

Witness Name: BARNABY PRITCHARD

Statement No: WITN0040001

Dated: 06/11/2025

## THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

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### FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF PC BARNABY PRITCHARD

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I, BARNABY PRITCHARD, will say as follows: -

1. My name is Barnaby Pritchard.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the “**Inquiry**”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 27<sup>th</sup> June 2025 (the “**Request**”).
3. In making this statement, I have refreshed my memory by reading the Incident Log 0483\_03092021 (**URN: NGPF0000023**), the Occurrence Log (**URN: NGPF0000027**), the Use of Force Forms I completed (**URN: NGPF0000034** and **URN: NGPF0000037**), my witness statement dated the 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2021 (**URN: NGPF0000017**) and by viewing the Body-Worn camera footage of PC Sutton (**URN: NGPF0000107**)

#### My Background

4. When I left school in June 1997 I went into further education studying for my A-Levels at college and briefly attended Nottingham Trent University studying for a degree in Accounting and Finance. Whilst at college and university between

1997 and 2002 I also worked part-time in hospitality at Nottingham University and at Sainsbury's supermarket. I left university in 2002 and joined Siemens Energy Services in an admin role taking voluntary redundancy in 2008. In 2009 I worked as a telecare operator for Nottingham On Call – Nottingham City Council until joining Nottinghamshire Police.

5. I joined Nottinghamshire Police in August 2010 where I performed the role of Response officer, initially based at Radford Road Police Station, Nottingham before moves to Broxtowe Police Station and St Ann's Police Station, both also in Nottingham. In January 2021 I transferred onto Operation Reacher as part of a proactive neighbourhood policing team based in Nottingham City Centre. I have spent my career to date mainly in uniform.
6. I am currently attached to the Tactical Support Group as a Licensed Search Officer based at Force Headquarters, a role which I have been in for approximately 3 years.
7. During my policing career I have assisted in executing warrants issued under section 135 Mental Health Act 1983 on numerous occasions. A section 135 warrant gives police officers the power to enter property to search for and remove people to a place of safety for assessment for potential admission to hospital. Such warrants tend to be obtained by the medical authorities where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person thought to have a mental disorder is being or has been ill-treated, neglected or kept otherwise than under proper control, or, if living alone, is unable to care for themselves.
8. As police officers, we are often first to respond to individuals experiencing mental health crises in any event.

### Events of the 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2021

9. On Friday 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2021 I was on duty at Byron House (Central Police Station), Nottingham, on an afternoon shift working from 1.00 pm to 11.00 pm.
10. During the course of the shift I was made aware of incident 0483\_03092021 by my sergeant at the time, namely Sergeant 2950 Louise Ellis. The Incident related to a section 135 warrant which required executing.
11. The Incident Log referred to a male named Valdo Calocane as the subject of the Section 135 warrant. I had no previous knowledge of or interactions with Valdo Calocane (by this name or any other alias) prior to this date and I researched police systems for any relevant information regarding him prior to my attendance at his address at Salisbury Street Nottingham.
12. Sergeant Ellis asked PC 3998 Sutton and myself to assist a single-crewed officer (PC 4416 Wakefield) in executing the warrant, meeting doctors and a social worker at the address.
13. From the information contained on the Incident Log for 0482\_03092021, I was aware that Valdo Calocane had a diagnosis of psychosis, which I understood as a condition which caused people to see or hear things that are not there or believe things that are not true, that he had had two previous hospital admissions and that he was refusing medication and to engage with mental health staff.
14. From checks made on the Police National Computer (PNC), a national database used by police, which amongst other things, contains details regarding individuals, I was aware that Valdo Calocane, although recorded on the PNC system, had no prior warning signals to suggest he was violent

towards the police or had any other associated risks. I noted that he had previously assaulted a flat mate, which had been recorded on the Nottinghamshire Police Niche system, but from my recollection this matter was taken no further. There was further information regarding Calocane breaking into two of his neighbours' flats as he could hear his Mum's voice and believed she was in the flat and in distress. Accordingly, I was aware he might pose a risk to himself and others. He was not showing as wanted for or involved in any outstanding criminal offences.

15. It was agreed that PC Sutton and I would attend the address with Sergeant Ellis and PC Wakefield to assist the doctors and Approved Mental Health Professional (AMHP) in executing the warrant.
16. At approximately 6.45 pm, we attended Calocane's address at 48 Salisbury Street, Lenton, Nottingham. The doctors and AMHP who I believe from the Safe incident log was Amie Staples, were already present and also an Ambulance crew. Calocane was living in a ground floor flat in a small block beyond a courtyard from the road.
17. On arrival, we had a discussion with the doctors and AMHP and it was agreed that they would try to engage with Calocane initially and explain the warrant. The AMHP knocked on the door and initially there was no response. After repeated knocks at the door Calocane answered and engaged with the AMHP who explained the warrant to him and that he needed to be taken to a place of safety for a mental health assessment. He was told that would be taken by ambulance to Highbury Hospital and the Cassidy Suite, which was the designated place of safety.

18. I saw that Calocane was speaking quietly and calmly but presenting as someone who was unwell mentally by his unemotional and blunt responses. He said he would not be going in the ambulance and attempted to close his flat door walking back into the hallway of the flat which prompted PC Wakefield to put her foot in between the door and step to prevent him from closing and locking it.
19. Sergeant Ellis and PC Wakefield followed Calocane inside the flat and I followed together with PC Sutton. My concern was that he would barricade himself inside his address or potentially arm himself with weapons, based on his demeanour and my experience of similar situations, so we therefore followed him to a bedroom at the back of the address. PS Ellis and PC Wakefield spoke with him at the door and I recall there was a conversation about a phone call.
20. PC Wakefield tried to reassure Calocane by telling him that he was not in any trouble but that the doctors needed to speak with him about his mental health. The AMHP explained to Calocane that the warrant had a use of force power, meaning that the police could use force to remove him from the address to be assessed and this was not what we wanted to do.
21. Calocane bluntly refused to walk out with us voluntarily to the ambulance outside and said words to the effect of: "I understand you are just doing your job, but I will go with the gentleman."
22. I noticed that, prior to saying this, Calocane removed his glasses and slowly and deliberately placed them either on a side table or in a glasses case. On reflection, I believe Calocane was preparing himself for a physical

- confrontation. PC Sutton said to me that she believed his words to mean that he would fight with me but not any female present. At the time I interpreted this to mean that Calocane wished to walk out of the address with me, but not any of the females present perhaps due to sexist attitudes he had towards women.
23. Calocane continued to speak with us all in a calm and unemotional way.
24. Sergeant Ellis stepped further into the bedroom, with Calocane a few feet from the door, and went to take hold of him. I saw Calocane tense up and I moved forward from the doorway to assist, when he lunged towards me with his right fist clenched and punched me directly to the left side of my face, I believe as hard as he could and then instantly punched me again with the same fist to the left side of my face.
25. Calocane's actions took me by complete surprise, his punches landing before I could do anything to defend myself. The situation escalated in a matter of seconds. He continued to lash out, trying to punch me repeatedly as I was struggling to gain control of him in an attempt to restrain him. With my colleagues assisting, we managed to move him backwards towards what I believe was a chest of drawers just inside the door on the left. I was facing him having taken hold of his upper body trying to pin him to the chest of drawers and took a number of punches to the face and head in short succession. I was clearly the focus of his aggression.
26. Whilst still pinning Calocane to the chest of drawers, I was aware that PC Sutton and PC Wakefield were trying to apply handcuffs as he was thrashing his arms around. I was almost face to face with Calocane and he tried to headbutt me.

His first attempt missed, but he thrust his head towards mine at least twice more, connecting with the side of my head and forehead. I still had hold of him but due to his size and the level of his aggression it was becoming difficult to keep hold of him. Calocane was taller than me, at around 6'00" – 6'02" tall and heavy build. He was resisting any attempts to apply handcuffs to his arms and verbal communication with him was pointless. As I had him pinned to the drawers I could not access any of my Personal Protective Equipment such as my PAVA incapacitant spray or Taser (Conducted Energy Device) which due to the level of violence and to prevent Calocane from seriously injuring me I would otherwise have deployed.

27. The small size of the bedroom made it difficult to manoeuvre Calocane away from me, and my colleagues were also struggling to contain him. PC Sutton eventually deployed PAVA but because Calocane was twisting and turning his face away, the majority of the spray appeared to miss his face and had no immediate effect on Calocane. I do not recall it having any effect on myself or other officers until the incident had ended. Calocane broke free from PC Sutton's grasp of the handcuff and went to hit me with this before being forced backwards onto a bed at the rear of the room.
28. I moved back towards the door in order to deploy Taser. I moved backwards to give myself a greater distance knowing that this would make the Taser more effective. I activated my Taser by turning off the safety which causes a white light and two red lasers at the front to illuminate. I aimed the red lights at Calocane (which is known as 'red dotting'). As I did this, so did PC Wakefield who deployed and fired her Taser. It was ineffective due to her close proximity to Calocane, so she fired for a second time and the effect of the Taser shock

- was to incapacitate Calocane, who fell backwards and laid prone on his back on the bed.
29. PC Sutton approached Calocane to put handcuffs on him, but Calocane tensed up and went to get up from the bed. PC Wakefield discharged her Taser until there was a behaviour change from Calocane and eventually he was handcuffed.
  30. Calocane was breathing heavily but had stopped fighting with us. I went over to him to check on his welfare after the Taser deployment. He said: "You didn't go down."
  31. I was unsure what Calocane meant by the comment, but I assumed that he believed I should have gone down from the force of his punches. It was obvious to me that Calocane was trying to cause me serious harm; it was a sustained and deliberate and accurate attack and I was the sole focus of this.
  32. Other officers arrived on scene and Calocane was handcuffed to the rear and leg straps were applied to prevent him from kicking out, as there was a concern he would begin fighting with officers again. He was taken from the flat and placed into the rear of a marked police van. Other officers transported him to hospital, which at the time was standard procedure following a Taser discharge.
  33. It was my understanding that following any treatment, Calocane would be taken to Highbury Hospital to have a mental health assessment and not to police custody, as his detention would not be authorised for his assault on me due to him not having capacity.
  34. As a result of the assault, I had bruising and swelling to the left and right of my forehead, to the right of my left eyebrow, swelling below my left eye on the

- cheekbone, and pain and discomfort either side of my head. My injuries were not serious and I did not deem it necessary to seek hospital treatment.
35. As with any assault on an emergency worker, I wanted the matter pursuing to prosecution not only as a matter of principle and a deterrent but for Calocane to be held accountable for his actions. My colleagues present with me at the incident assisted in compiling evidence, including statements regarding what occurred, before my shift came to an end.
36. The investigation was then progressed by other colleagues, PC 2511 Johnson and **GRO-B** PC 772 Myers and I was provided with victim updates. Other than that, I had no involvement in the investigation.
37. I attended the incident because there were concerns for Calocane's mental health, I believe that this had no bearing on his decision to use this level of violence towards me and my colleagues. I had been assaulted on duty before this incident and I have been assaulted since, but rarely have I been subjected to this level of violence and aggression.
38. I have no concerns over the recording of this matter or the actions of the police in dealing with it. Faced with the levels of aggression we encountered, the use of Taser was unavoidable to subdue Calocane. I do not think there were any other actions we could have taken.
39. As mentioned previously, I understood that Calocane would not be taken to custody due to his mental state and whether he had capacity, which at the time left me feeling perplexed but I accepted this decision which was out of my control. Had Calocane been conveyed to custody once discharged from

- hospital, he may have been deemed fit for detention and interview and the assault against me dealt with expeditiously.
40. Greater effort could have been made to detain Calocane and put him before the courts for the assault against me, once he failed to appear. I am disappointed he was never prosecuted for the assault on myself however, I am under no illusion, this would not have led to a custodial sentence. This failure has left me with an undeserved sense of guilt, however, as a victim, I know that the onus was not on me to investigate my own assault.
41. I have been asked if details of the attendance and/or decisions or actions taken were communicated to: (1) Health, social services or multi-agency organisations; (2) Valdo Calocane's family; (3) Nottingham University; (4) others who might be affected by Valdo Calocane's actions. My answer is that I was not privy to any details of the attendance and decisions or actions taken being communicated to: (1) Health, social services or multi-agency organisations; (2) Valdo Calocane's family; (3) Nottingham University; (4) others who might be affected by Valdo Calocane's actions. After completing my statement within the same tour of duty and assisting with any handover I had no further involvement in the investigation into Calocane's assault on me.
42. I have been asked if there were any barriers to the sharing of information with any of the above, or any other relevant individual, body or organisation. My answer is that I was not involved in any sharing of information.
43. I have been asked if I had any involvement in any assessment of Valdo Calocane, what procedures were in place as to assessment of medical and mental health issues and drug testing, and provision of appropriate medical

support. My answer is that I had no involvement in any assessment of Valdo Calocane.

44. I have been asked to set out the relevant policies, procedures and criteria which I consider governed my role in relation to this incident and set out the ways in which I consider these were or were not met. My answer is that my role at this incident was governed by the powers outlined in the Mental Health Act 1983 which gives the Police the power to enter a private property and remove a person to a place of safety for assessment. The subsequent use of force against Calocane was governed by my Common Law right to defend myself and others from violence, Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 to use reasonable force in effecting the lawful arrest, and Section 117 PACE to use in the exercise of our PACE powers. Under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 2 (Right to Life) lethal or potentially lethal force must be necessary to achieve a legitimate aim such as self-defence or defence of others; Article 3 (Prohibition of Torture) the use of Taser no longer than necessary; Article 8 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life) entering a persons home and searching for a person. Any decision made about the use of these powers must be proportionate, lawful, accountable, necessary and the least intrusive.

45. I have been asked to set out any concerns that I have in respect of the recording of this matter. My answer is that I do not have any concerns in the recording of the matter.

46. I have been asked if, looking back, I consider there are additional actions that I or others could have taken in respect of the incident. My answer is that

I do not believe there were any additional actions that I or anyone else could have taken in respect of this incident.

47. I have been asked if I consider there are any structural issues (regarding police policies, procedures, methodology, training etc.) which contributed to any issues I have identified. My answer is I do not consider that there are any structural issues which contributed to any issues I have identified.

48. I have been asked if there are any recommendations that I consider could help prevent any of the issues that I have identified in respect of this matter. On reflection, I do not have any recommendations which could help or even have prevented any issues I have identified.

**Statement of Truth**

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed: **GRO-B**

Dated: 06/11/2025

**Index to First Witness Statement of BARNABY PRITCHARD**

No.	URN	Document Description
1	NGPF0000023	Incident Details dated 03/09/2021 by Nottingham Police re: Section 135 warrant for Valdo Calocane
2	NGPF0000027	Occurrence details re: Whilst detaining male under mental health warrant PC punched twice, dated 03/09/2021, NGPF
3	NGPF0000034	Use of Force Report, Incident 03/09/2021, Subject Valdo Calocane, Nottinghamshire Police
4	NGPF0000037	Use of Force – Taser Deployment Record, dated 03/09/2021, Nottinghamshire Police
5	NGPF0000017	File relating to incident dated 03/09/2021 re: Section 135 warrant for Valdo Calocane (including MG11 witness statement from PC Pritchard)
6	NGPF0000107	BWV PC Sutton