

Witness Name: PC LIBBIE-MAE TAYLOR  
Statement No: WITN0009001  
Dated: 3 October 2025

## THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

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### FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF PC 1965 LIBBIE-MAE TAYLOR

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1. I am police constable 1965 Libbie-Mae Taylor of Leicestershire Police.
2. This statement is made pursuant to a request from the Inquiry dated 18 June 2025. I have obtained legal advice in drafting this statement from Mr Mark Wardley, Solicitor, Straw and Pearce solicitors, and Mr Hugh Davies KC. The format of the response reflects and follows the issues raised in that request.
3. I have referred to redacted police computer records, including the NICHE OEL ('Occurrence Enquiry Log') [LEPF0000004] and STORM Incident Log records [LEPF0000015], in preparing this statement.
4. I joined Leicestershire Police in November 2022. I have a BSc in Sport and Exercise Science that I obtained from Loughborough University in 2021. Prior to joining the police I had worked in a supermarket. I was in police training at Force Headquarters for 5 months, and concurrently studying at De Montfort University leading to a degree. This is an integrated programme.

5. I was recruited on entry as part of the accelerated programme to become a detective. It is called the DC DHEP programme. This means that once I have achieved independent patrol status ('IPS'), and completed all other aspects of the integrated training and degree programme, I hope to qualify as a detective. I am currently working within CID and passed the National Investigator exam in March 2024. Unlike other routes that require two years in uniform, entrants under DC DHEP can transfer to CID after six months of IPS.
  
6. My first operational shift was a night shift on 17 April 2023 at Coalville police station. I began my probationary period at Coalville police station with a tutor, namely PC 4430 Amos-Perkins.
  
7. During your probationary period you are required to complete a portfolio which is marked by an assessor. This portfolio covers a wide range of matters that need to be completed before IPS (i.e. the ability to patrol on your own) is achieved. A typical probationary period for a student officer to achieve IPS is 12 weeks; however, this can be extended if the portfolio is not completed. I believe my probationary period was extended by a few weeks in order to complete aspects of my portfolio as parts were not signed off due to the operational demand that I faced within my first 12 weeks. In other words, the high volume of reactive operational work meant that there was insufficient time to complete other aspects of the training.

8. Prior to 5 May 2023 I had no knowledge or interaction with anyone by the name of Valdo Calocane, by this name or any other alias. Now I know who he is, I can confirm that I had no prior knowledge of him.
  
9. On 5 May 2023 I was working a 17:00 – 03:00 shift. This was my 12th operational shift as a probationary constable. The control room put a message out over the airwaves to say that a 999 call had been received. PC Amos-Perkins and I were assigned to this at 17:55.
  
10. PC Amos-Perkins and I were at Coalville police station when the message was first passed over the airwaves. From what I can recall, we were made aware that one male had been punched and a female had been pushed over at a warehouse, and the suspect had left the scene. It was reported that the suspect had been escorted from the site by the security staff.
  
11. PC Amos-Perkins and I arrived at Arvato, Kegworth at 18:13. We travelled in a marked police vehicle, callsign NN10, with blue lights and sirens activated for the journey. PC Amos-Perkins was the driver of the vehicle as he had the qualifications to drive with emergency sirens and blue lights. I was the front seat passenger. We had been informed by the control room that the suspect has been escorted off site prior to police arriving and was walking towards a bus station. A description had been given. PC Amos-Perkins and I completed a

visual area search from our vehicle prior to our arrival at the location. We did not see anyone matching the description of the suspect.

12. I do not recall there being any delay in responding to this incident. The drive is around 22 minutes without blue lights and sirens activated. Apart from traffic delays we made our way as quickly and as safely as we could. It was a Grade One call, requiring an immediate response.
13. Upon arrival at Arvato, we were taken to the canteen area where the two people who had reportedly been assaulted were sat with other staff members. Another member of staff who was sat with them was used to assist with communication as both complainants spoke Romanian and little English. Basic verbal accounts were taken from both complainants. This was recorded on my body worn video camera and in a notebook along with personal details. I attach my notes of this as made at the scene marked LMT/1 [WITN0009002].
14. The complainants declined medical attention, and stated they would seek their own.
15. We also went into the warehouse where the assault had taken place in order to see where the assault had occurred.
16. PC Amos-Perkins and I then attended the security hut to view the CCTV from within the warehouse to see if it captured the incident. The camera covered the

entirety of the warehouse and was blurry. It had recorded the incident from a very far distance, such that you could just about make out something taking place due to the movement of persons, but you could not see the detail of what had actually occurred, nor identify persons from the footage. There was also a vertical metal support post obstructing some of the view. I recorded this CCTV footage onto my body worn video (BWV) camera by filming the CCTV from the screen. The security staff did not know either how to download the CCTV or to work the CCTV system. Neither PC Amos-Perkins or I were trained to operate CCTV at the time.

17. We spoke with a manager, who told us that the suspect's name was Val Mendes (recorded in my notes, as it sounded, as 'Valmendez'). Prior to our arrival, checks had been made by the Control room, who have access to various systems including Genie, Police National Computer, NICHE and other data, using the details provided by the caller. The checks were made using the Genie system at 18:04 in respect of the complainants (in each case, 'No history' (GRO-B at 18:04:00; GRO-B at 18:05:42)), and under 'Val Mendes' at 18:06:48 ('Unable to ID on Genie'). These entries are on the contemporaneous control room STORM Incident log [LEPF000015].
18. The complainants stated they did not know anything about the person that had just assaulted them. The manager told us that he had only been there for 3 - 5 days, was employed through an agency, and that she did not know who he was. She gave me the details of the agency. It was decided that we would not take

a statement at the time from the complainants as we did not have a qualified (and independent) interpreter present, and that this would need to be arranged in order to obtain statements. It was explained that statements would be taken later and we took emails and telephone numbers to facilitate this, and as a way to update more generally as to the investigation.

19. At 18:56 we were diverted from this incident at Arvato to a further Grade One incident regarding a male walking on the A6. The STORM Incident log [LEPF0000015] log was updated at 19:06:17 to reflect this.
  
20. At 22:46:37 I added to the STORM Incident log [LEPF0000015] that I would be creating a NICHE occurrence (i.e. to start an investigation log on the Leicestershire Police NICHE computer system, to which access is possible by a limited number of other forces) for an assault when I was available to do so.
  
21. As to what (if anything) I was told about a knife at the scene, there was no information relating to anything to do with a knife passed to PC Amos-Perkins or I by the Control room, nor was there mention of a knife on the STORM Incident log [LEPF0000015]. Whilst at Arvato, we were not informed of a knife in the context of the assault by anyone at Arvato. The manager of the warehouse mentioned at some point that each staff member had a safety knife/box knife, which was used for opening cardboard boxes and other operational work. I do not recall the context of this comment, but I can say that there was no mention of a knife being used in respect of the assault. I saw the

staff in possession of safety knives that they were using in the warehouse. They are a hook shape with a concealed blade.

22. The only thing that was searched for in the warehouse was a pair of glasses that it was believed had been dropped. Due to the passage of time, I now cannot recall if the glasses belonged to one of the complainants or the suspect. Neither of the persons assaulted made any reference to a knife having been used. There is no mention of a knife being used in the assault in my notes.
  
23. In respect of ensuring the accurate recording of the allegations and evidence, I recorded the complainants' initial accounts on my BWV camera. I also recorded the CCTV footage on my BWV camera. Unfortunately, I did not save my BWV footage as 'evidential' and it was accordingly automatically deleted after a fixed period of time. My understanding at the time, which I had gained from my training, (limited) experience to that date and from being told by colleagues, was that it should be saved as evidential only if it contained direct evidence of the offence. For example, and by reference to my DEMS360 account, I had previously saved a recording on 23 April 2023 when I was first to arrive at the scene of a drowning. This is my only saved body worn recording before 5 May 2023, and the next is 6 May 2023 and reflects the counting of a seized quantity of cash. I did not save the recording of the complainants' initial accounts as evidential. Due to the passage of time, I cannot say why I did not do so. I can only assume that either I forgot to do so or, due to lack of experience and

knowledge at the time, I assumed such a recording was not 'evidential'. I now recognise and accept that this was a mistake.

24. In terms of system capacity and practicability, we are trained that it is not possible to save all body worn recordings. They must be evidential.
25. I have been asked to set out in detail all steps I took to investigate the matter thereafter. Due to the passage of time, I will rely on my entries on the NICHE OEL record [LEPF0000004] in respect of the steps I took to investigate this matter. I also set out some wider context for that investigation in terms of other operational commitments. These have been established from other contemporaneous records when not on the OEL [LEPF0000004].
26. I am assuming that the Inquiry will have access to the NICHE OEL [LEPF0000004], and accordingly simply provide brief references to specific entries without reproducing the detail.
27. The investigation was allocated to me, under the supervision of PC Amos-Perkins. It was subject to review by PS Mark Read (or another equivalent officer) and would have formed part of my portfolio to achieve independent patrol status. I obviously had other investigations for which I was the officer in the case. I was typically in charge of 15 - 20 crimes at any one time. These investigations had to be progressed alongside my day-to-day reactive operational commitments. By definition, these are unpredictable. Operational

demand was consistently high on the team in this period: all officers were working at or near capacity.

28. My investigative objectives after leaving Arvato were primarily (1) to identify the true identity of 'Val Mendes'; (2) to obtain communication and evidential statements from the complainants; and (3) to identify and speak with other witnesses, if any, to the alleged assaults. These objectives were set together by myself and PC Amos-Perkins.
29. My first entry on the OEL [LEPF0000004] is numbered [1] and is timed at 00:41 on 6 May 2023. I was the designated officer in the case ('OIC'). It will be seen that, amongst other information, I have recorded a 'crime type' of 'ABH/Common'; that CCTV from 'within the warehouse' is 'available' but 'poor quality captures the incident from afar and captures suspects face but very blurry'; and for witnesses 'Please see OEL'. Injuries are noted as 'Minor – male victim injury just pain and female victim has a feeling of a bruised knee'. Under 'weapon used' there is no entry: this is because I clicked on the 'no weapon' option on the Pronto crime reporting system.
30. For my next shift, starting at 22:00hrs on 6 May 2023 and concluding at 07:00hrs on 7 May 2023, I had direct responsibility for a prisoner. This operational commitment effectively precluded my making progress with other investigations.

31. On 7 May 2023 my shift pattern was 23:00 – 07:00. I was tasked reactively to deal with a domestic incident. I was not able to complete my investigation report until 06:50hrs on 8 May 2023. This is entry [8] on the OEL [LEPF0000004]. The allegations described are a punch to the side of the male complainant's head with a closed fist, and pushing the female complainant to the floor. Additionally, that this was the end of my 'set' of shifts, and that a 'full OEL' would be submitted when starting the next set.
32. On May 8, 9 and 10 May 2023 I was on rest days.
33. On 11 May 2023, and as reflected at entry [10] of the OEL [LEPF0000004], I sent an SMS message and an email to the warehouse manager requesting a list of witnesses. I also attempted to call either the warehouse manager or the recruitment agency. Due to the passage of time, I cannot now recall who I am referring to in the OEL [LEPF0000004] as the copy I have has had the names redacted. As recorded, there was 'No answer so I have left a voicemail'. I was on a training day at force headquarters this day. I made contact as described on my lunch break.
34. On 12 May 2023 I had two handover prisoners to deal with and no capacity to progress this investigation.
35. On 13 May 2023 my shift was 17:00 – 03:00. As reflected in entry [12] of the OEL [LEPF0000004] on 14 May 2023, on 13 May 2023 I was unable to contact

the complainants or contact any witnesses due to dealing with a SUDI ('sudden unexpected death in infants') major incident for the entirety of the shift. This was the first time I had been involved in such an incident involving a child, although I had attended a death by drowning incident on 23 April 2023. The incident on 13 May 2023 was a 'major incident' where a child had to be located in the water, extracted and transferred to hospital. With other emergency services, PC Amos-Perkins and I were integral to this, and present in the hospital room whilst attempts were made at resuscitation. I was present when the child's parents were informed of his death.

36. I found this incident particularly traumatic, and have received counselling in relation to it. It still affects me.
37. On 13 May 2023 I did however record a further update at [11] of the OEL [LEPF0000004] timed at 21:03. I noted that I had tried to contact the recruitment agency, the '... most recent being on the 13/05/2025 in order to get details of the suspect but he has not answered and have I left voicemails on both occasions'.
38. On 14 May 2023 (OEL [13]) [LEPF0000004] I was provided, by the warehouse manager, with a list of names of people who may have been present at the time of the incident. I added these on an occurrence enquiry log on the NICHE at entry [12] (redacted in my copy) [LEPF0000004]. I was not able to action this due to then dealing with a Grade One incident, suicidal male and a failure to

stop. OEL [13] [LEPF0000004] reflects that 'I intended to contact the victim of this matter however I was unable to due to dealing with a SUDI yesterday 13/5/2023'.

39. On 15 May 2023 I was unable to progress contact with the complainants and witnesses due to the other operational commitments, reflected in part on the OEL [LEPF0000004] on other dates.
40. As reflected at OEL [14] [LEPF0000004] on 16 May 2023 I was 'unable to make contact with the I/P' due to 'prisoner transport', 'break in progress' (i.e. a break-in that is in progress) and 'dropped 9's/misper' (i.e. where during a 999 call a person either unexpectedly hangs up, or makes a silent 999 call. A 'misper' is a 'missing person'). I noted that it was not reasonable to contact the complainants 'throughout the night'. The entry reflects that I had discussed the progress of the investigation with 'PC 4430' (i.e. PC Amos-Perkins).
41. On 17 May 2023 I was dealing with a high risk suicidal male.
42. On 18 May 2023, my duties state I was on a rest day and it follows any entries were made from home in an attempt to catch up with outstanding enquiries. As reflected in OEL entries [15] and [16] [LEPF0000004], I contacted the agency in order to try and identify the suspect but had no answer and left a voicemail. OEL [15] [LEPF0000004] was entered at 16:10 and states, 'At this moment in time we are struggling to identify the suspect. I will call [name redacted] and

update her with our progress and get her to explain to the two victims about our situation as they have an interpreter in the warehouse or I will get an interpreter on the phone when calling the victims'. This entry speaks for itself.

43. At 16:17 I entered OEL [16] [LEPF0000004] which reflects a conversation with Ali Parvez (Sky recruitment) by mobile. It reads 'I have spoken with [redacted] from [redacted] on the phone and he has provided me with his email address which he is going to send me the details of the D/P via'. 'D/P' is police code for 'detained person'. I now realise that this was not the correct use of the term on the OEL [LEPF0000004] since the suspect was neither identified nor detained. Again, I can only put this down to my relative inexperience.
44. At 16:23 I entered OEL [17] [LEPF0000004] which reflects a conversation with the warehouse contact, and that my preferred approach was to visit the warehouse and to obtain statements in person using on site interpreters. Had this occurred I would have ensured that they were independent and reliable.
45. At 16:29 I entered OEL [19] [LEPF0000004]. This reflects an email I sent that day to the agency that employed 'Valmendez' and a request for his name, date of birth, phone number and home address. I had Ali Parvez's contact number on the date I attended the incident – this was provided by Louisa GRO-B the warehouse manager we spoke to on scene. I had tried to contact this number up until 18 May and left voicemails. Ali Parvez answered one of my calls on 18 May and then provided me his email address where he asked me to send

details of what I was requesting – this is noted on OEL 19 [LEPF0000004]. ‘ I have sent an email to [redacted] – ali parvez – following on from our phone call’.

46. I was on rest days between 18 and 21 May 2023.
47. On 22 May 2023 my shift was 07:00 – 16:00. I was tasked to assist in arrest attempts, and section 18 searches, completing 6 hours overtime.
48. On 23 May 2023 I was due to have a meeting with the professional development unit (PDU) which had to be rearranged due to demand. Due to the passage of time, I do not recall what I did on this date. However, from my emails I can see that I emailed my PDU assessor at 23:00hrs on the evening of 22 May as I was still on duty. I completed a shift that started at 07:00 and ended at approximately 23:30 on 22 May. On 23 May I believe I came into work at about 10:30 as we have to have an 11 hour gap between shifts. Due to the passage of time, I do not recall what incidents I attended on this date.
49. On 24 May 2023 my shift pattern was 15:00 – 00:00.
50. I had a review with the professional development unit. This had been rearranged three times. I believe we discussed, amongst other matters, the high level of my workload.

51. I then went on to deal, separately, with a 'high risk missing person' and a 'concern for safety'. The former would have involved executing some pre-planned enquiries. Due to their missing status being 'high risk', these enquiries had to take place as a matter of urgency and took precedence over any other matter on my crime queue. A 'concern for safety' would have reflected an immediate risk to a person requiring an immediate emergency response.
52. During this shift I had received an email from the agency with the suspect's details. The details included his name (Valdo Mendes Calocane); date of birth [redacted]; phone number [redacted]; and home address [redacted].
53. My memory is that PC Amos-Perkins advised me to enter these details onto NICHE. I cannot now remember the specific detail of this instruction. All that OEL [20] [LEPF0000004] reflects is the information I was supplied with, and that I entered it as OEL [20] [LEPF0000004] at 23:46. I asked PC Amos-Perkins how I should classify him on NICHE.
54. I had been trained to enter suspect information onto NICHE and, although obviously inexperienced, do not believe this would have been the first time I had done so.
55. I have received a summary of the NICHE activity around the time of this entry.

56. In summary, I understand this shows that I opened the relevant OEL (23\*273031) [LEPF0000004] at 23:46; inserted OEL log entry [20] [LEPF0000004] at 23:46; conducted a 'detailed find' for 'Valdo Mendes Calocane' at 23:48; that the system shows 'Open: Person' 'Valdo Calocane' at 23:48 and 23:51; an 'Update' link at 23:51; an 'Open' link at 23:52; and an 'Open' 'Occurrence/Intelligence enquiry log 23\*273031' at 23:52 [LEPF0000004].
57. I am not expert in the interpretation of the original Excel NICHE audit records, and this statement reflects my understanding of what they appear to show that I either did or did not do.
58. My understanding is that the audit shows that I opened the correct screen on NICHE to enter suspect information, and did enter that information. At some point in the process (I believe under 'detailed find') NICHE would have indicated that a person with these details was already recorded on NICHE. That being the case, the system would have contained other information about them, including any criminal history; other pending investigations; warning markers; and outstanding warrants.
59. The audit demonstrates that I did not 'click-through' to review any such other information held on NICHE. I did 'link' the suspect details to the specific NICHE Occurrence 23\*273031 [LEPF0000004].

60. I am now aware that Valdo Mendes Calocane was shown on NICHE as being subject to a warrant for a previous alleged assault in the Nottingham Police area. I accept that had I clicked-through to this part of the NICHE database when entering him as a suspect for my investigation, it is likely (1) that it would have promoted our interpretation of the allegations made in our immediate investigation; and (2) would have been likely to promote consideration of his arrest by Nottingham Police (or Leicestershire Police, if first) pursuant to that warrant. It is for the public inquiry to determine what effect such an arrest would have had, if made, before he killed three members of the public on 13 June 2023.
61. I address why I may not have clicked-through in subsequent answers. Before doing so, I continue with the chronology of the investigation.
62. On 25 May 2023 I addressed a domestic incident, and then with a complainant from another two reports.
63. On 26 May 2023 I was assigned 'night-time economy' duties. Such duties entail showing the public a visible police presence to provide reassurance, as well as a reactive response to incidents linked to the night-time economy, for example bars, High Streets, pubs, fast food retailers and other entertainment venues.
64. On 27 May 2023 I was assigned night-time economy duties and a domestic incident involving a knife.

65. Between 28 and 31 May 2023 I was on rest days.
66. On 1 June 2023 I had a prisoner handover which took my whole shift.
67. On 3 June 2023 I made entries [21] and [22] on the OEL [LEPF0000004] for the Arvato incident.
68. I noted on the OEL [LEPF0000004] that I was unable to get in contact with the Arvato manager, and explained that I had been unable to contact them due to dealing with a 'stalking/domestic' incident with a person arrested as a result. I also dealt with a burglary and a drug-drive prisoner.
69. OEL [22] [LEPF0000004] reflects that I sent an email to the Arvato manager to arrange a meeting with the complainants in order to obtain statements. I added a copy of this email to the OEL [LEPF0000004]. It included an apology for the delay in visiting the warehouse to obtain statements, stating 'We have been extremely busy'. This was accurate.
70. As reflected in OEL [23] [LEPF0000004], on 4 June 2023 I tried to contact the Arvato manager again by calling her. There was no answer so I left a voicemail. Other operational duties included dealing with a person under arrest for a stalking incident.

71. On 5 June 2023 I dealt with a stalking incident and a prisoner.
72. On 6 June 2023 I was given a handover prisoner to deal with. I sent an email to the complainants on this day. Although not entered to the OEL [LEPF0000004], I attach a copy of this email marked LMT/2 [WITN0009003 ]
73. On 7 June 2023 OEL [24] [LEPF0000004] reads 'Unable to make arrest attempts this set due to: - 2 prison handovers. Was meant to have an organised protected day but due to demand we had to attend other jobs which have led to arrests and paperwork and therefore we have no [sic] been able to look at this occurrence'.
74. An 'organised protected day' is where we are removed from reactive operational duties for a day in order to catch up on other investigations and necessary administration. As the entry implies, although it was recognised that I needed such a day, the reality of operational demand was such that it was cancelled. Without dedicated protected time such work has to simply fit in around reactive policing.
75. As to OEL [24] [LEPF0000004], in hindsight this is not clearly written. We were not in a position to arrest Calocane on 7 June 2023, since we did not have CCTV or witness statements. I observe that taking our investigation in isolation, there may have been no lawful necessity of arrest even had we obtained these by this date.

76. From 7 – 9 June 2023 I was on rest days. My shift on 6 June had started at 23:00, and finished at 07:00 on 7 June.
77. On 10 June 2023 (OEL [26]) [LEPF0000004] I sent another email to both complainants asking them to get in contact. I explained that I had tried to contact them via phone, voicemail and email. Although I do not believe I have noted this on the OEL [LEPF0000004], I do recall trying to contact them via the numbers they provided to me. The email includes 'If you are wishing to pursue this complaint please contact myself as soon as possible so we can progress this investigation' and 'Please make contact by Thursday 15<sup>th</sup> June 2023. If contact is not made then this investigation will be submitted for filing'.
78. Any such decision on 'filing' – in practical terms, meaning ending the live investigation – would have been taken by or in conjunction with supervising officers.
79. On 12 June 2023 I assisted with a kidnap incident.
80. On 13 June 2023 I was engaged with transporting a suspect to custody and assisted in the recovery of a firearm.
81. This was obviously the date on which Valdo Calocane killed three people, and Nottingham Police effectively took over the investigation.

Establishing the identity of, and other information relating to, Valdo Calocane

82. In respect of establishing the identity of Valdo Calocane, as set out above, I was made aware in our initial attendance on 5 May 2023 that the suspect 'Val Mendes' was employed at Arvato via an agency. I was given details of someone to contact at this agency to try and establish his identity.
83. On 13 May 2023, I tried to contact the agency contact provided to me. I also tried to make contact with the agency contact twice on 18 May 2023 when I was not at work. On 24 May 2023, I received an email from the agency containing Valdo Calocane's details known to them at the time.
84. But for the volume of other operational demands I believe I would have been more persistent in seeking these details in these early stages.
85. Once I had identified the identity of Valdo Calocane, I acknowledge that I did not search for his offending history and any outstanding criminal matters. The actions I completed on the OEL [LEPF0000004] on 24 May 2024, are set out in paragraph 56 - 59 above.
86. I have been asked to set out my decision-making process in respect of the decision to seek the arrest of Valdo Calocane. I did not seek to arrest Valdo Calocane. We had not obtained witness statements by 13 June 2023, and the CCTV was not adequate to prove the offence without witness statements.

87. I repeat what I have set out above in paragraph 60 as to what may or may not have occurred had we established that he was wanted on a warrant once identified on 24 May 2023.
88. Even if identified, it is not certain that he would have been arrested for the matter I was investigating taken in isolation. Given the delay, and that he was no immediate threat to either complainant, it is a realistic probability that he would have been asked to attend the police station voluntarily for interview.

Other matters

89. I did not make any attempts to effect an arrest of Valdo Calocane.
90. In respect of the steps taken to keep the complainants updated as to the status of the investigation, again, due to the passage of time, I am relying on my entries on the OEL [LEPF0000004]. I have set out all the steps taken to keep the complainants updated above.
91. As to my involvement in the decision to take no further action in respect of this matter, the indication to the complainants that the matter would be filed unless there was a response by 15 June 2023 reflected advice from PC Amos-Perkins, and would accord with my operational experience then and now. For isolated assaults at this level (common assault/ABH), and whilst recognising that they are serious from the perspective of the complainant's experience, if they are

not co-operating in providing witness statements a decision ultimately has to be made as to the allocation of limited investigative resources.

92. In respect of making information available to other police forces, health or social services or other third parties regarding this incident, I did not make any information available to any other police forces, health or social services or other third-parties regarding this incident. I do not believe that I had obtained any such relevant information during the course of the investigation. Had I thought any information obtained may require making available to other third parties, I would have discussed this with my tutor. We had no such discussions.
93. In respect of relevant policies, procedures and criteria which I consider governed my role in relation to this incident, this investigation should have reflected the standard operating procedures of Leicestershire Police, as trained to officers, and standard national policies such as the national decision-making model ('NDM') and APP (Authorised Police Practice) on Risk. I was not a trained detective, and obviously was at an early stage of probation.
94. Much of what is expected is based on operational experience and/or the necessity of understanding and using force data and intelligence systems in a dynamic way.
95. As a probationer, I was also dependant – as is good practice in my opinion – on practical supervision and operational guidance from my tutor constable.

Much of what you do is based on operational experience and cannot be trained in the classroom.

96. I have been asked whether in hindsight there are additional actions I could have taken in respect of the investigation. I recognise that it is arguable I could have done more to contact the complainants. I was not aware at that point in my service that I could utilise the services of an interpreter over the phone to interpret for me. When I did contact the complainants via email I used Google translate as well as English. I recognise that I could have made more attempts to call the complainants, including going back to the warehouse/place of work/incident location. The central reason I did not was the reality of operational demand in that period. This is outlined above.
97. I recognise and accept that it was a basic error not to have searched for background intelligence held on NICHE about Valdo Calocane when entering him as a suspect on 24 May 2023, or thereafter until 13 June 2023 when Nottingham Police took the investigation over. Given the potential significance of this, I have reflected at length on why I did not click-through to his recorded background, most specifically when entering him as a suspect on 24 May 2023. I do not have a specific memory as to taking a decision about this. With my greater experience now, it appears to be a basic action to take in any investigation.

98. Although speculative, I believe that one of two explanations may apply. Firstly, I may have been over-literal in following an instruction from PC Amos-Perkins to enter him as a suspect to NICHE, without realising (as I now would) that implied in that is to establish anything relevant as to background if the person being so entered was already known to the police. Secondly, it is at least possible that I simply got distracted at the time I entered the basic suspect details by something else, and accordingly failed to click-through.
99. After that, it appears that my focus was on obtaining witness accounts, and I did not pursue the suspect side of the investigation further pending the result of that.
100. I observe that I did not conduct either PNC or PND (police national database) checks either. This does not help me as to which of these possible explanations for not clicking-through or doing background checks is more likely.
101. At the time of attending the incident, I had 12 days' operational service. On 13 June 2023, I was still an in-company student. I had completed 36 operational shifts. I was still very new in to the job and I accept that I made mistakes. At the time I would have had 15 - 20 active open investigations on my queue. As well as supervising my investigations, my tutor-constable had his own investigations. To complete my training portfolio, every incident that I attended which resulted in a crime investigation report would be allocated to me, albeit more serious allegations would then be taken on by CID.

102. I now work in the criminal investigative department and have since passed my NIE (National Investigators Exam).
103. Whatever the explanation, not researching the suspect's background on NICHE (or other police databases) was an operational oversight that I will not repeat. It was not deliberate. I apologise for it. It meant an opportunity to contact Nottingham Police for them to consider an arrest strategy with us was missed.
104. In respect of the recording of the investigation, overall, I believe that the recording of the progress of this investigation was appropriate. For any officer reviewing the details I believe that the necessary contact details are present, as is the progression of the investigation. Any OEL record can be improved, and each is made in the context of high levels of operational demand and little or no protected duty time to make entries.
105. I have been asked if I consider there are any structural issues (regarding police policies, procedures, methodology, training etc) which contributed to the issues I have identified. There is inevitably a difference between the classroom and role-play activities and 'real-life' policing. Much of what you do as a reactive police officer is the direct product of policing. Certain things then become ingrained in what you do, and what you assume others will do. Overall, I believe the model of training is appropriate, albeit the reality of operational demand on

probationers is higher than I would prefer: in other words, more protected time may give greater opportunity for reflection and reduce the risk of mistakes.

106. The tutor constable system works well, although is of course dependant on the individuals in each case. PC Amos-Perkins was an experienced, capable and committed tutor constable. Whilst he did not specifically check that I had researched Calocane's history, I can see that he may have assumed that I had done so rather than taken any instruction he gave to enter information literally. To do so would have been second-nature to him, but was not – or at least may not have been – at the time to me as an in-company probationer.
107. I am not aware of the roles and responsibilities of a tutor as I am not trained to be a tutor. I am not aware of any formal checks required of a tutor to monitor progress to ensure protocols are being followed and that case objectives are being met. What I can say, however, is that PC Amos-Perkins and I would review cases/investigations together. During the first 6 weeks together, PC Amos-Perkins would have taken more control and lead on cases/investigations; he would ensure what I was doing was correct and would review my work. After that 6 week period, I would have started to take more of a lead in order to gain on the experience and confidence in my new role.
108. I believe that one clear lesson from this history is that the use, and purposes, of NICHE and other police data systems needs greater emphasis in training and through the probationary phase. I would also welcome anything that made

the navigation of NICHE somewhat easier, although I am not suggesting that this prevented my clicking-through for background information in the immediate case.

Conclusion

109. I have obviously reflected at length as to this investigation given the appalling crimes by Valdo Calocance on 13 June 2023. I cannot begin to imagine the feelings of those affected. I fully understand and support the need for an independent investigation, through a Public Inquiry (and separate IOPC-led misconduct investigation), into what happened, in order to provide the necessary explanations to those directly personally affected and the wider public, and to identify areas for reform to reduce the risk of an equivalent event in future. I will do all I can to support these objectives.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

**GRO-B** .....

PC 1965 Libbie-Mae Taylor

...03:10:2025.....

Dated

## Index of Documents

1. LEPF0000004 NICHE OCCURRENCE
2. LEPF0000015 STORM INCIDENT LOG
3. WITN0009002 Notebook entry
4. WITN0009003 Email to complainants dated 6 June 2023