

Witness Name: PC CONNOR AMOS-PERKINS
Statement No: WITN0010001
Dated: 3 October 2025

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF PC 4430 CONNOR AMOS-PERKINS

1. I am Police Constable 4430 Connor Amos-Perkins of Leicestershire Police.
2. This statement is made pursuant to a request from the Inquiry dated 18 June 2025. I have obtained legal advice in drafting this statement from Mr Mark Wardley, Solicitor, Straw and Pearce solicitors, and Mr Hugh Davies KC. The format of the response reflects and follows the issues raised in that request.
3. I have been a police officer with Leicestershire Police for 5 years. I have been at Coalville police station for the entire time as a response officer.
4. At the time of the events I was a student development co-ordinator ('Tutor') and standard response driver. I believe PC Taylor was the fifth 'in-company' probationer – i.e. patrolling only in the company of another officer, in practice their tutor – I had supervised. She joined me on 17 April 2023 and was on the direct entry detective training programme. Once she had achieved independent patrol status, she would have transferred immediately to CID. At the time I was the only tutor on shift. If I was not on shift she would be in company with other officers, and I received consistently good reports about her.

5. The training I had received as to this consisted of an online one day course organised through the Leicestershire Police Professional Development Unit ('PDU'). My first in-company probationer was when I had approximately 18 months of service. Part of the challenge is assessing how intrusive this supervision has to be for each probationer over time. There is also the simple human danger of assuming (sometimes sub-consciously) that basic actions will be taken, or have been taken, before they have become second-nature to the probationer.

6. Prior to 5 May 2023 I had no knowledge or previous interactions with Valdo Calocane.

7. I have been asked when and how I first became alerted to an incident at Arvato on 5 May 2023. From the NICHE OCCURRENCE OEL [LEPF0000004], I am aware that the control room received the call at 17:51 hours. At 17:55 hours on 5 May 2023, PC Taylor and I were assigned by the control room to a Grade one incident (requiring an immediate 'emergency' response) after a report of an assault by a worker at Arvato in Kegworth.

8. Due to the passage of time, I cannot now recall what information was passed to us by the control room other than that the report related to an assault by a worker at Arvato. It is possible that further updates were received whilst en route to Arvato. The STORM Incident log [LEPF0000015] reflects what was said and done by the control room: I have no independent memory of detail beyond that.

9. According to the STORM incident log [LEPF0000015], we arrived at the Arvato's car park at 18:13. We travelled in a marked police car utilising the emergency equipment, that is with the emergency blue lights and sirens. I was the driver of the police car and PC Taylor was the front seat passenger.
10. There was no delay in our responding. We travelled from Coalville police station to Arvato, which is a distance of approximately 15 miles.
11. In relation to the steps taken to investigate the matter at the scene, including any accounts from the complainants or witnesses, I am aware that this is documented by PC Taylor on the OEL [LEPF0000004]. I have read that OEL [LEPF0000004], as part of my preparation of this statement.
12. From memory, PC Taylor and I arrived on scene and were first met by a female, whose name I do not now remember. She was a member of management at Arvato. She explained that a male and female employee had been assaulted by an agency worker named Val Mendez / Valmendes, who had since been escorted from the site by security prior to police attending. We would have conducted a visual search from the vehicle for the suspect based on description as we approached. We did not see anyone matching that description.
13. We were directed by the female to the two alleged victims of the assault. There were several people within the area. We attempted to engage with the two victims, however there was a language barrier between us. I believe they were

Romanian and did not speak much English. We used another member of staff to interpret what the victims were saying, but this proved difficult. We were told, in summary, that Val Mendez assaulted the male by punching him to the face, following which the female had tried to intervene and had been pushed over. We were told the injuries were that the female had a previous leg injury which had been aggravated by this assault. The male had been punched in the face and had been caused pain, but I could not see any bruising or other injuries to either victim.

14. We were then taken through to the warehouse by staff as this is where the incident had occurred. There were other workers in the warehouse. We asked for details of witnesses, to which the female member of management said she would provide these details.

15. We noticed CCTV within the warehouse and enquired about this. We were then taken to the security booth by the security officers at Arvato. They showed PC Taylor and I the footage. It was from a distance as it was installed on the ceiling of the warehouse, and I would describe the quality of the footage to be grainy and poor. It did show the incident occurring insofar as it showed persons 'coming together', but I could not ascertain, for example, if there was a punch or a slap. Further, I would not have been able to use the footage for identification of the parties. The footage would not have been sufficient to prosecute the suspect without any further evidence. I believe that PC Taylor recorded the footage on her body worn video, as we did not have a USB to recover the footage.

16. I have been asked if I was told about a knife at the scene. I cannot remember being told anything about a knife whilst on scene. This was not reported on the original call to police either. It is not referred to in the OEL [LEPF0000004].

17. In order to ensure the accurate recording of the allegations and evidence, we gained an initial account, which was recorded on PC Taylor's BWV camera, from both victims via another Arvato employee, who spoke Romanian and English. We also captured the CCTV on body worn video. The body worn video was not exhibited correctly once we had left the scene and unfortunately was lost. Since it would be a basic obligation known to any experienced officer, I probably assumed that PC Taylor knew to preserve it as 'Evidential' on the system to prevent this. I do not recall either directing this be done, or checking that it had been. Particularly in hindsight, I should have done, given her probationer status and relative inexperience. I accept that this recording should have been preserved as evidence and that not to do so was a failure.

18. Due to the language difficulties, statements were not completed on scene. We could have used a 'language line' but there can be a delay when booking an interpreter. This service is normally not available immediately and has to be booked in advance. A more ordered in-person process could have been followed later. Further, we were assigned to another Grade one incident whilst at Arvato. This incident related to a male walking along a highway and there was an immediate concern for his safety and welfare. I accept that it would have

been better to arrange a specific date, time and place to obtain witness statements before leaving the scene to respond.

19. PC Taylor took the role as officer in the case once we had completed the initial investigation on scene. My role at this point onwards was to support PC Taylor in my role as tutor, which would involve providing PC Taylor with guidance and lines of enquiry. Due to the passage of time, I cannot now recall the precise details of the conversations I had with PC Taylor in respect of this investigation.

20. From looking at the OEL [LEPF0000004], I can see what actions PC Taylor took and I know we had conversations about her investigations on a regular basis. I just cannot recall the detail of the conversations we had about this investigation, save that I recall discussing her attempts to call the reporting person for further details of other witnesses, and calling the agency company that employed Val Mendez.

21. In relation to establishing the identity of Valdo Calocane, the extent of my own recollection is PC Taylor informing me that she had been provided with the name of the suspect. I do not recall her telling me the suspect's name, but she may have done so. From looking at the OEL [LEPF0000004], I can see that on 24 May 2023 PC Taylor received the full details for Valdo Calocane from the agency that employed him. PC Taylor had attempted to contact the agency prior to this date on a few occasions but had no response. Contact was received from the agency on 18 May 2023 and the details were forwarded on to PC Taylor on 24 May 2023. I believe that we were only given one point of contact

at the agency that Calocane worked for. I know that PC Taylor tried her best to get in contact with them as well as trying to contact witnesses and the victims.

22. I did not complete any checks on Valdo Calocane regarding his offending history or outstanding criminal matters. I can see from entry [20] on the OEL [LEPF0000004], that at 23:46 PC Taylor entered specific suspect details to NICHE. Had I instructed or advised her to do this, which is likely although I do not remember it specifically, I would have assumed she would review any background information held about a suspect that was already on police systems, including NICHE, the PNC, and PND without being directed to do so, and to react to any relevant information that existed. Given her inexperience I accept that I should have double-checked that she had done so and did not.

23. My explanation for this is simply that I probably assumed, whether consciously or sub-consciously, that these basic checks had been done. I am not aware of the existence of any policies or protocols that are provided to tutors to ensure the appropriate checks are completed. When I completed my tutor training, we were told that every tutor would develop their own style of tutoring; there is no set way to tutor. Also, students have different learning styles so, as tutors, we have to be aware of these different learning styles and support the students to learn. The approach I took as a tutor was one of providing guidance and advice on how to deal with certain scenarios or complete tasks. I would check that the student officer could complete these tasks the first few times and be present to observe. I would ensure that the student officer knew that they could ask me for help. After being satisfied that the student officer knew how to complete a

certain task, I wouldn't necessarily check that such tasks were completed on each and every occasion. I would assume that they were confident with what they were doing but I would ensure the student officer was aware that they could approach me and ask any questions they needed to ask and seek guidance from myself if they were unsure what to do or what was required of them.

24. To enable me to monitor a student officer's progress, I would complete a 6 week review. Prior to the review, the student officer completes a personal development form, which indicates how they feel they are progressing in the different areas e.g. arrests, searches and interviews. They would have to evidence this with occurrence numbers (Investigations) or incidents. In the review I would go through these areas with the student and sign off on topics I thought they had achieved or discuss a plan for areas they needed to work on. This then would get signed off by my sergeant.

25. I would also complete a 12 week review with the student. This would be in the same format as the 6 week review, however, at this point everything within the form would need to be completed for the student to become 'independent' which means they are no longer being tutored and would patrol by themselves. The 12 week review would then be signed off by my sergeant.

26. Regarding individual investigations, there wouldn't be any formal checks completed by myself on the progress of each investigation. I would discuss each investigation with the student and help them decide a plan of action and

give guidance for the investigation. These discussions were not planned in advance, and were usually as and when we had a chance to discuss each investigation.

27. I am aware that every 28 days a review is completed by a Sergeant to ensure the investigation is being investigated efficiently. There is also a review from an Inspector after 90 days to ensure the same.

28. In relation to the outstanding warrant, had I been told that Valdo Calocane was wanted on a warrant by Nottingham Police, I would have advised them of our investigation, and I expect that a co-ordinated approach would have been agreed between the forces. A history of reported violence to police/emergency workers and/or members of the public/other employees is obviously more serious than a one-off spontaneous event.

29. I would have assumed that PC Taylor knew that she should check Valdo Calocane on both NICHE and other force systems, namely PNC and possibly PND. I accept that, as PC Taylor was an in-company probationer, I should have reminded her to complete these (objectively basic) checks. I should not have made the assumption that I did that she had done so, given my role as PC Taylor's tutor. This was an operational oversight for which I apologise. It may have been a sub-conscious process.

30. There is a difficult balance between highly-intrusive supervision and allowing a probationer to develop by their showing initiative and operational ability. In

hindsight, I may have been over-confident in PC Taylor's abilities and knowledge at that point, since she had demonstrated real competence since 17 April 2023.

31. I have been asked to set out my decision making process in respect of the decision to seek the arrest of Valdo Calocane. To my knowledge no decision had been made to arrest Valdo Calocane as part of the Leicestershire Police investigation. We did not yet have sufficient evidence to do so. It is quite possible that without knowledge of the outstanding Nottinghamshire Police warrant he would have been asked to attend a voluntary interview without the need for arrest.

32. In respect of steps taken to keep the complainants updated as to the status of the investigation, I did not take any steps myself. This was the operational responsibility of PC Taylor, albeit supervised by me and (in theory) PS Read.

33. From conversations with PC Taylor I was aware that she was making attempts to contact the victims and recording these on the OEL [LEPF0000004], but I do not now recall any other details.

34. In respect of the decision to take no further action in respect of this matter, I had no involvement in the decision as it was not my decision to make. It is likely that we had such a conversation where we would have discussed the next steps required given the evidential issues with proving the assaults. This is standard practice where an investigation is determined to have concluded in practical

terms. From the OEL [LEPF0000004], this point had not been reached by 13 June 2023, and I would have expected PC Taylor to discuss the next steps after the deadline of 15 June 2023 set for the complainants to respond had passed.

35. I have been asked what, if any, information I made available to other police forces, health or social services or other third parties regarding this incident either at the time or subsequently. I had no contact with any other police forces, health or social services or other third party services regarding this matter.

36. In relation to relevant policies, procedures and criteria which governed my role in relation to this incident, I am governed by the code of ethics and the national decision model. I am also obliged as tutor to support and assist students that join Leicestershire Police. Standard policies apply, for example the National Decision Model and the APP on Risk.

37. The original training documents and policies covering my duties as a Tutor constable have been requested from Leicestershire Police. I have not retained them.

38. As to wider policies and procedures, many such policies and procedures are engaged by reactive policing. It is difficult to produce a definitive list. Leicestershire Police will have access to the policies and procedures in force in May to June 2023. These change over time.

39. I have been asked if there are any additional actions that should have been taken in respect of the investigation. As set out, a specific arrangement should

have been made to take statements from the alleged victims when we attended, albeit this may have been prevented by the necessity of responding to a Grade 1 call.

40. The BWV should have been preserved as evidence, and I should have checked this had occurred.

41. I should have confirmed with PC Taylor from 24 May 2023 that she had performed background checks on police databases on the now-identified suspect, Valdo Calocane.

42. In relation to whether the recording of the investigation was appropriate, having reviewed the OEL [LEPF0000004], I believe it is an appropriate record of the investigation. It provides contact details and information as to the ongoing state of the investigation.

43. Entry 20, 24 May 2023, does not record any product of background checks on the named suspect. It should have done to prove that the checks had been done, and even if those details had been that nothing relevant was recorded.

44. I have been asked if I consider whether there are any structural issues (regarding police policies, procedures, methodology, training etc) which contributed to any issues I have identified. Whilst I believe that a system of in-company probationer supervision is appropriate and effective, and ensures that probationers have the necessary support to transition from the classroom and

theory to real-world policing, a review would be justified as to what adjustments are needed to ensure the capacity of tutor constables is not exceeded.

45. To illustrate the point, in my case at the time of attending the incident I had 14 crimes to investigate myself. I was also tutoring PC Taylor. As time went on PC Taylor developed a 'crime queue' as well, so between us we could have been holding up to 30 investigations. We were reactive officers, which meant that intended lines of investigation on a shift were routinely overtaken by emergency calls. I believe this had an effect on my ability to effectively investigate this matter, as I had to review my own investigations as well as oversee PC Taylor's investigations. This was at or beyond my operational capacity, and promoted the risk of incorrect operational assumptions being made.

46. The overall volume of work at Coalville police station was such that protected duty time to catch up on investigations without being diverted by reactive duties was extremely limited. This was recognised, but is of course part of a wider problem as to resourcing across policing.

47. I make these points not to justify the errors in supervision I have recognised, but rather to provide a context such that the risk of repetition is addressed in future across policing.

48. As response officers there is a lot of expectation to cover the demand of that day, but also manage your own investigations. It becomes near impossible on occasions to do both. This is on top of having less staff to cover the demand, so the pressure becomes more intense on the few officers that are available.

49. In an ideal world there would be more officers to assist with demand to ensure adequate time to investigate matters efficiently and effectively.

Conclusion

50. Although not invited to do so, I wish to record that I fully understand why those most directly affected by Valdo Calocane's appalling crimes on 13 June 2023 should wish to have an independent investigation, in public, as to the preceding history, including as to the information available to public services including the police. I will fully support that necessary process, and the need for me to account for my actions. This applies equally to the IOPC investigation. The families and friends of those most directly affected by Valdo Calocane's actions deserve answers to these questions.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

GRO-B

PC 4430 CONNOR AMOS-PERKINS

03/10/2025

Dated

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1. LEPF0000004 NICHE OCCURRENCE
2. LEPF0000015 STORM INCIDENT LOG