4.10 In this case, however, covert police operations underway at the time, analysis of the wider intelligence picture and analysis by the Senior Investigating Officer in charge of the Omagh Investigation, provide a high degree of confidence that **the information concerned was either inaccurate or irrelevant to Omagh.**

Police Operations

4.11 The Ombudsman's Internet Statement describes the mishandled documents as 'highly significant' and fears that their incorrect processing precluded operational options such as alerting 'border surveillance units' and allowing 'some covert policing'. This is not the case. **For over a week prior to the Omagh bomb a security force surveillance operation had been running against 'B' and others suspected of planning terrorist crimes, of whom 'A' was a central associate. The operation continued right through August 1998 and for some time afterwards. The intelligence derived from this operation - on which the Ombudsman's investigators were briefed and the details of which were contained in the intelligence systems to which they were given full access – has enabled the police to confirm that the information which Fulton provided between June and August 1998, including that of 23 July 1998 and 12 August 1998, was not relevant to the Omagh bomb**

4.12 Separately 'A', who had been named as a possible suspect in one anonymous phone call to the Omagh Investigation incident room shortly after the bombing, and who was later mentioned in a separate report (the source of which was Fulton himself), had already been put through the same formal assessment process as other potential suspects by the Investigation Team. That assessment took into account a call made from a phone attributed to 'A' but not registered to him (and at the time in the Dundalk area of the Republic of Ireland) to one of the Omagh 'bomb phones', though not one which was in Omagh itself, on the day of the bombing. (Colleagues in An Garda Síochána are similarly convinced that this phone call did not relate to the Omagh attack). **In the light of that assessment 'A' was ruled out as a 'firm' suspect by the Senior Investigating Officer. That judgement is confirmed by the surveillance operation referred to above; and also by the absence of any other information, intelligence or evidence found during the whole of the investigation which might suggest 'A's' involvement with the Omagh firm suspects.**

SECTION 5: 4 AUGUST ANONYMOUS INFORMATION

5.1 As with Fulton's information, the Ombudsman's Statement leans heavily on an anonymous call made to Omagh CID office on 4 August 1998. It is necessary, therefore, to analyse this issue in detail also.

5.2 As noted in the Ombudsman's Statement, an anonymous call was received by a CID Detective Constable at RUC Omagh on 4 August 1998. The caller stated that two individuals ('C' and 'D') were arranging for four AK-47 rifles and two