

Witness Name: Lorraine Busby-McVey

Statement No: WITN0012001

Dated: 03 OCTOBER 2025

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF SUPERINTENDENT LORRAINE BUSBY-
MCVEY

I, Lorraine Busby-McVey, will say as follows: -

INTRODUCTION

1. I am Superintendent Lorraine Busby-McVey with the Metropolitan Police Service and currently hold responsibility for the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre (FTAC) within the Royalty and Specialist Protection Command. I have been a police officer since 1998 serving in a variety of frontline and leadership roles across operational policing. I am a graduate of Birmingham City University with an LLB (Hons) in Law and American Legal Studies (2005), and I completed the Bar Vocational Course at the Inns of Court School of Law (2006), having been called to the Criminal Bar and admitted to the Honourable Society of the Inner Temple (2005). I hold a Master of Science in Criminology and Criminal Justice from the University of Oxford (2007), and a Policing Postgraduate Diploma in Managing and Leading People from Coventry University (2013).

2. My current role includes overseeing national threat assessment processes for individuals exhibiting concerning behaviours towards prominent public figures, delivered through the multi-agency FTAC framework.
3. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the "Inquiry") with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 23 June 2025 (the "Request").

BACKGROUND

4. I have been asked to set out details relating to an incident on 31 May 2021 when Valdo Calocane (known by other aliases, including Mendes Calocane in respect of this matter) was spoken to after attending Thames House and referred to the Fixated Threat Assessment Centre.

Fixated Threat Assessment Centre

5. The Fixated Threat Assessment Centre is a joint NHS and Metropolitan Police Service team, commissioned by the Home Office and NHS England to manage the threat posed to protected public figures and protected sites (determined by the Royalty and VIP Executive Committee – RAVEC as part of the Home Office but principally the Royal Family and members of Parliament) by fixated lone individuals. It does this by receiving referrals from police and multiple partners in respect of those who correspond with and/or attend protected sites, with the intention for early identification, assessment and intervention to divert and treat

the behaviour which is predominantly driven by mental illness. The relevant policy for the team at the time of this referral was the 2017 Operating Procedure. This is exhibited to this statement as WITN0012002.

6. The unit is a joint one with NHS staff being employed by the North London NHS Foundation Trust (formerly Barnet Enfield & Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust) and the police officers being members of the Royalty and Specialist Protection (RaSP) command of the Metropolitan Police Service. Both halves of the team are located in the same office and work alongside one another.

7. FTAC is multi-governed; operational accountability is held jointly between the Metropolitan Police Service, Specialist Operations, Royalty & Specialist Protection headquarters Superintendent and North London NHS Foundation Trust Senior Service Lead Health in Justice. Strategic governance is held across a quintuple: Royalty and VIP Executive Committee in the Home Office, Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations of the MPS, NHS North London Foundation Trust, The Royal Household Director of Security and Parliamentary Security Department Director of Security.

8. The unit is a national initiative, covering the whole of the UK. The model has been replicated in other countries, such as the Fixated Threat Assessment Centres in each of the Australian states and the Australian federal Fixated Threat Assessment Team, the New Zealand FTAC, and the Dutch TDM team, for example.

9. In June 2021, FTAC comprised of policing resource of 1 x Chief Inspector responsible for a number of units within RaSP Headquarters, 1 x Inspector (joint lead of FTAC with other leadership responsibilities), 1 x Detective Sergeant, 8 x Detective Constables, 1 x Band E Researcher. NHS comprised of 1 x clinical forensic Psychiatrist lead, 2 x clinical forensic Psychiatrists, 2 x Clinical Forensic Psychologists, 1 x Band 8 Forensic Nurse Team Lead, x 4 Band 7 Mental Health Forensic Nurses/Social Workers, x 1 Band 6 Administrator. The number of posts in FTAC in 2025 has increased by 1 member of staff. The majority of FTAC funding is received from the Protective Security Grant originating from Government and the Home Office. Further funding contributions are made from Parliamentary Security Department due to responsibility for MP's and Lords, and the NHS staffing is funded through NHS England and North London Foundation Trust.

10. FTAC is unable to provide any accurate data regarding FTAC subjects who subsequently go on to commit crime, are detained under the Mental Health Act, commit suicide, or otherwise have adverse consequences following contact with authorities. Once a case is assessed and managed in respect of an appropriate health-based intervention, due to volume, FTAC are unable to track and monitor cases for the lifecycle of that person. This is because FTAC assess and manage cases from all over the UK and around the world and only hold case responsibility for the duration of its assessment and until satisfactory acknowledgment of an onward referral to and acceptance by local health, policing, or other statutory authority. FTAC rely on police and policing partners across the UK and worldwide

to communicate information regarding subjects, however there is no standardised process or requirement for other police forces or global policing partners to provide ongoing information.. FTAC do not have ready access to mental health and police systems globally.

11. Annual referrals into FTAC are represented below, together with the annual number of referrals which are identified as requiring further assessment and any appropriate intervention. On average approximately 88% of referrals relate to subjects who write, email and correspond with protected persons or sites with less than 12% of cases relating to those who attend relevant Royal and other protected sites, a small fraction of which have been evidenced to correspond with and attend locations.

	2019- 2020 †	2020- 2021	2021- 2022	2022- 2023	2023- 2024	2024- 2025*
Referrals received	2225	1118	1812	1480	1607	3118
Cases qualifying for further assessment	1686	765	1374	944	1044	2213

† Data relates to Jan-Dec 2019

* New IT system introduced with improved recording.

New IT system

12. This is a SharePoint browser based platform by Microsoft, which requires users to enter data into mandatory specific fields. The data captured records the number of referrals made in relation to subjects of concern and the target of their fixation against specific dates and times. The previous system, known as 'TOM' prior to 8th July 2024 could not support this functionality. As a result, the number of referrals relating to data subjects are logged separately, preventing double or hidden counting and as a result has contributed to an increase in overall referrals.

INVOLVEMENT WITH VALDO CALOCANE

13. FTAC received an email from the intelligence team, Protective Security Operations (dated 01/06/21) requesting a name check in relation to a Parliamentary and Diplomatic Protection (PaDP) policing interaction with Valdo Calocane (VC). In other words, this was not a formal referral but an inquiry as to whether or not VC was known to FTAC. This request was connected with VC's attendance at Thames House on 31/05/21. FTAC treated this as a referral because it was believed VC had travelled some distance to attend Thames House, a location in which FTAC provision is mandated to 'protect.' The email is exhibited to this statement as WITN0012003.
14. The information provided to FTAC at the time was a summary of the incident, a link to the PaDP police officer's Body Worn Video footage of their interaction with

VC, the Crimint and incident report (CAD) reference numbers and details of VC's records from the Police National Computer (PNC), MPS held information and intelligence (Integrated information Platform - IIP) and the Police National Database (PND).

15. FTAC did not have any direct interaction with VC as direct contact with subjects is not routinely undertaken by FTAC. FTAC's role is to leverage or catalyse a local health or policing response rather than provide one. In the most unique circumstances where local health authorities or police refused to accept a person was living within their jurisdiction, it may elicit a direct contact by FTAC or agents acting on their behalf to determine a subject's whereabouts in order to resolve the jurisdictional concern.

16. The information in this email referral was assessed jointly by a detective constable **GRO-E** and a forensic social worker **GRO-E**. The information provided was assessed to determine whether there was evidence of fixation (in other words being highly preoccupied with a person, place, or cause to the extent that this is interfering with one's day-to-day life), or threat towards Thames House. There was no evidence of this. Indeed, other than the fact VC had travelled some distance (from Nottingham to London) to attend Thames House, there was nothing giving rise for concern. Whilst there is reference in the PND record summarised in the referral email, to an incident on 24th May 2020 where "suspect identified but is too ill (physical or *mental health*)" (emphasis added) there was no evidence of mental disorder at all in the limited but pleasant and co-operative

interaction VC had with police on 31st May 2021. The case therefore did not reach the threshold set out in the 2017 Operating Procedures that required any further FTAC involvement. This decision was supervised by a consultant forensic psychiatrist (Dr Frank Farnham). This can be shown in the FTAC Nominal Record which I exhibit to this statement as WITN0012004.

17. The intelligence team had already shared information with the local police force (Nottingham), as is evidenced in the email LBM/01. FTAC was not required under its remit, to do anything more than assess the information provided to determine whether this was a matter for FTAC to deal with. As it was not, FTAC role ended upon completion of that assessment.
18. There was no relevant information to share with any health care providers. There was no communication of this police contact or FTAC assessment by FTAC with multi-agency organisations, VC's family, or Nottingham University.
19. No referrals were made by FTAC to partner agencies and there was no further follow up.
20. There was no further FTAC involvement following the assessment of the presentation in May 2021.

LESSONS LEARNED

21. The incident on 31 May 2021 was a very brief interaction of a few minutes' duration between Valdo Calocane and PaDP police officers two years prior to the

index offences. FTAC do not believe this encounter offered much opportunity or possibility of any action that might have reduced the risk or prevented any of the later attacks.

22. There are no structural, procedural, or other concerns identified from the Met's handling of this interaction. Existing process at the time, was followed.

23. There are no identified recommendations arising from this case. However, it is important to outline FTAC have since developed refreshed operating procedures in line with evolved processes and a new case management system. FTAC have also undertaken international benchmarking and peer-review with other threat management teams and have made case inclusion criteria clearer and more explicit as a result of this work. Whilst not an issue in this case, FTAC also now routinely request to review body worn video, have developed open-source review of social media and clear web footprint to support assessment, and have implemented a policing capability and intent framework to complement threat assessment and management opportunities. There is also now an FTAC on-call facility 24hrs/day/365 days/year and expanded FTAC training delivery to PaDP officers.

24. None of the above developments were as a result of the MPS interaction with VC. Further, had any of the above changes been in place as of 31 May 2021 when FTAC assessed VC conduct and contact with police, FTAC assessment of risk

and/or need for onward referral to multi-agency partners, would have been no different.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed: GRO-B

Dated: 3rd October 2025

Index to Exhibits in First Witness Statement of Lorraine Busby-McVey

<u>No.</u>	<u>Inquiry URN</u>	<u>Document</u> <u>Description</u>
1	WITN0012002	Fixated Threat Assessment Centre Operating Instructions, 2017 (v3 – 20/03/2017)
2	WITN0012003	Email from TAIU Protective Security Operations to PaDP and FTAC, dated 01.06.21
3	-WITN0012004	FTAC Nominal Record, dated 01.06.21