

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

OPENING STATEMENT FROM NOTTINGHAMSHIRE POLICE

Some INQ numbers are missing because at the time of writing, some exhibits had not yet been allocated INQ numbers on Relativity. Where this is so, the exhibit number is used instead as the next best URN.

Introduction

1. This is the opening statement from Nottinghamshire Police (“NP”).
2. NP starts by repeating its sincere condolences to the families and friends of Grace O’Malley Kumar, Barnaby Webber¹ and Ian Coates; and its sincere sympathies to the survivors (Wayne Birkett, Sharon Miller and Marcin Gawronski) and their families and friends.
3. VC’s crimes on 13 June 2023 were appalling in their ferocity, as many NP officers witnessed at first hand (see, for example, paragraphs 138, 139 and 165 of Karim Khalil KC’s opening note [CPSE0000475_0023]). How such appalling attacks could happen in a civilised country is, of course, a central question for this Inquiry.

NP’s approach to the Inquiry

4. NP is committed to adherence to the spirit and letter of the National Police Chiefs’ Council “Charter for Families Bereaved through Public Tragedy”.
5. NP has (so far as it can discern) disclosed all materials that may bear upon the Terms of Reference (“ToR”) of the Inquiry but NP is not complacent about that duty and will

¹ Who NP understands was known by his family as Barney and will be so referred herein.

continue to review the position where question marks arise about the existence of documents.

6. NP is committed, via its officers and staff (both serving and retired), to providing the maximum assistance to the Chair and her Inquiry team. All NP personnel have been instructed to provide all materials relevant to the ToR, to provide the fullest and frankest possible evidence to the Inquiry and to assist the Inquiry in helping to identify all and any lessons that can be learned.

A brief summary of NP's stance on the issues for this Inquiry

7. The provisional view of NP – subject, of course, to the evidence that may emerge – is that NP personnel did their reasonable best to manage VC's interactions with law enforcement between 24 May 2020 (NP's first encounter with VC) and 19 August 2022 (when NP closed the occurrence on the 28 July 2022 incident).
8. In the 9 months prior to the attacks, NP should have executed the "fail to appear" or FTA warrant issued by the Nottingham magistrates on 22 September 2022 in a timely manner, but failed to do so.
9. T/DCC Griffin addressed that failure in his statement at paragraph 473 [WITN0074001_0105] in these unequivocal terms (emphasis added):

"In relation to the non-executed FTA warrant I wish to state that this resulted from a serious systemic operational failure on the part of Nottinghamshire Police. I feel a strong sense of responsibility for the failings that took place. I deeply regret that these occurred, and I recognise the seriousness of what happened and the distress it caused. The warrant should have been executed in a timely manner. **VC should have been arrested pursuant to the warrant and that did not happen. I offer an unreserved apology to the families of the deceased and the survivors for this.** The fact that these

actions did not occur needed to be shared with the families as soon as possible. While I have already spoken about the importance of timing, I gave the SIO some discretion in this matter. However, I set the parameter that this information must be shared with the families no later than prior to charging VC. I took this approach because I anticipated that the issue of the warrant would likely arise at the court hearing, and it would not align with my “families first” principle for the families to learn of it there.”

10. Even if the FTA warrant had been executed in a timely manner – as it clearly should have been – given VC’s underlying psychosis at the time of the index offence, it seems unlikely that:
 - a. the CPS would have maintained the prosecution; and / or
 - b. the courts would have refused bail for VC; and/or
 - c. VC would have been convicted, particularly as NP officers had attended to assist with the execution of a s.135 Mental Health Act 1983 (“MHA”) warrant due to VC being particularly unwell; and/or
 - d. VC would have been imprisoned for the offence even if he was convicted of it.
11. Following the attacks, as can be seen from deeply harrowing BWV footage from responding officers², NP personnel did their very best to render first aid to Barney, Grace and Ian.
12. Indeed, the deployment of higher trained ARV officers in Ilkeston Road meant that Barney had the benefit of PC Demi Graham (an ARV officer) who expertly coordinated the first aid for Barney before paramedics arrived.

² Which must not, of course, be shown to the public but which the Chair will have to view (together with the dash-cam footage exhibit ASG-07 and SV1) fully to understand the savagery of VC’s attacks and the resultant scene presenting itself to the responding officers.

13. Likewise, PS Richard Hallam (the other ARV officer at the Ilkeston Road attack scene) coordinated the first aid to Grace, who was located slightly later by the responding police officers since she was behind the low front wall at No.316 Ilkeston Road such that her presence was not immediately apparent to the responding officers.
14. Further, when officers attended on Ian Coates, they provided constant and appropriate CPR until the paramedics took over his management.
15. Tragically, all three victims of VC's stabbing attacks proved to be beyond salvation ("unsurvivable" as Turner J observed in respect of Grace and Barney).
16. As to NP's efforts to apprehend VC after the attacks on Grace and Barney at 04:00 on 13 June 2023, NP's analysis of the emergency response suggests that whilst lessons can (and must) be learned (see Supt Simon Allardice's statement³) given VC's now known movements and the resources available, it is not realistic to suppose that NP could have prevented the killing of Ian Coates or the brutal running down of Wayne, Sharon or Marcin.
17. Whilst members of the public reported VC making towards the city after the Ilkeston Road attacks, a proposition apparently reinforced by the reports of a female screaming in the St Barnabas Cathedral area, in fact VC did not continue in that direction, but took an apparently random route towards Seely Hirst House and then Magdala Road. It may be that the Chair will wish to walk that route to retrace VC's steps via the fixed camera sitings so as to better appreciate the density of the housing and the number of junctions, blocked off roads and alleyways.

³ In particular from [WITN0311001_0114]

18. The responses of NP officers did ensure the arrest of VC on Bentinck Road at 05:35, thereby preventing any further death or serious injury, (though Karen Stennett, detention officer, was later assaulted by VC who kicked her in the left thigh as he left the cage of the detention van in the van dock area of the police station).
19. There were three matters in particular that the bereaved and survivors were entitled to know from NP clearly and at an appropriate and timely juncture after the information became clear to NP:
 - a. The extent of previous interactions between NP and VC;
 - b. The fact of the long-outstanding FTA warrant;
 - c. That a number of NP personnel misconducted themselves after the attacks.
20. There was no attempt by NP personnel to “cover up” these matters from the bereaved or survivors (or public). However, NP failed to deliver these three strands of information to the bereaved and survivors in a consistent, clear or timely manner. In short, there was a lack of coherence for which NP sincerely and unreservedly apologises to the bereaved and survivors.
21. The decision by the CPS to accept pleas to manslaughter of Grace, Barney and Ian on the grounds of diminished responsibility evidently and understandably caused anxiety and distress to the bereaved families. NP did its best to present the CPS with the full evidential matrix concerning VC’s dreadful attacks. As the Chair knows, NP has no statutory power to determine acceptability of pleas, that matter being confined to the CPS.
22. NP does not suggest that the CPS or Crown Counsel erred on this sensitive issue, given the unanimity of the expert psychiatric evidence. However, NP understands why the bereaved feel that murder convictions would have been more appropriate, noting that

the SIO had secured a sufficient evidential threshold for the CPS to authorise charges against VC for murder and attempted murder.

23. The SIO noted [NGPF0008791] in Policy Decision 81 following a meeting with the CPS and prosecuting counsel on 24 November 2023: “As SIO I have voiced my concerns and that there should be an element of punishment pursued. However it will be difficult to argue against the framework given by expert opinion and this will need to be carefully managed by the FLOs ...”
24. The failure of the SIO to require VC to give head hair samples is an oversight that he has admitted in paragraph 321 of his statement [WITN0359001_0108]. However, this is not, as far as NP understands it, an error that made any material difference to the appropriateness of the manslaughter pleas since NP is unaware of any evidence that VC took controlled drugs.
25. VC’s psychosis, the first documented episode of which appears to have been on 24 May 2020 and which was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia in July 2020, is not a condition that police officers or staff are trained or equipped to manage. The police service can only manage the sufferers of this dreadful condition on a case-by-case basis as manifestations of their illness present, sometimes as antisocial behaviour or criminality.
26. The MHA provides the police with limited contingent powers to detain under section 136, but use of this power:
 - a. requires the subject (in effect) to be in a public place;
 - b. requires the subject to be apparently suffering from a mental disorder and to be in immediate need of care and control;
 - c. does not provide any lasting remedy to someone in VC’s condition.

27. NP respectfully suggests that societal answers to the public safety risks posed by some paranoid schizophrenics lies not with the police but with the clinical services of the NHS, where judicious use of section 2 and 3 of the MHA may be required.
28. It will be for the treating psychiatrists and other healthcare witnesses in this Inquiry to explain why, following NP's first contact with VC on 24 May 2020, it was determined that VC was suitable for home treatment [NHFT0000168_0002].
29. Further, why VC was released on 17 June 2020, 31 July 2020, 22 October 2021 and 24 February 2022. Finally, why VC was discharged to his GP on 23 September 2022 after no contact had been made with him, and following which VC was apparently not seen again by mental health services or his GP before his dreadful attacks on 13 June 2023.
30. It is always difficult at inquests or public inquiries into tragic events to avoid hindsight reasoning, but the endeavour is required. Any counterfactuals (such as what would have happened had NP executed the FTA warrant) must be examined with forensic and factual rigour and on the basis of evidence rather than speculation.
31. Furthermore, the Inquiry is invited to be alive to the risks of media, including social media, coverage of VC's attacks affecting the memories of witnesses.
32. This note will now address:
 - a. NP's pre-13 June 2023 involvement with VC;
 - b. The FTA warrant;
 - c. The misconduct of certain NP personnel;
 - d. Communication of key messages to the bereaved and survivors;
 - e. Information sharing.

(a) NP's pre-13 June 2023 involvement with VC

33. NP's involvement with VC was as appears below, with some short commentary in respect of each incident:

NP incident 1 – 0011: 24 May 2020

34. At 00:20 VC was arrested by ARV officer PC Katie Eustace on suspicion of causing criminal damage by kicking the front door at 12 Brook Court. It was recorded that on police arrival VC had been attempting to get into 11 Brook Court [NGPF0000068_0010]. VC gave his address as 7 Brook Court. At the Bridewell, VC's detention was authorised by PS Wilde who suspected a mental health issue, such that at 02:55 VC was taken to the Queen's Medical Centre ("QMC") but returned to police custody as apparently fit to be detained at 04:04.

35. At 14:00 VC was assessed by the NHS Crisis Team in custody and underwent a MHA assessment [NHFT0000168_0002]. VC was deemed fit to be detained / interviewed and suitable for home treatment with Crisis Team support. When interviewed by PC Gail Collins at 17:53, VC disclaimed any memory of the criminal damage nor why he would think his mother was in the flat, but mentioned being stressed because he was behind in his studies.

36. VC was released from the Bridewell at 19:18 and transported home by NP officers [NGPF0000077_0045].

37. The processing by NP of this first allegation of criminal damage was slow. On 2 June 2020, Dr Seedat sent an email to PC Richard Marsden (in fact, concerning a second 24 May 2020 matter, see NP incident 2 below) diagnosing acute psychotic illness on the part of VC at the time of the index date and a lack of capacity [WITN0163014_0001]. PC Marsden updated the Occurrence log accordingly on 8 June 2020 [NGPF0000082_0015].

38. Accordingly, on 4 October 2021 the case was finally closed under “Outcome 12”: suspect too ill to prosecute. But this was not before VC had attended to see the officer in the case (“OIC”) PC Collins at the Bridewell on 29 July 2021, when he declined her offer of a conditional caution for the offence.

NP incident 2 – 0730: 24 May 2020

39. Little more than an hour after VC had been released from NP custody at the Bridewell on Incident 1, NP officers were called out again. At 20:30 it was reported that a female had jumped from a first floor window as a male she did not know (later identified as VC) was banging on the door of 23 Brook Court. VC caused un-repairable damage to the wooden frame and lock of the door and his behaviour was such as to so terrify the occupant (now known as Feven) that she jumped from her first floor window, thereby injuring herself.
40. At 21:14 PC 3974 Ashley Smith arrested VC on suspicion of criminal damage and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. VC was booked into custody at the Bridewell again at 21:46, this time by PS Swift [NGPF0000095_0002]. NP contacted the Crisis Team at 21:54.
41. Separately, at 21:50 the Crisis Team noted: “Valdo's mum voiced that she would prefer that her son goes in to hospital for treatment as he is a risk to others in his current mental state” [NHFT0000168_0003]. After some delay, at 18:05 on 25 May 2020, a MHA assessment was performed by doctors Sadraei and Malik who authorised VC’s detention under s.2 MHA [NHFT0000168_0004]. VC was transferred to Highbury Hospital at 23:03 on 25 May 2020 [NGPF0000095_0054].
42. VC remained an in-patient until discharged on 16 June 2020 into the care of the Crisis Team; and then from 30 June 2020, under the care of the Early Intervention in Psychosis (“EIP”) team.

43. Any potential prosecution of VC for his conduct at c.20:30 on 24 May 2020 (i.e. this second matter) was filed as “undetected” at 11:54 on 9 June 2020 by PS Katie Sparks (in light of Dr Seedat’s email dated 2 June 2020).

NP incident 3 – 0852: 13 July 2020

44. At c.22:16, VC attempted to enter 11 Brook Court and was detained by members of the public pending police attendance. The NP street triage team noted this incident and attended the scene. At 23:30, after assessment by CPN Nigel Wade, PC Jamie Severn of the Street Triage Team detained VC under s.136 MHA and VC was taken to the Cassidy Suite at Highbury hospital where he was in due course formally detained under s.3 MHA.

45. The incident that prompted police attendance was not processed via any criminal justice pathway.

46. It seems to have been during this second in-patient stay that VC was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, Dr Seedat being the lead clinician and discharging consultant [CHCA0000028_0001]. VC remained an in-patient until discharged on 31 July 2020.

47. There was then approximately one year during which NP had no dealings with VC, though the records indicate that the local NHS Trust did. NP notes that VC’s family became increasingly concerned by VC’s behaviour at the end of May 2021 but were unable to persuade the Crisis Team to admit him.

48. On 31 May 2021 VC attended MI5’s headquarters, which incident was reported to NP on 2 June 2021 [NGPF0000224].

NP Incident 4 – 0581: 5 July 2021

49. At 15:55, VC’s flat mate Sebastian called the police on 101 to report aggressive behaviour by VC (which would have constituted common assault).

50. Sebastian attended Radford Road police station about 90 minutes later and was seen by probationer constable Amy Pannell who noted that Sebastian had suffered no injury and did not want to make a formal complaint, but just wanted to make police aware. Sebastian signed PC Pannell's PNB to that effect [NGPF0000045_0001].
51. PC Pannell also noted that Sebastian reported that VC was regularly visited by NHS mental health nurses. PC Pannell advised Sebastian to speak to the mental health nurses when they attended upon VC and to keep a distance from VC. PC Pannell closed the case under "Outcome 16: Victim declines / withdraws support" and this was authorised by her Sergeant, PS Zoey Price at 21:26 who documented: "no evidence. one word against the other. no injury. IP not willing to provide statement but just wanted to let us know. No DV. Common assault. Low risk" [NGPF0000043_0010].
52. Within 2 months of this incident, VC had been detained again under s.2 MHA, on 3 September 2021.

NP incident 5: 18 August 2021

53. On this date, VC was summonsed for an accumulation of speeding offences on the following dates: 22 February 2021, 27 April 2021, 5 May 2021, 8 May 2021 and 15 May 2021. All apparently involved VC driving at a recorded speed of 35mph in a Speed Limit of 30mph.
54. On 22 February 2022 VC was convicted of these speeding offences in absentia. He was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence for 6 months.

NP incident 6 – 0483: 3 September 2021

55. NP officers were called by an NHS doctors team to assist with a s.135 MHA warrant at Flat 2, 48 Salisbury Street, Nottingham, VC's residence [NOCC0000048_0001]. Much of this interaction with NP is captured on BWV and will be shown at the Inquiry. As can be seen,

VC was articulate but apparently in psychosis. He assaulted PC Barnaby Pritchard by punching him in the face and headbutting him. The officer sustained minor but unpleasant injuries. VC was taken to QMC (to check him following the use of Taser and Pava spray) and then to a local s.136 suite at Highbury hospital.

56. VC was subsequently detained under s.2 MHA, initially remaining in a s.136 suite whilst a suitable in-patient bed was obtained. On 11 September 2021 VC was sent to an out of area hospital in Doncaster and the s.2 detention was converted to a s.3 detention on 24 September 2021. On 1 October 2021 VC was moved back to the Priory private hospital in Nottingham before being discharged into the community on 22 October 2021 under the EIP team [PAGR0000025_0001 / PAGR0000029_0004].

57. The processing of this assault on PC Pritchard was lengthy:

- a. On 8 September 2021, PC Louise Ellis opined that there was sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction for assaulting an emergency worker.
- b. The original OIC PC Matthew Johnson sent the case to the CPS for advice and on 25 November 2021 [WITN0023001_0004] received four actions from the CPS documented on 9 December 2021 [NGPF0000027_0018].
- c. By early December 2021 PC Johnson had addressed the four outstanding matters and pursued Dr Ben Lomas for a statement on VC's capacity at the index offence.
- d. On 27 January 2022 Dr Lomas signed an MG11 which confirmed *inter alia* that VC was detained under a s.135 warrant because of concerns from the community mental health nurse that he was relapsing, harbouring persecutory beliefs and refusing to cooperate with the community mental health team and that "it appeared highly likely that VC was unwell".

- e. Due to sickness on the part of PC Johnson, a new OIC PC David Myers was allocated by PS Ellis on 20 March 2022 (who – for context – noted the excessive demand on the OEL 29 entry [NGPF0000027_0019]).
- f. On or about 4 June 2022 the CPS authorised charge for assault on an emergency worker, see OEL 33 [NGPF0000027_0021].
- g. On 24 August 2022 a postal requisition for VC to attend Nottingham magistrates on 22 September 2022 [NGPF0000017_0039] was sent, noting the recipient address of Flat 15, Madison Court. It seems unlikely that VC would have received this postal requisition since VC had officially left Flat 15 on 8 February 2022 [UNIN0001304] and given what flatmate “Christopher” states in his MG11 dated 10 July 2023 [CPSE0001738_0005] (and notwithstanding the evidence that in May or June 2022 VC walked into the unlocked flat to collect letters [NGPF0002628] MG11 at page 4 of 5).
- h. On 22 September 2022 VC failed to appear at the magistrates and the court issued a warrant for VC’s arrest, not backed for bail – the FTA warrant.
- i. On 20 January 2023 PC Myers sent an email to PC Pritchard [NGPF0005699_0001] intimating that his team might try to locate VC the following week. That email was more in the way of an informal heads up between professional colleagues and in the event the FTA warrant was not executed.
- j. Indeed, the warrant was not executed until at 15:28 on 16 June 2023, PC James Lunt arrested VC (who was, of course, already in custody for the attacks) for failing to appear. That matter was not, in the event, proceeded with.

58. There is no doubt that the FTA warrant should have been executed by NP. Indeed, pursuant to the May 2022 joint NPCC-HMCTS-CPS “Fail to Appear Criminal Warrants Protocol”:
- a. Section 9.3 required regular audits of outstanding warrants, though did not define who should undertake these audits;
 - b. Annex A stipulated that warrants for assault of an emergency worker should be executed within 21 days.
59. NP adopts without repetition paragraphs 8 to 10 above.
60. On 19 January 2024, during a pre-recorded TV interview with the BBC, ACC Griffin confirmed that the FTA warrant was not executed. That part of the interview was never broadcast.
61. On 23 January 2024:
- a. NP issued a statement to the Daily Telegraph stating that VC “was never arrested for that warrant which was still outstanding at the point of his arrest in June 2023” [NGPF0005361].
 - b. The Daily Telegraph published a story online at 20:01 under the headline “Police failed to catch Nottingham killer for 9 months before his attacks”. Similar local and national on-line articles then followed.
62. On 25 January 2024 an NP press release [NGPF0006508] included the following: “In August 2022, [VC] was reported for summons and was due to attend court on 22 September 2022 for the assault on our officer. He failed to appear on that occasion and a warrant for his arrest was issued in September 2022. He was never arrested for that warrant which was still outstanding at the point of his arrest in June 2023, when he brutally killed three people and seriously injured three others on the streets of

Nottingham. After the June 2023 attacks, we followed the Independent Office of Police Conduct's guidance and, having shared details with them, we undertook professional discussions to establish whether the referral criteria was met over not executing the warrant for his arrest".

NP incident 7 – 0599: 15 January 2022

63. On 15 January 2022 Christopher, one of VC's five flatmates from Flat 15 Madison Court, Derwent Way, called police at 19:12 to report being assaulted by VC (an incident involving a headlock and punch). By 19:22 NP had identified that VC had 5 previous matters including pending CPS advice on charging for the assault of PC Pritchard [NGPF0000054_0003].
64. PS Faulkner and PC Zacharia responded to this call and attended at Flat 15. PC Zacharia spoke with Christopher who did not want to make a complaint. PS Faulkner spoke with VC who appeared calm. The officers decided against any arrest of VC since Christopher was undecided on whether he wanted any action taken, matters had calmed and there were other occupants of the flat to offer support to Christopher. Later the same evening PC Zacharia called Christopher to check whether he wanted to make a formal complaint but was only able to leave a voice message.
65. On 16 January 2022, Christopher telephoned PC Zacharia to confirm that he did not wish to make a complaint and that he would attend the police station to make a PNB entry to this effect. Christopher did so at 21:40 on 16 January 2022 [NGPF0000056] and confirmed that he no longer wished to make a complaint, stating that all he cared about was that he wanted VC to be removed from the complex and that he would be going through the proper channels with the university [NGPF0000055_0007].

66. On 17 January 2022 at 17:52 VC returned PC Zacharia's call to be told that the police were taking no further action, and VC was happy with the decision. PC Zacharia warned VC about his conduct and, being aware of the previous mental health issues, asked VC whether there was anything the police could do to help in this regard. At this, VC became evasive and put the phone down. PC Zacharia telephoned VC twice more, but got through to voicemail so left VC a message offering further help. VC never responded.
67. At c.22:01 on 17 January 2022, PC Zacharia spoke with Christopher on the telephone [NGPF0000055_0007] to tell him that the police were finalising the matter with no further action. PC Zacharia then asked his sergeant, PS Faulkner, to authorise closing the incident and PS Faulkner did so on 23 January 2022, "Outcome 16: Victim Declines / withdraws support", OEL 10.
68. Realistically, there was no other sensible disposal of what was – objectively – a low-level student fracas.
69. Within a fortnight of this incident, VC was detained again under s.2 MHA.

NP incident 8 – 0247: 19 January 2022

70. At 11:32 on 19 January 2022 Roseanne Crane from the Stonebridge Centre requested NP assistance in executing a s.135 warrant at 13:00. In light of VC's previous violence on 3 September 2021, pre-emptive authority to use Taser was authorised and attending officers advised to activate their BWV.
71. NP officers attended after 13:00 and VC was detained under s.135 and placed in handcuffs by police. VC was calm, but nonetheless NP officers escorted the ambulance containing VC to the Cassidy Suite where, following assessment by Dr Skelton, Dr Manzar, and "Rosie AMHP" [NHFT0000168_0205] it was decided that VC could be managed by the Crisis

Team in the community, noting “if it becomes clear he is not engaging or further risks become apparent, we will look at admission”.

NP incident 9 – 0294/0564/0626/0756: 28 January 2022

72. On 28 January 2022 at 12:40, 17:15 and 18:12 Jude Modern of Nottingham City Council Social Care requested NP attendance for a s.135 warrant on VC. The initial three incident logs noted 6 previous occurrences. Each of these 3 attempts to set up the execution of the warrant fell through, apparently due to lack of EMAS attendance.
73. Finally, at 20:41 AMHP Fiona Parker of Nottingham City Council requested NP attendance for the s.135 warrant and the NP controller asked for NP to be called once all other services were on the scene.
74. At c.21:23 PCs Matthew Gell and James Russell-Taylor attended Flat 15 Madison Court, incident log 0756. PC Gell spoke with VC at the front door and VC agreed to accompany the mental health professionals, who were content for the police then to leave. At around 21:40, after around 20 minutes in attendance, the two NP constables left.
75. VC was then admitted to the Cassidy Suite at Highbury hospital under s.2 MHA [NHFT0000168_0215], being discharged on 24 February 2022 into community-based care [NHFT0000168_0260]. It was noted: “[VC] has provided an address to ward staff: 209 Ilkeston Road, NG7 3FW”. NP note that RiO records show that on 4 August 2022 Gary Carter made a “cold call” to VC, asked for Valdo and was told that no one of that name lived there. It was noted that VC “has a history of giving false addresses” [NHFT0000168_0270] and on 9 August 2022 VC gave his address as 15 Madison Court and had “documented a different address to the address he provided to the EIP team post discharge”.

NP incident 10 – 0613: 26 April 2022

76. On 26 April 2022 Sebastian reported to NP that VC had followed him that day. NP graded this as a Grade 3 matter (i.e. for response within 24 hours) and linked the matter to the 0581 incident log from 5 July 2021 which also involved VC and Sebastian.
77. However, no action was taken within 24 hours and it was not until on 9 May 2022 that neighbourhood policing sergeant Neil Langham noted that the incident had been outstanding for 13 days that he telephoned Sebastian and elicited that VC's behaviour might have been coincidental and not stalking. Whilst there was no indication of imminent threat or harm to Sebastian – who was not sure what if any action he wanted to be taken – PS Langham did not close the incident but directed that a Managed Incident Team (“MIT”) officer should speak with Sebastian.
78. On 12 May 2022 PC Beardsmore spoke with Sebastian who confirmed he was not asking for any specific action, so PC Beardsmore closed the incident, albeit without speaking with a sergeant. That said, a member of the supervisory team in the FCR did close the incident (see paragraph 20 of PS Langham's statement [WITN0029001_0006]). NP have been unable to trace PC Beardsmore – who has left NP – for the purpose of producing a Rule 9 statement from him.
79. On 13 May 2022 NP's National Crime Recording Standards personnel deemed that a criminal offence had not been disclosed by the 26 April 2022 report, which is a fair and accurate analysis of the evidence. Indeed, there would have been no power of arrest at this point since neither the “reasonable suspicion” nor “necessity” threshold could have been surmounted.

NP incident 11 – 0089: 28 July 2022

80. At 08:03 on 28 July 2022 Sebastian telephoned 101 to report noticing VC at his gym – which he admitted could be a coincidence – and upon walking home, seeing someone hide behind a wall, the identity of that person being unclear. NP immediately linked this call to Sebastian’s 5 July 2021 matter.
81. On 30 July 2022, PC Sarah Barnes of the MIT was allocated case 0089 and called Sebastian by telephone. She elicited that this was the second time a similar thing had happened, 26 April 2022 being the previous. PC Barnes created an occurrence and crime number for stalking as Sebastian wanted the police to speak with VC and discover why he was following him.
82. After speaking with her sergeant PS Ashleigh Small on 3 August 2022, PC Barnes spoke with Sebastian once more and he confirmed that he was content for the police to speak with VC. PC Barnes also gave Sebastian some reassurance.
83. On 4 August 2022 PC Barnes visited the address for VC, but no-one answered so she left her card, OEL 9 [NGPF0000003_0007].
84. On 11 August 2022 PC Barnes re-visited VC’s address and again obtained no reply, but did notice that there was no post in the letter box addressed to VC. PC Barnes also attended the gym to which Sebastian and VC went, but could find no CCTV.
85. On 19 August 2022, PC Barnes closed the case after making Sebastian aware that no further action would be taken by police, OEL 13.
86. On 25 August 2022, PS Ashleigh Small formally closed the case under “Outcome 16: Victim declines / Withdraws support”.

(b) The FTA warrant

87. The narrative in respect of this warrant appears at paragraph 57 above.
88. As can be seen, after it became clear following the attacks in June 2023 that VC had been outstanding on a warrant since September 2022, NP reviewed the matter, see per T/DCC Griffin at paragraphs 645 to 696 of his statement [WITN0074001_0149-0162].
89. The NP operating practice now for outstanding warrants is at [NGPF0007449].
90. NP adopts without repetition paragraphs 8 to 10 above.

(c) Misconduct by NP personnel

91. In her Rule 9 statement dated 5 December 2025 [WITN0044001_0001], Supt Kathryn Craner sets out the history of the Professional Standard Department (“PSD”)’s involvement in responding to misconduct by NP personnel after the 13 June 2023 attacks.
92. **PC Matthew Gell** viewed data concerning VC on 15 June 2023. Specifically he accessed the NICHE subject record of VC. PC Gell was arrested on 19 June 2023 and suspended from duty. On 5 July 2023, DI Harding of PSD removed PC Gell from criminal investigation. On 14 September 2023 Det Supt Hayley Williams, Head of PSD, determined that there was a case to answer against PC Gell for gross misconduct and that matters should proceed to a gross misconduct hearing. On 19 January 2024 PC Gell attended a gross misconduct hearing accused of researching intelligence on VC after the attacks and for forwarding sensitive data⁴ outside of the Force. PC Gell admitted breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour in relation to Confidentiality and Orders and Instructions. He received a final written warning (“FWW”), in force for 2 years, imposed

⁴ Which included the distasteful language in the WhatsApp message drafted by another officer

by a panel chaired by an independent Legally Qualified Chair (“LQC”), Mr Oliver Thorne.

That FWW expired on 18 January 2026.

93.

GRO-E

94. **Special Constable Skenderaj** viewed sensitive BWV of the victims of VC on 31 August 2023. He self-reported this the following day and was suspended from duty on 8 September 2023. On 13 September 2023 he resigned. On 12 October 2023, DCC Cooper certified Skenderaj’s case as suitable for an accelerated misconduct hearing (“AMH”). On 11 December 2023 the Chief Constable Kate Meynell declared that Skenderaj “would have been dismissed” but for his resignation, at a so-called “former officer” gross misconduct hearing and directed that Skenderaj be placed on the College of Policing’s statutory Barred List. The Chief Constable directed that the bereaved and survivors be advised of the outcome for Skenderaj.
95. On 12 December 2023 the hearings officer (Stephen O’Connell) emailed DCI Reynolds and DI Harding to share the signed Regulation 62 Notice of Outcome and informed them

as follows: "The Chief has expressly asked that the families of the victims in Op Hendrix are informed of this matter prior to the former officer having the completed Reg 62. Clearly I have to have (sic) this to him and/or his representative by the 18th December, 2023."

96. So far as NP is aware, former SC Skenderaj was the only NP officer or staff member to view BWV relating to the victims of VC (though the Inquiry's attention is drawn to paragraph 137 of Supt Craner's statement [WITN0044001_0039]). The misconduct of PC Gell and Rutherford did not involve any such viewing.
97. The failure by NP to communicate the misconduct of these three members of NP personnel – and other less serious matters – in a consistent, clear and timely manner is a matter of profound regret for which NP sincerely and unreservedly apologises to the bereaved and survivors.

(d) Communication of key messages to the bereaved and survivors

98. NP adopts without repetition paragraphs 19 and 20 above.

The previous interactions between NP and VC

99. In respect of Grace's family, on 7 December 2023 during the meeting at Avon and Somerset Police HQ the SIO took Drs Kumar and O'Malley-Kumar through a timeline [NGPF0009926_0001 and NGPF0009927_0001] as recorded in the minutes of that meeting, [WITN0289004_0012]. That timeline dealt with the previous interactions between NP and VC and the fact of the long-outstanding FTA warrant. Dr Kumar thanked Sam Shallow and Det Supt Sanders for doing so in his email to them dated later that same day [HMCP0000385_0002].
100. Emma and Dave Webber had left this meeting just before the SIO went through the timeline, but the minutes of the meeting were sent to them by DC Gina Farrell at 22:13

on Sunday 17 December 2023 [NGPF0008622]. Those minutes referred to the FTA warrant from September 2022 [WITN0289004_0014].

101. On 4 January 2024 Elaine Newton (and her sister Carol Parlour) were informed of the previous interactions between NP and VC at a visit by the SIO and FLO DC Kimberley, see FLO log of DC Kimberley [NGPF0009914]. And again on 22 February 2024, see paragraph 143(b) below.

102. Regrettably, NP now realises that there was no dialogue with the survivors in respect of the previous interactions between NP and VC and that NP should have been more proactive in this respect. NP sincerely and unreservedly apologises for this omission in respect of the survivors.

The outstanding FTA warrant

103. On 16 June 2023 between 14:30 and 14:56 (see paragraph 218 of DCI Gould's statement) [WITN0284001_0094] the intention was that the bereaved and survivors should be told that CPS had authorised charging VC with three charges of murder, three charges of attempted murder and a low level assault of emergency worker **“for which he had been outstanding as a wanted person for this offence”**.

104. Ironically, this oral briefing was rushed out to the bereaved and survivors in a bid to avoid them reading about the outstanding FTA warrant in the Sun newspaper first.

105. Regrettably, the emboldened words in paragraph 103 above were lost in the process by which the FLOs conveyed this message to the bereaved and survivors such that it seems highly unlikely that these briefings would have conveyed to the bereaved or survivors the fact that the FTA warrant had been outstanding since September 2022.

106. The families were told more about the date from which the warrant was outstanding when the SIO visited the families with a briefing note ([HMCP0000175], paragraph 306 of DCI Gould's statement):

- a. **22 August 2023** for the O'Malley Kumar family: see (i) paragraph 309 of DCI Gould's statement (ii) DC McVey's FLO log [NGPF0008746] "Supt Sanders answered some questions posed from Sanjoy re mental health of defendant and agreed he would provide a timeline of contact with mental health /police incidents. Sanjoy stated he would like to know if there were any missed opportunities for MH services to engage with the defendant. **Supt Sanders discussed outstanding warrant for assault on emergency worker** and incident in Loughborough where defendant assaulted a colleague";
- b. **12 September 2023** for the Webber family at their home: see DC Farrell's FLO log entry [NGPF0008569] at page 21 of 82 "It was explained to them that the police had assisted in the execution of a mental health order, and that the defendant had assaulted a police officer. However they were reassured that had this been concluded in all likelihood the defendant would still have been in the community at the time of the attacks".
- c. **4 January 2024** for Elaine Newton when the SIO attended her home and DC Kimberley's FLO log states, *inter alia*, that "the following topics were covered ... (4) What we knew about VC and his history in mental health services" [NGPF0009914].

107. Any lingering uncertainties about the FTA warrant were dealt with as follows:

- a. For the O'Malley Kumar family, on 7 December 2023, as explained in paragraph 99 above;

b. For the Webber family, on 17 December 2023, as explained in paragraph 100 above.

108. DC Farrell and Piggott's FLO log for 19 December 2023 reveals that by this date the Webbers knew of the long outstanding FTA warrant: "Emma said that they were 'gunning' for the CPS and the fact that [VC] was wanted on a warrant for a violent offence".

109. NP adopts without repetition paragraphs 60 to 62 above.

110. All of the above demonstrates that NP did not seek to conceal from the families the fact of the long-outstanding FTA warrant. However, NP did not advise the bereaved and survivors about the FTA warrant in a timely, consistent and clear manner. Understandably, this may have given the erroneous impression that NP was either concealing the failure to execute the FTA warrant and / or seeking to distract from it.

The misconduct of some NP personnel

111. The misconduct of three NP personnel who were disciplined is summarised in paragraphs 92 to 94 above.

112. The evidence to the Inquiry of (amongst others) T/DCC Griffin, former Det Supt Sanders and DCI Gould will address the failure of NP to advise the bereaved and survivors of the internal NP misconduct in more detail. For present purposes NP wishes to record that despite then ACC Griffin making it clear that the families needed to hear about the internal misconduct from NP, that simply did not happen quickly enough or clearly enough. For that undoubted failure, NP sincerely and unreservedly apologises to the bereaved and the families.

113. Some contextual comments about that failure may assist:

114. On 20 September 2023 (see [NGPF0009729]):

- a. By her email at 09:07 DCI Gould FLA made clear to the FLOs that it was important to be open and honest about PC Gell's misconduct and she explained that PC Gell had shared a WhatsApp message with persons outside of policing and that she did not intend to share the content of the WhatsApp message. She explained she was waiting for Det Supt Williams to confirm that this could be shared.
- b. By her email at 11:23, the then Head of PSD, now former Det Supt Williams responded (copying in ACC Griffin amongst others) confirming that other than releasing PC Gell's name (because at that time it had not been confirmed by an LQC whether the hearing would be in public or private or anonymised) concurred and made clear that there was also a Special Constable who had admitted viewing a lot of the most distressing footage and that he was suspended and she anticipated that he would proceed to an AMH.
- c. By his email at 13:21, ACC Griffin confirmed that he was "Really ... keen to ensure that the family (sic) always find out about these types of issues from us, rather than anywhere else ..."

115. DCI Gould then telephoned the SIO, and her FLA log records: "Supt Sanders – SIO – Aware – and advised not to be shared at this stage and he will also discuss with PSD and Mr Griffin as Gold". In other words, the ball was now in the SIO's court as to the timing of these necessary disclosures to the bereaved and survivors.

116. On 21 September 2023, Elaine Newton was told by DC Kimberley about a media leak being investigated and an officer who accessed police systems without authority (page 19 of 21 FLO log [**NGPF0008774**]). Though DC Kimberley did not identify the individual, he was obviously referring to PC Gell since Rutherford was police staff and Skenderaj had by that time resigned and was not suspected to have leaked information.

117. On 22 September 2023 at 13:30, FLO PC Baxter told James Coates by telephone *inter alia* that: an officer had accessed a police system without authority but that there was no evidence it had been shared with the media; that this misconduct had not impacted upon the investigation; the officer (which was PC Gell) would face a gross misconduct hearing (Baxter FLO log page 8 [NGPF0008359]).

118. On 6 October 2023 FLA DCI Gould emailed some of the FLOs [NGPF0009677_0006] “[R]egarding the officers and police staff members under investigation for the PSD - There are now 3 who have been subject to GM [gross misconduct] investigations relating to viewing content and videos relating to HENDRIX”.

119. DCI Gould then set out the misconduct in some detail, as follows (with emphasis added):

“1 was a SPC [special police constable] who has self-reported to PSD and found to have looked 3 times at the BWV of the scene and even the bodies being put into body bags. He has been investigated and has resigned. He will go to a FT [fast track] misconduct hearing and, if found, will be on the barred list to ensure he cannot work for law enforcement in the future. This is still ongoing.

1 was a front counter clerk [Rutherford] who again claims curiosity got the better of her.

The final one is the PC [Gell] which we are aware of and have been given the green light to disclose. I am getting a form of words agreed via Supt Williams from PSD to ensure the information is all correct re the SPC and police staff member.

I will then collate a form of word for next week **so it can all be shared with the families. I feel it is crucial we are up front about this and can demonstrate the robust nature with which they have all been dealt.**

Thank you for your continued hard work and efforts in keeping the families updated.

I really want to ensure that **they all receive everything as timely as possible** and updates are all delivered as close together as possible. For any future updates re court etc, I will arrange a teams meeting for us to get together and thrash out”.

120. The FLA’s intention for transparency with the families about the PSD was therefore clear.

121. On 9 October 2023, at 14:10 FLO PC Baxter advised James Coates that three members of police staff had been investigated by PSD (Baxter FLO Log page 9 [NGPF0008359]).

122. On 13 October 2023 at 17:25, the SIO:

- a. Recorded in Policy Decision 73: “Professional Standards and information access: At this moment in time and until I get any further direction and information as SIO, there will be no dialogue with families surrounding PSD matters, as we simply have not had clarity as to the situation. In all good conscious (sic), I am not aware of any press leaks by employees as previously thought (and rumoured) if officers have looked at material without a policing purpose, to date that is only an allegation, will have to undergo due process and then we will be informed. Until formal notification to the contrary, there is simply nothing further to add or update families about”.
- b. Emailed the FLOs in the same terms (i.e. not to disclose the misconduct issues to the family) as is reflected in DC McVey’s FLO log at p39 of 150 [NGPF0008746]: “At this moment in time and until you get any further direction from myself as SIO, there will be no further dialogue with families surrounding this matter, simply as we have not had clarity as to the situation. In all good conscious (sic), I am not aware of any press leaks by employees and if officers have looked at material without a policing purpose, to date that is only an allegation and will have to go undergo (sic) due process before anything is found. Should this be an

organisational position, then I will seek a form of words from PSD / ACC as to what should be disclosed to families. If questions are asked by the family, then please refer them into me”.

123. DCI Gould’s FLA log of that same day reflected the SIO’s direction (page 29 of 54)

[**NGPF0010243**]: “SIO advises no discloses (sic) of any professional standards investigations / information access. At present further clarity is required from PSD about the current state of the investigations and due process needs to be undertaken before any updates are given. Will advise at a later date when discussed with Gold but at present nothing is to be disclosed to the families”.

124. In paragraph 361 of DCI Gould’s statement [**WITN0284001_0152**] she points out that she strongly believed it was necessary to tell the families about the misconduct issues “at this juncture”.

125. DCI Gould’s instinct – in accordance with ACC Griffin’s clearly expressed email of 20 September 2023 – was obviously the correct one. NP acknowledges that the SIO misjudged this situation, largely because (and as he will accept to the Inquiry in his oral testimony), he was not on top of the PSD matters, his focus inevitably being on the criminal investigation (as his full PD73 reveals, where he was also dealing with the fulminating “diminished responsibility” issue).

126. As can be seen from the end of paragraph 361 of her statement [**WITN0284001_0152**], DCI Gould regrets not updating Det Supt Williams and ACC Griffin herself following the SIO’s direction not to make the disclosure to the families.

127. Over the subsequent days, the emerging issue of the psychiatric evidence and the potential defence of diminished responsibility intensified for the SIO and this was discussed with the bereaved families *inter alia* in meetings on 24 November 2023 and 7

December 2023 (at the latter meeting, there was no mention of the internal NP misconduct).

128. On 12 December 2023 (i.e. the day after the Chief Constable had directed that the bereaved and families be advised of the disposition of Skenderaj's case), the SIO raised the Skenderaj matter with DCI Gould and said that he would urgently speak with ACC Griffin and Det Supt Williams, see SIO's Policy Decision 94 [NGPF0008791]. DCI Gould rightly emphasised the need for great sensitivity with the families given (i) that the diminished responsibility issue had been raised with the families to their evident distress and (ii) the delay since she and the SIO had last discussed the misconduct issues and their disclosure to the families.

129. On 14 December 2023:

- a. At 12:20, DCI Gould emailed the SIO raising the issue of revealing misconduct matters to the family as follows: "No, in short, I have not been kept in the loop of any misconduct stuff nor have I been given any form of words. Back in early October the decision was that these were still under investigation and that nothing was to be shared with the families as we did not know where the investigations would go and it would not be correct to inform the families. I had no knowledge of the AMH - I have been off for 6 days and just picked this up. Got some emails to still wade through so I will see if anything is lurking in there. I think we need to give some serious consideration to if there is a need to tell the families. It is not linked to any leakage. It is computer misuse essentially. Given the back drop of everything else that is going off, my counsel would be that we tread carefully around this?" [NGPF0009677];

- b. At 12:28, the SIO replied saying: “I have linked in with Andy Reynolds to get a briefing on what actually is happening at PSD. I will link in with Gold and the CC. She is on leave until Monday. We will then be driven by GOLD. I'll call when I know more to discuss” [NGPF0009677];
- c. At 14:11, the SIO emailed ACC Griffin, cc'ing DCI Gould and T/Supt Reynolds (acting Head of PSD) referencing the 3 PSD investigations and asking for ACC Griffin's guidance [NGPF0009802];
- d. At 17:12:57, ACC Griffin emailed stating that he had met with T/Supt Reynolds and that neither Op Glint nor Skenderaj triggered an obligation to disclose to the family. The outcome was, however, that ACC Griffin wanted the Skenderaj issues disclosed to the families as soon as possible, see:
 - i. Paragraph 484 of DCI Gould's statement [WITN0284001_0205];
 - ii. Paragraph 1514 of T/DCC Griffin's statement [WITN0074001_0349].

130. On 17 December 2023 the SIO and FLO DC Baxter met with James and Darren Coates and informed them, *inter alia*, “Some cops have been sacked for looking at CCTV when they have not had a policing purpose to do so which is not allowed” which was documented in the FLO log [NGPF0008359].

131. On 18 December 2023 the SIO documented Policy Decision 96 [NGPF0008791] that he was (emphasis added) “To answer further questions from OMK family, arrangements made via MET to have conference at Romford Police Station on 19/12/23. Open ended agenda to answer any questions held by family but again likely to include ... information security, **any PSD issues**, warrants, police interaction, mental health chronology ...”

132. Also on 18 December 2023, FLO DC Kimberley telephoned Elaine Newton and documented: “I did mention again that police PSD had been looking at officers/staff who

had been looking at documents without good cause. They would be dealt with individually and proportionately. No specific detail given and Elaine did not ask for any detail” [NGPF0009913].

133. The 19 December 2023 meeting with the O’Malley Kumar family was cancelled in favour of a meeting with the CPS legal team in January, see Policy Decision 97 [NGPF0008791].

134. On 4 January 2024 at the meeting with Elaine Newton and the SIO it was documented that topics covered included “PSD involvement with some officers” [NGPF0009914].

135. Early January 2024 was taken up with the psychiatric evidence and its mediation with the bereaved, including meeting with Karim Khalil KC on 15 January 2024.

136. During that meeting it was noted that “Det Leigh Sanders informed the families that a Special Constable who was nothing to do with the investigation had been sacked for looking at material in the case. He explained that this is because the safeguarding of our material is paramount” [NGPF0008569] and “Special constable has been sacked - thought acceptable to look at the footage - personal view, there will be media asking for information - you may already have had - whatever we share with the media we will show through FLOS” [NGPF0008917].

137. On 15 January 2024 the SIO documented in Policy Decision 101: “Families informed them that organisation has strict safeguards in place (even police officers who access material without legitimate policing purpose are subject to misconduct). Families informed of the sacking of a Special Constable who did just that (access case materials) before Christmas at a misconduct hearing. I have also informed the other family members (Ian Coates’) of these issues in previous face to face meetings (all logged by FLO’s)” [NGPF0008791].

138. Two matters occurred on 19 January 2024:

139. First, PC Gell’s gross misconduct case was dealt with on this date, see paragraph 92 above.

140. Second, at the Gold Group meeting the issue of NP misconduct arose again and the following action was documented: “At the appropriate time, Det Supt Sanders to inform the family whose deceased love (sic) one who was viewed by the special constable.” **[NGPF0007807_0002]**.

141. By the 30 January 2024 Gold Group meeting the SIO had not advised the families of the Skenderaj matter and this omission was raised at the Gold Group, see:

- a. paragraph 418 of T/DCC Griffin’s statement **[WITN0074001_0090]**;
- b. paragraph 570 of DCI Gould’s statement **[WITN0284001_0239]**.

142. On 20 February 2024 the Chief Constable Kate Meynell wrote to the bereaved families **[NGPF0007857, NGPF0007858, NGPF0007859]** setting set out the detail of the PSD investigations and, for Skenderaj and PC Gell, the outcome: the Rutherford matter was ongoing at this stage. The Chief Constable rightly apologised that the details of the PSD investigations or hearings had not been shared previously and referenced ongoing IOPC investigations.

143. On 22 February 2024:

- a. The Chief Constable wrote the same letter to the survivors of the deceased **[NGPF0007233, NGPF0007235, NGPF0007238]**;
- b. The Chief Constable and then ACC Rob Griffin met with Elaine Newton to explain the content of the letter, and also went into more detail on the FTA warrant and NP’s failure to execute it.

144. There is no doubt that NP’s failure to advise the bereaved and survivors in a coherent, clear and timely manner of the relevant misconduct by PC Gell, SC Skenderaj and Sarah Rutherford (and of the other interventions identified by Supt Craner in her statement to

this Inquiry) was a serious and unacceptable failure by NP for which sincere and unreserved apologies are proffered by NP.

145. However, it is equally clear that NP took the misconduct of PC Gell, Sarah Rutherford and SC Skenderaj seriously since:

- a. PC Gell and Sarah Rutherford were arrested by NP.
- b. Whilst not arrested, SC Skenderaj was suspended on 8 September 2023 and on 11 December 2023 subject to an AMH hearing, dismissal finding and placed on the Barred List.
- c. All three were prosecuted in the misconduct jurisdiction and all three found guilty of gross misconduct, with only PC Gell surviving with a FWW on a panel chaired by an independent LQC.

(e) Information sharing

146. NP would welcome any recommendations from the Inquiry which improves information sharing between relevant public bodies, but any such recommendations must not draw the police service from its core duties of preventing crime and apprehending criminals.

147. The police service has, in the last few years, sought to re-focus the care of the mentally ill away from ill-equipped and (necessarily) under-trained law enforcement officers to the more expert domain of mental health practitioners who are better equipped and skilled to do so.

148. **Right Care, Right Person** (“RCRP”) was launched by NPCC in July 2023 and is one of the main manifestations of that effort. RCRP was not launched because the police seek to evade their responsibilities to save life and limb, but because the police are plainly not the correct agency to manage and treat the mentally ill.

Conclusion

149. Finally, this: NP's further and ongoing involvement in the Inquiry is designed:

- a. to assist the Chair to discharge her ToR and to answer the legitimate questions of the bereaved and survivors;
- b. not to cause any further distress to the victims of VC's appalling crimes.

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19 February 2026