

1           THE INQUIRY RESUMED ON THURSDAY, 1ST OCTOBER 2026 AS  
2           FOLLOWS:

3  
4           CHAIRMAN: Mr. Rafferty.

5           MR. RAFFERTY: Good afternoon, Sir. Sir, you are going 12:23  
6           to hear from DCI Neil McGuinness now, on behalf of the  
7           PSNI. He was originally scheduled to give evidence  
8           yesterday but we're grateful to him for reattending  
9           today. So, before we get started could DCI McGuinness  
10          be sworn, please. 12:23

11  
12          DCI NEIL MCGUINNESS, HAVING BEEN SWORN, WAS QUESTIONED  
13          BY MR. RAFFERTY AS FOLLOWS:

14  
15          CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. McGuinness, and good 12:24  
16          afternoon.

17          THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Sir.

18          1 Q. MR. RAFFERTY: Can we begin, can you tell us your name  
19                  and your rank, please.

20          A. Yes, I'm Detective Chief Inspector Neil James 12:24  
21                  McGuinness.

22          2 Q. Thank you, DCI McGuinness. Now, we have a witness  
23                  statement that you have provided to the Inquiry, that  
24                  is for the purpose of the record, Sir, it's INQ  
25                  reference 041335, and that's the witness statement of 12:24  
26                  DCI McGuinness on behalf of the PSNI regarding entries  
27                  made on MoD Daily Occurrence Book on 15th August 1998.  
28                  And, DCI McGuinness, that statement, am I correct, was  
29                  made on 24th April of this year?

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 3 Q. Thank you. Is that statement, DCI McGuinness, based on  
3 your own knowledge and did you seek and obtain the  
4 assistance of others within the PSNI for the purposes  
5 of preparing that statement? 12:25

6 A. It's not based on my direct knowledge, but it is based  
7 on the research that my team have completed and liaison  
8 with certain experts who had working within the RUC at  
9 that time.

10 4 Q. So, the preparation of your statement involved your 12:25  
11 engagement and direction as between individuals who had  
12 worked for the police at the time, who may have some  
13 knowledge of the issues that are the subject of the  
14 statement, is that correct?

15 A. Yes, that's right. 12:25

16 5 Q. In terms of your own experience, do you have any  
17 personal experience of the matters that we're going to  
18 talk about?

19 A. No, no personal experience. I was in the police 1998  
20 but I was in the police force in England, I transferred 12:25  
21 back here in 2007.

22 6 Q. And you've a member of the PSNI since that point in  
23 time, is that correct?

24 A. Since 2007, yes.

25 7 Q. Thank you. In terms of the topics that we're going to 12:25  
26 deal with today, you will be aware from your statement  
27 that they can be stated simply. First of all, we're  
28 going to look at the concept and the details around  
29 what's has referred to as RUC Net, DCI McGuinness?

1 A. Yes.

2 8 Q. And then second of all we're going to look at what is a  
3 Daily Occurrence Book, and it is a military document  
4 that we looked at yesterday, and it's going to be a  
5 document we'll bring up onto the screen now if we can, 12:26  
6 that's INQ 034854. [Short pause]. Thank you. And  
7 just stay with the cover page for a moment. Just to  
8 introduce the context to this document and what your  
9 understanding of what that is. At paragraph 27 of your  
10 statement you say that it's your understanding of a 12:26  
11 particular regiment that was based in the Omagh and  
12 Fermanagh area in 1998, DCI McGuinness, is that  
13 correct?

14 A. Yes, that's correct.

15 9 Q. Can you explain that and clarify that for us, please? 12:27

16 A. Yes. My understanding is that Queen's Lancashire  
17 Regiment were based in Omagh at that period in time,  
18 along with 4 Royal Irish as well.

19 10 Q. Were you here yesterday, you heard some evidence that  
20 that's referred to, the Queen's Lancashire Regiment as 12:27  
21 1 QLR at the time?

22 A. Yes, that's right.

23 11 Q. And that's what we see in the cover page of this  
24 document, is that right?

25 A. Yes. 12:27

26 12 Q. And you referred to the Royal Irish Regiment?

27 A. Yes.

28 13 Q. And the 4th Battalion of that, which appears to be  
29 consistent with what we see on the cover page of this

1 document?

2 A. Yes, I understand that was the Omagh and Enniskillen  
3 area.

4 14 Q. There has been some evidence which the Inquiry has  
5 received which indicate that they were based at 12:27  
6 Lisanelly Barracks in Omagh at that time; do you have  
7 anything to say that that's not correct?

8 A. No, that's my belief as well.

9 15 Q. So, in terms of the particular document that we have,  
10 and again I appreciate that I'm asking you some 12:27  
11 questions about something which clear, without any  
12 argument, is a military document?

13 A. Yes.

14 16 Q. What can you say is your understanding of what this  
15 document is? 12:28

16 A. So, as has been discussed with previous evidence to the  
17 Inquiry, it's marked "for intelligence eyes only," so,  
18 that stands out to had me, there would be similar sort  
19 of precautions taken with police documents as well.  
20 But a Daily Occurrence Book, my understanding is, would 12:28  
21 be a note, potentially, used for briefing upwards on a  
22 daily basis of significant or noteworthy events that  
23 happened in that area on a given date.

24 17 Q. If I can ask for page 6 to be turned up, please. And  
25 the serial towards the bottom, 386, if that can be 12:28  
26 highlighted. So, DCI McGuinness, I'm not going to read  
27 this out but is it correct to say that it is this  
28 particular serial entry on the Daily Occurrence Book  
29 which has formed the focus of your statement and your

1 evidence to the Inquiry?

2 A. Yes, that's right.

3 18 Q. And, again, just to assist everyone, whereas there has  
4 been some evidence on behalf of individuals who were  
5 soldiers at the time, who may have been able to speak 12:29  
6 to this document and, perhaps, some general practice at  
7 the time as between the military or even between the  
8 RUC and military at the time, has this, am I right in  
9 understanding, been the focus of your statement rather  
10 than, perhaps for reasons not least you weren't in the 12:29  
11 police at the time, any of those issues discussed  
12 yesterday?

13 A. This document, yes.

14 19 Q. Thank you. Now, you can see, perhaps, if we just step  
15 back for a moment to see the document or the page as a 12:29  
16 whole. Is it your understanding you could see across  
17 the top, DCI McGuinness, the structure of the document,  
18 it permits a serial number on the first column, and  
19 then as you move across the top, date, time, et cetera  
20 there's a record of something being recorded. And then 12:30  
21 the details of the occurrence, action taken and so on  
22 and so forth?

23 A. Yes, I can see that.

24 20 Q. Thank you. Then just bring serial 386 back up please.  
25 Since you provided your statement, DCI McGuinness, 12:30  
26 you're aware, I hope, of a statement provided by the  
27 then Lance Corporal Thompson, is that correct?

28 A. Yes, I am, I've read that.

29 21 Q. That's a recent statement. That's dated 22nd September

1 Sir, from Mr. Errol Thompson, and he's going to give  
2 evidence next week. He will say, DCI McGuinness, do  
3 you understand, that he was a Lance Corporal within the  
4 4th Battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment and he was  
5 based in what's called the Intelligence Cell in  
6 Lisanelly Barracks at that time; that's your  
7 understanding now?

12:30

8 A. That is, yes.

9 22 Q. You didn't have that understanding when you first  
10 provided your statement, is that correct?

12:30

11 A. No, that was not known to me then.

12 23 Q. We understand that he says at his statement, which is  
13 paragraph 9, I'm not going to ask for it to be brought  
14 on the screen, but if you are aware of it, he said that  
15 he seen this Daily Occurrence Book and he goes on to  
16 say, in particular looking at serial 386:

12:31

17  
18 "I can confirm that I recognise my handwriting in the  
19 book on 15th August."

12:31

20  
21 As I said, including serial 386. Now, as I said,  
22 Mr. Thompson is going to give evidence about what he  
23 did and what he recalls of 15th August next week. But  
24 in terms of the detail of what appears to have been  
25 recorded you can see that it begins "overheard on RUC  
26 Net." Can I ask you, what is the PSNI's understanding  
27 of what the RUC Net was in August 1998?

12:31

28 A. So, in short terms the RUC radio network. So the RUC  
29 in 1998 was divided into three regions, Belfast, North

1 and South, essentially, so each region had four  
2 divisions and then they were broken up into  
3 sub-divisions. So, Omagh would have been one  
4 sub-divisional area. Each sub-divisional area had its  
5 main radio channel. It operated on the VHF frequency 12:32  
6 network, so the very high frequency which was effective  
7 in most areas across Northern Ireland. There was UHF,  
8 which was ultra high frequency and that provision was  
9 really normally used in rural areas outside Belfast and  
10 it had very limited application for areas. So, the UHF 12:32  
11 was used as a secondary sort of backup system in very  
12 small areas, in mainly rural areas. My advice is that  
13 Omagh didn't utilise the UHF frequency because the VHF  
14 signal was very strong. The transmitter being just  
15 outside Omagh Town. So, the VHF channel was the one 12:33  
16 that was in use in Omagh from the Omagh Communications  
17 Room.

18  
19 Do you want me to go to military access?

20 24 Q. Can we step back just a little bit. Perhaps can it can 12:33  
21 be established, so far as your understanding is, the  
22 RUC and the military, did they share, for all purposes,  
23 the same radio channel or did they operate different  
24 radio channels?

25 A. No, completely different systems. 12:33

26 25 Q. So, the RUC had its own radio system, so to speak, at  
27 the time?

28 A. Yes.

29 26 Q. And then you're, I think, saying that the RUC had

1 arranged itself between regional, divisional and  
2 sub-divisional bases, is that correct?

3 A. Yes. So, it's not like it is today where Belfast could  
4 speak on the radio channels to Omagh so that wasn't a  
5 capability. So, the officers based in Omagh would only 12:33  
6 have heard the Omagh VHF channel.

7 27 Q. Okay. Can you explain to us what your understanding of  
8 the VHF frequency was used for and who actually used  
9 it?

10 A. So, there were officers based in the Omagh Police 12:34  
11 Station Communications Room and their task was to  
12 direct and communicate with officers in and around the  
13 sub-division. So, they had a Command and Control  
14 computer system where calls for service were logged.  
15 They would then communicate directly with officers 12:34  
16 either on the ground or indeed in the station to sort  
17 of task them to attend various incidents, to relay  
18 messages back and forth between officers and between  
19 call signs, and they would really run the Command and  
20 Control across that radio network. 12:34

21 28 Q. You have, at paragraph 15 of your statement,  
22 DCI McGuinness, referred to "standard policing  
23 communications," is that really what you're describing  
24 in terms of the everyday communications that might be  
25 passed between a police station and its officers who 12:34  
26 aren't in that station at the time?

27 A. Yes, that's correct.

28 29 Q. That's something different, is it to be distinguished  
29 between ultra high frequency channel?

1 A. Yes, as I said, the information that I have is that  
2 Omagh didn't utilise the ultra high frequency channel,  
3 mainly because their VHF channel was so strong that  
4 everything could be put across that, it really was a  
5 backup system that wasn't needed in Omagh. 12:35

6 30 Q. And the information you have about the strength of the  
7 VHF frequency, if we call it that as opposed to ultra  
8 high frequency channel, where does that come from? Is  
9 that information you've gathered in the course of  
10 preparing for this statement? 12:35

11 A. Yes, it is, from an engineer who worked on the system  
12 at the time.

13 31 Q. We know that Lance Corporal Thompson (as he then was)  
14 he says in his statement, paragraph 7, that listening  
15 to what he calls the RUC Net enabled the intelligence 12:35  
16 team to listen to information that was being reported  
17 by officers on the ground to their Operations Room.  
18 Does that explanation appear to be consistent, or  
19 understanding at least, appear to be consistent with  
20 your understanding of what the VHF channel was? 12:36

21 A. Yes, the VHF channel would have been accessible.

22 32 Q. Can you say whether or not at the time the RUC was  
23 aware of the military being able to listen to, if it  
24 was in fact the VHF channel, at that time?

25 A. Yes, throughout all of Northern Ireland the RUC would 12:36  
26 have supplied local military bases with either a  
27 handheld radio set similar to what was carried by the  
28 police officers themselves, or a desk-based set as  
29 well, and the Army would have had full access to the

1 VHF system, locally.

2 33 Q. And if we can explore the purpose of doing that. Was  
3 the provision of this equipment and the system for the  
4 purpose of the military being able to listen, as Lance  
5 Corporal Thompson has indicated, or was it even greater 12:37  
6 than that insofar as did the police use it as a means  
7 of actually contacting the military?

8 A. No, it's former. It's really so that the military  
9 could be facilitated to listen to ongoing police  
10 actions in their vicinity. 12:37

11 34 Q. And if I could put it another way, would the RUC have  
12 had other means of contacting military, had they wanted  
13 to, rather than through what we understand, knowing  
14 that somebody in an Intelligence Cell would be  
15 listening in to the RUC Net? 12:37

16 A. Yes. The military wouldn't have been contacted through  
17 that radio system. The military would have been  
18 contacted by telephone system or liaison officers, so  
19 it was really a listening brief that the military had  
20 with the VHF radio. Obviously, the toggle switch on 12:37  
21 the radio switch was fictional so they could have  
22 transmitted on to our network but it wasn't, certainly  
23 wasn't the normal thing do.

24 35 Q. As you understand it, was it a radio or system as might  
25 have been provided to any other police officer and 12:38  
26 that's what the military happened to have, but they  
27 didn't use it as other police officers might have done?

28 A. Precisely. It was exactly the same radio set that a  
29 patrolling RUC officer would have had.

1 36 Q. And to the best of your knowledge, was the relationship  
2 whereby the military had this equipment and were able  
3 to listen in to the communications that you've  
4 described, was it something which was governed either  
5 by, or was it spoken to by any type of protocol or any 12:38  
6 type of rule or guidance?

7 A. We haven't been able to locate any sort of written  
8 protocol or anything of that nature from 1998, no.

9 37 Q. So, is your evidence not that there wasn't a document  
10 such as that or an agreement such as that, it's that 12:39  
11 your enquiries lead you to say that you just can't find  
12 one or you can't establish whether or not in fact  
13 something was in place?

14 A. Certainly, we can't find one from extensive research.  
15 It appears that there wasn't one in place but I can't 12:39  
16 say definitively.

17 38 Q. So, having asked you, if we focus for a moment on the  
18 idea of the VHF channel and that this is something  
19 which was available to and used by officers at a local  
20 level in Omagh, is that correct? 12:39

21 A. That's correct.

22 39 Q. Can we just deal with whether or not you're aware of  
23 any other channels that the RUC could have been?

24 A. No, there were no other alternatives at that time.

25 40 Q. And is the resting position then of the PSNI, as we are 12:39  
26 today, to the effect that the RUC Net, as you see it  
27 recorded in the Daily Occurrence Book, is in fact  
28 somebody listening in to what was the VHF channel in  
29 Omagh?

1           A.    Yes, the Omagh sub-divisional VHF channel, yes, that's  
2                correct.

3    41   Q.    Is that view strengthened, or otherwise affected, by  
4                what you understand Former Lance Corporal Thompson to  
5                have said? 12:40

6           A.    It's consistent with it but it was the sort of  
7                corporate information that we could locate.

8    42   Q.    So, if we could just look back then at serial 386,  
9                please. I won't repeat all of the detail that of  
10               serial there was quite a lot of evidence about it 12:40  
11               yesterday, DCI McGuinness, and I trust you're familiar  
12               with it?

13          A.    Yes.

14    43   Q.    On any reading, it suggests that there was a  
15                communication to the effect of there being several 12:40  
16                warning calls to areas other than Omagh, to multiple  
17                places. There's a reference to "province wide," for  
18                example. And you understand from attending yesterday  
19                not least, that this is an issue of importance to some  
20                or many of the Core Participants in this Inquiry, isn't 12:41  
21                that right?

22          A.    Yes, I understand that.

23    44   Q.    What is the PSNI's position as regards whether it has  
24                any record which reflects what is appearing in  
25                serial 386? 12:41

26          A.    So, our position is that the Omagh sub-divisional VHF  
27                channel was the only communication that would have been  
28                received from the military at that time regarding  
29                anything going on in Omagh. Our radio transmissions

1 are recorded. We have provided the recording from that  
2 day to the Inquiry, as well as the transcript. There  
3 was a transmission made at 14:35 from Omagh  
4 Communications Room but it does not match the wording  
5 that's recorded in this entry.

12:41

6 45 Q. So that we're clear, DCI McGuinness, and this is, as  
7 I've said, a matter of importance; is it the PSNI's  
8 position that it did receive information and may have  
9 communicated information to the effect that what is  
10 seen in serial 386, or that it does not have  
11 information as is reflected in serial 386?

12:42

12 A. It does not have information that reflects precisely  
13 what is written in serial 386, in particular the  
14 difference and the variation is that there were  
15 warnings received over bombs in several towns. We do  
16 not have information that suggests that that was the  
17 case.

12:42

18 46 Q. If I take you to paragraph 41 of your statement, am I  
19 right in putting it like this, that the PSNI maintains  
20 the position that the RUC was informed about three  
21 warning calls prior to the Omagh bombing and those are  
22 the three which are concerned with the Omagh bombing?

12:42

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 47 Q. And in investigating this issue and trying to assess  
25 whether or not there is anything which is connected as  
26 between the police records and what you see in the  
27 Daily Occurrence Book, you have said, is it correct, at  
28 paragraph 42 of your statement, that PSNI believes a  
29 mistake was made which led to incorrect information

12:43

1           being entered into the log, is that right?

2           A.    Yes, that's correct.

3    48   Q.    Now, whenever you say a mistake, do you offer an  
4           explanation as to where exactly the mistake occurred  
5           along the way or whether it was done intentionally? 12:43

6           A.    I can't comment on exactly how that mistake transpired  
7           or any deliberate measure or accidental. What I can  
8           say is that when we compare what was broadcast from  
9           Omagh RUC Communications Room at that time, that is  
10          similar to but has variance to the entry, it does not 12:43  
11          match it. So, I have a quote of exactly what we say  
12          was broadcast, if you allow me to read that.

13   49   Q.    Well, just before you do that. Is it right to say,  
14          then, that you have considered what the communications  
15          were, from PSNI's perspective, from the Omagh 12:44  
16          Communications Room on 15th August?

17          A.    Yes, we've reviewed that.

18   50   Q.    That has led you to particular communication or a  
19          particular entry which you think is relevant to the  
20          what you see in the Daily Occurrence Book? 12:44

21          A.    Yes. It appears to me that the communication at 13:35  
22          by Constable Millar was the one that generated the  
23          entry in the MoD log.

24   51   Q.    And am I right in saying that that's the entry which  
25          you have recorded and set out in paragraph 37(a) of 12:44  
26          your statement?

27          A.    That's right, yes.

28   52   Q.    Can you just, from your own perspective, set out why it  
29          is you think that is a communication which, perhaps

1 through mistakes, somewhere along the way has been  
2 recorded in the Daily Occurrence Book?

3 A. So, that transmission which was by a Constable Millar  
4 in Communications Room was the first transmission that  
5 the RUC made to its officers regarding a bomb threat in 12:45  
6 Omagh Town. It was made at 1435 hrs and that was after  
7 Constable Millar received information on the Command  
8 and Control system and by telephone of the three  
9 warnings that had been received by the police in the  
10 minutes before that. So, Constable Millar contacted 12:45  
11 the Duty Sergeant, as his immediate supervisor, to seek  
12 advice and then made a broadcast and started to task  
13 resources in Omagh Town.

14 53 Q. You have considered, am I right in saying, further  
15 other entries in the communications transmission record 12:45  
16 from 15th August, is that right?

17 A. Yes, I've reviewed the entire system.

18 54 Q. And your view is there is no other entry which may be  
19 related to what we see in the Daily Occurrence Book?

20 A. No, the entries prior to that are normal 12:45  
21 business as usual, counterfeit notes, statements being  
22 taken and that sort of nature.

23 55 Q. And those notes, without looking at the rest of the  
24 Daily Occurrence Book, those records don't necessarily  
25 all, or perhaps to any significant extent, make their 12:46  
26 way into the Daily Occurrence Book, is that correct?

27 A. That's correct, they wouldn't have been significant  
28 enough for the military to have recorded in their book,  
29 I wouldn't think.

1 56 Q. So, from your point of view, you're not saying, for  
2 example, that the Daily Occurrence Book could be taken  
3 itself to be an accurate record of what's in the RUC  
4 communication records?  
5 A. No, certainly not. 12:46  
6 57 Q. Now, I understand from looking at paragraph 37 of your  
7 statement that you go on to make, I think, suggestions  
8 in assistance of the Inquiry as to what the  
9 difficulties might have been in terms of the RUC  
10 communication and what then is recorded in the Daily 12:46  
11 Occurrence Book. Can you just explain, from the PSNI's  
12 perspective, what those reasons might be as to how  
13 there was a mistake along the way?  
14 A. The quality of the recording, the quality of the VHF  
15 channel at the time, albeit that I said earlier on it 12:47  
16 had good signal in Omagh sub-division, it still had its  
17 limitations. So, the quality of the sort of  
18 transmissions could have been problematic to the  
19 listener. At the time of preparing this statement I  
20 did posit that the local Northern Ireland accent that 12:47  
21 would have been broadcast on our channel may have been  
22 difficult for some British Army officers to sort of  
23 interpret or understand. I now understand that  
24 Corporal Thompson is from Northern Ireland so that may  
25 be less of an issue. But, also, there's a similarity 12:47  
26 in the wording, but I would say a crucial difference in  
27 the wording that Constable Millar put across about the  
28 three calls which could have been either  
29 misinterpreted. I also note that our transmission was

1 in 14:35 and the entry purports to be from the military  
2 at 14:40, so there seems to be a five-minute gap there,  
3 and I am aware that the Intelligence Cell would have  
4 had to travel to their Operations Room to convey the  
5 message to the log keeper. So, you know, there's a 12:48  
6 five-minute delay there and then the notes are made  
7 five minutes later. So, all those reasons,  
8 potentially, to me could be reasons for a slight  
9 misrecording of the information.

10 58 Q. Are you suggesting - and I'm not saying it is anything 12:48  
11 more than a suggestion - that the taking action having  
12 heard the communication on the RUC Net may have led to  
13 a period of time before the entry is actually made, is  
14 that correct?

15 A. Yes, that's correct. 12:48

16 59 Q. I understand. And that, you think, could be an  
17 explanation as to how there's a difference between what  
18 was first heard and then what was recorded?

19 A. Yes, that's right.

20 60 Q. I understand. You might be aware that Lance Corporal 12:48  
21 Thompson (as he then was), he has said in his statement  
22 that he can't be -- he cannot say whether or not what  
23 he has recorded is a verbatim note of a specific radio  
24 message or a summary of radio traffic which he heard on  
25 the RUC Net more generally. And he goes on to say: 12:49

26  
27 "I believe that I would have made this entry at 14:40  
28 when it is timed in the Occurrence Book rather than  
29 later in the day. I have no recollection of making

1 this entry or of receiving information which is written  
2 but recognise it to be my handwriting."  
3

4 The three final questions for you, DCI McGuinness, the  
5 first, is in relation the point we've just looked at, 12:49  
6 and that's the action taken. From your review of the  
7 action taken, is there anything within that, hat  
8 relates to the police that you can say or what you can  
9 say does not relate to the police?

10 A. Of the list of actions recorded in the "action taken" 12:49  
11 column there is a reference to "the RUC now checking  
12 and securing area," which indeed is consistent with  
13 what I believe we were doing at the time. The other  
14 actions then appear to relate to military messages and  
15 notifications, as I would expect. 12:50

16 61 Q. And your statement addresses what I think has been  
17 described as a time discrepancy between the serial that  
18 we've looked at and other entries in the Daily  
19 Occurrence Book. Is it right that the PSNI doesn't  
20 seek to offer an explanation for that? 12:50

21 A. No, we have no information to suggest why that would  
22 be.

23 62 Q. The last question I have comes back to a point I made  
24 earlier about, for example, other radio channels and  
25 the VHF channel that you've given evidence about, 12:50  
26 there's obviously a risk that we could focus on  
27 something and exclude possibilities. Has the PSNI  
28 considered whether or not there are entries elsewhere,  
29 so other than what's recorded, coming from the Omagh

1            Communications Room via Constable Millar which is  
2            similar to or reflective of or what serial 386 says?

3            A.    Yes, so on our Command and Control system we have  
4            records of the three independent sort of calls that we  
5            received leading up to Constable Millar's transmission, 12:51  
6            and they reflect individual calls to the police to  
7            calls from Ulster Television and then another call from  
8            Samaritans in the Coleraine area.

9    63    Q.    Let me ask that another way, that may be my  
10           responsibility, DCI McGuinness, the question is really 12:51  
11           as regards whether or not what is seen in the Daily  
12           Occurrence Book whether or not that could come from  
13           some other RUC Net or some other police document other  
14           than what you have checked and what has been the basis  
15           of the suggestion that this may be Constable Millar, is 12:51  
16           there some other book, for example, or some other net  
17           to be considered?

18           A.    I apologise, I understand what the question relates to  
19           now. The RUC had a large ledger called the C/6 Book  
20           which recorded pretty much everything similar to the 12:51  
21           Daily Occurrence Book of the military here. So, each  
22           sub-division would have had C/6 Book. We have reviewed  
23           all the available C/6 Books from all districts across  
24           Northern Ireland, albeit that there are a few which  
25           weren't able to be located in this day and age, and 12:52  
26           none of them have any other information relating to  
27           sort of bomb warnings before the incident in Omagh.

28    64    Q.    So, is it your view that everything that could be  
29           checked has been checked as regards something which

1 might be consistent with what is recorded in the Daily  
2 Occurrence Book?

3 A. Everything in the police estate and the police records  
4 has been checked and there's nothing to suggest other  
5 bomb warnings prior to the Omagh incident. 12:52

6 MR. RAFFERTY: Thank you, DCI McGuinness. That  
7 completes the questions that I have for you. Sir, it's  
8 eight minutes to one, some of the Core Participants  
9 have been granted permission through Rule 10 to ask  
10 questions. Can I just check as to whether or not they 12:52  
11 wish to avail of that before we break? The first Core  
12 Participant would be Mr. Kane, I believe, on behalf of  
13 those that he represents. He has been granted five  
14 minutes.

15 MR. KANE: Chairman, I'm entirely in your hands as to 12:52  
16 whether or not you wish me to start and finish now.

17 CHAIRMAN: What would you prefer, Mr. Kane?

18 MR. KANE: I'm entirely at the convenience of everyone  
19 else, I don't really mind.

20 CHAIRMAN: Shall we just -- 12:53

21 MR. KANE: Just keep going. I'll use the five minutes.  
22 I won't be very long actually.

23  
24 DCI NEIL MCGUINNESS WAS QUESTIONED BY MR. KANE AS  
25 FOLLOWS: 12:53

26  
27 65 Q. MR. KANE: So, are you saying Chief Inspector  
28 McGuinness, THAT there was an alternative UHF system  
29 which I think the word you used was a backup, is that

1 correct?

2 A. "Backup" is my own words. There was another system in  
3 force in the RUC at the time used in some areas but it  
4 would have been very, very much localised. So, a  
5 particular foot patrol in an area would have been able 12:53  
6 to communicate with each other but the rest of the  
7 staff in that district wouldn't have been able to hear  
8 that. Also, the military wouldn't have had access to  
9 the UHF channel.

10 66 Q. But it was, as far as you know, on 15th August, capable 12:53  
11 of being used?

12 A. By the RUC? Yes.

13 67 Q. Yeah. We have had you refer to paragraph 37 of your  
14 statement, and there is a conundrum, it's occupied all  
15 of yesterday and it's occupying a bit of today and will 12:54  
16 occupy whenever Lance Corporal Thompson comes, there's  
17 a clear conundrum as to what's recorded in the 386, and  
18 what was transmitted by Constable Millar. Do you  
19 accept that that exists? I'm not going to take you  
20 through it and point out the differences but, for 12:54  
21 instance, he does talk about and makes reference to,  
22 "RUC HQ Belfast," which doesn't appear at all in  
23 Constable Millar's transmission?

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 68 Q. And I will not take you through, would you just accept, 12:55  
26 there is other differences about plural bombs, plural  
27 towns, province wide and, very significantly,  
28 "including Omagh"?

29 A. I see that, yes.

1 69 Q. And we've heard the evidence yesterday from different  
2 people who were in the room, and will you, essentially,  
3 when you, as I think we all have to do, would you yield  
4 to whatever interpretation that the Chairman has to put  
5 on all of that evidence when it's all heard? 12:55

6 A. Yes. I can only offer the information that we can  
7 provide.

8 70 Q. And, essentially, what you have provided has been an  
9 opinion as to why there may have been, I think the word  
10 was, "a mistake"? 12:55

11 A. What I can say, just to clarify, is that we have a  
12 record of what was broadcast on the radio channel the  
13 RUC were using in Omagh and it does not reflect the  
14 precise detail of that entry.

15 71 Q. Yes. And that's the conundrum? 12:56

16 A. Yeah.

17 72 Q. You, at paragraph 37 of your statement, set out a  
18 number of observations comparing Mr. Millar's  
19 transmission with entry 386, isn't that right?

20 A. That's right, yes. 12:56

21 73 Q. And you've now had to back away from at least two of  
22 those because, is it correct that in your statement you  
23 engaged in speculation, on two occasions and two  
24 separate paragraphs, that one possible explanation was  
25 that Lance Corporal Thompson, whose identity wasn't 12:56  
26 known when your statement was being made, may have had  
27 difficulty in understanding Northern Ireland accents?

28 A. Yes. I'm not sure I could characterise it as  
29 speculation, so in order to try to assist the Chairman

1 I was trying to give some reasons that may explain why  
2 there's a variance between what was transmitted and  
3 what was recorded.

4 74 Q. But you'd no such evidence that Lance Corporal Thompson  
5 had any such difficulty? 12:57

6 A. No, I didn't purport to have any evidence of that.

7 75 Q. And, in fact, we now know that Lance Corporal Thompson  
8 is a Tyrone man?

9 A. That's my understanding, yes.

10 76 Q. And the other basis for your statement, I think as you 12:57  
11 set out at the beginning, was that you relied on a  
12 retired civilian staff member, I think you refer to at  
13 paragraph 4, paragraph 9, but again you haven't  
14 anything to suggest evidentially that that person was  
15 ever present in, familiar with or worked at Lisanelly 12:57  
16 Barracks in August 1998?

17 A. That person didn't work in Lisanelly Barracks, that was  
18 an engineer who worked in the RUC on our network.

19 MR. KANE: That's fine. Thank you very much, indeed,  
20 Chief Inspector. 12:58

21 MR. RAFFERTY: Thank you, Mr. Kane. Sir, there is  
22 questions which are being permitted and time which has  
23 been permitted to Mr. McGowan on behalf of the Fox Law  
24 Group and to Ms. Black on behalf of the group  
25 represented by PA Duffy, Roche McBride and Campbell and 12:58  
26 Haughey group. I'm just getting a nod that Mr. McGowan  
27 doesn't intend to ask any questions, and Ms. Black is  
28 telling me that she also intends not to ask any  
29 questions. I think just finally if I can deal with

1 Mr. Henry and he's telling me on behalf of the PSNI he  
2 doesn't have any questions, Sir. So, unless you have  
3 questions for DCI McGuinness, then this might be a good  
4 time to take a break and to return at 2:00 p.m.

12:58

5  
6 DCI NEIL MCGUINNESS WAS QUESTIONED BY THE CHAIRMAN, AS  
7 FOLLOWS:

8  
9 77 Q. CHAIRMAN: I would just like to be clear about a couple  
10 of things if I may, Mr. McGuinness. The Omagh  
11 sub-division of the RUC ordinarily used the VHF  
12 channel, is that correct?

12:59

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 78 Q. There was available also an UHF channel.

15 A. That's my information, yes.

12:59

16 79 Q. You understood that was not normally used?

17 A. We could find no evidence and no one could remember  
18 that being used in that particular sub-division. It  
19 was used in others, but my information also is that the  
20 military wouldn't have had access to that channel.

12:59

21 80 Q. That's what I was wondering about. The military had  
22 access in the way you've explained to us to the VHF  
23 channel used by the sub-division?

24 A. Yes.

25 81 Q. But you've told us that as far as you understand it,  
26 they did not have access to the UHF channel.

12:59

27 A. Yes, that's my understanding, yes.

28 82 Q. So, what we know is that various broadcasts were  
29 transmitted over the VHF channel during the course of

1           that afternoon?

2       A.    Yes.

3   83   Q.   And, in particular, around the time of 2:35 and

4           onwards.

5       A.    Yes, Mr. Chairman.   Yes. 13:00

6   84   Q.   And if I understood your evidence correctly, those

7           transmissions were all recorded?

8       A.    They are recorded, yes.

9   85   Q.   And if I understood what you said, you've provided

10          those recordings to the Inquiry. 13:00

11       A.    Yes, Mr. Chairman, you have the recordings and a

12          transcript of those recordings.

13   86   Q.   So, for example, we can listen for ourselves to the

14          transmission made by Constable Millar?

15       A.    I believe so, yes. 13:00

16   87   Q.   And we can listen to and look at the transcripts for

17          the other transmissions around that time?

18       A.    That's correct, yes.

19   88   Q.   And so, if Lance Corporal Thompson heard what he has

20          written down in the book we ought to be able to hear 13:01

21          that as well?

22       A.    That would be the case in that instance, yes.

23       CHAIRMAN:   well thank you very much, that's very

24          helpful.

25       THE WITNESS:   Thank you, Sir. 13:01

26       MR. RAFFERTY:   Thank you, Sir.   So if we could return

27          at 2:00 p.m.

28       THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH

29

1           THE INQUIRY RESUMED AS FOLLOWS:

2  
3           CHAIRMAN: Mr. de la Poer.

4           MR. DE LA POER: Sir, good afternoon, although  
5           Mr. Safranauskas has taken his place in the witness  
6           box, in fact we're going to begin with the recording  
7           that was conducted Dublin, it's about ten minutes and  
8           it covers the evidence gathered by the An Garda  
9           Síochána during the period of Part 6, so I wonder if  
10          that can now be played.

14:02

14:02

11  
12          [Evidence of DS Casserly played].

13  
14          DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT EMMET CASSERLY CONTINUED TO BE  
15          QUESTIONED (ON 1ST SEPTEMBER 2026) BY MR. GREANEY AS  
16          FOLLOWS:

14:02

17  
18       89   Q.   MR. GREANEY: Detective Superintendent, we're next  
19           going to deal with what the Inquiry describes as Part 6  
20           of its Chapter 3, so that is to say 15th August 1998,  
21           1504 hrs and the immediate aftermath. And just as you  
22           helped us in relation to Part 4 earlier, I'm now going  
23           to ask you to help us with the movements of mobile  
24           telephones in that subsequent period.

25           A.   Okay.

26       90   Q.   And in simple terms, is what we're going to see,  
27           Detective Superintendent, that the 585 and 980 numbers,  
28           which had moved from the Republic of Ireland to the  
29           area of Omagh in the period before the bombing --

1           A.     Mm-hmm.

2    91   Q.     -- moved back from the area of Omagh to the Republic of  
3               Ireland in the period after the bomb car had been left  
4               in Omagh?

5           A.     That's correct.

6    92   Q.     So, we'll begin, please, by dealing with the movements  
7               of the 585 number in that period, which takes us to  
8               Slide 94. And to remind ourselves, 585 is the mobile  
9               telephone number which is associated with  
10              Colm Murphy --

11          A.     That's right.

12   93   Q.     -- on the basis that that number was registered to him?

13          A.     That's right.

14   94   Q.     And Slide 94, which we have on the screen, was this  
15               slide the product of work that was undertaken by the  
16               AGS?

17          A.     It was.

18   95   Q.     Does the data underpinning that cell site map reveal  
19               that at 1513 hrs a telephone call was made from the 585  
20               number to the 980 number?

21          A.     It does.

22   96   Q.     And what was the duration of that call?

23          A.     56 seconds.

24   97   Q.     And did the data indicate which cell site was utilised  
25               for that call?

26          A.     Yes, it did. It was -- it utilised Eircell's Corcaghan  
27               site, which is south of Monaghan. And then it was  
28               answered off Eircell's Clontibret site in County  
29               Monaghan.

1 98 Q. At 1530 hrs, did the data reveal that a further call  
2 was made from the 585 number --  
3 A. It did.  
4 99 Q. -- to a number ending 371?  
5 A. That's right. It did, yes.  
6 100 Q. That 371 number being a number attributed in the  
7 materials to a person named Denis O'Connor?  
8 A. That's right.  
9 101 Q. What was the duration of that call?  
10 A. One minute and one second.  
11 102 Q. And did the data indicate which cell site was utilised  
12 for that call?  
13 A. It did. It was Eircell's Castleblayney site located in  
14 Castleblayney Town.  
15 103 Q. And then, finally, did the data demonstrate that at  
16 1723 hrs a telephone call was made from the 585 number  
17 to a fixed line number?  
18 A. It did, yes.  
19 104 Q. And by fixed line number, that would be distinct from a  
20 mobile telephone number?  
21 A. It would. It's a standard landline.  
22 105 Q. A standard landline --  
23 A. Yeah.  
24 106 Q. -- as might often be called. Was that landline number  
25 a number ending 088?  
26 A. It was.  
27 107 Q. How long did that call last for?  
28 A. One minute and 19 seconds.  
29 108 Q. And was the cell site serving that call by 585 at 17:23

1           ascertained?

2           A.    It was.  It was identified as Claremont Carn, located  
3                   at Ravensdale, Dundalk, County Louth.

4  109   Q.    So, that 585 number has, by now, travelled well back  
5                   from Omagh and is installed within the Republic of  
6                   Ireland in the area of Dundalk?

7           A.    It is, yes.

8  110   Q.    And we're next going to carry out an equivalent  
9                   exercise in relation to the 980 number.  And just to  
10                  remind ourselves, that number is associated with  
11                  Terrence Morgan, on the basis that it was registered to  
12                  his father-in-law and materials demonstrated that he  
13                  was the principal user of that number?

14          A.    That's right.

15 111   Q.    And so, can we go to the cell site map at 103, please.   14:07  
16                  And, again, is this a map showing the product of work  
17                  undertaken by the AGS?

18          A.    It is.

19 112   Q.    Did the data reveal that at 1541 hrs on 15th August a  
20                  call was made from the 980 number to a 105 number?

21          A.    It did.

22 113   Q.    And that 105 number, is that a number attributed in the  
23                  materials to a man named Seamus McKenna?

24          A.    It is, yes.

25 114   Q.    What was the duration of that call?

26          A.    That call lasted one minute and 55 seconds.

27 115   Q.    So, where we see calls that last 30 seconds, a minute,  
28                  a minute 30, a minute 55, we're looking at meaningful  
29                  contact between two mobile telephones?

1 A. It would seem so, yes.

2 116 Q. And that call at 15:41, which cell site was being  
3 utilised for that call?

4 A. Eircell's Clontibret site, which was located in  
5 Clontibret, County Monaghan.

6 117 Q. At 1600 hrs, was a call made by the 980 number to the  
7 585 number of Colm Murphy?

8 A. It was.

9 118 Q. And the duration of that call being?

10 A. 18 seconds.

11 119 Q. And which cell site or cell sites were being utilised  
12 for that communication?

13 A. That originated on Eircell's Castleblayney site,  
14 located in Castleblayney, and the call was answered and  
15 routed through Claremont Carn's site outside of  
16 Dundalk, County Louth, Ravensdale.

17 120 Q. And then at 16:01, so a very short time after that call  
18 we've just looked at, was a call made on the 980 number  
19 to the 585 number?

20 A. It was. That's right, yes.

21 121 Q. And lasting for?

22 A. 15 seconds.

23 122 Q. So, we've seen at 1600 hrs 980 contacts 585 for  
24 18 seconds and then the very next minute there is a  
25 communication in exactly the same direction lasting for  
26 15 seconds?

27 A. That's correct.

28 123 Q. And this 16:01 call, which cell site was utilised for  
29 that call?

1 A. So, the call originated through Eircell's Tallanstown  
2 mobile phone mast located at Aclint, Tallanstown,  
3 County Louth.

4 124 Q. And then the final call, did the data reveal that at  
5 1730 hrs a further telephone call was made from the 980  
6 number associated with Terrence Morgan, this time to  
7 the 259 number that has been associated with Derek  
8 'Shanty' Brady?

9 A. That's correct.

10 125 Q. For how long did that call last?

11 A. That call lasted for 35 seconds.

12 126 Q. And was it possible to ascertain what cell site had  
13 been utilised for that call?

14 A. Yes, it used Eircell's Dundalk site, located at  
15 Drumnasillagh, Dundalk.

16 127 Q. And so, did we see overall a similar pattern of  
17 movement on the part of the 980 phone?

18 A. Yes.

19 128 Q. In that, similarly to the 585 phone, it had moved  
20 northwards to the area of Omagh and then at a similar  
21 type of time it had moved back south across the Border  
22 under the Dundalk area?

23 A. Yes.

24 [End of video].

25 MR. DE LA POER: Sir, that concludes the AGS evidence 14:11  
26 relating to Part 6. We'll hear more of that in Part 7.

27

28 With your leave, Sir, I'll turn now to resume the  
29 questioning of Mr. Safranauskas. I need to say

1 something about what we're going to hear before we  
2 start.

3  
4 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY MR. DE LE POER:

5  
6 MR. DE LE POER: The first thing to say that we'll be  
7 using our timelines which have been distributed to  
8 everyone in the room, anyone who has access to the  
9 electronic copies, INQ 049121 or 049563.

10  
11 The second thing to say, Sir, is that you have made a  
12 Restriction Order in relation a radio transmission that  
13 we are shortly to hear, the effect of that Restriction  
14 Order is that it will be permitted to be broadcast in  
15 this hearing room, it will, however, not be broadcast  
16 to any other location, and will not be on YouTube. So,  
17 it is of the highest degree of importance that when we  
18 reach that, that the audio is muted, and I will do my  
19 part to assist with that.

20  
21 The third general observation is this, and it's by way  
22 of an additional warning, as can be seen on the screen,  
23 during the first six minutes of the presentation which  
24 in my estimation will account for approximately the  
25 next 10 to 15 minutes of the evidence, we are going to  
26 see a number of things which are capable of being  
27 highly distressing. Firstly, there is video footage  
28 from inside a shoe shop on Market Street at the time of  
29 the explosion. And, secondly, we are going to see, as

1 we did this morning, a number of photographs of the  
2 damage of the bomb. And, of course, there will be that  
3 audio that is overlaid. So, I would encourage anyone  
4 who considers that they would not wish to see or hear  
5 that, who is present in the hearing room, just to leave 14:13  
6 now and to return in about 15 minutes.

7  
8  
9 MR. MARK SAFRANAUSKAS (HAVING BEEN RECALLED) WAS  
10 FURTHER QUESTIONED BY MR. DE LA POER AS FOLLOWS: 14:13  
11

12 129 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Having made those general observations  
13 and seeing we are able to continue, can I ask you  
14 Mr. Safranauskas to turn up please, Part 6, which is on  
15 page 31 of the timeline, do you have that? 14:13

16 A. I do, yes.

17 130 Q. And we're going to start the sequence of your  
18 presentation with, effectively, a compilation that you  
19 have created, is that right?

20 A. Yes. 14:14

21 131 Q. And what you have done is to take video footage from  
22 inside McIlroy's Shoe Shop, is that right?

23 A. It is.

24 132 Q. You have taken particular care with that footage to  
25 edit it, is that right? 14:14

26 A. I have, yes.

27 133 Q. Those edits include reducing the size of the image to  
28 exclude parts of the image that may be particularly  
29 distressing?

1           A.    Yes.

2   134   Q.    And, also, to cut that footage before people become  
3           visible post-explosion?

4           A.    Correct.

5   135   Q.    Additionally, you have taken the audio footage provided 14:14  
6           by the PSNI, is that right --

7           A.    I have, yes.

8   136   Q.    -- and you have timed it so that, because we know when  
9           the moment of detonation is on that audio footage, it  
10          matches up with the video footage? 14:14

11          A.    Yes.

12   137   Q.    And so we can hear what is being said by the RUC  
13          officers immediately before and after the explosion and  
14          we also have some sense of the explosion from the  
15          video? 14:15

16          A.    At the same time as removing the existing audio from  
17          the shoe shop.

18   138   Q.    Because there was very distressing audio on that shoe  
19          shop footage which you have entirely expunged?

20          A.    There was, yes. 14:15

21   139   Q.    We're going to start this sequence now, the audio won't  
22          begin immediately, but I make it clear that within a  
23          very few seconds that audio will be played and so it's  
24          important that those managing the technical side of  
25          things are ready to mute it, so we will play please, 14:15  
26          Mr. Safranauskas. [Presentation played]. If we pause  
27          it there. You have picked up where we left off at the  
28          end of Part 5, is that right?

29          A.    Yeah, there or thereabouts, we left Part 5 with the

1 image --

2 140 Q. Of course, we did, taken on Market Street of the bomb  
3 car.

4 A. Yes.

5 141 Q. But the sequence immediately before that, you had 14:16  
6 displayed visually the deployment of RUC officers,  
7 their locations are obviously approximate and it is not  
8 to suggest that they were static, but this provides  
9 some idea, based on the material that you've reviewed,  
10 about where the different call signs were located 14:16  
11 around the time of the explosion?

12 A. It is, yes.

13 142 Q. And as we just heard and you stopped, the audio is  
14 about to begin playing, so it must be muted.  
15 [Presentation played]. That concludes the compilation 14:16  
16 that you've created, Mr. Safranauskas, drawing on a  
17 number of parts of the material made available to you,  
18 and you have shown visually on screen now, that the  
19 distance between the courthouse, the nearest point of  
20 the courthouse and seat of the explosion was 334 m or 14:18  
21 365 yds?

22 A. Yes, correct, and just to add to that, they're not  
23 measurements I've conducted myself, they were provided  
24 to me.

25 143 Q. Thank you very much, indeed. So, are we now going to 14:18  
26 watch a compilation of the photographs and location of  
27 the photographs?

28 A. Some of the photographs, yes.

29 144 Q. Again, a warning, but what you have done is study the

1 photographs to work out where the photographer would  
2 have been standing and the direction they would have  
3 been pointing, and we're going to see on the map that  
4 you've indicated the approximate position of the  
5 photographer so that we can better understand what 14:19  
6 we're looking at?

7 A. I have, yes.

8 145 Q. [Presentation played]. So, on the corner of Campsie  
9 Road junction?

10 A. Yes. 14:19

11 146 Q. Are we here looking diagonally across that junction?

12 A. We are, yes.

13 147 Q. [Presentation played]. A photograph taken on Campsie  
14 Road?

15 A. Yes. 14:19

16 148 Q. That is looking up towards the courthouse which we can  
17 see towards the top and in the centre, is that right?

18 A. Yes, so courthouse here (indicating), Drumragh Avenue  
19 to the right, Dublin Road to the left.

20 149 Q. And we can see there what others have spoken about, 14:19  
21 about how the ground rises - we heard this from some of  
22 the military witnesses - the ground rises from the  
23 junction up towards the courthouse?

24 A. Yes, correct.

25 150 Q. [Presentation played]. Slightly closer in photograph, 14:20  
26 the same perspective?

27 A. Yes, correct.

28 151 Q. [Presentation played]. Are we now moving up towards  
29 the seat of the explosion?

1 A. We are, yes.

2 152 Q. [Presentation played]. We saw that image this morning,  
3 those of us who were in the room.  
4

5 [Presentation played]. So, does that conclude the 14:23  
6 imagery from the scene part of your presentation?

7 A. It does, yes.

8 153 Q. So, we're going to, having covered row 244 with that  
9 part of your presentation, we're now going to return to  
10 our timeline, row 245? 14:24

11 A. Yes.

12 154 Q. And we have here an incoming call lasting 31 seconds,  
13 timed very shortly after the detonation --

14 A. Yes.

15 155 Q. -- from a telephone number ending 815 to the 14:24  
16 Liam Campbell, as provisionally attributed, 430 red  
17 phone?

18 A. Yes, that's correct.

19 156 Q. And the significance of this is it's an entry in the  
20 telephone records that Dr. Tart has identified showing 14:24  
21 us which cell site that red phone is using?

22 A. Yes.

23 157 Q. We can see it is the Clermont Cairn or Carn cell site?

24 A. Correct.

25 158 Q. So, if we move forward from this, we've got an 14:24  
26 Anthony Donegan, we've moved over row 246 which we had  
27 looked at exhaustively yesterday, in the Daily  
28 Occurrence Book, that was an Anthony Donegan cell site  
29 entry at 15:05?

1 A. Yes.

2 159 Q. There was a cell used for this at 15:06 but Dr. Tart is  
3 not able to identify where that cell is, is that your  
4 understanding?

5 A. It is, yes. 14:25

6 160 Q. And here you have identified within the materials that  
7 there was disruption caused by the explosion, and I  
8 think we can see that there was also a call to the RUC  
9 by an alarm monitoring company at this time?

10 A. Yes, that's correct. 14:26

11 161 Q. And that may be the first telephone notification that  
12 the RUC received?

13 A. Yes.

14 162 Q. Certainly, the first that we've been able to identify?

15 A. Yes. 14:26

16 163 Q. Now, are we going to now see a sequence covering  
17 emergency service response and the Army?

18 A. Yes, we are.

19 164 Q. Before we do this we should just acknowledge this,  
20 Mr. Safranauskas, that you have drawn on the material 14:26  
21 made available to you to create this part of your  
22 presentation, is that right?

23 A. It is, yes.

24 165 Q. Can you confirm that that detail can be found in the  
25 Inquiry Legal Team Summary for Part 6? 14:26

26 A. I can, yes.

27 166 Q. And that that summary, which is a very substantial  
28 document indeed, will be published on the website?

29 A. Yes.

1 167 Q. We are not proposing to read out that summary today, it  
2 is a very lengthy document seeking to capture multiple  
3 perspectives about the emergency service response, all  
4 that we do say now is to acknowledge the heroism of  
5 every single person, civilian, Army or emergency 14:27  
6 services who after the bomb went to help?

7 A. I entirely agree, yes.

8 168 Q. [Presentation played]. Let's just move through what  
9 you have created. We have a notification at 15:09 of  
10 the Northern Ireland Fire Brigade by the RUC? 14:27

11 A. Yes.

12 169 Q. And appliances were dispatched?

13 A. Yes.

14 170 Q. [Presentation played]. And, indeed, the response was  
15 wider than just those based in Omagh, other Fire 14:28  
16 Stations sent their units too?

17 A. Correct, yes.

18 171 Q. [Presentation played]. A 999 call to the Northern  
19 Ireland Ambulance Service at 3:11, led to them becoming  
20 aware? 14:28

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 172 Q. [Presentation played]. And both the Ambulance Service  
23 and units stationed at the Tyrone County Hospital were  
24 dispatched?

25 A. They were, yes. 14:29

26 173 Q. [Presentation played]. In addition, resources based  
27 outside of Omagh were also dispatched?

28 A. They were.

29 174 Q. [Presentation played]. Formal notification by the RUC

1 to the British Army at 15:11, that led to deployment  
2 from Lisanelly Barracks?

3 A. Yes.

4 175 Q. [Presentation played]. If we just pause here, we've  
5 moved now away from the emergency response and we 14:30  
6 return to those on the working hypothesis who are  
7 fleeing the absolute devastation and atrocity that they  
8 had caused. Here, we have a call between the 585 dark  
9 blue phone and the 980 orange phone?

10 A. We do, yes. 14:30

11 176 Q. Provisionally attributed to Seamus Daly and  
12 Seamus McKenna respectively?

13 A. Yes.

14 177 Q. Now, an observation to be made about this; the working  
15 hypothesis is that they fled Omagh together in the 14:31  
16 scout car, is that right?

17 A. Yes.

18 178 Q. Plainly whilst seated next to each other in the scout  
19 car there was no need for them to use their mobile  
20 telephones to call each other? 14:31

21 A. There wouldn't be, no.

22 179 Q. But here at 15:13 we can see that that is occurring and  
23 if the working hypothesis is correct, is a likely  
24 conclusion that they must, by this point, have  
25 separated? 14:31

26 A. Yes.

27 180 Q. Now, we don't have cell site information available for  
28 980 but what we can see is that the 585 is using the  
29 Stranooden cell?

1 A. Yes.

2 181 Q. And that that is a cell, the physical location of which  
3 is some substantial way across the Border into the  
4 Republic of Ireland.

5 A. It is, yes. 14:32

6 182 Q. So, we move on please. [Presentation played]. So,  
7 this is a call that has been included for the purpose  
8 of cell site in relation to Derek 'Shanty' Brady but  
9 it's incoming call so far as 259 yellow phone is  
10 concerned and, therefore, there is no cell site 14:32  
11 available to Dr. Tart, is that right?

12 A. There isn't, no.

13 183 Q. We go over our page, please, in our hard copy  
14 timelines, we're at row 255 and we are dealing with the  
15 pink Peter Campbell phone on provisional attribution 14:33  
16 971, again included for the purpose of cell site  
17 information?

18 A. Yes.

19 184 Q. And here we can see that we do have cell site  
20 information, it's using that Clermont Carn site over 14:33  
21 above Ravensdale, Dundalk?

22 A. Yes, that's right.

23 185 Q. Another cell site for the same phone, using a mast same  
24 as previously?

25 A. Correct, yes. 14:33

26 186 Q. The time is 15:23:21 for that call?

27 A. It is, yes.

28 187 Q. Now, Mr. Safranauskas, we're going to have a pair of  
29 calls here which are of potential significance?

1 A. Yes.

2 188 Q. The calling number is Sean Hoey's mobile telephone as  
3 provisionally attributed, is that right?

4 A. 898, I believe, was his landline, I believe it was the  
5 Jonesborough landline. 14:34

6 189 Q. In which case our timeline is wrong, we should cross  
7 out the word "mobile" there?

8 A. Yeah.

9 190 Q. But at all events, it is a call to the green phone?

10 A. It is, yes. 14:34

11 191 Q. This is the first activity we see on the green phone  
12 since it went dark?

13 A. Yes.

14 192 Q. And we remind ourselves that it went dark, as it  
15 sometimes described, in other words, was not used to 14:34  
16 make or receive calls, before the bomb run began?

17 A. At 10:58, yes.

18 193 Q. That's the last use of it. So, it's now back in use  
19 for a very substantial call of three minutes and 18  
20 seconds? 14:34

21 A. Yes.

22 194 Q. And if the Inquiry Legal Team are right in the  
23 provisional attribution of the 585 number to  
24 Seamus Daly, and they're right in 076 attribution, what  
25 we have here is Seamus Daly, just 22 minutes after the 14:35  
26 moment of detonation, spending three minutes and 18  
27 seconds speaking to Sean Hoey?

28 A. That's correct, yes.

29 195 Q. We don't have cell site available for the mast that

1           that 076 was using?

2           A.    We don't, no.

3   196   Q.    I said it's important pair of calls, let's move on to  
4           the next one, which is our row 258. [Presentation  
5           played]. Again, using the provisional attribution, 14:35  
6           having spoken to Sean Hoey, Seamus Daly is now using  
7           the 585 Colm Murphy phone to make an outgoing call?

8           A.    Yes.

9   197   Q.    And that is to Denis O'Connor. And, of course, we  
10          remind ourselves, Mr. Safranauskas, that it was this 14:36  
11          call that was identified in the Breslin litigation as  
12          forming the substantial basis for the case against  
13          Seamus Daly's involvement?

14          A.    It was, yes.

15   198   Q.    With the judge finding, as a fact, based on 14:36  
16          Mr. O'Connor's evidence about who he was speaking to,  
17          that Seamus Daly was the person who made this call to  
18          him?

19          A.    Yes.

20   199   Q.    And, of course, the time is just 26 minutes after 14:36  
21          detonation and that 585 mobile in the hands of  
22          Seamus Daly?

23          A.    Yes.

24   200   Q.    The final piece of information is that we can see that  
25          the location of the cell mast for the site used by 585 14:37  
26          is further south than we had seen previously?

27          A.    Yes.

28   201   Q.    So, if the crossing had taken place in approximately  
29          the location that it had travelling northbound, then a

1 further distance travelled south?

2 A. Correct.

3 202 Q. We move forward, now, to another call of very great  
4 significance in the context of the working hypothesis?

5 A. Yes. 14:37

6 203 Q. This is a call timed at 15:41 using the Clontibret cell  
7 site?

8 A. Yes.

9 204 Q. The one slightly north of Castleblayney?

10 A. Yes, that's right. 14:37

11 205 Q. This is the orange phone provisionally attributed to  
12 Seamus McKenna phoning the Seamus McKenna landline?

13 A. Yes, that's right.

14 206 Q. Again, we remind ourselves, because it was a week or so  
15 ago, that the Inquiry Legal Team have provisionally 14:38  
16 attributed 980 in the hands of Seamus McKenna for this  
17 call?

18 A. Yes.

19 207 Q. That's right, isn't it?

20 A. It is. 14:38

21 208 Q. That was the basis of the case in the Breslin  
22 litigation?

23 A. Yes.

24 209 Q. But that case did not succeed, the judge not being  
25 satisfied to the standard (namely the balance of 14:38  
26 probabilities) that Seamus McKenna did make that call?

27 A. Yes, that's right.

28 210 Q. Nevertheless, that is the working hypothesis, if it is  
29 correct it means that Seamus McKenna has, in his hands,

1 the phone that went to Omagh --

2 A. That's right.

3 211 Q. -- in the bomb car, just over 30 minutes after the  
4 detonation?

5 A. That's my understanding, yes. 14:38

6 212 Q. We move forward to a call 20 minutes later.  
7 [Presentation played]. We don't have cell site for 585  
8 but we can see that the same physical location for the  
9 mast, Castleblayney is being used for that 980 call, a  
10 call of 18 seconds? 14:39

11 A. Yes.

12 213 Q. [Presentation played]. Now, just over a minute later a  
13 cell mast some distance south of Castleblayney and  
14 indeed slightly south of Dundalk is used?

15 A. That's right, yes. 14:39

16 214 Q. Clearly, wherever that phone was, it was a minute or so  
17 earlier in range of the Castleblayney cell site and is  
18 now in range of the Tallanstown?

19 A. Correct.

20 215 Q. We'll hear from Dr. Tart about that but, again, the  
21 orange phone and the dark blue phone contacting each  
22 other? 14:40

23 A. That's right, yes.

24 216 Q. [Presentation played]. Now, we are going to see a  
25 three-way combination of mobile telephones that we  
26 might just want to mark. The first two in this  
27 combination, Peter Campbell's 971 on the provisional  
28 attribution pink phone contacting the 430 red phone of  
29 Liam Campbell? 14:40

1 A. Yes.

2 217 Q. They're both using cell sites which are described as  
3 being Clermont Carn, albeit that they have different  
4 cell IDs?

5 A. That's right. 14:40

6 218 Q. They're not using the same cell but they are both  
7 physically located at the Clermont Carn area?

8 A. Yes.

9 219 Q. That's 16:18:04?

10 A. Yes. 14:41

11 220 Q. Lasting for two seconds?

12 A. Yes.

13 221 Q. And less than a minute later, that Peter Campbell pink  
14 phone contacting the pale blue 406 phone attributed  
15 provisionally to Oliver Treanor? 14:41

16 A. Yes, that's right.

17 222 Q. And we can see the same physical location is being used  
18 by 971. We might just remember that and we'll come  
19 back to it in a moment. But let's keep going on,  
20 please. [Presentation played]. We can see there is, 14:41  
21 about half an hour later, another call from the pink  
22 phone to the pale blue phone?

23 A. Yes.

24 223 Q. This time the 971 is using a mast in the Dundalk area?

25 A. Yes, that's correct. 14:41

26 224 Q. [Presentation played]. Staying with 971 for the  
27 purpose of trying to understand where that phone may  
28 be, we can see the Clermont Carn site is being used at  
29 5:01?

1 A. Yes, it is.

2 225 Q. [Presentation played]. And a minute later we are back  
3 to the site in Dundalk?

4 A. Yes.

5 226 Q. Again, as we saw previously, a minute before this that 14:42  
6 phone must have been in range of the Clermont Carn mast  
7 and at this point it is in range of the Dundalk mast?

8 A. Yes.

9 227 Q. We'll ask Dr. Tart to help us with what we might  
10 conclude from that. [Presentation played]. We're now 14:42  
11 at 5:08, we see the 971 calling 430?

12 A. We do, yes.

13 228 Q. And both using sites at the Clermont Carn location?

14 A. Yes.

15 229 Q. And we have another important attribution call, 585 14:43  
16 provisionally attributed to Seamus Daly, we are now a  
17 couple of hours after the moment of detonation and we  
18 can see that that phone is calling the Daly household,  
19 a landline registered to Patrick Daly, the father, but  
20 at which we know a number of the Daly family live. 14:43

21 A. Yes, that's right.

22 230 Q. [Presentation played]. Here, we've got a 980 orange  
23 phone, so bomb car phone, calling 259 provisionally  
24 attributed to Seamus Brady?

25 A. Derek 'Shanty' Brady. 14:43

26 231 Q. Sorry, Derek 'Shanty' Brady, my mistake. We know the  
27 980 is using a Dundalk mast. We might just want to  
28 turn back to page 25 to see when these phones were last  
29 in contact with each other, just to build the picture.

1           On page 24, in fact, it's row 209, we can see at 14:14,  
2           so just about when the bomb car is approaching the  
3           centre of Omagh and about to park?

4           A.    Yes.

5   232   Q.    We had that call of 35 seconds. We can see that the           14:44  
6           next time they're in contact is shown on our screen,  
7           17:30?

8           A.    Yes, correct.

9   233   Q.    So, back to page 33, let's see if we can understand  
10           where the Peter Campbell phone is. The next two cell           14:44  
11           site entries. [Presentation played]. Using a site in  
12           Dundalk?

13          A.    Yes.

14   234   Q.    [Presentation played]. Again, using a site in Dundalk?

15          A.    Yes.                                                                   14:45

16   235   Q.    [Presentation played]. So, a call from the 076, so  
17           that's Seamus Daly's ordinary phone, as we've been  
18           describing it, it's using a site at Tallanstown, south  
19           and west of Dundalk?

20          A.    Yes.                                                                   14:45

21   236   Q.    And it's calling the Emerald Bar?

22          A.    Yes.

23   237   Q.    Owned by Colm Murphy?

24          A.    Yes, that's right.

25   238   Q.    [Presentation played]. We've not heard about           14:45  
26           Paul Kelly recently, he's the person on the working  
27           hypothesis acted as intermediary between  
28           Anthony Donegan who stole the car and Seamus Daly --

29          A.    That's right.

1 239 Q. -- who was part of the terrorist cell who committed  
2 this crime?  
3 A. Yes.  
4 240 Q. And here we can see Paul Kelly phoning Anthony Donegan?  
5 A. Yes. 14:46  
6 241 Q. I mentioned a moment ago that there was a three-way  
7 combination that we just looked at, we've got the pale  
8 blue phone here contacting, for 20 seconds, the pink  
9 Peter Campbell phone?  
10 A. Yes. 14:46  
11 242 Q. And then within a matter of seconds of that call ending  
12 we can see the pale blue 406 contacting the  
13 Liam Campbell phone?  
14 A. Yes, that's right.  
15 243 Q. If we look back up to rows 262 and 263, we see those 14:47  
16 phone in a not dissimilar combination. The caller is  
17 the pink phone in that combination but the caller calls  
18 first the red phone and then the pale blue phone; here,  
19 we've got the pale blue phone phoning the pink phone  
20 and then the red phone with the timings between the 14:47  
21 calls being very close?  
22 A. We do, yes.  
23 244 Q. [Presentation played]. We're going to see further  
24 contact between provisionally attributed  
25 Anthony Donegan and Paul Kelly? 14:47  
26 A. Yes.  
27 245 Q. The Donegan handset using a -- we don't have the cell  
28 site for that but we can see the location of the  
29 landline?

1 A. Yes.

2 246 Q. [Presentation played]. Then about 12 minutes later,  
3 the Paul Kelly mobile phone, so not the landline, calls  
4 the phone provisionally attributed to Anthony Cunnane?

5 A. Yes. 14:48

6 247 Q. Row 278, the reverse of the position, albeit that  
7 Anthony Cunnane is calling the landline?

8 A. Yes, correct.

9 248 Q. [Presentation played]. We now have an attempt to see  
10 where the 430 handset might be but we don't have any 14:48  
11 cell site for that?

12 A. No, we have -- it's "cell name unknown" again.

13 249 Q. That's at quarter to eight?

14 A. Yes.

15 250 Q. 076 using a site at Ardee East, which is some way south 14:49  
16 and west of Dundalk?

17 A. Yes.

18 251 Q. [Presentation played]. At 9:08 in the evening we've  
19 got the red phone contacting the pale blue phone for 43  
20 seconds? 14:49

21 A. Yes.

22 252 Q. [Presentation played]. Now, do we start what might be  
23 termed a sequence of contacts or potentially attempted  
24 contacts between the red phone and Danny Hughes,  
25 whether on a mobile phone or on a landline? 14:50

26 A. We do, yes.

27 253 Q. So, this is the first of them, 21:12, 14 seconds?

28 A. Correct.

29 254 Q. [Presentation played]. A minute later, 14 seconds?

1 A. Yes. 14:50

2 255 Q. [Presentation played]. Within a minute, two minutes  
3 and 45 seconds of contact, this time with the  
4 Danny Hughes mobile as provisionally attributed rather  
5 than the Danny Hughes landline? 14:50

6 A. Yes, that's right.

7 256 Q. [Presentation played]. And then we have the pink phone  
8 contacting the pale blue phone, a contact of 32 seconds  
9 with the 971 using a Dundalk mast?

10 A. Yes. 14:51

11 257 Q. [Presentation played]. Return to our Danny Hughes  
12 sequence, this time the reverse is true; it's the  
13 Danny Hughes provisionally attributed phone calling the  
14 Liam Campbell?

15 A. Yes. 14:51

16 258 Q. [Presentation played]. We see 971 is using Dundalk?

17 A. Yes.

18 259 Q. [Presentation played]. We have the pink Peter Campbell  
19 phone to pale blue Oliver Treanor phone?

20 A. Yes. 14:52

21 260 Q. 17 seconds?

22 A. Yes.

23 261 Q. [Presentation played]. And then the reverse, this time  
24 10 seconds?

25 A. Yes. 14:52

26 262 Q. We can see that the 971, having used a site up towards  
27 the Border, Clermont Carn, is now using one much  
28 further south?

29 A. Yes.

1 263 Q. [Presentation played]. Then we next return to the call  
2 that we looked at previously in the context of the  
3 purple phone, the 144 Town Glass mobile --  
4 A. Yes.  
5 264 Q. -- calling the 430 Liam Campbell red phone? 14:52  
6 A. Yes.  
7 265 Q. [Presentation played]. More contact between the pink  
8 and pale blue phones?  
9 A. Correct.  
10 266 Q. [Presentation played]. Back to our sequence involving 14:53  
11 Danny Hughes and the red phone, we've got this at 22:54  
12 for 11 seconds?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 267 Q. [Presentation played]. Then almost immediately, 13  
15 seconds? 14:53  
16 A. Correct.  
17 268 Q. [Presentation played]. Then almost immediately this,  
18 time using the landline, a call that we don't have the  
19 duration of?  
20 A. No. 14:53  
21 269 Q. [Presentation played]. A landline call, Danny Hughes  
22 to the Liam Campbell-Bernadette Lynch household?  
23 A. Yes, again, no duration determined.  
24 270 Q. [Presentation played]. Another Danny Hughes landline,  
25 this time back to the red phone? 14:54  
26 A. Yes.  
27 271 Q. [Presentation played]. If we just pause on this one  
28 for just a moment. We've got John Fee, brother of  
29 Joe Fee. John Fee here on the 132 is contacting the

1 yellow Derek 'Shanty' Brady 259 phone?

2 A. Yes.

3 272 Q. If we just remind ourselves, we've seen this a number  
4 of times. If we go back to page 6. [Presentation  
5 played]. Our row 19 on the afternoon of the 12th? 14:55

6 A. Yes.

7 273 Q. So, before the bomb car is stolen. Then if we go to  
8 page 15. [Presentation played]. We will see that at  
9 row 125 on the 14th, midafternoon, a very long call of  
10 five minutes and 28? 14:55

11 A. Yes.

12 274 Q. And then if we go to row 143, we can see later that day  
13 on the 14th another substantial call of two minutes and  
14 33 seconds?

15 A. Yes. 14:55

16 275 Q. That brings us back to row 297, this being a very short  
17 contact of four seconds, potentially to answer phone?

18 A. Correct.

19 276 Q. If we continue, please. [Presentation played].  
20 Row 298, a call of substantial duration to the 430 14:56  
21 answer phone?

22 A. Yes.

23 277 Q. [Presentation played]. Following which, the 430 calls  
24 971, the pink phone, a call between the Campbell  
25 brothers? 14:56

26 A. Yes.

27 278 Q. [Presentation played]. Then we have a cell site entry  
28 showing the Clermont Carn is being used by the 430 as  
29 we approach midnight?

1 A. Yes.

2 279 Q. [Presentation played]. Another call from 430 to 971 --

3 A. Yes.

4 280 Q. -- using the Clermont Carn in the case of 430.

5 14:57

6 [Presentation played]. Then, the penultimate call from

7 the Barleycorn public house, is that right?

8 A. I believe so, yes.

9 281 Q. Lasting 34 seconds. That public house located near the

10 Border up in the Ravensdale area, north of Dundalk? 14:57

11 A. Yes.

12 282 Q. [Presentation played]. And then, finally, for our

13 sequence of events a call at 23:17, the red phone, 430

14 provisionally attributed to Liam Campbell, to the pink

15 phone, 971 provisionally attributed to Peter Campbell? 14:58

16 A. Yes, that's right.

17 283 Q. Does that conclude the presentation that you have

18 created for Part 6?

19 A. It does, yes.

20 MR. DE LE POER: Sir, can I indicate this, that this is 14:58

21 the final time that Mr. Safranauskas will be giving

22 evidence and I can say on behalf of the Inquiry Legal

23 Team that we're extremely grateful to him for the

24 presentation that he's prepared and also for having

25 talked us through it. He is going to stay to help us 14:58

26 with Dr. Tart's evidence, but not from the witness box.

27 CHAIRMAN: And does that conclude the evidence for

28 today?

29 MR. DE LA POER: No, Sir. We hope with the time we

1 have left available that we can take in Dr. Tart's  
2 evidence, but we would propose a short break of perhaps  
3 ten minutes to make sure we complete that in good time.

4 CHAIRMAN: well, before we do, Mr. Safranauskas, I'd  
5 like to extend my sincere gratitude to you for all of 14:59  
6 the careful and detailed work that you have put into  
7 preparing the presentations which we've seen. I'm sure  
8 the Inquiry will benefit enormously from the evidence  
9 which you've given to us and so, I thank you very much  
10 in for your contribution. 14:59

11 THE WITNESS: I'm very grateful, Sir.

12 MR. DE LA POER: So, shall we say ten past.

13 CHAIRMAN: Yes.

14  
15 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED BRIEFLY AND RESUMED AS FOLLOWS: 14:59

16  
17 CHAIRMAN: Mr. de la Poer.

18 MR. DE LA POER: Sir, we're very pleased to welcome  
19 back Dr. Tart, who previously gave evidence last week,  
20 introducing us to the principles of cell site and 15:10  
21 touching on some of the matters that we're going to  
22 explore in greater depth today.

23  
24 DR. MATTHEW TART (HAVING BEEN RECALLED) WAS FURTHER  
25 QUESTIONED BY MR. DE LA POER AS FOLLOWS: 15:10

26  
27 284 Q. MR. DE LA POER: Dr. Tart, we're going to start by just  
28 going over, briefly, so as to give context to what  
29 you'll to say next, the problem of other party data and

1           why you would describe that as a problem and how it has  
2           affected your work. So, that's our first topic. You  
3           dealt with this previously.  
4  
5           Let's start with this: Other party data is a 15:11  
6           phenomenon recognised within your field of expertise,  
7           that is right?  
8           A. Yes.  
9   285   Q. And the problem exists in this way, that for some 15:11  
10           incoming calls, so in other words, the handset  
11           receiving the call, within the billing data the cell  
12           site that is associated with that incoming call can  
13           sometimes be borrowed from the outgoing call?  
14           A. Yes.  
15   286   Q. So, in other words, if I was here in Belfast and you 15:11  
16           were in Dublin and I phoned you, I would be using a  
17           Belfast cell, is that correct?  
18           A. Yes.  
19   287   Q. And you would, presumably, be using a Dublin cell?  
20           A. Yes, and by that I means a cell that serves in Dublin. 15:12  
21   288   Q. Exactly so. However, for some networks it may be the  
22           case that on your incoming data it will record a  
23           Belfast cell site, namely the cell site that I had used  
24           to call you?  
25           A. Yes. 15:12  
26   289   Q. And, so, does that mean that when you look at the data  
27           and you see an incoming and outgoing pair of calls, on  
28           certain networks if they are using the same cells, you  
29           will trust the outgoing one because that will always be

1 right --

2 A. Yes.

3 290 Q. -- but you won't know whether the incoming one is  
4 correct?

5 A. Yes. 15:12

6 291 Q. It might be, but it might be borrowed from the  
7 outgoing?

8 A. Yes.

9 292 Q. So, that is the problem of other party data. So, you  
10 told us about that last time you were here, we've gone 15:13  
11 into a little bit more depth but we're now just going  
12 to cover some of the further work that you have done  
13 since you were last here. And that is work which has  
14 principally been prompted because you are aware of a  
15 specific inquiry that has been raised about your report 15:13  
16 in relation to incoming cell sites for the number 980?

17 A. Yes.

18 293 Q. And the issue, as it was presented to you, was that you  
19 appeared not to provide cell site information for that  
20 number for certain calls when it was incoming, but that 15:13  
21 people who'd gone before you who'd conducted work  
22 seemed to be able to provide a cell mast for that?

23 A. Yes.

24 294 Q. And, so, that has led you to doing a deal of further  
25 work to try and give us your best evidence on this 15:14  
26 point?

27 A. Yes.

28 295 Q. Is the first thing that you did was to conduct a test?

29 A. Yes.

1 296 Q. And just in a couple of sentences, we don't need to go  
2 deep into the detail here, what was the test seeking to  
3 achieve?  
4 A. I wanted to see whether within the same network we were  
5 getting the same cells every time we had both ends of a 15:14  
6 call.  
7 297 Q. On the basis that if you didn't always see that, that  
8 might help you to reach a conclusion that the incoming  
9 cell was reliable?  
10 A. Yes. So, we've considered phones from a variety of 15:14  
11 networks and so the rules for one network might not  
12 apply to another. So, I looked at one network in  
13 isolation to see whether there was any evidence that  
14 suggested that I could trust the incoming cells.  
15 298 Q. What was your conclusion from that test? 15:14  
16 A. Every call event that I'd considered was the same cell  
17 for the incoming and outgoing and so I don't know if I  
18 can trust the incoming cells, it might be legitimate,  
19 but I don't know.  
20 299 Q. But for it to be legitimate it would have to, on every 15:15  
21 occasion, by coincidence, the pairs would always be  
22 using the same cell?  
23 A. Yes. So, if there was an occasion where they weren't  
24 the same cell then I would know that it wasn't, but  
25 there wasn't in the data that I considered. So, for 15:15  
26 that specific network I thought I don't know whether  
27 they are trustable and so I haven't used them.  
28 300 Q. Did you also scrutinise the report of Kevin Weeks, one  
29 of those who's conducted analysis before you, as part

1 of the Omagh investigation, to see how Mr. Weeks  
2 treated particular calls?

3 A. Yes. So I hadn't reviewed the details of his findings  
4 in my previous reviews, I'd looked at the processes  
5 that were used to avoid context bias in my own 15:15  
6 examination. As I say, I checked to see if there was  
7 balance to logical, robust and transparent and I hadn't  
8 gone into the detail so I did over the weekend because  
9 my report had been issued, and I found that he had some  
10 additional sites that were listed for incoming calls 15:16  
11 than that which I could find in my data.

12 301 Q. That, of course, is the data that the Inquiry Legal  
13 Team has provided you, which it has gathered in from  
14 various sources as part of the investigation?

15 A. Yes, quite comprehensive. There's a lot of it, but I 15:16  
16 didn't find this particular data within that set.

17 302 Q. So, does that lead you to two potential conclusions in  
18 relation to Mr. Weeks; on the one hand if he's  
19 recording data that you can't find option 1, he's made  
20 a mistake? 15:16

21 A. Yes, always an option.

22 303 Q. Or No.2, he has access to data that you don't have  
23 access to?

24 A. Yes. And, I suppose, there's a third, that I've made a  
25 mistake, that I have it but I haven't found it. We 15:16  
26 have put in checks to try and ensure that we haven't.  
27 For the second, for the mistake to have taken place I  
28 noticed that the cell names in some cases may apply to  
29 the same place but they've got a different address. He

1 hadn't listed cell IDs for the incoming calls, whereas  
2 he had for others that I could confirm. And, so,  
3 there's a consistent difference between our data which  
4 makes me believe that it's not an error, I think it's  
5 the additional data, potentially.

15:17

6 304 Q. It's likely that he has reliably identified, from the  
7 dataset that he had, cell sites that you were not able  
8 to identify from the data that you have?

9 A. Yes. In the detail of every other observation that I  
10 had data for I found no issues, or no differences, I  
11 should say, it was just these. And the differences --  
12 as I say, we included the absence of cell IDs and the  
13 different cell name, which leads me to believe that I  
14 think there was some additional data which he  
15 potentially had that I didn't. I know that he did work  
16 from bundles of data that were hard copy because he  
17 said so in his report, and so I can't readily check  
18 whether the same dataset was available to both of us.

15:17

15:17

19 305 Q. So does it come to this, that your position is that  
20 Mr. Weeks may very well be right, in fact there are  
21 good reasons to think that he was right about that, but  
22 that you are not able to independently verify that he  
23 is right from the raw data and, as a result, your  
24 conclusions remain unchanged, but you acknowledge that  
25 he may be able to add something to the picture?

15:18

15:18

26 A. Yes. I don't think the extra data would have changed  
27 any of my conclusions anyway, I might add, but there  
28 might be additional information that's of use to the  
29 Inquiry, the data that I've got, I'm not comfortable

1           that I could use.

2   306   Q.    was the final thing that you've done since last you  
3           were here was to do a deep dive into the number ending  
4           430, which we're calling the red phone?

5           A.   Yes. 15:18

6   307   Q.    And was that to test how reliable the network that 430  
7           was on was in relation to incoming call data?

8           A.   Yes, that was more of an illustration exercise, I  
9           already knew the answer so I merely showed my working  
10          and so that's in a separate letter. 15:19

11   308   Q.    All of these further tests you've committed to writing  
12          and in due course they will be published, alongside  
13          your other reports, so that everybody can see what  
14          you've done. But thank you for covering that now.  
15          We're going to come to the detail of Parts 3, 4, 5 and 15:19  
16          6 which you know we have been through already, we've  
17          done so chronologically; we're going to take a slightly  
18          different approach with you. Dr. Tart, we're going do  
19          it on a handset-by-handset basis, so we're just going  
20          to track through particular handsets over the course of 15:19  
21          the timeline that is now very well established in  
22          everybody's minds, and just see what conclusions you,  
23          as an expert, can draw from the masts themselves that  
24          those phones are using.

25 15:20

26          So, we're going to start with the 498 number, that is  
27          the number provisionally attributed by the Inquiry to  
28          Anthony Donegan. And you were asked to look at the  
29          data you had available for this and to see where it was

1 during the period 12th to 14th August, that being our  
2 Part 3?

3 A. This is a proposition that I tested.

4 309 Q. Yes. So, the first is on the 12th, this is at 12:37,  
5 498 is using a cell site in Dundalk, 0375. Just help 15:20  
6 us a little with what we can say, based on what you are  
7 able to conclude as an expert, about this particular  
8 mast?

9 A. Yes, so the 498 is based in Dundalk, it's not like  
10 Pigeon Top, in that it's not on the top of a hill. I 15:21  
11 don't know the height of the cell, I don't know the  
12 direction it's pointed in so I can only give a vague  
13 general expectation that a cell in this period was  
14 around 5-7 km but I can't be any more precise than  
15 that. We can't measure it. I don't know where it 15:21  
16 served. So, I'm using a general expectation of 5 km,  
17 potentially a little more.

18 310 Q. So, would you be comfortable or not with the phrase  
19 that that phone is somewhere in the Dundalk general  
20 area? 15:21

21 A. Yes. Dundalk is the main town. It's worth mentioning  
22 as well, that the icon that's shown, the blue circle  
23 isn't the predicted service of the cell or anything  
24 like that, it's to highlight the general area in which  
25 the mast is, which at this resolution I think 15:21  
26 highlights the uncertainty that's in it. So, don't  
27 equate the blue circles with service area, where the  
28 phone was. Don't equate the mast with the phone,  
29 basically.

1 311 Q. So, we move on please. [Presentation played]. So, we  
2 are moving through the day and we're not very much  
3 later than we were before, on the same day and yet  
4 suddenly 498 appears to be using a mast up at Clermont  
5 Carn which is to the north and east. Perhaps, we can 15:22  
6 just seek to understand how in that very short period  
7 of time masts which are that far apart appear to be  
8 being used by the same handset, I'm sure you will have  
9 a clear explanation for why that might be?

10 A. Yes. Again, I don't have the mast height, I don't have 15:22  
11 the azimuth, these are limitations that I'm not used to  
12 and to be honest I don't like. "Carn" is another word  
13 for hill, it's on the top of a hill, I've had a look at  
14 where it is. It's potentially a large cell. We talked  
15 about Pigeon Top being on the top of a tall hill and a 15:22  
16 large mast, and I think every expert that looked at  
17 that, they've got coverage maps and the like, implied  
18 that it could potentially provide service up to the  
19 maximum range of 35 km. After 35 km a phone can't  
20 actually connect to the mast and transfer information 15:23  
21 because there isn't enough time. So, this is  
22 potentially a very large cell. Potentially, comparable  
23 to Pigeon Top but I don't know.

24 312 Q. In terms of the scale of this, from that Claremont Carn  
25 to Dundalk, have you been able to have a look at scale 15:23  
26 map and establish the approximate distance?

27 A. I did it earlier but I didn't write it down. 15 km or  
28 20 km, of that order, between mast to mast. But,  
29 again, there'll be service beyond the mast so it could

1 be wider spaced than that. Or there could be  
2 overlapping service. And I just don't know. They're  
3 in a similar region, one of them is a large cell and  
4 may encompass the other.

5 313 Q. Play on please. [Presentation played]. We're a little 15:23  
6 later in the afternoon, back using the 0270 cell,  
7 Dundalk area?

8 A. Yes.

9 314 Q. Moving on please. [Presentation played]. Again, same  
10 cell, a little bit later in the afternoon, is that 15:24  
11 right?

12 A. Yes, sorry, yes. I think we're going to have a lot of  
13 Dundalks.

14 315 Q. [Presentation played]. As before, about half an hour  
15 or so later, same cell? 15:24

16 A. Yes.

17 316 Q. [Presentation played]. A little later in the  
18 afternoon, a different cell but in the Dundalk area?

19 A. Yes. That implies sectorisation, which you may recall  
20 means there's more than one aerial. But since I don't 15:24  
21 know where they're pointed, that means I can't really  
22 use the information.

23 317 Q. Again, likely within 5-7 km of the physical location of  
24 the cell?

25 A. As a general expectation, I could be wrong and wouldn't 15:25  
26 know it, but that's an operating assumption for me.

27 318 Q. [Presentation played]. Another one just a little later  
28 there, Mr. Safranauskas, there we go, that's 16:42.  
29 We're on to that second sector on the same mast?

1 A. Yes. 15:25

2 319 Q. Play on please. [Presentation played]. Now, we are  
3 later in the evening, and what the Inquiry is  
4 considering, not what you're considering, Dr. Tart, but  
5 so everyone understands the context for this, was  
6 whether or not carrying his mobile telephone, there was  
7 information which would suggest, or be consistent with,  
8 or be what we expect to find if Anthony Donegan went  
9 from the Dundalk area and stole a car from nearby  
10 Carrickmacross before returning to Dundalk, that's what 15:26  
11 we're exploring. We've got a call at 23:21 but it's an  
12 incoming call?

13 A. Yes.

14 320 Q. And, as a result, do we not have any cell site for it  
15 that you trust? 15:26

16 A. That I trust. And that was the proposition that I was  
17 asked to test.

18 321 Q. If we go on please. [Presentation played]. We are now  
19 after the time that the eyewitness evidence would  
20 suggest the theft had taken place, we do have data 15:26  
21 here: 2:28 in the morning, it's a matter for the  
22 Chairman, but the time of the theft, the eyewitness  
23 evidence appears to be sometime around one or just  
24 after?

25 A. Yes. 15:27

26 322 Q. And we have here, about an hour and a half later, in a  
27 nearby town not terribly far away, that Dundalk 0374  
28 cell being used by 498?

29 A. Yes.

1 323 Q. So, again is it the position at 2:28, doing the best  
2 you can, likely to be within 5-7 km of the physical  
3 location of that cell and, therefore, in the Dundalk  
4 area but obviously not something that you're able to  
5 test? 15:27

6 A. Yes. So, I don't know it doesn't serve Carrickmacross  
7 but I don't think I would expect it to, but it's an  
8 hour and something later, so there's an initial --  
9 there is enough time to travel back to use the cell. I  
10 couldn't -- it's not in conflict with it being present 15:27  
11 at Carrickmacross and it's not in conflict with it  
12 being in a lot of places because you can move a long  
13 distance in an hour and 20 minutes. So, it's not in  
14 conflict with that proposition.

15 324 Q. If we move forward please. [Presentation played]. We 15:28  
16 can see by the next day, 10:42, so after a time people  
17 might have expected to have slept for a period, still  
18 using a mast in the Dundalk area?

19 A. Yes.

20 325 Q. [Presentation played]. That position continues past 15:28  
21 midday, do you agree?

22 A. Yes. Yes.

23 326 Q. [Presentation played]. More of the same?

24 A. And then Clermont Carn. Yes.

25 327 Q. [Presentation played]. We see again the Dundalk site 15:29  
26 there. Playing on please. [Presentation played].  
27 Then we've got Clermont Carn at 12:26, so not a very  
28 long time since the last one but, you think it is  
29 reasonable to conclude that it's likely that Clermont

1           Carn has a substantial range, which may or may not  
2           overlap with Dundalk itself?

3           A.    I think it reasonably does overlap with Dundalk and you  
4           can see that in the next call which is two minutes  
5           later. 15:29

6 328 Q.   Two minutes later. So, we're now back to a Dundalk  
7           mast. And so, what we have is a position where two  
8           minutes earlier it's using that Clermont Carn and then  
9           the likely position within 5-7 km of Dundalk?

10          A.    Yes. And, indeed, Clermont Carn might serve beyond 15:30  
11          Dundalk, I mean it's on the top of a hill.

12 329 Q.   Keep going. [Presentation played]. Continue into the  
13           afternoon. Dr. Tart, as this plays on, I'll make clear  
14           that what we're doing here is reflecting the  
15           investigation that you carried out that we asked you 15:30  
16           to, we asked you for the whole of Part 3, 12th to the  
17           14th, it may be, as far as the Inquiry Legal Team's  
18           working hypothesis is concerned, it becomes  
19           increasingly less important where the Anthony Donegan  
20           handset is. Certainly on this working hypothesis his 15:30  
21           involvement was to steal the car, which by this stage  
22           was some 18 hours earlier, but, nevertheless, we're  
23           faithfully replicating what you've told us you found?

24          A.    Yeah. There's a reason for that. I have specific  
25           proposition and, so, the Dundalk is part of that. But 15:31  
26           it's also the main cell that I'm detecting through the  
27           rest of it. So, for context, it's a commonly-used  
28           cell, it is not a unusual pattern for it to be using  
29           the Dundalk cell.

1 330 Q. We'll keep going. [Presentation played]. We're here  
2 on the 14th, still in the Dundalk area?

3 A. It is, and again this one's at 20:04 and the next one  
4 is a minute and 20 seconds later using Clermont Cairns,  
5 which, again, illustrates an expected result if the 15:31  
6 cells overlap.

7 331 Q. We see that on our screen now?

8 A. Yes.

9 332 Q. So, even if the location of this particular handset at  
10 that particular time is of diminishing interest, we are 15:32  
11 learning something from the data that it is showing us?

12 A. Yes. It's not uncommon for it to use Dundalk or  
13 Clermont Carn, and that Clermont Carn would probably  
14 overlap with Dundalk. You could say it the other way  
15 round but I think Dundalk is a smaller cell. 15:32

16 333 Q. We're staying with the Donegan phone. Here, we're in  
17 Part 4, which means we've started on the 15th and we're  
18 going to go through to 14:28 with this part. But,  
19 again, you were asked to investigate this just to  
20 understand where that phone was and to see whether any 15:32  
21 of the locations appear to show a pattern, so far as  
22 the Inquiry Legal Team is concerned, of involvement in  
23 the attack itself?

24 A. Yes.

25 334 Q. And we will see where that phone is. I make clear it's 15:32  
26 not suggested that it was wistfully investigated?

27 A. Yes, there was no specific proposition to test.

28 335 Q. [Presentation played]. Continued use in the Dundalk  
29 area?

1           A.    Yes, and I think Clermont Carn doesn't rule out the  
2                   Dundalk area.

3   336   Q.    [Presentation played]. Now, Part 6, so this is the  
4                   moment of the explosion and onwards on the 15th, we're  
5                   staying with the Donegan handset. Just take us back,   15:33  
6                   Mr. Safranauskas, it's slightly fast. Now, here we've  
7                   got a problem that we will see elsewhere that you do  
8                   have cell site data for it, you just don't know where  
9                   that cell is?

10          A.    Yes. Again, in contemporaneous, normal CDRs that I see   15:33  
11                   in my normal working life, I get information in an  
12                   electronic format straight from the network and it has  
13                   got lots of information in it, it's got azimuths  
14                   sometimes heights and sometimes even more, and it's got  
15                   coordinates. For this Inquiry, I had a large number of   15:34  
16                   scanned documents in pdf files, thousands of pages that  
17                   were poured through and cell site information was  
18                   separate from the cell usage and the call data came  
19                   from different sources. So, there was fairly  
20                   meticulous process to cross-reference them and ensure   15:34  
21                   that I wasn't going to inadvertently mislead by  
22                   including incorrect information. The incoming other  
23                   party data being a prime example. But I wasn't able to  
24                   cross-reference every single cell that I found in the  
25                   call records.   15:34

26   337   Q.    Play on please. [Presentation played]. The same  
27                   problem again. Continue through. [Presentation  
28                   played]. In the evening now. I think we're indicating  
29                   no cell site included, it may be that as that's an

1 incoming call, we don't know?

2 A. Yes. It's not in the report in front of me because I'd  
3 excluded it, but if it's not there is because I  
4 couldn't find the cell ID or it's because it was an  
5 incoming event and I wasn't sure I could trust. 15:35

6 338 Q. That concludes does it, Mr. Safranauskas, the  
7 presentation for -- thank you very much indeed,  
8 slightly later in the evening. We've not included  
9 here, we'll remind ourselves, it's the evening of 15th  
10 August. Keep playing on please, Mr. Safranauskas. I 15:35  
11 think that concludes the presentation for the 498.  
12

13 So, we're next if I can just indicate to  
14 Ms. Montgomery, that we are doing the 076/585  
15 presentation. Here, Dr. Tart, we have two handsets 15:36  
16 076, the Inquiry as provisionally attributed to  
17 Seamus Daly. 585 is, for the most important sequence,  
18 attributed to Seamus Daly as well, it also has an  
19 attribution to Colm Murphy earlier than that. You  
20 don't have to worry about any of that, your job has not 15:36  
21 been to assist with attribution, has it?

22 A. It hasn't. And, in fact, I've quite deliberately been  
23 one step removed from the wider investigative elements  
24 of the Inquiry to avoid context bias. So, basically  
25 I'm just looking at specific questions to do with 15:36  
26 locations and I'm only looking at the call data  
27 records. And, so, other information that could  
28 influence opinion potentially, the way you manage that  
29 is by not seeing it, so, I've been deliberately

1 ignorant of the context.

2 339 Q. So, we play on now please for this. We're going to  
3 start with the 076. [Presentation played]. We're in  
4 Part 4 which means they are on the 15th. The early  
5 hours of Part 4 has 076 using the Ardee East cell, 15:37  
6 which is to the south and west of Dundalk. Did you  
7 have any information in relation to the potential range  
8 of that cell?

9 A. The Ardee East, I didn't assess it, so I think I don't  
10 know. I think if it's in a town perhaps 5 or 7 km, if 15:37  
11 it's on a hill it's perhaps much beyond that. It  
12 wasn't considered in my report because there's no  
13 specific location alleged.

14 340 Q. Yes. [Presentation played]. So, at 9:36, we don't  
15 have cell site available, this is incoming call? 15:37

16 A. Yes.

17 341 Q. [Presentation played]. Another incoming call, so we  
18 don't know?

19 A. Or I don't trust.

20 342 Q. [Presentation played]. Same issue here? 15:38

21 A. Yes.

22 343 Q. [Presentation played]. And with this one?

23 A. Yes.

24 344 Q. [Presentation played]. And 9:48 on the 15th, the same  
25 issue? 15:38

26 A. Yes.

27 345 Q. [Presentation played]. And at 9:50, this is a sequence  
28 of calls we looked at, when we looked at Part 4, all  
29 form the same public call box, a call box that was used

1 to call another key number, but on this occasion it  
2 doesn't help us with the cell site?

3 A. Yes.

4 346 Q. By contrast, we can know that the 076 is using Clermont  
5 Carn? 15:39

6 A. Yes.

7 347 Q. It may serve Dundalk?

8 A. Yes. I think it's likely a large -- there's an  
9 implication it is a large cell, both from where it is  
10 and also the usage close in time to the Dundalk cell, 15:39  
11 which is I think is a less large cell.

12 348 Q. So, we know at 10:58, that 076 phone stops being used  
13 for a period by its user, alleged to be Seamus Daly  
14 within the provisional attribution, and we're now going  
15 to focus on the handset which is provisionally 15:39  
16 attributed to Seamus Daly from this point. So, here we  
17 have at 12:41, this is the start of the cell site data  
18 in relation to the movement of the handset that is  
19 alleged to be in the scout car, the 585, so that's the  
20 Seamus Daly phone that you can see. We've got the 15:40  
21 physical location of the Castleblayney 6598 indicated  
22 by the blue beacon?

23 A. Yes.

24 349 Q. You can also see "SC" marked there, just so that you're  
25 aware of Mr. Safranauskas's evidence about this, and I 15:40  
26 know that you had some input on how this might be  
27 presented, Mr. Safranauskas was clear that he was not  
28 suggesting for a moment that that was the actual  
29 location. The purpose of the icon is to show a

1 direction of travel. He acknowledged that it would  
2 have to be in the range of that mast, which I'm sure  
3 you would agree is an inevitable conclusion, for it to  
4 be using it and that he didn't know the range of that  
5 mast, and he has used a circle rather than something 15:41  
6 with a point to make clear that this is illustrative  
7 and nothing more?

8 A. Yes. And, again, the circle for the cell site is just  
9 indicating the general area in which the cell site does  
10 not indicate where the phone was. 15:41

11 350 Q. But we move on please with this one. We've got an  
12 incoming call for 585, we don't know where that is but  
13 what we do know is that it was using Castleblayney not  
14 long before at 12:41, so nine minutes earlier, and it's  
15 going to use Emyvale at 13:13, which is to the north. 15:41  
16 And so, again, Mr. Safranauskas has made clear he  
17 doesn't know exactly where that is and nor does he  
18 suggest that you could tell us exactly where that is,  
19 but he has indicated that it is generally in the area  
20 between those two cells to reflect the data points 15:42  
21 either side?

22 A. Yes, the cells based, so they could serve beyond  
23 Castleblayney and Emyvale.

24 351 Q. Yes.

25 A. So, there's uncertainty but you can have a ballpark 15:42  
26 estimate as to the general area?

27 352 Q. Yes. If we continue, please to the next one.  
28 [Presentation played]. Which is Emyvale at 13:13.  
29 And, again, Mr. Safranauskas being clear that he is

1 showing, for illustrative purposes, where that vehicle  
2 might be if the handset was in it. But not seeking to  
3 imply that it is exactly where it is shown on the map,  
4 hence the circle.  
5 15:42

6 Now, in terms of those two cells that we've just looked  
7 at, Castleblayney and Emyvale, are you able to add  
8 anything to our understanding that the likely range,  
9 whether we're in the five to seven or the longer?

10 A. I didn't estimate anything outside of the specific 15:42  
11 propositions so, no, I've left that open. They're  
12 fairly likely -- they're rural cells, I think.

13 353 Q. If we continue please. [Presentation played]. Now,  
14 we're focusing here on 585, we'll deal separately with  
15 980, but here it is using a cell at Pound Hill, 15:43  
16 Aughnacloy, so it is in range of that cell at 13:29 but  
17 we don't have details about where it's pointing or what  
18 its range might be.

19 A. No, but this is switched over now to roaming, so it's  
20 now roaming in Vodafone in Northern Ireland and so I've 15:43  
21 got a different set of rules of incoming calls while  
22 roaming in Northern Ireland because I could see --

23 354 Q. I'm focusing on 585, not 980, we've got the outgoing?

24 A. Yes.

25 355 Q. Do your new rules apply to the outgoing as well? 15:43  
26 A. No, the outgoing, I trust.

27 356 Q. You're comfortable with that?

28 A. Yeah.

29 357 Q. We'll come to 980 in a moment. Do we know the

1           approximate range of the Aughnacloy or was there any  
2           indication in the material that you had seen about  
3           whether we can say, as we did with Dundalk, that it's  
4           likely in the Aughnacloy area?

5           A.   Not immediately to mind but there is something nagging   15:44  
6               at the back of it. Hold on, did I make a comment.  
7               "Not to hand," if I did.

8   358   Q.   Well, I'm sure it will be in the report if you did  
9               identify it and we can --

10          A.   If it's not in the report, I didn't do it. If it is in   15:44  
11               the report, I did.

12   359   Q.   We'll keep going, please. [Presentation played]. So,  
13               here a diagram which, again, you've had some input into  
14               in terms of, you didn't create it but you had reviewed  
15               it before it was finalised, this shows us a 35 km   15:44  
16               radius for the pink circle, a 5 km radius for the blue  
17               circle, and we have the azimuth marked for Pigeon Top?

18          A.   Yes. If I might speak to this for a moment.

19   360   Q.   Yes.

20          A.   So, the 35 km purple circle, that's the maximum range   15:45  
21               for the cell based at Pigeon Top, the GSM non-extended  
22               range, which is what we're talking about, the cell  
23               could provide service to. That means another phone  
24               could connect to it and actually make a call or send or  
25               receive a text message. We believe that Pigeon Top was   15:45  
26               sectorised. There was a coverage map which was a  
27               network prediction of where a signal might be detected,  
28               might be used, including the signal strengths. And it  
29               implied that there was azimuth of approximately 70°.

1 So, this would be one of the sectors for the purple.  
2 It wouldn't serve in all directions, it would serve  
3 primarily towards 70° and probably 60° either side, but  
4 it can be a little more, it can be up to 90°, a little  
5 behind the mast but usually that's not very far. So, 15:46  
6 we've got a large purple circle because we've also got  
7 the potential for sectors on there. So, I don't think  
8 Pigeon Top serves everywhere within that circle. I  
9 think it servers tot Omagh and through Omagh and  
10 potentially throughout Omagh. And at points up to that 15:46  
11 maximum range. It wouldn't be continuous, I don't  
12 think. And there'll be areas where there may be  
13 smaller hills where it's blocked. But we knew, when we  
14 had a look at the coverage map, that you could see  
15 points out to that range. And, so, I think every 15:46  
16 expert that looked at that said this is a very large  
17 cell and, therefore, any finding would be less precise.

18  
19 Omagh, by contrast, that was a lower mast and was lower  
20 than the terrain around it. And so it's terrain 15:46  
21 constrained, so the signal is more difficult for it to  
22 go past. And, again, the coverage may have implied  
23 that it wasn't going to provide service much further  
24 than that. And, again, there was agreement between all  
25 the experts and myself on that. 15:47  
26

27 So, the two points here is that the Pigeon Top cell, it  
28 doesn't serve everywhere in the area but just to give  
29 it context, it's a large cell and so when we're talking

1 about it, we've got to be careful that we don't equate  
2 the mast location where the phone is, the phone could  
3 be quite distant from it and still use that cell.  
4 Secondly, that it serves an area that includes the  
5 Omagh cell, so, just because it's using Pigeon Top 15:47  
6 doesn't mean it's not in Omagh. It could be distant  
7 from Omagh but it could also be in Omagh. And Omagh  
8 is, at least at this scale, a more precise mast. It's  
9 still much lower precision than we would get in current  
10 analyses, generally speaking. 15:47

11 361 Q. we'll play on, please.

12 A. Sorry, Omagh, I should say. Omagh, also, we don't  
13 believe it was sectorised. It means it's like a -- if  
14 you think of Pigeon Top as being a floodlight, three  
15 floodlights pointing in different directions like on a 15:47  
16 football pitched, perhaps, but arranged differently.  
17 With Omagh it's more of a street light, it's in all  
18 directions. Thank you.

19 362 Q. [Presentation played]. So, we're focusing on 585 here.  
20 We have it using the Omagh College cell, therefore, 15:48  
21 somewhere within 5 km of that cell or thereabouts?

22 A. Or thereabouts, yes. So, including all of Omagh and  
23 perhaps a little beyond.

24 363 Q. Playing on, please. [Presentation played]. It's now  
25 using Pigeon Top but, as you say, that serves Omagh? 15:48

26 A. Yes.

27 364 Q. So, I'm not suggesting it's suddenly left Omagh to go  
28 somewhere else?

29 A. In my opinion, it's reason -- like we saw with the --

1           which we just saw with the Dundalk and the Claremont  
2           Carn cell, we saw them used close in time. It's a  
3           normal thing for cells to overlap.

4   365   Q.   Play on. [Presentation played]. 14:09 now, we've just  
5           got the overview here, and really, the conclusion from 15:49  
6           your point of view as an expert, can we safely conclude  
7           that that 585 phone, which is shown on here, travelled  
8           from the Republic of Ireland into the Omagh area  
9           between 12:41 and 13:57?

10        A.   Yes. So, we've got a large scale map, even though some 15:49  
11        of these cells are very large, some of them aren't.  
12        Omagh is not going to serve in the Republic of Ireland.  
13        And also to roam, your phone doesn't want to do that,  
14        the network doesn't want to let go of the revenue, so  
15        to actually have been roaming on Northern Ireland cells 15:49  
16        means there wasn't a cell on its home network of  
17        Eircell or available to it. So, I think at this sort  
18        of scale that's a sound conclusion.

19   366   Q.   Let's continue please. [Presentation played]. So,  
20           we're now focusing on 585 using Pigeon Top, expected to 15:50  
21           use that if it was in Omagh that doesn't necessarily  
22           mean it is in Omagh?

23        A.   Yes. I would expect this data if it were in Omagh, I  
24        would. I would also expect it if it were quite distant  
25        from Omagh, which is a worthwhile qualification. 15:50

26   367   Q.   Carrying go on, please. [Presentation played].

27        A.   Sorry, on the previous slide, there was contact and I  
28        had both ends of that call, so I trust the incoming  
29        data from the 5430, because I can see the other side of

1 it.

2 368 Q. So, both at 14:19 but focusing on 585, Pigeon Top,  
3 which is what you would expect it to use if it was in  
4 Omagh, but, equally, out of Omagh?

5 A. Yeah, Pigeon Top is not a discriminating cell. 15:51

6 369 Q. Now, covering the period of the warning calls and the  
7 response. 585 now using Cranlome which, as we can see,  
8 is slightly to the south and but very much to the west  
9 of Omagh. Are we able to reach the conclusion that it  
10 has likely left the Omagh area by this stage? 15:51

11 A. Yes, in my opinion it had, although some of the cells  
12 might serve towards it but I think at this point it's  
13 moved away.

14 370 Q. Move on please, Mr. Safranauskas. [Presentation  
15 played]. So, it's now using Stranooden in the Republic 15:51  
16 of Ireland. We're about a little over half an hour  
17 since that Cranlome site. Are we able to safely  
18 conclude that it has now continued a southward journey  
19 and is likely in the Republic of Ireland?

20 A. Yes, from the same reasoning, it must have lost 15:52  
21 service. Again, while it's roaming on the other net --  
22 the other network won't want to let go of it either,  
23 because it's all to do with revenue, so they want to  
24 make sure they can charge. So, when there's a handover  
25 you must have lost contact with the previous network. 15:52

26 371 Q. So, continuing please. [Presentation played]. We've  
27 just seen that one, 15:13, Stranooden. 15:26, we're  
28 back on 076 here, but we don't have cell site available  
29 for that incoming call, is that right?

1 A. Not that I trust.

2 372 Q. [Presentation played]. We've now got 15:30, we're back  
3 to the 585 and we can see it's using the Castleblayney  
4 cell, so, again, a cell in the Republic of Ireland?

5 A. Yes. 15:53

6 373 Q. What you would expect to find if it had travelled south  
7 from Omagh and arrived in the Castleblayney area by  
8 about 3:30?

9 A. Yes. So, basically after Cranlome, which is in  
10 Northern Ireland, every cell that was used by 585 after 15:53  
11 that point was based back on the Eircell network in the  
12 Republic of Ireland, so I think it had transferred at  
13 that point.

14 374 Q. Keep going. [Presentation played]. So, nothing  
15 available for 585 at this point at four o'clock, that 15:53  
16 you trust?

17 A. Yes. So, this is the 980.

18 375 Q. No, 585. We're staying with 585.

19 A. So, the 585, I've got some data that appears to be  
20 different from Mr. Weeks, so he put in Clermont Carn at 15:54  
21 this point, but I didn't have that in my data so it's  
22 not on this map.

23 376 Q. Carrying on, please. [Presentation played].

24 A. And, again, Mr. Weeks had Mohercrom for this, and that  
25 wasn't in my data. 15:54

26 377 Q. Sorry, he had?

27 A. Mohercrom (M-O-H-E-R-C-R-O-M) within his data that I  
28 didn't, I couldn't replicate, but, again, these are  
29 both in the Republic of Ireland.

1 378 Q. Carrying on please, Mr. Safranauskas. [Presentation  
2 played]. So, back to the 076 using Tallanstown, south  
3 and west of Dundalk?  
4 A. Yes.  
5 379 Q. It's quarter past six? 15:55  
6 A. Yes.  
7 380 Q. Carrying on, please. [Presentation played]. Again,  
8 we've just seen that one. [Presentation played]. And  
9 Ardee East, which we've seen before?  
10 A. Yes. 15:55  
11 381 Q. So, we're going to look at two more. We're going to  
12 look at 980, much of which we've looked at already, but  
13 we can just move through it, and there's really just  
14 one part that we need to focus on here. So, start  
15 please, Mr. Safranauskas. [Presentation played]. So, 15:56  
16 this is the first point that's important. We're here,  
17 as we'll see, if we just play on just a second, at  
18 12:41 coming up in the bottom left-hand corner, you  
19 know where 585 is in terms of the mast that it's using,  
20 you don't have cell site available, according to the 15:56  
21 legend, on there for 980. Is that because there is the  
22 other party data problem?  
23 A. Yes, but Mr. Weeks had got data that was different to  
24 mine, I think, and he lists Clermont Carn at this time.  
25 382 Q. So, that, I think, as Mr. Safranauskas can indicate 15:56  
26 with the cursor, over to the right there in that  
27 general location and that is a cell which you  
28 previously thought may well serve the Dundalk area and  
29 is likely to have a substantial range?

1 A. Yes. So, we discussed that in the context of the 498  
2 phone earlier. It wouldn't just be serving in Dundalk  
3 it would be a wider area than that, I think.

4 383 Q. We're going to play on. [Presentation played]. Again,  
5 the second of those that we want to look at closely 15:57  
6 with 980. That is an incoming call at 13:13, we know  
7 which cell 585 is using. You didn't have reliable data  
8 to draw on the 980, did Mr. Weeks?

9 A. We had -- so, in his data he had Emyvale, within my  
10 data I also had Emyvale but with a different name for 15:57  
11 the site and the specific cell ID, which again leads me  
12 to believe we had different data. So, yes, Emyvale.

13 384 Q. So, a different cell located but in the Emyvale area on  
14 the same mast?

15 A. So, Mr. Weeks didn't list the cell, he listed the site 15:58  
16 and a different name for that site.

17 385 Q. So, we're not going to go through all of those entries  
18 for 980 which we've seen with 585. But, are we able,  
19 Dr. Tart, to reach the same conclusion as we did for  
20 585, namely bearing in mind the sort of distances, the 15:58  
21 handover that will take place, the point at which it's  
22 out of range of its home network at that moment, that  
23 that 980 travelled from the Republic of Ireland to  
24 Omagh, and then travelled back to the Republic of  
25 Ireland at about the same time as the 585 made the same 15:58  
26 journey?

27 A. Yes, in a similar period, a large-scale movement  
28 between similar areas, even though there's uncertainty  
29 in the precision of those areas.

1 386 Q. As far as 980 is concerned, I wasn't proposing to take  
2 you to any other entries, I just want to check with  
3 you, that there weren't any that you had particularly  
4 flagged that raise any new issues that we haven't  
5 covered already? 15:59

6 A. No. So, we were talking about the Pigeon Top and the  
7 Omagh cell, both 585 and 980 used both while they were  
8 in contact with each other and I had both ends of the  
9 calls, sometimes they were different cells, so I trust  
10 the incoming call data while they were roaming on 15:59  
11 Vodafone Northern Ireland, that's why I've used it. I  
12 know this was a matter of some questioning over the  
13 weekend. So, that's my reasoning.

14 387 Q. We'll conclude my questioning anyway by looking at 430,  
15 you've checked the presentation in relation to the 15:59  
16 other numbers, but it's the movement of this phone that  
17 we are particularly interested in, given your findings.  
18 430, attributed to Liam Campbell by the Inquiry Legal  
19 Team on a provisional basis for the period of 15th  
20 August. So, we start at 9:45 in the morning using that 16:00  
21 cell with a big range?

22 A. Yes.

23 388 Q. Now, that's an incoming call but you trust that?

24 A. I do. So, I had -- all of the data within the period I  
25 was asked to consider for 430 was either outgoing or 16:00  
26 when it was incoming I had the other side of the call,  
27 I had a cell site assigned to it. It was different, so  
28 I knew which data I could trust. And so for the 5430,  
29 I've used all of it.

1 389 Q. So, we move through this, please. [Presentation  
2 played]. We're at 13:48, again using that cell with a  
3 substantial range. Do you agree?  
4 A. Yes.

5 390 Q. Move forward again, please. [Presentation played]. 16:00  
6 So, this is receiving a call from, on the Inquiry's  
7 working hypothesis, the scout car 14:10, again using  
8 that cell with a large range. 430, bottom right-hand  
9 corner?  
10 A. Yes. 16:01

11 391 Q. Moving forward, please. [Presentation played]. So,  
12 we're focused on 430, it continues at 14:19 to be using  
13 Clermont Carn?  
14 A. Yes.

15 392 Q. [Presentation played]. So, we don't have data 16:01  
16 available for 2:30, do you agree?  
17 A. Yes.

18 393 Q. Is there just no data available at all?  
19 A. Yes.

20 394 Q. If we move on. [Presentation played]. So, here we're 16:01  
21 at 14:30:33, receives an incoming call and we have it  
22 at Camlough Hill?  
23 A. Yes.

24 395 Q. So, it's no longer using that Clermont Carn mast that  
25 it has been using for some time? 16:02  
26 A. Yes.

27 396 Q. We're going to zoom into these in a moment but let's  
28 just move through the sequence. So, 14:30, Camlough  
29 Hill?

1 A. Yes.

2 397 Q. [Presentation played]. And 14:37 Mulllyash Mountain,  
3 which is on the Border and to the west of where the  
4 location of the previous mast?

5 A. Yes. 16:02

6 398 Q. [Presentation played]. Another Mulllyash Mountain at  
7 about the same time?

8 A. Yes.

9 399 Q. And, again, Mulllyash Mountain there for the other side  
10 of the Cranlome call from the scout car phone? 16:03

11 A. Yes.

12 400 Q. [Presentation played]. So, if we just pause on this,  
13 it will be the last part that I ask you about,  
14 Dr. Tart. We can see here indicated the information  
15 that we've just had. The focal point of this part of 16:03  
16 the presentation is on the two public call boxes at  
17 those two crossroads because those were the call boxes  
18 that made the warning calls. The working hypothesis is  
19 that Liam Campbell was in contact with the people in  
20 Omagh, no doubt for the purpose of coordinating their 16:03  
21 actions with the warning calls, and that he either made  
22 or was responsible for causing to be made, the warning  
23 calls that we know were made. And so we're just  
24 looking at that handset. We can see at 14:10 and 14:19  
25 it is using that large range cell, Clermont Carn? 16:04

26 A. Yes.

27 401 Q. But it has then used a cell which is, I believe, over  
28 the Border in Northern Ireland?

29 A. Yes.

1 402 Q. Camlough Hill. But does that mean it has likely moved  
2 out of range of Clermont Carn because otherwise  
3 Clermont Carn would have held on to it?

4 A. Yes. I believe it's a text message so it could be  
5 welcome to the network-type text message that was 16:04  
6 received. And then it moves back to the Republic of  
7 Ireland cells quite quickly.

8 403 Q. Is that once we get over to Mullyash Mountain?

9 A. Mullyash Mountain and then back to Clermont Carn.

10 404 Q. Let's just understand, because it may be that the 16:04  
11 existence of the Border and the divisions between the  
12 network are really what help us to understand this. It  
13 has, in your expectation, moved out of range of the  
14 Republic of Ireland Clermont Carn in order to prefer  
15 Camlough Hill? 16:05

16 A. Yes.

17 405 Q. And then it has moved out of range of Camlough Hill,  
18 which would have been held on to by the Northern  
19 Ireland network, in order to use the Mullyash Mountain?

20 A. Yeah. And by range I think you could potentially be in 16:05  
21 a hollow and then -- you don't have necessarily move  
22 far, there would be terrain between you, for example.

23 406 Q. Does it imply movement by that phone though?

24 A. There could be an area of overlap where one cell is  
25 more prominent than the other. 16:05

26 407 Q. But the fact that it has dropped one and moved on to  
27 another --

28 A. Yeah.

29 408 Q. -- does that suggest that it must have moved because

1 otherwise it would have continued to use the one that  
2 was holding on to?

3 A. Yeah, potentially. It's in a low service area,  
4 potentially.

5 409 Q. And we can see that the locations of the mast form an 16:05  
6 arc around the top of the location of the warning call  
7 phones. Can we reach any safe conclusions about what  
8 might be likely going on here?

9 A. Yes. So, I expect -- because the calls are quite close  
10 in time I expect it to be at or near an area of overlap 16:06  
11 of the cell. And we've used this contemporaneously.  
12 So, for example, this year I published a paper on a  
13 missing child from a case last year, she went missing  
14 on the way to school and it turned into a live enquiry  
15 and we were getting call data records every 15, 30 16:06  
16 minutes, etc. And the phone came to rest in a  
17 different city, it started up in the Midlands and ended  
18 up in London. And we estimated an area or a few  
19 hundred metres and from that traditional policing found  
20 an address and she was recovered from that address 16:06  
21 within hours, so on the same day she was recovered.  
22 Again our precision of estimate was using the same sort  
23 of approach, but, we knew about the mast, there was  
24 more call data, there where azimuths involved, we knew  
25 the height of the cells, and we could estimate just as 16:06  
26 a desk exercise just to a few hundred metres for that  
27 specific set of case circumstances, that is not here.  
28 What we have here is large cells, we don't know the  
29 service areas of them, we couldn't measure them even if

1 we wanted to, its 30 years ago, 25 to 30 years ago,  
2 they won't be the same, we don't know the azimuths,  
3 but, we think it is an area of low service where it is  
4 close enough to Northern Ireland to be able to transfer  
5 to the Northern Ireland service and we think an area of 16:07  
6 possible overlap would include the areas that are  
7 highlighted, and potentially a much wider area. So our  
8 expectation of overlap is quite large here, but those  
9 locations are within it.

10 410 Q. It is what you would expect to find if it was in the 16:07  
11 vicinity of those call boxes granting it is what you  
12 would expect to find if it was other locations as well?

13 A. Yes, it could be distant from those and you would get a  
14 similar pattern. But I think it is reasonable from the  
15 information we have got at our disposal it is also 16:08  
16 reasonable you would see this call sequence.

17 411 Q. If we here conclude by looking to understand how your  
18 expertise might be integrated with other data points  
19 which are outside of cell sites, once the investigation  
20 understands that 430 is in contact with a phone that is 16:08  
21 responsible for the leaving of the bomb in Omagh and  
22 travelling back to avoid detection, as is the  
23 inference, then that is the sort of information that  
24 can be laid alongside what you are able to contribute  
25 to build a picture about what is going on here. Do you 16:08  
26 agree that's how your science interacts with other  
27 data?

28 A. Yes, so I operate in isolation of that because it could  
29 potentially bias me. Role or context or expectation,

1 all of these biases, you control them with process, so  
2 I don't why want to know why you believe the phone, on  
3 testing that proposition in isolation of all that  
4 information, but others absolutely should use that  
5 information. It is specifically not my role and I must 16:09  
6 stay out of that part of the process.

7 MR. DE LE POER: Thank you for doing so. Dr. Tart, I  
8 don't have any more questions. As I say your reports  
9 will be published and we have been through the most  
10 important elements of your evidence. There is a Rule 16:09  
11 10 permission -- can I just look to Mr. Foster to see  
12 whether there is anything he feels he needs to add.  
13 Yes.

14  
15 DR. MATTHEW TART WAS QUESTIONED BY MR. FOSTER AS 16:09  
16 FOLLOWS:

17  
18 412 Q. MR. FOSTER: Thank you, Dr. Tart. Just for one point  
19 of clarification, and it refers to 7.31 in your report.  
20 Are you satisfied on balance that at 12:41 and at 16:09  
21 13:13, the two phones, 585 and 980, were using  
22 Castleblayney and Emyvale cell sites respectively?

23 A. Sorry, so in 7.3.1 of my report I am talking about 980.  
24 What's the time you are requesting?

25 413 Q. Both of those times -- I am just clarifying that you 16:10  
26 are satisfied that both of the phones were using the  
27 cell sites you have identified?

28 A. If it is in my report I believe the data to be  
29 accurate.

1 414 Q. I appreciate there is discrepancy with Mr. weeks?  
2 A. Yes.  
3 415 Q. But I am asking you are you satisfy with the data you  
4 have been provided from the Inquiry that both those  
5 phones were using the same cell sites at those times? 16:10  
6 A. I don't know. I don't know where the discrepancy comes  
7 from, it is a possibility there is transcription error,  
8 I don't expect that was the case. So I believe they  
9 may well have used those sites, I just can't confirm it  
10 from the data I have considered. 16:10  
11 416 Q. Okay.  
12 A. I can't go any further than that.  
13 417 Q. You can't confirm it?  
14 A. Yeah, but if it were an error on Mr. Weeks part it  
15 would been a consistent error with all the incoming 16:10  
16 call, but I haven't specifically seen it, so I think it  
17 is reasonable it is accurate.  
18 418 Q. So, you are satisfied? On balance?  
19 A. I think it is a reasonable explanation that they are  
20 accurate but I can't confirm it, so I can't put it as a 16:11  
21 factual thing that I saw it and that it is definitely  
22 true, I think it is reasonable they are.  
23 MR. FOSTER: Thank you. Thank you, Chair.  
24 MR. DE LA POER: So there are no other Rule 10  
25 permissions, I have no more questions, do you have any 16:11  
26 questions?  
27 CHAIRMAN: No, thank you.  
28 MR. DE LA POER: Can I indicate this then, firstly,  
29 Dr. Tart will be assisting us with Chapter 4, so this

1 isn't, I anticipate, the last time that we will see  
2 him. And can I, finally, invite you, Sir to rise for  
3 the week for us to resume at ten o'clock on Monday  
4 morning.

5 CHAIRMAN: Yes. Well thank you again, Dr. Tart.

16:11

6 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Sir.

7  
8 THE INQUIRY ADJOURNED UNTIL MONDAY, 5TH OCTOBER 2026,  
9 AT 10:00 A.M.

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