

Witness Name: DAVID MATHER

Statement No: WITN0034001

Dated: 04/12/2025

## THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

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### FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF CHIEF INSPECTOR DAVID MATHER

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I, DAVID MATHER will say as follows: -

1. My name is David Mather.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the **"Inquiry"**) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 20<sup>th</sup> June 2025 (the **"Request"**).

#### My Background

3. I joined Nottinghamshire Police in 2009.
4. I served as a police constable engaged in frontline policing in the South of Nottingham until 2015 when I was promoted to the rank of Sergeant.
5. I was promoted to Inspector in January 2019 and moved to the Operational Support Department as Armed Policing Inspector. I undertook a Pursuit Managers course in May 2019, which I refreshed in November 2022. I completed an Initial Tactical Firearms Course in September 2021 and a Cadre Tactical Firearms Command Course in November 2021.

6. In March 2023, I was promoted to Chief Inspector and assigned to the Force Control Room in the role of Force Incident Manager.
7. In Nottinghamshire Police, the Force Incident Manager (FIM) is a police officer, usually in the rank of Chief Inspector, trained as an Initial and Cadre (Planned) Tactical Firearms Commander and Pursuit Supervisor. Outside of office hours the FIM is usually the senior officer that is on duty for the force. The FIM is responsible for the operation of the Force Control Room, management of outstanding demand (calls for service), works in conjunction with Response Policing Inspectors to coordinate the response and effective management of incidents that are more risk laden.
8. As previously stated, I had completed national ITFC and CTFC courses and an internal (i.e. Nottinghamshire Police) Pursuit Management Course and refresher training. I had also been deemed as being operationally deployable in these fields, having had a period of mentorship with officers more experienced in these fields.
9. I undertook Op Plato training on my ITFC course. I have also been part of unarmed Plato training before becoming a Firearms Commander. I have never declared an Op Plato outside of training before. It is a rare declaration to make and I have not made one since the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023.
10. To assist the Inquiry to understand the context of what follows, I will provide a summary of the operation of the Nottinghamshire Police Control Room.
11. The Nottinghamshire Force Control Room (FCR) can, at times, contain over a hundred staff during the daytime. Overnight, the only staff working within the

FCR are the call handlers, dispatchers, Real Time Intelligence Unit (RTIU), Force Incident Supervisors and the FIM.

12. On the 13<sup>th</sup> June 20203, at 04.00 hours, the following officers and staff were on duty in the FCR;
  - (a) 5 x Call Handlers;
  - (b) 9 x Dispatchers
  - (c) 2 x RTIU officers
  - (d) 1 x Control Room Manager (Force Incident Supervisor)
  - (e) 2 x Police Sergeants (Force Incident Supervisors)
  - (f) 1 x Chief Inspector (FIM)
  
13. In 2023, Nottinghamshire Police was using SAFE as its command and control software. When a 999 (or 101) call is directed to the Police via BT it is routed to an available call handler. A template will appear on the call handler's computer screen which is partially populated with the time and date of the call, rough location that the call is made from and Nottinghamshire Police reference numbers. There are various other prescribed boxes (i.e. type of call, location, caller's name and other details) along with free text boxes for the call handler to type into. As soon as the call handler identifies that this is a police incident which will require police attendance, they will click a button on the screen to generate an incident. The call taker will continue to take details from the caller.
  
14. Due to volume and geography, Nottinghamshire Police divides the county into 7 geographical talkgroups (radio channels) with an additional talkgroup for

- specialist responders (Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs), police dogs and drones).
15. Once an incident is generated, it will appear on a Dispatcher's screen (they will only see those incidents in their area unless a distinct decision is made to share an incident). The Dispatchers will only see incidents that relate to the geographical area that they are working on. If the call taker has deemed the incident to be an emergency response, the Dispatcher will immediately allocate the most appropriate police resource to attend the incident once they have read the new incident on their screen. They will be reading the information that the call handler is obtaining from the caller. The Dispatcher will conduct intelligence checks on any people, vehicles or addresses that have been mentioned on the incident and record the result of these checks on the log. They can also electronically tag an incident for it to be highlighted to RTIU and/or the Force Incident Supervisors and Manager. The Dispatchers are able to see the locations of the officers on their talkgroup. Their locations are tracked via the officers' personal radio sets and also those installed in their police vehicles.
  16. RTIU officers' computer screens will display all current Force Incidents. However, they will usually work from a smaller list of highlighted (tagged) incidents to which call handlers, Dispatchers or Supervisors have requested their attention. RTIU officers have access to more intelligence systems than most officers and staff due to their enhanced level of vetting and training.
  17. The Force Incident Supervisors and Manager are colloquially referred to as Top Desk. All those on the Top Desk will have the entire county's incidents up on their SAFE screen. They also have a FIM/FIS list of highlighted incidents which

- may require their attention. Any of the call handlers, Dispatchers or RTIU members are able to escalate an incident to the Top Desk's highlighted screen by tagging an incident to be escalated to FIM/FIS. Incidents involving weapons, potential pursuits, deaths or other matter deemed to be high risk would usually be on the FIM/FIS escalation page.
18. The Top Desk is situated almost centrally facing in towards the first two thirds of the room. The third of the room behind the Top Desk is comprised of offices and overspill desks. The Top Desk is a row of four workstations with (ordinarily) a FIS (Sergeant) sat at Desk 1, the FIM at Desk 2, FIS (Sergeant) at Desk 3, FIS (Manager) Desk 4 and if there is a full complement of management then another FIS (Manager) on the overspill desk immediately behind and to the right of Top Desk. This configuration can change depending on staffing but remains broadly consistent among all shifts for ease of handover procedures.
  19. The call takers sit at workstations in rows on the right of and adjacent to Top Desk. The Dispatchers sit in two rows immediately in front of but perpendicular to Top Desk. This means if Dispatchers or members of Top Desk on desks 1-4 stand up, they can see one another directly which often aids communication in what can be a very busy environment.

#### Events of the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023

20. Prior to the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023, to the best of my belief, I had no knowledge of, or interactions with, Valdo Calocane, by that or any other name.
21. In making this statement, I have refreshed my memory of events by reference to the following documents and materials:
  - (a) Incident Log 0077\_13062023 (URN: **NGPF0006113**)

- (b) Incident Log 0065\_13062023 (URN: NGPF0006136)
  - (c) Incident Log 0066\_13062023 (URN: NGPF0006111)
  - (d) Incident Log 0069\_13062023 (URN: NGPF0006112)
  - (e) Incident Log 0079\_13062023 (URN: NGPF0006137)
  - (f) Firearms Commander Notes (URN: NGPF0006115)
  - (g) Initial MG 11 (URN:NGPF0006132)
  - (h) Supplementary MG11 (URN:NGPF0006133)
  - (i) Anonymity MG11 (URN: NGPF0006134)
22. I was on duty as the Force Incident Manager in the Force Control Room at police headquarters on the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023. My shift had started at 22.00 on the 12<sup>th</sup> June and was scheduled to end at 07.00 on the 13<sup>th</sup> June.
23. I have now had the Nottinghamshire Police Duty Management System checked and this indicates that at 04.00 hours on the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023, there were 3 Sergeants and 35 police constables on duty and a Response Policing Inspector for that area. Those officers would be covering the South of Nottinghamshire County, the South of Nottingham City Conurbation, Nottingham City Centre itself and the Central area of Nottingham City Conurbation, an area of approximately 9 by 7 miles. Some officers would have been deployed on other incidents.
24. At or about 04.05 hours on the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023, I was made aware that someone had been stabbed on Ilkeston Road, Nottingham. I cannot recall how I was told, but it is likely that the Dispatcher for that area would have read the incident

- as the call was coming in and shouted over at me and the other supervisors because a weapon had been involved in the incident. I would have then clicked on the incident to view the details on the incident log (0065\_13062023).
25. I authorised the deployment of Taser equipped police officers to apprehend any suspects. This includes a number of Response Police officers from local policing and all Armed Response Vehicle (ARV) officers and Dog handlers. As a result of what had been described as a knife having been used in the incident, I deemed it prudent for officers trained to carry Taser to be deployed as a tactical contingency. The use of Taser can provide officers time and space from an offender and accordingly maximises officers' safety.
26. ARV officers are trained in advanced first aid. This is above the level that normal uniformed Response Officers are trained to and roughly equivalent to Fire and Rescue Officers. They carry a comprehensive first aid kit, more comprehensive than that which is carried by response officers. The main reason for this is so that they would be in a position to treat anyone who may have been shot, whether that be a suspect or another officer. As a result of this extra training, they are often deployed to incidents where persons are critically injured.
27. Although I would have been aware that the Ambulance Service would have been called to this incident, my priority was to provide potential life saving intervention to the victim.
28. Incident log 0066 (**URN: NGPF0006111**) refers to another call about the incident on Ilkeston Road timed at 04.06. There is not a lot of detail but I clearly saw the incident when it was first generated as I typed on the log (for the

attention of the call handler) “Keep on the line and get what info you can”. By this I meant that the call handler should try and keep their caller on the phone, to keep them reporting what they were seeing so as to improve the information for officers attending. Unfortunately, a few seconds afterwards, the call handler detailed on the log that the caller had ended the call. The call handler then closed incident 0066 and transferred the relevant information onto incident 0065. The reason this is done, is because it becomes too confusing if there are multiple incident logs open for the same incident and one can only have one log open on one’s screen at any one time. That caller referred to the offender walking in the direction of the City Centre.

29. Incident 0069\_13062023 (**URN: NGPF0006112**) refers to a call from an off duty officer at 0409, stating that they had heard a female shouting “ get off me, get off me” towards a male. The caller gave the location of St Barnabas Cathedral on Derby Road in Nottingham, which is just outside the centre of the City. Two officers attended and completed an area search but did not find the female. However, I knew the area and was aware there were some gardens which would be difficult to search in low light and the location on Derby Road is not far from Ilkeston Road. I wanted to be sure that the issue being reported was not caused by the subject from incident 0065 on Ilkeston Road. I tasked Police Sergeant Berry, the Force Incident Supervisor sat next to me, to ask more officers to attend to ensure that a thorough search had been completed. I am aware from checking the log that PS Berry deployed an ARV, dog officer, police drone, a Response Sergeant and two Response Officers. The officers who had originally attended also called back the original caller to see if they could obtain any further detail. Ultimately nothing further was

discovered. I will say that, looking back, the distance between the scene and Cathedral would have been a challenge for an individual to cover on foot in the short time between calls, but the information from the caller on incident log 0066 was that the subject had headed off in the direction of the City Centre, and so I could not rule out the possibility.

30. I have listened to the radio transmissions and can hear a response officer subsequently asking if ambulance had been called and the dispatcher on Talkgroup 6 replies "we're onto them". This would indicate to me that their colleague working on that talkgroup had made the call. It would be usual practice for the call taker or anyone tasked to make such a call, to add text to the log describing what they had done. Due to none of the outgoing calls from the control room recording, I cannot check this call. Likewise, quite often the ambulance service ring the police control room to inform us of serious incidents such as these and will always do this when a weapon is involved as was the case in this incident.
31. Two ARVs were involved in the treatment of the two victims on Ilkeston Road, another ARV and dog officer were involved in the search for the offender.
32. An ARV will always consist of two Authorised Firearms Officers who have undergone specific initial training and continuous professional development as mandated by the College of Policing in order that they can be permitted to be in possession of firearms. In Nottinghamshire, ARV officers routinely patrol in vehicles that contain a gun safe. Within the gun safe are Heckler & Koch G36 carbines, an H&K AEP (attenuating energy projectile) launcher (sometimes referred to as a baton gun), ammunition for the aforementioned as well as

- smoke and stun grenades. The carbine and launcher are stored breach safe which means that they are not loaded. Nottinghamshire ARV officers carry a Glock 17 Self Loading Pistol (SLP). This is made ready, meaning that the weapon is loaded with ammunition and there is a round in the chamber. This SLP is not stored in the gun safe but on the ARV officer's person usually in a holster strapped to their thigh or a holster on their hip.
33. ARV officers will also carry a Taser which will be worn upon their person.
  34. When an ITFC grants a spontaneous firearms authority, the ARV officers are being given the authority to get the weapons that are in the gun safe out, load said weapons and make them ready (put them in a state whereby they can be discharged). Depending on the threat faced and the tactics authorised by the ITFC, other equipment may be used such as ballistic shields and helmets.
  35. At the time of the incident on Ilkeston Road, there were three ARVs on duty in Nottinghamshire covering the entire county. I did consider granting a firearms authority. However, my priority was trying to save the lives of the victims of the attack. Although Response Officers are first aid trained, it is not to the level of ARV officers, nor do they carry the same level of first aid equipment. I wanted the ARVs to attend with a view to administering potentially life saving first aid to the victims. Furthermore, if ambulance staff were present, the ARVs could either assist them or disengage and be re-tasked to look for the subject.
  36. I was content that it was proportionate to authorise the deployment of Taser trained officers as a contingency, should the subject be located and pose a threat to officers. I do not have to make this authorisation as officers carrying Taser can self-authorise provided that they can rationalise the use of Taser.

- However, I do so as I believe it makes it more clear that an assessment has been undertaken. This decision is written on the incident log and will be passed by dispatchers to officers on the ground. In the case of TG1199 which is the talkgroup that the ARVs and I were on, I passed over the air that Taser had been authorised for this deployment.
37. I have listened to the radio transmissions and can confirm that I said; "Taser is authorised as a contingency", this was over Talkgroup 1199 and specifically aimed at the ARV officers that were travelling. The radio transmissions are not time stamped, but when cross referencing them with incident log 0065 (**URN: NGPF0006136**), I wrote that Taser had been authorised at 0405 hours and therefore I would have issued the authorisation immediately before.
38. At or about 04.07, I received information that there was a second victim at Ilkeston Road. I cannot recall how I came to know this; it may have been what I read on the log or what a colleague told me.
39. I noted that the description of the offender that had been given by the caller of incident 0065 was; a black male, in black clothing and carrying a black bag. I noted that this was a generic description and that, despite it being so early in the morning and therefore not yet busy in Nottingham, it may still be difficult to identify a suspect from such a general description as they were mobile and had not remained on scene. However, the description was passed by a Dispatcher by radio to all officers on several occasions.
40. I contacted the on-call Superintendent (Superintendent Louise Clarke) by telephone to make her aware of the incident. The On-Call Superintendent is an officer of that rank who will not be on duty but is available to be contacted

by phone. Certain police powers can only be exercised on the authority of a Superintendent or above and so a Superintendent is always on call if required. I called Superintendent Clarke due to the significance of the incident and so that she could confirm she was content with the actions that had been carried out at that point and to ask whether the on-call Gold Commander should be notified. She confirmed the on-call Gold Commander did need to be made aware. My best estimate would be that I made the call to Superintendent Clarke at approximately 04.45 as I endorsed the Incident Log at 04.59 am to the effect that I had briefed the Superintendent.

41. I will always, when possible, use the physical phone on my desk to make calls, as I understood that the calls from that phone are recorded and that the call history log can be obtained. However, I have requested the recordings and call history for the preparation of this statement and I have been advised by the Force's IT and Telecommunications staff that there was a fault and that the calls I made did not record and there is no call log for the morning in question.
42. At or about 04.49, I saw an entry on the incident log that the female victim, who I now know was Ms O'Malley-Kumar, had passed away.
43. I recall that I next telephoned the Response Policing Inspector for the South of the County (where the incident took place). At that time, the Inspector was Peter Shaw. I cannot recall the time of the call exactly, but I believe it was after briefing Superintendent Clarke but before speaking to ACC Griffin; I would estimate the call to have been made at approximately 5.00am. As the Area Inspector had attended the scene and was in command of the officers on the ground. He confirmed that there were sufficient officers in attendance to

- conduct the necessary investigative enquiries and also to inform him about what had been done in the FCR. I informed him that I had briefed the on-call Superintendent, was about to brief the on-call Gold Commander and that the on-call Detective Inspector had been called out. Inspector Shaw informed me that the on-call Detective Inspector (Pam Dowson) was already at the scene on Ilkeston Road with them, that it was a large scene, complicated by alleyways but that there were enough officers and that no suspect had yet been identified.
44. In addition to Inspector Shaw directing officers, from my review of the radio transmissions, it was apparent that officers had already commenced area searches to locate the suspect.
45. From checking the Incident Logs and listening to the radio transmissions my assessment is that, by 0500, there was an Inspector, a Detective Inspector, one Response sergeant and twelve officers at the scene. I believe that 4 officers attended the Queens Medical Centre and thirteen officers were engaged in searching for the offender. The officers searching would have coordinated the search themselves, with the assistance of their dispatchers in the control room to have oversight of the search.
46. Having agreed with Superintendent Clarke that I would brief the on-call Gold Commander, I called Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) Rob Griffin. The on-call Gold Commander is always a member of the Chief Officer Team.
47. The command structure for armed policing in the United Kingdom is a nationally standardised system set out in the College of Policing Armed Policing APP designed to ensure clarity, effective oversight, and legal compliance during the deployment of police firearms. It is built on a three-tier command model:

Strategic (Gold), Tactical (Silver), and Operational (Bronze), each with distinct roles and responsibilities:

(a) Strategic Firearms Commander (Gold/SFC)

The SFC sets the strategic objectives and tactical boundaries for the armed operation. The SFC maintains overall command, direction, and responsibility for all decisions made during the deployment of Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs).

(b) Tactical Firearms Commander (Silver/TFC)

The TFC commands and coordinates the tactical elements of the operation in line with the strategic objectives set by the SFC. The TFC is responsible for choosing tactical options, deploying AFO teams and managing the information flows between the strategic and operational levels.

(c) Operational Firearms Commander (Bronze/OFC)

The OFC commands officers in the field, ensuring frontline AFOs receive clear information, intelligence, and instructions necessary for their roles.

During this Armed deployment, the SFC was ACC Griffin, the TFC was myself and the OFC was PC Speeden.

48. I briefed ACC Griffin as I had done Superintendent Clarke, around the circumstances of the incident, the fact that the on-call Detective Inspector Dowson had been called out, that she had in turn spoken to the on-call Regional Homicide Senior Investigating Officer (Nottinghamshire Police is part of a 5 Force East Midlands regional collaboration which combines resources to

- provide a centralised specialist homicide unit), that the subject was outstanding, that we had not confirmed the identities of the victims as yet but believed that they were students and that on-call internal media staff had been informed to draft a press release (this would have been a nominated member of the Nottinghamshire Police Corporate Communications team who are made aware of all significant policing incidents so as to assist in an initial media release).
49. At approximately 05.30, I started to read the log of Incident 0077\_13062023 (URN: **NGPF0006113**) on my computer screen. I read that a member of the public had called to report that a white van had run over a pedestrian on Milton Street in the centre of Nottingham. I deployed an ARV to attend as I was aware that most resources in the City were committed with the incident on Ilkeston Road. I was aware from the Incident Log that Response Officers had been deployed to this pedestrian incident and that there were casualties.
50. Within seconds I was told by a call taker who approached me and the other Control Room Supervisors that there had been a second call from a different member of the public reporting what appeared to be the same event, this was called in at 05.29.
51. I checked the Incident Log for that call and read that the second caller had stated that the van ran the pedestrian down on purpose and had driven on to the wrong side of the road to hit the person. A description of the van had been provided as a white van with a roof rack and the driver was described as a black male. I then rechecked the details on the Incident Log of the first call about the van at 05.25 and I saw that the first caller had also stated that the actions of the van driver were deliberate.

52. At that point, based on the fact that there had been two independent calls about the van and confirmed casualties, I formed the belief that this had been a deliberate act. I also formed the view that this might be terrorist related as this method of attack has previously been used in London and other European cities. In Operation Plato training and from general awareness, I knew that the attack methodology for a number of terrorist attacks in the past had been to use a vehicle as a weapon to run people over, usually in crowded places.
53. I took the decision to open up a dedicated firearms talkgroup (Talkgroup 1205) and, at about 05.30 I declared Operation Plato, which I will describe below. I used words to the effect of: "I am declaring Operation Plato. Arming criteria is met. All tactics are available". The message was transmitted over a dedicated Airwaves radio talkgroup accessed only by officers in Armed Response Vehicles. My declaration would not have been heard by non- firearm response officers as they do not have access to the firearms talkgroup. This is done intentionally as sometimes firearms operations are of a sensitive nature and, there is the functionality to "patch" local talkgroups into the firearms group, this just means that the radio channels can be merged. My declaration would have been at about the same time as PC Reynolds reported seeing the van colliding with pedestrians at 05.31. However, I made the declaration before becoming aware of what PC Reynolds had reported on the Incident Log.
54. I became aware at 05.32 that Control Room Dispatchers were in communication with a local Response Officer keeping observations on the white van. As I was on a different talk group, I shouted to one of the

- Dispatchers words to the effect of: "Keep that unit following and report back the location". While I did not manage this as a pursuit, my words inferred that I was content for the local unit (Call sign CR410) to remain in pursuit of the subject vehicle and wanted them to keep updating on its location.
55. I sought an update on the location of the ARVs through the firearms talk group 1205. I was told the van had been sighted on Radford Road and then onto Bentinck Road.
56. I tried to limit my transmissions only to those moments when I felt it absolutely necessary to speak as, when I transmit, no-one else on the talkgroup can transmit and it would prevent the ARV officers being able to communicate with each other or report back to me. As a former ARV Inspector, I was also aware that Armed Response officers are well trained to deal with these situations and would know what tactics to deploy to minimise any threat.
57. At about 5.33 am, by reference to the Incident Log 0077 (**URN: NGPF0006113**), I was told by another Dispatcher that the local Response vehicle CR410 had stopped and I formed the impression that the officer had got out. This was because they were not reporting their location as moving. I also heard the word abandon on the radio and I assumed then that meant that the subject had abandoned from the van and was running away.
58. A short time after that update, I was informed by Control Room staff at 05.35 that a suspect had been detained.
59. My Body Worn Video camera was stood on the desktop computer in front of me and was activated by one of my Sergeants when I had already started commanding the spontaneous firearms deployment. I watched this footage for

the first time on the 20<sup>th</sup> June 2023 when completing my Post Incident Stage 4 account. The staged process for giving accounts after a significant incident is guided by the College of Policing APP on Armed Policing. It was on the 20<sup>th</sup> June 2023 that I realised that the BWV camera was activated at approximately the same time that ARV officers detained Calocane at 05.35.

60. I did not immediately activate my BWV camera when I granted armed authority and declared Operation Plato. There was so much happening and it was not a priority action. During the deployment PS 2930 Jon Straszewskyj who was sat next to me and also an ITFC, reached over and activated my camera, having noticed that it was not recording. The camera remained activated until I handed over command to Superintendent Sullivan the Specialist Tactical Firearms Commander. I did not attempt to view the footage that has been recorded until 20<sup>th</sup> June 2023, this was the day that I gave my detailed (Stage 4) account during the Post Incident Process that was conducted following the Op Plato Declaration and the pursuit of Calocane in the van. Upon reviewing the BWV recording, the first thing that I heard myself say on the recording was my asking the ARV Officers to confirm that they had detained the subject. It became clear to me that PS 2930 must have activated the recording function on my camera a few minutes into the deployment I would estimate this to be 05.35 as this is when the subject was detained. I stopped reviewing the footage because it did not cover my actions during the times relevant to the Post Incident Procedure (the pursuit of Calocane). It should be noted that the revised Op Plato action card for the FIM now clearly gives a BWV reminder.
61. I know that the footage was then cloaked as it formed part of a Post Incident Procedure. Cloaking means that it cannot be viewed by just anyone. It would

have been restricted to those on the BWV software systems that had Administration access and anyone that they gave permission to view the footage.

62. I never had cause to review the footage again until I caused a search to be made for it in connection with the preparation of this statement. Initially the footage could not be located and having consulted with staff in the Nottinghamshire Police IT department, it seemed that the footage had automatically been deleted and would not be able to be recovered. However, it has since been located, and I have had the opportunity to review it. The footage shows my command of the firearms incident from the time that Calocane was detained and until I handed over my responsibilities as the FIM to Ch Insp Humphris at approximately 07.00 am. I refer to the footage as **URN: NGPF0008561**, **NGPF0008562R**, **NGPF0008563** and **NGPF0008564**.
63. At 05.35, I used the ARV talk group to ask for confirmation and received a reply to confirm that the suspect had been detained and was handcuffed
64. From the description received of the arrested man, I realised that he may have been involved in the earlier incident on Ilkeston Road. However, that was not confirmed.
65. Following the detention of the suspected offender, I remained in command of the firearms operation for approximately two hours more, during which I discussed the events and my decision making with officers on the ground, Control Room operators, both my Control Room Sergeants, my Control Room Manager and the Strategic Firearms Commander. I did this in order to maintain effective command of the incident.

66. I made mention of this in my statement made on the 20<sup>th</sup> June 2023 during the post incident procedure as it is considered necessary to state when one has discussed one's honestly held belief before having completed the detailed (Stage 4) account.
67. At approximately 05.50 am I requested officers to attend the home address of Ian Coates, who was identified as the owner of the white van from records held on the Police National Computer, in order to ascertain the circumstances of how the van came to be in Calocane's possession. The van was registered and insured to Mr Coates and therefore this was an obvious line of enquiry.
68. Shortly afterwards, I was made aware that Ian Coates had been found on Magdala Road, Nottingham and an Incident 0079\_13062023 (**URN: NGPF0006137**) created.
69. The Control Room day shift started arriving at 06.00 and this meant that there were more supervisors in the FCR which helped with the number of tasks that needed to be done in connection with the management of the incident.
70. I handed command of the incident over to the incoming Force Incident Manager Chief Inspector Humphris at approximately 07.00 and handed over firearms command to Specialist Tactical Firearms Commander Superintendent Sullivan at approximately 07.30 and sat in on his initial meeting with the Strategic Firearms Commander.
71. I was not personally involved in any debrief on the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023 as I was declared a Key Police Witness in terms of the Post Incident Procedure.
72. I was involved in a debrief with the Firearms team on the 11<sup>th</sup> July 2023 in order to identify good practice as well as any points for development.

73. I was also part of a larger National CT Debrief on 10<sup>th</sup> August 2023 under the operational name Operation Alcanian (**URN:NGPF0007687**). This also took place to identify both good practice and aspects of the operation which could have been better dealt with and to share this nationally to inform recommended best practice. This debrief was facilitated by Counter Terrorism Policing. My involvement was to provide an account of the Op Plato declaration and initial tactical firearms command of the incident.

#### Operation Plato

74. Operation Plato is the planned response from the emergency services and partners to a marauding terrorist attack. This is thoroughly rehearsed and practised by emergency services in order to ensure that the plan is fit for purpose.

75. The Police are the only emergency service authorised to declare an Operation Plato incident and this would ordinarily be done by the Force's FIM.

76. Operation Plato enables the emergency services and other agencies to utilise agreed joint operating principles, have a shared understanding of risk and clear communications with one another. It allows the agencies to work effectively together to save lives.

77. The declaration of Operation Plato also mandates agreed mutual aid from the Region and also national assets, including those from Counter Terrorism Policing and the Military.

78. The principles and procedures are set out in Nottinghamshire Police Op Plato Procedure (**URN: NGPF0006117**) and OP PLATO JOPS (**URN:**

**NGPF0006114**). Both documents have been refreshed since the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023.

### Pursuit

79. As a Pursuit Manager, I am empowered to authorise officers to carry out vehicle pursuits in line with PS 198 Nottinghamshire Driver Standards and Police Pursuits Policy and College of Policing Pursuit APP and associated Tactics Directory. (Exhibits **URN: NGPF0006135** and **URN: NGPF0006116**).
80. Under normal circumstances, once a pursuit is commenced, authorisation for this to continue will be given by a Pursuit Supervisor in the FCR. This will depend on numerous factors, the most pertinent of which are the level of police driver, the type of vehicle they are in and a dynamic risk assessment provided by the pursuing officer.
81. Once a pursuit commences, it is for the Pursuit Officer or Pursuit Supervisor to declare a ceasing of the pursuit.
82. In relation to the incident of the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023, the pursuit of the white van commenced spontaneously without formal authority from me because events were developing so quickly at the scene and in the Control Room. However, I can say that had I known that the officer was following the vehicle that the suspect was travelling in, I would have authorised it. When I became aware that there was by definition a police pursuit, I did instruct CR410 via the dispatchers to keep following the suspect vehicle.
83. A police driver is deemed to be in pursuit when a driver/motorcyclist indicates by their actions or continuance of their manner of driving/riding that, they have no intention of stopping for the police, and the police driver believes that the

driver of the subject vehicle is aware of the requirement to stop and decides to continue behind the subject vehicle with a view to either reporting its progress or stopping it.

#### General Comments

84. I cannot comment on the arrest of Valdo Calocane, as I was not on scene and therefore not directly involved in it.
85. Similarly, I cannot comment on the conduct of the subsequent investigation as I had no involvement in it apart from the provision of witness statements about the events of the morning of the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023.
86. I have reflected on the way the events of the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023 were managed. I did not realise until some time after declaring Operation Plato that the Ground Bronze Commander Inspector Pete Shaw was unaware of the declaration. The Ground Bronze is commander on scene who coordinates officers on the ground. In this case it was a Response Policing Inspector. The Operation Plato plan has changed as a result of this incident and the Ground Bronze Commander is now allocated an officer to assist them so that they are not overwhelmed. They are also instructed to be on the firearms talkgroup.
87. On reflection, I could have given a more detailed briefing to the ARV officers but chose not to do so in order to keep the radio clear, so they could communicate with one another and monitor what was being reported by other officers. With hindsight, I had enough time to include details such as my Threat Assessment and Working Strategy. At the time I was concerned that I wanted the ARV officers to be able to listen to what was being reported by officers at

- the scene and coordinate amongst themselves how they were going to conduct a search for the subject.
88. The way our radio systems work is that I can talk over any officers but they cannot talk over me, hence my concern over talking too much.
89. However, overall, I consider the Force's plans and procedures operated as they should and officers and staff appeared to understand their roles in a fast developing situation and acted in accordance with their training.
90. A Monday night shift is not usually as busy with calls for service as a weekend night shift. There are less police officers on duty accordingly, as well as fewer staff within the control room. On average, I would say that between the hours of 00.00 hours on a Tuesday morning and 05.30, Nottinghamshire Police will generate 60 incidents requiring attendance. These incidents are graded by the call takers into four categories:
- (a) Grade 1 – which warrants an immediate policing response, and the aim is to arrive within 15 minutes in urban areas and 20 in rural areas;
  - (b) Grade 2 – which warrant an urgent policing response whereby the aim is to attend within two hours of the call;
  - (c) Grade 3 – which is an incident deemed to require attendance, and the aim is to attend within 24 hours; and
  - (d) Grade 4 – this is an incident which needs to be recorded but is deemed not to require a police officer to attend in person..
91. On the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023 between 00.00 and 0530 there were 79 incidents generated from 153 calls for service into the Control Room. 27 were Grade 1,

18 grade 2, 2 grade 3, 16 grade 4 and the 15 remaining would have been duplicate incidents that were closed as they had already been reported.

92. While the Control Room on a mid-week night shift can be relatively calm and quiet, on the 13<sup>th</sup> June 2023, the room witnessed more activity because of the significance of the attacks on Ilkeston Road. By the time that Op Plato was declared, it was loud and frantic. Although Plato is something that everyone in the Control Room trains and practices for, it is impossible to replicate what it will be like in reality. The minimal staffing in the Control Room added to this as everyone had to help each other out. The call takers are told to terminate calls that are coming into the Control Room if they are not related to the incident at hand or not a Grade 1 emergency and this in itself goes against the ethos of how call handlers are trained. My perception was that there was a degree of fear in the room, because this was so far from the norm and there had already been fatalities and serious injuries and, at least initially, it was unclear how many there might be. There was a lot of shouting, out of urgency and to ensure that people understood what was being said. Significantly, this was only the 10<sup>th</sup> declaration nationally since Plato came into existence.
93. Despite of all of this, the staff in the FCR performed professionally in an extremely stressful and extraordinary incident. There was a well-defined Operation Plato plan and staff in the FCR knew it and how to implement it.
94. I also feel that the officers on the ground performed well, in particular the ARV officers who did exactly what they are trained to do.

### **Statement of Truth**

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may

be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed:

**GRO-B**

Dated: 04/12/2025

**Index to First Witness Statement of DAVID MATHER**

No.	URN	Document Description
1	NGPF0006113	Incident Log 0077_13062023
2	NGPF0006136	Incident Log 0065_13062023
3	NGPF0006111	Incident Log 0066_13062025
4	NGPF0006112	Incident Log 0069_13062025
5	NGPF0006137	Incident Log 0079_13062025
6	NGPF0006115	Firearms Commander Notes
7	NGPF0006132	Initial MG 11
8	NGPF0006133	Supplementary MG11
9	NGPF0006134	Anonymity MG11
10	NGPF0006117	Nottinghamshire Police Op Plato Procedure
11	NGPF0006114	OP PLATO JOPS

12	NGPF0006135	PS 198 Nottinghamshire Driver Standards and Police Pursuits Policy
13	NGPF0006116	College of Policing Pursuit APP and Associated Tactics Directory
14	NGPF0007687	Operation Alcumian Debrief Report
15	NGPF0008561	D1105 0077_13062023-PSS-20230613-053353UTC_0100 2932984-2940557_Da.mp4
16	<b>NGPF0008562R</b>	D1106 0077_13062023-PSS-20230613-060353UTC_0100 2936341-2940557_Da.mp4
17	NGPF0008563	D1107 0077_13062023-PSS-20230613-063354UTC_0100 2936342-2940557_Da.mp4
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