I'm not entirely sure. Again, I refer you back
19 to that point that this is just an evolving operation.
20 This would be really useful to have, so it happened. 12:50

21 325 Q. Could I ask it in another way: Could the person
22 listening to the RUC Net contribute to the conversation
23 between police officers?

24 A. I doubt it. I mean, whether they had the capacity to
25 do, did the radio have a send and receive? I don't 12:50
26 know, I would imagine it would have done. Would there
27 have been an opportunity to do so or a requirement to
28 do so? I don't think so, there would have been other
29 mechanisms by which to do so. So, I think this is

1 information.

2 MR. TOAL: Okay. Perhaps we could clarify that as we

3 go forward as to whether or not that arrangement was

4 expressed. Okay, thank you, Sir, I've no further

5 questions. 12:51

6 MR. GREANEY: Sir, Mr. Henry has indicated that he no

7 longer has any questions on behalf of PSNI. I'm just

8 going to check whether there are any questions on

9 behalf of HMG and there are not.

10 12:51

11 Sir, I'm going to make sure that there is as much

12 clarity as we can achieve in relation to two issues and

13 it won't take long at all.

14

15 COLONEL PETER MacMULLEN WAS FURTHER QUESTIONED BY 12:51

16 MR. GREANEY AS FOLLOWS:

17

18 326 Q. MR. GREANEY: Now, first of all in light of the

19 questions you've been asked I want to see whether we

20 are any further ahead in relation to the sequence just 12:51

21 before and after 2:40 p.m. on 15th August. So, let's

22 just start with what we know. At 1440 hrs, Lance

23 Corporal Errol Thompson is in the Intelligence Cell.

24 A. [Witness nods].

25 327 Q. And you've just nodded your head. 12:52

26 A. Yes. Sorry.

27 328 Q. And whether pursuant to ad hoc or formal arrangement,

28 he is listening to the RUC Net, so the RUC radio?

29 A. Correct.

1 329 Q. And it's clear that at or shortly before that time he
2 hears a message that, on any view, relates to a bomb
3 warning?
4 A. Correct.

5 330 Q. I don't know whether you are aware of this, but we know 12:52
6 that at 1435 hrs, so timed five minutes before that
7 entry was made, there was a transmission on the police
8 systems by an officer called PC Millar; are you aware
9 of that?
10 A. No. 12:52

11 331 Q. I just want to see whether this is relevant to our
12 understanding. That transmission was played yesterday,
13 although it is subject to a Restriction Order and so
14 could not be heard outside of this room. And during
15 the course of that transmission PC Millar passed some 12:53
16 of the same information that was to be recorded in the
17 Daily Occurrence Log at 2:40. So, the matters in
18 common included the bomb was believed to be near the
19 courthouse, that it was believed to be in the region of
20 500lb and the same codeword had been used in the 12:53
21 Banbridge attack?
22 A. Sorry, on reflection I think I am aware of that.

23 332 Q. I would be surprised if you weren't. I'm just drawing
24 your attention to the fact that five minutes before the
25 14:40 entry, there was a transmission that on the face 12:53
26 of it Lance Corporal Thompson would have been listening
27 to which contained much of the information that he then
28 recorded; is that making sense so far?
29 A. Yes, it does.

1 333 Q. what he didn't say was there had been warnings in
2 relation to a number of towns. He said there had been
3 warnings all in relation to Omagh. And so does it
4 follow that the question we need to ask ourselves and
5 answer, is whether Lance Corporal Thompson was 12:54
6 listening to that message five minutes before he made
7 his record and has just made a mistake about the number
8 of towns that the calls were in respect of, or whether
9 he listened to a completely different message?
10 A. I think, I can't -- if there was no other message, and 12:54
11 that's the single point, it seems to be most likely the
12 first part of it, so he's listened to that message and
13 there's a transposition error both in time and content.
14 334 Q. In all events, when you dealt with the sequence you
15 were explaining the way in which the Army first becomes 12:54
16 aware of what is afoot is because the Intelligence Cell
17 hears about it on the radio?
18 A. Correct.
19 335 Q. But have I understood you correctly that the Army
20 didn't just continue to listen to the radio, there was, 12:55
21 following that, some direct communication between the
22 Army, Lisanelly and the RUC?
23 A. Correct.
24 336 Q. And during that period further information was sought
25 and obtained? 12:55
26 A. Correct.
27 337 Q. And it was during this period that there was discussion
28 about whether there was a necessity for the Army to
29 deploy?

1 A. Correct.

2 338 Q. That was the first thing that I just wanted to be clear
3 about.
4

5 The second thing probably is clear, but it could bear 12:55
6 certainty. Could we have on the screen please,
7 INQ 041598-2, so page 2. Do you remember that I took
8 you --

9 A. Yeah.

10 339 Q. It's the next page. I didn't take you to this and 12:56
11 maybe I should have done. Just enlarge the bottom
12 third of the page, please. So, we looked in the Daily
13 Occurrence Book for Omagh at serial 379, do you
14 remember?

15 A. Yeah. 12:56

16 340 Q. And that was the printed piece of page --

17 A. The threat at that stage.

18 341 Q. -- that had been sellotaped in dealing with the threat.
19 And I'd asked you whether that was something that was
20 specific to Omagh or whether it was a piece of 12:56
21 intelligence that was of general application and
22 dissemination within Northern Ireland?

23 A. Correct.

24 342 Q. And you told me it was the latter and you mentioned to
25 me the Daily Occurrence Book from Strabane? 12:57

26 A. Which this is.

27 343 Q. Right. And you were pressed on this by Mr. Kane and
28 you mentioned the Strabane book and I just want to be
29 clear; when you were making the point that you had seen

1 the same information not only in the Omagh Daily
2 Occurrence Book but in relation to other places and
3 referred to the Strabane Daily Occurrence Book this is
4 what you're referring to?

5 A. Correct. That's correct. 12:57

6 344 Q. And to your mind does that indicate support for your
7 view this was intelligence of general application --

8 A. Absolutely.

9 345 Q. -- and not specific to Omagh?

10 A. Yeah. 12:57

11 MR. GREANEY: Sir, can I check whether you have any
12 questions for the Colonel.

13 CHAIRMAN: No, thank you very much.

14 MR. GREANEY: Colonel, thank you very much indeed for
15 answering questions on the second occasion. As you 12:57
16 know, we will need you to return at some point in the
17 future to be identified.

18

19 Sir, we're nearly at one o'clock, could I suggest that
20 we break for lunch and return at two o'clock please. 12:58

21 CHAIRMAN: Yes.

22

23 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH AND RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:

24

25 CHAIRMAN: Mr. de la Poer. 14:02

26 MR. DE LA POER: Sir, good afternoon. Our next witness
27 is Former Captain James Hodgson and I wonder if we
28 could begin with him being sworn please.

29

1 FORMER CAPTAIN JAMES HODGSON HAVING AFFIRMED WAS
2 QUESTIONED BY MR. DE LA POER AS FOLLOWS:
3

4 CHAIRMAN: Thank you, good afternoon Mr. Hodgson.

5 THE WITNESS: Hello.

14:03

6 346 Q. MR. DE LA POER: We're going to start with how I'm
7 going to refer to you. You are the first of three
8 witnesses who all held the rank of captain on 15th
9 August 1998, and you have all variously gone on to
10 pursue different careers both in and out of the Army
11 between the three of you. Ordinarily, anybody who
12 reaches the rank of Captain or above is entitled in
13 civilian life to retain that as you are, but, to avoid
14 things becoming confusing and drawing distinctions
15 between the three of you, you have agreed, kindly, that
16 I will refer to you as Former Captain Hodgson to remind
17 everybody of the rank that you held at the time?

14:03

14:03

18 A. That's correct.

19 347 Q. So, Former Captain Hodgson, we'll deal with your
20 background first. Were you commissioned into the 1st
21 Battalion of 1 QLR in 1995?

14:03

22 A. That's correct.

23 348 Q. And in the late summer of 1997 were you posted to
24 Omagh?

25 A. That's right.

14:04

26 349 Q. In the Autumn of 1997 did you undertake training as an
27 intelligence officer?

28 A. I did.

29 350 Q. We'll come back to what that role is in a moment, but

1 staying with your progress. Subsequent to that
2 training, did you take up the position of Battalion
3 Intelligence Officer?

4 A. I did.

5 351 Q. And was that the role that you occupied on 15th August 14:04
6 1998?

7 A. It was.

8 352 Q. Just to complete the picture; did you leave the Army in
9 November 1998, so a matter of months after the Omagh
10 attack? 14:04

11 A. I did.

12 353 Q. And you've been in civilian life for the last 28 years?

13 A. That's correct.

14 354 Q. Having introduced you, let's move to the role of
15 Battalion Intelligence Officer. In just a few 14:05
16 sentences for us, please, Former Captain Hodgson, can
17 you tell us what that role entailed?

18 A. It entailed the leadership of the Battalion
19 Intelligence Cell, which was a group of, memory fades,
20 but between 50 and 60 soldiers, and their role was to 14:05
21 collate and review low-level intelligence such as a
22 vehicle's movement across borders, those kinds of
23 things. And that information would be collated - I led
24 the oversight of that - and it would be shared with the
25 RUC, where appropriate, and it would be shared with my 14:05
26 Commanding Officer and with Brigade Intelligence Cells
27 as well.

28 355 Q. Now, you have referred to the Intelligence Cell as a
29 group of people, 50 to 60 soldiers you've described?

1 A. Approximately, yeah.

2 356 Q. Was there, also, a physical location within Lisanelly
3 Barracks which may also have been referred as the
4 Intelligence Cell?

5 A. There, was indeed, there was a room which was secure, 14:06
6 you needed a pass to get in.

7 357 Q. And would we be correct to refer to that room as the
8 Intelligence Cell?

9 A. Yeah, I guess one and the same thing, used for the
10 same -- different things but used for the same purpose. 14:06

11 358 Q. I will try to make clear what I'm be referring to, I
12 will be talking about the physical location, unless I
13 indicate otherwise.

14 A. Okay.

15 359 Q. Just help us, firstly, with that room. How many people 14:06
16 at anyone time would be occupying that room?

17 A. I suppose maximum maybe ten.

18 360 Q. And was there a minimum deployment to that room at
19 anyone time, so in other words was it always occupied
20 by at least one member of your group? 14:07

21 A. It was. Memory, look, it's a long time ago, I
22 apologise, but there would be at least one person in
23 the room 24 hours a day, but there may have been more
24 than one, there may have been two on occasion.

25 361 Q. And what was the function of the person who would be in 14:07
26 that room on a 24-hour basis?

27 A. To continue the ongoing collation of the intelligence
28 that I just described, which was coming in via various
29 means, it could come in through the computer systems

1 which were linked to the vehicle checkpoints at the
2 borders. It could also come in from patrols, so the
3 Army would accompany RUC officers on patrol from time
4 to time, they would come back from their patrol, they
5 would have a debrief. The Intelligence Cell 14:08
6 representative would go to that and debrief them and
7 any sightings of interest or anything of interest from
8 the patrol would be part of the general intelligence
9 gathering.

10 362 Q. When you were on duty would you ordinarily be based in 14:08
11 that room?

12 A. No.

13 363 Q. So, would that be a room you would go to, from time to
14 time, but not one that you worked from?

15 A. I would say that's fair. There was a large room, there 14:08
16 were three separate rooms actually, there was an office
17 which was a small room where I would generally be, that
18 was adjacent to another slightly larger office and the
19 Intelligence Cell itself was adjacent to that room. So
20 there were three rooms effectively. 14:09

21 364 Q. And when we're talking about the Intelligence Cell and
22 the person who's occupying it 24 hours a day or the
23 people who do so on a rota, we're talking about the
24 larger of the --

25 A. The larger of the three rooms, yes, that's right. 14:09

26 365 Q. Now, you've talked about a computer system that they
27 had access to, were there any radios broadcasting into
28 that room?

29 A. There was definitely an RUC radio. I can't recall

1 whether there was a military radio.

2 366 Q. In terms of the RUC radio - it's a topic that's come up
3 this morning - do you know whether or not the RUC were
4 aware, at the time, that you were listening to their
5 radio traffic? 14:09

6 A. Yes, they were aware.

7 367 Q. And so, was that with their consent?

8 A. Well, it wasn't consent that I'd gained in the sense
9 that it was in place when I took over as intelligence
10 officer, so it was a standard procedure, it was an 14:10
11 ongoing, you know part of our close working with the
12 RUC in Omagh.

13 368 Q. So, does it follow from that, that you weren't covertly
14 eavesdropping on the RUC?

15 A. Certainly not. 14:10

16 369 Q. So, we've got at least one radio in there, a computer
17 terminal, presumably telephone as well?

18 A. Yeah.

19 370 Q. And was there any form of book or log that you would
20 expect to be completed? 14:10

21 A. There was the Daily Occurrence Book. There may have
22 been other methods of recording. There would have been
23 various computer terminals. Forgive me, I forget the
24 names of the computer systems that we used but there
25 were various ways of logging information that could be 14:11
26 seen by brigade.

27 371 Q. One of them that we see repeatedly is VENGEFUL which we
28 know was an intelligence database in relation to the
29 movement of vehicles?

1 A. what I'd like to say is that on receiving the
2 invitation to be here, a lot of documents were shared
3 about me and the names of locations and places and
4 people and the systems that we used were things that I
5 have not used for 28 years. So, the VENGEFUL, the name 14:11
6 "VENGEFUL" is something that I recall and I've seen
7 documents explaining its use but I wouldn't rely on my
8 evidence to say what VENGEFUL was.

9 372 Q. That's entirely appropriate that you give that answer.
10 Can we return to the Daily Occurrence Book, please. 14:11
11 what was the purpose of that document?

12 A. So, almost as it sort of describes. It would be a
13 paper record of things of interest that were happening
14 that the Int Cell or the intelligence members --
15 members of the team who were on duty would make a 14:12
16 record. It was not an operational log in the sense
17 that absolutely everything was noted down. Things of
18 note, things of -- you know, a judgment would be made
19 as to whether something was worth noting from an
20 intelligence perspective and it would be written in the 14:12
21 log.

22 373 Q. Just help us with the process of making entries and
23 what you would expect as the person heading this unit.
24 would you expect people to be transcribing in
25 real-time, in other words that if they heard something 14:13
26 on the radio that they would be writing it out as it
27 occurred? would you expect them to write it somewhere
28 else and later put it into the Occurrence Book; how did
29 that process work?

1 A. My memory is that it was a document that was primarily
2 used to collate information, not in real-time but as
3 things -- as things, you know, came up on a system,
4 VENGEFUL for example, that would be sort of checked and
5 verified and then at some point entered into the Daily 14:13
6 Occurrence Book. One thing that did happen from the
7 Daily Occurrence Book was that there would be a summary
8 that I would see every morning. So, my first task
9 every morning would be to see a sort of printed summary
10 of incidents of note, probably best describe them. 14:13

11 374 Q. Now, we know there was an Operations Room at Lisanelly
12 Barracks?

13 A. There was.

14 375 Q. Approximately how close was that to the Intelligence
15 cell? 14:14

16 A. A short walk, 30/40 yards. At the end of a corridor.

17 376 Q. In the event that the person in the Intelligence Cell
18 heard something on the radio or received intelligence
19 by some other way, that they thought the Operations
20 Room should be aware of, would you have expected them 14:14
21 to go and tell the Operations Room straight away or
22 would you expect them to make the record and then go
23 and tell the Operations Room?

24 A. Oh, tell them straight away, and then make the record.

25 377 Q. Now, you weren't on duty, were you, on 15th August 14:15
26 1998?

27 A. No, I wasn't.

28 378 Q. So, it follows from that that you weren't in or
29 immediately around the Intelligence Cell between 2:30

1 and 3:30 that day?

2 A. No, I wasn't. I wasn't far away, I was in and around
3 the Officers' Mess which was a few hundred yards away.

4 379 Q. Can you just tell us; when, approximately, did you
5 first become aware of a bomb either by way of a warning 14:15
6 or by way of a detonation in Omagh?

7 A. When the bomb went off.

8 380 Q. Was that because you heard it because you were close?

9 A. I heard it. I was actually -- it was the day -- the
10 Saturday was the, we'd planned an Officers' Mess summer 14:15
11 ball that weekend, we had guests, our wives/girlfriends
12 were attending. There were two tennis courts outside
13 in front of the Officers' Mess, I happened to be
14 playing tennis with another officer and his girlfriend
15 and my girlfriend, we were playing. 14:16

16 381 Q. So, when did you first turn up for duty after 15:04,
17 which is when we know the bomb detonated?

18 A. I immediately went to work. So, I stopped playing
19 tennis. I ran up to my room, which was on the first
20 floor of the Officers' Mess. I got changed out of my 14:16
21 sports gear, put some jeans on, T-shirt, whatever, and
22 drove to the Ops Room.

23 382 Q. And is that where you presented yourself?

24 A. It is.

25 383 Q. We'll come back to that moment in time in a moment. 14:16
26 We're now going to just go back in time from that and
27 we're going to do so by having a look at the Daily
28 Occurrence Book. So, can I please invite to come up on
29 screen INQ 034854, page 4 please. We're starting, so

1 everybody understands, the day before the Omagh bomb.
2 And it's serial entry 379 that I would like to ask you
3 about. We can see that unlike other entries on that
4 page and indeed entries on other pages that this is a
5 typed entry. First question: Do you, sitting there 14:17
6 now, have any recollection of that message being
7 received?

8 A. No, unfortunately I have no recollection of that.

9 384 Q. That, notwithstanding, are you able to help with,
10 bearing in mind the presentation of that message, what 14:17
11 your expectations are about where it might have come
12 from and what its purpose was?

13 A. It looks like it's a general threat message for the
14 whole of Northern Ireland. So, no specific threat to
15 Omagh. And it looks like it's been sent from Brigade, 14:18
16 I imagine. I can't recall exactly, but these kind of
17 threats were made known to us from time to time, they
18 were very general and within the overall threat
19 envelope, they would be, they would either change our
20 sort of state of alertness or readiness or not. 14:18

21 385 Q. Were they provided to your unit to be actioned?

22 A. For general dissemination, yes.

23 386 Q. That's the first part of this book that I would like to
24 ask you about. Can we please move forward -- you'll
25 note as we do so the entry at the bottom of the page is 14:18
26 382, it continues over the page, we'll see that that's
27 15th August 1100 hrs, but we'll just, if we may,
28 Ms. Montgomery, move forward a page so we can see the
29 continuation of that. Just to pick out some of the

1 details. This is a continuation of the entry timed and
2 dated 1100 hrs, 15th August. We can see in the course
3 of this entry there is a heading "car trawls," do you
4 see that, about a third of the way down?

5 A. Do you mind if I pull the screen closer? 14:19

6 387 Q. I would do so carefully, if I were you, so you don't
7 unplug it, but by all means, if it's going to help.

8 A. I'm struggling to... That's okay.

9 388 Q. Does that give you a clearer view?

10 A. Yes, slightly. 14:19

11 389 Q. Car trawls. I'll read it out to you and you can follow
12 along. We can see that the entry marked "A" is a
13 reference to 14th August 1998 at 1930 hrs. We can see
14 that "B" is 14th August at 1950 hrs. And at "C," is
15 14th August at 1940 hrs, they're a series of different 14:20
16 events?

17 A. Yes.

18 390 Q. Now, those events all occurred the day before this
19 entry was made because this entry, on the face of it,
20 was timed at 1100 hrs on 15th August, but they relate 14:20
21 to events the preceding day?

22 A. Yeah.

23 391 Q. I was just wondering if you could just help us with
24 that in terms of our understanding about the way that
25 this document operated and whether it is a real-time 14:20
26 record or whether it has some other function as well?

27 A. Yeah. So, that's an Int Cell operative taking data
28 from various systems and making a judgment to annotate
29 those into the logbook at a time that probably suited

1 them. That's probably what I would say.

2 392 Q. And as the person in charge of those people, are you at
3 all critical of them not entering it at the time that
4 it occurred, but doing it a bit later; is there any
5 difficulty with that? 14:21

6 A. No not at all. I'd far rather it was -- yeah, I have
7 no criticism of that at all.

8 393 Q. So, let's move forward, please, to page 6. And I
9 wonder if we could first, Ms. Montgomery, crop in
10 please to entry serial 386 at the bottom. We'll try 14:21
11 and expand that for you. That might make it a little
12 clearer. I know that you've had an opportunity to
13 familiarise yourself with this particular entry,
14 haven't you, in preparation for today?

15 A. I have, thank you. 14:22

16 394 Q. As we have heard a number of times now, this is 15th
17 August, the time annotation is 1440 hrs.

18

19 "Overheard on RUC Net, RUC HQ Belfast have received
20 warnings over bombs in several towns province wide, 14:22
21 including Omagh."

22

23 And so it goes on?

24 A. Yeah.

25 395 Q. And I've read out the sentence which is the focus of 14:22
26 much of the evidence today. The first question is
27 this: As the person who didn't make the entry but who
28 is in overall charge of those who are making such
29 entries, would you expect the person making the entry

1 to record it as being the time that they are writing it
2 or record it as the time that the event occurred? They
3 may be the same thing but they may not be so can you
4 help us with what your expectation would be about what
5 the time is indicating to the reader such as yourself? 14:23
6 A. My expectation is that the timestamp on here written is
7 the time of the incident, not the time of the record
8 being made.
9 396 Q. So, we've got two possibilities here, haven't we?
10 Either this was written down at the same time as the 14:23
11 event, so the time would be 14:40 and that would
12 reflect the fact that that's when it's written down and
13 when it was occurring, or, alternatively, you seem to
14 be crediting that there's possibility that it was
15 written down later, but if it was written down later 14:23
16 you would expect that it wouldn't be the time that it
17 was written down that would be written into the time
18 column, but the time that the event occurred?
19 A. Correct.
20 397 Q. So, we can see in the right-hand column that a number 14:23
21 of people are informed and one of them is Warrant
22 Officer Second Class Brisco, who was that please?
23 A. That was Sergeant Major Brisco who was my Assistant
24 Intelligence Officer.
25 398 Q. Sergeant Major Brisco, bearing in mind that you weren't 14:24
26 on duty that day, would you have expected him to have
27 been informed?
28 A. Correct, yes, I would.
29 399 Q. Now, we know - and just this is for everybody's note -

1 that in fact we have a statement from Sergeant
2 Major Brisco who has told us that he was away from the
3 Intelligence Cell when he was informed. He was walking
4 a distance of several hundred metres back to the
5 Intelligence Cell when the bomb detonated. So, in 14:24
6 other words, he was informed a matter of minutes before
7 15:04 which is when we know the bomb detonated. So,
8 certainly in relation to that sentence, that must have
9 been written, just so that you understand the full
10 picture, at some point after, at least five to three? 14:25
11 A. Correct.
12 400 Q. So, we'll come back to the first sentence that I've
13 read out, I just want to ask you about one more entry
14 in this book. If we could please bring that down,
15 Ms. Montgomery, and just bring up the preceding entry 14:25
16 just to try and see if you can help us at all with
17 this. So, the entry we were just looking at was timed
18 at 14:40. This entry, and I think this is where the
19 evidence seems to be settling and different people may
20 reasonably hold different views, that there is a time 14:25
21 which begins with a 1 and the last two letters are 21
22 and the second number is smudged at the top and it
23 might be a 5 and it might be a 3. So, it's either
24 timed at 13:21 or 15:21, all right? It's a matter for
25 the Chairman to resolve that. But what we can see, 14:26
26 clear as day, which doesn't require any interpretation,
27 is in a different handwriting and a different pen
28 colour on the first line, the time 1521 hrs which
29 appears to be a VENGEFUL entry?

1 A. That's correct.

2 401 Q. And so it's just for you, bearing in mind you weren't
3 there and you didn't make these entries but you will
4 have some familiarity about how these logs are expected
5 to be completed, whether you can shed any light for us 14:26
6 on how it seems to be the case that we have an entry,
7 at least within the body of it, which is timed later
8 than the 14:40 entry that we have been focused on, but
9 appearing before it in the log. So, are you able to
10 help us at all with that, based on your experience? 14:26

11 A. I can't remember. What it would -- I mean, there's two
12 things that stand out for me; the first is that the
13 handwriting on the left, the first two columns on the
14 left in the blue ink appears to be consistent with the
15 rest of the log. 14:27

16 402 Q. Yes.

17 A. So, written in the same hand. And then another hand
18 has written -- filled in the rest of the VENGEFUL
19 account. I can't give you an authoritative reason why
20 those timestamps look different or why they're out of 14:27
21 sequence. I could give you -- I could theorise as to
22 why but I'm not sure that's helpful.

23 403 Q. Well, if it is based on your experience as to the sort
24 of thing that happened, then that is a legitimate
25 answer to give in terms of -- what we're not seeking 14:27
26 you to do is to guess or speculate.

27 A. No.

28 404 Q. So, if you have experience from your work supervising
29 this unit of people making entries which were out of

1 sequence, or something like that, or perhaps explaining
2 why there are two different handwritings then we would
3 benefit from your experience?

4 A. Okay. So, we would generally not try to make entries
5 out of sequence but if something happened or drew 14:28
6 somebody away from their role of making a note at that
7 particular time, or writing something in the Daily
8 Occurrence Book, they would -- a gap would be left for
9 that to be filled at some later point, even by somebody
10 else. That's not unusual. 14:28

11 405 Q. Thank you. If we can take that down, we're just going
12 to conclude my questions by taking us back to the
13 moment that you presented yourself to the Operations
14 Room and no doubt worked to support the response to the
15 attack. During that period, the immediate aftermath 14:29
16 and time following, were you aware of any discussion
17 about any towns, other than Omagh, being the subject of
18 a threat before the point of detonation?

19 A. No.

20 406 Q. If there had been such discussion brought to your 14:29
21 attention, is that something you would have wished to
22 understand more about or would you simply have left it
23 at what you were being told?

24 A. I would have wanted to know more about it but, frankly,
25 that wasn't the focus of the response at the time. It 14:29
26 became a very operational situation and the entire
27 focus of the battalion was to support the response.
28 The operational response.

29 407 Q. I'm going to put to you two possibilities that we are

1 exploring, and doing so I'm adopting neither and
2 neither am I suggesting that they are the only
3 possibilities. But if we could, please,
4 Ms. Montgomery, bring up that same page and just focus
5 on the first sentence that we looked at, please, I 14:30
6 would like to seek your help with the possibilities,
7 please. So we are looking at the:
8
9 "Overheard on RUC Net, RUC has received warnings over
10 bombs in several towns province wide, including Omagh." 14:30
11
12 A. Yeah.
13 408 Q. We know that at 14:35 Police Constable Millar made a
14 broadcast over the RUC Net. That broadcast included
15 information within this message, later sentences, it 14:31
16 also included this sentence and I'm going to quote it
17 directly, I'm not going to play it, its playing is the
18 subject of a Restriction Order. What he is heard to
19 say is:
20
21 "There's a bomb warning in from about three different
22 locations."
23
24 So, we know he said that?
25 A. Yeah. 14:31
26 409 Q. So, the possibility 1 is that the sentence that I have
27 just read out in this Daily Occurrence Book is some
28 sort of misunderstanding or mishearing of that sentence
29 uttered by PC Millar. The alternative is that that

1 information came from somewhere else. Those are the
2 two possibilities?

3 A. Yeah.

4 410 Q. The concern which is sincerely held is that that
5 information was an accurate recording of what Lance 14:31
6 Corporal Thompson heard and that if that is right,
7 because we don't see that anywhere else in any of the
8 documentation, there must have been a deliberate and
9 conscious effort to conceal that fact, effectively,
10 rewriting history. So, those are the two 14:32
11 possibilities. I don't suggest that they're the only
12 ones, and I don't underestimate the sincerity and the
13 strength of the concern that is being expressed. What
14 I need to know from you, as the person who was in
15 charge of this unit, Former Captain Hodgson, is, are 14:32
16 you aware of any decision that was taken to remove or
17 conceal information that was heard by your unit that
18 day?

19 A. No.

20 MR. GREANEY: Thank you very much, indeed. There are 14:32
21 Core Participants with permission to ask you questions.
22 Mr. Kane, I think if you are content to go first?

23

24 FORMER CAPTAIN JAMES HODGSON WAS QUESTIONED BY MR. KANE
25 AS FOLLOWS: 14:33
26

27 411 Q. MR. KANE: To follow on from your last answer, are you
28 aware of any decision or any action to investigate the
29 words which are written down in that entry

1 subsequently?

2 A. No.

3 412 Q. would you have expected that entry to have been picked
4 up on by the people who subsequently read the contents
5 of the Daily Occurrence Book? 14:33

6 A. well, what I can say is, as the officer in charge of
7 the unit at the time, it was not a concern that that
8 entry was written in the way that it was written.

9 413 Q. I beg your pardon, it's not what?

10 A. It was not a concern to me that the entry was written 14:34
11 in the way that it was written.

12 414 Q. what do you mean by that?

13 A. well, I think it's clear what I mean.

14 415 Q. Do you remember reading this entry?

15 A. I don't remember reading that entry, no. 14:34

16 416 Q. So, is that why it was of no concern to you?

17 A. what's of no concern to me?

18 417 Q. I think you indicated it was no concern about this
19 entry, you didn't read it?

20 A. That's right, I can't recall it being brought to my 14:34
21 attention.

22 418 Q. If any officer above the rank of the person who wrote
23 it was reviewing this entry, would you have expected
24 that person to have investigated it further?

25 A. Not necessarily. 14:35

26 419 Q. what were the conditions which, perhaps, would have
27 given rise to further investigations later in a
28 positive sense?

29 A. well, in terms of the investigation of the incident

1 afterwards, that would be a matter for the police.

2 420 Q. Yes. So, you would have expected, perhaps, the police
3 to have looked at it. What about within the Army;
4 would you have expected anyone within the Army to have
5 picked up on it and, perhaps, investigated it? 14:36

6 CHAIRMAN: What do you envisage being investigated?

7 MR. KANE: Looked at it further.

8 CHAIRMAN: Just a minute, Mr. Kane. What I understand
9 the entry to say is that there were overheard bomb
10 warnings in relation to different places. So, one 14:36
11 would know in the aftermath of 14:40 what happened both
12 in Omagh and elsewhere, if anything. Is it a question
13 as to whether there were other bombings or is it a
14 question as to whether there was investigation as to
15 these other bomb warnings? 14:37

16 MR. KANE: Yes, it was the latter and the entry itself.

17 CHAIRMAN: Well, I think you need to be clear, ensure
18 that Former Captain Hodgson understands what it is
19 you're asking him to contemplate. What you're asking
20 so far is whether he would have expected anyone to have 14:37
21 picked up on this entry and investigated it, but, I'm
22 not clear as to what you would envisage being
23 investigated?

24 421 Q. MR. KANE: The fact that this was written down, that
25 other towns were involved, this warning had come in, 14:38
26 was there any further investigation as to the accuracy
27 or the authenticity or the source of the information
28 which was written down?

29 A. By that time, the explosion had happened. I, if I may,

1 I listened into the Inquiry yesterday afternoon when
2 the coded -- the period when the coded warnings were
3 being given in and the transcripts from the RUC when
4 they received those calls. They didn't directly
5 receive the coded bomb warnings, did they, they went 14:39
6 to, I think, the Samaritans and Ulster TV. I have to
7 tell you, listening to that slowly described yesterday
8 afternoon, I was confused. It was confusing. What
9 were the code words that were used? There was
10 confusion over the code words. There were -- there was 14:39
11 some confusion about how many calls the RUC Station in
12 Omagh had received and from where. And, if you are an
13 individual who is overhearing this on a walkie-talkie
14 radio amongst doing other things, and you hear, you
15 know, a bomb warning or notification of a bomb warning 14:40
16 in your town, that is a lot of information to
17 unscramble and, to my mind, the way this has been
18 recorded is entirely consistent with someone doing
19 their best and recording what they thought they heard.
20 422 Q. So, the comparison that should be made, therefore, in 14:41
21 your analysis and interpretation, is with the
22 transcript of what Constable Millar said over the
23 radio.
24 A. Correct.
25 MR. KANE: Thank you. 14:41
26 MR. DE LA POER: Next, Mr. McGowan please on behalf of
27 the Fox Law group.
28
29

1 FORMER CAPTAIN JAMES HODGSON WAS QUESTIONED BY
2 MR. MCGOWAN AS FOLLOWS:
3

- 4 423 Q. MR. MCGOWAN: Former Captain Hodgson, I just have one
5 question for you and it's on the issue of the MoD 14:41
6 monitoring of the RUC Net. And the question is, in the
7 evidence this morning, in relation to the issue of
8 whether or not the police would have been aware of the
9 Army monitoring of the net, the indication was given
10 that there would have been an RUC Liaison Officer in 14:41
11 place and my question is just, were you aware of an RUC
12 Liaison Officer in place in the barracks at that time?
13 A. No, I don't think there -- no, the -- sorry, if I'm
14 understanding -- I'm not quite sure the point you're
15 referring to prior to. The RUC radio that was in the 14:42
16 Intelligence Cell, the room, was unaccompanied, it was
17 just a walkie-talkie.
18 424 Q. Yes, sorry, I wasn't clear, I meant arising from
19 Colonel McMullen's evidence this morning?
20 A. Okay. 14:42
21 425 Q. The answer had been given that the police would have
22 been aware that the Army were monitoring the RUC Net
23 because there would have been an RUC Liaison Officer in
24 place. And I'm just wondering --
25 A. When you say an RUC Liaison Officer in place, you mean 14:42
26 permanently stationed at Lisanelly Barracks?
27 426 Q. Well, I suppose, that's what I'm exploring?
28 A. Right, okay. So, I can't -- forgive me, it's a long
29 time ago, I can't recall a permanent liaison officer

1 being present. What I can recall is that at heightened
2 times like this one would be sent over. At the time
3 the bomb warning was received, so those sort of 14,
4 that particular period of time, I don't think there was
5 a liaison officer present.

14:43

6 MR. MCGOWAN: Okay, thank you. I've nothing further.
7 Thank you, Sir.

8 MR. DE LA POER: Next, Ms. Black on behalf of the
9 PA Duffy, Roche McBride and Campbell and Haughey group.

10 MS. BLACK: Chair, we are satisfied that our questions
11 have been answered already this afternoon.

14:43

12 MR. DE LA POER: Thank you. I see no wish to ask
13 questions on behalf of PSNI. And, finally, can I just
14 see whether Ms. Fee... I'm grateful.

14:44

15
16 Sir, I don't have any further questions for Former
17 Captain Hodgson, do you?

18 CHAIRMAN: No, thank you very much, Mr. de la Poer.

19 MR. DE LA POER: In those circumstances I wonder
20 whether Former Captain Hodgson can leave with our
21 thanks. We're a little early for a break and we've got
22 quite a deal of evidence to get through for the balance
23 of the afternoon, I wonder if we could just sit on and
24 perhaps Former Captain Peebles can come and join us in
25 replacement to our current witness.

14:44

14:44

26 CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Hodgson.

27 MR. DE LA POER: Sir, can I just indicate as that
28 change is taking place, and I'll do it again with the
29 witness in the box, but Former Captain Peebles is the

1 subject of Restriction Order which has been made by
2 you, Sir. That Restriction Order is available on our
3 website. It is of critical importance that that is
4 observed. I know that Mr. Suter is just stepping
5 outside to ensure that the technology fits with the 14:45
6 Order that you've made but, as I say, everybody should
7 be aware of that. [Short pause].

8
9 I wonder if you want to just take a seat for a moment.
10 I think we'll begin with you being sworn but I think 14:46
11 the gentleman is ready, I wonder if we can begin with
12 this witness being sworn.

13
14 FORMER CAPTAIN MICHAEL PEEBLES, HAVING BEEN SWORN WAS
15 QUESTIONED BY MR. DE LA POER AS FOLLOWS: 14:47

16
17 CHAIRMAN: Thank you Mr. Peebles.

18 427 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Everybody present in this room and who
19 heard my questioning of Former Captain Hodgson knows
20 that I will be addressing you, with your consent, as 14:47
21 Former Captain Peebles?

22 A. Thank you.

23 428 Q. Before we get going, before you entered the room I
24 announced that your evidence is the subject of a
25 Restriction Order which is on the website. Now that we 14:47
26 are about to embark on it I repeat that fact and the
27 importance of that Order being observed.

28
29 Having said those things, please can you give us your

1 full name?

2 A. Michael Edwin Peebles.

3 429 Q. And it will be helpful for us to understand a little
4 bit about your background in the British Army up to the
5 point of 15th August 1998. What year did you join 14:48
6 please?

7 A. I was commissioned in 1995, in December.

8 430 Q. When were you first stationed at the Lisanelly
9 Barracks?

10 A. October '97, as I recall, because it was around about 14:48
11 the date that when Princess Diana was killed.

12 431 Q. Were you thereafter on a four-monthly rotation cycle?

13 A. Yes.

14 432 Q. So, it was that on 15th August 1998 you held the rank
15 of captain, is that right? 14:48

16 A. That's correct.

17 433 Q. And you were stationed in the Lisanelly Barracks?

18 A. Yes, I was.

19 434 Q. And what was your role at that time please?

20 A. By that point I was Company 2 IC is double hatted as 14:49
21 the Company Ops Officer for A Company, 1 QLR.

22 435 Q. As the Company Ops Officer what responsibilities did
23 you have?

24 A. Predominantly, it was the planning of deliver of
25 operations, all of the patrols in the area of 14:49
26 responsibility that the company had or when we were in
27 the battle group location in Omagh then for the battle
28 group. Yes, so -- and that was organising flight
29 plans, getting the resources that the military -- the

1 patrols needed to effect their operations, and liaising
2 with the RUC in the process of doing that.

3 436 Q. And we know that you were on duty on 15th August;
4 that's right, isn't it?

5 A. Yes. 14:50

6 437 Q. And were you based in the Ops Room for the period of
7 that shift?

8 A. Yes, I was.

9 438 Q. And would that be the place that you stayed for the
10 entirety of it or would you be mobile as well? 14:50

11 A. No, I was there for the entire time.

12 439 Q. And were you the most senior person in that room for
13 that period?

14 A. Not for all of it, no. Once the incident in question
15 started then more senior people arrived. 14:50

16 440 Q. But until that point, were you, effectively, the person
17 in charge of the staff in that room?

18 A. Yes, I was.

19 441 Q. And how many staff were there in that room
20 approximately, please? 14:50

21 A. Certainly two of us and there may have been three.

22 442 Q. And in the event that you were notified of an incident
23 what role, would you have in the early stages in terms
24 of any response?

25 A. Predominantly passing on the information to the 14:51
26 commanders who would assume control of a situation if
27 it were to arise. And to also pass on to any of our --
28 any military entities within our command or the CO's
29 command, to alert them that there was a situation

1 potentially arising. So, they were on alert and aware
2 that something was happening.

3 443 Q. But you yourself wouldn't take command of the response?
4 A. No, I don't take the ultimate decisions to deploy
5 people or other matters. 14:51

6 444 Q. Before we go any further, I just want to ask you about
7 a particular part of your statement which I think you
8 have in a folder there, and I'll help you navigate to
9 it. We're just going to have a look at page 8 please,
10 paragraph 39. We're here discussing resources and the 14:51
11 sort of people that you might notify.

12 A. Yes.

13 445 Q. We have already heard evidence on behalf of the British
14 Army given by corporate witness, Colonel MacMullen,
15 which has established that the arrangements at the time 14:52
16 were that the RUC would request the military to lend
17 support and that until then the military would be in a
18 state of preparedness, that was the effect of his
19 evidence?

20 A. Yes. 14:52

21 446 Q. Is that your understanding of the arrangements at the
22 time?

23 A. Absolutely, especially after the Good Friday Agreement.

24 447 Q. I'm sorry, could you repeat that?

25 A. Especially after the Good Friday Agreement. 14:52

26 448 Q. And in terms of the resources that were available to
27 you at Lisanelly Barracks, one of the items that you
28 identify under the general heading of resources - and I
29 want to understand whether this was a resource

1 available or not - is specialist search and dogs?

2 A. Yes.

3 449 Q. Now, do you know whether that was a resource that was
4 present in Lisanelly Barracks on 15th August?

5 A. I cannot say whether there was, on that day, the 14:53
6 presence of that capability. Whilst the capability may
7 well have been stationed in Omagh over the period, it
8 was not directly a battle group asset. So, there are
9 some assets that were stationed in Lisanelly Barracks
10 that, like, for example, the Ammunition Technical 14:53
11 Officer, the ATO, who are not directly under command of
12 the Commanding Officer, they are broader brigade, so in
13 this case it would have been 8 Brigade assets. So,
14 they may well be stationed there. I couldn't account
15 on that day for whether they were present, I can't 14:53
16 recall.

17 450 Q. In terms of recognising that you're not able to say
18 whether that was available or not and if it was, it was
19 a brigade-wide resource, not necessarily directly under
20 the Commanding Officer, what you say in your statement 14:54
21 is, you say:

22
23 "They look for devices, particularly secondary
24 devices."

25
26 So, let's just understand for a moment. That's a term
27 of art within the military and the police. What is
28 secondary device, please?

29 A. So, a secondary device could be a device which is

1 placed purposefully to attack first responders, so in
2 other words there's a primary device or a hoax that is
3 given that attracts the attention of the military, the
4 RUC and other first responders, and then devices are
5 placed deliberately in the locations where those 14:54
6 additional forces may turn up, so at an incident
7 control point, an ICP, and then attack the personnel
8 who have turned up at those locations. So, before you
9 may occupy an ICP, for example, you may send a dog in
10 to see if there is anything there like under a culvert 14:54
11 or something.

12 451 Q. So, in the event that there is a device and it
13 detonates, the expectation of the secondary device is
14 that that will remain intact, perhaps away from the
15 seat of the explosion, either to be timed or detonated 14:55
16 at the time that the emergency services turn up to the
17 site?

18 A. Yes.

19 452 Q. Now, you say this in the second half of that sentence,
20 I just want to understand it: 14:55
21

22 "Note that dogs would not have been deployed to the
23 Omagh Courthouse situation without a either specific
24 request from the RUC or to confirm a suspected device
25 that was already located. Dogs also require a handler 14:55
26 who would not readily be put into the radius of a
27 device prior to ATO support attending. Dog resource
28 would also not have been ready to deploy within the
29 warning time provided for Omagh bomb as they were used

1 for preplanned operations, they were subsequently
2 deployed to look for secondary devices."
3
4 A. Yes.
5 453 Q. Firstly, does that accurately represent your state of 14:55
6 understanding?
7 A. My state of understanding, yes.
8 454 Q. So, if we just break that down. There seemed to be a
9 number of stages to this, the first is that you say
10 that the Army would not unilaterally deploy them, in 14:56
11 other words deploy a dog without a request?
12 A. Yes.
13 455 Q. Secondly, you say that you wouldn't expect, or an
14 alternative scenario is that once a device has been
15 located, that the dog would provide effectively 14:56
16 confirmation if whether that suspected device is or is
17 not explosive?
18 A. Yes. It was my understanding that they would sniff out
19 explosives and react to that, giving an indication to
20 the handler that there was an explosive device in the 14:56
21 vicinity by pointing at it.
22 456 Q. Thirdly, describing the policy as you understood it,
23 that a handler, together with a dog - so, a human being
24 in addition to the animal - would not readily be put
25 within the radius, in other words the likely explosion 14:56
26 area of a device, before the ATO, that's the Ammunition
27 Technical Officer attends; is that right?
28 A. Yes, that would be my understanding.
29 457 Q. So, again if we just envisage how this might work

1 practically. On the policy as you understand it, there
2 needs to be request, the device needs located, other
3 resource needs to be on site in the form of the ATO,
4 and it would only then be that there would be
5 consideration given to deploying a dog?

14:57

6 A. Yes.

7 458 Q. Then, as you conclude that sentence, to look for
8 secondary devices?

9 A. Yes.

10 459 Q. The bit that I've moved over that I just wanted help
11 with, was you talk about:

14:57

12
13 "Dog resources would also not have been ready to deploy
14 within the warning time provided for the Omagh bomb as
15 they were used for preplanned operation."

14:57

16
17 Now, we've heard about Quick Reaction Force which I'm
18 sure very much means what the name suggests, namely
19 they are ready to stand to at a moment's notice and to
20 deploy. We heard, perhaps, quite evocatively from
21 Colonel MacMullen, that idea that engines are switched
22 on, ready to go on vehicles. Just help us with your
23 understanding about how dogs might fit into that
24 scenario or whether they're entirely removed from it?

14:58

25 A. Well, my understanding, and bearing in mind it would be
26 appropriate to ask the questions of actual dog handlers
27 who served in Northern Ireland for the absolute correct
28 answer, but I wasn't aware that they were put on any
29 notice like a QRF would have been, in part because they

14:58

1 weren't directly a battle group resource. So, as a
2 Company Ops Officer and planning a deliberate operation
3 where I deemed it necessary or it would be useful for a
4 dog to take part, I would bid to the battle group, the
5 battle group would bid to brigade for that asset - and 14:58
6 bearing in mind when I say deliberate operation, I'm
7 talking days, weeks in advance of an operation taking
8 place where dogs would go in and do a clearance,
9 supported by other troops, and do their job.

10 460 Q. Thank you very much, indeed. I'm going to return us 14:59
11 back to the Ops Room and to the term "watchkeeper."
12 Was that a title that you had when you were there in
13 charge of the Ops Room?

14 A. We call it triple-hatted responsibility. Company 2,
15 Company 2 IC and Company Ops Officer, which was my 14:59
16 primary function, it was an additional duty to assume
17 the battle group watchkeeper position, which rotated
18 through most of the battle group officers who did not
19 necessarily have another duty. So, for example, the
20 IO, the Intelligence Officer who you just heard from, 14:59
21 had his own duty to perform and would not have been a
22 watchkeeper I don't think at any stage in the Battalion
23 Ops Room. But the Company 2 ICs, appropriately, would
24 take turns, amongst other officers, in assuming that
25 role as watchkeeper. 15:00

26 461 Q. On 15th August you were wearing that third hat?

27 A. I was, yeah.

28 462 Q. And what was the function of the watchkeeper over and
29 above the other duties that you have described that you

1 had in your double-hatted role?

2 A. Really, I say command loosely, Command and Control, C2
3 is what we term it, but it's really a C2 function,
4 Command is vested in the commanders, the Commanding
5 Officer, the Company Commanders and the multiple 15:00
6 Commanders and Platoon Commanders of the assets. So,
7 the watchkeeper is there to passage and prioritise
8 appropriate information to the commanders for their
9 decision-making and to log down what is occurring. And
10 to play their part in effecting further communication 15:01
11 with other organisations. And that is very routinely.

12 463 Q. So, you have mentioned in the course of that answer
13 "log down"?

14 A. Yes.

15 464 Q. And just help us to understand, we are familiar now 15:01
16 with the term "Watchkeeper's Log," is that what you are
17 referring to?

18 A. Yes, you would log down key information into the
19 Watchkeeper's Log.

20 465 Q. And the version that you used? 15:01

21 A. Yes.

22 466 Q. We would like to understand it, was that in a ring
23 binder, a series of sheets? Was it a bound book? What
24 form did the Watchkeeper's Log take?

25 A. And the Watchkeeper's Log is a communal document set, a 15:01
26 piece of stationery, produced by the Army which is used
27 across all operations rooms. And I've been familiar
28 with them in other operational settings other than
29 Northern Ireland, so it's a very commonly used format.

1 And it comes in a block, I couldn't say of how many
2 sheets, let's say approximately 100 sheets, and you are
3 able -- you're supposed to place the cardboard from
4 underneath that block of sheets underneath the first
5 two sheets that you write on and one would carbon score 15:02
6 the other underneath it, with your piece of cardboard
7 preventing the writing going through to other sheets
8 underneath it. When that sheet was then written on, it
9 would be placed into a binder almost exactly the same
10 as this, on the desk. 15:02

11 467 Q. When you say when that sheet was written on and placed
12 in a binder, are both sheets taken out and put in a
13 binder or are they separated at that time, because
14 we've got a duplicate, haven't we?

15 A. Yes. I can't recall whether the separation happens -- 15:03
16 I believe that it happened, in my recollection,
17 separately, that the separation is one sheet went into
18 a binder on the desk and the other sheet went into
19 another binder.

20 468 Q. What was the purpose of the Watchkeeper's Log, what 15:03
21 made the cut to go in and what would be left out?

22 A. That is left to sort of judgment of the watchkeeper at
23 the time as to what was important enough. The idea was
24 that key communications, most of which that affected a
25 decision on the grouped or that affected the decision 15:03
26 to deploy forces, gave key, locations, so aside from
27 writing things in the logbook. Another responsibility
28 of ours was to go up and to mark the mapping.
29 Generally speaking, I would try and get the signaller

1 to refresh the map marking because it was very
2 important that the watchkeeper kept account of where
3 everybody was within the operating area. Predominantly
4 where our troops were.

5 469 Q. So, you, as the watchkeeper, make a judgment about what 15:04
6 you're going to record in there?

7 A. Yeah, absolutely.

8 470 Q. You describe the process of it being removed from the
9 stack of the pages. Your belief is that one goes into
10 a binder like that, the other goes into a different 15:04
11 binder?

12 A. That's correct.

13 471 Q. What are the purpose of the two binders, why do we need
14 two copies of this rather than just one?

15 A. Well, one is a -- the binder that remains on the desk 15:05
16 is important for the subsequent watchkeepers so that
17 they can come on to the watch, read back through
18 information that has happened, let's say, in the past
19 24 hours. I can't recall how many sheets would be held
20 in a binder at any one time because really that would 15:05
21 have been the responsibility of the battle group Ops
22 staff for that particular Ops Room. But at Company
23 level that worked in exactly the same way in that one
24 sheet would go into a folder that remained on the desk
25 in the Ops Room, the watchkeeper, and presumably the 15:05
26 other goes in for record keeping. So, one is more of a
27 current refresh, and bear in mind we didn't have the
28 operating systems that we have today, that gave you a
29 database of everything that had been going on in the

1 past few days and months, it was all -- predominantly,
2 it was done by paper.

3 472 Q. At what stage would the two sheets be removed from the
4 stack? would you wait till you got to the bottom of
5 the sheet before you removed them or might they be 15:06
6 removed at some earlier stage?

7 A. No, you would remove them from the block of sheets, you
8 would remove it straight away, because you probably
9 imagine a sort of gum that held those sheets together
10 at the back and once you start folding them over each 15:06
11 other, one, they could get marked or dirty, you would
12 want to take them off straight away and put them into
13 one or t'other folder.

14 473 Q. It was my fault, it was a poor question in terms of its
15 phraseology. would you wait to complete the sheet and 15:06
16 then immediately remove it, or might you remove it
17 before it was complete and add to it after that?

18 A. In most cases - and we'll come on to a slightly
19 different case - it would be completed to the end. Or,
20 you may come to the end of a shift where the sheet has 15:07
21 only been filled up halfway, you get to midnight and
22 then a fresh sheet is started at midnight or 0001, to
23 be precise, with new serial numbering on there for a
24 new day. So, even if it was incomplete sheet you would
25 take it off and put it into the binder. 15:07

26 474 Q. Finally, by way of generality about this log and how it
27 ordinarily operated, were entries made
28 contemporaneously, as we might say, in real-time or
29 were they entered after events?

1 A. Probably the easiest answer is to say sometimes yes,
2 sometimes no because things can occur. At that time,
3 when somebody is not taking notes - and bearing in mind
4 most of the time you're on a radio or you're on a phone
5 talking to somebody, naturally, it is a few minutes 15:08
6 afterwards that you then write in, if it was
7 significant enough to do so, would write something into
8 the log. So, it doesn't necessarily reflect an
9 immediate contemporaneous entry of data and can be
10 absolutely added to afterwards if any more information 15:08
11 came to light that was important.

12 MR. DE LE POER: We're going to turn now to have a look
13 at the documents. I'm just going to turn behind me to
14 see -- we'd normally take a break around this time, but
15 I wonder if we might make a start on this. Our 15:08
16 shorthand writer indicates she's okay to continue for a
17 period.

18 CHAIRMAN: I'll leave it to you to keep an eye on where
19 we are.

20 475 Q. MR. DE LA POER: I certainly will do that, thank you 15:08
21 very much. Ms. Montgomery, can we bring up on to the
22 screen INQ 034853? Can we start on page 9, please.
23 [Short pause]. I know you've had an opportunity,
24 Former Captain Peebles, to familiarise yourself with
25 both this and the other document that we're going to 15:09
26 look at together, but let's just have a look at what's
27 on screen now. We can see towards the top right-hand
28 corner the date is 14th August 1998, so, the day before
29 the attack?

1 A. Yeah.

2 476 Q. We can see that the sheet number is 4. We can see that
3 the last serial entry in the left-hand column, do you
4 see that, is 23 in terms of the complete entry, and
5 then "001" is written beneath it? 15:10

6 A. Yeah.

7 477 Q. And we can see that Sergeant Cooke, who seems to be the
8 author of this document as per the heading, has started
9 to write "0001" and then thought better of it; and can
10 you just help us with your experience about what you 15:10
11 would expect a watchkeeper to be doing, we can see the
12 serial 23 is an hour before midnight. 2300?

13 A. Yeah. He's put in his last entry, his last true entry
14 at 2300 when there was any information of worth. He,
15 as you said, likely put in 0001 and then on reflection 15:10
16 decided actually I'm going to turn the sheets and start
17 a new sheet, I expect, when he passed over the midnight
18 hour.

19 478 Q. So we turn to the next page please, Ms. Montgomery,
20 we'll see the next sheet and we can see "0001" and in 15:11
21 the top right-hand corner you can see sheet No.1, would
22 you expect a new sheet number to reflect a new day?

23 A. So, the first significant entry of that day marks 0200
24 it says "info only," there is no "to," no "from,"
25 "Colour Sergeant McCleary has come into the Ops Room to 15:11
26 take out of from, forgive me, who was the one before?

27 479 Q. He was Sergeant Cooke?

28 A. Sergeant Cooke. And Colour Sergeant McCleary has put,
29 he's the log keeper at the top, so he has started that

1 fresh sheet with his first annotation being this is the
2 first thing we're going to log in the day starting 0001
3 on 15th August 98, that I took over Colour Sergeant
4 McCleary took over at 0200 hrs.

5 480 Q. Now, the previous day's sheet, the final one was 4? 15:12
6 A. Yeah.

7 481 Q. Was it conventional for the sheet number to continue,
8 so that the next day would be 5, or would you expect a
9 reset on the sheet?

10 A. No, you would have ended up with, well, however many 15:12
11 thousands of sheets. So, the convention was to start
12 sheet number 0001 on the new date in question.

13 482 Q. So, a reset of the sheet number and reset of the serial
14 numbering?

15 A. That's correct. 15:12

16 483 Q. We can see the second entry is where you come into the
17 picture; do you agree?

18 A. Yes, it is.

19 484 Q. So, at 0800 hrs "Captain Peebles T/OVER" is that takes
20 over? 15:12

21 A. Take over.

22 485 Q. "Watchkeeper"?

23 A. Yes.

24 486 Q. And is the handwriting that we see on the balance of
25 this page your handwriting? 15:13

26 A. It is.

27 487 Q. We can see that the serials continue to 0006 and we're
28 going to proceed, please, to the next page bearing in
29 mind that the last entry there is 1147 hrs. We can see

1 top right-hand corner, sheet 2?

2 A. Yes.

3 488 Q. So, following on from sheet 1, and the serial is 7

4 following on from serial 6?

5 A. Yes. 15:13

6 489 Q. And if we continue down we'll see, 013 serial:

7

8 "1440, bomb warning on RUC means."

9

10 Do you see that? 15:13

11 A. Yes.

12 490 Q. Is that your handwriting?

13 A. Yes, it is.

14 491 Q. And in terms of the security classification, which

15 appears at the very top, do we see "restricted Ops"? 15:13

16 A. Yes, and that is the way that I titled, generally

17 speaking, my Watchkeeper's Logs with "restricted Ops".

18 492 Q. Now, in terms of your entry 013, "bomb warning on RUC

19 means," you've not filled in any actions against that;

20 do you agree? 15:14

21 A. I agree.

22 493 Q. And nor have you completed the row at the bottom?

23 A. No, I haven't.

24 494 Q. We're going to go to the next page and then just try

25 and understand that, but do you want to add something? 15:14

26 A. May I add something?

27 495 Q. Of course you can, yes.

28 A. And note where the information came from, says "INT"

29 which is Int, so, that gives you an indication of where

1 I received that initial piece of information from.
2 496 Q. So, Int being a reference?
3 A. Intelligence Cell.
4 497 Q. Former Captain Hodgson's Intelligence Cell, not
5 himself? 15:14
6 A. Not him.
7 498 Q. The person who, as he's described it, would have filled
8 in the Daily Occurrence Book, would not have done so
9 before they had relayed that information to you in the
10 Ops Room? 15:15
11 A. Yes.
12 499 Q. We're going to come to the timings of these entries in
13 a moment but let's go over the page, please, bearing in
14 mind the security classification that you had
15 previously used. You had used the term "restricted 15:15
16 Ops" on the previous sheet. We can see that the
17 security classification box now says "restricted
18 incident," why you have written that?
19 A. Because -- and this is quite an important transition;
20 so when we were informed that there had been a bomb 15:15
21 warning and there was not very much information at that
22 point to go off, my recollection being that a person
23 came from the Int Cell into the Ops Room and said, "can
24 you hear what's going on in the RUC Net?" To which I
25 said, "no". And I can explain why. 15:16
26
27 So, in the course of the conversation that toed and
28 froed thereafter, i.e. 'you need to go and find me more
29 information,' and then a subsequent call that I made to

1 the RUC to find out more information about the bomb
2 warning, it was evident to me that we were on the
3 foothills of something important. So, I started a new
4 sheet and at that time it was unlikely to be labelled
5 at all, either restricted incident or otherwise, but I 15:16
6 started a new sheet because I knew it was highly likely
7 we were going to be writing stuff in quick time. And
8 then the idea being that I would collate the
9 information in a clear way and transpose that into the
10 log when we had that information available. And then 15:17
11 it became fairly clear that this was becoming more
12 serious as time went on.

13 500 Q. I just need to unpick one or two things that you've
14 just told us about. The first is that you said that
15 you could explain why you answered the person you were 15:17
16 speaking to, who we understand will be Lance Corporal
17 Thompson?

18 A. Thompson.

19 501 Q. Exactly right. Why you said you couldn't hear the RUC
20 Net? 15:17

21 A. Yes.

22 502 Q. Why did you say that?

23 A. So, it might be helpful, at this point, to try to
24 illustrate to the Inquiry how the Ops Room was set up.
25 So, if you imagine that this as being the main desk 15:18
26 where I was sat and the signaller off to my left,
27 obviously, a much larger desk with variety bits of
28 equipment in front of it, our military radio, which was
29 then known as "Cougarnet," the Province Incident Net,

1 which was another radio system but based on the
2 CougarNet system but on a different channel. The tape
3 recorder, we'll come on to that no doubt later. But
4 off to the right-hand of the desk which I remembered
5 vividly, was a separate radio system which was the RUC 15:18
6 radio.

7
8 The RUC radio had a small sort of Pressel handset with
9 a short of stretchy cord, and for a lot of the time the
10 volume on the RUC radio was turned down. Not switched 15:19
11 off but turned down, simply because the day-to-day
12 chatter on the RUC Net got in the way of listening to
13 our own radio communications for running our patrols,
14 which was the primary function of the Ops Room. So,
15 the RUC Net radio existed in the Ops Room not for the 15:19
16 day-to-day monitoring of radio chatter but to be
17 available in an incident such as this. And grateful
18 for the fact that it was there, in order to improve our
19 situational awareness and give us another system with
20 which we could communicate with the RUC if other means 15:19
21 broke down.

22 503 Q. Former Captain Peebles, I'm going to ask for a break in
23 a moment, but I don't want to leave this very important
24 moment in time. You have reported Lance Corporal
25 Thompson coming in to give you information and you've 15:20
26 reported a conversation that you had with him telling
27 him you needed more information and dispatching him for
28 that purpose. It's a very long time ago, but doing the
29 best you can, what was it, at that stage, that Lance

1 Corporal Thompson told you?

2 A. My recollection is asking the question: "Have you
3 heard what is being said on the RUC Net?" I was
4 oblivious to it at the time so I said "no." And that
5 he had said that there is a bomb warning. But very 15:20
6 little more than that. And I can assure you that if
7 there was anything more that he gave me at that point
8 in time, I would have written that down, because that
9 is critical to the information that -- I need to brief
10 the Commanding Officer, I need to brief the Ops 15:21
11 officer. It is very difficult to do that when I know
12 the first question they're going to ask me is, okay, so
13 where, when and how. And at that time, you know, we
14 were not given anything more than that. But then
15 you'll see that what is logged is in 14:40, so at some 15:21
16 point shortly thereafter we were given more
17 information.

18 504 Q. We're going to look at this sheet after the break that
19 I'm going to propose, but if we cast our mind back to
20 the entry on the preceding sheet to a serial 13, it 15:21
21 just followed in the sequence. When in the course of
22 the events that you have described, in other words
23 before, during or after, do you think you made that
24 preceding entry that was marked at 14:40?

25 A. On the one that's on the screen? 15:22

26 505 Q. On the previous page?

27 A. On the previous. Then, yeah, as close to then as
28 possible. It is possible that he -- that there was a
29 timing given that he was able to give me and it would

1 have been important that -- what I can't reconcile
2 right now, whether that was a time that reflected a
3 time that he had been given and passed to me, or
4 whether that was pretty much the moment when he came in
5 and said, 'Look, have you heard what's going on.' So, 15:22
6 I don't know is, giving you a clear answer, what 14:40
7 represents. But, I suppose, if you take it from my
8 perspective the clock starts ticking at 14:40.

9 MR. DE LE POER: Thank you very much. Sir, would that
10 be a convenient moment for a ten-minute break. 15:23

11 CHAIRMAN: Yes. When would you suggest we return, 25
12 to?

13 MR. DE LA POER: I think so. Yes, please.

14
15 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED BRIEFLY AND RESUMED AS FOLLOWS: 15:23
16

17 CHAIRMAN: Mr. de la Poer.

18 MR. DE LA POER: Thank you, Sir.

19
20 FORMER CAPTAIN MICHAEL PEEBLES WAS CONTINUED TO BE 15:37
21 QUESTIONED BY MR. DE LE POER AS FOLLOWS:
22

23 506 Q. MR. DE LE POER: Former Captain Peebles, we have on
24 screen the second iteration of your 14:40 entry, which
25 now appears at the top and is given the serial 1, and 15:37
26 in the top right-hand corner we can see in the sheet
27 number, "00" and then written in much darker text what
28 appears to be a "3" but which might suggest a previous
29 number has been written over?

1 A. Yes, that is the case, and written over by me.

2 507 Q. okay. well, we'll take it in stages. If we just move
3 to the next page to see another illustration of this
4 and then I'm sure you will be able to agree, given that
5 last answer, that we can see the same occurring in the 15:37
6 top right-hand corner that a number has been written
7 over?

8 A. Yes, it says "4."

9 508 Q. Going back to that preceding page, and just help us,
10 what number did you first write? 15:38

11 A. So, I wrote "001."

12 509 Q. And why did you write "001"?

13 A. Because it was the beginning of a significant incident.

14 510 Q. why then did you write over it with a "3"?

15 A. I believe this will be because when it was placed back 15:38
16 into the running log folder then that -- in order to
17 make it contiguous with the previous log sheets that
18 ran 1, 2 and then this would have been the third one,
19 in order to make it contiguous I then wrote in 2, 4, 5,
20 and so on, to make it contiguous, within that -- so it 15:39
21 was a contiguous Watchkeeper's Log account, whereas I
22 can't remember now whether this means it was the top
23 sheet or the underlying sheet, but the top sheet was
24 likely to become the incident log. So, it becomes a
25 separate entity. That was my intention and that was my 15:39
26 logic at the time.

27 511 Q. I'm going to just draw your attention to some features
28 on this sheet before we go to look at a different
29 version of the same sheet. So, you will see, on the

1 first row, that in the "action" column we've "guard
2 Quick Reaction Force stood to" and then "OMA OOB;" do
3 you see that?

4 A. Yes.

5 512 Q. And it's the "OMA OOB" that I'm drawing attention to, 15:39
6 we understand that to indicate Omagh out of bounds?

7 A. Yes.

8 513 Q. So, I'm going to ask you about the order in which
9 you've entered these in a moment, but we're just at the
10 moment just analysing this sheet together so that we've 15:40
11 got the necessary information in our minds?

12 A. Yes.

13 514 Q. At serial 3, the primary entry is at 14:50, but do you
14 see there is secondary entry under that serial, 15:53?

15 A. Yes. 15:40

16 515 Q. And that reads, "from RUC, 15-minute warning" and then
17 "from HQ RUC 500lb vehicle borne IED, codeword given,
18 Inspector Johnston," we are now reading down the action
19 column, "Duty Inspector" and I'm asked to -- and then I
20 am not sure I can read that next word. And so it goes 15:40
21 on. OC A Company in Ops Room?

22 A. Yeah. "Asked to phone OC A Company in Ops Room."

23 516 Q. So, we're going to try and hold that information that
24 I've just drawn to your attention, the OMA OOB and that
25 entry at 15:53 which cascades down the action column? 15:41
26 CHAIRMAN: Is it not 14:53?

27 517 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Sorry, 14:53, Sir, you're quite right.
28 Thank you for the correction. So, that's one feature
29 that we're going to hold in our heads as we just have a

1 look at another document please. So, if I can ask
2 please to come on screen INQ 013164. So, this
3 document, which is fainter in the way that it appears
4 in the reproduction we have digitally, has at the top
5 "Omagh Town bomb log" written in black pen? 15:42

6 A. Yes.

7 518 Q. We can then see what may be impressions from the top
8 sheet, so this may be the bottom sheet, bearing in mind
9 the faintness of the text, but do you also see that a
10 feature of this is that not everything seems to fall 15:42
11 exactly on the line, some of the entries are, in fact,
12 written as if the line goes through them?

13 A. Yes, this is the carbon copy underneath them, yes.

14 519 Q. Is that coming from your use of these documents that
15 you're very familiar with that there isn't always 15:42
16 perfect alignment with the copy underneath?

17 A. Oh, yeah, if you're talking about the alignment within
18 the boxes, yes.

19 520 Q. Now, just to pick out some features on here, you'll
20 recall I drew your attention to those words in row 1 15:42
21 "OMA OOB," do you agree that those are absent on this
22 version?

23 A. Yes.

24 521 Q. And do you also agree that absent on this version is
25 the entry at 14:53 that moves under the bottom of 15:43
26 serial 3 and appears to cascade down the "action"
27 column?

28 A. Yes.

29 522 Q. A final thing to draw your attention to, if you look in

1 the top right-hand corner we can see that what appears
2 to be 001, which is out of alignment with the box, has
3 been struck through?

4 A. Yes.

5 523 Q. And above it "003," is written? 15:43

6 A. Yes.

7 524 Q. So, my first question, having just identified those
8 about this sheet is, do you know who wrote "003" and
9 struck through the "001"?

10 A. I think that was me, I believe. I can't remember but I 15:43
11 think that was me making the adjustments, as I
12 mentioned before.

13 525 Q. We're trying to draw some common sense conclusions. We
14 can see that the 001 has been struck through rather
15 than overwritten, as we saw on the previous version; 15:43
16 can we conclude from that, that the moment that this
17 was struck through, the two versions had been
18 separated?

19 A. Yes.

20 526 Q. Otherwise, that overwriting would have been apparent on 15:44
21 this?

22 A. Yes.

23 527 Q. And does it also follow that those additional entries
24 that we looked at on the previous version must have
25 been added -- 15:44

26 A. Yes.

27 528 Q. -- after the two sheets were separated, otherwise,
28 again, we would have seen an impression of those?

29 A. Yes, they were and that was by me.

1 529 Q. And so, having just had a look at those features of
2 those documents, what I'd really seek your help on is,
3 to reconstruct, as best you can, the order of events.
4 In other words, firstly, when these entries were made,
5 the ones that appear on both documents, so when they 15:44
6 were together, and then we'll move on and I'll ask you
7 so that you will know, that will be your cue, when the
8 additional changes were made. So, let's stick with the
9 features in common. Were they written
10 contemporaneously to the times that you have given, or 15:45
11 were they written at some other time?
12 A. I could not say for every case whether the timings are
13 contemporaneous to an event. On this sheet, and the
14 one that we are looking at, I believe that I wrote that
15 in at the time, but it was thereafter that the sheets 15:45
16 are then written in postscript within six to 12 hours
17 after, well the next morning, effectively, when I came
18 back into work.
19 530 Q. So, can I just reflect back to you what I understand
20 you to be saying. You can't say, firstly, exactly when 15:45
21 you made all of the entries that are in common to both
22 sheets?
23 A. Yes.
24 531 Q. So, when they were together?
25 A. I can say it is no more than, in totality, the changes 15:46
26 to the serials, the additional add info notes on one of
27 the sheets, not both of them, within no more than 24
28 hours after the event.
29 532 Q. So, there you're talking about the features that they

1 don't have in common, so the ones that were added to
2 the top sheet --

3 A. Yes.

4 533 Q. -- after the separation?

5 A. Yes. 15:46

6 534 Q. Let's just focus on the entries they do have in common,
7 just reflecting to you your answer, you can't say
8 exactly when but is it your expectation that that would
9 have been recorded around the time the incident was
10 unfolding? 15:46

11 A. Yes. Yes.

12 535 Q. There then comes a stage, if I've understood it
13 correctly, where the forms are separated so they no
14 longer have the information in common, and if we go
15 back please to 034853, page 12, we'll see where that 15:46
16 additional information is to be found, so that's on the
17 top copy. When do you think you added that additional
18 information?

19 A. In the following day and after I had listened to the
20 tapes. 15:47

21 536 Q. That was what I was coming to. So, there was a
22 recording facility in the Ops Room, is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 537 Q. Was that a standard tape as they were back in those
25 days, a cassette tape? 15:47

26 A. A cassette tape, yes.

27 538 Q. And was it, as, many people may have been familiar with
28 who lived through that time, a tape that you could turn
29 around to record on the B side?

1 A. Yes, it was.

2 539 Q. What was the expectation in terms of who would press
3 record and who would turn the tape around to continue
4 the recording?

5 A. So, I took the decision to press the record button and, 15:48
6 thereafter, it was between me and the signaller to turn
7 over the tape, or switch out the tape when it ran out.

8 540 Q. So, when you say that you took the decision to press
9 record?

10 A. Yes. 15:48

11 541 Q. Was it not continuously recording then?

12 A. After I -- no. Probably best described. Old-fashioned
13 tape recorder, eight inches by five, with tapes in it,
14 the bank of buttons at the end. Not even powered,
15 powered by battery, and only there for the purpose of 15:48
16 when there was an incident. Omagh, the Omagh bomb was
17 the only time in my two years in Northern Ireland when
18 I used a tape recorder. And the purpose of having it
19 there was to -- recognising that the watchkeepers could
20 become and all of the staff could become very busy, it 15:49
21 was to record our conversations with whichever agencies
22 over the radio, whatever it could pick up, bearing in
23 mind its position within the room, so if somebody was
24 stood at the other end of the room it may not pick up
25 what they were saying, so, that you could go back in 15:49
26 over those tapes and have, at least relatively accurate
27 record, if not exact record of the sequence of events
28 and timings. There are some fallibilities. So, there
29 was no alert or alarm that told you, you were coming

1 towards the end of the tape. So, in amongst all of the
2 commotion the tape could come to an end and there would
3 just be a little click, and if somebody didn't notice
4 it, they didn't notice it and then it wasn't turned --
5 and that happened at least on one occasion at some 15:50
6 point over the event. Or somebody could just -- or we
7 started to run out of tapes. So, I also recorded
8 towards the end of the day, after the tape had been
9 going consistent, pretty much consistently over the
10 incident, that I asked for more tapes to be sourced 15:50
11 because we were running out.

12 542 Q. And about what time do you think you pressed record?
13 A. On the time that it says there, so 14:55.

14 CHAIRMAN: Just before we leave this, do you mind if I
15 clarify something in my own mind, Mr. de la Poer? 15:50
16 MR. DE LA POER: Of course, Sir.

17 CHAIRMAN: Captain Peebles, we've been looking at what
18 you've explained is the top copy of the sheets on the
19 watchkeeper's Log and also the carbonless copies that
20 are made at the same time. 15:51
21 THE WITNESS: Yes.

22 CHAIRMAN: And you've explained to us that the top
23 copies have some additional features which you've just
24 been talking about

25 THE WITNESS: Yes. 15:51
26 CHAIRMAN: And you've explained when they came to be
27 entered.
28 THE WITNESS: Yes.
29 CHAIRMAN: What I wasn't just sure about, though, was

1 this, obviously, there's information which is common to
2 both under for example, the "events" heading.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes.

4 CHAIRMAN: So, in the "events" column there's
5 information that's been recorded and we can see that it 15:51
6 finds its way through to the carbonless copy as well.
7 When Mr. de la Poer was asking you about when these
8 entries, which are consistent in each of the two copies
9 were made, you said something to the effect of -- you
10 wrote in at the time, but the sheets that were written 15:51
11 in postscript were within six to 12 hours afterwards.
12 I wasn't quite sure what I followed that. What was it
13 that was written in six to 12 hours afterwards?

14 THE WITNESS: So, the subsequent sheets beyond what is
15 there marked "003," were written up in the morning 15:52
16 using the tape recordings. This one I believe to be an
17 original sheet written at the time.

18 CHAIRMAN: I see.

19 THE WITNESS: So, by the time I came to what I thought
20 was the end of writing up the sheets toward the end of 15:52
21 the following day, and submitting them back, evidently
22 they had been separated by the time I put in to the
23 actions, the actions that were undertaken and the
24 important fact of when the tape was started, which I,
25 for whatever reason, the sheet had been separated by 15:52
26 the point I'd added that note.

27 543 Q. MR. DE LA POER: We don't see that on the carbonless
28 copy, do we, that entry which, if we all navigate to
29 it, is on 0044, 14:55, under the events there's a cross

1 had out bit and then we can see "tape started"?
2 A. Yes. There's a lot packed into that period of time and
3 I must have felt that there wasn't a sufficient account
4 in what I had written at that point accounting for
5 either what was on the tape or what was, you know, what 15:53
6 should have been recorded as actions at the time, that
7 were undertaken.
8 CHAIRMAN: Does that mean that the entries from 14:55
9 were the entries that were made at a later point?
10 THE WITNESS: No, Sir. This appears to have been -- 15:53
11 14:53 was put in afterwards. Then when we move on to
12 the next sheet, this is when I start to write up the
13 whole log neatly from that point on words.
14 544 Q. MR. DE LA POER: So, we go over the page.
15 A. Yes. 15:54
16 545 Q. You think the entries, save for 14:53 and that
17 information not in common was written up
18 contemporaneously?
19 A. Yes.
20 546 Q. Then we go over to the next page which is where we will 15:54
21 see an entry timed at three o'clock. Now, these
22 entries here on this next sheet for the incident, do
23 you think those were written up near contemporaneously
24 or were they the product of, as you've described it
25 listening back to the tape? 15:54
26 A. I don't believe they were. Using contemporaneous
27 information, yes, from the tapes and from the notepaper
28 that I was using at the time. But when the bomb went
29 off, it was pandemonium, understandably.

1 CHAIRMAN: I'm not sure you've told us about the
2 notepaper you were using.

3 THE WITNESS: I don't recall well, but the notepaper in
4 front of me was the stack of log sheets and memo pads,
5 if I remember rightly. So, the two things I had to 15:55
6 write on, bits of paper, were the wedge of log sheets
7 and some memo pads.

8 547 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Do you think you may have --
9 A. So, anything I wrote down after that in addition to
10 the, you know the tape information was hastily 15:55
11 scribbled on sheets of paper like that, yes.

12 548 Q. This Watchkeeper's Log, were you expected to maintain a
13 neat and legible version or --
14 A. Yes.

15 549 Q. -- would it have been appropriate for to you scrawl 15:55
16 real-time, pandemonium notes on?
17 A. No, this is to get as accurate a ledger of an incident
18 as possible and a tape -- the tape's existence was
19 there to take account of the fact that you'd be too
20 busy to write down these notes in amongst the other 15:56
21 things you were trying to achieve.

22 550 Q. Now, we will all be familiar that there are some
23 documents which it is entirely inappropriate to go back
24 and alter or add to after the event, particularly if
25 you're adding times, we all know about such documents 15:56
26 in our ordinary lives, I'd like to you help with this
27 particular document. In your view, was it appropriate,
28 based on the circumstances that you were dealing with
29 and the function of this document, for you to be

1 creating, effectively, non-contemporaneous notes, timed
2 and dated at earlier times; was that within the scope
3 of the document?

4 A. Yes, yes.

5 CHAIRMAN: This is in effect to be the final record. 15:56
6 THE WITNESS: Yes, Sir, absolutely.

7 551 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Finally this from me, Former
8 Captain Peebles, the Inquiry is investigating a very
9 real and sincerely held concern that there has been an
10 attempt to rewrite history and I want to give you an 15:57
11 opportunity to help us with that to the degree that you
12 can. Firstly, we know from the Daily Occurrence Book
13 that read on its face it appears that there were
14 threats, bomb threats made to locations other than
15 Omagh before 14:40; was that something that you have a 15:57
16 recollection of ever discussing with anybody?

17 A. No.

18 552 Q. Had that been communicated to you either at the time of
19 the incident -- well, let's start with that. Before
20 the explosion is that something would you have regarded 15:57
21 as significant?

22 A. Yes, and it would have gone into the previous sheet had
23 that been disclosed to me at the time.

24 553 Q. Once the pandemonium had subsided, had that been
25 communicated to you, would you have regarded that as 15:58
26 significant?

27 A. Yes, had that information been presented to me and then
28 I would have considered whether it would make that into
29 the log.

1 554 Q. Putting the issue foursquare for you to comment upon,
2 your first entry timed at 14:40 does not mention the
3 threat being specific to Omagh, the second one does?
4 A. Yes.

5 555 Q. I want to just give you an opportunity to explain why 15:58
6 that is?
7 A. So, as I mentioned, the very first mention of bomb
8 warning was walked in with very little information
9 other than that by the Int Cell. So, we elucidated
10 more information from the RUC, and that was me phoning 15:59
11 them to find out more detail, which then disclosed, you
12 know, a number of facts which are recorded there.
13

14 I would like to express my primary recollections of the
15 time with or without notes in that my understanding was 15:59
16 the target was the courthouse. My understanding was
17 the RUC were clearing away from the courthouse. And,
18 therefore, everything within the proximity to the
19 courthouse was being cleared. The one ongoing concern
20 was that the RUC had not yet located a vehicle, a 15:59
21 suspect vehicle. Clearly, we then understood,
22 potentially, what the size of the device was and the
23 impact that that may have if it were to be in the
24 vicinity of the courthouse. Shortly after the
25 explosion took place it wasn't until - and this is 16:00
26 recorded in the log - Gazelle 5 was up and I asked it
27 to give a grid reference of the seat of the explosion
28 that we really then understood, and I asked them to
29 repeat that grid reference because I didn't believe it.

1 Because I believed when I heard the explosion that it
2 was going to be up near the courthouse and it wasn't.
3 And that, coupled with the radio traffic that we could
4 then by that point hear from the RUC of screams and
5 cries and how frantic the RUC were, made it very clear 16:00
6 that something very different had occurred to what I
7 had expected on the basis of the information that we
8 were given at the time.

9 MR. DE LE POER: Former Captain Peebles, those are my
10 questions for you. Can I turn now please to Mr. Kane, 16:01
11 King's Counsel, on behalf of the John McBurney client
12 group.

13

14 FORMER CAPTAIN MICHAEL PEEBLES WAS QUESTIONED BY
15 MR. KANE AS FOLLOWS: 16:01

16

17 556 Q. MR. KANE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is there any
18 reason why you would not have had access to the Daily
19 Occurrence Book when you were writing your
20 Watchkeeper's logs? 16:01

21 A. I wasn't aware of its existence. It was never a
22 document that I came across -- the first time I was
23 aware of that document was a couple of weeks ago when
24 this was sent as part of the evidence of this Inquiry.
25 I was never aware that that was kept or had any, you 16:01
26 know, relevance to my work within the Ops Room.

27 557 Q. So, the entry, if we can just have it up on screen,
28 which is 034854-0006?

29 A. Sorry, can I see?

1 558 Q. It will come up. And if the bottom half could be...
2 So, just so that I'm absolutely clear, this is an
3 extract from the Daily Occurrence Book which was
4 maintained by a Lance Corporal in the Intelligence
5 Cell. If we can just, perhaps, go back to 0002, just 16:03
6 so we see the front cover. That's the front cover,
7 it's printed, you'll see down at the bottom "printed in
8 the UK for HMSO," are you saying you never had seen a
9 book like this during your time of service?

10 A. I have not, Sir. When I first saw this a couple of 16:03
11 weeks ago I remarked, "Is this the Daily Occurrence
12 Book from the Guard Room, where has it come from?"
13 Because I've never seen it.

14 559 Q. You would have been in and out, I take it, from time to
15 time to the Int Cell, would you not? 16:04

16 A. No.

17 560 Q. Not at all?

18 A. No, Sir, they would come and the Int officers or the
19 Int Cell personnel would come and brief us in the Ops
20 Room. 16:04

21 561 Q. Now, can I then just ask you about whenever you had
22 contact with the person who came from the Int Cell,
23 what you've said is that - and, again, I'm only taking
24 a very shorthand note, but you said the bomb warning
25 was very little more than that? 16:04

26 A. Yes.

27 562 Q. Is that basically what you were told?

28 A. In the very first instance.

29 563 Q. Yes. So, you weren't given any other details about the

1 area in which it was or the size of it?

2 A. At that point, no. No, Sir.

3 564 Q. Or the use of a codeword?

4 A. No, in the early stages, no.

5 565 Q. But you're clear, from your own recollection, that 16:05

6 somebody came from the Int Cell and told you that there

7 was a bomb warning for Omagh?

8 A. I am, yes.

9 MR. KANE: If just give me a moment, Sir, just one

10 moment. 16:05

11 CHAIRMAN: well, I wonder if you've answered that last

12 question correctly, and if the proposition was put

13 clearly. The question was that you were clear, in your

14 first recollection, that when somebody came from the

15 Intelligence Cell they told you there was a bomb 16:05

16 warning for Omagh. But in your first entry all you've

17 put is "bomb warning on RUC means".

18 THE WITNESS: Yes.

19 CHAIRMAN: I'd rather thought you told us it wasn't

20 specific? 16:06

21 THE WITNESS: The inference for Omagh.

22 CHAIRMAN: Sorry?

23 THE WITNESS: The inference being for Omagh and that it

24 would affect us.

25 CHAIRMAN: I see. Do you remember that or not because 16:06

26 it doesn't seem to be in the first entry?

27 THE WITNESS: I remember sending him back to find out

28 more information because it was insufficient.

29 CHAIRMAN: And then you phoned the RUC?

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes sir.

2 CHAIRMAN: Which RUC, do you remember?

3 THE WITNESS: Omagh, Omagh Station.

4 566 Q. MR. KANE: Did he come back with further information,
5 the person who'd come to you initially? 16:06

6 A. I can't recall whether the person alleged to be Lance
7 Corporal Thompson came back and gave me the further
8 information. But my belief is, and there may be double
9 taps on information as well, of course, is that I had
10 the conversation with the RUC, they gave me what they 16:07
11 had at that time and then, at that point, I knew, and
12 when "codeword" was mentioned, things started to
13 escalate.

14 MR. KANE: Very well, thank you very much indeed.

15 MR. DE LA POER: Thank you, Mr. Kane. Can I next turn 16:07
16 to Mr. McGowan on behalf of the Fox Law group.

17 MR. MCGOWAN: Sir, we are content that we don't need to
18 ask any questions.

19 CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

20 MR. DE LA POER: Mr. Toal, on behalf of PA Duffy, Roche 16:07
21 McBride and Campbell and Haughey group, please.

22

23 FORMER CAPTAIN MICHAEL PEEBLES WAS QUESTIONED BY
24 MR. MCGOWAN AS FOLLOWS:

25 16:07

26 567 Q. MR. MCGOWAN: Captain Peebles, I just want to make it
27 clear that in my questions I don't criticise you in any
28 way, and in actual fact your proactive response on 15th
29 August should be commended.

You said the following at paragraphs 25 and 26 of your statement, and you're talking about the RUC, you say:

"In order to support them, the key assets were troops in vehicles to provide security to the RUC, assist clearance, cordons and security."

16:08

And 26 you say:

"The military were capable and trained to conduct these tasks independently of the RUC, but particularly post the Good Friday Agreement the form was to follow police primacy."

16:08

Yes?

16:08

A. Yeah.

568 Q. Now, when you refer to post Good Friday Agreement arrangements, are you referencing the drive towards normalisation?

A. I am exactly that, Sir.

16:08

569 Q. You are. And before the Good Friday Agreement, is the
inference that things were different and the military
had more autonomy to react to these situations?

A. The inference would be, my experience would be divided into two, in that my recollection is our time in Omagh was always police led because it was quieter, it was more peaceful. Our autonomy was executed more vigorously along the Borders, Fermanagh, Rosslea and Clogher.

16:09

1 570 Q. Yes.

2 A. But we would never operate without an RUC officer

3 present. So, in a sense, RUC primacy always existed in

4 my recollection from when I arrived in '97.

5 571 Q. So, you would always have needed a request from the RUC 16:09

6 to become involved?

7 A. Depending on the situation. If an event had just

8 occurred. For example, we had something called 'Rat

9 Trap' which was a codeword that was given in response

10 to an incident, most likely a terrorist incident 16:10

11 whereby we would send call signs out to the nearest

12 road to set up VCPs in order to try to prevent the

13 getaway of the terrorists. So, there were certain

14 actions taken with autonomy, yes.

15 572 Q. I'm just trying to understand, had this bomb warning 16:10

16 been phoned in 1988 as opposed to '98, would, for

17 example, ATO and other robot assets be deployed

18 immediately into the Town Centre without an official

19 request from the RUC? Was that possible?

20 A. I honestly comment for the pre-ceasefire and pre-Good 16:10

21 Friday Agreement standard of operation autonomy.

22 573 Q. Yes. Because amongst concern of the victims is that

23 immediate Army deployment and involvement may have

24 changed the course of events, you understand that?

25 A. Yes, I do. 16:11

26 574 Q. And, as I understand your evidence today, the Army were

27 listening to the RUC Net as essentially a backup

28 measure, is that correct?

29 A. Up to a point. Once it was evident that there was a

1 scenario unfolding, then it was another source of
2 information. If any decision was going to be executed,
3 it was likely to be conducted over the telephone. So,
4 a phone call through to Omagh Station.

5 575 Q. Yes. Could I just probe that, please? The key message 16:11
6 received over the RUC Net occurred at 14:40, yes?

7 A. As I understand it, yes.

8 576 Q. And you then - and this is at serial 002 - you phone
9 the RUC Ops Room to ask for more information, correct?

10 A. Yes. 16:12

11 577 Q. And that was at 14:45?

12 A. Yes, I'm taking it that that's what it says in the log,
13 yes.

14 578 Q. So, before that time when you placed that phone call,
15 had any RUC officer made contact with the Army to make 16:12
16 them aware that they were dealing with an accredited
17 bomb warning?

18 A. If they didn't phone through to the Ops Room, other
19 avenues could have been to phone somebody else that
20 they knew, the Commanding Officer or some other Duty 16:12
21 Officer, but you would expect it to come to the Ops
22 Room, which is where I was sat, and I would have picked
23 up that call.

24 579 Q. Well, let's just take a look at that information. If
25 they had phoned someone else from within the Army, I'm 16:13
26 sure that the very first call that they would make
27 would be to the Ops Room; correct?

28 A. Yes, I would expect so.

29 580 Q. So, we know the RUC were on notice from 14:30, so

1 that's a full 15 minutes without any official contact
2 from the RUC, would you agree with that?

3 A. Evidently, so.

4 581 Q. And when that contact did occur, it was initiated by
5 the Army and specifically by you? 16:13

6 A. Yes.

7 582 Q. Now, in your statement at paragraph 37 you say:
8
9 "The Army Quick Reaction Force could have actioned
10 eight to 15 soldiers and up to four vehicles at 15 16:13
11 minutes' notice."
12

13 Is that correct?"

14 A. Yes, we could have done.

15 583 Q. So, had the Army been immediately notified by the 16:13
16 police at 14:30, they could have had 15 extra bodies on
17 the streets of Omagh by the time they were first
18 officially contacted, or made contact with the police
19 about the bomb warning; yes?

20 A. And, indeed, we stood by troops ready to go. 16:14

21 584 Q. Yes. You see, that is why we have been asking
22 questions about the Army listening in on the Police Net
23 and why we have been asking about the lack of any
24 formal agreement. And the reason for that is that we
25 are now led to believe that the RUC's official 16:14
26 notification of a bomb warning to the Army depended
27 upon an assumption that the Army would be listening to
28 the RUC Net and inadvertently pick up this information
29 some ten minutes after they received it; do you

1 understand that concern?

2 A. I can understand that concern.

3 585 Q. Did the RUC have their own bomb disposal teams?

4 A. I'm not aware, I can't recall.

5 586 Q. So, they were depending on you, the Army, do that? 16:15

6 A. Presumably, yes.

7 587 Q. And would an additional 15 minutes of notice assisted
8 the ATO had a device been located in Omagh?

9 A. Had a device been located -- the ATO was put on notice
10 pretty early, you can see when it appeared in the log, 16:15
11 but as early as it could be, any notification that a
12 bomb, IED, any explosive device might be involved in
13 any incident we would have sought to let the ATO know
14 as a critical asset, as early as possible so he can
15 prepare, or she can prepare for a potential operation. 16:15

16 588 Q. Yes. So, had the RUC immediately requested your
17 support, you could have had 15 extra soldiers on the
18 streets of Omagh assisting with the clear stage as
19 well?

20 A. Had they asked for that assistance. I would caveat, 16:16
21 though, that the RUC -- to be useful for the Inquiry I
22 think I can provide the perspective that I took at the
23 time that I was in the Ops Room.

24 589 Q. Yes.

25 A. My reading of the situation, of course, it got more 16:16
26 perilous as you approached the time that one expected
27 the bomb to potentially go off because nobody had found
28 the device, but, we did ask the RUC if they felt they
29 needed more resources from us.

1 590 Q. Yes.

2 A. And the answer, at that time, was no. And in my

3 reading of where they had deployed and had cleared, the

4 running concern being that they hadn't identified the

5 vehicle or a vehicle to be a suspect vehicle in 16:17

6 question, so arguably there the ATO has nothing to

7 clear if there has been no confirmation at least of a

8 suspect vehicle. But otherwise they were comfortable

9 that a clearance operation was taking place and was

10 making the immediate area of the courthouse safe, 16:17

11 because they confirmed that they had cleared --

12 accounted for all vehicles and they had cleared all

13 personnel from the area. So, they were, from my

14 perspective -- had we done the operation ourselves, we

15 would have done exactly the same thing, started at the 16:17

16 courthouse and cleared out from the courthouse,

17 systemically, then cordoning off the area so nobody

18 would be injured should a device go off.

19 591 Q. Yes. And just to be clear, I'm not asking you to

20 criticise the RUC, I'm asking you something else. My 16:18

21 questions are directed to the normalisation process and

22 the reluctance, perhaps, to get the Army involved at

23 all. But had your Quick Reaction Force been notified

24 immediately at 14:30 could you, in theory, have had 15

25 extra bodies and 15 extra set of eyes on the streets of 16:18

26 Omagh; do you agree with that?

27 A. Yes, and we would have responded to a more specific

28 request of what to do with those bodies. We would not

29 throw people out onto the streets willy-nilly. We

1 would provide very specific directions as to what their
2 role would be, and we would expect some guidance, the
3 RUC would say, 'We need assistance here in manning the
4 cordon, can you do from that grid to that grid,' and we
5 would deploy troops in. I'm just hypothesising the
6 scenario.

16:18

7 592 Q. Yes, and I understand that. And we will never know if
8 the outcome could have been different, but what we do
9 know from your evidence today is that the system of
10 notification by the RUC to the Army could certainly
11 have been better than depending upon the Army to pick
12 it up on the Police Net; is that a fair way to put it?

16:19

13 A. It's difficult to read the format. I would have to
14 read the circumstances that existed in the RUC Station
15 at the time, and I have no awareness of what their
16 resources were when they received the calls, because I
17 should imagine there was degree of anxiety and they
18 were busy doing things. Could they have phoned at some
19 point when they felt it was necessary to do so? Yes.
20 But the communications were established, you know, in
21 time before the event took place.

16:19

22 MR. McGOWAN: Thank you, Sir, thank you. No further
23 questions?

24 MR. DE LA POER: Mr. Henry next please for the PSNI.

16:20

26 FORMER CAPTAIN MICHAEL PEEBLES WAS QUESTIONED BY
27 MR. HENRY AS FOLLOWS:

28
29 593 Q. MR. HENRY: Captain Peebles, just to try and establish

1 a little bit of a brief timeline, if I can, to begin
2 with. We know that the bomb warnings were received by
3 the RUC at 14:29, 14:31, 14:32. We know that radio
4 transmission was made from Omagh Communications Room
5 out to officers on the ground at 14:35? 16:20

6 A. Yeah.

7 594 Q. We know that you first became aware of the existence of
8 a bomb warning in and around 14:40?

9 A. Yes.

10 595 Q. It could have been slightly after that but that's in 16:21
11 and around the period of time?

12 A. Yes.

13 596 Q. And that you also made a telephone call to the Omagh
14 Police Station, whether it was to the Communications
15 Room or somewhere else, in and around 14:45? 16:21

16 A. Yes.

17 597 Q. I think, as you fairly observed a few moments ago, in
18 that period of time from the Omagh Communications Room
19 becoming aware of the bomb warning on three separate
20 occasions, so, three separate communications being made 16:21
21 through to them, they would have been busy readying
22 themselves to deal with that?

23 A. Yes.

24 598 Q. So, that's speaking with superior officers and starting
25 to deploy police assets on the ground, as it were? 16:21

26 A. Yes.

27 599 Q. Within a relatively short period of time after that
28 then you make a telephone call through to them and you
29 ask them for more information, which is provided?

1 A. Yes.

2 600 Q. And one of the questions that's been posed to you this
3 afternoon was, there were potentially 15 soldiers who
4 were available to go and assist police if that
5 assistance had been requested? 16:22

6 A. Just to be clear, I wouldn't have specified how many
7 troops were available. I would have said the QRF, the
8 QRF is on standby if you need it.

9 601 Q. Thank you. So, I'll avoid talking about numbers but
10 there were soldiers, potentially, available to assist 16:22
11 if they had been requested?

12 A. Yes.

13 602 Q. And if they had been requested, I think your evidence
14 was that they would have been requested in the sense of
15 performing specific duties such as manning a roadblock 16:22
16 or assisting in a particular way?

17 A. Yes.

18 603 Q. If it was something other than manning a roadblock, and
19 if it was to engage in evacuation assistance --

20 A. Yes. 16:23

21 604 Q. -- is it likely that the soldiers would have performed
22 a similar type of activity to the police officers who
23 were moving people away from the courthouse?

24 A. Yes, with direction and with coordination because we
25 wouldn't want to clear the same areas that would have 16:23
26 already been cleared, we would look to your lead to say
27 where can we help you, because you can become a
28 hindrance.

29 605 Q. And I think that echoes something that

1 Colonel MacMullen mentioned earlier.

2
3 Another point then, Captain Peebles, you were asked
4 about the potential influence of the post Good Friday
5 situation and whether that had any impact on the Army 16:23
6 being alerted to the existence of the threat or a
7 warning that the police had received?

8 A. Sorry, if I misunderstood something earlier then please
9 forgive me. I don't think the Good Friday Agreement
10 had any effect on the efficacy of the communication 16:24
11 between the RUC and the military.

12 606 Q. We're dealing with the issue of preventability at the
13 very core of this public inquiry, the Army were, as of
14 in and around 1440 hrs aware that the police had
15 received a bomb warning? 16:24

16 A. Yes, we were.

17 607 Q. And so if we're talking about the efficacy of systems
18 or otherwise, we know for certain that the Army were
19 made aware, through listening in on the police radio
20 system? 16:24

21 A. Yes.

22 MR. HENRY: Thank you very much.

23 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

24 MR. DE LA POER: Thank you, Mr. Henry. Nothing I see
25 from Ms. Fee. Sir, I don't have any further questions. 16:24

26 CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

27 MR. DE LA POER: In those circumstances, with our
28 thanks can we ask Former Captain Peebles to withdraw.
29

1 sir, it's 4:25, ordinarily we would draw stumps for the
2 day at this time. Can I just give this indication: We
3 have already stood one of our later witnesses down,
4 he's coming back tomorrow, that's DCI McGuinness. We
5 have Former Captain Park who's travelled here from
6 elsewhere in the UK to be with us today. He's
7 anticipated to be a relatively short witness. What
8 would be highly undesirable is that we start him but
9 don't complete him and I understand that there is a
10 very hard stop today of five o'clock, after which time
11 arrangements in this building mean that we will need to
12 stop. Over and above, that Former Captain Park has to
13 leave this building to catch a flight at five o'clock
14 as a hard stop also.

16:25

16:25

15
16 Having spoken to my learned friend, Ms. Briggs, who is
17 taking him, and I'm conscious that I am occupying time
18 here, in her hands he will be a short witness. I will
19 just look to the room to indicate whether it's
20 anticipated that anyone is expecting to have very
21 substantial question for him, the total permissions
22 are, I think, in total 20 minutes.

16:25

16:26

23 MR. TOAL: I'm not asking any questions.

24 MR. DE LA POER: Thank you, Mr. Toal.

25 MR. KANE: My questions will be relatively short.

16:26

26 MR. DE LA POER: Nothing from the Fox Law team. It may
27 be in those circumstances then, with optimism perhaps
28 rather than confidence, we could bring Captain Park in.

29 CHAIRMAN: well, let's try. Thank you very much

1 Mr. Peebles.

2 THE WITNESS: I'm grateful, Sir. Thank you.

3 MS. BRIGGS: I think it is important to note, Sir, that

4 the same Restriction Order applies to Former

5 Captain Park as applied to Former Captain Peebles. Can 16:27

6 I stress, as Mr. de la Poer did, that it is of the

7 highest importance, Sir, that is respected.

8 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Park.

9 MS. BRIGGS: With that Restriction Order in place, Sir,

10 can the witness please be sworn. 16:27

11 CHAIRMAN: Yes, Ms. Briggs.

12 MS. BRIGGS: Thank you, Sir.

13

14 FORMER CAPTAIN BRUCE PARK WAS QUESTIONED BY MS. BRIGGS

15 AS FOLLOWS: 16:28

16

17 608 Q. MS. BRIGGS: Former Captain Park, as has become the

18 course this afternoon, I will refer to you as Former

19 Captain Park, and you've agreed to that.

20 A. Yeah. 16:28

21 609 Q. You have provided a witness statement to the Inquiry,

22 it's dated 22nd of June 2026, and for the purpose of

23 the transcript, Sir, that is INQ 043833.

24

25 Former Captain Park, it's correct to say you joined 16:28

26 1 QLR as a 2nd Lieutenant in August 1991?

27 A. Correct.

28 610 Q. And at that time the battalion was based in Lancashire

29 in Weeton Barracks?

1 A. That's right.

2 611 Q. And you had previously in the period 1991 to 1992
3 completed some deployments to Northern Ireland for six
4 to eight week towers of duty?

5 A. That's right. 16:28

6 612 Q. And that was as Platoon Commander?

7 A. Correct.

8 613 Q. You later returned to Northern Ireland?

9 A. Yes.

10 614 Q. When was that? 16:28

11 A. About 12 months before the incident.

12 615 Q. So in, and around mid 1997?

13 A. Yes.

14 616 Q. And you were, on 15th August 1998, a captain and
15 Battalion Operations Officer for 1 QLR? 16:29

16 A. That's right.

17 617 Q. And you were based in Lisanelly Barracks?

18 A. Yes.

19 618 Q. And that was in the Operations Room, is that right?

20 A. That would be my normal place of work, yeah. 16:29

21 619 Q. And for that room you had overall responsibility, is
22 that fair to say?

23 A. I did, yes.

24 620 Q. And on 15th August 1998, you were off duty that
25 morning? 16:29

26 A. That's right.

27 621 Q. And you tell us in your witness statement that you were
28 notified of a bomb warning in Omagh by the operations
29 Room?

1 A. I think I was paged, I honestly can't remember if we
2 even had mobile phones, I think I was paged and at that
3 point then came back and started heading back to the
4 barracks.

5 622 Q. And it was on your way back that the bomb detonated, 16:29
6 isn't that right?

7 A. That's right.

8 623 Q. And, after that, you undertook a role with the
9 Operations Room in relation to the emergency response?

10 A. Yes. 16:30

11 624 Q. And can you recall now when you were notified of the
12 bomb warning were you notified of a bomb warning in any
13 town or location other than Omagh Town?

14 A. No, I didn't receive details of the bomb warning. By
15 the time I got to the Operations Room the bomb had 16:30
16 already detonated.

17 625 Q. And you're aware from your witness statement that there
18 is an entry in a book called the Daily Occurrence Book
19 and that's kept in the Intelligence Cell?

20 A. As I think I said in my statement, at the time I wasn't 16:30
21 aware that that book existed. You often hear of Daily
22 Occurrence Book and things possibly in Guard Rooms but
23 over the last few weeks it's become apparent that that
24 was a book that was held within the Int Cell and not
25 something I'd seen before the evidence bundle was 16:31
26 provided to me a few weeks ago.

27 626 Q. So, to summarise your evidence in relation to the book,
28 it wasn't something you were aware of until this
29 process began, this Inquiry?

1 A. That's right, yeah.

2 627 Q. And it wasn't a book that you would ever have seen?

3 A. No.

4 628 Q. Was it a book that ever made its way into the
5 Operations Room? 16:31

6 A. No. There's a real separation between the Operations
7 Room and the Int Cell. If I wanted to have anything
8 from the Int staff they would come to us or if I went
9 to the Int Cell to speak to Captain Hodgson I would
10 need to knock on the door and ask if he was in and he 16:31
11 would then come and meet me at the door. So, I
12 wouldn't go into the Int Cell.

13 629 Q. And if we can just pull up an entry within the
14 Occurrence Book, INQ 034854-0004. If we can put that
15 on the screen please. It's the first entry on the 16:32
16 page, if we can just make that larger, it says 14th
17 August 1998.

18 A. Yeah.

19 630 Q. And that entry indicates a threat on 14th August 1998
20 serial 379, and it indicates that a dissident 16:32
21 republican group is in possession of a supply of
22 devices for use against commercial targets in Northern
23 Ireland. Do you now, at this juncture, have any
24 recollection of whether you were aware of that message
25 being passed on to the Operations Room or indeed to 16:32
26 yourself?

27 A. I can't recall that specific message but messages like
28 that would be received routinely. It was part of kind
29 of threat background that we faced and there were

1 routine meetings held during the week where the Int
2 officer would be briefing myself and the CO on the
3 latest message. So, I'm not shocked or surprised by
4 that message. If it came into the hands of the Int
5 Cell I imagine that they would have passed it on to us 16:33
6 at some point.

7 631 Q. Moving on, then, to the second of three topics that I'm
8 going to ask you about. After the bomb you authored
9 what the Inquiry understands to be called
10 "post-incident reports." And one you wrote on 25th 16:33
11 August 1998 and that, if we can bring that on screen
12 INQ 015720-0005 is the first page?

13 A. Yes, that's right.

14 632 Q. That's the cover page, do you recognise that?

15 A. Yes, I do. 16:34

16 633 Q. If we move to the next page, page 6. And this is the
17 first page of that report. Can you explain to the
18 Inquiry what the purpose behind the report was?

19 A. Yeah, I think the first point is that until this was
20 sent to me a couple of weeks ago I had no recollection 16:34
21 of writing this but as I read it, yes, I definitely
22 wrote this. This was -- if you look at the address
23 list which I think is at the final page of it, it's
24 very much an internal document, so, this was what are
25 the lessons that we could learn, what do we need to 16:34
26 take on board should a similar incident happen again?

27 634 Q. And one can see at section 2 details of incident
28 there's an entry 14:40, if we can just make that
29 larger. This is the start of a section with timed

1 entries, isn't that right, Former Captain Park?

2 A. Yes, it is. As I said earlier, I couldn't recall
3 writing this but as I've been looking through the
4 bundles of evidence that you sent me, the information I
5 put in here absolutely corresponds with what was in 16:35
6 Watchkeeper's Log. So, I think what I will have done
7 is gone through the log and tried to pull out what were
8 the pertinent points so that we had that chronological
9 set of what happened as part of the report for
10 everybody? 16:35

11 635 Q. So, it was the Watchkeeper's Log which you drew on to
12 write your report?

13 A. I'm saying that with many years' hindsight just because
14 it seems to match every entry in that report.

15 636 Q. Can you recall, at this juncture, if you relied on any 16:35
16 other source?

17 A. I'm sorry, I can't.

18 637 Q. There's a very similar report and it's dated 26th
19 August 1998 and we can pull that up, it's INQ 041767?

20 A. So, the first document we were talking about was the 16:36
21 post-incident report which was a decision that I'll
22 have come to probably in conjunction with the
23 Commanding Officer, let's write up our understanding of
24 what have we learned about what went on there that we
25 need to share with the rest of the battalion. The 16:36
26 second document you're referring to, on 26th August, is
27 a serious incident report; my recollection is that's
28 something that we were mandated to do after any serious
29 incident and that would follow a number of set

1 headings. So, bits of the report are probably copy and
2 pasted verbatim, but this was something, if we look at
3 the address list, that went out to the other battalions
4 in the brigade. So, I'll have made some changes in
5 terms of minor changes in terms of what did I think was 16:37
6 appropriate to share with the wider brigade, rather
7 than something that we were just using internally.

8 638 Q. Okay. If we can go to page 10, that's the first page
9 of that report. So, this then, your evidence is a
10 serious incident report, but it's also compiled before 16:37
11 the bomb detonated, isn't that right?

12 A. That's right.

13 639 Q. And without going through each and every entry in that
14 report, would you agree, if I put it to you, that it's
15 in many ways similar to the post-incident report we 16:37
16 looked at a moment ago?

17 A. Yes.

18 640 Q. And it, I assume, therefore, drew from the same sources
19 and information as you took in relation to the
20 post-incident report? 16:38

21 A. That's right.

22 641 Q. Finally then, Former Captain Park, the last topic that
23 I want to address with you is the Watchkeeper's Log?

24 A. Yeah.

25 642 Q. You tell us in your statement - and I'm at paragraph 10 16:38
26 for anyone following along with that statement - that
27 you were responsible for the Operations Room but also
28 the quality of the reporting in the Watchkeeper's Log?

29 A. Yeah.

1 643 Q. would it be fair to say that writing in that log was
2 the role of the watchkeeper and not your role?
3 A. That's correct.
4 644 Q. And the Inquiry has heard evidence today at length
5 about the form that log took. Effectively, there was a 16:38
6 block of sheets and carbonless copies would emerge from
7 one writing on to the block of sheets?
8 A. Yeah.
9 645 Q. Does that accord with your understanding?
10 A. It does, yes. 16:39
11 646 Q. And on 15th August then are you aware that Former
12 Captain Peebles made entries into that log?
13 A. I am, yes.
14 647 Q. And you're aware from the documents that you have seen
15 that there are white pages and pink pages? 16:39
16 A. Yes.
17 648 Q. And those pink pages represent what appear to be the
18 carbonless copies?
19 A. That's right.
20 649 Q. And Former Captain Peebles has given an account that he 16:39
21 took a role in marking those pages when they were
22 together, the pink and white copies, and then making
23 additional markings and entries when they were
24 separated?
25 A. Yeah. 16:39
26 650 Q. And he said he did that on the white copies. Did you
27 take any role in marking either copy, white or pink?
28 A. No.
29 651 Q. And his evidence to the Inquiry was that he made the

1 additional entries on the top copy, the white sheets,
2 because to his mind that became the final record, the
3 incident log. And given your role with overall
4 responsibility for the recording in the log, does that
5 evidence, hearing it now, does that give rise to any
6 concern on your own part? 16:40

7 A. So, I'm comfortable thinking about the mayhem that's
8 going on in an Operations Room at that time, that an
9 officer like Captain Peebles who knew that he had the
10 tapes running, I am comfortable that he decided to add 16:40
11 additional information to the log to make it a clearer
12 record of what happened. With hindsight, would it have
13 been better if that was written on both pieces of
14 paper, yes, but I'm very happy it was done with the
15 best of intentions to make sure there was really 16:40
16 accurate record of what was going on in the Operations
17 office then.

18 MS. BRIGGS: Thank you very much, Former Captain Park.
19 I am going to pass to Mr. Kane, I understand he has
20 some questions. 16:41

21 MR. KANE: Yes, Chairman. Thank you.

22
23 FORMER CAPTAIN BRUCE PARK WAS QUESTIONED BY MR. KANE AS
24 FOLLOWS:

25 16:41
26 652 Q. MR. KANE: Captain Park, just a few questions just
27 dealing with the last topic. You've accepted it might
28 have been better if there'd been two pieces of paper
29 rather than the way it was done. Can I ask you, did

1 you ever record, in your report, the fact that there
2 were two copies of the watchkeeper's logs?

3 A. No, I would have no reason to do that. It was, I think
4 as Captain Peebles mentioned, it was standard on all
5 operations that the Army deployed them. 16:41

6 653 Q. You don't think with hindsight it might have been
7 better if you had included that in your report and the
8 reason for it?

9 A. No, I don't.

10 654 Q. You've said in your statement that you don't recall 16:41
11 ever seeing the Daily Occurrence Book?

12 A. That's right.

13 655 Q. Isn't that correct?

14 A. That's correct.

15 656 Q. Now, can I ask you to look at, and if it can be shown 16:42
16 on screen, INQ 015720-0006. And if you could highlight
17 the top half of that page, please. That's fine. And
18 there you will see the entry at 14:40, which says:
19

20 "The RUC received a bomb warning for Omagh Town and 16:42
21 began clearing the Town Centre starting from the
22 courthouse."
23

24 The next sentence is:
25 16:42

26 "Detail overheard by Int Cell 1 QLR monitoring RUC
27 Net."
28

29 where did you get that information?

1 A. From the Watchkeeper's Log.

2 657 Q. Well, can I ask you now if we can go and look at those
3 logs. And if we could look at the first one, that's
4 the document INQ 034853-0011 and if we could
5 highlight -- I don't think we're there yet, 16:43
6 Mr. Chairman. Yes, and if we could highlight the
7 bottom half of 0011, please. There, we see the entry
8 which was recorded on the Watchkeeper's Log for 14:40,
9 and it says:
10
11 "Bomb warning on RUC means". 16:44
12
13 That doesn't contain the detail which you have recorded
14 in your incident report, namely "detail overheard by
15 Int Cell 1 QLR monitoring RUC Net"? 16:44
16 A. So, my document was not a contemporaneous document,
17 mine was written on, I think, 25th August. What I may
18 well have done is added bits of information together, I
19 can see there at 14:40 it clearly says:
20
21 "Bomb warning on RUC means." 16:44
22
23 I can't recall now, I'm assuming later in the log,
24 possibly after the call with Inspector Johnston it will
25 have said something about the RUC starting to clear 16:45
26 from the courthouse. I will have decided that in terms
27 of laying out what's happening and our battalion's
28 involvement in it to bring those points together.

29 658 Q. Yes. And if we can just then turn to page 0012, and

1 highlight the top entry, please. Again, that's quite
2 sparse in what it says:
3
4 "RUC have received a bomb warning in Omagh Town".
5 16:45
6 And, again, there's nothing there to give you the
7 detail contained in your report, isn't that correct?
8 A. Yeah.
9 659 Q. And then if we could move to the final document,
10 INQ 013164-0001. If we could highlight the top half, 16:45
11 please. This is the pink paper version and, again, we
12 just see a replication of what I've shown to you at
13 14:40:
14
15 "RUC have received bomb warning in Omagh Town." 16:46
16
17 Can I suggest to you, that what you have recorded in
18 your report at 14:40 is more consistent with what is
19 noted in the Daily Occurrence Book and I'll let you see
20 that. If we can have INQ 034854-0006. 16:46
21 A. Before we move to that, could we just stick at serial
22 002 on the current thing we're looking at, where it
23 says:
24
25 "To RUC from Ops Room: Request further info. Target 16:47
26 is courthouse on top of High Street. All RUC mobile
27 call signs deployed to clear personnel from Omagh Town
28 Centre beginning at courthouse."
29

1 That's what I will have read, if you add the
2 information from 14:40 and 14:45 together, I believe
3 that's what I was trying to succinctly say in my
4 post-incident report.

5 660 Q. Thank you for that explanation. And also it will be 16:47
6 for the Chairman to look at all of this, but finally
7 can I just let you see, in fairness to you,
8 INQ 034854-0006. And if we could go to the bottom
9 half, please, to entry 386 and if that could be
10 highlighted. You'll see there -- 16:48

11 A. Yeah.

12 661 Q. -- the words:
13
14 "Overheard on RUC Net."
15
16 And we see in your entry: 16:48
17
18 "Detail overheard by Int Cell monitoring RUC Net."
19
20 Then it goes on: 16:48
21
22 "RUC HQ Belfast have received..."
23
24 I'm suggesting that that's more indicative of you
25 having seen the Daily Occurrence Book, that's where you 16:48
26 got the detail for your report?

27 A. That's 386 you're asking about?

28 662 Q. Yes.

29 A. I know there's been a discussion about 386 today, and

1 as I've made it clear, I've never seen that Daily
2 Occurrence Book before.

3 MR. KANE: Very well, thank you very much.

4 MS. BRIGGS: Sir, I'm just looking to Ms. Fee. She's
5 indicated, Sir, she has no questions.

16:49

6
7 Finally, Sir, do you have any questions for Former
8 Captain Park?

9 CHAIRMAN: No, thank you.

10 MS. BRIGGS: Thank you, Sir. Sir, tomorrow we are
11 scheduled to commence at 10:00 a.m. with Hazel Hutson
12 of FBL and we expect to hear after that, Sir, from
13 DCI McGuinness.

16:49

14 CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Park.

15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Sir.

16:49

16
17 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED UNTIL THURSDAY, 1ST OCTOBER 2026
18 AT 10:00 A.M.

INDEX

WITNESS	PAGE
<u>COLONEL PETER MacMULLEN</u>	
QUESTIONED BY MR. GREANEY	1
QUESTIONED BY MR. KANE	65
QUESTIONED BY MR. SOUTHEY	73
QUESTIONED BY MR. TOAL	81
FURTHER QUESTIONED BY MR. GREANEY	90
<u>FORMER CAPTAIN JAMES HODGSON</u>	
QUESTIONED BY MR. DE LA POER	95
QUESTIONED BY MR. KANE	111
QUESTIONED BY MR. MCGOWAN	115
<u>FORMER CAPTAIN MICHAEL PEEBLES</u>	
QUESTIONED BY MR. DE LA POER	117
QUESTIONED BY MR. KANE	152
QUESTIONED BY MR. MCGOWAN	155
QUESTIONED BY MR. HENRY	162
<u>FORMER CAPTAIN BRUCE PARK</u>	
QUESTIONED BY MS. BRIGGS	167
QUESTIONED BY MR. KANE	175

	- 176:16 0200 [2] - 131:23, 132:4 023 [1] - 50:4 034848 [1] - 20:5 034853 [4] - 49:1, 69:7, 130:22, 144:15 034853-0011 [1] - 177:4 034854 [5] - 35:17, 35:18, 68:21, 84:15, 102:29 034854-0004 [1] - 170:14 034854-0006 [3] - 152:28, 178:20, 179:8 035228 [1] - 32:2 035229 [2] - 77:14, 77:22 041598 [1] - 75:14 041598-2 [1] - 93:7 041767 [1] - 172:19 043833 [1] - 167:23 0800 [1] - 132:19	9:22 11.1 [1] - 3:25 1100 [3] - 103:27, 104:2, 104:20 111 [1] - 181:13 1147 [1] - 132:29 115 [1] - 181:14 117 [1] - 181:17 11:00 [1] - 50:4 11:30 [1] - 50:28 11TH [2] - 12:1, 12:27 12 [10] - 4:16, 9:28, 52:22, 53:21, 53:24, 143:16, 144:15, 147:11, 147:13, 168:11 122 [4] - 37:5, 37:9, 40:26, 76:20 123 [2] - 40:24 1250 [1] - 37:15 12C [1] - 9:28 13 [8] - 4:27, 9:23, 43:24, 52:2, 53:10, 55:3, 137:20 1321 [3] - 42:24, 45:27, 47:26 13:21 [17] - 42:26, 43:12, 43:22, 44:6, 45:22, 46:14, 47:4, 47:27, 48:4, 48:9, 48:11, 48:19, 84:24, 85:3, 86:7, 107:24 13C [2] - 9:28, 11:8 13TH [1] - 49:7 14 [5] - 27:14, 53:20, 54:22, 77:14, 116:3 1435 [1] - 91:6 1440 [8] - 38:14, 48:9, 52:3, 84:28, 90:22, 105:17, 133:8, 165:14 14:29 [2] - 34:27, 163:3 14:30 [3] - 158:29, 159:16, 161:24 14:31 [1] - 163:3 14:32 [1] - 163:3 14:35 [2] - 110:13, 163:5	14:40 [41] - 27:19, 29:19, 32:7, 32:29, 45:22, 46:11, 54:25, 56:20, 56:26, 58:24, 58:25, 65:13, 67:16, 67:17, 67:18, 68:3, 77:19, 77:25, 85:5, 91:25, 106:11, 107:18, 108:8, 113:11, 137:15, 137:24, 138:6, 138:8, 138:24, 150:15, 151:2, 158:6, 163:8, 171:28, 176:18, 177:8, 177:19, 178:13, 178:18, 179:2 14:45 [4] - 32:10, 158:11, 163:15, 179:2 14:50 [2] - 32:10, 140:13 14:53 [5] - 140:26, 140:27, 141:25, 148:11, 148:16 14:55 [7] - 32:17, 32:29, 70:26, 82:14, 146:13, 147:29, 148:8 14TH [10] - 10:16, 37:14, 50:2, 72:13, 104:13, 104:14, 104:15, 130:28, 170:16, 170:19 15 [14] - 27:16, 45:8, 45:26, 77:14, 86:1, 159:1, 159:10, 159:16, 160:7, 160:17, 161:24, 161:25, 164:3 15-MINUTE [3] - 32:21, 51:5, 140:16 1503 [1] - 33:14 1505 [1] - 42:11 152 [1] - 181:18 1521 [3] - 42:24, 45:3, 107:28 155 [1] - 181:19 15:00 [1] - 33:7 15:03 [1] - 34:28 15:04 [2] - 102:16, 107:7	15:21 [11] - 43:12, 43:22, 43:24, 44:8, 45:4, 45:9, 45:13, 46:14, 48:19, 84:24, 107:24 15:53 [2] - 140:14, 140:25 15TH [50] - 3:7, 9:13, 9:21, 9:27, 12:1, 12:19, 12:27, 15:5, 15:10, 15:23, 21:27, 22:19, 22:27, 26:22, 26:27, 27:8, 38:14, 40:5, 42:22, 45:2, 45:3, 51:17, 53:4, 53:26, 54:18, 57:7, 60:18, 64:8, 64:22, 72:12, 72:14, 74:26, 90:21, 95:8, 96:5, 101:25, 103:27, 104:2, 104:20, 105:16, 118:5, 118:14, 119:3, 121:4, 125:26, 132:3, 155:28, 168:14, 168:24, 174:11 1605 [1] - 86:1 162 [1] - 181:20 167 [1] - 181:23 16:05 [1] - 86:11 16TH [1] - 85:27 175 [1] - 181:24 17TH [1] - 35:23 19 [2] - 18:13 1930 [1] - 104:13 1940 [1] - 104:15 1950 [1] - 104:14 1988 [1] - 157:16 1990 [3] - 19:23, 20:6, 20:28 1990S [1] - 61:12 1991 [2] - 167:26, 168:2 1992 [1] - 168:2 1994 [1] - 81:11 1995 [2] - 95:21, 118:7 1997 [4] - 14:6, 95:23, 95:26, 168:12 1998 [33] - 4:29, 6:13, 10:17, 12:20, 14:6,	14:17, 18:5, 21:7, 26:28, 35:23, 37:15, 38:14, 42:22, 49:7, 73:1, 74:26, 81:8, 81:19, 95:9, 96:6, 96:9, 101:26, 104:13, 118:5, 118:14, 130:28, 168:14, 168:24, 170:17, 170:19, 171:11, 172:19 1ST [1] - 180:17 1ST [3] - 3:6, 3:14, 95:20
				2	
					2 [23] - 18:11, 20:5, 32:5, 35:18, 41:10, 49:2, 50:17, 53:17, 59:20, 63:17, 63:18, 64:6, 73:4, 93:7, 118:20, 125:14, 125:15, 125:23, 133:1, 139:18, 139:19, 171:27 2.2 [1] - 74:14 20 [2] - 67:19, 166:22 2000 [1] - 79:23 2002 [3] - 19:25, 20:26, 20:29 2025 [2] - 4:12, 27:15 2026 [2] - 167:22, 180:17 21 [1] - 107:21 22ND [1] - 167:22 23 [2] - 131:4, 131:12 2300 [2] - 131:12, 131:14 24 [4] - 97:23, 98:22, 128:19, 143:27 24-HOUR [2] - 7:3, 97:26 25 [2] - 138:11, 156:1 25TH [2] - 171:10, 177:17 26 [2] - 156:1, 156:8 26TH [2] - 172:18, 172:26

28 [2] - 96:12, 100:5 29 [1] - 11:18 2:29 [2] - 22:22, 31:26 2:30 [1] - 101:29 2:40 [3] - 15:23, 90:21, 91:17 2ND [1] - 167:26	4:25 [1] - 166:1 4TH [1] - 35:26	9	ACCORD [1] - 174:9 ACCORDANCE [2] - 22:24, 35:3 ACCORDING [1] - 27:17 ACCOUNT [7] - 108:19, 121:14, 128:2, 139:21, 148:3, 149:19, 174:20 ACCOUNTED [1] - 161:12 ACCOUNTING [1] - 148:4 ACCOUNTS [1] - 42:16 ACCREDITED [8] - 20:14, 21:13, 22:1, 22:3, 22:6, 22:19, 23:10, 158:16 ACCURACY [1] - 113:26 ACCURATE [9] - 8:11, 28:13, 30:5, 40:15, 64:19, 111:5, 145:26, 149:17, 175:16 ACCURATELY [2] - 39:3, 123:5 ACHIEVE [2] - 90:12, 149:21 ACHIEVED [3] - 24:6, 28:27, 61:25 ACHIEVING [3] - 4:4, 4:7, 61:14 ACKNOWLEDGMENT [1] - 87:19 ACT [1] - 26:10 ACTION [14] - 20:8, 22:25, 28:20, 28:21, 32:12, 36:14, 49:24, 55:11, 111:28, 140:1, 140:18, 140:25, 141:26 ACTIONED [2] - 103:21, 159:9 ACTIONS [12] - 33:21, 35:8, 55:23, 55:25, 59:12, 76:12, 76:13, 133:19, 147:23, 148:6, 157:14 ACTIVE [4] -	10:6, 11:19, 11:22, 13:14 ACTIVITY [3] - 26:27, 67:26, 164:22 ACTUAL [6] - 30:6, 43:17, 48:8, 61:8, 124:26, 155:28 AD [3] - 89:16, 89:17, 90:27 ADD [9] - 34:18, 59:14, 129:17, 133:25, 133:26, 143:26, 149:24, 175:10, 179:1 ADDED [13] - 55:6, 55:18, 67:13, 69:23, 70:6, 71:13, 83:28, 130:10, 142:25, 144:1, 144:17, 147:26, 177:18 ADDING [4] - 69:26, 70:2, 84:8, 149:25 ADDITION [2] - 123:24, 149:9 ADDITIONAL [14] - 69:23, 72:19, 122:6, 125:16, 142:23, 143:8, 143:26, 144:16, 144:17, 146:23, 160:7, 174:23, 175:1, 175:11 ADDITIONS [1] - 60:24 ADDRESS [4] - 55:29, 171:22, 173:3, 173:23 ADDRESSED [2] - 74:17, 74:22 ADDRESSING [1] - 117:20 ADJACENT [2] - 98:18, 98:19 ADJOURNED [4] - 51:8, 94:23, 138:15, 180:17 ADJUSTMENT [1] - 142:11 ADMINISTRATIVE [4] - 57:27, 57:28, 58:10, 58:16 ADOPTING [2] - 57:12, 110:1	ADVANCE [1] - 125:7 ADVISE [1] - 83:12 AFFECT [2] - 13:27, 154:24 AFFECTED [2] - 127:24, 127:25 AFFIRMED [1] - 95:1 AFOOT [1] - 92:16 AFRAID [1] - 73:1 AFRESH [2] - 63:10, 63:11 AFTERMATH [2] - 109:15, 113:11 AFTERNOON [11] - 67:12, 68:1, 94:26, 95:4, 114:1, 114:8, 116:11, 116:23, 164:3, 167:8, 167:18 AFTERWARDS [7] - 46:1, 113:1, 130:6, 130:10, 147:11, 147:13, 148:11 AGENCIES [1] - 145:21 AGO [12] - 11:7, 15:20, 65:20, 97:21, 115:29, 136:28, 152:23, 153:11, 163:17, 169:26, 171:20, 173:16 AGREE [14] - 53:4, 60:5, 60:8, 67:15, 86:20, 132:17, 133:20, 133:21, 139:4, 141:21, 141:24, 159:2, 161:26, 173:14 AGREED [3] - 4:5, 95:15, 167:19 AGREEING [1] - 66:29 AGREEMENT [7] - 120:23, 120:25, 156:12, 156:17, 156:21, 157:21, 165:9 AGREEMENT [3] - 88:4, 89:9, 159:24	
3	5	A	ACCORD [1] - 174:9 ACCORDANCE [2] - 22:24, 35:3 ACCORDING [1] - 27:17 ACCOUNT [7] - 108:19, 121:14, 128:2, 139:21, 148:3, 149:19, 174:20 ACCOUNTED [1] - 161:12 ACCOUNTING [1] - 148:4 ACCOUNTS [1] - 42:16 ACCREDITED [8] - 20:14, 21:13, 22:1, 22:3, 22:6, 22:19, 23:10, 158:16 ACCURACY [1] - 113:26 ACCURATE [9] - 8:11, 28:13, 30:5, 40:15, 64:19, 111:5, 145:26, 149:17, 175:16 ACCURATELY [2] - 39:3, 123:5 ACHIEVE [2] - 90:12, 149:21 ACHIEVED [3] - 24:6, 28:27, 61:25 ACHIEVING [3] - 4:4, 4:7, 61:14 ACKNOWLEDGMENT [1] - 87:19 ACT [1] - 26:10 ACTION [14] - 20:8, 22:25, 28:20, 28:21, 32:12, 36:14, 49:24, 55:11, 111:28, 140:1, 140:18, 140:25, 141:26 ACTIONED [2] - 103:21, 159:9 ACTIONS [12] - 33:21, 35:8, 55:23, 55:25, 59:12, 76:12, 76:13, 133:19, 147:23, 148:6, 157:14 ACTIVE [4] -	10:6, 11:19, 11:22, 13:14 ACTIVITY [3] - 26:27, 67:26, 164:22 ACTUAL [6] - 30:6, 43:17, 48:8, 61:8, 124:26, 155:28 AD [3] - 89:16, 89:17, 90:27 ADD [9] - 34:18, 59:14, 129:17, 133:25, 133:26, 143:26, 149:24, 175:10, 179:1 ADDED [13] - 55:6, 55:18, 67:13, 69:23, 70:6, 71:13, 83:28, 130:10, 142:25, 144:1, 144:17, 147:26, 177:18 ADDING [4] - 69:26, 70:2, 84:8, 149:25 ADDITION [2] - 123:24, 149:9 ADDITIONAL [14] - 69:23, 72:19, 122:6, 125:16, 142:23, 143:8, 143:26, 144:16, 144:17, 146:23, 160:7, 174:23, 175:1, 175:11 ADDITIONS [1] - 60:24 ADDRESS [4] - 55:29, 171:22, 173:3, 173:23 ADDRESSED [2] - 74:17, 74:22 ADDRESSING [1] - 117:20 ADJACENT [2] - 98:18, 98:19 ADJOURNED [4] - 51:8, 94:23, 138:15, 180:17 ADJUSTMENT [1] - 142:11 ADMINISTRATIVE [4] - 57:27, 57:28, 58:10, 58:16 ADOPTING [2] - 57:12, 110:1	ADVANCE [1] - 125:7 ADVISE [1] - 83:12 AFFECT [2] - 13:27, 154:24 AFFECTED [2] - 127:24, 127:25 AFFIRMED [1] - 95:1 AFOOT [1] - 92:16 AFRAID [1] - 73:1 AFRESH [2] - 63:10, 63:11 AFTERMATH [2] - 109:15, 113:11 AFTERNOON [11] - 67:12, 68:1, 94:26, 95:4, 114:1, 114:8, 116:11, 116:23, 164:3, 167:8, 167:18 AFTERWARDS [7] - 46:1, 113:1, 130:6, 130:10, 147:11, 147:13, 148:11 AGENCIES [1] - 145:21 AGO [12] - 11:7, 15:20, 65:20, 97:21, 115:29, 136:28, 152:23, 153:11, 163:17, 169:26, 171:20, 173:16 AGREE [14] - 53:4, 60:5, 60:8, 67:15, 86:20, 132:17, 133:20, 133:21, 139:4, 141:21, 141:24, 159:2, 161:26, 173:14 AGREED [3] - 4:5, 95:15, 167:19 AGREEING [1] - 66:29 AGREEMENT [7] - 120:23, 120:25, 156:12, 156:17, 156:21, 157:21, 165:9 AGREEMENT [3] - 88:4, 89:9, 159:24	
3 [15] - 32:6, 53:8, 53:21, 53:28, 63:20, 64:6, 64:7, 75:14, 85:16, 107:23, 138:28, 139:14, 140:13, 141:26 30 [1] - 81:29 30-YEAR [1] - 78:28 30/40 [1] - 101:16 32 [3] - 37:15, 37:17, 75:29 37 [1] - 159:7 379 [3] - 93:13, 103:2, 170:20 38-1 [1] - 26:25 382 [1] - 103:26 385 [5] - 42:20, 45:21, 45:25, 84:21, 85:12 386 [12] - 38:12, 38:14, 42:20, 65:14, 66:17, 84:10, 86:25, 88:17, 105:10, 179:9, 179:27, 179:29 387 [1] - 42:11 39 [1] - 120:10 3:03 [1] - 31:26 3:30 [1] - 102:1 3RD [1] - 35:23	5 [14] - 12:25, 14:1, 27:16, 33:14, 53:22, 63:20, 64:7, 77:16, 85:16, 85:18, 107:23, 132:8, 139:19, 151:26 50 [2] - 96:20, 96:29 500LB [6] - 22:11, 32:22, 38:21, 83:13, 91:20, 140:17 550LB [1] - 31:16 5S [1] - 85:12	9 [2] - 49:29, 130:22 90 [1] - 181:9 95 [1] - 181:12 98 [1] - 132:3 9S [1] - 65:16	ACCORD [1] - 174:9 ACCORDANCE [2] - 22:24, 35:3 ACCORDING [1] - 27:17 ACCOUNT [7] - 108:19, 121:14, 128:2, 139:21, 148:3, 149:19, 174:20 ACCOUNTED [1] - 161:12 ACCOUNTING [1] - 148:4 ACCOUNTS [1] - 42:16 ACCREDITED [8] - 20:14, 21:13, 22:1, 22:3, 22:6, 22:19, 23:10, 158:16 ACCURACY [1] - 113:26 ACCURATE [9] - 8:11, 28:13, 30:5, 40:15, 64:19, 111:5, 145:26, 149:17, 175:16 ACCURATELY [2] - 39:3, 123:5 ACHIEVE [2] - 90:12, 149:21 ACHIEVED [3] - 24:6, 28:27, 61:25 ACHIEVING [3] - 4:4, 4:7, 61:14 ACKNOWLEDGMENT [1] - 87:19 ACT [1] - 26:10 ACTION [14] - 20:8, 22:25, 28:20, 28:21, 32:12, 36:14, 49:24, 55:11, 111:28, 140:1, 140:18, 140:25, 141:26 ACTIONED [2] - 103:21, 159:9 ACTIONS [12] - 33:21, 35:8, 55:23, 55:25, 59:12, 76:12, 76:13, 133:19, 147:23, 148:6, 157:14 ACTIVE [4] -	10:6, 11:19, 11:22, 13:14 ACTIVITY [3] - 26:27, 67:26, 164:22 ACTUAL [6] - 30:6, 43:17, 48:8, 61:8, 124:26, 155:28 AD [3] - 89:16, 89:17, 90:27 ADD [9] - 34:18, 59:14, 129:17, 133:25, 133:26, 143:26, 149:24, 175:10, 179:1 ADDED [13] - 55:6, 55:18, 67:13, 69:23, 70:6, 71:13, 83:28, 130:10, 142:25, 144:1, 144:17, 147:26, 177:18 ADDING [4] - 69:26, 70:2, 84:8, 149:25 ADDITION [2] - 123:24, 149:9 ADDITIONAL [14] - 69:23, 72:19, 122:6, 125:16, 142:23, 143:8, 143:26, 144:16, 144:17, 146:23, 160:7, 174:23, 175:1, 175:11 ADDITIONS [1] - 60:24 ADDRESS [4] - 55:29, 171:22, 173:3, 173:23 ADDRESSED [2] - 74:17, 74:22 ADDRESSING [1] - 117:20 ADJACENT [2] - 98:18, 98:19 ADJOURNED [4] - 51:8, 94:23, 138:15, 180:17 ADJUSTMENT [1] - 142:11 ADMINISTRATIVE [4] - 57:27, 57:28, 58:10, 58:16 ADOPTING [2] - 57:12, 110:1	ADVANCE [1] - 125:7 ADVISE [1] - 83:12 AFFECT [2] - 13:27, 154:24 AFFECTED [2] - 127:24, 127:25 AFFIRMED [1] - 95:1 AFOOT [1] - 92:16 AFRAID [1] - 73:1 AFRESH [2] - 63:10, 63:11 AFTERMATH [2] - 109:15, 113:11 AFTERNOON [11] - 67:12, 68:1, 94:26, 95:4, 114:1, 114:8, 116:11, 116:23, 164:3, 167:8, 167:18 AFTERWARDS [7] - 46:1, 113:1, 130:6, 130:10, 147:11, 147:13, 148:11 AGENCIES [1] - 145:21 AGO [12] - 11:7, 15:20, 65:20, 97:21, 115:29, 136:28, 152:23, 153:11, 163:17, 169:26, 171:20, 173:16 AGREE [14] - 53:4, 60:5, 60:8, 67:15, 86:20, 132:17, 133:20, 133:21, 139:4, 141:21, 141:24, 159:2, 161:26, 173:14 AGREED [3] - 4:5, 95:15, 167:19 AGREEING [1] - 66:29 AGREEMENT [7] - 120:23, 120:25, 156:12, 156:17, 156:21, 157:21, 165:9 AGREEMENT [3] - 88:4, 89:9, 159:24	
4	6 [9] - 20:23, 27:25, 38:11, 77:16, 79:26, 84:15, 105:8, 133:4, 171:16 60 [2] - 96:20, 96:29 65 [1] - 181:6 6TH [3] - 4:12, 9:22, 27:15	A.M [1] - 180:18 A.M [2] - 51:23, 180:11 A10 [1] - 41:12 A12C [1] - 11:8 ABANDONED [1] - 84:29 ABBREVIATION [2] - 41:12, 42:4 ABILITY [1] - 26:3 ABLE [18] - 19:26, 24:20, 25:5, 26:1, 32:13, 42:21, 55:29, 66:16, 66:19, 78:11, 79:5, 87:15, 103:9, 108:9, 121:17, 127:3, 137:29, 139:4 ABNORMAL [2] - 10:25, 11:3 ABSENT [2] - 141:21, 141:24 ABSOLUTE [2] - 66:14, 124:27 ABSOLUTELY [1] - 45:14, 56:2, 70:7, 94:8, 100:17, 120:23, 128:7, 130:10, 150:6, 153:2, 172:5 ACCELERATING [1] - 67:12 ACCELERATION [1] - 67:26 ACCEPTABLE [1] - 83:23 ACCEPTED [1] - 175:27 ACCESS [4] - 21:22, 23:28, 98:27, 152:18 ACCOMPANY [1] - 98:3	9 [2] - 49:29, 130:22 90 [1] - 181:9 95 [1] - 181:12 98 [1] - 132:3 9S [1] - 65:16	ACCORD [1] - 174:9 ACCORDANCE [2] - 22:24, 35:3 ACCORDING [1] - 27:17 ACCOUNT [7] - 108:19, 121:14, 128:2, 139:21, 148:3, 149:19, 174:20 ACCOUNTED [1] - 161:12 ACCOUNTING [1] - 148:4 ACCOUNTS [1] - 42:16 ACCREDITED [8] - 20:14, 21:13, 22:1, 22:3, 22:6, 22:19, 23:10, 158:16 ACCURACY [1] - 113:26 ACCURATE [9] - 8:11, 28:13, 30:5, 40:15, 64:19, 111:5, 145:26, 149:17, 175:16 ACCURATELY [2] - 39:3, 123:5 ACHIEVE [2] - 90:12, 149:21 ACHIEVED [3] - 24:6, 28:27, 61:25 ACHIEVING [3] - 4:4, 4:7, 61:14 ACKNOWLEDGMENT [1] - 87:19 ACT [1] - 26:10 ACTION [14] - 20:8, 22:25, 28:20, 28:21, 32:12, 36:14, 49:24, 55:11, 111:28, 140:1, 140:18, 140:25, 141:26 ACTIONED [2] - 103:21, 159:9 ACTIONS [12] - 33:21, 35:8, 55:23, 55:25, 59:12, 76:12, 76:13, 133:19, 147:23, 148:6, 157:14 ACTIVE [4] -	10:6, 11:19, 11:22, 13:14 ACTIVITY [3] - 26:27, 67:26, 164:22 ACTUAL [6] - 30:6, 43:17, 48:8, 61:8, 124:26, 155:28 AD [3] - 89:16, 89:17, 90:27 ADD [9] - 34:18, 59:14, 129:17, 133:25, 133:26, 143:26, 149:24, 175:10, 179:1 ADDED [13] - 55:6, 55:18, 67:13, 69:23, 70:6, 71:13, 83:28, 130:10, 142:25, 144:1, 144:17, 147:26, 177:18 ADDING [4] - 69:26, 70:2, 84:8, 149:25 ADDITION [2] - 123:24, 149:9 ADDITIONAL [14] - 69:23, 72:19, 122:6, 125:16, 142:23, 143:8, 143:26, 144:16, 144:17, 146:23, 160:7, 174:23, 175:1, 175:11 ADDITIONS [1] - 60:24 ADDRESS [4] - 55:29, 171:22, 173:3, 173:23 ADDRESSED [2] - 74:17, 74:22 ADDRESSING [1] - 117:20 ADJACENT [2] - 98:18, 98:19 ADJOURNED [4] - 51:8, 94:23, 138:15, 180:17 ADJUSTMENT [1] - 142:11 ADMINISTRATIVE [4] - 57:27, 57:28, 58:10, 58:16 ADOPTING [2] - 57:12, 110:1	ADVANCE [1] - 125:7 ADVISE [1] - 83:12 AFFECT [2] - 13:27, 154:24 AFFECTED [2] - 127:24, 127:25 AFFIRMED [1] - 95:1 AFOOT [1] - 92:16 AFRAID [1] - 73:1 AFRESH [2] - 63:10, 63:11 AFTERMATH [2] - 109:15, 113:11 AFTERNOON [11] - 67:12, 68:1, 94:26, 95:4, 114:1, 114:8, 116:11, 116:23, 164:3, 167:8, 167:18 AFTERWARDS [7] - 46:1, 113:1, 130:6, 130:10, 147:11, 147:13, 148:11 AGENCIES [1] - 145:21 AGO [12] - 11:7, 15:20, 65:20, 97:21, 115:29, 136:28, 152:23, 153:11, 163:17, 169:26, 171:20, 173:16 AGREE [14] - 53:4, 60:5, 60:8, 67:15, 86:20, 132:17, 133:20, 133:21, 139:4, 141:21, 141:24, 159:2, 161:26, 173:14 AGREED [3] - 4:5, 95:15, 167:19 AGREEING [1] - 66:29 AGREEMENT [7] - 120:23, 120:25, 156:12, 156:17, 156:21, 157:21, 165:9 AGREEMENT [3] - 88:4, 89:9, 159:24
4 [12] - 4:25, 23:25, 33:19, 35:29, 53:17, 63:18, 64:7, 102:29, 131:2, 132:5, 139:8, 139:19 400 [2] - 85:20, 85:27 47 [1] - 26:23	8 [5] - 37:9, 37:10, 74:10, 120:9, 121:13 81 [1] - 181:8 86 [1] - 18:13 86-PAGE [2] - 18:12, 26:24 89 [1] - 36:1 8:00 [2] - 50:21, 51:23 8TH [3] - 3:8, 27:3, 40:22	A.M [1] - 180:18 A.M [2] - 51:23, 180:11 A10 [1] - 41:12 A12C [1] - 11:8 ABANDONED [1] - 84:29 ABBREVIATION [2] - 41:12, 42:4 ABILITY [1] - 26:3 ABLE [18] - 19:26, 24:20, 25:5, 26:1, 32:13, 42:21, 55:29, 66:16, 66:19, 78:11, 79:5, 87:15, 103:9, 108:9, 121:17, 127:3, 137:29, 139:4 ABNORMAL [2] - 10:25, 11:3 ABSENT [2] - 141:21, 141:24 ABSOLUTE [2] - 66:14, 124:27 ABSOLUTELY [1] - 45:14, 56:2, 70:7, 94:8, 100:17, 120:23, 128:7, 130:10, 150:				

AGREEMENTS ^[1] - 87:16 AHEAD ^[3] - 6:20, 54:4, 90:20 AIDE ^[1] - 18:6 AIDE ^[2] - 18:16, 19:1 AIDE- MEMOIRE ^[1] - 18:6 AIDE- MEMOIRE ^[2] - 18:16, 19:1 AIM ^[1] - 74:8 ALARM ^[1] - 145:29 ALBEIT ^[1] - 31:29 ALERT ^[3] - 119:29, 120:1, 145:29 ALERTED ^[1] - 165:6 ALERTNESS ^[1] - 103:20 ALIGNMENT ^[3] - 141:16, 141:17, 142:2 ALLEGED ^[1] - 155:6 ALLOCATED ^[1] - 73:21 ALLOWED ^[1] - 87:20 ALMOST ^[2] - 100:12, 127:9 ALONGSIDE ^[2] - 7:15, 34:10 ALPHA ^[1] - 10:3 ALTER ^[1] - 149:24 ALTERNATE ^[1] - 81:17 ALTERNATIVE ^[2] - 110:29, 123:14 ALTERNATIVE LY ^[1] - 106:13 AMENDED ^[1] - 64:2 AMENDMENT ^[1] - 64:1 AMMUNITION ^[4] - 15:13, 24:25, 121:10, 123:26 ANALYSED ^[1] - 85:6 ANALYSING ^[1] - 140:10 ANALYSIS ^[7] -	46:20, 47:9, 47:17, 48:6, 88:15, 88:25, 114:21 AND ^[3] - 51:8, 94:23, 138:15 ANIMAL ^[1] - 123:24 ANNEXES ^[1] - 18:22 ANNOTATE ^[1] - 104:28 ANNOTATION ^[3] - 63:29, 105:17, 132:1 ANNOUNCED ^[1] - 117:24 ANOMALY ^[1] - 43:14 ANSWER ^[16] - 15:12, 17:19, 86:26, 89:7, 92:5, 100:9, 108:25, 111:27, 115:21, 124:28, 126:12, 130:1, 138:6, 139:5, 144:7, 161:2 ANSWERED ^[5] - 37:25, 74:28, 116:11, 135:15, 154:11 ANSWERING ^[1] - 94:15 ANTECEDENT ^[1] - 73:12 ANTICIPATED ^[4] - 25:25, 76:28, 166:7, 166:20 ANXIETY ^[1] - 162:17 ANYWAY ^[3] - 13:19, 83:25, 83:27 APART ^[1] - 40:6 APOLOGISE ^[2] - 66:12, 97:22 APPARENT ^[4] - 7:29, 12:16, 142:20, 169:23 APPEAR ^[9] - 53:7, 57:14, 62:3, 64:10, 72:4, 73:5, 81:11, 143:5, 174:17 APPEARED ^[1] - 160:10 APPEARING ^[1] - 108:9 APPLICATION	^[2] - 93:21, 94:7 APPLIED ^[1] - 167:5 APPLIES ^[1] - 167:4 APPLY ^[1] - 75:12 APPRECIATE ^[3] - 24:15, 65:1, 71:28 APPRENTICE ^[1] - 27:3 APPROACH ^[4] - 25:7, 25:11, 26:5, 83:3 APPROACHED ^[2] - 25:1, 160:26 APPROACHIN G ^[1] - 25:4 APPROPRIATE ^[7] - 96:25, 100:9, 124:26, 126:8, 149:15, 149:27, 173:6 APPROPRIATE LY ^[1] - 125:23 ARCHIVE ^[2] - 65:19, 66:11 AREA ^[41] - 3:8, 3:13, 3:16, 4:22, 8:29, 9:29, 10:3, 12:6, 12:21, 13:1, 20:13, 21:23, 22:17, 24:12, 24:29, 25:4, 25:5, 25:9, 25:10, 25:11, 26:2, 26:9, 27:5, 27:7, 31:15, 34:12, 38:20, 41:20, 41:27, 75:3, 75:5, 75:13, 82:5, 82:7, 118:25, 123:26, 128:3, 154:1, 161:10, 161:13, 161:17 AREAS ^[4] - 13:11, 13:12, 13:15, 164:25 ARGUABLY ^[1] - 161:6 ARISE ^[1] - 119:27 ARISES ^[1] - 57:10 ARISING ^[2] - 115:18, 120:1 ARMAGH ^[1] - 42:1 ARMY ^[70] - 4:3,	8:19, 15:4, 26:22, 27:8, 27:16, 29:16, 33:1, 33:21, 34:14, 34:25, 35:2, 35:8, 59:4, 64:21, 65:23, 66:3, 68:11, 71:17, 74:18, 76:28, 77:18, 77:24, 77:26, 79:12, 79:14, 81:20, 81:23, 81:29, 82:28, 83:3, 86:28, 87:4, 88:27, 88:29, 92:15, 92:19, 92:22, 92:28, 95:10, 96:8, 98:3, 113:3, 113:4, 115:9, 115:22, 118:4, 120:14, 123:10, 126:26, 157:23, 157:26, 158:15, 158:25, 159:5, 159:9, 159:15, 159:22, 159:26, 159:27, 160:5, 161:22, 162:10, 162:11, 165:5, 165:13, 165:18, 176:5 ARMY'S ^[1] - 77:10 ARMY-TO- ARMY ^[1] - 88:27 AROSE ^[1] - 67:3 ARRANGEMEN T ^[6] - 78:23, 78:25, 87:10, 89:15, 90:3, 90:27 ARRANGEMEN TS ^[4] - 120:15, 120:21, 156:18, 166:11 ARRIVE ^[4] - 17:11, 17:20, 24:7, 55:10 ARRIVED ^[4] - 34:12, 47:14, 119:15, 157:4 ARRIVES ^[1] - 34:4 ARRIVING ^[1] - 34:18 ART ^[1] - 121:27 AS ^[18] - 51:8, 51:14, 65:10,	73:26, 81:1, 90:16, 94:23, 95:2, 111:25, 115:2, 117:15, 138:15, 138:21, 152:15, 155:24, 162:27, 167:15, 175:23 ASCERTAIN ^[2] - 33:4, 34:1 ASIDE ^[1] - 127:26 ASPECT ^[1] - 88:14 ASSESS ^[1] - 30:26 ASSESSED ^[1] - 88:18 ASSESSMENT ^[9] - 30:18, 35:1, 39:22, 39:26, 40:13, 42:3, 44:12, 48:24, 71:17 ASSESSMENT S ^[1] - 46:24 ASSET ^[3] - 121:8, 125:5, 160:14 ASSETS ^[7] - 15:27, 121:9, 121:13, 126:6, 156:4, 157:17, 163:25 ASSIST ^[7] - 4:1, 27:10, 33:12, 73:7, 156:5, 164:4, 164:10 ASSISTANCE ^[10] - 32:26, 33:22, 73:10, 81:26, 82:16, 82:22, 160:20, 162:3, 164:5, 164:19 ASSISTANT ^[2] - 41:11, 106:23 ASSISTANT ^[1] - 7:10 ASSISTED ^[1] - 160:7 ASSISTING ^[2] - 160:18, 164:16 ASSOCIATED ^[2] - 34:24, 35:15 ASSUME ^[4] - 76:17, 119:26, 125:16, 173:18 ASSUMED ^[1] - 51:25	ASSUMING ^[2] - 125:24, 177:23 ASSUMPTION ^[5] - 22:6, 61:2, 61:6, 76:10, 159:27 ASSURE ^[1] - 137:6 AT ^[1] - 180:18 ATMOSPHERE ^[2] - 67:28, 67:29 ATO ^[33] - 15:14, 15:21, 15:28, 16:16, 17:5, 17:10, 17:20, 17:22, 17:29, 18:2, 23:4, 23:19, 24:4, 25:18, 25:27, 26:11, 31:24, 74:2, 74:4, 74:16, 74:18, 83:11, 83:28, 121:11, 122:27, 123:26, 124:3, 157:17, 160:8, 160:9, 160:13, 161:6 ATOS ^[8] - 21:27, 21:28, 23:24, 24:13, 24:16, 24:21, 26:17, 83:10 ATROCITY ^[1] - 67:19 ATTACHMENT ^[1] - 59:1 ATTACK ^[7] - 37:18, 91:21, 96:10, 109:15, 122:1, 122:7, 130:29 ATTACKS ^[1] - 10:10 ATTEMPT ^[4] - 64:23, 66:2, 67:1, 150:10 ATTEND ^[1] - 23:15 ATTENDING ^[3] - 74:2, 102:12, 122:27 ATTENDS ^[1] - 123:27 ATTENTION ^[12] - 20:10, 65:22, 66:21, 91:24, 109:21, 112:21, 122:3, 139:27, 140:5, 140:24, 141:20, 141:29
--	---	--	--	--	--

ATTRACTS ^[1] - 122:3 AUGHNACLOY ^[4] - 81:7, 81:18, 86:1, 86:6 AUGMENTED ^[2] - 4:21, 7:9 AUGUST ^[67] - 3:7, 9:14, 9:21, 9:27, 10:16, 12:1, 12:20, 12:27, 14:17, 15:5, 15:10, 21:27, 22:19, 22:28, 26:23, 26:28, 27:8, 38:14, 40:5, 42:22, 45:2, 45:3, 45:8, 45:26, 49:7, 50:2, 51:17, 53:4, 53:26, 54:18, 57:7, 60:18, 64:8, 72:12, 72:15, 74:26, 85:27, 86:1, 90:21, 95:9, 96:5, 101:25, 103:27, 104:2, 104:13, 104:14, 104:15, 104:20, 105:17, 118:5, 118:14, 119:3, 121:4, 125:26, 130:28, 132:3, 155:29, 167:26, 168:14, 168:24, 170:17, 170:19, 171:11, 172:19, 172:26, 174:11, 177:17 AUGUST.. ^[1] - 37:14 AUTHENTICITY ^[1] - 113:27 AUTHOR ^[1] - 131:8 AUTHORED ^[1] - 171:8 AUTHORITATIVE ^[1] - 108:19 AUTHORITY ^[4] - 8:10, 27:4, 65:23 AUTOMATIC ^[1] - 15:26 AUTOMATICAL ^[3] - 18:28, 61:20, 80:11 AUTONOMY ^[4] - 156:23, 156:27, 157:14, 157:21 AUTUMN ^[1] -	95:26 AVAILABLE ^[17] - 8:6, 25:18, 40:7, 70:9, 71:12, 74:24, 74:29, 75:2, 117:2, 120:26, 121:1, 121:18, 135:10, 136:17, 164:4, 164:7, 164:10 AVENUES ^[1] - 158:19 AVOID ^[2] - 95:13, 164:9 AWARE ^[45] - 27:17, 41:17, 65:13, 77:11, 77:18, 77:24, 77:27, 78:1, 78:14, 78:23, 79:12, 79:13, 83:14, 91:5, 91:8, 91:22, 92:16, 99:4, 99:6, 101:20, 102:5, 109:16, 111:16, 111:28, 115:8, 115:11, 115:22, 117:7, 120:1, 124:28, 152:21, 152:23, 152:25, 158:16, 160:4, 163:7, 163:19, 165:14, 165:19, 169:17, 169:21, 169:28, 170:24, 174:11, 174:14 AWARENESS ^[3] - 14:7, 136:19, 162:15 AWFUL ^[2] - 89:4 AXLES ^[1] - 22:12 B BACKGROUN D ^[3] - 95:20, 118:4, 170:29 BACKING ^[1] - 62:25 BACKS ^[1] - 30:26 BACKUP ^[1] - 157:27 BALANCE ^[4] - 35:7, 82:4, 116:22, 132:24 BALL ^[1] -	102:11 BANBRIDGE ^[3] - 31:17, 38:21, 91:21 BANBRIDGE-TYPE ^[2] - 31:17, 38:21 BANK ^[1] - 145:14 BANNER ^[1] - 18:20 BARRACK ^[1] - 36:21 BARRACKS ^[16] - 12:8, 15:14, 15:15, 28:29, 73:3, 82:8, 97:3, 101:12, 115:26, 118:9, 118:17, 120:27, 121:4, 121:9, 167:29, 168:17 BARRACKS ^[3] - 78:17, 115:12, 169:4 BASE ^[6] - 10:6, 10:10, 11:10, 11:15, 11:24 BASED ^[13] - 5:5, 13:5, 48:24, 48:25, 70:2, 98:10, 108:10, 108:23, 119:6, 136:1, 149:28, 167:28, 168:17 BASIC ^[3] - 46:19, 74:20, 80:7 BASIS ^[4] - 19:29, 68:4, 97:26, 152:7 BATTALION ^[10] - 3:15, 4:18, 4:20, 41:25, 95:21, 96:2, 96:15, 96:18, 125:22, 168:15 BATTALION ^[5] - 3:19, 41:26, 109:27, 167:28, 172:25 BATTALION'S ^[1] - 177:27 BATTALIONS ^[1] - 173:3 BATTALIONS ^[1] - 4:25 BATTERY ^[1] - 145:15 BATTLE ^[9] -	118:27, 121:8, 125:1, 125:4, 125:5, 125:17, 125:18, 128:21 BE ^[2] - 51:13, 138:20 BE.. ^[2] - 11:21, 153:1 BEAR ^[8] - 15:5, 24:17, 26:19, 28:27, 29:13, 39:25, 93:5, 128:27 BEARING ^[11] - 16:26, 103:10, 106:25, 108:2, 124:25, 125:6, 130:3, 132:28, 134:13, 141:8, 145:22 BEAT ^[1] - 13:24 BEAT-TYPE ^[1] - 13:24 BECAME ^[7] - 30:6, 77:27, 79:9, 109:26, 135:11, 163:7, 175:2 BECOME ^[10] - 65:13, 71:12, 102:5, 139:24, 145:20, 157:6, 164:27, 167:17, 169:23 BECOMES ^[3] - 46:4, 92:15, 139:24 BECOMING ^[5] - 77:18, 77:24, 95:14, 135:11, 163:19 BEEN ^[1] - 117:14 BEFOREHAND ^[2] - 67:20, 68:5 BEG ^[1] - 112:9 BEGAN ^[2] - 169:29, 176:21 BEGIN ^[4] - 94:28, 117:10, 117:11, 163:1 BEGINNING ^[2] - 139:13, 178:28 BEGINS ^[1] - 107:21 BEHALF ^[13] - 8:8, 65:5, 73:22, 89:6, 90:7, 90:9, 114:26, 116:8, 116:13, 120:13, 152:11, 155:16,	155:20 BEHIND ^[2] - 130:13, 171:18 BELFAST ^[4] - 31:13, 38:17, 105:19, 179:22 BELIEF ^[2] - 128:9, 155:8 BELOW ^[1] - 85:1 BEN ^[1] - 48:2 BENEATH ^[1] - 131:5 BENEFIT ^[2] - 7:23, 109:3 BEREAVED ^[1] - 24:15 BESIDE ^[1] - 84:23 BEST ^[12] - 24:25, 66:11, 66:14, 71:9, 88:24, 88:26, 101:10, 114:19, 136:29, 143:3, 145:12, 175:15 BETTER ^[11] - 25:28, 50:9, 52:23, 53:10, 56:1, 74:22, 131:9, 162:11, 175:13, 175:28, 176:7 BETWEEN ^[23] - 3:3, 3:6, 12:27, 13:23, 20:1, 30:8, 31:26, 32:29, 33:1, 34:8, 34:27, 43:12, 68:12, 82:4, 89:23, 92:21, 95:11, 95:15, 96:20, 101:29, 145:6, 165:11, 170:6 BEYOND ^[1] - 147:14 BID ^[2] - 125:4, 125:5 BINDER ^[11] - 126:23, 127:9, 127:12, 127:13, 127:18, 127:19, 128:10, 128:11, 128:15, 128:20, 129:25 BINDERS ^[1] - 128:13 BIRO ^[2] - 42:26, 43:15 BIT ^[9] - 14:8,	40:19, 54:14, 77:12, 105:4, 118:4, 124:10, 148:1, 163:1 BITS ^[4] - 135:27, 149:6, 173:1, 177:18 BLACK ^[6] - 44:27, 45:7, 45:8, 46:15, 116:8, 141:5 BLACK ^[1] - 116:10 BLANK ^[1] - 69:19 BLAST ^[1] - 79:28 BLOCK ^[5] - 127:1, 127:4, 129:7, 174:6, 174:7 BLUE ^[7] - 44:24, 45:6, 45:10, 45:11, 45:25, 46:14, 108:14 BOARD ^[1] - 171:26 BOBBIES ^[1] - 13:24 BODIES ^[3] - 159:16, 161:25, 161:28 BODY ^[4] - 43:23, 46:15, 89:12, 108:7 BOMB ^[122] - 15:9, 15:26, 16:12, 17:6, 19:15, 21:13, 22:1, 22:3, 22:6, 22:11, 22:19, 22:22, 23:7, 23:10, 24:10, 25:7, 25:13, 25:21, 25:29, 26:20, 27:19, 28:12, 31:15, 32:7, 32:20, 38:19, 39:8, 39:28, 42:14, 43:7, 44:7, 44:8, 44:13, 44:14, 45:29, 46:5, 46:11, 52:7, 52:8, 52:18, 54:10, 54:28, 55:4, 55:5, 56:21, 57:17, 58:4, 58:25, 58:26, 59:17,
--	--	---	--	---	--

60:15, 66:19, 66:23, 67:8, 68:3, 70:27, 71:2, 74:5, 74:6, 75:8, 81:27, 81:28, 83:12, 83:13, 83:19, 83:21, 91:2, 91:18, 102:5, 102:7, 102:17, 103:1, 107:5, 107:7, 110:21, 113:9, 113:15, 114:5, 114:15, 116:3, 122:29, 124:14, 133:8, 133:18, 134:20, 135:1, 137:5, 141:5, 145:16, 148:28, 150:14, 151:7, 153:24, 154:7, 154:15, 154:17, 157:15, 158:17, 159:19, 159:26, 160:3, 160:12, 160:27, 163:2, 163:8, 163:19, 165:15, 168:28, 169:5, 169:12, 169:14, 169:15, 171:8, 173:11, 176:20, 177:11, 177:21, 178:4, 178:15 BOMB [1] - 15:28 BOMB'S [1] - 71:3 BOMBING [2] - 35:25, 37:14 BOMBINGS [1] - 113:13 BOMBS [9] - 31:14, 31:19, 38:18, 38:29, 40:5, 66:18, 74:19, 105:20, 110:10 BOOK [69] - 4:28, 4:29, 5:1, 5:16, 6:4, 6:9, 7:1, 7:14, 9:1, 9:27, 12:19, 27:25, 29:5, 30:12, 30:20, 30:27, 31:4, 34:23, 35:15, 35:18, 35:26, 38:6, 43:1, 43:21, 46:18, 47:20, 52:5, 52:16,	56:17, 56:27, 57:4, 65:14, 65:15, 65:18, 66:17, 67:16, 68:17, 71:8, 72:2, 72:28, 75:19, 75:20, 75:21, 76:4, 93:13, 93:25, 94:2, 94:3, 99:21, 100:10, 100:28, 101:6, 101:7, 102:28, 109:8, 110:27, 112:5, 134:8, 150:12, 152:19, 153:3, 153:12, 169:18, 169:22, 170:14, 176:11, 178:19, 179:25, 180:2 BOOK [35] - 5:9, 6:13, 6:22, 35:19, 35:20, 36:1, 36:19, 36:22, 37:3, 37:27, 38:9, 46:16, 46:26, 47:15, 47:18, 47:21, 85:9, 86:11, 87:23, 87:24, 87:28, 88:6, 88:13, 93:28, 99:19, 103:23, 107:14, 126:23, 153:9, 169:18, 169:21, 169:24, 169:27, 170:2, 170:4 BOOKS [3] - 72:14, 72:17, 77:3 BOOKS [1] - 5:3 BORDER [1] - 81:12 BORDERS [1] - 156:28 BORDERS [2] - 96:22, 98:2 BORED [1] - 89:2 BORNE [2] - 32:22, 140:17 BOTTOM [21] - 38:13, 61:17, 69:8, 69:9, 69:11, 69:17, 70:17, 75:24, 75:25, 79:27, 93:11, 103:25, 105:10, 129:4, 133:22, 141:8, 141:25,	153:1, 153:7, 177:7, 179:8 BOUND [1] - 126:23 BOUNDS [6] - 55:15, 55:27, 56:4, 60:26, 83:24, 140:6 BOX [6] - 60:5, 60:6, 60:7, 116:29, 134:17, 142:2 BOXES [6] - 59:29, 62:9, 62:10, 69:18, 80:9, 141:18 BOYS [1] - 27:3 BRANCH [2] - 76:9, 76:10 BREAK [10] - 51:2, 51:3, 51:5, 94:20, 116:21, 123:8, 130:14, 136:22, 137:18, 138:10 BRIEF [5] - 32:20, 137:9, 137:10, 153:19, 163:1 BRIEFING [2] - 39:15, 171:2 BRIEFLY [2] - 51:8, 138:15 BRIGADE [9] - 3:9, 27:4, 37:5, 37:9, 37:11, 41:1, 96:26, 103:15, 121:13 BRIGADE [7] - 56:13, 99:26, 121:12, 121:19, 125:5, 173:4, 173:6 BRIGADE- WIDE [1] - 121:19 BRIGADES [1] - 40:9 BRIGADIER [2] - 3:10, 3:12 BRIGGS [2] - 166:16, 167:11 BRIGGS [9] - 167:3, 167:9, 167:12, 167:14, 167:17, 175:18, 180:4, 180:10, 181:23 BRING [10] - 28:27, 65:22, 74:9, 107:14,	107:15, 110:4, 130:21, 166:28, 171:11, 177:28 BRINGING [1] - 39:25 BRISCO [5] - 41:10, 106:22, 106:23, 106:25, 107:2 BRITISH [9] - 4:3, 26:22, 27:16, 29:16, 33:21, 34:25, 35:2, 118:4, 120:13 BROAD [2] - 21:17, 24:24 BROADCAST [3] - 29:22, 110:14 BROADCASTI NG [1] - 98:27 BROADER [1] - 121:12 BROKE [1] - 136:21 BROKEN [1] - 47:5 BROUGHT [6] - 24:17, 26:18, 66:21, 75:13, 109:20, 112:20 BRUCE [3] - 167:14, 175:23, 181:22 BRUSH [1] - 24:24 BUILDING [6] - 10:22, 10:26, 29:5, 46:28, 166:11, 166:13 BULLET [3] - 19:4, 74:12, 74:13 BUNDLE [1] - 169:25 BUNDLES [1] - 172:4 BUSY [4] - 145:20, 149:20, 162:18, 163:21 BUTTON [1] - 145:5 BUTTONS [2] - 80:9, 145:14 BY [29] - 51:14, 65:10, 73:25, 81:1, 90:15, 95:2, 111:24, 115:1, 117:15, 138:21, 152:14, 155:23, 162:26, 167:14,	175:23, 181:5, 181:6, 181:7, 181:8, 181:9, 181:12, 181:13, 181:14, 181:17, 181:18, 181:19, 181:20, 181:23, 181:24 C C'TOWN [1] - 42:6 C2 [2] - 126:2, 126:3 CAM [1] - 152:27 CAMP [1] - 11:24 CAMPAIGN [1] - 78:28 CAMPBELL [2] - 116:9, 155:21 CANDOUR [2] - 65:28, 66:5 CANNOT [1] - 121:5 CAPABILITIES [1] - 15:10 CAPABILITY [2] - 121:6 CAPABILITY [1] - 15:29 CAPABLE [2] - 63:1, 156:10 CAPACITY [5] - 74:18, 74:19, 74:28, 89:6, 89:24 CAPTAIN [58] - 41:9, 41:16, 50:22, 50:25, 51:26, 55:24, 57:20, 58:12, 60:6, 60:25, 63:10, 63:25, 64:16, 71:10, 94:27, 95:12, 95:16, 95:19, 96:16, 111:15, 113:18, 115:4, 116:17, 116:20, 116:24, 116:29, 117:19, 117:21, 130:24, 132:19, 134:4, 136:22, 138:23, 146:17, 150:8, 152:9, 155:26, 162:29, 165:3, 165:28, 166:5, 166:12,	166:28, 167:5, 167:17, 167:19, 167:25, 170:9, 172:1, 173:22, 174:12, 174:20, 175:9, 175:18, 175:26, 176:4, 180:8 CAPTAIN [13] - 95:1, 111:24, 115:1, 117:14, 138:20, 152:14, 155:23, 162:26, 167:14, 175:23, 181:11, 181:16, 181:22 CAPTAIN [3] - 95:8, 118:15, 168:14 CAPTURE [1] - 70:8 CAR [5] - 10:15, 10:28, 26:19, 104:3, 104:11 CARBON [17] - 55:17, 55:18, 61:3, 61:5, 61:15, 61:19, 62:7, 62:19, 62:25, 62:29, 64:1, 64:2, 68:25, 69:21, 71:14, 127:5, 141:13 CARBONISATI ON [1] - 69:1 CARBONISING [1] - 70:13 CARBONLESS [7] - 62:22, 62:25, 146:19, 147:6, 147:27, 174:6, 174:18 CARDBOARD [3] - 61:21, 127:3, 127:6 CAREERS [1] - 95:10 CAREFULLY [2] - 68:7, 104:6 CARRIED [1] - 68:28 CARRY [1] - 63:19 CARS [2] - 10:29, 11:2 CASCADE [1] - 141:26 CASCADES [1] - 140:25 CASCADING [1]
---	---	--	---	--	---

- 32:24 CASE ^[11] - 19:27, 21:29, 32:14, 69:21, 88:21, 108:6, 121:13, 129:19, 139:1, 143:12 CASES ^[2] - 6:19, 129:18 CASSETTE ^[2] - 144:25, 144:26 CAST ^[2] - 30:29, 137:19 CATCH ^[1] - 166:13 CAUSED ^[1] - 14:15 CAUTIOUS ^[2] - 14:9, 82:4 CAVEAT ^[1] - 160:20 CAVEATING ^[1] - 78:19 CEASED ^[1] - 51:24 CEASEFIRE ^[1] - 157:20 CELL ^[1] - 7:20 CELL ^[61] - 5:19, 6:15, 6:21, 7:8, 7:26, 27:21, 28:6, 28:10, 28:18, 28:28, 28:29, 29:7, 29:8, 29:20, 29:26, 30:10, 30:15, 30:25, 38:7, 40:29, 41:1, 46:19, 51:23, 78:6, 86:28, 90:23, 92:16, 96:19, 96:28, 97:4, 97:8, 98:5, 98:19, 98:21, 100:14, 101:15, 101:17, 101:29, 104:27, 107:3, 107:5, 115:16, 134:3, 134:4, 134:23, 151:9, 153:5, 153:15, 153:19, 153:22, 154:6, 154:15, 169:19, 169:24, 170:7, 170:9, 170:12, 171:5, 176:26, 177:15, 179:18 CELL.. ^[1] - 31:8 CELLS ^[1] - 96:26	CELLS ^[3] - 5:4, 5:10, 41:29 CENTRE ^[5] - 12:13, 15:18, 15:21, 16:27 CENTRE ^[4] - 10:7, 157:18, 176:21, 178:28 CENTRES ^[1] - 13:15 CERTAIN ^[9] - 6:18, 14:12, 24:15, 53:12, 55:26, 81:17, 87:21, 157:13, 165:18 CERTAINLY ^[13] - 8:9, 11:27, 38:25, 61:4, 72:8, 74:25, 79:4, 86:20, 99:15, 107:8, 119:21, 130:20, 162:10 CERTAINTY ^[1] - 93:6 CETERA ^[9] - 9:7, 11:3, 13:16, 21:16, 22:13, 39:19, 71:11, 75:7, 79:6 CHAIR ^[1] - 116:10 CHAIRMAN ^[1] - 73:18 CHAIRMAN ^[8] - 68:27, 70:10, 71:28, 107:25, 152:17, 175:21, 177:6, 179:6 CHAIRMAN ^[60] - 11:5, 11:17, 27:26, 44:18, 44:23, 44:26, 45:1, 45:4, 45:7, 45:11, 45:15, 47:3, 50:26, 51:2, 51:6, 51:10, 62:21, 65:8, 68:19, 68:22, 68:25, 69:3, 75:17, 94:13, 94:21, 94:25, 95:4, 113:6, 113:8, 113:17, 116:18, 116:26, 117:17, 130:18, 138:11, 138:17, 140:26, 146:14, 146:17, 146:22, 146:26, 146:29,	147:4, 147:18, 148:8, 149:1, 150:5, 154:11, 154:19, 154:22, 154:25, 154:29, 155:2, 155:19, 165:26, 166:29, 167:8, 167:11, 180:9, 180:14 CHANCE ^[1] - 72:6 CHANGE ^[3] - 39:19, 103:19, 116:28 CHANGED ^[4] - 64:6, 68:1, 102:20, 157:24 CHANGES ^[5] - 64:3, 143:8, 143:25, 173:4, 173:5 CHANGING ^[1] - 77:12 CHANNEL ^[1] - 136:2 CHAPTER ^[1] - 14:1 CHARGE ^[7] - 66:22, 105:2, 105:28, 111:15, 112:6, 119:17, 125:13 CHARGED ^[1] - 79:2 CHATTER ^[2] - 136:12, 136:16 CHECK ^[8] - 5:26, 5:27, 9:6, 11:6, 46:21, 77:25, 90:8, 94:11 CHECKED ^[6] - 21:2, 40:7, 41:19, 72:1, 73:16, 101:4 CHECKING ^[2] - 10:10, 41:19 CHECKLIST ^[1] - 18:24 CHECKPOINTS ^[1] - 98:1 CHRONOLOGICAL ^[4] - 5:8, 45:20, 45:21, 172:8 CHRONOLOGICAL ^[1] - 44:7 CIRCUMSTANCES ^[9] - 69:2, 75:11, 83:3,	83:29, 116:19, 149:28, 162:14, 165:27, 166:27 CITY ^[2] - 12:13, 13:15 CIVILIAN ^[3] - 14:16, 95:13, 96:12 CLAM ^[1] - 68:6 CLARIFY ^[2] - 90:2, 146:15 CLARITY ^[2] - 28:27, 90:12 CLASS ^[1] - 106:22 CLASSIC ^[1] - 80:8 CLASSIFICATION ^[4] - 49:5, 133:14, 134:14, 134:17 CLEAR ^[39] - 11:9, 11:28, 14:19, 20:16, 21:9, 22:28, 24:5, 26:4, 39:10, 44:18, 45:23, 52:29, 75:17, 91:1, 93:2, 93:5, 93:29, 97:11, 107:26, 112:13, 113:17, 113:22, 115:18, 135:9, 135:11, 138:6, 152:5, 153:2, 154:5, 154:13, 155:27, 160:18, 161:7, 161:19, 164:6, 164:25, 177:25, 178:27, 180:1 CLEARANCE ^[11] - 22:2, 22:7, 22:15, 25:6, 41:22, 69:29, 83:16, 84:9, 125:8, 156:6, 161:9 CLEARED ^[6] - 151:19, 161:3, 161:11, 161:12, 161:16, 164:26 CLEARER ^[3] - 104:9, 105:12, 175:11 CLEARING ^[8] - 17:14, 21:19, 25:10, 75:4, 82:10, 151:17, 176:21	CLEARLY ^[5] - 18:12, 81:16, 151:21, 154:13, 177:19 CLICK ^[1] - 146:3 CLIENT ^[1] - 152:11 CLOCK ^[1] - 138:8 CLOGGING ^[1] - 82:7 CLOGHER ^[1] - 156:29 CLOSE ^[4] - 99:11, 101:14, 102:8, 137:27 CLOSELY ^[1] - 31:21 CLOSER ^[1] - 104:5 CLOTHING ^[1] - 77:6 CO ^[3] - 33:14, 69:13, 171:2 CO'S ^[1] - 119:28 COAT ^[1] - 77:6 CODE ^[3] - 31:17, 114:9, 114:10 CODED ^[3] - 114:2, 114:5 CODEWORD ^[8] - 22:23, 32:21, 38:21, 91:20, 140:17, 154:3, 155:12, 157:9 COLIN ^[1] - 3:11 COLLATE ^[3] - 96:21, 101:2, 135:8 COLLATED ^[2] - 43:7, 96:23 COLLATION ^[1] - 97:27 COLLATOR ^[3] - 7:2, 28:22, 42:13 COLLECTED ^[1] - 28:25 COLLECTING ^[2] - 10:21, 10:28 COLLECTION ^[1] - 6:6 COLONEL ^[18] - 3:11, 3:14, 11:6, 44:3, 44:19, 47:4, 62:22, 64:29, 69:4, 73:28, 79:23, 81:4,	94:12, 94:14, 115:19, 120:14, 124:21, 165:1 COLONEL ^[6] - 51:13, 65:10, 73:25, 81:1, 90:15, 181:4 COLOUR ^[3] - 19:23, 19:25, 107:28 COLOUR ^[5] - 50:17, 51:24, 131:25, 131:28, 132:3 COLUMN ^[24] - 36:23, 36:28, 43:22, 44:5, 44:20, 44:21, 44:23, 45:21, 45:26, 45:27, 49:13, 49:20, 49:24, 49:26, 76:7, 85:11, 106:18, 106:20, 131:3, 140:1, 140:19, 140:25, 141:27, 147:4 COLUMNS ^[3] - 36:2, 44:19, 108:13 COMFORTABLE ^[3] - 161:8, 175:7, 175:10 COMING ^[13] - 24:25, 45:29, 51:4, 67:21, 77:2, 82:7, 97:28, 136:25, 141:14, 144:21, 145:29, 166:4 COMMAND ^[2] - 126:2, 126:4 COMMAND ^[10] - 3:5, 3:12, 4:25, 33:10, 34:20, 119:28, 119:29, 120:3, 121:11, 126:2 COMMANDED ^[2] - 3:8, 3:9 COMMANDER ^[4] - 17:25, 23:21, 84:6 COMMANDER ^[3] - 3:10, 32:19, 168:6 COMMANDER'S ^[2] - 10:4, 14:18 COMMANDER ^[3] - 119:26,
---	---	---	--	---	--

126:4, 126:8 COMMANDER S [3] - 126:5, 126:6 COMMANDING [1] - 56:8 COMMANDING [11] - 3:13, 3:14, 4:26, 33:15, 96:26, 121:12, 121:20, 126:4, 137:10, 158:20, 172:23 COMMENCE [1] - 180:11 COMMENDED [1] - 155:29 COMMENT [4] - 46:23, 47:17, 151:1, 157:20 COMMENT/ ELEMENT [1] - 46:23 COMMENTS [1] - 67:1 COMMERCIAL [2] - 37:23, 170:22 COMMISSIONE D [4] - 7:5, 8:4, 95:20, 118:7 COMMON [10] - 61:14, 91:18, 142:13, 143:9, 143:21, 144:1, 144:6, 144:14, 147:1, 148:17 COMMONLY [2] - 70:12, 126:29 COMMOTION [1] - 146:2 COMMUNAL [1] - 126:25 COMMUNICAT E [1] - 136:20 COMMUNICAT ED [2] - 150:18, 150:25 COMMUNICATI ON [3] - 92:21, 126:10, 165:10 COMMUNICATI ONS [15] - 5:27, 8:8, 8:18, 8:19, 8:20, 78:15, 83:15, 84:1, 88:27, 89:5, 89:13, 127:24, 136:13, 162:20, 163:20 COMMUNICATI	ONS [3] - 163:4, 163:14, 163:18 COMPANY [19] - 4:24, 10:14, 32:17, 32:19, 33:7, 56:10, 118:20, 118:21, 118:22, 125:2, 125:15, 125:23, 126:5, 128:22, 140:21, 140:22 COMPANY [2] - 118:26, 125:14 COMPARE [3] - 11:1, 60:1, 60:11 COMPARISON [1] - 114:20 COMPASS [1] - 74:19 COMPILED [1] - 173:10 COMPLETE [7] - 46:4, 46:12, 96:8, 129:15, 129:17, 131:4, 166:9 COMPLETED [8] - 43:3, 44:16, 46:2, 99:20, 108:5, 129:19, 133:22, 168:3 COMPLETELY [3] - 6:17, 73:2, 92:9 COMPLEXITY [1] - 66:10 COMPONENTS [1] - 3:17 COMPUTER [5] - 97:29, 98:26, 99:16, 99:23, 99:24 CONCEAL [3] - 64:24, 111:9, 111:17 CONCERN [18] - 38:25, 56:15, 57:10, 84:17, 111:4, 111:13, 112:7, 112:10, 112:16, 112:17, 112:18, 150:9, 151:19, 157:22, 160:1, 160:2, 161:4, 175:6 CONCERNING [1] - 66:17 CONCLUDE [3] - 109:12, 124:7, 142:16 CONCLUSION	S [1] - 142:13 CONDITIONS [1] - 112:26 CONDUCT [4] - 3:24, 23:5, 25:6, 156:10 CONDUCTED [5] - 10:16, 12:20, 12:26, 71:10, 158:3 CONDUCTING [1] - 23:3 CONFIDENCE [3] - 62:18, 63:6, 166:28 CONFIRM [12] - 20:16, 20:19, 21:9, 24:5, 32:20, 58:21, 58:27, 68:14, 81:6, 81:9, 87:6, 122:24 CONFIRMATIO N [15] - 21:12, 21:17, 21:28, 21:29, 22:7, 22:20, 22:21, 22:24, 22:27, 23:8, 23:9, 34:7, 123:16, 161:7 CONFIRMED [2] - 22:9, 161:11 CONFIRMING [1] - 17:14 CONFLATION [1] - 71:5 CONFUSED [2] - 77:21, 114:8 CONFUSING [2] - 95:14, 114:8 CONFUSION [2] - 114:10, 114:11 CONJUNCTIO N [1] - 172:22 CONNECTEDL Y [1] - 48:29 CONSCIOUS [2] - 111:9, 166:17 CONSENT [3] - 99:7, 99:8, 117:20 CONSIDER [2] - 19:17, 60:23 CONSIDERATI ON [1] - 124:5 CONSIDERED [3] - 82:22, 82:29, 150:28 CONSIDERING [1] - 35:10 CONSISTED [1]	- 4:20 CONSISTENT [10] - 26:28, 50:13, 52:15, 52:21, 64:23, 108:14, 114:18, 146:9, 147:8, 178:18 CONSISTENTL Y [1] - 146:9 CONSTABLE [2] - 110:13, 114:22 CONSTANT [1] - 14:14 CONTACT [6] - 79:19, 153:22, 158:15, 159:1, 159:4, 159:18 CONTACTED [1] - 159:18 CONTAIN [1] - 177:13 CONTAINED [3] - 22:23, 91:27, 178:7 CONTAINING [3] - 19:3, 25:29, 26:19 CONTAINS [4] - 58:23, 58:27, 58:28, 59:5 CONTEMPLAT E [1] - 113:19 CONTEMPORA NEOUS [8] - 8:15, 44:10, 45:18, 130:9, 143:13, 148:26, 150:1, 177:16 CONTEMPORA NEOUSLY [4] - 129:28, 143:10, 148:18, 148:23 CONTEND [1] - 85:16 CONTENT [5] - 20:25, 88:5, 92:13, 111:22, 155:17 CONTENTS [2] - 65:22, 112:4 CONTEXT [4] - 20:19, 46:18, 59:15, 76:2 CONTIGUOUS [4] - 139:17, 139:19, 139:20, 139:21 CONTINUATIO N [2] - 103:29,	104:1 CONTINUE [8] - 27:8, 92:20, 97:27, 130:16, 132:7, 132:27, 133:6, 145:3 CONTINUED [2] - 51:13, 138:20 CONTINUED [1] - 22:8 CONTINUES [2] - 10:12, 103:26 CONTINUING [2] - 38:3, 77:8 CONTINUITY [1] - 20:1 CONTINUOUS [1] - 80:5 CONTINUOUS LY [1] - 145:11 CONTRAST [2] - 60:1, 60:11 CONTRIBUTE [1] - 89:22 CONTRIBUTIO N [1] - 36:29 CONTROL [1] - 126:2 CONTROL [16] - 17:9, 20:16, 21:10, 21:22, 22:5, 23:1, 23:25, 23:26, 23:28, 24:5, 30:22, 34:20, 78:20, 84:5, 119:26, 122:7 CONTROLLIN G [4] - 23:28, 23:29, 24:1 CONVENIENT [1] - 138:10 CONVENTION [1] - 132:11 CONVENTION AL [1] - 132:7 CONVERSATI ON [4] - 89:22, 134:27, 136:26, 155:10 CONVERSATI ONS [1] - 145:21 CONVERTED [1] - 53:22 COOKE [3] - 131:7, 131:27, 131:28 COOKSTOWN [2] - 42:3, 42:6 COORDINATE	[1] - 84:5 COORDINATIN G [1] - 27:4 COORDINATIO N [1] - 164:24 COPIES [12] - 61:3, 61:26, 64:2, 128:14, 146:19, 146:23, 147:8, 174:6, 174:18, 174:22, 174:26, 176:2 COPY [30] - 35:20, 55:17, 55:18, 61:2, 61:5, 61:6, 61:10, 61:14, 61:26, 62:7, 62:9, 62:19, 62:28, 64:1, 68:25, 70:17, 70:20, 71:13, 71:14, 71:24, 141:13, 141:16, 144:17, 146:18, 147:6, 147:28, 173:1, 174:27, 175:1 CORD [1] - 136:9 CORDON [9] - 20:16, 21:9, 21:21, 22:5, 22:29, 24:5, 83:17, 83:23, 162:4 CORDONING [1] - 161:17 CORDONS [1] - 156:6 CORE [2] - 38:26, 111:21 CORE [1] - 165:13 CORNER [9] - 35:22, 53:6, 69:18, 130:28, 131:21, 133:1, 138:26, 139:6, 142:1 CORPORAL [1] - 41:17 CORPORAL [16] - 7:6, 7:12, 40:21, 42:13, 43:5, 65:15, 90:23, 91:26, 92:5, 111:6, 135:16, 136:24, 137:1, 153:4, 155:7 CORPORATE
---	--	--	---	--	--

[3] - 59:1, 77:13, 120:14 CORRECT ^[124] - 3:22, 3:28, 4:2, 4:9, 7:28, 8:16, 9:17, 14:28, 15:17, 15:19, 15:24, 16:23, 16:25, 18:7, 19:2, 19:12, 19:24, 20:9, 20:21, 21:1, 21:5, 21:8, 21:25, 23:18, 24:3, 26:21, 27:1, 27:12, 29:12, 31:12, 31:18, 31:27, 32:9, 32:27, 33:3, 33:18, 33:23, 35:21, 35:24, 35:28, 36:9, 36:13, 36:15, 37:1, 37:4, 38:16, 41:7, 41:14, 42:16, 44:17, 44:22, 46:7, 46:10, 48:17, 48:20, 48:28, 49:9, 49:23, 49:28, 50:6, 50:9, 50:10, 50:12, 51:21, 51:27, 52:20, 53:5, 53:18, 54:11, 54:24, 54:27, 55:1, 56:14, 56:24, 58:15, 58:21, 59:2, 62:2, 63:3, 64:9, 65:29, 66:4, 66:7, 70:27, 72:3, 74:3, 77:20, 77:23, 77:26, 81:22, 81:25, 90:29, 91:4, 92:18, 92:23, 92:26, 93:1, 93:23, 94:5, 95:18, 95:22, 96:13, 97:7, 106:19, 106:28, 107:11, 108:1, 114:24, 118:16, 124:27, 128:12, 132:15, 157:28, 158:9, 158:27, 159:13, 167:25, 167:27, 168:7, 174:3, 176:13, 176:14, 178:7 CORRECTED ^[1] - 72:4	CORRECTION ^[1] - 140:28 CORRECTLY ^[6] - 48:22, 71:14, 74:3, 92:19, 144:13, 154:12 CORRESPOND S ^[1] - 172:5 CORRIDOR ^[2] - 6:18, 101:16 COUGARNET ^[2] - 135:29, 136:2 COUNSEL ^[1] - 152:11 COUNTER ^[3] - 3:27, 3:29, 55:23 COUNTER-TERRORISM ^[2] - 3:27, 3:29 COUNTERING ^[2] - 4:6, 27:9 COUNTY ^[3] - 3:6, 37:17, 75:29 COUPLE ^[5] - 37:7, 39:16, 152:23, 153:10, 171:20 COUPLED ^[1] - 152:3 COURSE ^[21] - 5:17, 6:21, 12:1, 12:28, 14:5, 14:27, 27:24, 37:26, 44:20, 83:26, 91:15, 104:2, 126:12, 133:27, 134:27, 137:21, 146:16, 155:9, 157:24, 160:25, 167:18 COURTHOUSE ^[16] - 31:16, 38:20, 91:19, 151:16, 151:17, 151:19, 151:24, 152:2, 161:10, 161:16, 164:23, 176:22, 177:26, 178:26, 178:28 COURTHOUSE ^[1] - 122:23 COURTS ^[1] - 102:12 COVER ^[8] - 68:23, 80:12, 80:17, 87:23, 88:7, 153:6, 171:14 COVERING ^[1] - 35:25	COVERS ^[2] - 35:23, 80:25 COVERT ^[1] - 88:22 COVERTLY ^[1] - 99:13 CREATE ^[4] - 21:19, 22:15, 26:4, 64:18 CREATED ^[5] - 43:13, 53:29, 54:7, 54:21, 61:27 CREATING ^[4] - 23:11, 42:26, 54:2, 150:1 CREDIBLE ^[1] - 40:2 CREDITING ^[1] - 106:14 CRIBS ^[1] - 18:17 CRIES ^[1] - 152:5 CRITICAL ^[6] - 5:21, 5:29, 105:3, 117:3, 137:9, 160:14 CRITICISE ^[2] - 155:27, 161:20 CRITICISM ^[1] - 105:7 CROP ^[1] - 105:9 CROSS ^[1] - 147:29 CROSSED ^[1] - 63:14 CROSSING ^[1] - 62:11 CRUCIAL ^[1] - 73:7 CS ^[2] - 32:22, 37:15 CS ^[3] - 20:27, 23:23, 41:22 CT ^[1] - 3:24 CUE ^[1] - 143:7 CULVERT ^[1] - 122:10 CURRENT ^[3] - 116:25, 128:27, 178:22 CURTAILED ^[1] - 42:18 CUT ^[2] - 36:23, 127:21 CYCLE ^[1] - 118:12	D DAILY ^[71] - 4:27, 4:29, 5:1, 5:15, 6:3, 6:9, 7:1, 7:13, 9:1, 9:27, 12:18, 27:25, 29:5, 30:11, 30:20, 30:27, 31:4, 34:23, 35:14, 35:18, 35:26, 38:6, 43:1, 43:20, 46:17, 47:20, 52:5, 52:16, 56:16, 56:27, 57:3, 65:14, 65:15, 65:18, 66:17, 67:16, 68:16, 71:8, 72:1, 72:14, 72:17, 72:28, 75:19, 75:20, 75:21, 76:4, 77:3, 91:17, 93:12, 93:25, 94:1, 94:3, 99:21, 100:10, 101:5, 101:7, 102:27, 109:7, 110:27, 112:5, 134:8, 150:12, 152:18, 153:3, 153:11, 169:18, 169:21, 176:11, 178:19, 179:25, 180:1 DAILY ^[1] - 5:2 DANGER ^[8] - 24:11, 25:4, 25:9, 25:10, 25:11, 26:9, 75:3, 75:5 DARKER ^[1] - 138:27 DATA ^[2] - 104:27, 130:9 DATABASE ^[3] - 47:13, 99:28, 128:29 DATE ^[17] - 7:17, 35:22, 36:6, 43:27, 43:28, 43:29, 44:20, 44:23, 45:1, 45:6, 49:7, 52:27, 60:7, 65:16, 118:11, 130:28, 132:12 DATED ^[5] - 4:12, 104:2, 150:2, 167:22, 172:18 DATING ^[2] -	19:23, 19:25 DAVID ^[2] - 3:14, 33:15 DAYS ^[1] - 132:5 DAY-TO-DAY ^[2] - 136:11, 136:16 DAYS ^[5] - 26:27, 62:16, 125:7, 129:1, 144:25 DCI ^[2] - 166:4, 180:13 DE ^[6] - 94:25, 116:18, 138:17, 146:15, 147:7, 167:6 DE ^[33] - 94:26, 95:2, 95:6, 114:26, 116:8, 116:12, 116:19, 116:27, 117:15, 117:18, 130:12, 130:20, 138:9, 138:13, 138:18, 138:21, 138:23, 140:27, 146:16, 147:27, 148:14, 149:8, 150:7, 152:9, 155:15, 155:20, 162:24, 165:24, 165:27, 166:24, 166:26, 181:12, 181:17 DEAL ^[9] - 18:10, 18:11, 23:5, 27:2, 33:20, 54:15, 95:19, 116:22, 163:22 DEALING ^[14] - 3:2, 19:3, 19:8, 20:7, 35:11, 58:14, 60:20, 63:26, 83:26, 93:18, 149:28, 158:16, 165:12, 175:27 DEALS ^[2] - 35:8, 75:15 DEALT ^[3] - 29:28, 44:28, 92:14 DEBRIEF ^[2] - 98:5, 98:6 DECEMBER ^[2] - 3:6, 118:7 DECIDED ^[3] - 131:16, 175:10, 177:26 DECISION ^[16] -	18:17, 53:27, 54:17, 58:7, 63:25, 75:10, 84:7, 111:16, 111:28, 126:9, 127:25, 145:5, 145:8, 158:2, 172:21 DECISION-MAKING ^[4] - 18:17, 58:7, 75:10, 126:9 DECISIONS ^[2] - 59:22, 120:4 DECOMMISSIONED ^[1] - 15:15 DECREASES ^[1] - 16:11 DEDICATED ^[1] - 54:8 DEEMED ^[1] - 125:3 DEFENCE ^[1] - 12:21 DEFENCE ^[2] - 58:29, 74:11 DEFENSIVE ^[1] - 13:9 DEFINE ^[1] - 89:17 DEFINITELY ^[7] - 13:3, 14:18, 67:29, 69:20, 69:28, 98:29, 171:21 DEGREE ^[5] - 48:5, 62:18, 63:6, 150:11, 162:17 DELIBERATE ^[3] - 111:8, 125:2, 125:6 DELIBERATELY ^[1] - 122:5 DELINEATION ^[1] - 10:4 DELIVER ^[4] - 14:10, 16:2, 47:16, 118:24 DELIVERY ^[1] - 14:22 DENOTES ^[2] - 29:19, 31:13 DEPARTURE ^[1] - 9:19 DEPENDED ^[1] - 159:26 DEPENDENT ^[1] - 25:15 DEPLOY ^[16] - 24:13, 32:11,
---	---	--	--	---	---

33:5, 33:12, 34:11, 82:1, 92:29, 120:4, 122:28, 123:10, 123:11, 124:13, 124:20, 127:26, 162:5, 163:25 DEPLOYED [13] - 18:3, 24:17, 24:22, 26:18, 34:12, 73:1, 81:23, 122:22, 123:2, 157:17, 161:3, 176:5, 178:27 DEPLOYING [2] - 17:22, 124:5 DEPLOYMENT [3] - 15:1, 97:18, 157:23 DEPLOYMENT S [1] - 168:3 DEPUTY [1] - 3:10 DESCRIBE [7] - 57:26, 77:14, 77:18, 77:23, 80:2, 101:10, 128:8 DESCRIBED [16] - 4:8, 7:12, 12:3, 26:16, 57:11, 58:16, 63:7, 77:15, 96:29, 97:28, 114:7, 125:29, 134:7, 137:22, 145:12, 148:24 DESCRIBES [3] - 79:28, 100:12 DESCRIBING [6] - 36:3, 58:9, 58:17, 59:20, 62:28, 123:22 DESCRIPTION [3] - 8:1, 9:3, 36:11 DESIGNATION S [1] - 11:8 DESK [7] - 127:10, 127:18, 128:15, 128:24, 135:25, 135:27, 136:4 DETACHMENT [5] - 15:14, 15:22, 15:28, 16:16, 17:5 DETAIL [1] - 179:18	DETAIL [13] - 5:28, 9:5, 9:9, 27:24, 45:2, 49:22, 51:4, 151:11, 176:26, 177:13, 177:14, 178:7, 179:26 DETAILS [10] - 7:19, 24:25, 36:10, 44:20, 44:26, 45:12, 104:1, 153:29, 169:14, 171:27 DETECT [1] - 74:19 DETECTED [1] - 74:5 DETECTION [3] - 15:9, 25:21, 74:15 DETONATED [7] - 102:17, 107:5, 107:7, 122:15, 169:5, 169:16, 173:11 DETONATES [1] - 122:13 DETONATION [4] - 17:5, 54:10, 102:6, 109:18 DEVELOP [1] - 53:15 DEVELOPED [9] - 18:21, 31:11, 40:1, 78:7, 78:27, 78:28, 78:29, 79:4, 79:9 DEVELOPING [4] - 14:27, 34:4, 34:19, 87:17 DEVELOPS [2] - 52:23, 52:29 DEVICE [26] - 19:18, 23:6, 24:1, 25:15, 25:16, 74:8, 77:5, 121:28, 121:29, 122:2, 122:12, 122:13, 122:24, 122:27, 123:14, 123:16, 123:20, 123:26, 124:2, 151:22, 160:8, 160:9, 160:12, 160:28, 161:18 DEVICES [10] - 37:12, 37:22, 39:5, 76:1, 121:23, 121:24, 122:4, 123:2,	124:8, 170:22 DIALOGUE [1] - 33:1 DIANA [1] - 118:11 DIFFERENCE [5] - 13:22, 14:17, 25:14, 34:8, 68:12 DIFFERENCES [1] - 71:20 DIFFERENT [47] - 3:3, 5:12, 5:25, 9:3, 16:11, 18:22, 18:23, 20:24, 28:4, 38:8, 41:24, 43:25, 43:26, 43:27, 44:19, 46:24, 58:9, 62:12, 64:14, 68:2, 68:9, 68:13, 68:18, 68:22, 69:5, 77:4, 79:19, 92:9, 95:10, 97:10, 104:15, 107:19, 107:20, 107:27, 108:20, 109:2, 110:21, 113:10, 128:10, 129:19, 136:2, 139:28, 152:6, 156:22, 162:8 DIFFERENTIAT E [1] - 13:22 DIFFICULT [5] - 42:23, 52:9, 75:24, 137:11, 162:13 DIFFICULTY [2] - 87:15, 105:5 DIFFUSING [2] - 15:10, 25:14 DIGESTED [1] - 85:6 DIGIT [1] - 53:7 DIGITALLY [1] - 141:4 DIRECT [3] - 25:2, 81:24, 92:21 DIRECTED [1] - 161:21 DIRECTION [4] - 13:21, 14:9, 31:25, 164:24 DIRECTIONS [1] - 162:1 DIRECTLY [8] - 72:21, 78:1, 110:17, 114:4,	121:8, 121:11, 121:19, 125:1 DIRTY [1] - 129:11 DISCERN [1] - 42:23 DISCLOSED [4] - 66:3, 72:20, 150:23, 151:11 DISCOVERED [1] - 66:1 DISCOVERY [1] - 20:13 DISCREPANCY [2] - 86:3, 86:4 DISCUSSED [1] - 82:22 DISCUSSING [2] - 120:10, 150:16 DISCUSSION [4] - 92:27, 109:16, 109:20, 179:29 DISPATCHING [1] - 136:27 DISPOSAL [1] - 15:28 DISPOSAL [5] - 19:9, 19:15, 75:7, 75:8, 160:3 DISRUPTION [2] - 14:7, 77:7 DISSEMINATIO N [2] - 93:22, 103:22 DISSIDENT [5] - 4:6, 37:21, 38:2, 77:9, 170:20 DISTANCE [2] - 21:19, 107:4 DISTANCES [1] - 83:16 DISTINCT [1] - 79:5 DISTINCTION [1] - 56:26 DISTINCTIONS [1] - 95:14 DIVERSION [1] - 15:2 DIVIDED [1] - 156:24 DOCUMENT [42] - 18:5, 19:28, 20:6, 20:20, 20:22, 28:4, 32:3, 42:8, 45:17, 49:2, 53:19, 58:23, 58:27, 58:28, 59:4, 60:13, 61:14, 70:8,	70:15, 77:20, 84:14, 84:20, 100:11, 101:1, 104:25, 126:25, 130:25, 131:8, 141:1, 141:3, 149:27, 149:29, 150:3, 152:22, 152:23, 171:24, 172:20, 172:26, 177:4, 177:16, 178:9 DOCUMENTAT ION [5] - 6:27, 18:19, 27:17, 71:18, 111:8 DOCUMENTS [14] - 19:3, 66:10, 70:6, 70:12, 79:5, 100:2, 100:7, 130:13, 141:14, 143:2, 143:5, 149:23, 149:25, 174:14 DOG [9] - 122:9, 122:27, 123:11, 123:15, 123:23, 124:5, 124:13, 124:26, 125:4 DOGS [5] - 121:1, 122:22, 122:25, 124:23, 125:8 DONE [19] - 19:7, 24:21, 26:6, 34:1, 47:16, 48:12, 81:22, 83:18, 89:26, 93:11, 129:2, 134:8, 159:14, 161:14, 161:15, 172:6, 175:14, 175:29, 177:18 DOOR [2] - 170:10, 170:11 DOUBLE [5] - 5:8, 70:25, 118:20, 126:1, 155:8 DOUBLE- HATTED [1] - 126:1 DOUBT [6] - 11:12, 40:23, 61:13, 89:24, 109:14, 136:3 DOWN [44] - 6:18, 12:10, 12:23, 16:11, 22:11, 28:10,	28:15, 44:14, 56:5, 61:20, 68:7, 69:10, 75:1, 82:8, 85:20, 85:21, 100:17, 104:4, 106:10, 106:12, 106:15, 106:17, 107:14, 109:11, 111:29, 113:24, 113:28, 123:8, 126:9, 126:13, 126:18, 133:6, 136:10, 136:11, 136:21, 137:8, 140:18, 140:25, 141:26, 149:9, 149:20, 153:7, 166:3 DRAW [6] - 20:10, 47:22, 139:27, 141:29, 142:13, 166:1 DRAWING [4] - 8:27, 91:23, 95:14, 140:5 DRAWN [1] - 140:24 DRESSED [1] - 16:22 DREW [4] - 109:5, 141:20, 172:11, 173:18 DRILL [2] - 20:16, 21:9 DRILLS [1] - 26:11 DRIVE [2] - 16:9, 156:18 DROVE [1] - 102:22 DUE [4] - 5:16, 6:21, 13:21, 27:24 DUFFY [2] - 116:9, 155:20 DUKE [1] - 73:11 DUNGANNON [1] - 41:27 DUPLICATE [1] - 127:14 DURING [12] - 7:9, 14:5, 61:12, 71:17, 91:14, 92:24, 92:27, 109:15, 137:23, 153:9, 171:1 DUTIES [3] - 50:23, 125:29, 164:15 DUTY [2] -
---	---	--	---	---	--

140:19, 158:20 DUTY [20] - 7:2, 7:5, 28:21, 36:16, 36:21, 42:13, 65:28, 66:5, 98:10, 100:15, 101:25, 102:16, 106:26, 119:3, 125:16, 125:19, 125:21, 168:4, 168:24	66:14, 111:9 EGRESS [1] - 72:8 EIGHT [3] - 145:13, 159:10, 168:4 EITHER [19] - 21:12, 25:28, 65:23, 66:22, 71:23, 81:7, 86:5, 87:6, 89:12, 102:5, 103:19, 106:10, 107:23, 122:15, 122:23, 135:5, 148:5, 150:18, 174:27 ELECTRONIC [1] - 32:1 ELEMENT [10] - 19:18, 22:21, 33:9, 46:18, 47:9, 54:1, 55:21, 58:7, 61:10, 64:13 ELEMENTS [5] - 4:22, 4:24, 5:2, 33:10, 71:22 ELSEWHERE [4] - 64:3, 77:15, 113:12, 166:6 ELUCIDATED [1] - 151:9 EMBARK [1] - 117:26 EMERGE [1] - 174:6 EMERGENCY [2] - 122:16, 169:9 END [14] - 33:14, 50:4, 52:24, 80:10, 101:16, 129:19, 129:20, 145:14, 145:24, 146:1, 146:2, 146:8, 147:20 ENDED [1] - 132:10 ENDURING [3] - 7:3, 20:27, 77:7 ENGAGE [1] - 164:19 ENGINES [3] - 16:9, 16:23, 124:21 ENLARGE [8] - 38:12, 49:2, 50:15, 52:1, 52:26, 53:14, 53:24, 93:11 ENORMITY [2] - 71:1, 71:3	ENORMOUS [1] - 57:21 ENSURE [4] - 64:11, 64:21, 113:17, 117:5 ENTAILED [2] - 96:17, 96:18 ENTER [2] - 34:16, 45:12 ENTERED [9] - 28:12, 46:9, 48:2, 72:5, 101:5, 117:23, 129:29, 140:9, 146:27 ENTERING [5] - 21:21, 24:11, 25:9, 43:4, 105:3 ENTIRE [2] - 109:26, 119:11 ENTIRELY [6] - 11:9, 89:18, 100:9, 114:18, 124:24, 149:23 ENTIRETY [1] - 119:10 ENTITIES [1] - 119:28 ENTITLED [1] - 95:12 ENTITY [1] - 139:25 ENTRIES [31] - 7:1, 7:13, 44:10, 58:23, 64:8, 84:16, 87:25, 87:28, 100:22, 103:3, 103:4, 105:29, 108:3, 108:29, 109:4, 129:27, 134:12, 141:11, 142:23, 143:4, 143:21, 144:6, 147:8, 148:8, 148:9, 148:16, 148:22, 172:1, 174:12, 174:23, 175:1 ENTRY [139] - 5:9, 28:8, 28:13, 30:11, 31:4, 36:3, 36:5, 36:8, 38:4, 38:6, 39:16, 40:21, 42:8, 42:19, 43:17, 44:12, 44:24, 44:27, 45:21, 46:2, 46:4, 46:6, 46:11, 46:13, 46:26, 47:4, 47:8, 47:10, 47:26,	47:28, 48:8, 48:12, 49:11, 49:27, 50:4, 50:8, 50:16, 50:21, 51:28, 52:2, 52:3, 52:4, 52:8, 52:15, 52:16, 53:3, 56:20, 56:25, 56:27, 58:24, 58:25, 65:14, 66:16, 66:20, 67:15, 67:16, 69:13, 70:26, 72:10, 75:26, 75:27, 75:28, 76:3, 76:16, 80:1, 84:21, 84:29, 85:20, 85:24, 85:27, 91:7, 91:25, 103:2, 103:5, 103:25, 104:1, 104:3, 104:12, 104:19, 105:10, 105:13, 105:27, 105:29, 107:13, 107:15, 107:17, 107:18, 107:29, 108:6, 108:8, 111:29, 112:3, 112:8, 112:10, 112:14, 112:15, 112:19, 112:23, 113:9, 113:16, 113:21, 130:9, 131:3, 131:4, 131:13, 131:23, 132:16, 132:29, 133:18, 137:20, 137:24, 138:24, 140:13, 140:14, 140:25, 141:25, 147:28, 148:21, 151:2, 152:27, 154:16, 154:26, 169:18, 170:13, 170:15, 170:19, 171:28, 172:14, 173:13, 176:18, 177:7, 178:1, 179:9, 179:16 ENVELOPE [1] - 103:19 ENVIRONMEN T [2] - 24:2, 67:13 ENVIRONMEN TS [1] - 5:9 ENVISAGE [3] - 113:6, 113:22, 123:29	EOD [6] - 19:11, 19:13, 19:20, 20:7, 20:16, 22:25 EQUALLY [1] - 13:4 EQUIPMENT [8] - 16:22, 16:23, 25:17, 25:29, 26:19, 74:15, 87:20, 135:28 EQUIPPED [1] - 25:28 ERROL [1] - 90:23 ERROR [3] - 27:27, 45:10, 92:13 ESCALATE [1] - 155:13 ESPECIALLY [2] - 120:23, 120:25 ESSENCE [1] - 24:28 ESSENTIAL [1] - 21:3 ESSENTIALLY [5] - 3:17, 20:29, 67:3, 78:22, 157:27 ESTABLISH [2] - 22:3, 162:29 ESTABLISHED [3] - 34:21, 120:15, 162:20 ESTABLISHIN G [1] - 21:21 ET [9] - 9:7, 11:2, 13:15, 21:16, 22:13, 39:19, 71:11, 75:7, 79:6 ETB [1] - 41:24 EVACUATE [1] - 25:5 EVACUATION [1] - 164:19 EVENT [23] - 5:6, 5:11, 9:9, 24:13, 47:27, 48:4, 48:5, 48:11, 49:20, 55:2, 67:21, 101:17, 106:2, 106:11, 106:18, 119:22, 122:12, 143:13, 143:28, 146:6, 149:24, 157:7, 162:21	EVENTS [41] - 4:10, 5:7, 5:21, 5:23, 6:3, 8:11, 9:19, 18:18, 18:23, 22:18, 27:14, 28:14, 28:24, 29:28, 30:23, 30:28, 31:26, 34:6, 35:11, 39:18, 42:18, 43:6, 67:10, 67:25, 74:25, 78:4, 83:26, 85:7, 92:14, 104:16, 104:18, 104:21, 129:29, 137:22, 143:3, 145:27, 147:2, 147:4, 147:29, 157:24 EVENTUALLY [1] - 83:21 EVERYWHERE [1] - 73:16 EVIDENCE [31] - 9:18, 26:14, 40:4, 40:10, 43:18, 53:15, 54:13, 59:5, 74:1, 74:4, 85:22, 100:8, 105:26, 107:19, 115:7, 115:19, 116:22, 117:24, 120:13, 120:19, 152:24, 157:26, 162:9, 164:13, 169:25, 169:27, 172:4, 173:9, 174:4, 174:29, 175:5 EVIDENCE [1] - 32:1 EVIDENT [3] - 30:7, 135:2, 157:29 EVIDENTIAL [2] - 59:10, 80:20 EVIDENTLY [2] - 147:21, 159:3 EVOCATIVELY [1] - 124:20 EVOLVING [1] - 89:19 EXACT [5] - 7:19, 19:26, 23:6, 65:16, 145:27 EXACTLY [19] - 14:12, 17:1, 20:3, 21:16, 24:9, 26:13, 35:5,
E					
E.G [1] - 20:13 E10 [1] - 11:8 E10A [1] - 9:28 EARLY [7] - 34:19, 116:21, 119:23, 154:4, 160:10, 160:11, 160:14 EASIEST [1] - 130:1 EASILY [3] - 39:19, 42:27, 43:11 EAST [1] - 41:25 EASY [1] - 38:24 EAVESDROPPING [1] - 99:14 ECHO [1] - 10:3 ECHOES [1] - 164:29 EDWIN [1] - 118:2 EFFECT [9] - 14:10, 14:22, 17:16, 71:3, 119:1, 120:18, 147:9, 150:5, 165:10 EFFECTING [1] - 126:10 EFFECTIVELY [20] - 16:12, 16:20, 24:10, 27:5, 28:20, 34:14, 38:9, 53:29, 74:14, 76:5, 76:16, 76:27, 77:24, 98:20, 111:9, 119:16, 123:15, 143:17, 150:1, 174:5 EFFICACY [2] - 165:10, 165:17 EFFORT [2] -					

37:13, 48:23, 67:21, 103:16, 127:9, 128:23, 135:19, 141:11, 143:20, 144:8, 156:20, 161:15 EXAMINATION [3] - 29:13, 68:26, 68:27 EXAMINE [1] - 26:8 EXAMINED [1] - 86:24 EXAMPLE [8] - 81:28, 101:4, 121:10, 122:9, 125:19, 147:2, 157:8, 157:17 EXAMPLES [3] - 5:15, 75:23, 77:2 EXECUTED [2] - 156:27, 158:2 EXECUTIVE [1] - 8:9 EXERCISE [1] - 68:29 EXIST [2] - 72:24, 80:24 EXISTED [10] - 18:17, 21:7, 23:14, 35:4, 61:12, 89:17, 136:15, 157:3, 162:14, 169:21 EXISTENCE [5] - 86:27, 149:18, 152:21, 163:7, 165:6 EXISTING [1] - 64:12 EXISTS [2] - 61:11, 70:11 EXPAND [2] - 17:24, 105:11 EXPECT [23] - 6:13, 8:13, 9:8, 29:10, 54:17, 66:6, 82:10, 99:20, 100:23, 100:24, 100:27, 101:22, 105:29, 106:16, 123:13, 131:11, 131:17, 131:22, 132:8, 158:21, 158:28, 162:2, 180:12 EXPECTATION [6] - 45:17, 106:4, 106:6, 122:13, 144:8, 145:2	EXPECTATION S [1] - 103:11 EXPECTED [18] - 6:22, 6:28, 7:13, 9:16, 29:6, 59:23, 59:25, 101:20, 106:26, 108:4, 112:3, 112:23, 113:2, 113:4, 113:20, 149:12, 152:7, 160:26 EXPECTING [1] - 166:20 EXPENSIVE [1] - 61:13 EXPERIENCE [11] - 7:23, 25:28, 48:24, 68:10, 83:10, 108:10, 108:23, 108:28, 109:3, 131:10, 156:24 EXPERIENCED [2] - 56:16, 83:25 EXPERT [3] - 26:13, 74:22 EXPERTISE [2] - 26:16, 39:25 EXPLAIN [12] - 4:18, 5:17, 21:10, 37:6, 55:9, 67:2, 86:3, 88:1, 134:25, 135:15, 151:5, 171:17 EXPLAINED [5] - 23:14, 80:21, 146:18, 146:22, 146:26 EXPLAINING [5] - 11:6, 11:9, 92:15, 100:7, 109:1 EXPLAINS [1] - 4:28 EXPLANATION [13] - 32:5, 40:3, 41:21, 56:3, 56:20, 57:3, 57:19, 59:3, 71:19, 71:23, 84:12, 179:5 EXPLANATION S [3] - 39:1, 39:10, 44:6 EXPLANATOR Y [1] - 36:6 EXPLICIT [1] - 14:19 EXPLODED [1] - 42:14	EXPLORE [2] - 57:13, 61:24 EXPLORED [1] - 57:15 EXPLORING [2] - 110:1, 115:27 EXPLOSION [18] - 15:7, 20:13, 24:18, 24:23, 33:20, 34:2, 34:5, 34:13, 35:8, 44:8, 80:3, 113:29, 122:15, 123:25, 150:20, 151:25, 151:27, 152:1 EXPLOSIVE [8] - 19:8, 19:15, 19:17, 23:6, 75:6, 123:17, 123:20, 160:12 EXPLOSIVES [1] - 123:19 EXPOSE [1] - 71:25 EXPRESS [5] - 25:19, 26:1, 56:15, 87:4, 151:14 EXPRESSED [2] - 90:4, 111:13 EXTENSIVE [1] - 72:27 EXTENT [2] - 14:15, 42:21 EXTRA [6] - 70:2, 82:12, 159:16, 160:17, 161:25 EXTRACT [1] - 153:3 EXTRACTED [2] - 60:22, 61:7 EXTREMELY [4] - 12:15, 61:13, 63:26, 81:28 EYE [1] - 130:18 EYES [4] - 88:2, 88:7, 161:25	FACT [26] - 16:16, 18:11, 23:18, 34:1, 35:15, 39:26, 54:9, 64:20, 66:2, 71:2, 71:23, 77:9, 81:7, 85:17, 91:24, 106:12, 107:1, 111:9, 113:24, 117:26, 136:18, 141:11, 147:24, 149:19, 155:28, 176:1 FACTORS [1] - 59:17 FACTS [1] - 151:12 FADES [1] - 96:19 FAINTER [1] - 141:3 FAINTLY [2] - 61:29, 62:4 FAINTNESS [1] - 141:9 FAIR [10] - 11:26, 33:6, 53:23, 57:9, 68:8, 69:20, 98:15, 162:12, 168:22, 174:1 FAIRLY [3] - 73:7, 135:11, 163:17 FAIRNESS [1] - 179:7 FALL [1] - 141:10 FALLIBILITIES [1] - 145:28 FALLS [1] - 83:22 FAMILIAR [5] - 126:15, 126:27, 141:15, 144:27, 149:22 FAMILIARISE [2] - 105:13, 130:24 FAMILIARITY [1] - 108:4 FAMILIES [2] - 24:15, 67:2 FAR [14] - 28:28, 39:10, 52:15, 52:21, 56:23, 66:28, 78:14, 78:23, 79:12, 91:28, 102:2, 105:6, 113:20	FASHIONED [1] - 145:12 FAULT [2] - 28:26, 129:14 FBL [1] - 180:12 FEATURE [2] - 140:28, 141:10 FEATURES [6] - 139:27, 141:19, 143:1, 143:9, 143:29, 146:23 FED [1] - 76:18 FEE [2] - 165:25, 180:4 FEE.. [1] - 116:14 FELT [3] - 148:3, 160:28, 162:19 FERMANAGH [1] - 156:28 FEW [8] - 96:15, 102:3, 129:1, 130:5, 163:17, 169:23, 169:26, 175:26 FILE [3] - 60:16, 60:22, 61:7 FILL [2] - 30:26, 48:15 FILLED [7] - 30:20, 48:14, 108:18, 109:9, 129:21, 133:19, 134:7 FILLING [2] - 43:12, 84:26 FINAL [11] - 36:23, 52:9, 53:7, 56:13, 79:21, 132:5, 141:29, 150:5, 171:23, 175:2, 178:9 FINALLY [7] - 72:26, 116:13, 129:26, 150:7, 173:22, 179:6, 180:7 FINE [1] - 176:17 FINISH [1] - 46:5 FIRE [1] - 77:6 FIRST [79] - 4:5, 11:27, 18:15, 20:23, 27:17, 28:5, 28:8, 28:14, 29:16, 30:18, 32:2, 36:1, 43:23, 44:4, 45:26, 53:3, 56:20, 56:25, 58:21, 60:14, 65:13, 71:1, 73:7,	73:29, 76:1, 77:26, 79:26, 80:1, 90:18, 92:12, 92:15, 93:2, 95:7, 95:20, 101:8, 102:5, 102:16, 102:19, 103:5, 103:23, 105:9, 105:26, 107:12, 107:28, 108:12, 108:13, 110:5, 111:22, 118:8, 122:1, 122:4, 123:9, 127:4, 131:23, 132:1, 132:2, 135:14, 137:12, 139:10, 140:1, 142:7, 151:2, 151:7, 152:22, 153:10, 153:28, 154:14, 154:16, 154:26, 158:26, 159:17, 163:7, 170:15, 171:12, 171:17, 171:19, 172:20, 173:8, 177:3 FIRSTLY [6] - 76:3, 97:15, 123:5, 143:4, 143:20, 150:12 FIT [1] - 124:23 FITS [2] - 44:7, 117:5 FIVE [8] - 16:10, 91:6, 91:24, 92:6, 107:10, 145:13, 166:10, 166:13 FLAT [1] - 83:6 FLICK [1] - 18:25 FLIGHT [2] - 118:28, 166:13 FLIMSY [1] - 61:2 FLOATING [1] - 75:18 FLOODING [1] - 82:5 FLOOR [1] - 102:20 FLOW [1] - 57:24 FLOWED [1] - 78:20 FLY [1] - 33:28 FOCUS [10] - 8:26, 58:2, 59:27, 59:28, 69:4,
---	---	---	--	---	---

105:25, 109:25, 109:27, 110:4, 144:6 FOCUSED [2] - 60:17, 108:8 FOCUSING [2] - 58:3, 58:6 FOLDER [4] - 120:8, 128:24, 129:13, 139:16 FOLDING [1] - 129:10 FOLLOW [15] - 18:25, 18:26, 54:22, 57:2, 59:4, 64:7, 64:27, 74:27, 92:4, 99:13, 104:11, 111:27, 142:23, 156:12, 172:29 FOLLOWED [4] - 42:29, 86:24, 137:21, 147:12 FOLLOWING [13] - 17:23, 33:20, 51:29, 68:19, 80:2, 92:21, 109:16, 133:3, 133:4, 144:19, 147:21, 156:1, 173:26 FOLLOWINGS [1] - 54:3 FOLLOWS [3] - 29:17, 47:18, 101:28 FOLLOWS [18] - 51:8, 51:14, 65:11, 73:26, 81:2, 90:16, 94:23, 95:2, 111:25, 115:2, 117:15, 138:15, 138:21, 152:15, 155:24, 162:27, 167:15, 175:24 FONT [1] - 20:25 FOOTHILLS [1] - 135:3 FOR [1] - 94:23 FORCE [5] - 17:21, 32:12, 33:26, 55:14, 83:25 FORCE [6] - 55:12, 55:13, 124:17, 140:2, 159:9, 161:23 FORCES [3] - 23:3, 122:6,	127:26 FORENSIC [1] - 85:10 FORGET [1] - 99:23 FORGIVE [4] - 99:23, 115:28, 131:26, 165:9 FORM [8] - 39:29, 40:20, 80:18, 99:19, 124:3, 126:24, 156:12, 174:5 FORMAL [8] - 79:8, 79:9, 87:10, 87:15, 87:19, 89:9, 90:27, 159:24 FORMALISED [2] - 78:24, 89:15 FORMAT [3] - 38:9, 126:29, 162:13 FORMATION [1] - 49:6 FORMATTING [1] - 20:24 FORMED [2] - 40:13, 64:12 FORMER [1] - 115:4 FORMER [32] - 94:27, 95:16, 95:19, 96:16, 111:15, 113:18, 116:16, 116:20, 116:24, 116:29, 117:19, 117:21, 130:24, 134:4, 136:22, 138:23, 150:7, 152:9, 165:28, 166:5, 166:12, 167:4, 167:5, 167:17, 167:18, 167:25, 172:1, 173:22, 174:11, 174:20, 175:18, 180:7 FORMER [13] - 95:1, 111:24, 115:1, 117:14, 138:20, 152:14, 155:23, 162:26, 167:14, 175:23, 181:11, 181:16, 181:22 FORMS [1] - 144:13 FORMULAIC [1] - 16:7	FORWARD [7] - 20:22, 23:27, 25:6, 90:3, 103:24, 103:28, 105:8 FOUR [9] - 4:21, 20:27, 21:24, 21:26, 23:16, 23:23, 41:22, 118:12, 159:10 FOUR- MONTHLY [1] - 118:12 FOURSQUARE [1] - 151:1 FOURTH [1] - 4:23 FOX [3] - 114:27, 155:16, 166:26 FRAMED [1] - 28:8 FRANKLY [1] - 109:24 FRANTIC [1] - 152:5 FRESH [6] - 54:7, 57:21, 63:25, 63:26, 129:22, 132:1 FRICTION [10] - 40:17, 43:15, 59:14, 67:4, 67:7, 67:18, 67:29, 70:29, 71:6, 84:6 FRIDAY [8] - 120:23, 120:25, 156:12, 156:17, 156:21, 157:21, 165:4, 165:9 FRIEND [1] - 166:16 FROED [1] - 134:28 FRONT [6] - 88:7, 102:13, 135:28, 149:4, 153:6 FULL [3] - 107:9, 118:1, 159:1 FULLY [1] - 18:12 FUNCTION [7] - 97:25, 104:26, 125:16, 125:28, 126:3, 136:14, 149:29 FUNCTIONALI TY [2] - 9:10, 9:11	FURTHER [2] - 90:15, 181:9 FUTURE [1] - 94:17 G GAINED [1] - 99:8 GAP [6] - 44:9, 44:15, 46:8, 47:21, 48:14, 109:8 GATHER [1] - 80:20 GATHERING [2] - 88:22, 98:9 GAZELLE [2] - 33:28, 151:26 GDA [1] - 12:21 GEAR [1] - 102:21 GENERAL [11] - 37:29, 52:18, 55:4, 60:20, 93:21, 94:7, 98:8, 103:13, 103:18, 103:22, 120:28 GENERALITY [1] - 129:26 GENERALLY [8] - 12:7, 17:22, 74:18, 76:26, 98:17, 109:4, 127:29, 133:16 GENERIC [3] - 37:8, 38:1, 77:1 GENTLEMAN [1] - 117:11 GEOGRAPHIC AL [1] - 38:5 GETAWAY [1] - 157:13 GIRLFRIEND [2] - 102:14, 102:15 GIVEN [43] - 11:8, 16:7, 22:4, 23:7, 23:11, 32:4, 32:20, 42:23, 42:25, 43:16, 43:21, 43:24, 43:25, 49:7, 49:8, 49:13, 54:25, 55:11, 56:19, 57:3, 59:7, 72:8, 87:8, 112:27, 114:3, 115:9, 115:21, 120:14, 122:3, 124:5,	137:14, 137:16, 137:29, 138:3, 138:25, 139:4, 140:17, 143:10, 152:8, 153:29, 157:9, 174:20, 175:3 GOC [1] - 14:19 GORTIN [1] - 15:16 GOVERNING [1] - 81:19 GRADUATED [1] - 16:6 GRANTED [1] - 83:20 GRATEFUL [3] - 116:14, 136:17, 167:2 GREANEY [7] - 11:5, 50:26, 51:10, 67:1, 70:7, 75:2, 83:9 GREANEY [23] - 11:26, 28:1, 45:16, 47:22, 50:24, 50:29, 51:3, 51:11, 51:14, 51:16, 63:4, 64:29, 73:19, 80:27, 84:15, 90:6, 90:16, 90:18, 94:11, 94:14, 111:20, 181:5, 181:9 GREAT [2] - 13:15, 84:4 GREENCASTL E [2] - 9:29, 10:16 GRID [4] - 151:27, 151:29, 162:4 GRIM [1] - 67:13 GROUND [19] - 6:3, 9:13, 10:21, 10:27, 12:21, 14:10, 23:3, 27:7, 55:11, 74:25, 81:10, 81:14, 82:9, 82:28, 83:18, 83:22, 84:1, 163:5, 163:25 GROUND- HOLDING [1] - 27:7 GROUP [19] - 37:21, 96:19, 96:29, 97:20,	114:27, 116:9, 118:27, 118:28, 121:8, 125:1, 125:4, 125:5, 125:17, 125:18, 128:21, 152:12, 155:16, 155:21, 170:21 GROUP [3] - 33:7, 33:8, 33:10 GROUPED [2] - 13:11, 127:25 GROUPS [1] - 77:9 GUARANTEE [1] - 72:27 GUARD [5] - 5:10, 36:20, 55:13, 55:14, 140:1 GUARD [2] - 153:12, 169:22 GUESS [3] - 65:21, 97:9, 108:26 GUESSING [1] - 86:12 GUESTS [1] - 102:11 GUIDANCE [1] - 162:2 GUM [1] - 129:9 GUT [1] - 79:8 H HALF [7] - 69:9, 122:19, 153:1, 176:17, 177:7, 178:10, 179:9 HALFWAY [1] - 129:21 HAND [21] - 35:22, 42:17, 43:6, 53:6, 69:10, 69:12, 69:17, 72:7, 76:7, 85:11, 106:20, 108:17, 130:27, 131:3, 131:21, 133:1, 136:4, 138:26, 139:6, 142:1 HANDED [1] - 59:19 HANDLER [3] - 122:25, 123:20, 123:23 HANDLERS [1] - 124:26
--	---	--	--	--	---

HANDS [2] - 166:18, 171:4 HANDSET [1] - 136:8 HANDWRITING [8] - 41:24, 46:14, 60:24, 107:27, 108:13, 132:24, 132:25, 133:12 HANDWRITING S [1] - 109:2 HANDWRITTE N [3] - 38:9, 43:15, 72:10 HAPPY [3] - 3:4, 4:15, 175:14 HARD [6] - 7:16, 13:3, 21:15, 35:19, 166:10, 166:14 HASTILY [1] - 149:10 HAT [1] - 125:26 HATTED [3] - 118:20, 125:14, 126:1 HAUGHEY [2] - 116:9, 155:21 HAVING [2] - 95:1, 117:14 HAZEL [1] - 180:11 HEAD [1] - 90:25 HEADED [1] - 49:20 HEADING [6] - 100:23, 104:3, 120:28, 131:8, 147:2, 169:3 HEADINGS [1] - 173:1 HEADQUARTERS [1] - 33:9 HEADS [1] - 140:29 HEAR [10] - 22:9, 40:22, 41:9, 41:16, 114:14, 134:24, 135:19, 152:4, 169:21, 180:12 HEARD [21] - 39:3, 68:7, 91:14, 100:25, 101:18, 102:8, 102:9, 105:16, 110:18, 111:6, 111:17, 114:19, 117:19, 120:13, 124:17, 124:20, 125:20,	137:3, 138:5, 152:1, 174:4 HEARING [6] - 9:13, 30:10, 30:24, 39:14, 67:8, 175:5 HEARS [2] - 91:2, 92:17 HEAT [6] - 55:25, 57:8, 59:13, 68:28, 80:14, 80:17 HEIGHT [2] - 13:2, 80:13 HEIGHTENED [2] - 67:27, 116:1 HELD [14] - 22:28, 22:29, 31:7, 32:12, 95:8, 95:17, 111:4, 118:14, 128:19, 129:9, 150:9, 169:24, 171:1 HELICOPTER [3] - 18:23, 33:28, 34:12 HELICOPTERS [1] - 14:20 HELLO [1] - 95:5 HELP [33] - 24:20, 34:15, 40:23, 42:21, 42:22, 49:4, 55:10, 58:19, 78:11, 82:8, 83:4, 84:11, 84:18, 86:27, 97:15, 100:22, 103:9, 104:7, 104:23, 106:4, 107:16, 108:10, 110:6, 120:8, 124:10, 124:22, 126:15, 131:10, 139:9, 143:2, 149:26, 150:11, 164:27 HELPED [1] - 82:12 HELPFUL [11] - 7:22, 12:15, 15:1, 34:22, 56:6, 76:12, 76:25, 81:19, 108:22, 118:3, 135:23 HELPFULLY [1] - 34:17 HELPING [2] - 65:1, 82:4 HENCE [1] -	61:10 HENRY [3] - 90:6, 162:24, 165:24 HENRY [4] - 162:27, 162:29, 165:22, 181:20 HERON [1] - 3:11 HIDE [2] - 66:2, 71:26 HIGH [3] - 12:10, 83:22, 178:26 HIGH [7] - 9:15, 40:17, 59:21, 62:18, 63:6, 67:4, 67:7 HIGHER [1] - 52:28 HIGHEST [1] - 167:7 HIGHLANDER S [1] - 4:23 HIGHLIGHT [7] - 69:8, 69:17, 176:16, 177:5, 177:6, 178:1, 178:10 HIGHLIGHTED [2] - 69:18, 179:10 HIGHLY [4] - 48:10, 67:6, 135:6, 166:8 HIMSELF [2] - 33:17, 134:5 HINDERED [1] - 82:13 HINDERING [2] - 82:5, 84:8 HINDRANCE [1] - 164:28 HINDSIGHT [4] - 82:11, 172:13, 175:12, 176:6 HISTORY [4] - 57:16, 64:24, 111:10, 150:10 HMG [1] - 90:9 HMSO [1] - 153:8 HOAX [1] - 122:2 HOC [3] - 89:16, 89:17, 90:27 HODGSON [14] - 41:16, 94:27, 95:4, 95:16, 95:19, 96:16, 111:15, 113:18, 115:4, 116:17,	116:20, 116:26, 117:19, 170:9 HODGSON [4] - 95:1, 111:24, 115:1, 181:11 HODGSON'S [1] - 134:4 HOLD [4] - 87:7, 107:20, 140:23, 140:29 HOLDING [1] - 27:7 HOLLINSHEAD [1] - 74:10 HOME [1] - 4:25 HONESTLY [2] - 157:20, 169:1 HOPE [6] - 7:24, 39:17, 52:24, 57:1, 66:6, 77:20 HOPED [1] - 51:1 HOPES [1] - 30:28 HOURLY [3] - 47:6, 131:12, 131:18 HOURS [8] - 7:9, 97:23, 98:22, 128:19, 143:16, 143:28, 147:11, 147:13 HQ [5] - 31:13, 38:17, 105:19, 140:17, 179:22 HRS [27] - 33:7, 37:15, 38:14, 42:11, 42:24, 45:3, 45:27, 47:26, 48:9, 52:3, 84:28, 86:1, 90:22, 91:6, 103:27, 104:2, 104:13, 104:14, 104:15, 104:20, 105:17, 107:28, 132:4, 132:19, 132:29, 165:14 HUMAN [3] - 40:17, 59:17, 123:23 HUNDRED [2] - 102:3, 107:4 HUTSON [1] - 180:11 HYPOTHESIS [1] - 48:4 HYPOTHESISI NG [1] - 162:5	I I.E [1] - 134:28 IC [2] - 118:20, 125:15 ICP [2] - 122:7, 122:9 ICS [1] - 125:23 IDEA [8] - 17:14, 25:8, 34:18, 55:19, 82:3, 124:21, 127:23, 135:8 IDENTICAL [2] - 21:3, 60:27 IDENTIFICATIO N [1] - 10:24 IDENTIFIED [9] - 23:6, 25:16, 26:3, 26:10, 40:11, 66:28, 94:17, 142:7, 161:4 IDENTIFY [9] - 19:29, 21:16, 25:12, 26:8, 55:24, 71:14, 72:19, 79:5, 120:28 IDENTIFYING [2] - 58:12, 58:20 IED [5] - 20:12, 20:13, 32:22, 140:17, 160:12 IGNORING [1] - 74:16 ILLUSTRATE [1] - 135:24 ILLUSTRATES [1] - 34:8 ILLUSTRATIO N [1] - 139:3 ILT [1] - 65:24 IMAGINE [16] - 8:21, 16:18, 25:27, 39:14, 60:22, 67:8, 67:23, 71:13, 87:7, 87:8, 89:26, 103:16, 129:9, 135:25, 162:17, 171:5 IMMEDIATE [13] - 16:8, 16:15, 16:20, 17:3, 20:12, 28:20, 33:26, 40:28, 82:27, 109:15, 130:9, 157:23, 161:10	IMMEDIATELY [14] - 16:4, 17:4, 19:6, 24:22, 33:27, 34:11, 47:3, 101:29, 102:18, 129:16, 157:18, 159:15, 160:16, 161:24 IMMINENT [3] - 25:2, 39:12, 39:14 IMPACT [2] - 151:23, 165:5 IMPLIES [1] - 76:15 IMPLY [1] - 76:9 IMPORTANCE [3] - 117:3, 117:27, 167:7 IMPORTANT [17] - 7:18, 9:19, 46:4, 46:17, 54:9, 63:26, 75:5, 127:23, 128:2, 128:16, 130:11, 134:19, 135:3, 136:23, 138:1, 147:24, 167:3 IMPRESSION [3] - 26:17, 61:5, 142:28 IMPRESSIONS [1] - 141:7 IMPRINTED [1] - 63:2 IMPROVE [1] - 136:18 INADVERTENT LY [1] - 159:28 INAPPROPRIA TE [1] - 149:23 INCENDIARIES [1] - 75:16 INCENDIARY [6] - 37:12, 37:18, 37:22, 72:10, 75:29, 77:5 INCHES [1] - 145:13 INCIDENT [46] - 17:9, 20:12, 21:29, 32:13, 54:2, 60:4, 61:8, 63:27, 64:16, 69:14, 69:22, 73:3, 80:4, 86:18, 106:7, 112:29, 119:14, 119:22, 122:6, 134:18, 135:5, 136:17,
---	---	--	---	---	--

139:13, 139:24, 144:9, 145:16, 146:10, 148:22, 149:17, 150:19, 157:10, 160:13, 168:11, 171:10, 171:26, 171:27, 172:21, 172:27, 172:29, 173:10, 173:15, 173:20, 175:3, 177:14, 179:4 INCIDENT [1] - 135:29 INCIDENTS [2] - 60:21, 101:10 INCLUDE [2] - 32:20, 76:14 INCLUDED [5] - 87:19, 91:18, 110:14, 110:16, 176:7 INCLUDING [7] - 10:15, 31:14, 31:20, 38:19, 60:25, 105:21, 110:10 INCOMPLETE [1] - 129:24 INCONSISTEN T [2] - 64:23, 86:21 INCONVENIEN CE [3] - 13:15, 14:11, 14:16 INCORPORAT ED [2] - 31:29, 64:22 INCORRECTLY [1] - 11:18 INCREASED [2] - 16:14, 32:15 INCREMENTAL [1] - 22:21 INCREMENTAL LY [1] - 32:15 INDEED [17] - 15:21, 16:28, 38:4, 38:25, 63:24, 64:29, 70:11, 70:20, 73:18, 94:14, 97:5, 103:4, 111:20, 125:10, 155:14, 159:20, 170:25 INDEPENDENT LY [2] - 86:29, 156:11 INDEX [1] -	181:1 INDICATE [13] - 16:3, 20:2, 21:13, 29:25, 35:1, 57:17, 60:16, 81:14, 94:6, 97:13, 116:27, 140:6, 166:19 INDICATED [3] - 90:6, 112:18, 180:5 INDICATES [7] - 32:2, 37:21, 38:2, 78:18, 130:16, 170:19, 170:20 INDICATING [3] - 62:6, 71:19, 106:5 INDICATION [8] - 32:7, 34:24, 36:19, 71:25, 115:9, 123:19, 133:29, 166:2 INDICATIVE [4] - 62:13, 77:7, 87:17, 179:24 INDIVIDUAL [3] - 44:2, 46:22, 114:13 INFALLIBLE [1] - 59:16 INFANTRY [1] - 3:9 INFANTRY [1] - 74:20 INFER [1] - 21:6 INFERENCE [4] - 154:21, 154:23, 156:22, 156:24 INFILL [1] - 43:10 INFLUENCE [1] - 165:4 INFO [3] - 131:24, 143:26, 178:25 INFORMAL [2] - 78:26, 79:8 INFORMALLY [1] - 78:29 INFORMATION [128] - 5:5, 5:29, 6:1, 6:6, 6:9, 7:7, 8:28, 10:22, 10:28, 28:24, 29:29, 30:12, 30:16, 32:10, 32:23, 32:24, 33:2, 34:25, 39:29, 41:3,	41:25, 41:28, 42:17, 43:19, 46:27, 47:13, 47:14, 47:19, 48:13, 48:16, 49:15, 49:16, 49:18, 49:22, 52:18, 55:6, 65:18, 66:12, 66:14, 66:24, 66:26, 67:9, 67:10, 67:22, 69:23, 70:2, 70:9, 71:6, 71:12, 72:19, 74:23, 76:18, 78:4, 78:13, 78:20, 78:26, 79:6, 80:14, 80:20, 81:13, 83:5, 85:3, 85:6, 86:15, 86:21, 88:21, 90:1, 91:16, 91:27, 92:24, 94:1, 96:23, 99:25, 101:2, 110:15, 111:1, 111:5, 111:17, 113:27, 114:16, 119:25, 126:8, 126:18, 128:18, 130:10, 131:14, 133:28, 134:1, 134:9, 134:21, 134:29, 135:1, 135:9, 135:10, 136:25, 136:27, 137:9, 137:17, 140:11, 140:23, 144:14, 144:16, 144:18, 147:1, 147:5, 148:17, 148:27, 149:10, 150:27, 151:8, 151:10, 152:7, 154:28, 155:4, 155:8, 155:9, 158:2, 158:9, 158:24, 159:28, 163:29, 172:4, 173:19, 175:11, 176:29, 177:18, 179:2 INFORMED [15] - 32:25, 40:24, 41:4, 41:10, 41:13, 56:10, 56:11, 56:13, 76:14, 76:23, 106:21, 106:27, 107:3, 107:6,	134:20 INITIAL [5] - 31:23, 35:2, 36:26, 71:7, 134:1 INITIALS [1] - 49:26 INITIATED [2] - 34:3, 159:4 INITIATIVE [1] - 82:1 INJURED [1] - 161:18 INK [1] - 108:14 INPUT [1] - 83:11 INPUTTED [1] - 43:20 INQ [32] - 4:13, 20:5, 32:2, 35:17, 35:18, 35:29, 49:1, 60:13, 63:17, 72:5, 74:9, 75:14, 77:14, 77:21, 77:22, 77:23, 79:21, 84:15, 87:22, 93:7, 102:29, 130:22, 141:2, 167:23, 170:14, 171:12, 172:19, 176:16, 177:4, 178:10, 178:20, 179:8 INQUIRY [18] - 59:6, 59:20, 65:25, 66:15, 72:17, 72:22, 73:4, 114:1, 135:24, 150:8, 152:24, 160:21, 167:21, 169:29, 171:9, 171:18, 174:4, 174:29 INQUIRY [4] - 51:8, 94:23, 138:15, 180:17 INQUIRY [1] - 165:13 INSERT [1] - 62:25 INSERTED [1] - 61:21 INSERTS [1] - 62:29 INSIDE [1] - 78:17 INSOFAR [1] - 26:17 INSPECTOR [4]	- 69:11, 140:18, 140:19, 177:24 INSTANCE [1] - 153:28 INSTANCES [1] - 70:5 INSTANTANEO US [3] - 46:27, 46:29, 85:9 INSTANTANEO USLY [1] - 47:15 INSTANTLY [1] - 19:18 INSUFFICIENT [1] - 154:28 INT [5] - 37:18, 37:21, 54:26, 88:1, 133:28 INT [22] - 40:24, 100:14, 104:27, 133:29, 134:2, 134:23, 151:9, 153:15, 153:18, 153:19, 153:22, 154:6, 169:24, 170:7, 170:8, 170:9, 170:12, 171:1, 171:4, 176:26, 177:15, 179:18 INTACT [1] - 122:14 INTELLIGENC E [40] - 5:4, 5:5, 5:10, 6:6, 6:11, 7:10, 10:23, 28:22, 37:10, 37:19, 40:8, 41:13, 41:15, 41:29, 44:2, 46:20, 46:28, 54:26, 75:16, 76:5, 76:14, 88:2, 88:7, 88:9, 88:14, 88:20, 88:22, 93:21, 94:7, 95:27, 96:21, 97:27, 98:8, 99:9, 99:28, 100:14, 100:20, 101:18 INTELLIGENC E [56] - 5:19, 6:15, 6:21, 7:8, 7:26, 27:21, 28:6, 28:9, 28:18, 28:28, 28:29, 29:6, 29:8, 29:20, 29:26, 30:10, 30:15, 30:25, 31:7, 37:5, 37:9, 38:7, 40:25,	40:29, 41:1, 41:11, 46:19, 51:23, 76:20, 78:5, 86:28, 90:23, 92:16, 96:3, 96:15, 96:19, 96:26, 96:28, 97:4, 97:8, 98:5, 98:19, 98:21, 101:14, 101:17, 101:29, 106:24, 107:3, 107:5, 115:16, 125:20, 134:3, 134:4, 153:4, 154:15, 169:19 INTELLIGENC E-BASED [1] - 5:5 INTELLIGENC E-GATHERING [1] - 88:22 INTENDED [1] - 26:15 INTENT [2] - 14:18, 89:6 INTENTION [1] - 139:25 INTENTIONED [1] - 4:5 INTENTIONS [1] - 175:15 INTEREST [7] - 11:4, 13:13, 38:25, 43:2, 98:7, 100:13 INTERESTING [2] - 68:26, 68:29 INTERNAL [1] - 171:24 INTERNALLY [1] - 173:7 INTERPRET [1] - 10:1 INTERPRETATI ON [4] - 10:20, 39:19, 107:26, 114:21 INTRODUCED [1] - 96:14 INVESTIGATE [1] - 111:28 INVESTIGATE D [5] - 112:24, 113:5, 113:6, 113:21, 113:23 INVESTIGATIN G [3] - 66:21, 66:23, 150:8 INVESTIGATIO N [4] - 48:6,
--	---	---	--	---	--

112:29, 113:14, 113:26 INVESTIGATION NS ^[1] - 112:27 INVITATION ^[1] - 100:2 INVITE ^[4] - 4:16, 26:23, 65:4, 102:28 INVITED ^[1] - 62:8 INVOLVE ^[1] - 16:4 INVOLVED ^[8] - 12:5, 12:22, 16:21, 17:22, 113:25, 157:6, 160:12, 161:22 INVOLVEMENT ^[2] - 157:23, 177:28 IO ^[2] - 41:13, 125:20 IRA ^[1] - 37:18 IRELAND ^[17] - 14:19, 14:26, 16:1, 18:6, 18:18, 37:23, 37:29, 40:10, 66:18, 93:22, 103:14, 124:27, 126:29, 145:17, 168:3, 168:8, 170:23 IRISH ^[3] - 4:24, 4:25, 35:27 IRRELEVANT ^[1] - 43:17 ISSUE ^[11] - 9:21, 14:25, 52:23, 52:29, 55:9, 73:2, 81:6, 115:5, 115:7, 151:1, 165:12 ISSUES ^[2] - 40:9, 90:12 IT'LL ^[2] - 68:29, 70:20 ITEM ^[1] - 70:16 ITEMS ^[1] - 120:27 ITERATION ^[2] - 20:7, 138:24 ITERATIVE ^[1] - 19:27 ITSELF ^[10] - 4:20, 10:8, 11:13, 36:1, 46:16, 61:8, 81:14, 98:19, 113:16	J JAMES ^[4] - 3:14, 33:15, 79:23, 94:27 JAMES ^[4] - 95:1, 111:24, 115:1, 181:11 JEANS ^[1] - 102:21 JOB ^[3] - 7:14, 23:20, 125:9 JOHN ^[2] - 81:11, 152:11 JOHNSTON ^[3] - 69:11, 140:18, 177:24 JOIN ^[2] - 116:24, 118:5 JOINED ^[1] - 167:25 JOTTED ^[1] - 56:4 JUDGMENT ^[4] - 100:18, 104:28, 127:22, 128:5 JULY ^[1] - 35:23 JUMP ^[1] - 20:22 JUMPED ^[1] - 54:4 JUMPING ^[2] - 3:2, 6:20 JUNCTURE ^[2] - 170:23, 172:15 JUNE ^[1] - 167:22 JUNIOR ^[3] - 7:5, 8:3	180:3, 181:6, 181:13, 181:18, 181:24 KEEN ^[1] - 24:16 KEEP ^[6] - 13:11, 21:20, 23:29, 41:4, 87:22, 130:18 KEEPER ^[3] - 50:20, 60:6, 131:29 KEEPER'S ^[1] - 49:6 KEEPING ^[11] - 5:2, 7:17, 8:17, 8:25, 27:27, 50:7, 59:22, 65:28, 66:5, 80:18, 128:26 KEPT ^[21] - 6:10, 6:14, 6:22, 6:23, 7:26, 8:10, 19:28, 27:21, 27:28, 28:7, 29:6, 29:10, 61:7, 70:17, 72:18, 80:15, 88:13, 128:2, 152:25, 169:19 KEY ^[7] - 3:17, 14:8, 126:18, 127:24, 127:26, 156:4, 158:5 KILLED ^[1] - 118:11 KILOMETRE ^[2] - 15:18, 16:26 KIND ^[4] - 62:7, 62:15, 103:16, 170:28 KINDLY ^[1] - 95:15 KINDS ^[1] - 96:22 KING'S ^[1] - 152:11 KIT ^[1] - 16:9 KNOCK ^[1] - 170:10 KNOWING ^[2] - 25:24, 34:19 KNOWLEDGE ^[4] - 74:20, 79:18, 88:24, 88:26 KNOWN ^[8] - 24:9, 24:28, 43:2, 71:4, 74:6, 74:8, 103:17, 135:29 KNOWS ^[2] - 73:17, 117:19	L LA ^[28] - 94:26, 95:2, 95:6, 114:26, 116:8, 116:12, 116:19, 116:27, 117:15, 117:18, 130:20, 138:13, 138:18, 140:27, 146:16, 147:27, 148:14, 149:8, 150:7, 155:15, 155:20, 162:24, 165:24, 165:27, 166:24, 166:26, 181:12, 181:17 LAB ^[1] - 74:11 LABELLED ^[1] - 135:4 LACK ^[2] - 89:15, 159:23 LANCASHIRE ^[4] - 3:15, 3:20, 73:13, 167:28 LANCASHIRE' S ^[1] - 73:12 LANCE ^[14] - 7:5, 7:12, 40:21, 42:13, 65:15, 90:22, 91:26, 92:5, 111:5, 135:16, 136:24, 136:29, 153:4, 155:6 LAND ^[1] - 33:9 LARGE ^[3] - 4:22, 42:14, 98:15 LARGER ^[6] - 98:18, 98:24, 98:25, 135:27, 170:16, 171:29 LAST ^[18] - 23:8, 73:8, 74:13, 75:26, 85:28, 86:1, 96:12, 107:21, 111:27, 131:3, 131:13, 132:29, 139:5, 154:11, 169:23, 173:22, 175:27 LATE ^[1] - 95:23 LATEST ^[1] - 171:3 LATTER ^[2] - 93:24, 113:16 LAW ^[3] - 114:27, 155:16,	166:26 LAYING ^[1] - 177:27 LE ^[5] - 130:12, 138:9, 138:21, 138:23, 152:9 LEAD ^[1] - 164:26 LEADERSHIP ^[1] - 96:18 LEADING ^[3] - 26:27, 29:28, 67:11 LEARN ^[1] - 171:25 LEARNED ^[2] - 166:16, 172:24 LEAST ^[13] - 39:11, 53:27, 60:16, 63:6, 67:20, 97:20, 97:22, 99:16, 107:10, 108:7, 145:26, 146:5, 161:7 LEAVE ^[10] - 3:12, 42:8, 44:14, 49:29, 96:8, 116:20, 130:18, 136:23, 146:14, 166:13 LED ^[4] - 14:20, 96:23, 156:26, 159:25 LEDGER ^[1] - 149:17 LEFT ^[17] - 5:22, 35:22, 43:6, 44:9, 46:8, 48:14, 69:12, 76:7, 85:11, 108:13, 108:14, 109:8, 109:22, 127:21, 127:22, 131:3, 135:26 LEFT-HAND ^[6] - 35:22, 43:6, 69:12, 76:7, 85:11, 131:3 LEGAL ^[1] - 70:8 LEGIBLE ^[1] - 149:13 LEGITIMATE ^[1] - 108:24 LEND ^[1] - 120:16 LENGTH ^[1] - 174:4 LESSONS ^[1] - 171:25	LETTERS ^[1] - 107:21 LEVEL ^[13] - 5:5, 6:12, 9:15, 14:4, 14:13, 46:24, 76:24, 77:4, 79:19, 88:19, 96:21, 128:23 LIAISING ^[1] - 119:1 LIAISON ^[5] - 82:25, 115:10, 115:12, 115:23, 115:25 LIAISON ^[4] - 79:16, 79:17, 115:29, 116:5 LIEUTENANT ^[3] - 3:13, 79:23, 167:26 LIFE ^[2] - 95:13, 96:12 LIGHT ^[4] - 30:29, 90:18, 108:5, 130:11 LIKELY ^[15] - 10:5, 11:10, 12:6, 15:27, 30:23, 48:10, 67:6, 92:11, 123:25, 131:15, 135:6, 139:24, 157:10, 158:3, 164:21 LIMIT ^[1] - 71:28 LINE ^[14] - 11:18, 17:29, 35:5, 41:1, 43:23, 43:25, 44:4, 56:13, 57:1, 83:19, 85:29, 107:28, 141:11, 141:12 LINES ^[6] - 13:13, 19:16, 26:7, 60:5, 62:11, 78:1 LINKED ^[3] - 6:10, 79:10, 98:1 LINKS ^[1] - 75:26 LISANELLY ^[17] - 12:8, 15:14, 15:15, 21:27, 28:28, 73:2, 82:8, 92:22, 97:2, 101:11, 115:26, 118:8, 118:17, 120:27, 121:4, 121:9, 168:17 LIST ^[3] - 10:15,
	K KANE ^[10] - 65:4, 65:8, 68:20, 73:19, 93:27, 111:22, 113:8, 152:10, 155:15, 175:19 KANE ^[27] - 65:10, 65:13, 68:21, 68:23, 68:26, 69:6, 73:18, 111:24, 111:27, 113:7, 113:16, 113:24, 114:25, 152:15, 152:17, 154:9, 155:4, 155:14, 166:25, 175:21, 175:23, 175:26,				

171:23, 173:3 LISTEN [3] - 88:27, 89:12, 92:20 LISTENED [6] - 79:14, 88:9, 92:9, 92:12, 114:1, 144:19 LISTENING [17] - 6:24, 7:6, 8:18, 8:27, 87:25, 89:22, 90:28, 91:26, 92:6, 99:4, 114:7, 136:12, 148:25, 157:27, 159:22, 159:27, 165:19 LITERALLY [3] - 5:22, 5:26, 19:1 LIVED [1] - 144:28 LIVES [1] - 149:26 LOCAL [2] - 10:2, 13:9 LOCATE [1] - 25:29 LOCATED [9] - 32:22, 73:8, 80:22, 122:25, 123:15, 124:2, 151:20, 160:8, 160:9 LOCATING [1] - 26:19 LOCATION [22] - 6:14, 6:27, 16:13, 22:4, 23:7, 23:10, 25:12, 25:16, 26:3, 30:6, 34:7, 39:13, 42:2, 42:14, 49:17, 56:22, 72:29, 86:14, 97:2, 97:12, 118:27, 169:13 LOCATIONS [20] - 12:12, 17:25, 34:21, 38:5, 40:11, 42:5, 43:21, 44:4, 56:18, 56:22, 56:29, 81:15, 83:17, 83:23, 100:3, 110:22, 122:5, 122:8, 127:26, 150:14 LOG [46] - 5:12, 5:14, 5:16, 5:18, 5:20, 5:25, 6:2,	7:25, 7:29, 9:1, 9:4, 27:20, 27:28, 28:5, 28:7, 28:13, 28:19, 29:9, 29:19, 30:17, 41:5, 47:2, 49:1, 51:17, 56:21, 60:20, 68:15, 68:16, 68:17, 75:19, 91:17, 126:16, 126:19, 126:24, 126:25, 127:20, 139:21, 146:19, 149:12, 172:6, 172:11, 173:23, 173:28, 177:1, 177:8 LOG [68] - 8:13, 8:17, 9:2, 9:4, 9:8, 27:21, 27:23, 29:23, 49:5, 49:6, 50:7, 50:20, 51:19, 53:29, 54:7, 54:18, 54:21, 56:25, 57:21, 58:14, 58:25, 60:6, 60:15, 60:17, 61:2, 61:9, 63:26, 64:7, 64:11, 64:12, 64:21, 64:22, 68:13, 70:24, 71:11, 75:15, 99:19, 100:16, 100:21, 108:9, 108:15, 126:9, 126:13, 126:18, 129:26, 130:8, 131:29, 132:2, 135:10, 139:16, 139:17, 139:24, 141:5, 148:13, 149:4, 149:6, 150:29, 151:26, 158:12, 160:10, 172:7, 174:1, 174:5, 174:12, 175:3, 175:4, 175:11, 177:23 LOGBOOK [4] - 7:17, 39:17, 104:29, 127:27 LOGGED [2] - 9:27, 137:15 LOGGING [2] - 49:16, 99:25 LOGIC [4] - 25:15, 57:2, 57:24, 139:26	LOGS [3] - 67:17, 68:10, 133:17 LOGS [8] - 67:24, 70:6, 75:15, 77:15, 108:4, 152:20, 176:2, 177:3 LONDONDERR Y [1] - 27:3 LOOK [54] - 22:8, 22:10, 27:23, 28:17, 31:21, 38:11, 41:5, 47:18, 53:10, 53:16, 53:20, 53:21, 54:12, 54:18, 54:19, 55:16, 60:25, 62:8, 63:9, 63:19, 69:8, 69:24, 81:5, 81:15, 83:18, 84:20, 85:11, 85:13, 85:17, 85:27, 97:21, 102:27, 108:20, 120:9, 121:23, 123:2, 124:7, 130:12, 130:26, 137:18, 139:28, 141:1, 141:29, 143:1, 158:24, 164:26, 166:19, 171:22, 173:2, 176:15, 177:2, 177:3, 179:6 LOOKED [14] - 42:27, 53:25, 56:19, 60:28, 62:19, 63:18, 72:15, 85:4, 93:12, 110:5, 113:3, 113:7, 142:24, 173:16 LOOKING [23] - 5:15, 45:9, 51:17, 54:16, 58:22, 60:2, 60:12, 62:10, 64:14, 75:18, 78:3, 81:9, 81:10, 81:14, 82:11, 107:17, 110:7, 143:14, 146:17, 172:3, 178:22, 180:4 LOOKS [9] - 35:19, 37:2, 47:29, 53:26, 54:16, 71:14,	85:25, 103:13, 103:15 LOOSELY [1] - 126:2 LOW [8] - 5:5, 6:12, 22:12, 46:23, 76:24, 77:4, 88:19, 96:21 LOW-LEVEL [4] - 5:5, 77:4, 88:19, 96:21 LOWER [1] - 44:14 LUNCH [1] - 94:20 LUNCH [1] - 94:23 M MACMULLEN [10] - 44:19, 51:13, 65:10, 73:25, 81:1, 90:15, 120:14, 124:21, 165:1, 181:4 MAIN [3] - 26:24, 37:6, 135:25 MAINTAIN [1] - 149:12 MAINTAINED [2] - 51:19, 153:4 MAJOR [4] - 81:11, 106:23, 106:25, 107:2 MAJOR [2] - 54:2, 80:3 MAN [1] - 86:14 MANAGE [2] - 14:22, 21:22 MANAGED [1] - 31:7 MANDATED [1] - 172:28 MANDRAULIC [1] - 66:11 MANNING [4] - 8:7, 162:3, 164:15, 164:18 MANPOWER [1] - 82:12 MANUALLY [3] - 25:1, 25:4, 64:1 MAP [2] - 22:18, 128:1 MAPPING [2] - 81:10, 127:28	MARK [2] - 53:27, 127:28 MARKED [5] - 49:10, 104:12, 129:11, 137:24, 147:15 MARKET [1] - 12:23 MARKING [3] - 128:1, 174:21, 174:27 MARKINGS [1] - 174:23 MARKS [1] - 131:23 MARRY [3] - 64:14, 64:17, 64:18 MARTHA [1] - 22:23 MATCH [1] - 172:14 MATERIAL [3] - 23:21, 25:21, 81:10 MATERIALS [3] - 34:24, 35:15, 48:25 MATTER [7] - 25:15, 83:26, 84:16, 96:9, 107:6, 107:24, 113:1 MATTERS [2] - 91:17, 120:5 MAXIMUM [1] - 97:17 MAYHEM [1] - 175:7 MCBRIDE [2] - 116:9, 155:21 MCBURNIE [1] - 152:11 MCCLEARY [3] - 131:25, 131:28, 132:4 MCGOWAN [11] - 114:26, 115:2, 115:4, 116:6, 155:16, 155:17, 155:24, 155:26, 162:22, 181:14, 181:19 MCGUINNESS [2] - 166:4, 180:13 MCLEANIE [2] - 50:18, 51:24 MCMULLEN'S [1] - 115:19 MEAN [31] -	6:18, 12:8, 21:6, 32:11, 32:28, 40:4, 42:25, 45:11, 47:28, 49:14, 53:1, 55:11, 68:12, 68:19, 69:5, 72:7, 79:10, 80:7, 86:12, 86:27, 87:2, 87:3, 89:3, 89:18, 89:24, 108:11, 112:12, 112:13, 115:25, 148:8, 166:11 MEANING [2] - 17:17, 52:12 MEANS [16] - 21:11, 25:12, 29:20, 52:10, 52:11, 52:19, 87:8, 88:23, 97:29, 104:7, 124:18, 133:8, 133:19, 136:20, 139:22, 177:21 MEANS" [2] - 154:17, 177:11 MEANT [1] - 115:18 MEASURE [1] - 157:28 MECHANISM [2] - 13:24, 25:22 MECHANISMS [1] - 89:29 MEDIA [1] - 34:26 MEET [1] - 170:11 MEETINGS [1] - 171:1 MEMBER [2] - 25:26, 97:20 MEMBERS [4] - 7:11, 64:18, 100:14, 100:15 MEMO [2] - 149:4, 149:7 MEMOIRE [1] - 18:6 MEMOIRE [2] - 18:16, 19:1 MEMORANDU M [1] - 79:1 MEMORY [4] - 60:12, 96:19, 97:21, 101:1 MEN [1] - 84:2 MENTION [2] - 151:2, 151:7
---	--	---	--	--	--

MENTIONED ^[10] - 5:14, 9:2, 93:24, 93:28, 126:12, 142:12, 151:7, 155:12, 165:1, 176:4 MESS ^[4] - 102:3, 102:10, 102:13, 102:20 MESSAGE ^[28] - 30:19, 37:8, 37:11, 37:13, 38:1, 38:10, 39:7, 39:14, 39:27, 40:20, 76:6, 76:23, 76:25, 77:1, 91:2, 92:6, 92:9, 92:10, 92:12, 103:6, 103:10, 103:13, 110:15, 158:5, 170:24, 170:27, 171:3, 171:4 MESSAGES ^[3] - 42:29, 88:6, 170:27 METHODS ^[1] - 99:22 METRES ^[1] - 107:4 MICHAEL ^[6] - 117:14, 138:20, 152:14, 155:23, 162:26, 181:16 MICHAEL ^[1] - 118:2 MICROPHONE ^[1] - 9:6 MID ^[1] - 168:12 MIDNIGHT ^[4] - 129:21, 129:22, 131:12, 131:17 MIDWAY ^[1] - 53:26 MIGHT ^[29] - 5:17, 7:29, 22:9, 25:26, 29:25, 40:26, 47:28, 51:3, 55:19, 57:26, 76:29, 78:11, 85:16, 103:11, 105:11, 107:23, 120:11, 123:29, 124:23, 129:5, 129:16, 129:28, 130:15, 135:23, 138:28, 160:12, 175:27, 176:6 MIGHTILY ^[1] -	89:2 MILITARY ^[25] - 3:5, 5:10, 13:25, 16:2, 18:19, 26:27, 26:29, 32:26, 42:2, 42:4, 74:15, 82:12, 82:16, 82:21, 99:1, 118:29, 119:28, 120:16, 120:17, 121:27, 122:3, 135:28, 156:10, 156:22, 165:11 MILLAR ^[5] - 91:8, 91:15, 110:13, 110:29, 114:22 MIND ^[21] - 15:5, 16:26, 64:20, 94:6, 103:10, 104:5, 106:25, 108:2, 114:17, 124:25, 125:6, 128:27, 130:3, 132:29, 134:14, 137:19, 141:8, 145:23, 146:14, 146:15, 175:2 MINDS ^[1] - 140:11 MINE ^[1] - 177:17 MINIMISE ^[1] - 14:10 MINIMUM ^[1] - 97:18 MINISTRY ^[1] - 58:29 MINOR ^[2] - 81:6, 173:5 MINUTE ^[4] - 5:27, 55:9, 113:8, 138:10 MINUTES ^[13] - 16:10, 39:16, 67:19, 81:29, 91:6, 91:24, 92:6, 107:6, 130:5, 159:1, 159:29, 160:7, 166:22 MINUTES' ^[1] - 159:11 MINUTIAE ^[1] - 5:28 MISHEARING ^[1] - 110:28 MISREPRESNTATION ^[1] - 76:21	MISSING ^[2] - 73:5, 73:15 MISTAKE ^[4] - 40:14, 46:13, 57:8, 92:7 MISTAKENLY ^[1] - 85:23 MISUNDERSTANDING ^[3] - 28:1, 40:1, 110:28 MISUNDERSTOOD ^[2] - 39:9, 165:8 MITCHELL ^[1] - 41:17 MOBILE ^[3] - 119:10, 169:2, 178:26 MOD ^[3] - 59:5, 66:6, 115:5 MODD ^[1] - 16:19 MOMENT ^[39] - 3:1, 9:14, 9:20, 11:7, 15:6, 17:18, 23:3, 30:5, 34:23, 40:12, 41:5, 55:25, 57:8, 59:13, 59:28, 67:11, 69:28, 70:3, 74:16, 80:13, 80:14, 80:17, 95:29, 102:25, 109:13, 117:9, 121:26, 134:13, 136:23, 136:24, 138:4, 138:10, 140:9, 140:10, 142:16, 154:9, 154:10, 173:16 MOMENT'S ^[1] - 124:19 MOMENTS ^[1] - 163:17 MONDAY ^[7] - 3:19, 4:5, 14:2, 26:16, 38:3, 77:8, 81:5 MONITOR ^[1] - 14:22 MONITORED ^[1] - 29:21 MONITORING ^[10] - 23:29, 86:29, 87:11, 115:6, 115:9, 115:22, 136:16, 176:26, 177:15,	179:18 MONTGOMER Y ^[6] - 103:28, 105:9, 107:15, 110:4, 130:21, 131:19 MONTHLY ^[1] - 118:12 MONTHS ^[3] - 96:9, 129:1, 168:11 MORNING ^[11] - 12:19, 50:17, 50:21, 99:3, 101:8, 101:9, 115:7, 115:19, 143:17, 147:15, 168:25 MORTAR ^[1] - 10:10 MOST ^[12] - 10:5, 11:14, 18:17, 40:2, 80:11, 92:11, 119:12, 125:18, 127:24, 129:18, 130:4, 157:10 MOVE ^[22] - 11:5, 15:22, 15:25, 16:3, 16:8, 16:13, 16:15, 17:3, 17:4, 17:5, 26:22, 75:13, 96:14, 103:24, 103:28, 105:8, 139:2, 143:6, 148:11, 171:16, 178:9, 178:21 MOVED ^[6] - 28:21, 28:22, 30:14, 30:18, 75:10, 124:10 MOVEMENT ^[3] - 37:15, 96:22, 99:29 MOVEMENT ^[1] - 37:17 MOVEMENTS ^[1] - 83:16 MOVES ^[1] - 141:25 MOVING ^[3] - 16:4, 164:23, 171:7 MR ^[107] - 11:26, 28:1, 45:16, 47:22, 50:24, 50:29, 51:3, 51:11, 51:14, 51:16, 63:4,	64:29, 65:10, 65:13, 68:21, 68:23, 68:26, 69:6, 73:18, 73:19, 73:25, 73:28, 75:20, 80:25, 80:27, 81:1, 81:4, 84:15, 84:16, 90:2, 90:6, 90:16, 90:18, 94:11, 94:14, 94:26, 95:2, 95:6, 111:20, 111:24, 111:27, 113:7, 113:16, 113:24, 114:25, 114:26, 115:2, 115:4, 116:6, 116:8, 116:12, 116:19, 116:27, 117:15, 117:18, 130:12, 130:20, 138:9, 138:13, 138:18, 138:21, 138:23, 140:27, 146:16, 147:27, 148:14, 149:8, 150:7, 152:9, 152:15, 152:17, 154:9, 155:4, 155:14, 155:15, 155:17, 155:20, 155:24, 155:26, 162:22, 162:24, 162:27, 162:29, 165:22, 165:24, 165:27, 166:23, 166:24, 166:25, 166:26, 175:21, 175:23, 175:26, 180:3, 181:5, 181:6, 181:7, 181:8, 181:9, 181:12, 181:13, 181:14, 181:17, 181:18, 181:19, 181:20, 181:24 MS ^[10] - 116:10, 167:3, 167:9, 167:12, 167:14, 167:17, 175:18, 180:4, 180:10, 181:23 MULTIPLE ^[3] - 9:28, 32:14, 126:5 MUSEUM ^[1] - 73:11 MUST ^[5] - 84:27, 107:8, 111:8, 142:24,	148:3 N NAME ^[4] - 49:6, 100:5, 118:1, 124:18 NAMELY ^[7] - 23:25, 39:4, 39:8, 54:9, 57:4, 124:18, 177:14 NAMES ^[2] - 99:24, 100:3 NARRATIVE ^[7] - 9:9, 36:10, 40:20, 48:18, 49:21, 55:5, 75:6 NATURAL ^[2] - 29:25, 30:28 NATURALLY ^[5] - 53:28, 54:3, 54:22, 64:27, 130:5 NATURE ^[1] - 39:12 NAVIGATE ^[2] - 120:8, 147:28 NCO ^[1] - 36:16 NEAR ^[4] - 15:20, 91:18, 148:23, 152:2 NEARER ^[1] - 48:9 NEAREST ^[2] - 15:9, 157:11 NEARLY ^[1] - 94:19 NEAT ^[1] - 149:13 NEATLY ^[1] - 148:13 NECESSARILY ^[15] - 5:6, 8:9, 13:16, 34:21, 43:3, 59:23, 61:18, 73:29, 76:17, 80:11, 82:8, 112:25, 121:19, 125:19, 130:8 NECESSARY ^[3] - 125:3, 140:11, 162:19 NECESSITY ^[1] - 92:28 NEED ^[33] - 4:13, 19:6, 31:21, 31:24, 43:10, 52:22, 52:23,
---	---	--	---	--	--

52:26, 54:15, 55:10, 58:19, 61:18, 69:3, 69:4, 78:1, 83:4, 84:1, 92:4, 94:16, 111:14, 113:17, 128:13, 134:28, 135:13, 137:9, 137:10, 155:17, 162:3, 164:8, 166:11, 170:10, 171:25, 172:25 NEEDED [6] - 81:27, 97:6, 119:1, 136:27, 157:5, 160:29 NEEDS [4] - 58:13, 124:2, 124:3 NEFARIOUS [1] - 87:8 NEIGHBOURIN G [2] - 32:22, 32:25 NET [33] - 6:25, 22:10, 28:10, 28:18, 30:11, 38:14, 38:17, 40:16, 78:5, 78:10, 87:26, 89:22, 90:28, 105:19, 110:9, 110:14, 115:6, 115:22, 134:24, 135:20, 135:29, 136:12, 136:15, 137:3, 157:27, 158:6, 159:22, 159:28, 162:12, 176:27, 177:15, 179:14, 179:18 NET [7] - 8:7, 8:24, 8:26, 52:14, 88:22, 115:9 NETS [1] - 8:22 NETWORK [1] - 29:21 NEVER [8] - 88:19, 152:21, 152:25, 153:8, 153:13, 157:2, 162:7, 180:1 NEW [20] - 50:10, 50:11, 50:22, 53:29, 54:21, 58:13, 58:25, 63:11, 64:7, 64:11, 64:22, 129:23, 129:24, 131:17,	131:22, 132:12, 135:3, 135:6 NEXT [41] - 4:10, 14:13, 15:4, 25:26, 27:13, 35:14, 35:29, 37:25, 38:11, 40:22, 42:19, 48:29, 49:29, 50:8, 50:15, 51:29, 52:22, 70:19, 73:21, 78:22, 79:29, 80:28, 93:10, 94:26, 114:26, 116:8, 131:19, 131:20, 132:8, 132:28, 133:24, 139:3, 140:20, 143:17, 148:12, 148:20, 148:22, 155:15, 162:24, 171:16, 176:24 NILLY [1] - 161:29 NINE [1] - 12:28 NO" [1] - 134:25 NO.1 [4] - 49:10, 50:16, 131:21 NO.2 [3] - 50:21, 51:28, 52:1 NO.3 [1] - 85:12 NO.379 [1] - 37:2 NOBODY [3] - 73:17, 160:27, 161:17 NODS [1] - 90:24 NON [3] - 7:5, 8:4, 150:1 NON- COMMISSIONED [2] - 7:5, 8:4 NON- CONTEMPORANEOUS [1] - 150:1 NONE [2] - 72:16, 72:18 NORMAL [5] - 10:25, 36:21, 80:4, 83:2, 168:20 NORMALISATI ON [2] - 156:19, 161:21 NORMALITY [2] - 4:8, 27:11 NORMALITY" [1] - 4:1	NORMALLY [2] - 20:12, 130:14 NORTH [1] - 76:10 NORTHERN [18] - 14:19, 14:26, 15:29, 18:5, 18:18, 37:23, 37:29, 40:9, 66:18, 76:10, 93:22, 103:14, 124:27, 126:29, 145:17, 168:3, 168:8, 170:22 NORTHERN [1] - 27:10 NOTE [19] - 5:7, 27:27, 29:12, 42:9, 42:20, 59:9, 60:14, 62:25, 71:19, 100:18, 101:10, 103:25, 106:29, 109:6, 122:22, 133:28, 147:26, 153:24, 167:3 NOTEBOOK [3] - 59:11, 61:23, 84:27 NOTED [3] - 42:13, 100:17, 178:19 NOTEPAPER [3] - 148:27, 149:2, 149:3 NOTES [8] - 10:14, 43:15, 130:3, 143:26, 149:16, 149:20, 150:1, 151:15 NOTHING [9] - 35:5, 71:26, 83:27, 89:14, 116:6, 161:6, 165:24, 166:26, 168:6 NOTICE [17] - 15:22, 15:25, 16:3, 16:8, 16:13, 16:15, 16:20, 17:3, 17:4, 124:19, 124:29, 146:3, 146:4, 158:29, 159:11, 160:7, 160:9 NOTICED [1] - 63:5 NOTIFICATION [5] - 29:19, 114:15, 159:26,	160:11, 162:10 NOTIFIED [7] - 29:16, 119:22, 159:15, 161:23, 168:28, 169:11, 169:12 NOTIFY [1] - 120:11 NOTING [2] - 36:11, 100:19 NOTWITHSTA NDING [1] - 103:9 NOVEMBER [3] - 4:12, 27:15, 96:9 NUGENT [4] - 47:11, 85:24, 85:25, 85:28 NUMBER [40] - 12:2, 12:29, 13:20, 36:3, 36:4, 36:5, 39:1, 44:5, 49:8, 49:11, 52:17, 52:27, 53:7, 53:8, 56:18, 57:17, 60:7, 60:21, 63:11, 63:12, 72:6, 77:21, 77:23, 92:2, 92:7, 105:16, 106:20, 107:22, 123:9, 131:2, 131:22, 132:7, 132:12, 132:13, 138:27, 138:29, 139:6, 139:10, 151:12, 172:29 NUMBERING [2] - 129:23, 132:14 NUMBERS [3] - 4:13, 54:16, 164:9	117:27, 163:17 OBTAINED [1] - 92:25 OBVIOUSLY [15] - 9:12, 24:13, 28:9, 31:21, 39:1, 39:22, 44:5, 45:22, 53:11, 58:22, 80:3, 85:12, 87:24, 135:27, 147:1 OC [6] - 32:17, 36:26, 56:8, 140:21, 140:22 OCCASION [3] - 94:15, 97:24, 146:5 OCCASIONS [1] - 163:20 OCCUPIED [2] - 96:5, 97:19 OCCUPY [1] - 122:9 OCCUPYING [4] - 10:9, 97:16, 98:22, 166:17 OCCUR [2] - 130:2, 159:4 OCCURRED [12] - 60:18, 63:23, 67:19, 71:1, 100:27, 104:18, 105:4, 106:2, 106:18, 152:6, 157:8, 158:6 OCCURRENCE [73] - 4:27, 4:29, 5:1, 5:16, 6:4, 6:9, 7:1, 7:14, 9:1, 9:27, 12:19, 27:25, 29:5, 30:11, 30:20, 30:27, 31:4, 34:23, 35:14, 35:18, 35:26, 38:6, 43:1, 43:20, 46:18, 47:20, 52:5, 52:16, 56:17, 56:27, 57:4, 65:14, 65:15, 65:18, 66:17, 67:16, 68:17, 71:8, 72:2, 72:14, 72:17, 72:28, 75:19, 75:20, 75:21, 76:4, 77:3, 91:17, 93:13, 93:25, 94:2, 94:3, 99:21, 100:10, 100:28,	101:6, 101:7, 102:28, 109:8, 110:27, 112:5, 134:8, 150:12, 152:19, 153:3, 153:11, 169:18, 169:22, 170:14, 176:11, 178:19, 179:25, 180:2 OCCURRENCE [6] - 5:3, 36:10, 44:21, 44:26, 45:2, 45:12 OCCURRING [4] - 47:27, 106:13, 126:9, 139:5 OCCURS [1] - 47:5 OCTOBER [1] - 180:17 OCTOBER [3] - 35:23, 40:22, 118:10 OFFICE [2] - 98:16, 98:18 OFFICE [1] - 175:17 OFFICER [26] - 7:5, 7:10, 7:11, 8:3, 8:4, 36:28, 41:8, 41:13, 41:15, 56:8, 66:22, 75:9, 91:8, 95:27, 99:10, 102:14, 112:6, 112:22, 115:29, 116:5, 137:11, 157:2, 158:15, 171:2, 175:9 OFFICER [33] - 3:13, 3:14, 4:26, 15:13, 24:26, 33:15, 41:10, 41:11, 82:26, 96:3, 96:15, 96:26, 106:22, 106:24, 115:10, 115:12, 115:23, 115:25, 118:21, 118:22, 121:11, 121:12, 121:20, 123:27, 125:2, 125:15, 125:20, 126:5, 137:10, 158:20, 158:21, 168:15, 172:23 OFFICERS [11] - 79:16, 79:17, 83:29, 89:23, 98:3, 125:18,
O					
O'CLOCK [6] - 50:17, 94:19, 94:20, 148:21, 166:10, 166:13 OBJECTIVE [1] - 3:23 OBJECTIVES [1] - 4:4 OBLIVIOUS [1] - 137:4 OBSERVE [1] - 31:4 OBSERVED [4] - 51:23, 117:4,					

125:24, 153:18, 163:5, 163:24, 164:22 OFFICERS' [4] - 102:3, 102:10, 102:13, 102:20 OFFICIAL [3] - 157:18, 159:1, 159:25 OFFICIALLY [1] - 159:18 OFTEN [3] - 6:25, 18:8, 169:21 OLD [2] - 5:8, 145:12 OLD- FASHIONED [1] - 145:12 OMA [6] - 55:14, 55:17, 140:2, 140:5, 140:24, 141:21 OMAGH [109] - 3:13, 3:20, 4:18, 10:7, 11:13, 11:23, 12:3, 12:6, 12:14, 12:20, 12:26, 13:17, 13:18, 14:25, 15:10, 15:16, 15:18, 15:21, 16:27, 18:3, 27:6, 27:18, 29:17, 31:14, 31:15, 31:20, 33:5, 34:27, 35:25, 37:28, 38:19, 39:5, 39:9, 39:28, 40:6, 54:10, 54:28, 55:7, 55:15, 55:27, 56:4, 56:18, 56:29, 57:7, 57:18, 58:3, 58:26, 60:15, 60:18, 60:25, 66:19, 66:23, 67:19, 74:29, 75:27, 76:4, 76:14, 76:16, 81:27, 92:3, 93:13, 93:20, 94:1, 94:9, 95:24, 96:9, 99:12, 102:6, 103:1, 103:15, 105:21, 109:17, 110:10, 113:12, 114:12, 118:27, 121:7,	122:23, 122:29, 124:14, 140:6, 141:5, 145:16, 150:15, 151:3, 154:7, 154:16, 154:21, 154:23, 155:3, 156:25, 158:4, 159:17, 160:8, 160:18, 161:26, 163:4, 163:13, 163:18, 168:28, 169:13, 176:20, 178:4, 178:15, 178:27 OMAGH'S [1] - 76:16 ON-SCENE [1] - 17:25 ON-SITE [2] - 17:28, 23:21 ONCE [12] - 23:26, 25:12, 26:5, 34:2, 56:5, 56:25, 74:6, 119:14, 123:14, 129:10, 150:24, 157:29 ONE [93] - 6:27, 6:28, 9:12, 9:20, 12:20, 17:18, 19:23, 19:25, 19:26, 21:26, 30:28, 31:21, 39:2, 39:6, 39:17, 40:28, 44:6, 50:17, 53:26, 54:8, 54:17, 55:26, 57:16, 61:25, 62:6, 63:19, 63:28, 64:2, 64:17, 65:21, 66:6, 70:25, 75:15, 75:22, 75:23, 75:26, 75:28, 76:3, 76:7, 77:13, 78:24, 79:10, 80:8, 81:20, 86:13, 87:6, 88:16, 94:19, 97:9, 97:20, 97:22, 97:24, 98:14, 99:16, 99:27, 101:6, 106:21, 107:13, 113:10, 115:4, 116:2, 120:27, 127:5, 127:17, 128:9, 128:14, 128:15, 128:20,	128:23, 128:26, 129:11, 129:13, 131:26, 132:5, 135:13, 137:25, 139:18, 140:28, 143:14, 143:26, 146:5, 147:16, 151:3, 151:19, 154:9, 160:26, 164:2, 166:3, 171:10, 171:27, 174:7, 177:3 ONE'S [1] - 68:25 ONES [5] - 10:3, 70:22, 111:12, 143:5, 144:1 ONGOING [3] - 97:27, 99:11, 151:19 ONLINE [1] - 32:16 ONWARDS [2] - 16:12, 22:2 OOB [6] - 55:14, 55:18, 140:2, 140:5, 140:24, 141:21 OPEN [5] - 76:13, 81:9, 81:13, 81:16, 88:4 OPENLY [2] - 79:20, 84:1 OPERATE [4] - 21:20, 23:12, 36:20, 157:2 OPERATED [2] - 104:25, 129:27 OPERATING [6] - 8:22, 23:23, 26:29, 81:21, 128:3, 128:28 OPERATION [1] - 18:20 OPERATION [17] - 7:4, 17:27, 23:4, 30:22, 34:4, 58:6, 84:9, 87:17, 89:19, 124:15, 125:2, 125:6, 125:7, 157:21, 160:15, 161:9, 161:14 OPERATIONAL [8] - 58:2, 58:17, 81:7, 83:6, 100:16, 109:26, 109:28, 126:28 OPERATIONAL	LY [1] - 83:24 OPERATIONS [36] - 6:2, 6:16, 7:27, 27:29, 28:7, 29:1, 29:7, 29:11, 29:26, 30:13, 30:15, 30:16, 30:19, 30:25, 33:27, 51:20, 58:6, 59:12, 73:3, 88:13, 101:11, 101:19, 101:21, 101:23, 109:13, 168:15, 168:19, 168:28, 169:9, 169:15, 170:5, 170:6, 170:25, 173:27, 175:8, 175:16 OPERATIONS [13] - 3:6, 3:24, 3:27, 4:21, 8:23, 18:18, 27:5, 58:3, 118:25, 119:1, 123:1, 126:27, 176:5 OPERATIVE [1] - 104:27 OPERATOR [1] - 8:26 OPERATOR'S [2] - 5:25, 9:4 OPINION [1] - 83:11 OPPORTUNITY [7] - 36:29, 84:18, 89:27, 105:12, 130:23, 150:11, 151:5 OPPOSED [5] - 40:14, 60:20, 64:1, 75:4, 157:16 OPS [52] - 5:19, 28:10, 28:22, 29:21, 31:7, 32:17, 33:15, 33:17, 39:13, 39:15, 41:6, 54:26, 69:13, 69:25, 70:6, 71:8, 78:7, 78:10, 80:11, 102:22, 118:21, 118:22, 119:6, 125:2, 125:11, 125:13, 125:15, 125:23, 128:21, 128:22, 128:25, 131:25, 133:15, 134:10,	134:16, 134:23, 135:24, 136:14, 136:15, 137:10, 140:21, 140:22, 144:22, 152:26, 153:19, 158:9, 158:18, 158:21, 158:27, 160:23, 178:25 OPS" [1] - 133:17 OPTIMISM [1] - 166:27 OPTIONS [2] - 57:13, 57:15 ORDER [9] - 91:13, 110:18, 117:1, 117:2, 117:6, 117:25, 117:27, 167:4, 167:9 ORDER [19] - 3:29, 13:11, 24:29, 25:3, 27:1, 27:10, 30:15, 33:22, 34:1, 45:20, 47:13, 61:22, 136:18, 139:16, 139:19, 140:8, 143:3, 156:4, 157:12 ORDERING [1] - 64:26 ORDERS [1] - 26:28 ORDINARILY [5] - 81:23, 95:11, 98:10, 129:27, 166:1 ORDINARY [2] - 25:15, 149:26 ORDNANCE [3] - 19:8, 19:15, 75:6 ORGANISATIO N [1] - 79:20 ORGANISATIO NS [1] - 126:11 ORGANISING [1] - 118:28 ORIGINAL [3] - 70:4, 71:13, 147:17 ORIGINALLY [1] - 34:3 OTHERWISE [6] - 97:13, 135:5, 142:20, 142:27, 161:8, 165:18 OURSELVES [2]	- 92:4, 161:14 OUTCOME [1] - 162:8 OUTLIER [1] - 66:27 OUTSIDE [5] - 16:10, 35:9, 91:14, 102:12, 117:5 OUTSTATION [1] - 76:24 OUTSTATIONS [1] - 42:4 OVERALL [5] - 3:23, 103:18, 105:28, 168:21, 175:3 OVERARCHIN G [1] - 14:9 OVERHEARD [12] - 38:17, 39:7, 39:27, 77:27, 78:5, 105:19, 110:9, 113:9, 176:26, 177:14, 179:14, 179:18 OVERHEARIN G [1] - 114:13 OVERSEEING [1] - 3:5 OVERSIGHT [1] - 96:24 OVERTAKEN [2] - 42:18, 85:7 OVERVIEW [1] - 71:17 OVERWRITING [3] - 53:13, 53:16, 142:20 OVERWRITTE N [3] - 53:8, 53:17, 142:15 OWN [1] - 4:23 OWN [8] - 14:14, 82:1, 125:21, 136:13, 146:15, 154:5, 160:3, 175:6
					P
					P.M [4] - 15:23, 31:26, 50:4, 90:21 PA [2] - 116:9, 155:20 PACKED [1] - 148:2 PADS [2] -

149:4, 149:7 PAGE [98] - 12:25, 18:11, 18:13, 20:5, 20:23, 20:24, 26:23, 27:16, 27:24, 27:25, 32:2, 32:5, 32:6, 33:19, 35:18, 35:29, 36:1, 38:11, 38:13, 42:26, 49:2, 49:4, 49:29, 50:1, 50:10, 50:11, 50:15, 50:16, 51:29, 52:22, 52:26, 53:10, 53:14, 53:20, 53:21, 53:24, 55:17, 60:8, 61:27, 62:1, 63:17, 63:20, 69:7, 69:9, 70:26, 74:10, 74:13, 75:14, 75:24, 75:25, 75:26, 77:16, 79:26, 79:27, 79:29, 80:1, 84:15, 87:23, 88:1, 93:7, 93:10, 93:12, 93:16, 102:29, 103:4, 103:25, 103:26, 103:28, 105:8, 110:4, 120:9, 130:22, 131:19, 132:25, 132:28, 133:24, 134:13, 137:26, 139:3, 139:9, 144:15, 148:14, 148:20, 170:16, 171:12, 171:14, 171:16, 171:17, 171:23, 173:8, 176:17, 177:29 PAGE [1] - 181:2 PAGED [2] - 169:1, 169:2 PAGES [9] - 33:19, 53:26, 63:1, 103:4, 128:9, 174:15, 174:17, 174:21 PAINSTAKING LY [1] - 54:15 PANDEMONIU M [3] - 148:29, 149:16, 150:24 PAPER [9] -	61:15, 61:26, 100:13, 129:2, 149:6, 149:11, 175:14, 175:28, 178:11 PARA [1] - 77:14 PARADE [1] - 27:3 PARAGRAPH [10] - 3:25, 4:16, 4:27, 9:23, 26:25, 27:14, 27:16, 120:10, 159:7, 173:25 PARAGRAPHS [1] - 156:1 PARAMETERS [3] - 72:22, 79:6, 87:21 PARDON [1] - 112:9 PARK [12] - 166:5, 166:12, 166:28, 167:5, 167:17, 167:19, 167:25, 172:1, 173:22, 175:18, 175:26, 180:8 PARK [3] - 9:11, 167:8, 180:14 PARK [3] - 167:14, 175:23, 181:22 PARKED [1] - 10:29 PART [1] - 33:14 PART [20] - 7:18, 20:10, 29:13, 35:9, 40:13, 46:17, 53:25, 64:12, 92:12, 98:8, 99:11, 103:23, 120:7, 124:29, 125:4, 126:10, 152:24, 170:28, 172:9, 175:6 PARTICIPANT S [2] - 38:26, 111:21 PARTICULAR [18] - 6:10, 9:9, 9:11, 23:24, 26:18, 38:28, 40:12, 56:22, 69:9, 84:21, 85:14, 105:13, 109:7, 116:4, 120:7, 128:22, 149:27, 164:16	PARTICULARL Y [4] - 4:22, 121:23, 149:24, 156:11 PARTS [2] - 21:3, 73:4 PASS [5] - 30:18, 39:29, 97:6, 119:27, 175:19 PASSAGE [1] - 126:7 PASSED [13] - 10:22, 34:25, 40:15, 48:13, 49:15, 49:22, 78:6, 80:14, 91:15, 131:17, 138:3, 170:25, 171:5 PASSING [4] - 41:29, 67:9, 71:6, 119:25 PAST [2] - 128:18, 129:1 PASTED [1] - 173:2 PATRICK [2] - 47:11, 85:24 PATROL [11] - 5:22, 9:29, 10:4, 10:14, 10:27, 12:20, 12:21, 98:3, 98:4, 98:8 PATROLLED [1] - 11:14 PATROLLING [15] - 10:7, 11:19, 11:23, 13:4, 13:5, 13:8, 13:23, 13:25, 13:26, 13:27, 14:3, 14:13, 14:15 PATROLLING' S [2] - 13:6, 13:26 PATROLS [18] - 10:2, 10:6, 10:9, 10:21, 11:2, 11:7, 11:10, 11:24, 12:2, 12:25, 13:1, 13:10, 13:18, 14:21, 98:2, 118:25, 119:1, 136:13 PATTERN [1] - 10:26 PAUL [1] - 74:10 PAUSE [8] - 20:6, 53:25, 69:7, 69:17, 79:26,	85:21, 117:7, 130:23 PAUSED [2] - 43:8, 44:13 PC [3] - 91:8, 91:15, 110:29 PEACE [1] - 14:6 PEACEFUL [1] - 156:27 PEEBLES [6] - 117:14, 138:20, 152:14, 155:23, 162:26, 181:16 PEEBLES [35] - 41:9, 50:22, 50:25, 51:26, 55:24, 57:20, 58:12, 60:6, 60:25, 63:10, 63:25, 64:16, 71:10, 116:24, 116:29, 117:17, 117:21, 118:2, 130:24, 132:19, 136:22, 138:23, 146:17, 150:8, 152:9, 155:26, 162:29, 165:3, 165:28, 167:1, 167:5, 174:12, 174:20, 175:9, 176:4 PEN [5] - 44:24, 44:27, 45:25, 107:27, 141:5 PENULTIMATE [1] - 43:24 PEOPLE [32] - 9:28, 14:11, 21:20, 21:21, 22:16, 25:2, 34:11, 36:18, 43:1, 43:25, 59:21, 64:14, 78:11, 82:6, 82:7, 89:4, 96:29, 97:15, 98:23, 100:4, 100:24, 105:2, 106:21, 107:19, 108:29, 112:4, 119:15, 120:5, 120:11, 144:27, 161:29, 164:23 PER [1] - 131:8 PERCEPTION [1] - 59:15 PERFECT [2] - 59:22, 141:16	PERFECTLY [3] - 24:18, 83:14, 83:23 PERFORM [1] - 125:21 PERFORMED [1] - 164:21 PERFORMING [1] - 164:15 PERHAPS [20] - 9:11, 41:19, 42:11, 42:23, 43:26, 50:21, 61:29, 83:12, 87:22, 90:2, 109:1, 112:26, 113:2, 113:5, 116:24, 122:14, 124:20, 153:5, 161:22, 166:27 PERILOUS [1] - 160:26 PERIMETER [1] - 11:24 PERIOD [24] - 3:23, 12:1, 12:28, 16:28, 19:27, 24:23, 32:29, 35:25, 81:29, 85:5, 92:24, 92:27, 109:15, 114:2, 116:4, 119:6, 119:13, 121:7, 130:17, 148:2, 163:11, 163:18, 163:27, 168:2 PERIODS [1] - 68:24 PERMANENT [1] - 115:29 PERMANENTL Y [2] - 7:8, 115:26 PERMISSION [3] - 80:28, 87:5, 111:21 PERMISSIONS [1] - 166:21 PERMITTED [1] - 89:1 PERSON [45] - 6:28, 8:2, 8:6, 8:17, 25:10, 26:9, 30:16, 30:24, 36:3, 36:7, 39:2, 41:6, 44:28, 45:25, 46:25, 49:26, 50:7, 64:15, 75:3, 84:26, 85:13,	85:23, 85:24, 85:28, 87:25, 89:21, 97:22, 97:25, 98:22, 100:23, 101:17, 105:2, 105:27, 105:29, 111:14, 112:22, 112:24, 119:12, 119:16, 134:7, 134:22, 135:15, 153:22, 155:5, 155:6 PERSONALLY [1] - 65:19 PERSONNEL [4] - 122:7, 153:19, 161:13, 178:27 PERSPECTIVE [4] - 100:20, 138:8, 160:22, 161:14 PERTINENT [1] - 172:8 PETER [6] - 51:13, 65:10, 73:25, 81:1, 90:15, 181:4 PHONE [7] - 130:4, 140:22, 158:4, 158:8, 158:14, 158:18, 158:19 PHONED [4] - 154:29, 157:16, 158:25, 162:18 PHONES [1] - 169:2 PHONING [1] - 151:10 PHOTOCOPIE RS [1] - 61:12 PHRASE [1] - 31:19 PHRASEOLOG Y [1] - 129:15 PHYSICAL [3] - 86:17, 97:2, 97:12 PICK [7] - 10:4, 103:29, 141:19, 145:22, 145:24, 159:28, 162:11 PICKED [8] - 11:17, 28:9, 28:18, 29:22, 112:3, 113:5, 113:21, 158:22 PICKING [1] - 83:9 PICTURE [5] -
---	---	--	---	--	---

10:23, 46:29, 96:8, 107:10, 132:17 PIECE ^[14] - 21:17, 23:28, 25:22, 61:15, 61:19, 61:21, 61:26, 76:5, 87:20, 93:16, 93:20, 126:26, 127:6, 134:1 PIECES ^[2] - 175:13, 175:28 PILE ^[1] - 61:9 PINK ^[5] - 174:15, 174:17, 174:22, 174:27, 178:11 PITCHING ^[1] - 83:8 PLACE ^[60] - 5:7, 5:11, 5:22, 6:3, 6:4, 8:5, 8:12, 12:14, 13:9, 13:16, 13:18, 13:19, 14:8, 17:27, 18:18, 21:22, 22:3, 22:4, 22:8, 22:14, 25:8, 30:23, 33:25, 34:13, 35:9, 36:19, 41:22, 47:9, 47:19, 48:1, 48:2, 48:5, 49:21, 55:23, 55:26, 58:8, 59:12, 64:3, 67:26, 69:29, 70:24, 74:26, 75:11, 85:3, 87:11, 89:5, 99:9, 115:11, 115:12, 115:24, 115:25, 116:28, 119:9, 125:8, 127:3, 151:25, 161:9, 162:21, 167:9, 168:20 PLACED ^[13] - 15:22, 15:25, 16:16, 17:3, 31:28, 71:9, 75:8, 122:1, 122:5, 127:9, 127:11, 139:15, 158:14 PLACES ^[7] - 28:5, 38:4, 76:22, 79:17, 94:2, 100:3, 113:10 PLACING ^[1] - 26:9	PLAN ^[1] - 83:24 PLANNED ^[1] - 102:10 PLANNING ^[2] - 118:24, 125:2 PLANS ^[1] - 118:29 PLATE ^[2] - 62:26, 62:29 PLATOON ^[1] - 10:3 PLATOON ^[2] - 126:6, 168:6 PLAY ^[4] - 14:17, 46:17, 110:17, 126:10 PLAYED ^[1] - 91:12 PLAYING ^[5] - 59:17, 102:14, 102:15, 102:18, 110:17 PLUNKETT ^[2] - 85:25, 85:28 PLURAL ^[2] - 66:17, 66:18 POCKET ^[1] - 77:6 POER ^[6] - 94:25, 116:18, 138:17, 146:15, 147:7, 167:6 POER ^[33] - 94:26, 95:2, 95:6, 114:26, 116:8, 116:12, 116:19, 116:27, 117:15, 117:18, 130:12, 130:20, 138:9, 138:13, 138:18, 138:21, 138:23, 140:27, 146:16, 147:27, 148:14, 149:8, 150:7, 152:9, 155:15, 155:20, 162:24, 165:24, 165:27, 166:24, 166:26, 181:12, 181:17 POINT ^[63] - 14:24, 16:12, 17:9, 20:28, 22:2, 22:27, 23:8, 23:9, 23:11, 24:7, 24:9, 26:4, 26:10, 33:14, 34:16, 40:17, 42:18, 58:4, 59:19, 59:20, 66:1, 67:22, 74:13,	75:1, 76:18, 78:18, 80:19, 80:26, 82:2, 84:6, 89:19, 92:11, 93:29, 94:16, 101:5, 107:10, 109:9, 109:18, 115:14, 118:5, 118:20, 119:16, 122:7, 134:22, 135:23, 137:7, 137:16, 146:6, 147:26, 148:4, 148:9, 148:13, 152:4, 154:2, 155:11, 157:29, 162:19, 165:3, 169:3, 171:6, 171:19 POINTING ^[1] - 123:21 POINTS ^[6] - 19:4, 34:20, 59:13, 79:19, 172:8, 177:28 POLICE ^[23] - 8:19, 81:21, 83:12, 83:14, 83:29, 87:7, 89:23, 91:7, 113:1, 113:2, 115:8, 115:21, 121:27, 156:12, 156:26, 159:16, 159:18, 163:25, 164:4, 164:22, 165:7, 165:14, 165:19 POLICE ^[4] - 110:13, 159:22, 162:12, 163:14 POLICEMAN ^[3] - 23:22, 36:21, 88:28 POLICEMAN'S ^[1] - 59:10 POLICEMEN ^[2] - 13:24, 82:9 POLICIES ^[3] - 35:3, 35:5, 78:16 POLICY ^[5] - 17:21, 18:1, 78:15, 123:22, 124:1 POLITICAL ^[1] - 37:17 POOR ^[1] - 129:14 POPE ^[1] - 22:23 POPULATION	^[1] - 14:16 POSE ^[2] - 65:4, 73:22 POSED ^[4] - 24:19, 82:24, 82:26, 164:2 POSITION ^[13] - 8:10, 9:16, 10:8, 21:7, 28:3, 47:23, 48:21, 65:7, 77:10, 81:26, 96:2, 125:17, 145:23 POSITIVE ^[1] - 112:28 POSSESSION ^[3] - 37:22, 75:29, 170:21 POSSIBILITIES ^[9] - 57:23, 58:18, 58:20, 106:9, 109:29, 110:3, 110:6, 111:2, 111:11 POSSIBILITY ^[10] - 39:6, 57:26, 57:27, 57:28, 58:10, 58:17, 106:14, 110:26 POSSIBLE ^[8] - 22:16, 32:24, 84:2, 137:28, 149:18, 157:19, 160:14 POSSIBLY ^[9] - 13:13, 13:20, 41:24, 53:9, 64:15, 82:13, 84:14, 169:22, 177:24 POST ^[8] - 156:11, 156:17, 165:4, 171:10, 172:21, 173:15, 173:20, 179:4 POST- INCIDENT ^[5] - 171:10, 172:21, 173:15, 173:20, 179:4 POSTED ^[1] - 95:23 POSTSCRIPT ^[2] - 143:16, 147:11 POSTULATE ^[1] - 57:22 POSTULATING ^[2] - 44:15, 45:24 POTENTIAL ^[6]	- 37:12, 39:1, 74:19, 83:12, 160:15, 165:4 POTENTIALLY ^[5] - 120:1, 151:22, 160:27, 164:3, 164:10 POWERED ^[2] - 145:14, 145:15 PRACTICALLY ^[1] - 124:1 PRACTICE ^[2] - 78:26, 87:1 PRE ^[2] - 157:20 PRE- CEASEFIRE ^[1] - 157:20 PRE-GOOD ^[1] - 157:20 PRECEDING ^[5] - 104:21, 107:15, 137:20, 137:24, 139:9 PRECISE ^[1] - 129:23 PRECISELY ^[2] - 50:5, 55:3 PREDOMINANTLY ^[4] - 118:24, 119:25, 128:3, 129:1 PREFER ^[1] - 65:6 PREPARATION ^[2] - 71:18, 105:14 PREPARE ^[3] - 77:10, 160:15 PREPARED ^[2] - 31:25, 61:7 PREPAREDNESS ^[1] - 120:18 PREPLANNED ^[2] - 123:1, 124:15 PRESENCE ^[6] - 7:8, 10:25, 12:11, 13:11, 78:17, 121:6 PRESENT ^[7] - 68:28, 116:1, 116:5, 117:18, 121:4, 121:15, 157:3 PRESENTATION ^[1] - 32:1 PRESENTATION ^[1] - 103:10 PRESENTED ^[5] - 65:25, 72:22, 102:23, 109:13, 150:27	PRESS ^[4] - 80:9, 145:2, 145:5, 145:8 PRESSED ^[2] - 93:27, 146:12 PRESSEL ^[1] - 136:8 PRESSURE ^[3] - 18:26, 19:6, 59:22 PRESTON ^[1] - 73:13 PRESUMABLY ^[6] - 36:7, 37:19, 76:15, 99:17, 128:25, 160:6 PRETEND ^[1] - 21:2 PRETTY ^[7] - 18:17, 42:28, 62:21, 81:16, 138:4, 146:9, 160:10 PREVENT ^[3] - 21:21, 61:22, 157:12 PREVENTABILITY ^[1] - 165:12 PREVENTING ^[1] - 127:7 PREVIOUS ^[11] - 13:12, 40:28, 132:5, 134:16, 137:26, 137:27, 138:28, 139:17, 142:15, 142:24, 150:22 PREVIOUSLY ^[4] - 46:22, 66:25, 134:15, 168:2 PRIMACY ^[3] - 81:20, 156:13, 157:3 PRIMARILY ^[2] - 79:11, 101:1 PRIMARY ^[5] - 122:2, 125:16, 136:14, 140:13, 151:14 PRINCESS ^[1] - 118:11 PRINCIPAL ^[1] - 52:4 PRINCIPLE ^[3] - 13:14, 20:27, 81:20 PRINTED ^[4] - 93:16, 101:9, 153:7 PRIORITISE ^[1]
--	---	---	--	--	--

- 126:7 PRIORITY [2] - 48:14, 48:15 PROACTIVE [1] - 155:28 PROACTIVELY [1] - 83:3 PROBE [1] - 158:5 PROCEDURE [4] - 17:16, 23:5, 23:27, 99:10 PROCEDURES [2] - 35:3, 35:6 PROCEED [1] - 132:28 PROCESS [10] - 10:27, 59:11, 59:18, 73:20, 100:22, 100:29, 119:2, 128:8, 161:21, 169:29 PROCESS [1] - 14:6 PRODUCED [2] - 19:20, 126:26 PRODUCT [1] - 148:24 PROFESSIONAL [1] - 68:5 PROGRESS [1] - 96:1 PROGRESSING [1] - 86:18 PROPOSE [1] - 137:19 PROPOSITION [5] - 26:20, 54:13, 54:20, 57:5, 154:12 PROPOSITION [1] - 47:23 PROTOCOL [3] - 17:21, 23:13, 78:15 PROVIDE [9] - 10:20, 33:22, 49:21, 57:14, 74:23, 123:15, 156:5, 160:22, 162:1 PROVIDED [12] - 36:12, 57:5, 58:29, 59:6, 66:29, 73:4, 103:21, 122:29, 124:14, 163:29, 167:21, 169:26 PROVIDES [2] - 25:13, 36:28	PROVINCE [1] - 135:29 PROVINCE [9] - 31:14, 31:20, 38:18, 38:29, 52:7, 66:18, 72:18, 105:20, 110:10 PROVISION [2] - 16:1, 16:2 PROXIMITY [4] - 11:15, 12:9, 39:12, 151:18 PSNI [5] - 65:23, 66:22, 90:7, 116:13, 162:24 PUBLIC [4] - 25:26, 34:26, 65:23, 165:13 PUBLICLY [1] - 88:20 PULL [4] - 104:5, 170:13, 172:7, 172:19 PURCHASE [1] - 70:16 PURPORT [1] - 68:23 PURPORTEDLY [1] - 69:1 PURPOSE [12] - 6:10, 80:16, 97:10, 100:11, 103:12, 127:20, 128:13, 136:28, 145:15, 145:18, 167:22, 171:18 PURPOSEFUL [1] - 122:1 PURSUANT [1] - 90:27 PURSUE [1] - 95:10 PUT [36] - 12:26, 15:22, 20:3, 22:19, 24:20, 46:27, 47:15, 55:22, 55:27, 55:29, 60:10, 61:9, 69:6, 76:2, 77:5, 100:28, 102:21, 109:29, 122:26, 123:24, 124:28, 127:12, 129:12, 129:25, 131:13, 131:15, 131:28, 147:22, 148:11, 154:12, 154:17, 160:9, 162:12, 170:14,	172:5, 173:14 PUTTING [4] - 25:10, 57:12, 75:3, 151:1 Q QLR [16] - 3:20, 3:23, 4:20, 4:26, 10:14, 12:21, 29:19, 29:21, 35:26, 49:6, 95:21, 118:21, 167:26, 168:15, 176:26, 177:15 QRF [4] - 32:10, 124:29, 164:7, 164:8 QUALIFIED [1] - 25:19 QUALITY [1] - 173:28 QUARTER [1] - 38:13 QUEEN'S [4] - 3:15, 3:20, 4:23, 73:13 QUESTIONED [29] - 51:13, 65:10, 73:25, 81:1, 90:15, 95:2, 111:24, 115:1, 117:15, 138:21, 152:14, 155:23, 162:26, 167:14, 175:23, 181:5, 181:6, 181:7, 181:8, 181:9, 181:12, 181:13, 181:14, 181:17, 181:18, 181:19, 181:20, 181:23, 181:24 QUESTIONING [1] - 117:19 QUESTIONS [35] - 30:7, 65:1, 65:2, 65:4, 65:6, 71:29, 73:22, 80:29, 81:5, 90:5, 90:7, 90:8, 90:19, 94:12, 94:15, 109:12, 111:21, 116:10, 116:13, 116:16, 124:26, 152:10, 155:18, 155:27, 159:22, 161:21, 162:23, 164:2, 165:25, 166:23, 166:25,	175:20, 175:26, 180:5, 180:7 QUICK [2] - 33:25, 135:7 QUICK [6] - 55:12, 55:13, 124:17, 140:2, 159:9, 161:23 QUICKLY [4] - 22:5, 22:16, 32:12, 71:29 QUIET [2] - 67:12, 68:1 QUIETER [1] - 156:26 QUITE [18] - 6:8, 19:1, 21:15, 39:19, 44:1, 44:3, 54:4, 67:12, 74:21, 82:9, 82:13, 115:14, 116:22, 124:20, 134:19, 140:27, 147:12, 178:1 QUOTE [2] - 67:4, 110:16 R RADIO [2] - 5:25, 9:4 RADIO [50] - 5:26, 6:2, 6:24, 8:7, 8:21, 8:24, 8:26, 9:2, 9:4, 9:5, 22:10, 29:21, 38:15, 39:4, 52:14, 77:28, 79:13, 83:15, 87:2, 87:7, 88:22, 89:4, 89:25, 90:28, 92:17, 92:20, 98:29, 99:1, 99:2, 99:5, 99:16, 100:26, 101:18, 114:14, 114:23, 115:15, 130:4, 135:28, 136:1, 136:5, 136:6, 136:8, 136:10, 136:13, 136:15, 136:16, 145:22, 152:3, 163:3, 165:19 RADIOS [3] - 78:17, 78:24, 98:27 RADIUS [3] - 83:13, 122:26, 123:25	RAISE [1] - 76:8 RAISED [1] - 83:10 RAN [3] - 102:19, 139:18, 145:7 RANK [6] - 49:6, 95:8, 95:12, 95:17, 112:22, 118:14 RAPIDLY [2] - 67:12, 74:21 RATE [1] - 46:1 RATHER [17] - 5:28, 8:25, 13:5, 13:25, 17:15, 49:16, 65:25, 68:15, 76:23, 87:17, 105:6, 128:14, 142:14, 154:19, 166:28, 173:6, 175:29 REACH [1] - 21:27 REACHED [2] - 33:17, 51:16 REACHES [2] - 30:12, 95:12 REACT [3] - 77:10, 123:19, 156:23 REACTING [1] - 54:1 REACTION [5] - 15:27, 19:14, 33:25, 35:2, 55:14 REACTION [6] - 55:12, 55:13, 124:17, 140:2, 159:9, 161:23 READ [25] - 16:18, 20:26, 41:20, 43:11, 43:17, 45:8, 45:13, 46:14, 49:3, 52:9, 75:25, 77:25, 104:11, 105:25, 107:13, 110:27, 112:4, 112:19, 128:17, 140:20, 150:13, 162:13, 162:14, 171:21, 179:1 READER [1] - 106:5 READILY [3] - 74:24, 122:26, 123:24 READINESS [2]	- 32:13, 103:20 READING [11] - 29:25, 40:14, 44:18, 45:1, 45:5, 45:6, 112:14, 112:15, 140:18, 160:25, 161:3 READS [4] - 29:14, 47:29, 52:8, 140:16 READY [17] - 16:5, 16:9, 16:14, 16:20, 16:22, 17:4, 17:26, 32:11, 33:11, 33:12, 34:11, 117:11, 122:28, 124:13, 124:19, 124:22, 159:20 READYING [1] - 163:21 REAL [7] - 100:25, 101:2, 104:25, 129:28, 149:16, 150:9, 170:6 REAL [1] - 37:18 REAL-TIME [5] - 100:25, 101:2, 104:25, 129:28, 149:16 REALIGNMENT [1] - 27:1 REALISTIC [2] - 26:20, 26:21 REALISTICALLY [1] - 59:25 REALITY [1] - 58:18 REALLY [9] - 71:1, 75:5, 89:20, 126:2, 126:3, 128:20, 143:2, 151:28, 175:15 REASON [9] - 44:9, 54:17, 58:13, 108:19, 147:25, 152:18, 159:24, 176:3, 176:8 REASONABLY [1] - 107:20 REASONING [1] - 57:1 RECALLED [1] - 56:3 RECAP [1] - 51:16 RECEIPT [1] - 15:26
--	--	---	---	---	---

RECEIVE [3] - 89:25, 114:5, 169:14 RECEIVED [26] - 28:11, 31:13, 31:19, 38:17, 54:28, 55:5, 68:3, 68:4, 101:18, 103:7, 105:19, 110:9, 114:4, 114:12, 116:3, 134:1, 158:6, 159:29, 162:16, 163:2, 165:7, 165:15, 170:28, 176:20, 178:4, 178:15 RECEIVED.. [1] - 179:22 RECEIVING [1] - 100:1 RECOGNISE [1] - 171:14 RECOGNISED [1] - 22:23 RECOGNISING [3] - 57:20, 121:17, 145:19 RECOLLECTIO N [16] - 16:17, 55:21, 61:18, 103:6, 103:8, 127:16, 134:22, 137:2, 150:16, 154:5, 154:14, 156:25, 157:4, 170:24, 171:20, 172:27 RECOLLECTIO NS [1] - 151:14 RECONCILE [1] - 138:1 RECONFIRME D [1] - 78:6 RECONSTRUC T [1] - 143:3 RECORD [46] - 5:2, 5:4, 5:6, 5:11, 5:20, 8:11, 8:24, 9:9, 9:12, 28:19, 30:17, 40:15, 59:11, 59:16, 59:22, 64:19, 80:9, 80:15, 80:18, 82:14, 86:13, 92:7, 100:13, 100:16, 101:22, 101:24, 104:26, 106:1, 106:2,	106:7, 128:6, 128:26, 144:29, 145:3, 145:5, 145:9, 145:21, 145:27, 146:12, 150:5, 175:2, 175:12, 175:16, 176:1 RECORDED [27] - 5:7, 5:24, 6:5, 11:19, 27:19, 29:22, 37:27, 39:2, 39:3, 52:8, 55:2, 55:3, 76:28, 86:7, 88:9, 91:16, 91:28, 114:18, 144:9, 146:7, 147:5, 148:6, 151:12, 151:26, 177:8, 177:13, 178:17 RECORDER [5] - 80:2, 80:12, 136:3, 145:13, 145:18 RECORDING [11] - 7:7, 47:1, 79:22, 80:16, 99:22, 111:5, 114:19, 144:22, 145:4, 145:11, 175:4 RECORDINGS [2] - 73:8, 147:16 RECORDS [3] - 12:19, 52:18, 57:5 RECTANGLE [1] - 60:5 RECURRING [1] - 28:20 RED [2] - 19:23, 20:7 REDUCED [2] - 13:20, 32:13 REDUCTION [1] - 12:29 REFER [8] - 71:5, 84:3, 89:18, 95:7, 95:16, 97:7, 156:17, 167:18 REFERENCE [8] - 38:28, 56:17, 56:29, 72:1, 104:13, 134:2, 151:27, 151:29 REFERENCIN G [1] - 156:18 REFERRED [5] - 18:8, 41:12, 94:3,	96:28, 97:3 REFERRING [7] - 3:17, 52:14, 94:4, 97:11, 115:15, 126:17, 172:26 REFERS [2] - 56:21, 58:25 REFINEMENT [1] - 26:12 REFLECT [6] - 64:2, 72:16, 106:12, 130:8, 131:22, 143:19 REFLECTED [1] - 138:2 REFLECTING [1] - 144:7 REFLECTION [2] - 91:22, 131:15 REFLECTS [1] - 30:4 REFRAIN [1] - 67:28 REFRESH [2] - 128:1, 128:27 REFRESHED [1] - 19:28 REGARD [1] - 26:15 REGARDED [2] - 150:20, 150:25 REGARDING [1] - 75:16 REGIMENT [1] - 73:12 REGIMENT [4] - 3:15, 3:21, 73:12, 73:13 REGIMENTAL [2] - 36:20, 73:11 REGION [1] - 76:11 REGION [4] - 27:10, 31:16, 38:21, 91:19 REGULAR [2] - 19:28, 68:4 REGULARLY [1] - 13:19 RELATE [5] - 66:25, 72:16, 72:18, 86:5, 104:20 RELATED [2] - 57:17, 57:18 RELATES [3] - 56:25, 72:21, 91:2 RELATING [15] -	18:20, 37:11, 38:5, 39:4, 39:8, 46:5, 46:6, 50:1, 52:7, 53:4, 56:17, 57:6, 58:24, 58:26, 74:26 RELATION [19] - 40:23, 42:7, 53:1, 56:28, 74:12, 74:15, 74:17, 90:12, 90:20, 92:2, 92:3, 94:2, 99:28, 107:8, 113:10, 115:7, 169:9, 169:27, 173:19 RELATIVE [1] - 72:10 RELATIVELY [5] - 21:17, 145:26, 163:27, 166:7, 166:25 RELATIVITY [2] - 72:5, 72:7 RELAYED [1] - 134:9 RELEVANCE [2] - 58:5, 152:26 RELEVANT [7] - 4:19, 13:17, 14:1, 17:22, 49:4, 59:29, 91:11 RELIED [1] - 172:15 RELUCTANCE [1] - 161:22 RELY [2] - 70:29, 100:7 REMAIN [2] - 68:6, 122:14 REMAINED [2] - 14:3, 128:24 REMAINS [2] - 14:22, 128:15 REMARKED [1] - 153:11 REMEMBER [20] - 18:28, 40:27, 55:26, 61:4, 70:3, 70:23, 75:6, 88:16, 93:7, 93:14, 108:11, 112:14, 112:15, 139:22, 142:10, 149:5, 154:25, 154:27, 155:2, 169:1 REMEMBERED [1] - 136:4 REMIND [2] -	19:7, 95:16 REMINDED [1] - 28:2 REMOTE [1] - 26:7 REMOVE [7] - 13:14, 22:16, 111:16, 129:7, 129:8, 129:16 REMOVED [10] - 55:19, 61:8, 63:29, 69:22, 71:15, 124:24, 128:8, 129:3, 129:5, 129:6 RENDER [7] - 17:16, 23:5, 23:20, 23:27, 24:29, 25:3, 74:8 RENDER [1] - 15:29 REPEAT [4] - 4:13, 117:26, 120:24, 151:29 REPEATEDLY [1] - 99:27 REPLACEMEN T [1] - 116:25 REPLICATED [2] - 20:26, 61:17 REPLICATION [1] - 178:12 REPORT [29] - 10:14, 10:15, 10:27, 40:8, 43:10, 46:20, 85:2, 86:15, 171:17, 171:18, 172:9, 172:12, 172:14, 172:18, 172:21, 172:27, 173:1, 173:9, 173:10, 173:14, 173:15, 173:20, 176:1, 176:7, 177:14, 178:7, 178:18, 179:4, 179:26 REPORTED [5] - 34:9, 36:6, 76:8, 136:24, 136:26 REPORTING [2] - 40:29, 173:28 REPORTS [1] - 171:10 REPOSTURIN G [1] - 13:4 REPRESENT [7] - 21:7, 67:2, 84:12, 84:17,	87:18, 123:5, 174:17 REPRESENTA TIVE [1] - 98:6 REPRESENTS [4] - 31:10, 65:5, 73:22, 138:7 REPRODUCTI ON [1] - 141:4 REPUBLICAN [5] - 4:6, 37:21, 38:2, 77:9, 170:21 REPUTED [1] - 37:18 REQUEST [19] - 17:10, 17:19, 17:23, 17:26, 17:28, 18:2, 23:15, 24:8, 24:14, 33:4, 81:24, 120:16, 122:24, 123:11, 124:2, 157:5, 157:19, 161:28, 178:25 REQUESTED [5] - 160:16, 164:5, 164:11, 164:13, 164:14 REQUIRE [4] - 32:25, 82:16, 107:26, 122:25 REQUIREMEN T [3] - 13:8, 65:26, 89:27 RESEARCH [2] - 74:14, 89:10 RESERVE [1] - 4:23 RESET [3] - 132:9, 132:13 RESIDENT [1] - 3:19 RESOLVE [1] - 107:25 RESOURCE [6] - 120:29, 121:3, 121:19, 122:27, 124:3, 125:1 RESOURCES [12] - 8:5, 9:21, 15:1, 34:15, 81:23, 118:29, 120:10, 120:26, 120:28, 124:13, 160:29, 162:16 RESPECT [1] - 92:8 RESPECTED [1]
---	---	---	---	--	--

SCRAWL ^[1] - 149:15 SCREAMS ^[1] - 152:4 SCREEN ^[23] - 20:4, 20:5, 31:29, 33:24, 35:17, 60:11, 69:6, 74:9, 75:14, 79:25, 87:23, 93:6, 102:29, 104:5, 130:22, 130:27, 137:25, 138:24, 141:2, 152:27, 170:15, 171:11, 176:16 SCRIBBLED ^[1] - 149:11 SCRUTINISING ^[1] - 52:4 SEARCH ^[2] - 57:4, 121:1 SEARCHES ^[1] - 66:20 SEARCHING ^[1] - 47:12 SEAT ^[4] - 34:2, 117:9, 122:15, 151:27 SEATED ^[1] - 65:6 SECOND ^[23] - 4:11, 9:22, 18:10, 27:13, 35:7, 43:22, 44:4, 45:21, 45:27, 57:26, 61:3, 74:13, 74:27, 75:26, 93:5, 94:15, 107:22, 122:19, 132:16, 138:24, 151:3, 171:7, 172:26 SECOND ^[1] - 106:22 SECONDARY ^[7] - 121:23, 121:28, 121:29, 122:13, 123:2, 124:8, 140:14 SECONDLY ^[2] - 71:3, 123:13 SECRETLY ^[1] - 88:8 SECTION ^[8] - 19:8, 19:20, 37:10, 45:2, 45:13, 47:17, 171:27, 171:29 SECTION ^[3] -	37:9, 40:25, 76:20 SECURE ^[2] - 22:4, 97:5 SECURING ^[1] - 41:19 SECURITY ^[11] - 10:6, 10:11, 11:10, 11:16, 11:25, 49:5, 133:14, 134:14, 134:17, 156:5, 156:6 SEE ^[118] - 11:29, 12:12, 12:18, 16:8, 20:25, 28:14, 28:26, 32:6, 33:19, 35:19, 35:22, 37:13, 43:11, 43:16, 43:21, 43:23, 46:22, 47:22, 50:1, 50:7, 50:16, 50:17, 51:28, 53:6, 53:19, 55:16, 57:24, 58:19, 60:7, 60:14, 62:3, 62:11, 63:9, 63:15, 63:18, 63:20, 67:15, 67:23, 68:29, 69:10, 69:12, 69:18, 74:11, 82:11, 85:11, 85:12, 85:14, 89:2, 90:19, 91:11, 99:27, 101:8, 101:9, 103:3, 103:26, 103:28, 104:2, 104:4, 104:12, 104:13, 106:20, 107:16, 107:25, 111:7, 116:12, 116:14, 122:10, 130:14, 130:27, 131:2, 131:4, 131:7, 131:11, 131:20, 131:21, 132:16, 132:24, 132:27, 132:29, 133:6, 133:10, 133:15, 134:16, 137:15, 138:26, 139:3, 139:5, 139:29, 140:3, 140:14, 141:7, 141:9, 142:1, 142:14, 144:15,	147:5, 147:18, 147:27, 148:1, 148:21, 152:29, 153:6, 153:7, 154:25, 159:21, 160:10, 165:24, 171:27, 176:18, 177:7, 177:19, 178:12, 178:19, 179:7, 179:10, 179:16 SEEING ^[1] - 176:11 SEEK ^[3] - 34:6, 110:6, 143:2 SEEKING ^[4] - 10:24, 33:2, 33:4, 108:25 SEEM ^[5] - 16:3, 31:1, 63:23, 106:13, 154:26 SELF ^[2] - 36:6, 70:13 SELF-CARBONISING ^[1] - 70:13 SELF-EXPLANATORY ^[1] - 36:6 SELLOTAPED ^[2] - 37:3, 93:18 SEND ^[3] - 89:25, 122:9, 157:11 SENDING ^[3] - 17:15, 17:26, 154:27 SENIOR ^[5] - 8:4, 36:28, 66:21, 119:12, 119:15 SENSE ^[14] - 24:4, 30:24, 55:7, 56:10, 56:23, 78:24, 79:10, 91:28, 99:8, 100:16, 112:28, 142:13, 157:3, 164:14 SENSIBLE ^[3] - 31:1, 51:3, 56:2 SENT ^[5] - 103:15, 116:2, 152:24, 171:20, 172:4 SENTENCE ^[10] - 105:25, 107:8, 107:12, 110:5, 110:16, 110:26, 110:28, 122:19, 124:7, 176:24	SENTENCES ^[3] - 37:7, 96:16, 110:15 SEPARATE ^[23] - 5:19, 6:4, 6:5, 6:15, 6:17, 28:6, 28:29, 29:2, 29:3, 30:26, 41:1, 44:28, 51:22, 58:13, 61:9, 73:2, 75:13, 88:13, 98:16, 136:5, 139:25, 163:19, 163:20 SEPARATED ^[8] - 71:11, 127:13, 142:18, 142:27, 144:13, 147:22, 147:25, 174:24 SEPARATELY ^[4] - 47:1, 64:5, 65:19, 127:17 SEPARATION ^[6] - 30:8, 39:18, 127:15, 127:17, 144:4, 170:6 SEQUENCE ^[30] - 4:10, 5:8, 5:12, 7:3, 18:26, 27:14, 28:14, 28:24, 30:23, 30:28, 34:18, 39:17, 40:29, 42:25, 54:2, 57:10, 66:13, 67:24, 69:25, 71:15, 71:27, 74:25, 78:3, 90:20, 92:14, 108:21, 109:1, 109:5, 137:21, 145:27 SEQUENCES ^[1] - 64:26 SEQUENCING ^[3] - 17:11, 56:1, 75:7 SEQUENTIAL ^[2] - 21:24, 23:16 SEQUENTIAL ^[1] - 64:8 SERGEANT ^[12] - 16:19, 50:18, 51:24, 106:23, 106:25, 107:1, 131:7, 131:25, 131:27, 131:28, 132:3 SERIAL ^[32] - 36:2, 37:2, 38:12, 49:10, 50:17,	52:2, 54:20, 54:22, 54:23, 55:2, 55:3, 63:11, 84:10, 86:25, 93:13, 103:2, 105:10, 129:23, 131:3, 131:12, 132:13, 133:3, 133:4, 133:6, 137:20, 138:25, 140:13, 140:14, 141:26, 158:8, 170:20, 178:21 SERIALS ^[3] - 42:9, 132:27, 143:26 SERIES ^[8] - 10:2, 10:9, 11:2, 16:5, 18:16, 34:6, 104:15, 126:23 SERIOUS ^[4] - 135:12, 172:27, 172:28, 173:10 SERVED ^[1] - 124:27 SERVICE ^[1] - 4:25 SERVICE ^[1] - 153:9 SERVICES ^[1] - 122:16 SET ^[23] - 8:21, 14:2, 17:9, 18:19, 18:20, 18:26, 19:1, 41:25, 42:28, 47:23, 64:26, 75:10, 75:11, 77:6, 83:15, 83:18, 83:26, 126:25, 135:24, 157:12, 161:25, 172:9, 172:29 SETTING ^[1] - 31:26 SETTINGS ^[1] - 126:28 SETTLING ^[1] - 107:19 SEVEN ^[1] - 4:19 SEVERAL ^[9] - 31:14, 31:20, 38:18, 38:29, 39:5, 39:7, 105:20, 107:4, 110:10 SHARE ^[2] - 172:25, 173:6 SHARED ^[8] - 66:8, 66:25, 79:7,	79:20, 88:20, 96:24, 96:25, 100:2 SHARING ^[6] - 41:2, 41:28, 78:15, 78:25, 83:5, 83:6 SHED ^[1] - 108:5 SHEET ^[68] - 49:5, 49:8, 49:10, 52:1, 52:27, 53:7, 53:28, 53:29, 54:16, 56:5, 60:7, 60:17, 61:9, 61:15, 61:16, 61:17, 61:20, 62:13, 62:19, 63:12, 127:8, 127:11, 127:17, 127:18, 128:24, 129:5, 129:15, 129:20, 129:22, 129:24, 131:2, 131:17, 131:20, 131:21, 131:22, 132:1, 132:5, 132:7, 132:9, 132:12, 132:13, 133:1, 133:3, 134:16, 135:4, 135:6, 137:18, 137:20, 138:26, 139:23, 139:28, 139:29, 140:10, 141:8, 142:8, 143:13, 144:2, 147:17, 147:25, 148:12, 148:22, 150:22 SHEETS ^[34] - 61:2, 63:28, 64:4, 70:24, 71:11, 126:23, 127:2, 127:4, 127:5, 127:7, 127:12, 128:19, 129:3, 129:7, 129:9, 131:16, 132:11, 139:17, 142:27, 143:15, 143:22, 143:27, 146:18, 147:10, 147:14, 147:20, 149:4, 149:6, 149:11, 174:6, 174:7, 175:1 SHIFT ^[3] - 50:22, 119:7, 129:20 SHIRT ^[1] -
--	--	--	---	--	--

102:21 SHOCKED [1] - 171:3 SHOES [1] - 24:20 SHOP [2] - 70:16, 77:6 SHORT [1] - 53:25 SHORT [17] - 7:24, 15:20, 16:28, 20:6, 69:7, 69:16, 79:26, 81:29, 85:21, 101:16, 117:7, 130:23, 136:9, 163:27, 166:7, 166:18, 166:25 SHORTER [1] - 52:15 SHORTHAND [2] - 130:16, 153:24 SHORTLY [5] - 46:1, 84:28, 91:1, 137:16, 151:24 SHOWING [1] - 69:19 SHOWN [2] - 176:15, 178:12 SHOWS [1] - 72:9 SIDE [7] - 9:12, 42:17, 43:6, 69:10, 69:12, 81:7, 144:29 SIGHT [2] - 73:16, 83:19 SIGHTED [3] - 46:22, 86:1, 86:6 SIGHTING [13] - 10:15, 46:8, 46:9, 48:1, 85:2, 85:5, 86:7, 86:9, 86:10, 86:14, 86:15, 86:18, 88:15 SIGHTINGS [3] - 43:1, 88:17, 98:7 SIGN [2] - 9:5, 9:6 SIGNALLER [3] - 127:29, 135:26, 145:6 SIGNATURE [2] - 36:16, 36:18 SIGNIFICANCE [1] - 76:27 SIGNIFICANT [5] - 130:7, 131:23, 139:13,	150:21, 150:26 SIGNIFICANTL Y [1] - 68:9 SIGNS [6] - 9:28, 32:23, 32:25, 82:28, 157:11, 178:27 SIMILAR [7] - 11:2, 14:4, 70:5, 164:22, 171:26, 172:18, 173:15 SIMON [1] - 3:10 SIMPLE [1] - 21:15 SIMPLY [6] - 10:29, 51:28, 57:21, 62:29, 109:22, 136:11 SIMULTANEO USLY [1] - 48:3 SINCERELY [2] - 111:4, 150:9 SINCERITY [1] - 111:12 SINGLE [7] - 26:10, 39:8, 58:23, 58:26, 64:21, 92:11 SINISTER [3] - 57:19, 57:27, 59:3 SIT [2] - 66:10, 116:23 SITE [6] - 17:28, 23:21, 23:28, 24:29, 122:17, 124:3 SITS [3] - 5:1, 43:14, 47:1 SITTING [3] - 16:8, 65:19, 103:5 SITUATION [19] - 17:15, 24:4, 34:17, 34:19, 36:22, 53:11, 58:14, 59:21, 68:29, 78:7, 82:9, 84:9, 109:26, 119:26, 119:29, 122:23, 157:7, 160:25, 165:5 SITUATIONAL [1] - 136:19 SITUATIONS [2] - 18:22, 156:23 SIX [4] - 143:16, 147:11, 147:13, 168:3 SIZE [3] - 8:23,	151:22, 154:1 SKILL [1] - 26:18 SLIGHT [2] - 71:5, 76:21 SLIGHTLY [13] - 5:25, 11:17, 16:7, 36:23, 38:8, 62:14, 68:2, 75:24, 87:16, 98:18, 104:10, 129:18, 163:10 SLIPPING [1] - 62:13 SLOT [1] - 9:18 SLOWER [1] - 50:29 SLOWLY [1] - 114:7 SMALL [2] - 98:17, 136:8 SMUDGED [1] - 107:22 SMIFF [1] - 123:18 SOLDIER [6] - 6:23, 23:22, 30:9, 36:21, 39:7, 39:27 SOLDIERS [15] - 6:24, 12:5, 12:9, 12:12, 12:22, 16:22, 33:27, 68:5, 96:20, 96:29, 159:10, 160:17, 164:3, 164:10, 164:21 SOLE [2] - 7:14, 7:16 SOMEONE [12] - 30:14, 46:12, 48:18, 60:14, 60:16, 63:14, 64:6, 64:11, 64:20, 77:28, 114:18, 158:25 SOMETIMES [4] - 41:11, 59:15, 130:1, 130:2 SOMEWHERE [7] - 13:8, 13:23, 46:28, 58:5, 100:27, 111:1, 163:15 SOON [1] - 67:25 SORRY [22] - 8:25, 27:26, 45:5, 63:4, 65:20, 68:14, 77:16,	77:19, 79:21, 86:12, 88:26, 89:8, 90:26, 91:22, 115:13, 115:18, 120:24, 140:27, 152:29, 154:22, 165:8, 172:17 SORT [26] - 5:22, 5:27, 5:28, 10:24, 42:17, 66:26, 67:8, 67:10, 71:25, 76:27, 78:13, 78:14, 78:24, 79:10, 79:12, 100:12, 101:4, 101:9, 103:20, 108:23, 110:28, 116:3, 120:11, 127:22, 129:9, 136:8 SOUGHT [3] - 71:23, 92:24, 160:13 SOURCE [9] - 34:27, 36:8, 40:7, 76:15, 81:9, 88:21, 113:27, 158:1, 172:16 SOURCED [1] - 146:10 SOURCES [2] - 8:28, 173:18 SOUTHEY [3] - 73:21, 75:17, 80:27 SOUTHEY [5] - 73:25, 73:28, 75:20, 80:25, 181:7 SOVEREIGNTY [2] - 37:17, 75:29 SPACE [1] - 74:21 SPARSE [1] - 178:2 SPEAKING [7] - 11:27, 12:16, 16:18, 127:29, 133:17, 135:16, 163:24 SPECIAL [2] - 76:9, 76:10 SPECIALIST [1] - 121:1 SPECIFIC [14] - 13:7, 18:20, 37:28, 75:11, 93:20, 94:9,	103:14, 122:23, 151:3, 154:20, 161:27, 162:1, 164:15, 170:27 SPECIFICALLY [1] - 159:5 SPECIFIED [2] - 55:5, 164:6 SPECIFY [1] - 56:22 SPECIFYING [1] - 52:17 SPECULATE [1] - 108:26 SPIRIT [1] - 26:15 SPOKEN [2] - 30:1, 166:16 SPORTS [1] - 102:21 SPREADING [1] - 32:23 SQUARE [1] - 80:8 STACK [3] - 128:9, 129:4, 149:4 STAFF [7] - 7:11, 64:18, 119:17, 119:19, 128:22, 145:20, 170:8 STAGE [1] - 23:25 STAGE [44] - 5:17, 17:10, 17:27, 17:29, 23:6, 23:9, 23:20, 24:11, 25:8, 26:9, 26:21, 33:17, 34:14, 44:16, 46:9, 46:12, 46:13, 49:16, 50:24, 51:2, 51:4, 53:27, 54:7, 59:9, 63:14, 64:4, 64:6, 64:10, 69:28, 71:10, 79:3, 79:15, 82:5, 82:26, 83:28, 85:7, 93:17, 125:22, 129:3, 129:6, 136:29, 144:12, 160:18 STAGES [8] - 16:11, 21:24, 21:26, 23:16, 119:23, 123:9, 139:2, 154:4 STAND [5] -	16:10, 72:4, 86:16, 108:12, 124:19 STANDARD [9] - 10:26, 11:1, 18:19, 42:28, 78:14, 99:10, 144:24, 157:21, 176:4 STANDBY [2] - 33:26, 164:8 STARING [1] - 63:4 STARK [1] - 57:14 START [13] - 50:11, 63:25, 90:22, 95:6, 129:10, 130:15, 130:22, 131:16, 132:11, 148:12, 150:19, 166:8, 171:29 STARTED [20] - 44:12, 50:8, 57:21, 63:10, 63:11, 65:17, 80:2, 84:29, 119:15, 129:22, 131:8, 131:29, 135:3, 135:6, 146:7, 147:24, 148:1, 155:12, 161:15, 169:3 STARTING [9] - 16:23, 48:12, 52:28, 53:15, 102:29, 132:2, 163:24, 176:21, 177:25 STARTS [3] - 48:8, 50:22, 138:8 STATE [5] - 38:2, 103:20, 120:18, 123:5, 123:7 STATE [1] - 9:25 STATEMENT [40] - 4:11, 4:12, 9:22, 11:29, 12:18, 16:21, 18:11, 18:12, 18:13, 26:24, 27:13, 27:14, 27:15, 28:3, 29:13, 29:14, 30:4, 35:7, 35:11, 37:6, 59:1, 74:10, 77:13, 77:20,
---	---	--	---	---	--

81:12, 107:1, 120:7, 121:20, 156:2, 159:7, 167:21, 168:27, 169:17, 169:20, 173:25, 173:26, 176:10 STATEMENTS [2] - 3:3, 16:18 STATES [1] - 82:14 STATION [5] - 114:11, 155:3, 158:4, 162:14, 163:14 STATIONED [6] - 115:26, 118:8, 118:17, 121:7, 121:9, 121:14 STATIONERY [1] - 126:26 STAYED [1] - 119:9 STAYING [1] - 96:1 STEPPING [2] - 74:20, 117:4 STEPS [5] - 32:8, 33:25, 34:11, 64:11, 64:21 STICK [2] - 143:8, 178:21 STILL [8] - 17:14, 23:22, 53:3, 70:11, 75:2, 77:10, 81:26, 82:6 STOOD [5] - 55:12, 140:2, 145:24, 159:20, 166:3 STOP [3] - 166:10, 166:12, 166:14 STOPPED [2] - 43:4, 102:18 STRABANE [9] - 38:8, 72:2, 75:21, 75:22, 76:17, 76:23, 93:25, 93:28, 94:3 STRAIGHT [5] - 21:18, 101:21, 101:24, 129:8, 129:12 STREET [1] - 83:20 STREET [4] - 12:10, 12:23, 	83:22, 178:26 STREETS [4] - 159:17, 160:18, 161:25, 161:29 STRENGTH [2] - 9:28, 111:13 STRESS [1] - 167:6 STRETCHY [1] - 136:9 STRUCK [4] - 142:3, 142:9, 142:14, 142:17 STRUCTURE [2] - 3:5, 83:6 STRUGGLING [1] - 104:8 STUFF [12] - 5:24, 25:7, 47:1, 55:22, 64:17, 64:18, 65:20, 66:13, 71:7, 71:10, 80:13, 135:7 STUMPS [1] - 166:1 STYLE [3] - 46:16, 46:26, 85:17 STYLISTIC [1] - 47:20 SUBJECT [7] - 48:5, 85:23, 91:13, 109:17, 110:18, 117:1, 117:24 SUBMITTED [4] - 71:21, 72:9, 72:23, 73:14 SUBMITTING [1] - 147:21 SUBSEQUENT [10] - 33:21, 61:5, 78:11, 81:13, 86:10, 88:17, 96:1, 128:16, 134:29, 147:14 SUBSEQUENT LY [13] - 26:5, 30:20, 43:9, 43:13, 55:22, 55:28, 56:3, 63:29, 64:16, 78:6, 112:1, 112:4, 123:1 SUBSIDED [1] - 150:24 SUBSTANTIAL [1] - 166:21 SUBUNITS [1] - 	4:19 SUCCINCTLY [1] - 179:3 SUFFICIENT [2] - 22:24, 148:3 SUGGEST [8] - 68:6, 82:21, 88:8, 94:19, 111:11, 138:11, 138:28, 178:17 SUGGESTING [4] - 30:14, 54:6, 110:2, 179:24 SUGGESTS [1] - 124:18 SUIT [1] - 25:7 SUITED [1] - 104:29 SUMMARISE [3] - 12:25, 37:7, 169:27 SUMMARY [4] - 9:15, 74:4, 101:7, 101:9 SUMMER [2] - 95:23, 102:10 SUPERIOR [1] - 163:24 SUPERVISING [1] - 108:28 SUPERVISION [1] - 36:26 SUPPLY [3] - 37:22, 78:13, 170:21 SUPPORT [19] - 3:29, 4:3, 4:21, 15:27, 27:9, 34:3, 37:10, 40:11, 54:13, 54:20, 57:5, 81:21, 94:6, 109:14, 109:27, 120:17, 122:27, 156:4, 160:17 SUPPORTED [1] - 125:9 SUPPOSE [5] - 5:1, 82:2, 97:17, 115:27, 138:7 SUPPOSED [2] - 14:29, 127:3 SURPRISED [2] - 91:23, 171:3 SURVIVORS [1] - 24:16 SUSPECT [4] - 37:25, 151:21, 161:5, 161:8 SUSPECTED [2] - 122:24, 123:16 	SUSPICIOUS [2] - 22:13, 64:28 SUTER [1] - 117:4 SWITCH [1] - 145:7 SWITCHED [2] - 124:21, 136:10 SWORN [1] - 117:14 SWORN [4] - 94:28, 117:10, 117:12, 167:10 SYMPATHETIC [1] - 14:23 SYSTEM [16] - 8:25, 26:6, 26:7, 38:15, 52:13, 61:25, 62:29, 72:8, 98:26, 101:3, 136:1, 136:2, 136:5, 136:19, 162:9, 165:20 SYSTEM'S [1] - 6:1 SYSTEMICALL Y [1] - 161:17 SYSTEMS [11] - 8:8, 8:18, 8:19, 8:20, 91:8, 97:29, 99:24, 100:4, 104:28, 128:28, 165:17 T T'OTHER [1] - 129:13 T-SHIRT [1] - 102:21 T/OVER [1] - 132:19 TACTICAL [1] - 18:6 TACTICAL [1] - 18:16 TALKIE [2] - 114:13, 115:17 TALKS [1] - 74:14 TAM [7] - 18:8, 18:9, 18:10, 18:15, 19:19, 19:21 TAPE [30] - 69:25, 73:4, 73:5, 73:15, 73:17, 80:2, 80:5, 80:10, 	80:12, 80:16, 136:2, 144:24, 144:25, 144:26, 144:28, 145:3, 145:7, 145:13, 145:18, 146:1, 146:2, 146:8, 147:16, 147:24, 148:1, 148:5, 148:25, 149:10, 149:18 TAPE'S [1] - 149:18 TAPES [8] - 73:3, 144:20, 145:13, 145:26, 146:7, 146:10, 148:27, 175:10 TAPS [1] - 155:9 TARGET [2] - 151:16, 178:25 TARGETED [2] - 13:10, 13:21 TARGETS [2] - 37:23, 170:22 TASK [1] - 101:8 TASKED [2] - 7:21, 33:28 TASKING [2] - 13:6, 34:3 TASKINGS [1] - 10:15 TASKS [1] - 156:11 TEAM [5] - 15:14, 66:22, 100:15, 166:26 TEAMS [1] - 160:3 TECHNICAL [9] - 9:4, 17:17, 24:24, 25:12, 26:6, 26:13, 52:12, 74:19, 74:22 TECHNICAL [4] - 15:13, 24:26, 121:10, 123:27 TECHNICALLY [1] - 61:24 TECHNICIAN [1] - 23:20 TECHNIQUES [1] - 25:18 TECHNOLOGY [3] - 79:6, 80:8, 117:5 TECHNOLOGY [1] - 74:11 TEEING [1] - 	34:15 TELEPHONE [4] - 99:17, 158:3, 163:13, 163:28 TEN [3] - 97:17, 138:10, 159:29 TEN-MINUTE [1] - 138:10 TEND [1] - 48:26 TENNIS [3] - 102:12, 102:14, 102:19 TENSION [7] - 40:18, 59:21, 67:5, 67:7, 67:14, 67:18, 69:28 TERM [8] - 16:3, 16:15, 21:17, 121:26, 125:11, 126:3, 126:16, 134:15 TERMINAL [1] - 99:17 TERMINALS [1] - 99:23 TERMINOLOG Y [1] - 75:18 TERMS [44] - 5:2, 5:9, 13:6, 13:20, 14:9, 14:19, 16:1, 17:11, 17:17, 17:25, 18:24, 19:14, 21:10, 25:14, 25:17, 32:5, 40:8, 47:19, 52:18, 55:4, 65:29, 66:11, 68:12, 76:12, 76:25, 78:13, 78:19, 78:29, 86:25, 99:2, 104:24, 108:25, 112:29, 119:23, 120:26, 121:17, 129:14, 131:4, 133:14, 133:18, 145:2, 173:5, 177:26 TERRORISM [4] - 3:27, 3:29, 4:6, 27:9 TERRORIST [1] - 157:10 TERRORISTS [1] - 157:13 TEST [1] - 86:16 TEXT [9] - 43:23, 46:15, 49:3, 59:28, 60:26,
--	--	--	--	---	---

60:27, 69:19, 138:27, 141:9 THE ^[35] - 11:12, 11:22, 27:29, 44:22, 44:25, 44:28, 45:3, 45:5, 45:8, 45:14, 47:7, 51:8, 63:3, 94:23, 95:5, 138:15, 146:21, 146:25, 146:28, 147:3, 147:14, 147:19, 148:10, 149:3, 150:6, 154:18, 154:21, 154:23, 154:27, 155:1, 155:3, 165:23, 167:2, 180:15, 180:17 THEMSELVES ^[2] - 63:1, 163:22 THEORISE ^[1] - 108:21 THEORY ^[1] - 161:24 THERE'D ^[1] - 175:28 THEREAFTER ^[6] - 84:28, 118:12, 134:28, 137:16, 143:15, 145:6 THEREFORE ^[5] - 64:7, 70:29, 114:20, 151:18, 173:18 THEY'VE ^[5] - 28:10, 28:17, 43:10, 83:15, 84:28 THINKING ^[1] - 175:7 THINKS ^[1] - 50:11 THIRD ^[10] - 18:13, 52:26, 58:1, 59:27, 70:20, 74:12, 93:12, 104:4, 125:26, 139:18 THIRDLY ^[1] - 123:22 THOMPSON ^[12] - 40:21, 42:13, 65:15, 90:23, 91:26, 92:5, 111:6, 135:17, 135:18, 136:25, 137:1, 155:7 THOMPSON'S	^[1] - 43:5 THOUSANDS ^[1] - 132:11 THREAT ^[42] - 10:8, 10:11, 13:5, 13:7, 13:21, 19:15, 19:17, 22:17, 25:2, 27:18, 29:16, 34:27, 37:8, 37:11, 37:13, 37:28, 37:29, 38:1, 38:2, 39:14, 52:17, 75:28, 76:6, 76:22, 77:1, 77:4, 77:8, 77:18, 77:24, 77:27, 78:2, 93:17, 93:18, 103:13, 103:14, 103:18, 109:18, 151:3, 165:6, 170:19, 170:29 THREATS ^[3] - 103:17, 150:14 THREE ^[17] - 39:27, 43:21, 53:25, 69:18, 95:7, 95:11, 95:15, 98:16, 98:20, 98:25, 107:10, 110:21, 119:21, 148:21, 163:19, 163:20, 171:7 THROUGHOUT ^[2] - 73:15, 77:3 THROW ^[2] - 58:1, 161:29 THURSDAY ^[1] - 180:17 THURSDAY ^[1] - 40:23 TICKING ^[1] - 138:8 TIER ^[1] - 5:29 TIMED ^[16] - 42:11, 45:22, 52:3, 67:16, 67:17, 91:6, 104:1, 104:20, 107:17, 107:24, 108:7, 122:15, 148:21, 150:1, 151:2, 171:29 TIMEFRAME ^[4] - 16:6, 72:21, 75:2, 85:2 TIMEFRAMES ^[2] - 86:5, 86:23	TIMELINE ^[3] - 31:25, 77:19, 163:1 TIMESTAMP ^[1] - 106:6 TIMESTAMPS ^[1] - 108:20 TIMING ^[1] - 137:29 TIMINGS ^[3] - 134:12, 143:12, 145:28 TITLE ^[2] - 88:1, 125:12 TITLED ^[1] - 133:16 TO ^[3] - 50:22, 51:13, 138:20 TO.. ^[2] - 52:25, 104:8 TOAL ^[3] - 80:28, 155:20, 166:24 TOAL ^[6] - 81:1, 81:4, 84:16, 90:2, 166:23, 181:8 TODAY ^[15] - 3:3, 35:12, 41:9, 52:24, 71:18, 72:1, 105:14, 105:26, 128:28, 157:26, 162:9, 166:6, 166:10, 174:4, 179:29 TOED ^[1] - 134:27 TOGETHER ^[11] - 29:1, 123:23, 129:9, 130:26, 140:10, 143:6, 143:24, 174:22, 177:18, 177:28, 179:2 TOMORROW ^[2] - 166:4, 180:10 TOPE ^[1] - 14:21 TOOK ^[22] - 18:18, 22:4, 34:13, 48:1, 55:23, 55:26, 64:21, 70:24, 74:26, 87:11, 93:7, 99:9, 132:3, 132:4, 145:5, 145:8, 151:25, 160:22, 162:21, 173:19, 174:5, 174:21 TOP ^[42] - 12:25, 35:22, 52:26,	53:6, 53:14, 56:5, 60:15, 61:15, 61:17, 61:26, 61:27, 61:29, 62:19, 63:20, 69:14, 70:16, 70:19, 71:13, 80:1, 107:22, 130:27, 131:21, 131:29, 133:1, 133:15, 138:25, 138:26, 139:6, 139:22, 139:23, 141:4, 141:7, 142:1, 144:2, 144:17, 146:18, 146:22, 175:1, 176:17, 178:1, 178:10, 178:26 TOPIC ^[8] - 7:24, 54:8, 77:12, 79:21, 99:2, 173:22, 175:27 TOPICS ^[1] - 171:7 TORE ^[1] - 70:16 TOTAL ^[3] - 12:27, 166:21, 166:22 TOTALITY ^[1] - 143:25 TOUCHED ^[2] - 35:16, 70:11 TOWARD ^[1] - 147:20 TOWARDS ^[5] - 79:27, 130:27, 146:1, 146:8, 156:18 TOWERS ^[1] - 168:4 TOWN ^[15] - 10:7, 11:13, 15:21, 54:28, 55:7, 57:18, 58:26, 60:15, 141:5, 157:18, 169:13, 176:20, 176:21, 178:15, 178:27 TOWN ^[16] - 10:7, 11:11, 11:12, 11:20, 11:23, 12:5, 12:8, 12:13, 13:19, 33:28, 39:8, 40:5, 57:6, 82:1, 114:16, 169:13 TOWN" ^[1] - 178:4	TOWNS ^[14] - 31:14, 31:20, 38:18, 38:29, 39:5, 52:17, 57:18, 66:18, 92:2, 92:8, 105:20, 109:17, 110:10, 113:25 TRACKING ^[1] - 44:2 TRADITIONAL LY ^[1] - 5:3 TRAFFIC ^[4] - 22:10, 86:29, 99:5, 152:3 TRAINED ^[2] - 68:6, 156:10 TRAINING ^[2] - 95:26, 96:2 TRANSCRIBIN G ^[1] - 100:24 TRANSCRIPT ^[4] - 11:18, 79:22, 114:22, 167:23 TRANSCRIPTS ^[1] - 114:3 TRANSITION ^[1] - 134:19 TRANSMISSIO N ^[5] - 91:7, 91:12, 91:15, 91:25, 163:4 TRANSMISSIO NS ^[1] - 79:13 TRANSMITTIN G ^[1] - 67:9 TRANSPAREN T ^[1] - 88:4 TRANSCOPE ^[1] - 135:9 TRANSPPOSED ^[2] - 40:27, 42:27 TRANSCOPE ^[1] - 48:19 TRANSPPOSITI ON ^[3] - 43:11, 45:10, 92:13 TRAP ^[1] - 157:9 TRAVELLED ^[1] - 166:5 TRAWL ^[2] - 10:15, 10:28 TRAWLS ^[2] - 104:3, 104:11 TRIED ^[4] - 64:17, 66:9, 80:23, 172:7 TRIGGER ^[1] - 67:25	TRIPLE ^[1] - 125:14 TRIPLE- HATTED ^[1] - 125:14 TROOPS ^[11] - 27:7, 32:12, 32:15, 72:29, 82:6, 125:9, 128:4, 156:4, 159:20, 162:5, 164:7 TROUBLES ^[2] - 13:2, 14:5 TRUE ^[1] - 131:13 TRUTH ^[1] - 64:24 TRY ^[16] - 18:28, 22:18, 55:22, 67:1, 80:23, 97:11, 105:10, 107:16, 109:4, 127:29, 133:24, 135:23, 140:23, 157:12, 162:29, 166:29 TRYING ^[11] - 5:29, 22:15, 34:6, 55:24, 64:13, 64:18, 70:8, 142:13, 149:21, 157:15, 179:3 TURN ^[27] - 7:16, 13:3, 15:4, 21:15, 26:23, 27:23, 34:23, 35:14, 48:29, 51:29, 52:22, 80:10, 84:4, 88:15, 102:16, 122:6, 122:16, 130:12, 130:13, 131:16, 131:19, 144:28, 145:3, 145:6, 152:10, 155:15, 177:29 TURNED ^[7] - 11:3, 43:29, 81:12, 122:8, 136:10, 136:11, 146:4 TURNING ^[1] - 23:4 URNS ^[2] - 88:18, 125:24 TV ^[1] - 114:6 TWO ^[50] - 4:4, 11:7, 19:20, 20:1, 28:4, 29:3, 30:8,
--	--	---	---	---	--

42:9, 44:4, 57:14, 57:22, 58:18, 58:20, 58:28, 67:17, 68:13, 68:17, 69:5, 71:29, 75:15, 75:23, 80:9, 85:21, 90:12, 94:20, 97:24, 102:12, 106:9, 107:21, 108:11, 108:13, 109:2, 109:29, 111:2, 111:10, 119:21, 127:5, 128:13, 128:14, 129:3, 135:13, 142:17, 142:27, 145:17, 147:8, 149:5, 156:25, 175:28, 176:2 TYPE [9] - 6:27, 13:24, 21:16, 31:17, 38:21, 47:19, 70:15, 77:4, 164:22 TYPED [2] - 75:28, 103:5 TYPES [1] - 28:4 TYRONE [2] - 3:6, 41:25	[10] - 41:23, 61:16, 61:27, 62:14, 127:4, 127:6, 127:8, 141:13, 141:16 UNDERSTAND ABLE [1] - 24:19 UNDERSTAND ABLY [1] - 148:29 UNDERSTOOD [17] - 6:7, 11:28, 13:28, 14:13, 26:14, 28:2, 30:5, 30:13, 32:3, 47:24, 48:21, 74:3, 92:19, 123:22, 144:12, 151:21, 151:28 UNDERTAKE [1] - 95:26 UNDERTAKEN [2] - 147:23, 148:7 UNDERTOOK [2] - 81:5, 169:8 UNDESIRABLE [1] - 166:8 UNFOLDING [2] - 144:10, 158:1 UNFORTUNAT ELY [2] - 36:24, 103:8 UNHELPFUL [1] - 54:5 UNILATERALL Y [1] - 123:10 UNIT [7] - 72:29, 100:23, 103:21, 108:29, 111:15, 111:17, 112:7 UNIT [1] - 49:6 UNITS [1] - 3:16 UNKNOWN [2] - 24:12, 42:14 UNLESS [1] - 97:12 UNLIKE [1] - 103:3 UNLIKELY [2] - 24:8, 135:4 UNPICK [1] - 135:13 UNPLUG [1] - 104:7 UNREPRESEN TATIVE [1] - 70:4 UNSCRAMBLE [1] - 114:17 UNTIL [1] - 180:17 UNUSUAL [1] -	109:10 UP [71] - 7:17, 10:23, 10:26, 11:3, 11:17, 12:10, 17:9, 23:4, 26:27, 27:3, 28:9, 28:18, 29:22, 34:15, 41:1, 46:28, 52:28, 64:14, 64:17, 64:18, 67:11, 69:6, 74:9, 75:13, 77:29, 79:25, 82:7, 83:9, 83:18, 84:14, 84:20, 96:2, 99:2, 101:3, 102:16, 102:19, 102:28, 107:15, 110:4, 112:4, 113:5, 113:21, 118:4, 122:6, 122:8, 122:16, 127:28, 129:21, 130:21, 132:10, 135:24, 145:22, 145:24, 147:15, 147:20, 148:12, 148:17, 148:23, 151:26, 152:2, 152:27, 153:1, 157:12, 157:29, 158:23, 159:10, 159:28, 162:12, 170:13, 172:19, 172:23 UPDATE [1] - 43:10 UPKEEP [1] - 8:1 URBAN [1] - 20:13 URGENT [1] - 81:26 USEFUL [4] - 83:11, 89:20, 125:3, 160:21 UTILISED [1] - 32:5 UTILITARIAN [1] - 36:22 UTTERED [1] - 110:29 UTTERLY [1] - 59:16	VARIATIONS [1] - 59:7 VARIETY [2] - 19:3, 135:27 VARIOUS [11] - 10:14, 11:7, 18:21, 32:7, 66:29, 71:20, 77:15, 97:28, 99:23, 99:25, 104:28 VARIOUSLY [1] - 95:9 VCPS [1] - 157:12 VEHICLE [13] - 14:21, 22:13, 25:29, 32:21, 47:12, 98:1, 140:17, 151:20, 151:21, 161:5, 161:8 VEHICLE'S [1] - 96:22 VEHICLES [9] - 10:22, 16:10, 16:24, 22:11, 99:29, 124:22, 156:5, 159:10, 161:12 VENGEFUL [19] - 43:2, 43:18, 43:19, 46:6, 46:8, 46:13, 46:20, 47:4, 47:7, 85:3, 86:17, 88:17, 99:27, 100:5, 100:6, 100:8, 101:4, 107:29, 108:18 VERBATIM [2] - 5:6, 173:2 VERIFIED [1] - 101:5 VERSION [13] - 20:7, 20:26, 20:28, 20:29, 60:27, 126:20, 139:29, 141:22, 141:24, 142:15, 142:24, 149:13, 178:11 VERSIONS [7] - 19:20, 68:9, 68:13, 68:18, 68:22, 69:5, 142:17 VESTED [1] - 126:4 VIA [1] - 97:28	VICINITY [4] - 10:16, 81:18, 123:21, 151:24 VICTIMS [2] - 84:17, 157:22 VIEW [7] - 25:19, 26:1, 80:26, 91:2, 94:7, 104:9, 149:27 VIEWED [1] - 82:19 VIEWS [1] - 107:20 VIGOROUSLY [1] - 156:28 VIOLENT [1] - 4:6 VIRTUE [1] - 66:2 VISIBILITY [1] - 14:14 VISUAL [2] - 21:12, 25:22 VIVIDLY [1] - 136:5 VOLUME [1] - 136:10	38:22, 39:28, 43:7, 44:8, 44:13, 44:14, 45:29, 46:5, 46:11, 48:13, 48:16, 52:7, 52:8, 52:19, 54:10, 54:28, 55:4, 55:6, 56:21, 56:28, 58:4, 58:25, 58:26, 67:8, 67:25, 68:3, 72:10, 81:28, 83:20, 88:6, 91:3, 102:5, 110:21, 113:25, 114:15, 116:3, 122:29, 124:14, 133:8, 133:18, 134:21, 135:2, 137:5, 140:16, 151:8, 153:24, 154:7, 154:16, 154:17, 157:15, 158:17, 159:19, 159:26, 163:8, 163:19, 165:7, 165:15, 168:28, 169:12, 169:14, 176:20, 177:11, 177:21, 178:4, 178:15 WARNING [1] - 20:14 WARNINGS [20] - 31:13, 31:19, 38:18, 38:28, 39:4, 39:7, 40:5, 56:17, 57:6, 57:17, 68:3, 92:1, 92:3, 105:20, 110:9, 113:10, 113:15, 114:2, 114:5, 163:2 WARRANT [1] - 41:10 WARRANT [1] - 106:21 WAS [15] - 51:13, 65:10, 73:25, 81:1, 90:15, 95:1, 111:24, 115:1, 117:14, 138:20, 152:14, 155:23, 162:26, 167:14, 175:23 WATCH [1] - 128:17 WATCHKEEPE R [2] - 67:17, 68:10	
U						
UK [2] - 153:8, 166:6 ULSTER [1] - 114:6 ULTIMATE [1] - 120:4 UNACCOMPAN IED [1] - 115:16 UNAFFECTED [1] - 27:6 UNDER [18] - 4:25, 5:12, 19:6, 23:26, 26:28, 42:1, 59:22, 61:20, 74:14, 87:10, 120:28, 121:11, 121:19, 122:10, 140:14, 141:25, 147:2, 147:29 UNDERESTIM ATE [1] - 111:12 UNDERLYING [3] - 56:5, 64:4, 139:23 UNDERNEATH						
V						
VALUE [1] - 84:8 VARIATION [1] - 71:24						
W						
WAIT [4] - 79:25, 84:20, 129:4, 129:15 WAITING [1] - 34:16 WALK [1] - 101:16 WALKED [1] - 151:8 WALKIE [2] - 114:13, 115:17 WALKIE- TALKIE [2] - 114:13, 115:17 WALKING [3] - 10:29, 12:23, 107:3 WANDERING [1] - 12:12 WARN [1] - 3:1 WARNING [86] - 15:6, 15:26, 16:13, 21:13, 22:1, 22:4, 22:6, 22:20, 22:22, 23:10, 27:19, 28:12, 29:20, 31:17, 32:7, 32:20, 32:21,						

WATCHKEEPER R ^[24] - 6:2, 8:27, 29:22, 30:12, 41:4, 41:8, 50:23, 50:25, 51:25, 58:3, 82:25, 125:11, 125:17, 125:22, 125:25, 125:28, 126:7, 127:22, 128:2, 128:5, 128:25, 131:11, 132:22, 174:2 WATCHKEEPER R'S ^[47] - 5:12, 5:14, 5:16, 5:18, 5:20, 7:25, 7:29, 9:1, 27:20, 27:28, 28:5, 28:7, 28:13, 28:19, 29:9, 29:19, 30:1, 30:17, 41:5, 47:1, 49:1, 51:17, 56:21, 60:20, 67:24, 68:15, 68:16, 68:17, 75:19, 126:16, 126:19, 126:24, 126:25, 127:20, 133:17, 139:21, 146:19, 149:12, 152:20, 172:6, 172:11, 173:23, 173:28, 176:2, 177:1, 177:8 WATCHKEEPER RS ^[2] - 128:16, 145:19 WAYS ^[3] - 43:26, 99:25, 173:15 WEARING ^[1] - 125:26 WEBSITE ^[2] - 117:3, 117:25 WEDGE ^[1] - 149:6 WEEK ^[3] - 43:19, 168:4, 171:1 WEEKEND ^[1] - 102:11 WEEKS ^[6] - 125:7, 152:23, 153:11, 169:23, 169:26, 171:20 WEETON ^[1] - 167:29 WEIGHED ^[1] - 22:11	WHEREAS ^[2] - 46:17, 139:21 WHEREBY ^[2] - 61:25, 157:11 WHICHEVER ^[2] - 8:26, 145:21 WHILST ^[5] - 4:7, 4:20, 5:23, 43:8, 121:6 WHITE ^[7] - 19:25, 20:24, 174:15, 174:22, 174:26, 174:27, 175:1 WHO'D ^[1] - 155:5 WHOLE ^[7] - 14:26, 15:29, 59:11, 59:18, 72:18, 103:14, 148:13 WIDE ^[9] - 31:14, 31:20, 38:18, 38:29, 52:7, 66:18, 105:20, 110:10, 121:19 WIDELY ^[1] - 32:24 WIDER ^[2] - 27:1, 173:6 WILLING ^[1] - 71:25 WILLY ^[1] - 161:29 WILLY-NILLY ^[1] - 161:29 WING ^[1] - 37:17 WISH ^[2] - 85:10, 116:12 WISHED ^[1] - 109:21 WITHDRAW ^[1] - 165:28 WITNESS ^[32] - 11:12, 11:22, 27:29, 44:22, 44:25, 44:28, 45:3, 45:5, 45:8, 45:14, 47:7, 63:3, 95:5, 146:21, 146:25, 146:28, 147:3, 147:14, 147:19, 148:10, 149:3, 150:6, 154:18, 154:21, 154:23, 154:27, 155:1, 155:3, 165:23, 167:2, 180:15, 181:2	WITNESS ^[1] - 90:24 WITNESS ^[12] - 59:1, 94:26, 116:25, 116:29, 117:12, 120:14, 166:7, 166:18, 167:10, 167:21, 168:27, 169:17 WITNESSES ^[3] - 30:29, 95:8, 166:3 WIVES/ GIRLFRIENDS ^[1] - 102:11 WONDER ^[8] - 94:27, 105:9, 116:19, 116:23, 117:9, 117:11, 130:15, 154:11 WONDERING ^[2] - 104:23, 115:24 WORD ^[7] - 20:18, 20:19, 21:2, 52:9, 69:14, 82:21, 140:20 WORDS ^[15] - 55:17, 97:19, 100:25, 107:6, 111:29, 114:9, 114:10, 122:2, 123:11, 123:25, 137:22, 141:20, 143:4, 148:13, 179:12 WORTH ^[3] - 36:11, 100:19, 131:14 WORTHWHILE ^[1] - 78:9 WRITE ^[19] - 39:16, 61:26, 68:7, 70:19, 84:29, 87:28, 100:27, 127:5, 130:6, 130:7, 131:9, 139:10, 139:12, 139:14, 148:12, 149:6, 149:20, 172:12, 172:23 WRITER ^[1] - 130:16 WRITES ^[2] - 48:18, 85:14 WRITING ^[20] - 43:5, 45:10, 45:11, 62:9, 69:10, 84:27,	85:9, 85:17, 100:26, 106:1, 109:7, 127:7, 127:27, 135:7, 147:20, 152:19, 171:21, 172:3, 174:1, 174:7 WRITTEN ^[63] - 28:15, 28:23, 41:23, 44:12, 44:14, 45:25, 45:26, 46:15, 60:15, 61:16, 61:29, 62:4, 63:15, 63:18, 63:20, 65:14, 69:14, 78:16, 86:11, 87:25, 88:6, 100:20, 106:6, 106:10, 106:12, 106:15, 106:17, 107:9, 108:17, 108:18, 111:29, 112:8, 112:10, 112:11, 113:24, 113:28, 127:8, 127:11, 131:5, 134:18, 137:8, 138:27, 138:29, 139:1, 139:6, 141:5, 141:12, 142:5, 143:9, 143:11, 143:16, 147:10, 147:13, 147:15, 147:17, 148:4, 148:17, 148:23, 175:13, 177:17 WROTE ^[10] - 67:22, 112:22, 139:11, 139:19, 142:8, 143:14, 147:10, 149:9, 171:10, 171:22	YOUNG ^[2] - 3:10, 3:12 YOURSELF ^[9] - 19:7, 24:20, 102:23, 105:13, 106:5, 109:13, 120:3, 130:24, 170:26
Z				
ZONE ^[4] - 22:16, 24:11, 26:4, 26:5				
Y				
YARDS ^[2] - 101:16, 102:3 YEAR ^[2] - 65:20, 118:5 YEARS ^[6] - 18:21, 68:5, 87:17, 96:12, 100:5, 145:17 YEARS' ^[1] - 172:13 YESTERDAY ^[3] - 91:12, 114:1, 114:7				