

Witness Name: Leigh Sanders

Statement No: WITN0359001

Dated: 12 January 2026

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF LEIGH SANDERS

I, Leigh Sanders, will say as follows: -

Introduction

1. I am retired Detective Superintendent (“Det Supt”) Leigh Sanders, formerly of Nottinghamshire Police, having served the communities of the East Midlands for over 30 years. I retired on 19 May 2025.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the “Inquiry”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Requests dated 26 September and 9 October 2025.
3. From the outset, I was the Senior Investigating Officer (“SIO”) for Operation Hendrix (the Operational Policing name allocated to the investigations into the Nottingham Attacks).

Career Background & Relevant Education and Training

4. During my 30-year career, approximately 25 years of my service was within Criminal Investigation Departments ("CID"); during my career, I received various Police and Court Commendations and was a recipient of the Police Long Service and Good Conduct Medal.
5. Although retired, in July 2025 I was contacted by a UK Police Force to conduct an undetected homicide review. I now hold a part-time position regarding that enquiry with several people charged with murder (trial scheduled April 2026).
6. A full list of career postings and duties throughout my service (in chronological order) can be summarised as follows.
 - 1995 – 1997: Uniform Neighbourhood Police Team and Response office, Nottinghamshire Police
 - 1997 – 2001: Divisional Support Unit, Nottinghamshire Police
 - 2001 – 2002: Divisional CID (County), Nottinghamshire Police
 - 2002 – 2003: Uniform Beat Manager Sergeant ("Sgt") (City Division), Nottinghamshire Police
 - 2003 – 2005: City Divisional CID Detective Sergeant ("DS"), Nottinghamshire Police
 - 2005 – 2007: City Divisional CID Detective Inspector ("Det Insp"), Nottinghamshire Police
 - October 2007 - October 2008: City Divisional CID – reactive and acquisitive crime teams (Det Insp), Nottinghamshire Police
 - October 2008 – June 2012: Operation Vanguard – Organised Crime Group ("OCG") management and Undercover Operations (Det Insp).

Nottinghamshire Police / East Midlands Special Operations Unit
("EMSOU")

- July 2012 - July 2015: EMSOU Homicide and Major Crime ("MC") Unit, Det Insp, then promoted to Detective Chief Insp ("DCI"). Nottinghamshire Police / EMSOU
- July 2015 - Feb 2018: Force Public Protection Unit (DCI - Adults Lead)
- Feb 2018 - April 2019: Head of Serious and Organised Crime, Det Supt. Nottinghamshire Police
- April 2019 - March 2022: Deputy head of Professional Standards Directorate and Counter Corruption Unit, Nottinghamshire Police
- March 2022 - March 2023: Public Protection (DCI - Children's Lead), Nottinghamshire Police
- March 2023 – May 2025: Head of Homicide (Det Supt) (EMSOU).

7. At the time of the Nottingham attacks I was Head of Homicide and MC investigations within EMSOU. EMSOU is the collaboration of the five forces of the East Midlands Region (Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, Leicestershire and Northamptonshire) that tackle the most serious crimes. This is the only Homicide Unit within the UK that sits within the national Regional Organised Crime Unit ("ROCU") system.

8. EMSOU provides a 'high-end capability' to deal with Counter Terrorism Policing East Midlands ("CTPEM"), homicide and major crime, organised crime, and cold case reviews undertaken by the Regional Review Unit ("RRU"). It has access to Sensitive Intelligence Units ("SIU"), Technical Services Unit ("TSU") and Forensic Services ("FS"). Those capabilities co-

existed within the ROCU, a structure which enabled me as SIO to secure, at pace, additional resources from other EMSOU disciplines, including direct access into the CTPEM networks and SIU resources.

9. I have been a nationally accredited SIO since 2014. I attach below a full list of what may be considered relevant academic and professional qualifications (in chronological order of receipt).

- 1993: Loughborough University. BA (Hons) Politics and Social Administration.
- 1998: Loughborough University. MSc Criminology and Criminal Justice.
- 2001: West Yorkshire Police. Professionalising Investigative Practice Accreditation (“PIP 2”).
- 2002. Edexcel and Chartered Management Institute. BTEC Certificate in Management Studies.
- 2005. Leicestershire Police (Quercus). Initial Management of Serious Crime (Supervisors Course) (“IMSC”).
- 2008: Nottinghamshire Police. Qualified Interview Assessor – Crime.
- 2008: College of Policing. Covert Law Enforcement Managers Course (“CLEM”).
- 2009: Regional Crime Training. Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (“HOLMES”) II Managers Course. Regional Crime Training.
- 2012: College of Policing. Kidnap and Extortion SIO.
- 2014: College of Policing. PIP 3 SIO National Accreditation.
- 2014: Regional Crime Training. Family Liaison Coordinator (“FLC”).
- 2015: Regional Crime Training. Child Death SIO and Rapid Response Procedures.

- 2019. SANCUS – London. Professional Standards Directorate (“PSD”) Investigators Course.
 - 2019: College of Policing. Appropriate Authority Course (PSD).
 - 2019: College of Policing. SIO Counter Corruption Course (PSD).
 - 2024: College of Policing. PIP 4 Management of Complex Crime.
 - 2025: College of Policing. Review Officer Course.
10. At the time of the incident, I was the East Midlands Regional Representative on the National Police Chiefs’ Council (“NPCC”) National Homicide Working Group. I sat in other working groups including the Regional Pathology User Group at the University of Leicester, and various Regional Review and Cold Case committees, plus the regional Heads of Crime and Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”) forum.

The Role of Senior Investigating Officer (“SIO”)

11. I commenced my role as SIO for Operation Hendrix at 06:00am on 13 June 2023 after being appointed in the role by Assistant Chief Constable (“ACC”) Griffin who had the role of Gold Commander. I began my SIO policy log at this time, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0008791.
12. My role as SIO was to be the lead investigator for the team, with overall responsibility for the strategic and tactical management of the criminal (and on this occasion potentially terrorist) investigation (policy decision 1, URN: NGPF0008791). I established and set up the major incident room (“MIR”) (policy decision 4), ensuring it was adequately staffed with people with the correct skills and ability to cover key investigative roles (policy decision 5). At the same time, I linked in with Gold Command to ensure delivery on their

wider organisational aims and strategic objectives (policy decisions 3 and 7). Operation Hendrix had been declared both a critical and a major incident (policy decision number 2).

13. I put in place a Casualty Bureau to manage public concerns and deal with the anticipated high volume of calls and surrounding the attacks (Policy decision 8); this process would address public concerns, assist identifying missing persons (potential victims) and establish fast track actions to assist investigators.
14. My enquiry was based on 'the building block' principles which are the cornerstone for all major investigations. These principles are outlined in NPCC (2021) Major Crime Investigation Manual ("MCIM"), which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008898. It provided the framework to operate within and secure objectives, which were; the maintenance of public safety and preservation of life, gathering intelligence (policy decision 14), securing and preserving evidential opportunities (policy decisions 13 and 15) and identifying witnesses (policy decision 17). These would lead to the identification and prosecution of any offender(s).
15. I developed reasonable lines of enquiries based on the MCIM building blocks (URN: NGPF0008898). The process helped me answer a series of hypotheses to understand what had and had not occurred (policy decision 9). Ultimately it was this process that led to the arrest and conviction of the attacker.

16. Evidence obtained from key lines of enquiries would inform my decision-making. As new information entered the MIR, areas of focus would continually be assessed and reassessed to progress the investigation.
17. I recorded my decision making throughout on my policy log (URN: NGPF0008791). They, and all enquiries undertaken, were recorded on the HOLMES computerised system (policy decision 11). The HOLMES reference number for the investigation was 33EM23E50 - E50 (OP HENDRIX).
18. To the best of my ability, the decisions that I made were accompanied with a clear, logical rationale to explain them and the reasonable lines of enquiries thereafter pursued (or not). As a process, this evolved organically alongside the investigation and is easily referenced throughout (policy decision 9).
19. The HOLMES system recorded all the investigative information, data, documents, decisions and enquiry actions undertaken within the investigation; this enables clear and transparent auditing to take place, at any moment in time, within the life-cycle of the enquiry.
20. Operation Hendrix was managed as a fully indexed investigation on HOLMES. I categorised it as a Category A ("Cat A") homicide (policy decision 5) which, for the purpose of command and resourcing, is defined by the MCIM (URN: NGPF0008898) as one which *'is of **grave public concern** or where vulnerable members of the public are at risk; where the identity of the offender(s) is not apparent, or the investigation and the securing of evidence requires **significant resource allocation**'*.

21. This categorisation provided immediate availability of regional resources to establish a fully indexed HOLMES account. This meant that, once established, the HOLMES account would create and show accurate records for all links between all various entities generated by the investigation team. Both a regional HOLMES manager (Lucy Heslin) and a local HOLMES manager (Sharron Hather) were allocated to provide HOLMES oversight and assist with the prioritisation and progression of material through the Major Incident Room (“MIR”).
22. In accordance with convention, the first five documents or D numbers created on HOLMES were key business areas for the investigation. They can be summarised thus:
- D1 – Indexer’s Policy guide.
 - D2 – SIO Policy.
 - D3 – Initial briefing document.
 - D4 – Investigation Management Document
 - D5 – Family Liaison Log
23. In my role as SIO, I placed particular prominence to – D2 SIO Policy Log (URN: NGPF0008791). As SIO I take full responsibility for the conduct of this investigation (policy decision 1) and the decisions made throughout which were recorded in my SIO Policy Log. When I rationalised my decision-making and sought to use the knowledge and experience of other experts, that too would be recorded for investigative transparency. The HOLMES system also enabled my officers and I to fulfil our disclosure obligations as set out within Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (“CPIA”), Part II and associated Code of Practice. My policy decisions

were made in chronological order as to the time and dates the decisions were made.

24. Part of my role was to ensure staff were regularly briefed and debriefed. HOLMES convention document 3 (D3 – initial briefing document) contains details of the Operation Hendrix briefings between 09:30am on 13 June 2023 and 17:00pm on 16 June 2023, and I now refer to this as URN: NGPF0003635.
25. As evidenced in policy decision 10, I appointed Det Insp Claire Gould as a Family Liaison Advisor (“FLA”) to ensure early access to and deployment of Family Liaison Officers (“FLO”s). After the victims were identified, regular family contact through FLOs was established to manage their immediate needs and expectations, at a time when there was a heavy media footprint.
26. I adopted the national Standard Operating Procedures (“SOP”s) that governed the way homicide investigations are undertaken. That included the NPCC (2021) MCIM (URN: NGPF0008898) and also the Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures 2021 (“MIRSAP”), which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008979. To the best of my ability these protocols were followed during what was a highly pressurised, intensive and dynamic situation; whilst these documents provided the framework, I also had to adapt to consider the real possibility of an unfolding terrorist attack, further potential casualties (Op Plato declared), a high number of victims and associated scenes, plus the coordination of local, regional and national resources. In summary, this was a highly complex investigation for which no single manual or checklist existed.

27. Operation Plato is the national police response to a suspected terrorist attack, and is designed to coordinate how the police, other emergency services and partner agencies respond to an incident of that nature.
28. During the first 7 days of this investigation, I worked alongside a Counter Terrorist ("CT") SIO and utilised CT resources alongside the MC team (policy decisions 7 and 27). CT quickly processed intelligence through an intelligence cell to ascertain possible motive behind the attacks and for the maintenance of public safety. They also assisted with actions to secure and preserve evidence. Once ideology was eliminated as a motivational factor behind the attacks, total investigative primacy passed to the MC team.

Relevant prior experience

29. At the time of the attacks, I was an experienced SIO within the East Midlands, having secured national SIO accreditation in 2014. I undertook overall responsibility for this investigation as Head of Homicide and MC investigations within EMSOU.
30. By June 2023 I had detective experience at all ranks (up to Supt) covering all types of criminal investigations, including homicide and kidnap and I had experience in the utilisation of covert policing tactics. During my period as Departmental Head, (March 2023 - May 2025) there were approximately 120 homicide and major crime investigations referred to the MC teams for investigation. I was ultimately accountable for all those investigations and provided varying levels of oversight, direction and personal investigative support to my SIO's to ensure the best possible outcomes were secured.

31. At the time of Operation Hendrix, I had responsibility for 15 SIOs providing homicide oversight across the five East Midland Hubs (Nottinghamshire 4, Lincolnshire 2, Northamptonshire 2, Leicestershire 4 and Derbyshire 3).
32. I retained three of those SIOs within Operation Hendrix to assist with investigations during the early stages. Det Insp Gibson coordinated the oversight of actions surrounding scene 1. Det Insp Smithson coordinated the oversight of actions surrounding scene 2. DCI Dean became my deputy SIO with oversight regarding resourcing. In addition, I also had assistance from both the CT and Serious Collision Investigation Unit (“SCIU”) specialist SIO’s (both Det Insp).
33. Successful MC investigations are a team effort. In the 10-day period post Operation Hendrix the department was also responsible for providing an effective response into the following homicides.
- Operation Aspen - A murder investigation regarding a 47-year-old man, stabbed to death in Leicestershire (date: 15 June 2023).
 - Operation Mill Meadow - A murder investigation into the death of a 21-year-old man, found with his throat cut, dumped in a stream within Derbyshire (date: 23 June 2023).
 - Operation Micro Stone – A murder investigation following the discovery of a partially clothed woman, strangled in a layby close to M1 (date: 23 June 2023).
 - In addition, there were also a number of homicides preceding Operation Hendrix, plus a number of trials that required management and attendance at court. They included another triple homicide in

Nottingham (Operation Hebden where a mother and two young children had been killed by means of arson).

34. The Nottingham attacks had understandably shocked the nation; the public outpouring of grief, locally and nationally, was clear and extensively reported by the media. Expressions of sympathy were personally extended to the affected families by the Prime Minister, Government Ministers and members of the Royal Family (including the King).
35. As departmental head I also witnessed the impact this investigation had on colleagues. I took my responsibility for the resilience and wellbeing for the department seriously (policy decision 57). Whilst Operation Hendrix was adequately resourced throughout (including good support from other agencies), thereafter many EMSOU staff who worked on Operation Hendrix were deployed 'post charge' to other equally challenging and difficult murder investigations (often without adequate rest or recuperation); whilst this did not have a detrimental impact on the Hendrix investigation, or indeed others (convictions were secured), it did impact on colleagues working long hours over several weeks throughout the East Midlands.

Issue 1: Lead up to the attacks on 13 June 2023

36. I had never heard of nor knew anything about Valdo Calocane, (known hereafter as "VC") until the events of Tuesday 13 June 2023.
37. To determine what background enquiries were required or necessary, the first steps were to establish the identity of the attacker(s), whether the attacks were a planned event and, if so, between whom, and whether victimology identified any link between the victims, the locations and the

offender(s). Victimology in this context meant a real-time study of the victims. Following their identification, a pen- picture of their lifestyle could ascertain any relationship or link to the offender(s) or provide potential reasons as to why they were attacked.

38. I progressed the following strategies in an attempt to secure information to answer those questions:

- Policy decision 6: An investigative assessment regarding Victimology: At 08:30 on 13 June 2023 I noted "*I have been informed of the following deaths. This is now a multiple homicide enquiry. Grace O'Malley - Kumar - Ilkeston Road - Incident 1: Barnaby Phillip Webber - Ilkeston Road - Incident 1: Ian Robert Coates - Magdala Road - Incident 2. At this moment in time, all I know is that they have died of multiple stab wounds. I have been informed that an arrest has now been made but as yet I do not know if this is (a) 'lone-wolf' or someone acting in concert with others. As with the incidents being linked, at this time I will retain an open mind and that will be reflected in my hypothesis. In addition there appears to be a stolen van in which a suspect has been arrested that is linked to incidents within the City Centre where indiscriminate acts of criminality (possibly terrorism) have occurred; (victims include) Wayne Birkett (serious injuries) vehicle collision on Milton Street: Marcin Gawronski - Parliament Street: Sharon Miller - Parliament Street: At this moment in time these acts appear to be attempts to cause really serious harm to people indiscriminately. These actions appear to be attempts to murder other individuals. Rationale: Out of this assessment a number of clear lines of enquiry have emerged as fast*

track, namely around victim identification, FLO liaison and scene preservation. A Senior SOCO and CCTV co-ordinator to assist senior officers secure and preserve evidence will be key. This will be addressed during a force-wide and MC briefing that I will chair at 09:00 hours”.

- Policy Decision 11: Main Lines of Enquiry. I recorded at 09:50 hours 13 June 2023 that having conducted a force-wide briefing, key lines of enquiry at that time included (amongst others) *“Intelligence functions (regarding person in custody, their movements, associations, digital, RF/cell site analysis) utilising the SIU: The urgent recovery of identified CCTV covering incidents: Telephony data: Digital strategy: Media management and casualty bureau”*. I recorded the rationale in my policy log as: *“at this time, it is not clear as to exact circumstances. Pursuance of all enquiries will help formalise hypothesis as discussed at policy decision 9. These priorities identified will provide the opportunity to secure available evidence to identify those responsible or eliminate person(s) from the investigation and in doing so bring about an early resolution to the investigation”*.
- Policy Decision 14: Intelligence Management. I recorded at 09:50 hours 13 June 2023 that *“I will liaise with and allocate resources from the SIU to supplement force resources. The rationale being to assist with intelligence collation, analysis and development opportunities (regarding) a complex multiple homicide investigation. In addition, the motive behind the attacks or involvement of others at this time remains unclear. I will be liaising with a CTSIO (Counter Terrorist Senior*

Investigating Officer) to establish whether there could be a wider CT (Counter Terrorist) connection. This would involve the potential handling of sensitive intelligence and as such, wider utilisation of the SIN (Sensitive Intelligence Network) network may be required. In addition, the SIU have access to a wide range of intelligence products that will help me bring about an early resolution to this investigation. This will be key and critical to maintaining public confidence”.

- Policy Decision 15: Technical and Digital support. I logged at 09:50 hours 13 June 23 that *“I will liaise with EMSOU to secure assistance for investigative expertise with regards digital and technical strategies. This is a complex investigation; appointment of experts in this field will assist with securing technical evidence and assist with identification and development of other opportunities around all things digital, various communication devices and telephony. Again, I will be liaising with CT to establish what assistance they can also provide in this area”.*
- Policy Decision 19: Search strategy. At 11:30 hours 13 June 2023 I recorded that PoISA (Police Search Advisors) *“to be consulted regarding search strategy and they are to link in with senior crime scene coordinator (“CSC”) Tess Buxton, TFC (Tactical Firearms Commander) and the MIR so that relevant scenes can be searched in a way that secures evidence but in a way that is cognisant of public and officer safety. Three PoISA's have been allocated to the enquiry. TSG (Tactical Support Group) and CT resources have been allocated to undertake searches. Risk assessments will be carried out by the SIU and they will link in with the silver suite”.* This would ensure *“best management of*

resources so that those with relevant training can provide a sequential approach that is intelligence led so as to secure and preserve evidence in a safe and appropriate manner". I refer to the CoP definition of the role of a CSC as URN: NGPF0008990.

- Policy Decision 21: Key Appointments. At 11:40 on 13 June 2023 I ensured that key appointments of appropriately and skilled personnel were made. In areas relating to the Casualty Bureau - Lucy Heslin, CCTV co-ordination – Detective Constable ("DC") Azif Stevens-Garrib, exhibits - Nick Harris / Darren Mee, PolSA's – Sgt Richard Shaw / Sgt Nick Cobb / Sgt Martyn Toombes, FLA – Det Insp Claire Gould, SIU - Amy Grainger-Matthews, Digital - Lauren Cunnilliffe, Phones / Authorities - Jono Rushen, CT - Chris Brett / Steve Riley. My rationale for doing so was *"to ensure that resources can be deployed appropriately and effectively to secure and preserve evidence. A vast number of resources has been thrown at this investigation, but this must be directed effectively and in accordance with skills sets so that evidence regarding the criminal investigations can be secured"*.

39. At 19:00 hours 13 June 2023 I conducted an evening debriefing to determine the facts uncovered to date. Described as a mature assessment, in policy decision 34 I identified my main lines of enquiry as including amongst others, the *"SIU intelligence picture on the suspect, family and associates...(the) liaison with CT Fusion Cell (regarding) London enquiries and suspect movements to be progressed via SO15"*. I noted how I would *"review previous incidents involving (the) alleged suspect, (and analyse and examine) telephony, data returns and review the digital strategy"*. I logged

my rationale for doing so being that these “*key areas are my main lines of enquiry, a focus upon which will assist me answer hypothesis (in policy decision 9) and concentrate resources in areas that are likely to secure the biggest evidential yield*”.

40. Having set the strategic focus, the enquiries undertaken identified the only suspect as VC, who was responsible for all attacks, and that he had acted alone; investigations surrounding his communications identified relevant contacts and established a picture of his movements prior to the attacks.

a) **Any statements that were taken or interviews carried out regarding VC’s movements before the attacks.**

41. Intelligence analysis and the products generated, identified investigative opportunities that progressed my knowledge of VC’s pre-attack movements. Of relevance were the following documents:

- D19: Offender Profile document completed by CT – VC, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0009000.
- D569 and Z1: Financial Intelligence assessment, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0009009 and financial enquiries for VC, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0000216.
- D623 & D644: Association Charts for VC. I refer to association chart V1 as URN: NGPF0002690 and association chart V2 as URN: NGPF0002712.
- D692: Copy of Officer report from J Lundie (CT Policing) detailing alias for VC. I refer to that officer report as URN: NGPF0008801.

- R19: Copy of Officer report from DC Cronshaw details enquiries with Monzo bank for VC. I refer to that officer report as URN: NGPF0000450.
 - D285: Spreadsheet of transactions made by VC regarding use of Monzo Cards. I refer to that spreadsheet as URN: NGPF0008823.
 - R29: Officers Report from DC Glen Finbow regarding a review of financial intelligence for VC. I refer to that officer report as URN: NGPF0000482.
 - D785: Copy of Police National Database (“PND”) check results for VC. I refer to those PND results as URN: NGPF0008845.
 - D428: Research document re VC submitted by Sarah HARRISON. I refer to that research document as URN: NGPF0008856.
 - D440: Response from His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) re details held on VC. I refer to that response as URN: NGPF0002080.
42. Approximately 8 months before the attacks, VC secured a contract to reside at GRO-B Burford Road, Forest Fields, Nottingham. Enquiries with Monzo Bank (R19, URN: NGPF0008801) established that transferred monies totalling £3,600.00 went from VC into the Metro Bank account of landlord Mr Aruna Jayakody (using references of “Deposit” and GRO-B). A first payment was made on 19 October 2022 (start date) with the last payment made on 28 January 2023 (end date). It is unknown how often VC actually stayed at the address; but the landlord evicted VC from the property on the weekend preceding the attacks. I refer to the action log relating to the enquiry with Aruna Jayakody as URN: NGPF0000393.
43. Cell site analysis undertaken by CT officers for call data attributable to VC’s mobiles VC phone number 3 & VC phone number 7 which I now refer to as URN:

NGPF0008887, also identified [GRO-B] Burford Road, Forest Fields as being VC's 'most likely' home address. Cell site data appeared consistent with use and coverage for the address and the assertion that VC was evicted the weekend before the attacks. Cell site data had VC leaving the property on 11 June 2023 (see below) when both mobile numbers [VC phone number 3] (EE); [VC phone number 7] (Vodafone) travelled to London where they remained overnight until 12 June 2023.

44. Address checks at [GRO-B] Burford Road led officers to interview former housemate Akhil [GRO-B] who described VC as a loner, distant and never speaking unless spoken to (only then providing short response answers). I refer to the statement of Akhil [GRO-B] as URN: NGPF0002383.
45. On Sunday 11 June 2023, Akhil [GRO-B] saw VC using his laptop. He was researching for new accommodation on a website. He asked of Akhil "Bro, do any of your friends have any spare rooms?". Akhil stated this was the first time VC had spoken to him in any meaningful way. Akhil stated he would ask, when, in reality, his concerns regarding VC's suitability were such that he had no real intention of doing so. He would not ask privately as requested. Before the attacks (and departure to London), VC had given Akhil property to look after; this included a wet stone knife sharpener. The statement of PC 3825 Daniel Vasper, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0002455, outlined its subsequent recovery following the police search at [GRO-B] Burford Road on 16 June 2023. Officers recovered a holdall (exhibit DAV/1001) containing items, including the wet stone sharpener

(exhibit DAV/1002). I refer to the search record relating to [GRO-B] Burford Road as URN: NGPF0008920.

46. Enquiries with Iulian [GRO-B] another flat resident at [GRO-B] Burford Road, outlined how on 9 June 2023 he took a call from the property landlord and at his request passed his phone to VC. The landlord's personal attempts to contact VC had failed. Using Iulian's phone, he informed VC that he had to return his keys and leave the flat by Sunday 11 June 2023. VC refused to continue the call, stating he would speak to the landlord personally later. Call data does not suggest this call took place. I refer to the translated English statement of Iulian [GRO-B] as URN: NGPF0002460. I refer to the statement in Iulian's native language as URN: NGPF0002461.

47. The telephone product secured will be separately outlined in the section 'telephone contact, content of messages and cell site analysis'. This line of enquiry proved crucial in identifying potential witnesses. As I recorded in my policy log (policy decision 41) at 15:00 hours 15 June 2023, that Fast Track ("FT") actions following billing enquiries undertaken were to include interviewing the *"FT of brother Elias Calocane, FT Ali Parvez (warehouse incident in May - Leicester), FT (enquiries) movements to London and Nottingham (cell site - see Policy 42), FT mother of suspect, FT father Amasaio (gets a call from suspect & says to dad tell mum not to contact me. If I go to hospital don't see me).... FT Sister [GRO-B] FT friend - Bill Monteiro"*. I recorded my rationale for doing so as one where *"detailed telephone analysis identified recent communications in the run up to the attacks. VC had contacted Elias Calocane (brother), his parents and Bil Monteiro (fellow Guinea-Bissau national). With VC identified as the sole*

attacker, plus the absence of evidence surrounding ideological cause or wider conspiracy, I regard all these individuals as significant witnesses”.

48. At 19:00 hours on 15 June 2023, I further recorded within my policy log (policy decision 47) that Bil Monteiro was to be seen with high priority as a significant witness (“Sig Wit”) with a statement taken from him by officers in London. I recorded my lengthy rationale for doing so as *“I am not in possession of any material that is suggestive that BM is involved in any criminality in relation to this investigation. The mobile provided by the suspects brother (Elias) [VC phone number 3] from the SIU, I know that this number now subscribes to VC, [GRO-B] Sneinton Dale and is in contact with Bil Monteiro, Elias Calocane (brother) and Celeste Calocane (mother). These are all key witnesses in terms of potential disclosures made. This number is consistent with CCTV (and) travel by the DP (detained person) to London prior to the murders (travelling from Nottingham to London on 11 June 2023). Cell site data suggests the number stayed in the Romford area from 17:03hrs to 23:48hrs (no data to confirm as yet but potentially DP stayed overnight). The phone is inactive on 12 June 2023 apart from at 09:47 – 10:14hrs in the Lewisham area – adjacent to both Cost cutters and a linked address for Bil Monteiro [GRO-B] Fordel Rd). Re Cost cutters, a phone number found on the back of the Cost cutter receipt taken from the DP, (number) [VC phone number 7] also has significant movement. [VC phone number 7] is first active on the networks at 15:05hrs, also cell siting on a mast less than 100 metres from Cost cutter (receipt venue) – reinforcing the idea that he has just purchased the SIM noted thereon. [VC phone number 7] then remains in the Lewisham area until 19:00hrs – in vicinity of Bil Monteiro’s linked address at [GRO-B] Fordel Rd SE6 1XS. Whilst*

in this area, [VC phone number] makes its sole communication – sending a text message to **GRO-B** before the DP catches the 21:35 hrs St Pancras – Nottingham train, arriving (late) into Nottingham at approximately 23:15hrs.

[VC phoen number 7] is the only number that remains active on the network during this journey. The last available cell site at 04:50hrs on 13/06/2023 places one of his phones on a mast in the vicinity of scene 2 at Magdala Rd (the time when Ian Coates is murdered). All this information infers a visit perhaps to Monteiro and others during the weekend leading up to the homicides in London. The SIU inform me that two messages from Monteiro are received during this time. In addition, we know there was contact with family members. They remain witnesses as nothing exists to suggest otherwise. But clearly these individuals have information of interest”.

49. To understand the status of Bil Monteiro within the enquiry, on 15 June 2023 the SIU were tasked to undertake an intelligence review of Monteiro (D229) with assistance provided by CT. The findings would have been completed and shared with myself to assist my decision making. I now refer to that completed review (D229) as URN: NGPF0001671.
50. First, a PNC police report (D1092) for Bil Montiero was completed at 09:25 hours 15 June 2023. I now refer to this PC report as URN: NGPF0005989. The report outlines his conviction regarding an assault with intent to resist arrest dated March 2020 (North Essex Magistrates Court dated 13 September 2021).
51. At 12:45 hours 15 June 2023, electronic messages (33EM405, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0010186) between DS Laura Alexander (CT) to

myself, CT SIO Det Insp Chris Brett, the Fusion Cell and other colleagues confirmed how the *"information from the SIU in relation to CycComms work completed on the suspects number....had identified the individual below - Monteiro. As discussed.....the following actions have been identified before we attend this address to confirm whether we treat MONTEIRO as a witness or a suspect; * Wait for POI- being completed by SIU. * Request top 10 contacts from MONTEIRO phone. * Confirm whether MONTEIRO has had any contact with family members of suspect. Once complete, I will come back to you to confirm decision in relation to contact with MONTEIRO"*.

52. On 15 June 2023 analyst Jono Rushen provided his written analytical report of call data for telephone number VC phone number 3 (VC mobile) and contact with Monteiro (URN: NGPF0009012). This followed up previous taskings where, post analysis, he concluded in his written recommendations regarding Bil Monteiro that *'as before, speak to Monteiro as a Sig wit'*.
53. As with the telephone investigations (D202, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0010187, and URN: NGPF0009012), the intelligence report received from the SIU (URN: NGPF0001671) identified nothing of substance regarding Bil Monteiro to impact either the investigation or suggest he was anything other than a witness regarding VC's movements and actions.
54. This information was therefore fully known to me at some time before 19:00 hours 15 June 2023, when I make the clear policy entry (policy decision 47, as detailed above in paragraph 48) that Bil Monteiro will be a significant witness.

55. The HOLMES account highlights on 16 June 2023 a request for witness enquiries by SO15 officers regarding Bil Montiero was made. On 17 June 2023, Bil Monteiro provided those officers with his significant witness statement, itself audio recorded, along with screenshots regarding his WhatsApp conversations and two voice note recordings with VC. On 19 June 2023, Monteiro met police officers at **GRO-B** Fordel Road and consented to officers undertaking a search of his property (policy decision 62) (S127 – URN: NGPF0002389). This is discussed further in paragraph 136.
56. On 17 June 2023, a statement was taken from Bil Monteiro, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0002282. It outlined VC's contact and visit to London to visit him between 11 to 12 June 2023. His account was taken as a 'Sig Wit' which resulted in the officer taking a video recording of Bil Monteiro's account. I refer to the 'Sig Wit' recording as URN: **NGPF0009221R**. I refer to the transcript of that 'Sig Wit' recording as URN: NGPF0008965.
57. During that video recording, Monteiro provided DC Kathleen Brennan, Metropolitan ("MET") police officer (SO15) with a series of screenshots regarding WhatsApp conversations and voice notes, which were exchanged between him and VC, and were written in Portuguese, as follows:
- KBM/03 Screenshot of WhatsApp conversation with Valdo #1, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001831.
 - KBM/04 Screenshot of WhatsApp conversation with Valdo #2, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001832.

- KBM/05 Screenshot of WhatsApp conversation with Valdo #3, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001817.
 - KBM/06 Screenshot of WhatsApp conversation with Valdo #4, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001819.
 - KBM/07 Screenshot of WhatsApp conversation with Valdo #5, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001820.
 - KBM/08 Screenshot of WhatsApp conversation with Valdo #6, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001826.
 - KBM/09 Screenshot of WhatsApp conversation with Valdo #7, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001828.
 - KBM/10 Screenshot of WhatsApp conversation with Valdo #8, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001829.
 - KBM/11 Screenshot of WhatsApp conversation with Valdo #9, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001830.
58. DC Brennan's examination also identified two voice notes which were secured and produced as police exhibit KBM/12. I now refer to the one recording of two voice notes as URN: NGPF0001815. I refer to the statement of DC Brennan as URN: NGPF0008977.
59. On 26 June 2023, Bil Monteiro identified some keys (exhibits NJB/5 and NJB/6), which were taken from VC on his arrest. I refer to the statement of Bil Monterio identifying the keys as URN: NGPF0002283. When shown them by officers, Monteiro identified them as his. PC Andrew Reid checked and found the keys did fit the locks at  Fordel Road. I refer to the statement of PC Reid as URN: NGPF0002389. These actions were

completely consistent with Bil Montiero's account and the telephone content sent (and recovered) between both parties.

60. The messages in Portuguese obtained by DC Brennan were translated by Ms Paula Carvalho. I refer to the statement of Paula Carvalho as URN: NGPF0002778. The translations into English (exhibits PC1 to PC10) were combined into one document which I refer to as URN: NGPF0008982.
61. Bil Montiero's testimony was corroborated not just by the WhatsApp communications and telephony. Accounts provided by other witnesses including Bil's partner Innocencii Sucuma, his cousin Herickson Monteiro, his uncle Carlos Monteiro and his wife Laruna Tivana corroborated the general account of Monteiro and the movements for VC regarding his attendance at the BBQ (see detailed analysis below in issue 2: The Slazenger Bag, where these accounts are covered in paragraphs 180 to 192). I refer to the statement of Innocencii Sucuma as URN: NGPF0008983. I refer to the statement of Herickson Monterio as URN: NGPF0008984. I refer to the statement of Carlos Monterio as URN: NGPF0008985. I refer to the action record in relation to making contact with Laurinda Tivana as URN: NGPF0003818.
62. Statements were also secured from VC's brother Elias, who helped investigators with enquiries, providing details of the communications between him and VC in his first statement. I refer to the first statement of Elias Calocane as URN: NGPF0008987. He outlined the calls VC made to him both the day before and the day of the attack. In his second statement, Elias corrected a telephone number he provided in URN: NGPF0008987. I

refer to the second statement of Elias Calocane as URN: NGPF0008988.
These matters are covered further in paragraphs 198 to 200.

63. Following contact, Elias remained concerned for his brother's well-being: he contacted his mother and attempted to re-contact VC both by WhatsApp and direct calls. Calls at 05.10 hours, 06.59 hours, and 08.12 hours from both VC's mother and brother went unanswered by VC. Elias checked Twitter for the news when at 09.40 hours he saw a newsflash from Nottinghamshire Police. From the descriptions given, Elias believed it was his brother who had been arrested so he rang the police (subsequently corroborating the telephony analysis undertaken by officers).
64. Elias referenced his brother's history of mental health (dating back to 2020) and his delusional belief that he was being listened to by MI6. The content of the telephone calls listed plus the zip file sent by e-mail by VC to Elias (described later), certainly fitted that pattern of mental health history as described by Elias. I refer to the email Elias received from VC as URN: NGPF0004065. I refer to the zip file sent to Elias on that email (Police exhibit EAMC1) as URN: NGPF0000127.
65. On 14 June 2023 detectives interviewed Celeste Calocane (VC's mother), Amissao Calocane (VC's father) and **GRO-B** Calocane (VC's sister) at the family address in Wales. I refer to the action record relating to contact with Celeste as URN: NGPF0000126. I refer to the action record relating to contacting Amissao as URN: NGPF0003735. Collectively they outlined their concerns about VC's history of mental health but knew nothing about his current movements. They did not know his current GP details and

suspected he was unregistered due to the 'lack of trust' he held regarding authorities. The family stated VC's paranoia regarding the government led to him shutting them out, in his warped view, to protect the family. Such was VC's paranoia that the family stated VC would rent two flats due to his beliefs regarding government surveillance. They confirmed VC heard voices in his head but claimed it was a 'government controlled high-tech voice' telling him his mother was under threat. I refer to the officer report of DC De Waele, who details the outcome of these enquiries as URN: NGPF0008993.

66. The family believed this was the perverse reason why at university VC broke into another student's flat (in his mind to protect his mother). VC would not give his family his address(es), though his mother stated she was aware of one address at 48 Salisbury Street Flat 2, Nottingham (searched but negative). The family outlined VC's lack of friends and stated that when he left home he initially went to Birmingham. They did not know anything about his Birmingham life and thought he was moving to Newcastle before eventually attending University in Nottingham to study Mechanical Engineering in 2018, subsequently graduating in 2022. I refer to incident log 0264_130623, on which the search of Flat 2, 48 Salisbury Street is recorded as URN: NGPF0008994.
67. VC's family mentioned altercations between VC and other students which led to VC's sectioning in September 2021. The family were never aware of any weapons and stated VC never took drugs or alcohol. VC's father confirmed (supporting the statement provided by Elias) that he received a

telephone call from his son at 22.52 hours Monday 12 June 2023 (as below).

68. On 13 June 2023 a statement was obtained from Ali Parvez, an employee at Sky Recruitment, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0002310. Parvez provided information regarding the call identified from billing on 9 June 2023. In that call, VC demanded that all records and identification relating to him be cleared. Mr Parvez provided details surrounding the alleged assault by VC on fellow employees **GRO-B**. The allegation resulted in his dismissal from Avarto Warehouse on 5 May 2023. Mr Parvez also provided a copy of VC's proof of identity which was an image of VC's passport, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0002205.
69. Statements were taken from **GRO-B** regarding that alleged assault. I refer to the Romanian version of **GRO-B** statement as URN: NGPF0002259. I refer to the translated English version of **GRO-B** statement as URN: NGPF0002258. I refer to the Romanian version of **GRO-B** statement as URN: NGPF0002257. I refer to the translated English version of **GRO-B** statement as URN: NGPF0002256. These statements confirmed that VC was recruited via Sky Recruitment Agency to work at Arvato warehouse, Keyworth, between 28 April 2023 to 5 May 2023 and therefore local to the East Midlands. This Leicester aspect is currently subject to an investigation by the Independent Office for Police Conduct ("IOPC"). I refer to the officer report of DC Robertson confirming dates of VC's employment as URN: NGPF0000443.

70. On 18 August 2023 Avarto Warehouse was again visited by officers, this time to establish witnesses to the assaults. I refer to the officer's report regards that enquiry as URN: NGPF0003746.
71. With VC, Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar all current or recent students at the University of Nottingham, enquiries were naturally undertaken there. The statement of Dr Donald Giddings details interactions with VC, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0002854. Dr Giddings recounts an email from Celeste Calocane concerning her son's mental health. He outlined subsequent actions regarding VC's welfare and academic progression. Dr Alastair Campbell-Ritchie, Assistant Professor at University of Nottingham, also described University contact/dealings with VC who achieved a 2:1 in his BEng degree on 7 July 2022. This date appeared to be the last contact the university had with VC. I refer to the statement of Dr Campbell-Ritchie as URN: NGPF0002775.
72. Other than to reaffirm the belief that VC and the attack victims were not known to each other, plus the provision of a mobile number, university enquiries did not progress matters regarding pre-attack movements.

b. Any telephone contact, content of messages and cell site analysis.

73. Cell site data, intelligence and telephony products identified many investigative opportunities. Of relevance are the following documents, several of which outline the relevant data extrapolation, messages and material that was secured and the key lines of enquiry that naturally followed:

- D683: An Op Alcanian Timeline (marked sensitive by Counter Terrorism Police North East (“CTPNE”) analysts Andy Dyson and Joe Pringle. I refer to the Op Alcanian timeline as URN: NGPF0009006.
- D191: C Boulby Review log re exhibit JR/11 extraction 2 (Op Alcanian). I refer to C Boulby’s review log as URN: NGPF0001493.
- D256 / D251: phone extraction material, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0009008.
- D705: Analytical Report for cell site analysis for [VC phone number 3] & [VC phone number 7] (URN: NGPF0008887).
- KPR/14: Full extraction report of police exhibit JR/11 which I refer to as URN: [REDACTED]
- KPR/15: Timeline (11/06/2023 – 13/06/2023) download report (Excel and PDF versions) of police exhibit JR/11. I refer to the timeline download reports (Excel and PDF) as URN: NGPF0003002 and URN: NGPF0008789.
- KPR/6: (D661) – Review document for police exhibit JR/10 – SIM card from VC. I refer to this review document as URN: NGPF0002732.
- KPR/16: (D761) - Review of timeline extraction report for police exhibit JR/11. I refer to this review as URN: NGPF0003001.
- D268: Analyst report of Rushen re call data for [Bil Monteiro Mobile] Bil MONTEIRO. I refer to this analyst report as URN: NGPF0009012.
- Z7: 15 June 2023 CT Intel report. [Bil Monteiro Mobile] linked to Bil MONTEIRO related to His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (“HMPPS”). I refer to this intel report as URN: NGPF0000222.

- D133: Analysis report of call data re tel no [VC phone number 2] I refer to this analyst report as URN: NGPF0009014.
- D289: Analyst report of Rushen re call data for [VC phone number 3] I refer to this analyst report as URN: NGPF0009015.
- D701: Copy of CT investigation report VC III V1. I refer to VC investigation report III V1 as URN: NGPF0009016.
- D595: Copy JAR/30072023 – Mobile phone draft exhibit sequence of events (“SOE”) for VC. I refer to this as URN: NGPF0002374.
- D779: Copy JAR1.2 - Attribution of [VC phone number 3] I refer to that attribution report as URN: NGPF0003021.
- D639: Copy of Timeline of events Version 2 created by East Midlands CTU. I refer to the Copy of Timeline of events Version 2 created by East Midlands CTU as URN: NGPF0009020.
- D711: Copy of timeline V6. I refer to copy of timeline V6 as URN: NGPF0002941.
- D774: Digital device strategy: DC Rowbotham, which now I refer to as URN: NGPF0009022.

74. During the course of his interview on 17 June 2023, Bil Montiero volunteered to DC Brennan the intermittent WhatsApp communications between him and VC, covering the period 25 April to 14 June 2023. The officer secured screen captures of that material when video recording Monteiro's evidence, as detailed above at paragraph 57.

75. Interpreter Paula Carvalho (S 174) (URN: NGPF0002778) translated those messages from Portuguese to English (original police exhibits PC1 to

PC10), which were produced in a single document (URN: NGPF0008982). The translated messages in URN: NGPF0008982 are listed below, cross-referenced with their original exhibit numbers. The English translation for each communicator is colour coded (VC / BM) and listed within the respective exhibit.

- Exhibit KBM-03 / PC1 (URN: NGPF0001831)

Date of communication: 25 April 2023

VC (11:11 hours): So, bro how are you?

BM (11:12): Cool bro and how are you.

VC (11:15) Yeah okay

VC (11:16) What's the news?

Date of communication: 26 April 2023

BM (08:31): In response to VC phone number 3 Yeah, okay (reply)

Good me too. Bro. I'm fine too thanks.

VC (13:30): Cool

VC (13:30): When are you coming back here?

Date of communication: 30 April 2023

VC (19:07) What are you up to on the bank holiday?

- Exhibit KBM-04 / PC 2 (URN: NGPF0001832)

Date of communication: 1 May 2023

BM (11:53): In response to VC phone number 3: When are you coming back here? (reply) I am not going to live there anymore

BM (11:53): In response to VC phone number 3: What are you up to on the bank holiday ? (reply) I'm just home today and you

VC (12:01): I'm going out with some friends

VC (12:01): Are you still in London?

BM (12:07): In response to VC phone number 3 I'm going out with some friends (reply) Hey man, I hope you enjoy it yeah

BM (12:07) But is there a party over there today

BM (12:08): In response to VC phone number 3 : Are you still in London?
(reply) Yeah bro now I live here

- Exhibit KBM-05 / PC3 (URN: NGPF0001817)

VC (12:14): We are going to a few places first, but even that, people want to arrange it later

VC (12:14): Yeah, I was in London a few days ago

VC (12:15): Do you like the place?

BM (12:27): Yeah, I see

BM (12:27): Yeah, my family is here

VC (12:41): Nice. Yeah, I may go there again. Maybe we can arrange and meet up.

BM (17:38): In response to VC phone number 3 : Nice. Yeah, I may go there again. Maybe we can arrange and meet up (reply) Yeah, believe me bro just give me a ring

BM (17:39): You already know how it is

Date of communication: 10 May 2023

VC (10:49): Yeah bro, I may go there this weekend.

- Exhibit KBM-06 / PC 4 (URN: NGPF0001819)

BM (11:20): Yeah bro, it's okay give me a ring

Date of communication: 1 June 2023

VC (18:06): Yeah bro, I may go there

VC (18:40): When you can call me

Date of communication: 2 June 2023

BM Missed voice call at 10:56 from VC

Date of communication: 5 June 2023

VC (12:06): Hello Bill

Date of communication: 7 June 2023

VC (10:46): Hey fella

BM Missed voice call at 12:31 from VC

- Exhibit KBM-07 / PC 5 (URN: NGPF0001820)

Date of communication: 8 June 2023

BM Missed voice call at 18:35 from VC

Date of communication: 9 June 2023

BM (10:34): Yoo

VC (10:34): How are you?

BM (10:35): Yeah, I am okay bro and you

BM (10:35): I had travelled.

BM (10:35): Are you still in London

VC (10:36): I'll pass by

VC (10:36): Who are you there with?

BM (10:37): I'm with my lady

BM (10:38): When will you pass by

VC (10:42): I'll see when it's possible

VC (10:42): Listen, your uncle still where he was?

- Exhibit KBM-08 / PC 6 (URN: NGPF0001826)

BM (10:45): I am not sure where he lives but he is in Nottingham

BM (10:46): Look for him on face

BM (10:46): Marcelo Monteiro

VC (10:49): Have you got the number

VC (11:04): ?

BM (13:18): I don't have the number

BM (13:18): **GRO-B**

BM (13:18): It's there

VC (13:20): Okay. Listen, do you know someone who can accommodate me for a few days??

Date of communication: 10 June 2023

VC (11:23): What is the address?

BM (11:48): **GRO-B** Fordel Road Lewisham

- Exhibit KBM-09 / PC 7 (URN: NGPF0001828)

BM (11:50): SE6 1XS

Date of communication: Sunday 11 June 2023

VC (10:50): Can you contact your uncle?

VC (11:50): I tried but I can't

VC (11:53): No worries

BM (11:55): **GRO-B**

BM (11:55): Romford

- Exhibit KBM-10 / PC 8 (URN: NGPF0001829)

VC (12:09): Okay fella

BM (14:37): Tell me when you here

VC (19:51): I'm here but no one's here

BM Missed voice call at 19:56 from VC

Date of communication: Monday 12 June 2023

BM (01:14): Yoo valdo can you pass my vape there

BM Missed voice call at 11:38 from VC

BM (11:38): Can't talk now. What's up ?

VC (11:39): You called

BM Missed voice call at 18:56 from VC

BM (19:23): Yoo

BM (19:23): So man

VC (21:49): I will send it by post

- Exhibit KBM-11 / PC 9 (URN: NGPF0001830)

VC (21:49): Couldn't do it

BM (22:16): Okay bro but don't forget to do it

Date of communication: Wednesday 14 June 2023

BM (13:13): Leaves VC a voice message (KBM / 12)

BM (13:15): Give me your number

- Exhibit KBM-12 / PC 10 (URN: NGPF0001815)

Transcript of 47 second voice message sent by BM to VC on 14 June 2023 at 13:13 hours:

BM: Oh! I also tried calling since yesterday but this number is not going through, I don't know why. BM: (incomprehensible), I really want to talk to you. Send me your normal number. I will call you on WhatsApp, on mobile WhatsApp. I really want to talk to you... really because I want to go to that house there, see what's going on there. See what happened and what didn't happen. What's more, you're telling me one thing at a time. If this turns into a police case... Bro! I'm

going, I'm going... I'm going... I'm going to hand you over. Well, I won't lie to you. You can't get me into trouble, leave like that and think "yeah, it's ok man." When you see this message, give me a ring, man. And send me your normal number so that we can talk properly. I have to know what's going on there, man. I trusted you at my home, man! I trusted you at my home and you took my key and left with it. You got into trouble with my neighbour and now I'm here (incomprehensible) "Waiting for you bro. Come on man!"

76. Telephone billing applications were made to secure data for mobile telephone numbers being attributed to VC. The billing data received would be examined to identify contact and movements for VC. The appointed telecoms liaison officer ("TLO") DC Kelly Rowbotham, was tasked to undertake a time specific review of downloaded data, concentrating on the time period covering the date of the offence, plus two days preceding the attack (between 11/06/2023 – 13/06/2023). DC Rowbotham produced a number of documents in connection with those reviews as detailed in her statement dated 9 September 2023 which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002398.
77. VC's arrest led to the recovery and search of his rucksack (police exhibit JR/9). Found within was his Motorola Moto G(9) Play mobile device: IMEI 35554111119090 (police exhibit JR/11). Examination of his phone JR/11 provided further opportunities to establish VC's movements.

78. Handset (police exhibit JR/11) was a dual SIM device which when recovered contained two SIM cards: an EE SIM card and a Vodafone SIM card.
79. The handset and SIMS were subject of an extraction. The extraction report (D761 - URN: NGPF0003001), from handset JR/11 confirmed the two SIMS found inside the handset related to phone numbers which were most pertinent to the investigation: the Vodafone number, **VC phone number 7** and the EE number, **VC phone number 3**. Details of the extraction are documented in DC 653 Rowbotham's statement dated 9 September 2023 (URN: NGPF0002398).
80. Call data records were requested for both the phone numbers which confirmed that both numbers were in use at the material times.
81. Cell site analysis for **VC phone number 3** outlined travel to London, leaving Nottingham Sunday 11 June 2023 at or before 13:19 hours, arriving in London at or before 15:52 hours. Between 15:00 to 17:00 hours (times cannot be more specific) this number connected to various public Wi-Fi networks including Burger King, McDonalds, O2 Wi-Fi and BT Wi-Fi within the capital.
82. At 15:44 hours two pictures were taken on device JR/11 regarding maps for London Public Transport. Throughout the afternoon and into the evening, VC continued to visit London map applications. At 20:57 hours a standard network (SMS) message was sent from this number to Bil Monteiro in Portuguese (translation: '*Send a text that you arrive. I don't have Wi-Fi*'). – in KPR/16 D761 (URN: NGPF0003001).

83. At 23:48:04 hours on 11 June 2023 the Motorola handset is turned off and not powered on again until 09:34:13 hours on Monday 12 June 2023. When powered on, it received notification regarding a missed call from telephone number [Bil Monteiro Mobile] (Bil Monteiro). At 13:02 hours on 12 June 2023, a series of further photographs were taken regarding London public transport journeys.
84. Between 15:05:10 – 19:17:24 hours, the IMSI 234159565516575 associated with VC's Motorola mobile device JR/11 had the SIM regarding mobile: [VC phone number?] inserted into SIM slot 2 for the first time.
85. Call data records confirm the number [VC phone number?] was used from 15:05:10 – 19:17:24 hours. It was re-inserted at 21:44:36 hours into SIM Slot 1 (from where it was subsequently recovered, post arrest).
86. Between 15:07 – 16:58 hours on 12 June 2023 there occurred a series of phone calls and text messages to Vodafone from [VC phone number?]. It was also confirmed (corroborated by CCTV) that at 14:52 hours on Monday 12 June 2023 VC purchased a £10 Vodafone top-up credit for [VC phone number?] from a newsagent in Catford, SE6 4BD. CCTV is discussed in more detail at various points later in this statement.
87. Between 20:03 and 21:44 hours on 12 June 2023 the handset device JR/11 was turned on and off 3 times.
88. Between 23:00 hours 12 June 2023 – 05:00 hours on 13 June 2023, the device [VC phone number?] connected to the East Midlands Railway Wi-Fi. This was consistent with VC's train travel back to Nottingham from London, arriving back at 23:23 hours 12 June 2023. VC then undertook a Google Search on

Play Store for 'file manager' before sending at 23:52 hours the email (zip file) from his Gmail account: **VC email address 2** to his brother Elias.

89. At 00:40 hours 13 June 2023 VC visited a map application before his Motorola device was again turned off at 00:44 hours (for approximately 40 minutes). It was turned back on at 01:24 hours on 13 June 2023.
90. At 02:50 hours on 13 June 2023 VC received further network messages from Vodafone regarding SIM swapping. From call data records, the SIM relating to a third number **VC phone number 2** was inserted into the Motorola handset (SIM Slot 2 position) at 02:50:12 hours, for 22 seconds.
91. The SIM card for **VC phone number 2** was recovered from VC's custody property at the Nottingham Custody Suit following his arrest. The Vodafone SIM card for telephone number **VC phone number 2** (Police exhibit NJB/12) had a SIM card review undertaken but this offered no further assistance. I refer to the document relating to the review of this SIM card as URN: NGPF0002968.
92. Analyst Jono Rushen provided analysis for the number **VC phone number 2**, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0009025. On Sunday 11 June 2023, **VC phone number 2** also travelled from Nottingham to London via train (cell site data suggesting a route following the train lines not the M1). Cell site data shows that number in the area of Nottingham Train Station at or before 12:46 hours (or before 13:12:11 hours if including GPRS - general packet radio services) later being in the area of Kings Cross / Blackfriars Train Station between 15:05 hours – 16:05 hours on 11 June 2023.
93. GPRS, also referred to as mobile data sessions, relate to data being sent to or from a mobile device such as a phone. This does not always require

the user to take any action or be using the device. The device just needs to be switched on, and capable of connecting to a mast.

94. Remaining cell site data for the 11 June 2023 places the phone [VC phone number 2] in and around the Romford and Dagenham areas between 18:05 – 20:57 hours. At 20:57:08 hours, [VC phone number 2] attempted (unsuccessfully) to send a text message to mobile [Bil Monteiro Mobile] (Bil Monteiro). Later that evening VC's phone co-locates with Monteiro's indicating they met up.
95. On 12 June 2023 the number remained in south London, specifically the Catford area. However, no cell site data for [VC phone number 2] exists from 15:33 hours on 12 June 2023 until 02:50 hours on 13 June 2023, when that SIM / Phone went 'live' once more within the Radford Area of Nottingham. This is documented in analyst report URN: NGPF0009025.
96. At 02:51:22 hours Tuesday 13 June 2023, the EE SIM card for the telephone number [VC phone number 3] was again placed into SIM Slot 2 for use within the Motorola handset (where it was later recovered).
97. Having re-inserted the SIM card [VC phone number 3], further missed notifications were sent regarding missed loan payments, plus another missed call notification regarding number [Bil Monteiro Mobile] (Bil Monteiro). At 02:52 hours [VC phone number 3] a search is made in the Google Play Store for 'wjatsapp', likely typo for 'WhatsApp. At 02:56 hours [VC phone number 3]), VC received a call from the generic number attributed to WhatsApp (most likely for device verification).
98. At 03:03 hours 13 June 2023, the Motorola handset device that had utilised all the above numbers was turned off for approximately 1 hour and 44

minutes. It was turned back on at 04:47 hours, after the attacks on Ilkeston Road.

99. Undertaking the challenging Cell Site and telephony examinations underpinned numerous strategies and enquiries. Specific to telephony, I recorded in my policy log (policy decision 42, URN: NGPF0008791) at 15:00 hours 15 June 2023 that *"SO15 (were) to undertake CCTV enquiries in London on behalf of the investigation team. Tasking will take place via the CT contact"*. I recorded the rationale for doing so *"based on telephony and investigative work, I know from the SIU that the suspect phone travels from Nottingham to London on 11 June 2023: Departs Nottingham approximately 13:00hrs. Thereafter cell site around Nottingham Train Station at or before 12:46hrs – at or before 13:12:11hrs (all GPRS sessions). Arrives in London approximately 16:00hrs. On Monday 12/06/2023 [VC phone number 2] remains in south London, specifically in the Catford area. Close proximity of cost cutter receipt / top up site. Thereafter 13/06/2023---No cell site for [VC phone number 2] from 15:33:48hrs on 12/06/2023 until 02:50:12hrs on 13/06/2023. Phone is now siting in Radford area of Notts. There are clear CCTV opportunities which will be passed to CT colleagues"*.
100. At 19:00 hours 15 June 2023, I also recorded in my policy log (policy decision 48) my considerations surrounding priority actions which included the requirement if necessary to secure production / preservation orders to secure the contact information between Bil Monteiro and VC. I note within my rationale that the TLO should *"apply for a production order re [VC phone number 3] (to enable access to the EE text messages. The suspect receives 3 texts from*

the number associated with Bil Monteiro in the 24 hours preceding the murders".

101. Messages were subsequently obtained by officers and are covered elsewhere within this statement.
102. Recognising the continued importance of intelligence and telephone strategies, (policy decision 64) I recorded at 09:00 hours 20 June 2023 my decision *"to continue work with CT colleagues and (to) utilise their digital and intelligence expertise; DI (Detective Inspector) Chris Brett (to) continue to coordinate staff in the East Midlands, London and North East regions around intelligence development activities (Fusion Cell) to secure and preserve material going forward for intelligence / evidence / disclosure purposes. Assurances provided (regarding) Digital, Intel and outside enquiry support around the country If required"*.
103. The telephony and intelligence analysis regarding the different aspects of VC's life was pictorially represented by the CT fusion team in a single page association chart (URN: NGPF0002712), including mobile numbers and social media accounts that provided a useful oversight and quick reference guide.
104. CT resources undertook open-source research (URN: NGPF0009016) and reviewed VC's use of Snapchat and WhatsApp accounts associated with numbers VC phone number 2 and VC phone number 3 respectively. Analysis established Google, Github, Duolingo and Skype accounts, again associated to the email: **VC email address 2** Other than the e-mail sent to Elias Calocane at

23:52 hours 12 June 2023, these enquiries did not provide relevant material regarding movements or progression of the homicide investigation.

105. Further commentary regarding cell site and telephony work was undertaken when addressing Issue 2: Searches regarding the Slazenger bag and titled section 'relevant telephone contact, message content and cell site analysis' and can be cross referenced there.
106. Regarding communication content, shortly after 19:00 hours on Monday 12 June 2023, VC phoned his brother Elias on WhatsApp. In a call lasting approximately 45 minutes, VC told his brother '*This is the last time I will talk to you. After this I will leave you alone*'; he told his brother '*Disassociate yourself from me. If anything happens don't come and see me in hospital*'. VC further stated "*This is not mental illness, I am fine. I'm not ill but there is 2-way communication and 24/7 voices in my head, they are intelligent people, and they are making threats*" ... "*I will send you the files that I sent to Mum and dad at Christmas, I know what is happening is real*".
107. At 23:52 hours Monday 12 June 2023, VC sent an email (URN: NGPF0004065) to his brother – containing police exhibit EAMC1 (URN: NGPF0000127). At that time VC was in the locality of Nottingham Train Station (corroborated by CCTV). The email contained a zip file with approximately 1400 documents. The review of those contents is again covered in the section titled: 'Slazenger bag - relevant telephone contact, content of messages and cell site analysis'. Other than the time, date and location for VC when that e-mail was sent, the zip file (URN:

NGPF0000127) content did not progress the homicide investigation (outside of matters pertaining to VC's state of mind).

108. Around the same time (22:52 hours) on Monday 12 June 2023, Amissao Calocane (father) received a call from VC (as detailed in URN: NGPF0008993). He had only one number for his son VC phone number 3. During that call VC instructed his father to tell his mother not to contact him and that if he were to end up in hospital, neither parent should attempt to visit or contact him. He provided no indication as to his intentions and provided no location details. Amissao attempted polite conversation; he asked his son about work, but VC became paranoid, believing his father did not trust him to be working. CCTV analysis (which I discuss in detail from paragraph 110) again placed VC in the area of Nottingham Train station at the time of this conversation.

109. After the first attacks on Grace and Barnaby, at 04:52 hours on Tuesday 13 June 2023, VC rang Elias. He asked his brother during a 1 minute and 5 second call: *'Did you get the documents. This will be the last time I speak to you. Take the family out of the country'*. Elias asked him: *'Are you going to do something stupid'*, to which VC apparently replied, *'It's already done'*.

c. Any CCTV analysis (pre attack movements).

110. A CCTV SOE document was prepared by DC Stevens-Garrib, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0010192, covering known CCTV movements for VC.

111. In addition to this, a CCTV compilation (police exhibit HS/196/23) was produced by digital multimedia technician Harry Smallwood on 2 October

2023. This compilation was a digital video file comprised of video footage from multiple sources and contained extremely distressing images.

112. In conjunction with the analytical SOE (URN: NGPF0002374), a narrative regarding movements for VC was obtained. The salient points are as follows:

113. At 13:47 hours on 12 June 2023, financial enquiries identified a £10 withdrawal from a Catford ATM, London SE6 4BJ from VC's Monzo account (URN: NGPF0009020).

114. At 14:52 hours on 12 June 2023, a corresponding £10.00 Vodafone credit top-up for the mobile [VC phone number 7] was purchased at the Cost Cutter store, Rushen Green, Catford SE6 4BD. VC was positively identified from CCTV images secured at the store. This confirmed affiliation of VC to this number and mobile. I refer to that CCTV image as URN: NGPF0001788.

115. When purchasing the top up, VC was not in the company of any person and was seen wearing his rucksack. Corresponding cell site data for VC's mobile number [VC phone number 3] further placed VC within the Catford Area for this time, again confirming affiliation and his use of this handset and associated numbers.

116. At 19:50 hours on 12 June 2023, financial transactions identified a spend of £2.40 at Marks and Spencer, St. Pancras Station, London (VC's Monzo bank account). I refer to the relevant financial transaction report as URN: NGPF0009028.

117. Directed CCTV enquiries captured VC's movements within St Pancras station (police exhibit BRH/83/23). At 20:15 hours he arrived alone heading towards payment barriers. He held a phone in his hand and did not engage with any third person throughout.
118. Between 20:55 – 21:29 hours VC made his way to the upper concourse, interacting with a ticket machine before boarding the London St Pancras East Midlands Rail Train to Nottingham.
119. That train arrived at Nottingham (Platform B.) at 23:28 hours. VC remained at the station until 23:56 hours before walking to Tram Bridge. There at 00:06 hours 13 July 2023, VC boarded Tram 236 to Wilkinson Street, Nottingham. He was wearing a Mid Tone Beanie Style Hat, Light Tone T-shirt, Dark Tone Trousers, Dark Tone Trainers (with a light tone outer edge to the sole). He was in possession of his Dark Tone Rucksack (worn over the right shoulder) and Slazenger bag (see below). He was also wearing white cable headphones and was seen to put on dark tone Long Sleeve Top.
120. The tram contained other people, but VC did not engage with them. At 00:23 hours that tram arrived at Wilkinson Street where VC alighted, leaving the tram platform before crossing over Wilkson Street towards the direction of Radford Road.
121. At 00:29 hours, VC then made his way on foot from Wilkinson Street to Gladstone Street. This is the last CCTV sighting until 01:17 hours when he reappears on Zulu Road, New Basford.

122. VC's movements during this 48-minute period are unknown. There is no cell site data to assist, no financial transactions undertaken and no calls received into the casualty bureau or MIR with information. VC no longer had his Slazenger bag (see below) and had changed his footwear.
123. At 01:30 hours VC made his way to Nottingham Road. Financial analysis directed CCTV enquiries to Sainsbury's, Perry Road, Nottingham. Here at approximately 01:33 hours VC used the ATM to withdraw £10.
124. Between 01:34 and 01:37 hours, CCTV captured VC's movements within the New Basford Area before again being lost in the location of Rosetta Road, Basford.
125. VC is again not seen until 02:19 hours (approximately 42 minutes) when recovered footage identified him on Radford Road near the junction with Gregory Boulevard. His movements during this 42-minute period are unknown.
126. Thereafter VC's travel continued through the Radford Area towards Ilkeston Road. Between 02:43 hours – 03:30 hours VC was tracked to the Ilkeston Road / Middleton Street area. His walking appears without meaning or purpose, with nothing remarkable noted about his movements.
127. At 03:30 hours, VC again disappeared from view, off Ilkeston Road near to the pathway providing access to Hopedale Close. A shrubbed green area containing a large tree, lay adjacent to that pathway. Here somebody could easily remain undetected and out of view should they wish.

128. I believe VC moved towards that area adjacent to Hopedale Close. With no further sighting of VC between 03:30 – 04:00 hours, he remained in or close to that shrubbed area until Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar walked past at 04:00 hours.
129. Between 03:49 – 04:00 hours, CCTV footage captured both Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar walking together along Ilkeston Road. Travelling towards VC's location, they walk past the pathway / shrubbed area before, seconds later, VC was captured following them along Ilkeston Road. Seconds later he is upon them with dagger in hand; as they turn to face him VC unleashed his violent and unprovoked attack outside the addresses of 312 and 314 Ilkeston Road. The attack is graphically captured on vehicle dashcam footage (police exhibit ASG/07), which contains extremely distressing images.

d. Searches of premises/locations that were carried out to assist with pre attack movements).

130. In the 14 days prior to 13 June 2023, my contention is that VC stayed at only two known locations: [GRO-B] Burford Road Forest Fields, Nottingham (last known residence) and [GRO-B] Fordel Road, London SE6 1XS (home address of Bil Monteiro).
131. This is consistent with the cell site data, WhatsApp and financial investigations undertaken.
132. Examination of VC's bank transactions between April 2023 and June 2023 suggest he was a Nottingham resident by virtue of the trends surrounding his financial transaction (URN: NGPF0009028 and URN: NGPF0008823).

During May and early June 2023, VC regularly frequented the Tesco Express on Alfreton Road and other businesses in the NG7 and NG6 areas of Nottingham, including: Price Cutter, Mahmoods takeaway (Radford Road) and Greggs, plus various Tesco, Asda and Aldi stores within those post codes. VC also used local public transport to travel around the Nottingham area with numerous transactions for buses and trams serving the East Midlands area (dating back to December 2022). Tram transactions are Nottingham centric. I concurred with CT officers who concluded that the realistic probability was that VC had lived within Nottingham for at least 6 months prior to the attacks (URN: NGPF0009028).

133. Since October 2022, VC had paid a monthly amount of £500 to landlord Aruna Jayakody (URN: NGPF0000482).
134. This transaction appeared to have stopped in January 2023. Financial Investigations had reported VC's links to 3 other addresses between March 2023 - June 2023: [GRO-B] Sneinton Dale, a Derby address, and then a Newark address. Enquiries undertaken at [GRO-B] Sneinton Dale Nottingham, [GRO-B] Milton Street Derbyshire, and [GRO-B] Hatton Gardens Newark were undertaken and did not progress investigations. I refer to the action log for enquiries undertaken at [GRO-B] Sneinton Dale (A512) as URN: NGPF0009030. I refer to the search record for [GRO-B] Milton Street, Derbyshire as URN: NGPF0002070.
135. Whilst VC had on 11 June 2023 attended a BBQ at the home address of Carlos Monteiro [GRO-B] there were never any grounds or good cause for this location to be searched and it was not.

136. On 19 June 2023 officers from the MET Police SO15 - CT Command attended [GRO-B] Fordel Road, London. They conducted a consensual search of [GRO-B] the property rented by Bil Monteiro. Between 11 - 12 June 2023 VC had stayed at this location. DC Reid (URN: NGPF0002389) and DC Yearby attended the address. I refer to the statement of DC Yearby as URN: NGPF0002488. Bil Monteiro identified to them the keys (exhibit NJB/5 and NJB/6) that he had given to VC (URN: NGPF0002283) but VC had not returned (as corroborated within WhatsApp messages). Those keys were taken from VC on his arrest. The keys facilitated entry to the property and a search of the address proved negative. No property was found within that belonged to VC. I refer to the search log relating to [GRO-B] Fordel Road as URN: NGPF0009033.

137. Officers attended [GRO-B] Burford Road and searched it on 16 June 2023 with a copy of the search record undertaken by Nottinghamshire Police Officers recording the limited items seized (URN: NGPF0008920). This is described in detail at paragraph 169.

138. As referenced, other addresses were searched but sat outside the 14-day parameter of the information request for this statement. For completeness, those searches are recorded on the HOLMES account but equally did not assist determine VC's movements in the 14-day period preceding the attacks.

Issue 2: The Slazenger Bag:

a. Any information or indication as to the origins and contents of the bag.

139. The origins of the bag are not fully known. VC answered 'no comment' when asked in interview about the Slazenger bag; but the irresistible inference is the bag was his. CCTV cannot determine VC's possession of the Slazenger bag during the outward journey. But enquiries with fellow Guinea Bissau national and Portuguese speaker, Bil Monteiro, revealed that VC had both a holdall and rucksack when attending London.
140. Monteiro provided a statement to MET police colleagues in London (URN: NGPF0002282) which was sent to the Operation Hendrix enquiry team on 18 June 2023 with a document recorded on HOLMES as Electronic Message 592, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0009034.
141. In his statement, Monteiro confirmed VC arrived in London on Sunday 11 June 2023. He collected VC in his car and took him to a BBQ. He allowed VC to stay at his rented flat (GRO-B Fordel Road) providing him with keys to the flat.
142. In his statement (URN: NGPF0002282), Monteiro confirmed the duration of VC's stay as Sunday night (11 June 2023) to Monday morning on 12 June 2023. Monteiro stated that on arrival VC had a bag on his back and was carrying a black bag. Monteiro did not know what was in the bags but assumed clothes. Monteiro did not stay with VC but at the home address of his partner Mrs Innocencii Sucuma. By the morning of Monday 12 June 2023 VC had left, returning to Nottingham before Monteiro could meet and collect his keys. Those same keys were with VC on his arrest. Officers conducted a consensual search at (GRO-B Fordel Road, London (search log URN: NGPF0009033)). Nothing of relevance was found in the search.

143. VC had clear possession and control of the Slazenger bag (corroborated by CCTV footage) on his return journey from London to Nottingham on 12 June 2023. Having been evicted from [GRO-B] Burford Road he had searched for alternative accommodation. In his WhatsApp communication with Monteiro on 9 June 2023, at 13:20 hours VC asked Monteiro “*Okay. Listen, do you know someone who can accommodate me for a few days??*”.
144. With little to no property belonging to VC left at [GRO-B] Burford Road, the logical conclusion was that it seemed highly likely that the Slazenger bag would have possessed most or all of VC’s personal belongings.
145. DCs Ferguson and Halfyard were deployed on 16 June 2023 to Nottingham Train Station to identify VC’s movements, significant actions and to follow VC using the CCTV footage in existence. Liaising with the duty station manager, Owen Lee-Johnson, they commenced the recovery and viewing of relevant CCTV. This is documented in DC Ferguson’s Officer Report which I refer to as URN: NGPF0000442. DC Ferguson provided a statement on the 10 August 2023, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002842. DC Halfyard provided a statement on the 14 June 2023, which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0002862 and a further statement on the 16 June 2023, which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0002863. The time for local CCTV footage was checked against the speaking clock and established to be 1 minute and 24 secs slower than actual real time. Subsequent CCTV analysis within my statement makes reference to the real time as to commentary.

146. These officers confirmed that at 23:24:42 (real time) on 12 June 2023, the train carrying VC arrived at Nottingham from London St Pancras. At 23:26:41 VC came into view and put on a dark top to cover his grey T shirt. He was carrying both a small black rucksack on his back (exhibit JR/9) and was also seen carrying in his hand a larger black Slazenger sports bag.
147. DC Ferguson identified VC's movements from the train to the tram station via Tram Bridge, Station Street, Nottingham. The fast-track enquiries identified VC on CCTV at 23:56:08, again in possession of the Slazenger bag. Upon this analysis of the CCTV, I and the enquiry team first become aware of the existence of a Slazenger bag.
148. The officers made continued enquiries with the tram network, liaising with local managers. From their HQ they identified and secured footage that established the suspect's tram movements. From 23:55:22 hours, walking along the platform, at 23:56:25 engaging with staff, examining the board for tram times, before at 00:06:25 hours, 13 June 2023, boarding tram 236 destined for Wilkinson Street. VC boarded with the Slazenger bag and remained on the tram until Wilkinson Street. At 00:23 hours VC departed, walking over Wilkinson Street towards Radford Road. He was then lost from view by detectives, in possession of the Slazenger bag.
149. A full CCTV strategy was developed with CCTV trawlers and the appointment of a CCTV coordinator to determine further movements. Hundreds of hours of CCTV enquiries and analysis was undertaken by detectives. These enquiries were documented on a CCTV spreadsheet

which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008793. DC Asif Stevens-Garrib was the allocated CCTV coordinator for the enquiry (Policy decision 21 and 33).

150. DC Stevens-Garrib painstakingly stitched together the CCTV SOE document that identified VC from viewed footage recovered (URN: NGPF0010192). That review included CCTV material, (police exhibit BRH/83/23), recovered from London by law enforcement colleague DC Hitchings, outlined in their statement, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002877.
151. That footage identified VC's arrival at 20:15 hours on Monday 12 June 2023 (via Thames Link) at London St Pancras International Train Station. He was then in possession of a rucksack (worn across his back) and holding the Slazenger bag. Between 20:15 and 20:55 hours, VC is shown wandering around the lower concourse, often leaving the holdall unattended. He appears unconcerned as to the bag or its contents. The same cannot be said for the rucksack which remains on his person.
152. CCTV examination identified that VC must have disposed of or deposited that Slazenger bag at a location unknown sometime between 00:29 hours (Gladstone Street sighting) and his reemergence on CCTV footage within the Chard Street area of New Basford (entering a child's playground area at 01:23 hours). Therefore, the last sighting of VC with the Slazenger bag is at 00:29 hours 13 June 2023, some three and a half hours before the first attack on Ilkeston Road. He retained possession of the rucksack.
153. With the Slazenger bag undiscovered, it is not possible to determine what exactly it contained. What we can say with certainty is that VC had clothes

in that bag by virtue of the fact he was seen on CCTV at 23.29 hours on Monday 12 June 2023 putting clothes on (a top). He had also changed his footwear between 00:29 hours and 01:23 hours (from trainers to dark tone boots). VC was not seen carrying footwear, ergo they most likely were within the bags being carried.

154. I can also say with certainty that the Slazenger bag cannot have contained any of the weapon(s) used in the murders, for the following reasons:

- The Slazenger bag was not in VC's possession at the time of any attacks as determined from witness testimony and CCTV footage. Several weapons, including the dagger (police exhibit SJB/1 Boker Dagger), had undoubtedly been inside VC's rucksack before he committed the attacks on Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar.
- Statement of Hans Pakpahan, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002308 and mobile phone video footage supplied by Shilpa Venugopal (police exhibit SV/1), provide corroboration that the rucksack was present with VC at Ilkeston Road. The mobile phone footage supplied by Shilpa Venugopal contains extremely distressing images.
- VC is seen on CCTV walking with his rucksack before and after the attacks on Ilkeston Road. This is from original CCTV (police exhibit PO/1), seized by DC 5435 Owens and referred to in his statement, which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0002306. This footage also contains extremely distressing images.
- Thereafter the rucksack is with VC at Seely Hirst House, evidenced on CCTV (originally seized as police exhibit JP/1). This was seized by DC

Primrose, and I now refer to the statement of DC Primrose as URN: NGPF0002322. VC is then later at Mapperley Road immediately before the attack at Scene 2.

- Finally, that rucksack was on VC's back when arrested in the stolen van on Bentinck Road, with the Boker Dagger recovered next to VC in the front off-side footwell of the stolen van. My suspicion is that the weapon was close at hand in readiness for an attack on the attending police officers.
- The Boker Dagger (police exhibit SJB/1) was forensically linked to the murders with VC himself forensically linked to the murder of all three victims. This is documented in three separate streamlined forensic reports D482 – dated 7 July 2023, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002123; D485 – dated 21 June 2023, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002128 and D481 – dated 7 July 2023, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002122.
- The subsequent forensic search of the stolen van found no trace of the Slazenger bag. It was clear from later CCTV analysis that VC had not collected or secured the Slazenger bag from any location after his last sighting with it at 00:29 hours 13 June 2023. This is clear from various statements and CCTV analysis regarding his movements.
- The mobile phone footage provided by Shilpa Venugopal (police exhibit SV/1) showed 11 seconds of the Ilkeston Road attacks (with audio). There was no mention or sight of the Slazenger bag, whilst VC's rucksack is clearly seen in background footage on the road. After the horrific attacks on Barnaby and Grace, VC calmly collected his

rucksack and walked off. Shilpa Venugopal referred to this footage in her statement, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002457.

- No CCTV footage in existence, covering locations between the Ilkeston Road attacks and all other locations, up to the point of VC's arrest provided any further sighting of VC with the Slazenger bag.

155. VC was directly asked in his suspect interviews, by DCs Davis and Clifford, about the Slazenger Bag. During interview the following questions were posed.

- What do you have in the Black Slazenger bag?
- Did you have a change of clothing in the Slazenger bag?
- Is that where you kept them (clothes)?
- Where did you actually go to change your shoes and your top?
- What happened to the Slazenger bag?

156. VC, acting on the advice of his solicitor, answered 'no comment' to all questions posed. I refer to the Record of Taped Interview ("ROTI") as URN: NGPF0008803.

b. All attempts to establish the whereabouts of the bag.

157. I think all reasonable lines of enquiry were pursued to establish the location of the Slazenger bag. Three specialist PolSA advisers were allocated to the investigation to assist with all search strategies. In light of the prevailing circumstance and the possibility of a terrorist attack, all searches undertaken were completed in conjunction with appropriate risk assessments to maintain officer and public safety, but completed in a way that ensured forensic evidence could be preserved and secured. The

consideration of forensic matters was a key consideration for many of the searches undertaken, all of which required careful coordination, see Policy decision 19.

158. At 19:00 hours on 15 June 2023 I make my first direct reference to the Slazenger bag in my policy log (URN: NGPF0008791, policy decision 49). I directed that officers on Nottingham CCTV enquiries were to concentrate their search and viewing efforts on VC's movements between 23:23 hours on Monday 12 June 2023 and 04:00 hours on Tuesday 13 June 2023.
159. I would be aware from the CCTV enquiries of VC arriving at Nottingham Train Station at 23:23 hours on Monday 12 June 2023 carrying the black Slazenger holdall bag. VC's next known movement was identified at the Sainsbury's ATM at 01:33 hours (Perry Road, Nottingham), but now without the Slazenger bag. Its whereabouts were unknown, and thus efforts were made to locate it.
160. With the potential added dimension of terrorism, the establishment by CT colleagues of a 'fusion cell' enabled fast paced intelligence development to drive enquiries. The fusion cell was a collaborative intelligence team that pooled and analysed intelligence from various partners and external sources to counter identified threats and inform my decision making.
161. The fusion cell enabled real-time actioning of intelligence sharing as soon as it was received from the CT liaison officers into the MIR. Initially the focus was to determine the identity and numbers of those involved in a potential terrorist attack to prevent further loss of life. I referenced this in the policy log (policy decision 20) as I noted: "*as yet I do not know motive, or if there*

is assistance provided in terms of a wider conspiracy. This will of course be uncovered as I pursue relevant lines of enquiry. What I do know is that since the arrest of the suspect, there have been no further incidents”.

162. Counter Terrorist Specialist Firearms Officers (“CTSFO’s”) were deployed securing entry to a number of properties with intelligence links to VC. Following threat assessments, unarmed searches were then conducted as threat levels decreased. Despite the searches undertaken over several days, no Slazenger bag was ever found.
163. At 10.00 hours on 16 June 2023, I liaised with PoSA officers regarding searches for the outstanding Slazenger bag (policy decision 52). CCTV investigations were providing a good narrative for VC’s movements, which when overlaid with intelligence and telephony enquiries, provided opportunities regarding further searches (see below).
164. Being a dynamic investigation, resources were often reprioritised to new and emerging enquiries. This was evident with my decisions regarding this line of enquiry (policy decision 49). This entry makes direct reference to the Slazenger bag, but that took place at 19:00 hours on 15 June 2023, two days after the attacks and following 48 other key decisions already made.
165. That did not mean the search strategy and the resources required to discover the Slazenger bag were unimportant. Rather resources would often require redirection to complete other actions I had assessed as providing greater investigative opportunities to secure and preserve evidence. I had to keep in mind the tight criminal justice timeframes imposed by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”), namely a

maximum 96-hour period to secure relevant evidence and present to CPS to secure charges on a threshold basis.

166. For an investigation presenting such voluminous amounts of material, plus associated lines of enquiries, prioritising those I considered most relevant was a challenge; thus the comment noted in policy decision 49 that *'there is even a need to prioritise within high priority actions'*. Competing lines of enquiry existed for actions that were categorised within HOLMES as high priority. That included the discovery of the Slazenger bag.
167. My policy log (URN: NGPF0008791) constantly outlines the competing demands and the pressure of time critical decisions that had to be made. Sometimes that required a compromise. To illustrate the dilemma, ultimately greater evidence would be secured through the concentrated focus on VC's rucksack as opposed to VC's Slazenger Bag. The former required the completion of a number of sequential steps that included the forensic search of the stolen van (the search record for which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008804), the recovery of the Boker Dagger Knife (SJB/1) from within, the subsequent fast track lab submission of that weapon to determine its forensic importance, then the recovery of VC's rucksack (JR/9) proximate to the stolen van before a forensic search of the same to assess the value of items found within, that led to securing and progressing the analysis of VC's mobile phone (JR/11). These were all priority actions that would prove essential in securing from CPS a threshold charge.
168. In contrast, there was a requirement to ascertain the location of the Black Slazenger bag, but with contents unknown, last seen three hours before the

attacks, known not to contain the weapons used in the attack and as noted from CCTV playing no actual part in the attacks themselves. Whilst important, the discovery of the Slazenger bag would not supersede other important lines of enquiry. It would have been illogical and negligent to prioritise resources and efforts over and above those allocated to its recovery and at the expense of other more important matters.

169. In summary, 14 addresses / locations were searched or visited by officers, detailed in a spreadsheet which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0008805. Where it became clear that the intelligence link to an address was incorrect or outdated, the occupants would have been interviewed and the address not searched. The Slazenger bag was not found at any of the below listed locations. In fact, very little personal property for VC was located throughout the enquiry, a telling factor in itself with regards his lifestyle, and what property one could logically assume to be inside the Slazenger bag. An all-premises warrant was applied for on the 16 June 2023 which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008806. The authorised warrant, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001653, was granted on the 16 June 2023. The addresses searched and attended included:

- **GRO-B** Fordel Road London, on 19 June 2023. Home of Bil Monteiro - Last address that VC known to have stayed at immediately prior to the attacks. D158 is a copy of the MET Police search record (URN: NGPF0009033).
- **GRO-B** Burford Road Forest Fields. A warrant was obtained (D225), which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0001658. Last known residence in Nottingham, reportedly vacated on Sunday 11 June 2023. That warrant

was executed and the address searched 16 June 2023. Small amount of property recovered (no bag or clothing). Document 596 refers – (URN: NGPF0008920).

- **GRO-B** Maddison Court, Derwent Way, Nottingham, NG72EG. Had previously lived at this student flat but had been evicted by the landlord following his assault of a fellow flatmate (whilst on unaccompanied leave from hospital). Section 18 PACE search undertaken on 13 June 2023 at 18:47 hours. Nothing of relevance found. No search record located; however, I refer to SAFE Incident Log 0128_13062023 as URN: NGPF0008809.
- **GRO-B** Exeter Road, Nottingham - Section 8 PACE Warrant executed 16 June 2023. Nothing of relevance found. D224 refers - I refer to that warrant as URN: NGPF0001662.
- **GRO-B** Maud Street Nottingham attended 2 August 2023. Identified as linked to Amazon accounts. Address attended by DS Cooper with occupants spoken to who confirmed VC was not a resident. No search conducted. This interaction is recorded in DS Cooper's officers report (R19B), which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0000452.
- Storage King Radford Road Nottingham was attended 29 August 2023. Intelligence established links to this location. Attended to search but shown to have closed account (May 2023) and no longer held storage unit so no search conducted, this information being contained in two documents; Storage King Information (D240), which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0001693 and Storage King Statement (D888), which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0003137.

- GRO-B Milton Street Derbyshire. Section 18 PACE search authorised and conducted on the 14 June 2023 at 22:20 hours (URN: NGPF0002070). Occupants of address confirmed VC has not resided there. Nothing of relevance found.
- GRO-B Hatton Gardens, Newark. Identified through financial enquiries. Address established not to have any links to VC from a family who have been residing there since 2001 The address was not subject of a search.
- GRO-B Sneinton Dale Nottingham was attended on 15 June 2023. The landlord confirmed that VC lived there between September 2020 and March 2021. The address was not subject of a search.
- 46 Young Street Derby. Police checks identified the address to be linked to another family since 2011. The address was attended but not searched.
- Flat 2, 20 Middleton Street / 48 Salisbury Street, Nottingham. Experian links to both properties (which were one and the same). Searched on 13 June 2023. Nothing of value established.
- 209 Ilkeston Road, Nottingham. This address was searched on 13 June 2023 and nothing of relevance was found. I now exhibit the Exhibits Book (D160) as URN: NGPF0001454.
- 7 Brook Court Player Street Nottingham. Officers attended on 15 June 2023. Nothing of relevance located as the address was not searched.
- 89 Ilkeston Road, Nottingham. Searched on 13 June 2023. Nothing of relevance found. SAFE Incident Log 0128_13062023 (URN: NGPF0008809) refers.

170. In addition to the above, PoLSA led searches were also conducted at the following locations:

- Searches at and around the attack scene on Ilkeston Road (scene 1), including house-to-house enquiries undertaken in the locality. I refer to the Search Record for this location as URN: NGPF0008816. Both PC 2320 Atkinson and PC 2997 Cawar provided statements of this search, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008817 and URN: NGPF0002781 respectively.
- Searches in and around North Sherwood Street including Nottingham City Council Bins situated near to and within the entrance to the Arboretum Park. I refer to the Search Record for this location as URN: NGPF0008819. The search record is exhibited in PC 3576 Pritchard's statements which I refer to as URN: NGPF0008820 and URN: NGPF0008821.
- PoLSA also searched around the crime scene regarding the murder on Magdala Road, Nottingham (scene 2). I refer to the search record for this location as URN: NGPF0008822. PC 3903 Thompson provided a statement of this search which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008824.
- Searches of and around the location for VC's arrest on Bentinck Road Nottingham. I refer to the search record for this location as URN: NGPF0008825. Both PC 2393 Adams and PC 2349 Harvie provided statements of the search, these now being referred to as URN: NGPF0008826 and URN: NGPF0008827 respectively.
- Coordinated searches in and around Nottingham City Centre including Milton Street. This search is outlined in PC 898 Wilde's statement dated

the 13 June 2023, which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0008828, along with the Search Record which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0008829. Upper Parliament Street and the Theatre Square Area were also searched, this being outlined in PC 2984 Sisson's statement, which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0008830. The search log for this search I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0008831.

171. A forensic search of the stolen Vauxhall Vivaro van, VRM: FD64LUJ took place at 16:40 hours 11 July 2023 (search record URN: NGPF0008804). All such searches were negative with regards recovery of the Slazenger bag or other material that would progress the investigation.
172. PoLSA undertook a walkthrough and search of areas between the first attack location (scene 1) on Ilkeston Road (search record URN: NGPF0008816) and the attack location at Magdala Road (scene 2) - including bins and drains. The routes searched included Ilkeston Road between Middleton Street and Faraday Road. In addition, they searched along Auckland Close, Hopedale Close, Lismore Close, Cleveland Close, Bramcote Street, Forster Street, Citadel Street, Catling Street and Bastion Street. I refer to the search record (BWP/801) as URN: NGPF0008832. No Slazenger bag was found or anything else to assist the homicide investigation.
173. Searches between Claypole Road and Maples Street (scene log JL/01) were again negative with no Slazenger bag found. I refer to the scene log for this search as URN: NGPF0008833.

174. Finally, a briefing note to officers and staff force-wide was prepared and shared, requesting assistance in locating the Slazenger bag during the normal course of duties. This was delivered to all staff force-wide on 10 July 2023 using the force Briefing and Tasking System ("BATS") which all officers and staff have access to, dependent on the areas to which they work. This was produced in two documents that were shared on BATS. I now refer to these exhibits, Briefing Note - BATS Bag Appeal (D514) as URN: NGPF0002156 and Investigation to locate Slazenger bag (D513) as URN: NGPF0008836.
175. Despite significant efforts, the Slazenger bag was never recovered. Ultimately, within the context of this investigation, its lack of discovery had no adverse effect regarding the progress of the investigation. In my opinion it did not influence threshold charges brought by CPS, the accepted pleas to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility or the subsequent sentence passed by the High Court judge.
176. Evidence provided by Professor Blackwood surrounding VC's actions was categoric: he stated that VC's possession of weapons, his constant change of SIM cards, the telephone contact with his brother, his changing footwear and then the disposal of the Slazenger bag were all part of his mental illness, which in oral evidence, Dr Blackwood agreed was a case of one psychotic episode of intense severity incorporating these many incidents. To that end, the disposal of the Slazenger bag by VC was a symptom of his illness and not the motive behind a criminal action or a cause for the attacks.

C) Any statements that were taken or interviews carried out

177. VC was interviewed on two occasions on 14 June 2023, three occasions on 15 June 2023 and then finally on 16 June 2023, all in the presence of his solicitor.

- The first interview commenced at 1019 hours 14 June 2023. I refer to the Record of Taped Interview ('ROTI') as URN: NGPF0008837.
- The second interview commenced at 2203 hours 14 June 2023. I refer to the ROTI as URN: NGPF0000307.
- The third interview commenced at 1041 hours 15 June 2023. I refer to the ROTI as URN: NGPF0000308.
- The fourth interview commenced at 1817 hours 15 June 2023. I refer to the ROTI as URN: NGPF0008840.
- The fifth interview commenced at 2150 hours 15 June 2023. (URN: NGPF0008803).
- The sixth interview commenced at 1026 hours 16 June 2023. I refer to the ROTI as URN: NGPF0000311.

178. VC made no comment to all questions asked, including those specifically relating to the Slazenger bag.

179. London based enquiries resulted in several interviews, with witness statements and reports secured to cover VC's movement in London.

180. On Saturday 17 June 2023, a 'Sig Wit' interview with Bil Monteiro (URN: **NGPF0009221R**) was undertaken at Romford Police Station. I refer to the ROTI of the 'Sig Wit' recorded interview as URN: NGPF0008965 In addition to his written account (URN: NGPF0002282), this significant interview was also video recorded.

181. The Interview included the review of screenshots (URN: NGPF0001831 to URN: NGPF0001830 respectively) and one recording of two voice notes (URN: NGPF0001815) taken from Monteiro's mobile phone that covered his contact with VC in the run up to VC's London visit. Those WhatsApp and audio file conversations with VC are produced earlier in this statement at paragraphs 57 to 60.
182. The original voice notes and texts are in Portuguese, which required translating into English (URN: NGPF0008982).
183. When translated, those text messages offer nothing of significance regarding the investigation. If anything, they reinforce the narrative of the actions of a loner and a man evicted from a property who was looking for a place to stay.
184. For completeness, D157 has been included as it related to officer notes made at the time when securing witness testimony from Bil Monteiro. I refer to Officer notes made while obtaining witness statement from Bil Monterio as URN: NGPF0008842.
185. These enquiries progressed neither the discovery of the Slazenger bag nor the homicide investigation itself. The search subsequently undertaken at **GRO-B** Fordel Road, London by police officers was negative, documented in the search log URN: NGPF0009033.
186. DS Yerby (MET Police) outlined in his report, which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0008843, the initial contact and enquiries undertaken with Monteiro, plus other identified witnesses who had contact with VC that weekend during the family BBQ. His report outlined how Monteiro had known VC for

3-4 years, having previously worked together as warehouse operatives in Nottingham. They had worked together for approximately 4 months and had exchanged numbers, communicating via WhatsApp.

187. Bil's partner Innocencii Sucuma and their children were also at the BBQ as were Bil's cousins, Luis Felipe Sanha and Herikson Monteiro. All the aforementioned held common factors in that they were of Guinea-Bissau descent, spoke a common language (Portuguese) and these factors were no doubt a logical pull for VC and other guests at the party.
188. Carlos Monteiro was seen by detectives. He described hosting the BBQ with his wife Laruna Tivana at their London address on Sunday 11 June 2023. He outlined family members attending including Bil, his wife Innocencii Sucuma and their children and his nephews. He also mentions 'Bil's friend' VC. He stated he had never met VC before (or since) and was introduced as Bil's acquaintance who was visiting for the weekend. Carlos stated VC hardly spoke the whole time being quiet throughout. When asked, he stated he did not remember VC having anything else with him like a bag (but this account is consistent with Bil's account in that VC left his bags in the car). Carlos' account neither assisted in the discovery of the Slazenger bag nor progression of the homicide investigation.
189. This account is from the statement of Carlos Monterio, referred to earlier as URN: NGPF0008985.
190. In the statement taken from Herickson Monteiro (URN: NGPF0008984) he reported being at the BBQ on Sunday 11 June 2023 with other family members and their children. At 21:00 hours Bil asked him to go with him

and pick his friend up from Romford train station. The friend had apparently called Bil saying he wanted to come down to London for the weekend. Bil offered him his flat in Lewisham. He (Bil) would stay with his partner. Herickson along with Bil and his cousin Luis Felipe, collected VC from the train station in Bil's car.

191. They returned to the BBQ and Herickson recalled that VC was quiet, the same nationality as him (namely Guinea-Bissau) and was the first time they had met. Herickson believed VC had two bags with him - one bag described as a grey rucksack, the second similar to a 10kg style bag, like a wheeled suitcase style bag that you would bring onto a plane (likely the Slazenger bag). Herickson's account neither assisted in the discovery of the Slazenger bag or progression of the homicide investigation.
192. Innocencii Sucuma was interviewed. In her statement (S125 – URN: NGPF0008983) she confirmed her attendance at the BBQ at the Romford address. She described having two children with Bil and together they and the others named were present. The first time she met VC was at the BBQ and she had no prior knowledge of him. VC was collected by Bil in the car. She did not recall seeing bags or a mobile phone (again consistent) but thought VC was odd and very quiet. This enquiry did not progress the homicide investigation or recovery of the Slazenger bag.
193. Within the HOLMES account, other actions were raised for SIO consideration to trace other persons present at the BBQ. For example, A353 (Action 353), '*SIO to consider TST (take a statement) from Luis Sanha, cousin of Bil Monteiro*'. As SIO I considered that a statement from

this witness (over and above the existing contacts undertaken) would not progress the investigation further and was therefore not required. Following the telephony, CCTV and witness testimony already obtained, it was not considered significant with regards enquiry progression. DS Yerby's contact with Sanha was documented in an officer's report (URN: NGPF0008843).

194. Within the HOLMES account, a referred action relates to an enquiry that has been raised but is no longer of relevance or of significance. These actions are sent (referred) to the SIO for a decision as to their completion or otherwise.
195. At 17:52 hours on 24 July 2023, Action 353 had been sent to me as SIO as a referral action. Following my review, I referred the action and noted: *'that Substantial evidence already exists (regarding the homicide) and a statement has already been secured from Bil Monteiro to highlight interactions with VC (which appears minimal) during his visit to London. Furthermore, quality CCTV and substantial forensic evidence is also in existence in relation to the attacks. This enquiry would not progress the quality of the evidence in existence in this case. Officers are to concentrate their efforts on other key lines of enquiry. NFA'. DSU Leigh Sanders.'*
196. I applied the same logic to the same process that had been initiated regarding Action 356. That enquiry was for the *'SIO to consider TST (take a statement) from Laurinda Tivana, wife of Carlos Monteiro who was at BBQ with VC on 11 June 2023'*. Again, I referred the action as the progression of the action would not progress the quality of the evidence for

this case. Officers were again to concentrate efforts on other key lines of enquiry that could progress the investigation.

197. This process explains why the young children of Innocencii Sucuma and Bil Monteiro were also not interviewed as part of the enquiry.

198. Telephone enquiries and a self-referral by Elias Calocane (VC's brother) resulted in officer deployments to speak with him surrounding his telephone conversations and interaction with VC in the run up to the attacks. In his statement (URN: NGPF0008987 and URN: NGPF0008988) Elias disclosed

that his brother rang him on his mobile phone from a number ending VC phone number 3

Elias stated his brother VC used at least 2 different numbers as he was paranoid about being monitored. He had not spoken to VC since Christmas time (2022) and the last time he saw him in person was in Birmingham on Saturday 5 November 2022 (attending a family concert).

199. WhatsApp contact occurred on Monday 12 June 2023. Whilst VC did not say where he was, Elias believed his brother was in London at a train station (hearing announcements regarding train arrivals at Blackfriars). VC did not disclose where he was, where he was going, or what he was planning to do. The next contact between the brothers occurred on WhatsApp after the Ilkeston Road attack on Tuesday 13 June 2023. VC made significant disclosures to Elias. Significant evidence in terms of the homicide investigation was secured, as discussed below at paragraphs 233 to 236, but again nothing noted that could assist with the location of the Slazenger bag.

200. On 14 June 2023, detectives visited the parents of VC at their home address in Wales. They interviewed mother (Celestine), father (Amisao) and spoke with wider family members including sister, cousins, as well as Elias. I refer to the officer report relating to these enquiries as URN: NGPF0008993. The family disclosures are covered earlier in this statement at paragraphs 62 to 67. Outside of familial concerns regarding mental health (dating back to 2020), nothing else was obtained that progressed the investigation.
201. Following the various searches listed above in paragraph 169, a number of interviews and statements were undertaken with the various occupants. Those afforded most significance relate to the last two locations frequented by VC prior to the attacks: namely the London flat belonging to Monteiro (as discussed above) and the other address established at [GRO-B] Burford Road, Forest Fields (a multi occupancy dwelling and now believed to be VC's last known address before eviction).
202. The address at [GRO-B] Burford Road, Forest Fields was vacated by VC on 11 June 2023; as such it is clear that VC had no permanent residency at the time of the attacks, having been asked to leave the premises by his landlord. Financial records suggest no rent had been paid since January 2023.
203. Resident Iulian [GRO-B] stated that in October or November 2022, VC moved into [GRO-B] Burford Road, occupying the room directly above his. His interactions with VC have already been addressed in this statement at

paragraph 46. They rarely talked, with pleasantries exchanged on rare occasions only.

204. We know from events outlined in [GRO-B] English statement (URN: NGPF0002460) that VC left on Sunday and travelled to London. No return to the property has been mentioned by any occupant and no Slazenger bag has been recovered when searching this location.
205. In his statement, Akhil [GRO-B] (URN: NGPF0002383) another resident at [GRO-B] Burford Road, Forest Fields, outlined his interactions with VC, as discussed earlier at paragraphs 44 to 45. He described VC as unhygienic and said he never cleaned up after himself. VC asked Akhil for his telephone number so as to hopefully arrange new accommodation. No follow up contact appears to have been made.
206. No other personal belongings for VC were recovered during the police search at [GRO-B] Burford Road, Forest Fields. This leads to the irresistible inference that VC's personal effects had been removed and packed personally by VC ahead of eviction and before his London travel. The inference is that personal belongings would have been taken by VC to London and packed in his Slazenger bag and rucksack.
207. Regarding the other 12 addresses listed as searched or attended by the police, enquiry details surrounding these locations with the following persons can be summarised as follows:
- Report 23 A: Outlined police interviews with occupants of the multi occupancy flat at [GRO-B] Maud Street. Residents Reema Elizabeth Bijoy and Naanchan Saini were spoken to and had no knowledge of VC with no

packages or property regarding him in any guise being at that location.

I refer to the officer's report relating to this enquiry as URN: NGPF0000466.

- Action 526: Created regarding attendance at the Storage King Unit, Radford Road. DC Reid and DC Walker attended and spoke with staff member Jordan Dack. He confirmed VC no longer had a storage unit at Storage King; the enquiry not progressing the homicide investigation or recovery of the Slazenger bag. I refer to the Action Record regarding the unit at Storage King as URN: NGPF0003989.
- The search record for [GRO-B] Milton Street Derbyshire (URN: NGPF0002070) outlined the interview with Milan Garbo, [GRO-B] family Mr Kailam Ywan and Ms Yvet Ywan identified as residing at the location when police attended to search the property. No record of VC at the location and nothing obtained to progress the enquiry.
- Action 262 was created to contact Aruna Jayalkody, the landlord for both [GRO-B] Burford Road and [GRO-B] Exeter Road, Nottingham. Initially Section 8 PACE warrants were obtained for [GRO-B] Exeter Road (URN: NGPF0001662) and for [GRO-B] Burford Road (URN: NGPF0001658). This action was filed as no longer required following the submission of a guilty plea by VC. The action log for A262 was referred to earlier in this statement as URN: NGPF0000393.
- The statement of Michael Munro documented his life at [GRO-B] Hatton Gardens, Newark where he lived with his family since 2001. Whilst Royal Mail had delivered letters to his home addressed to VC, he had never heard of him and to his knowledge had never lived at the address.

This enquiry did not progress the homicide investigation or recovery of the Slazenger bag. I refer to the Statement of Michael Munro as URN: NGPF0002289.

- Action 512 (URN: NGPF0009030) and T29 outlined how DS Aram contacted landlord John Fairley (who runs the multi-occupancy rental business for [GRO-B] Sneinton Dale). Fairley recalls VC renting a room at [GRO-B] Sneinton Dale but for a short period only (Sept 2020 – March 2021). He explained that he met VC for a visit at the property shortly after he began renting a room. Having left in March 2021 this enquiry did not progress the investigation or lead to the recovery of the Slazenger bag. I refer to the email enquiries undertaken as URN: NGPF0004104.
- In relation to 48 Salisbury Street Nottingham (in the former Marquis of Lorne public house – also known as Flat 2, 20 Middleton Street) formerly an address of VC, officers attended at 11:02 on 14 June 2023. Flat 2 at that time was empty and unoccupied. The letting agent was present and allowed a search to take place (URN: NGPF0008994). A statement was secured from Sebastian [GRO-B]. He outlines how in September 2019 he shared student accommodation with two other students including VC. [GRO-B] described VC as being quiet and remembers health care workers or support workers visiting him. [GRO-B] described incidents in July 2021 in which VC showed aggression towards him, so he left the property. VC had not been to the property, and no Slazenger bag was recovered. I now refer to this statement as URN: NGPF0002925.

- In relation to [GRO-B] Madison Court, Raleigh Park, Nottingham (from September 2021 until July 2022), a former address of VC: Officers attended and at 18:47 hours on 13 June 2023 the incident log 0128_13062023 (URN: NGPF0008809) was updated. No property and no Slazenger bag were recovered. In his statement, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002490, Christopher [GRO-B] outlined how as a student, he lived at this address with 5 others including Ryan [GRO-B] Sam [GRO-B] Tom [GRO-B] Abdullah [GRO-B] and VC. Stated he got on well with everyone in the flat apart from VC who he described as aggressive and messy. He outlined physical altercations with VC which were reported to the police. He spoke with officers at the time, but he did not progress matters. Again, no property was recovered, and the enquiry did not progress the homicide investigation.

d. Any relevant telephone contact, content of messages and cell site analysis.

208. DC Kelly Rowbotham was appointed the dedicated TLO for this investigation. She worked in conjunction with an analyst to review and report on relevant information secured from call data applications and material obtained from digital devices seized during the investigation. DC Rowbotham produced two statements (S235 and S235a). I now refer to statement S235 as URN: NGPF0002400. S235A was referred to earlier as URN: NGPF0002398.
209. I arranged for fast-track interrogation of mobile phone devices via the CT fusion cell (policy decision 39, URN: NGPF0008791). They would interrogate and analyse mobile phones and other devices capable of

holding digital media. They also assisted with telecom applications, with details passed back to the MIR via the CT liaison officer.

210. The SIU at the ROCU provided further analytical support which assisted with the review and interpretation of retrieved telephone data. This meant that call data with cell site details that was obtained could be quickly interpreted, assist ongoing reviews and drive key lines of enquiry. The analyst assigned to Operation Hendrix was Jono Rushden from the SIU, who provided two statements in relation to the work he conducted, which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0002403 and URN: NGPF0002404.
211. The arrest of VC led to the recovery of Exhibit JR/11: VC's mobile phone. It was recovered from JR / 9 (VC's rucksack). On 14 June 2023, this device was fast tracked for analysis at CTPNE. An extraction report was created from this device [REDACTED] which fed into a timeline (URN: NGPF0003002). The analytical report prepared by the CT Fusion Cell (URN: NGPF0008887) also provided a fast-time analytical narrative.
212. The recovered handset JR/11 was determined to be a Motorola Moto G (9) with a handset IMEI being: 3555411111909. A dual SIM phone, it contained two (2) SIM cards. For brevity the two relevant numbers found inside this handset were a focus of interest for the investigation. They were [VC phone number 7]. [VC phone number 7] Call data applications confirmed the number was in use at the time of the attacks. The second number was [VC phone number 3]. Call data applications confirmed this number was also in use at the time of the attacks, this exhibited in document D766, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0003008.

213. Cell site analysis of call data for [VC phone number 3] & [VC phone number 7] was completed (D 705) with an aim being “to aid with the identification of a home address” for VC. This is documented in URN: NGPF0008887.
214. Data highlighted the following factors which I deemed significant in trying to establish movements and search strategies. The most used cell location in use was identified as one near Hyson House Student Accommodation NG7 6AW. This location was near to and in a central position regarding properties of interest: [GRO-B] Burford Road and [GRO-B] Exeter Road. Consequently, searches for these addresses were undertaken but negative, both in terms of progression of the Slazenger bag or wider homicide investigation. The search record for [GRO-B] Burford Road being exhibited as URN: NGPF0008920 and the section 8 PACE Warrant for [GRO-B] Exeter Road exhibited as URN: NGPF0001662.
215. Analysis noted VC was likely in the area for this cell site coverage during the early hours of 13 June 2023 (prior to the attacks taking place) This is corroborated by later CCTV examinations.
216. Being the most commonly connecting cell for VC, the data supports the proposition that [GRO-B] Burford Road was likely to have been VC’s last known residency. CTPNE assessed this cell location to be the most ‘realistic possibility’ for VC’s home address (based on it being marginally closer to the most activated cell towers and having a greater overlap with the approximate azimuths and radius of cell tower coverage for that area).
217. This data is also consistent with the Landlord’s action of evicting VC from [GRO-B] Burford Road over the weekend. The date for VC leaving the property

was assessed to be 11 June 2023 as both mobile numbers: [VC phone number 3] (EE) & [VC phone number 7] (Vodafone) travelled to London that day and remained there overnight.

218. Cell site data indicates that [VC phone number 3] left Nottingham at or before 13:19 hours 11 June 2023, arriving in London at or before 15:52 hours 11 June 2023, as detailed in the cell site analysis (URN: NGPF0008887).

219. Analyst Jono Rushen (URN: NGPF0009015) identified important telephone contacts and movements in the days before the attacks. His SOE log (URN: NGPF0002374) covering the period 00:00 hours 11 June 2023 to 00:00 hours 14 June 2023 incorporated all details pertaining to SMS, Call data, WhatsApp exchanges and GPRS location data. It also included VC's limited interaction with others, notably Bil Monteiro and Elias Calocane. D781 - JAR30072023 - Version 2 was created by Jono Rushen. I now refer to that as URN: NGPF0003023.

220. At 15:00 hours on 15 June 2023 I recorded in my policy log (policy decision 41) a number of FT actions in relation to that analysis. Detectives were to see and speak to Elias Calocane (VC's brother), Ali Parvez (Leicester warehouse incident in May), review VC's movements between London and Nottingham (cross referencing cell site data#), (as at policy decision 42), see VC's mother, father and sister plus his friend Bil Monteiro. I recorded my rationale "*a number of actions have been raised, based on SIU input today from analyst Jono Rushen re billing returns from mobile number [VC phone number 2] (a number provided for the suspect by the University of Nottingham). Also, mobile number [VC phone number 3] (provided by his brother)*".

221. Telephone material when overlaid with CCTV product and relevant witness testimony provided an effective framework to understand VC's movements, contacts and actions leading up to the attacks. These independent areas of investigations were corroborative of each other as exhibited by the analyst in his SOE – URN: NGPF0003023.
222. Regarding the content of important messages, I list below those considered important as SIO. A full list of communications can be determined by reviewing the SOE by the analyst.
223. Elias Calocane (S13 – URN: NGPF0008987 / S 13 A – URN: NGPF0008988) in his statements outlined how his brother VC rang him on 12 and 13 June 2023 from the mobile number ending [VC phone number]. He stated his brother often used two numbers as he was paranoid about being monitored. Elias outlined how he thought his brother believed MI6 were listening to him; despite previous psychotic incidents, his brother sounded calm and fine on the call (although the 'stuff' he was saying was not).
224. The time when Elias Calocane spoke to VC on Monday 12 June 2023 via WhatsApp, was 19:09 hours ending at 19:53 hours. Elias Calocane states in his witness testimony that VC said: *'This will be the last time I will talk to you, After this I will leave you alone' '...I will send you the files that i sent to mum and dad at Christmas. I know what is happening this is real' '...just disassociate yourself from me, if anything happens don't come and see me in the hospital'.*
225. At 23.52 hours, Elias Calocane received an e-mail from VC (URN: NGPF0004065) containing documents (URN: NGPF0000127). At 00:47

hours 13 June 2023, having sent the e-mail, VC switched his mobile phone handset off. It remained off until 01:24 hours that morning when it was switched back on. Cell site data at 02:50 hours indicated his phone was in the Basford, Nottingham, area.

226. Consequently, there is no cell data for the period 00:47 and 01:24 hours 13 June 2023 to assist with analysis of VC's movements.
227. For completeness, the zip file (URN: NGPF0000127), sent by VC to Elias Calocane contained approximately 1400 documents, including files URN: NGPF0009039 to URN: NGPF0009219. Officers were tasked to proportionately review the videos and documents contained within it. A preliminary review by officers Cumberpatch, Beddoe and Mason resulted in the translation of various documents from Portuguese into English for review. The majority of that material surrounded the topic of 'mind control' by the state to control individuals.
228. Two main documents therein, titled "ReadmeFirst" (EM303 (D 21), which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0008857 and "update" (EM304 D 22), which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0002529 were obvious standouts for translation into English and done so by Eloisa Galluzzi Dos Santos, her statement exhibited as URN: NGPF0002818. The email discussion surrounding these documents I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0008860. I would describe the contents written by VC therein as clear ramblings of an individual with mental health issues. By means of illustration D22 – URN: NGPF0002529 outlined how VC within the correspondence to his brother included "*the video "DARPAadvisor reveals conscious AI supercomputers utilized for*

mind control_1080p.mp4” in the folder AmericanNews. This was a mistake and should not be there, I only noticed it later. The video that was supposed to be there is “Dr James Giordano at the Modern War Institute at West Point.mp4”. It is a short video where he identifies several possible manners to “weaponize neuroscience”.

229. Outside of matters regarding mental state of mind (background for VC), the zip file did not progress the recovery of either the Slazenger bag or the progression of the homicide investigation. The full translation and review of each of those 1400 documents was clearly not a proportionate line of enquiry to progress the investigation.
230. Elias stated to officers that his brother did not say where he was, but he believed he was in London on a train having heard a background announcement proclaim, ‘this train will be arriving at Blackfriars’. His assertion was a correct one, a fact corroborated both by cell and CCTV data. Elias further states his brother did not say where he was going or what he was planning to do.
231. Between 02:50 hours and 02:56 hours, Tuesday 13 June 2023, cell site data had VC’s phone in the Basford area of Nottingham (NG7) before he switched his mobile off at 03:03 hours for a second time. It was not turned on again until 04:47 hours Tuesday 13 June 2023 (after the attacks on Barnaby Webber and Grace O’Malley–Kumar).
232. The last location data at 03:03 hours provided a focus for CCTV capture, with CCTV analysis thereafter picking VC up between 03:10 and 03:30 hours as he walked on Ilkeston Road to a shrub area / pathway providing

access to Hopedale Close (just off Ilkeston Road). Here VC remained until the time he commenced his attacks at 04:00 hours against Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar on Ilkeston Road (refer to CCTV SOE Document v.2, ASG/507 – URN; NGPF0010192).

233. The next relevant contact between VC and Elias Calocane is after the brutal attacks on Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar. The contact was by WhatsApp and occurred after VC switched his mobile phone back on at 04:47 hours, Tuesday 13 June 2023.
234. Elias Calocane says in his statement: *"he (VC) rang again at 04.52 hours for 1 min 5 secs, he said 'did you get the documents' 'this will be the last time I speak to you, take the family out of the country' I said (to him) 'are you going to do something stupid', I was thinking he was going to self-harm or commit suicide, He had said (mentioned in) 2020, suicide before, (but) he has never expressed to me that he would cause harm to other people. He said 'It's all ready done' and then he hung up."* That conversation is also recorded within the SOE (D781 – URN: NGPF0003023).
235. After the conversation at 04:54 hours, Elias Calocane contacted his mother via WhatsApp to tell her about this conversation. He relayed to her that conversation; but like Elias, she also could not get hold of VC. He was not answering any calls.
236. Between 04:47 hours (the time that VC switched his mobile back on) and the time of his arrest, VC made no further calls and did not respond to any messages.

237. Cell site and telephony enquiries assisted to establish VC's movements and directed search and witness strategies. There was never any mention of a Slazenger bag within the material examined and their analysis did not lead to any disclosures, information or the recovery of the Slazenger bag.

e. Any CCTV analysis, including precise timings

238. My policy log (URN: NGPF0008791) is clear that CCTV enquiries would become a key feature of my investigation (policy decision 11 and policy decision 22). CCTV trawls were initially undertaken at the three main sites (Ilkeston Road, Magdala Road and the City Centre) before further extension outward, as dictated by witness testimony and telephony analysis.

239. I noted in my policy log at 13:40 hours, 13 June 2023 (policy decision 33) regarding my CCTV strategy that a *"local CCTV team will be established (with support from the Counter Terrorist IRAT team) to search, identify and then secure relevant CCTV / video evidence. Initial time parameters to focus between 03:00 (4.04 am- Ilkeston Road attack) and 5.45 (arrest of suspect by OS at 05:35 hours)."* I note my rationale as follows. *"Starting with the locations of the three main incidents and then expanding outwards, this will assist gather / secure and preserve evidence regarding serious crime which if pursued could bring about an early resolution of the enquiry and progress hypothesis. It is a key piece of work that will also assist not just gather fast-track evidence but later will enable early CPS liaison to take place. At this moment in time I am aware of CCTV footage covering incident 1 and also events within the City Centre. Ds Par Ahluwalia will coordinate*

the grab and seizure efforts, as (Dc) Az Stevens-Garrib will start to put together all relevant footage in a narrative to assist investigators”.

240. A master spreadsheet outlining the CCTV recovered and viewed by officers was produced (URN: NGPF0008793). It represents hundreds of resource hours put into the strategy, securing an editing document from which the final SOE was prepared by the CCTV coordinator ((URN: NGPF0010192).
241. I commend these documents in their entirety to the Inquiry. But as requested, I will include here the relevant times and date extracts along with a brief narrative as to the event from the CCTV imagery collated.
242. On Monday 12 June 2023 between 20:15 – 21:30, VC arrives at St Pancras International Train Station via the Thames Link, London.
243. At 20:15 hours VC makes his way towards the payment barriers providing access to the lower concourse. VC is shown wondering around the lower concourse between 20:15 and 20:55 hours. During this period, he is shown leaving his Slazenger bag unattended.
244. Between 20:55 – 21:29 hours VC then is seen to make his way to the upper concourse where he interacts with a ticket machine before boarding the EMA train to Nottingham.
245. Between 23:25 – 23:56 hours on Monday 12 June 2023, VC arrived at Nottingham Train Station. The East Midlands train from London St Pancras arrived at Nottingham Train Station Platform B, at 23:25 hours. At 23:28 hours VC exits the train and sits on a platform bench. At this time, he was wearing a Mid Tone Beanie Style Hat, Light Tone T-shirt, Dark Tone

Trousers, Dark Tone Trainers with a light tone outer edge to the sole. He is in possession at this time with a Dark Tone Rucksack (worn over the right shoulder) and Dark Tone Slazenger bag. At 23:29 hours VC puts on a Dark Tone Long Sleeve Top before he sits on the platform bench where at 23:30 hours he is shown to be using a mobile device.

246. At 23:00 hours the device containing the number attributed to VC (07392 386166) connects to the East Midlands Railway Wi-Fi (as evidenced in URN: NGPF0003001 and URN: NGPF0002398). Call data records confirm that the number [VC phone number 7] (used in SIM Slot 2) for mobile device JR/11 - Motorola mobile phone – and recovered from VC on arrest, had at 23:32 hours made a search in the Google Play Store for 'file manager'.
247. At 23:42 hours VC stands and gathers his belongings on CCTV before making his way along Platform 3B and the male public toilets. He remains in the area between platform 1A and 3A and is shown using his mobile device before making his way from the platform towards the tram bridge at 23:55 hours.
248. Analysis of VC's mobile account (URN: NGPF0009016) shows that at 23:52 hours, VC sends an email from his Gmail account ([VC phone number 7]) to his brother Elias containing the zip file (EAMC1 - URN: NGPF0000127).
249. From the analytical SOE (D595 – URN: NGPF0002374) the e-mail to his brother at 23:52 hours is likely to be the interaction seen by CCTV investigators.
250. At 23:56 hours VC arrived on the tram bridge. He engages with tram staff before sitting alone and interacting again with a mobile device. This is the

only known visible face to face interaction VC has with anybody until the commencement of the attacks.

251. At 00:06 hours Tuesday 13 June 2023, Tram 236 arrives at the tram bridge and VC enters the front carriage. Other passengers are present on the tram, but VC sits alone in the front carriage, again interacting with his mobile device.
252. As Tram 236 arrives at Wilkinson Street, VC prepares to exit at 00:23 hours, Tuesday 13 June 2023. CCTV from Tram 236 shows VC leaving the tram platform and crossing over Wilkinson Street before heading in the direction Gladstone Street, Radford Road. He is last seen at 00:29 hours.
253. At 00:44 hours, VC turns his device off for approximately 40 minutes before turning it back on at 01:24 hours.
254. At 01:17 hours, CCTV investigators capture VC's movements within the area of New Basford. He is shown entering a playground area located on Chard Street. He no longer has the Slazenger bag in his possession, and has changed his footwear, now wearing Dark Tone Boots. At 01:29 hours VC exits the playground area and makes his way out on to Nottingham Road where he attends a cash machine located at Sainsbury's supermarket to withdraw cash.
255. Between 01:34 – 01:37 hours, VC travels along Nottingham Road towards Rosetta Road. He continues on foot between 02:19 – 03:10 hours through the Radford area towards Ilkeston Road. At 03:10 hours VC steps out on to Ilkeston Road and makes his way towards Middleton Street, eventually turning left into Middleton Street from Ilkeston Road.

256. At 03:14 hours VC then exits Middleton Street and travels back towards the pathway between Ilkeston Road and Cleveland Close. Between 03:15 and 03:29 hours VC remains within the vicinity of the pathway between Ilkeston Road and Cleveland Close. He does not seem to have any obvious purpose, aimlessly walking around.
257. 03:30 hours is the last sighting of VC until the attacks begin. He is seen to step out onto Ilkeston Road before crossing the junction with Middleton Street and out of view. There are no further sightings of VC between 03:30:47 – 04:00:00 (the time of the attacks).
258. As depicted within the CCTV SOE Document (ASG/507 – URN: NGPF0010192), a pedestrian crossing is located at the point where VC goes out of view. A pathway just beyond that pedestrian crossing provides access to Hopedale Close. At this point investigators think that VC crossed over Ilkeston Road towards that pathway providing access to Hopedale Close and remained within this area out of view until the time Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar walked past.
259. Between 03:49 – 03:59 hours, CCTV picks up the movements of Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar, as they walk along Ilkeston Road. They walk together, past the junction of Middleton Street towards the pathway near Hopedale Close and the position VC was last sighted. As they walk past this location, seconds later, VC is captured following Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar from behind. VC now has hold of the rucksack which had previously been worn over both shoulders.

260. At 04:00 hours, the attack by VC on Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar starts, without warning or provocation, outside the properties 312 and 314 Ilkeston Road. The attack by VC, using a single dagger, lasted for approximately 2 minutes. The injuries sustained were catastrophic and are listed by Home Office Pathologist Dr Mike Biggs in his statements. I now exhibit Dr Biggs' statement for Barnaby Webber as URN: CPSE0006754 and his statement for Grace O'Malley-Kumar as URN: NGPF0002635.
261. The area of this attack provided limited CCTV coverage; however detectives in their evidence trawl identified a stationary taxi with a potential 'Dashcam'. A statement was obtained from Mr Terab, the owner of the taxi, on 13 June 2023 (S19), which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0002445. Whilst he had not witnessed anything, when officers recovered the Dashcam they discovered that it had graphically captured the relentless and savage attack on the two students in audio and video. The CCTV files were retrieved from an SD card (police exhibit MAT/02) in the Dashcam from vehicle MM15TVX, and were seized as police exhibit MAT/01. The sight of view afforded by this footage is illustrated on page 29 of the CCTV narration (URN: NGPF0010192) with selected stills depicting limited images of the attack.
262. Witness Shilpa Venugopal had also recorded part of the attack on her mobile phone (police exhibit SV/1) as documented in her statement (S25A), which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0002458. The sight of view afforded by this distressing footage is illustrated on pages 30 and 33 of URN: NGPF0010192.

263. Prior to the attack VC had taken his rucksack off. He is not wearing it at the time of the attack and at 04:02 hours, he walks towards where his rucksack is located on the road and collects it. He then makes his way from Ilkeston Road towards Hopedale Close and the Radford area. The rucksack can be seen in his hands as he does so.
264. From 04:02 – 05.01 hours VC is tracked from Ilkeston Road towards the Mapperley Area. At 05:01 hours he arrives at Seely Hirst House where between 05:04 – 05:08 hours he attempts to gain entry inside the building. A statement was taken from Mr O'Connell, who initially reported this information to the police; I now exhibit this statement as URN: NGPF0002297. VC's hands can be seen pulling on the window frames. VC's fingerprints are subsequently linked and identified to this action (D222). This forensic result is outlined in the Streamlined Forensic Report dated 15 June 2023, URN: NGPF0008867. VC engages and speaks to the security guard Ivan **GRO-B** when challenged (D52) and is punched by occupant Trevor Proverbs when he tries to enter Proverbs bedroom via the window. VC walks off but then returns. A statement was obtained from Mr Proverbs, which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0002326. A video recorded interview was obtained with Mr **GRO-B** I now refer to the English transcription of this recorded interview as URN: NGPF0000320.
265. On his return, between 05:11- 05:12 hours VC makes 4 strikes against the window with an object wrapped in a carrier bag. This was later established to be JR/15 Metal Pole found inside JR/14 an orange B&M bag - both exhibits were found inside the rucksack JR/9 recovered from VC.

266. As VC attacks the window, CCTV at 05:11 hours captures Ian Coates driving his van along Magdala Road towards Woodbrough Road. VC then leaves Seely Hirst House for the final time and walks off along Mapperley Road towards Woodborough Road.
267. No CCTV was found to cover the attack on Ian Coates. It has not been established how his van stopped or if he had already pulled his van over. However, between 05:14 - 05:15 hours, CCTV from an address within close proximity of the attack site on Magdala Road captures the sound of Ian Coates screaming in distress.
268. Having attacked Ian Coates, VC steals his white van (FD64LUJ) and at 05:15 hours is seen on CCTV driving the stolen van along Woodborough Road towards the city centre.
269. VC drives the White Van (FD64LUJ) along Mansfield Road towards Milton Street. He drives along a bus only lane on to Milton Street. At 05:23 hours the bus lane enforcement CCTV captures the impact between the van driven by VC and Wayne Birkett. In an obviously deliberate act, Wayne Birkett was struck from behind and driven over by VC. After impact, VC continues driving the van along Milton Street towards and on to Lower Parliament Street.
270. Between 05:23 – 05:29 hours, numerous CCTV cameras pick up the van through the City Centre before being seen by Police Officers. Police Officers in a vehicle (FJ23AEX) follow VC as he drives towards Sharon MILLER and Marcin GAWRONSKI who are at a pedestrian island between Market Street and Upper Parliament Street. VC deliberately drives into them both from

behind. The collision is captured on the Police dash camera (police exhibit CA-101-23) which contains distressing footage.

271. VC then drives out of the City Centre and into Radford Area at 05:32 hours. Police find the vehicle at 05:35 hours stationary on Bentinck Road next to the junction with Maples Street. Officers box the vehicle in and VC is tasered before being arrested.

Issue 3: Gaps in CCTV coverage

272. I consider the relevant location and time periods where there is an absence of CCTV coverage to capture the movements for VC as follows:

- VC's last sighting on Gladstone Street, Radford Road at 00:29:13 hours until his next sighting on Chard Street, New Basford at 01:17:28 hours.
- VC's last sighting on Rosetta Road, New Basford at 01:37:54 hours until his next sighting on Radford Road near the junction with Gregory Boulevard at 02:19:47 hours.
- VC's last sighting on Ilkeston Road near the pathway close to Hopedale Close at 03:30:47 hours until his next sighting on Ilkeston Road immediately before the attacks at 04:00:40 hours.
- VC's last sighting on Mapperley Road towards Woodborough Road at 05:13:10 hours until his next sighting driving the stolen Vivaro Van on Woodborough Road at 05:15 hours.

273. These periods were discovered following the implementation of the CCTV strategy.

274. From the outset CCTV was a key line of enquiry, and I mentioned it as such during my force briefing between 09:00 - 09:50 hours on 13 June 2023

(policy decision 11, URN: NGPF0008791). Officers were allocated to trawl locations and secure downloaded material from identified CCTV cameras within the scenes. The footage then had to be watched in real-time; first to determine whether VC was present and thereafter to trace movements. A Sgt was allocated (DS Par Ahluwalia) to supervise and coordinate 'grab and seizure efforts' with DC Az Stevens-Garrib (CCTV co-ordinator) coordinating, viewing and piecing together relevant footage to form a narrative to assist investigators.

275. At 11:30 hours 13 June 2023 I record in my policy log (policy decision 23) the decision to trawl for CCTV in areas I regarded at that time as priority locations. They were the three main designated sites: scene 1 (Ilkeston Road), Scene 2 (Magdala Road) and Scene 11 Nottingham City Centre (Milton Street / Parliament Street vehicle attacks); these were known locations that the offender(s) must clearly have been at to perpetrate the crimes. I record my rationale for doing so as "*progression of these actions is likely to bring about an earlier resolution of this investigation by securing best evidence*".

276. At 13:40 hours I add to that strategy (policy decision 33) by determining that "*local CCTV teams will be established (with support from CT IRAT teams (investigations retrieval assessment teams) to search, identify and then secure relevant CCTV / video evidence. Initial time parameters (were) to focus between 03:00 (as 04.00 hours being the commencement time for attacks) and 05.45 hours (post the suspect arrest time by OS - operational support - at 05:35 hours)*". The rationale I provided was that "*starting with the locations of the three main incidents and then expanding outwards, this*

will assist gather, secure and preserve evidence regarding serious crime which if pursued could bring about an early resolution of the enquiry and progress hypothesis. It is a key piece of work that will also assist not just gather fast-track evidence but later enable early CPS liaison to take place. At this moment in time I am aware of CCTV footage covering incident 1 and also events within the City Centre".

277. These enquiries were independent of, yet interdependent on the intelligence and financial enquiries underway, the witness testimonies being secured and the cell site and telephone analysis taking place. As more information entered the MIR, it was processed and assisted in the direction of further investigations for the CCTV teams.

278. In support of those decisions, at 13:40 hours 13 June 2023, I directed radio frequency ("RF") surveys be undertaken covering those key locations (policy decision 32). RF surveys enable investigators to analyse a mobile phone's call data records ("CDR's") including calls, texts and sometimes internet usage and using cell site data place them in an approximate area near to a particular mast (or cell) that was used to make the connection for that relevant CDR. A mast will only cover a certain geographical area which, when examined, will provide an approximate area of coverage for that particular mast. In this way we can plot the movement of a mobile telephone according to how it connects to different cells on different masts. This work was undertaken by technical support and digital teams in order to *"be able to assist place the offender at relevant scenes at relevant times"*.

279. These were the decisions behind the deployment of CCTV and digital resources to certain locations. You do not know what you do not know or what footage you do or do not have at a particular time until you undertake due process (i.e. trawl, secure, view, identify).
280. Wider movements for VC, including last sightings and his disappearance from Gladstone Street (00:29:13 – 01:17:28) and later Rosetta Road (01:37:54 – 02:19:47) were therefore unknown and the absence of any CCTV would only be established at a later date by applying due process to the recovered CCTV. That meant sifting and reviewing over and over again many cameras, and watching the many hours-worth of CCTV footage retrieved.
281. A master spreadsheet for recovered CCTV, with recorded viewing records and other related actions was undertaken by officers, (URN: NGPF0008793). From this an editing document was prepared, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0003014, which thereafter led to the final submission of CCTV analysis in the form of the SOE document (URN: NGPF0010192) and the CCTV Compilation (police exhibit HS/196/23). All CCTV and video imagery (as with all documents relevant to the investigation) were also recorded by the exhibits officer on the exhibits list, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008871.
282. CCTV recovery can be a difficult process and often would require the assistance of IT and digital experts to facilitate seizure and downloads. Regarding technical and digital assistance, I recorded in my policy log (policy decision 15) at 09:50 hours on 13 June 2023 that *'I will liaise with*

EMSOU to secure assistance for investigative expertise with regards digital and technical strategies'. I recorded my rationale for doing so that the "appointment of experts in this field will assist with securing technical evidence and assist with identification and development of other opportunities around all things digital, (plus) various communication devices and telephony. Again I will be liaising with CT to establish what assistance they can also provide in this area".

283. From EMSOU key managerial single points of contact ("SPOC's") were appointed to assist implement the strategy (policy decision 21) including SIU manager - Amy Grainger-Matthews, Digital manager - Lauren Cunliffe with Phones / Authorities/ Analysis - Jono Rushen.

284. Additionally, Gold Command (ACC Griffin) ensured support from CT resources (policy decision 27) where at 12:30 hours 13 June 2023, I noted that the majority of those officers (29 officers) would be *"deployed to Significant Witnesses, House to House and CCTV trawls. In addition, CT (would) provide a direct link (to the MIR) with their intelligence cell. I have stressed to them the need for them to link in with our SIU. Any sensitive information will be retained and managed by the CT network"*.

285. During my evening debriefing on 13 June 2023, at 19:00 hours, CCTV remained a key area of investigative business. I noted this in my policy log (policy decision 34) and how a focus on this (and other) areas of business, were likely to yield evidential material.

286. At 09:00 hours 15 June 2023, I directed that CT expedite examination of the mobile phone handset (JR/11) recovered from VC (Policy decision 39).

This would supplement location data enquiries with CT being *"able to assess any material found quickly and determine if there is any CT link. An evidential trawl (of material) will then be undertaken by the enquiry team."*

However, this enquiry did not assist trace VC's movements for the above specified times.

287. The other Interdependencies (intelligence, financial and telephone enquiries) directed further CCTV enquiries as evident in my decision at 19:00 hours on 15 June 2023 namely that CCTV resources be directed to establish VC's movements between 23:23 hours Monday 12 June 2023 and 04:00 hours 13 June 2023 (policy decision 49). The reason recorded being *"telephony and CCTV trawl has (the) suspect in London (the) weekend before (the) murders. He (VC) returns to Platform 3 Nottingham at 23.23 hours, Monday 12 June 2023 carrying a Black Slazenger holdall bag. His next known movement is at 01:33 hours, Sainsbury's ATM (Tuesday 13 June 2023), Perry Road, Nottingham"* because *"...there is a need to establish where he has been, who with (if anybody) and where property may be"*.

288. As more information was received into the MIR, the CCTV enquiries expanded outward to include locations including Gladstone Street and Rosetta Road. Efforts made to capture all of VC's movements were very considerable. Further efforts included:

289. Officer Reports prepared by DC Mount dated 30 June 2023, outlining further taskings with regards CCTV enquiries in and around the areas of Radford where VC had been identified and seen walking toward on the

morning of 13 June 2023. I now refer to these reports as URN: NGPF0003757 and URN: NGPF0003737 respectively.

290. Officer reports by DC Adams detail CCTV enquiries undertaken on 16 June 2023 in the area of Middleton St and Forest Road, before conducting further trawls in and around the Norton Court area of Radford on 21 June 2023. I now refer to these Officer reports as URN: NGPF0000460 and URN: NGPF0000462 respectively.
291. Further summaries covering house to house and CCTV strategies in and around scene 1, Ilkeston Road, dated 10 July 2023. I refer to these summaries as URN: NGPF0001856 and URN: NGPF0000463 respectively. A further report by DC Baird outlines his CCTV enquiries in and around this same location, I refer to DC Baird's report as URN: NGPF0000500.
292. CCTV trawls covering areas within Radford carried out by DC Akehurst dated 29 June 2023, covered Rifle Street, Denman Street West, St Peters Street, Clapham Street, Croydon Road, Lonsdale Road, and Hartley Road. I now exhibit DC Akehurst's officer report as URN: NGPF0003741.
293. Reports by DC Smith, dated 16 June 2023, which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0000485 and three reports by DC Gray dated 30 June 2023, 6 July 2023 and 7 July 2023, outline their CCTV trawls and enquiries covering the Northgate areas within Radford. I now refer to DC Gray's officer reports as URN: NGPF0003731, URN: NGPF0003732 and URN: NGPF0003733 respectively.

294. A copy of the spreadsheet regarding all Woodlands CCTV recovered by DS Doel was completed (D754) dated 8 September 2023. I refer to this spreadsheet as URN: NGPF0008885.
295. In conclusion, despite best endeavours, there remained an absence of CCTV footage or information from other enquiries to account for VC's movements for the periods listed; specific to CCTV coverage, it either did not exist for particular areas, or VC's movements were not captured by cameras within the locality.
296. The interdependent investigations failed to progress the establishment of VC's movements. His mobile telephones were often switched off and as such cell site or GPRS data did not assist. No financial transactions were undertaken during these periods; and with regards intelligence checks regarding links to known locations, those identified were subject to search, or an attendance visit by officers (as reported), all of which proved negative.
297. House to house enquiries conducted in the locality did not progress matters. For me, this was unsurprising considering both the time in question and the non-descript movements hitherto displayed by VC. No suspicious calls were received regarding VC until the commencement of the attacks.
298. On 19 December 2023 the criminal trial was adjourned for sentence administratively with the prosecution having indicated that VC's pleas of not guilty to murder but guilty to manslaughter by virtue of diminished responsibility would be accepted. All CCTV and enquiry actions regarding this matter were subsequently referred as their progression would no longer further the investigation.

Issue 4: Non-intimate samples

299. At the outset of the investigation a CSC was allocated to the enquiry. The College of Policing PPP (Policing Professional Profile) identifies their 'role purpose' being to *"co-ordinate the forensics investigation element of major and complex crimes, co-ordinating teams across multiple or complex crime scenes linking to a single case, or a series of crimes. Liaising with Crime Scene Managers, Senior Investigating Officers and Specialists in the development of forensic strategies for each site and the investigation as a whole. To ensure that individual investigations share information, learn lessons and make progress in the role that forensics plays in bringing offenders to court"*.
300. At 09:50 hours on 13 June 2023, I recorded in my policy log (policy decision 12, URN: NGPF0008791) that *'The Crime Senior Coordinator allocated will be Tess Buxton. I have delegated the following scenes that will require forensic consideration and review in order to provide the best opportunity to yield and harvest best forensic evidence to assist the investigation'*.
301. I listed the full series of complex scenes requiring forensic examination at that time including VC. They were designated as follows:
- Scene 1: Ilkeston Road,
 - Scene 2: Magdala Road,
 - Scene 3: FD64 LUJ (stolen vehicle belonging to Ian Coates),
 - Scene 4: Noel Street,
 - Scene 5: Grace O'Malley-Kumar,
 - Scene 6: Barnaby Webber,

- Scene 7: Ian Coates,
- Scene 8: Potential home address of VC GRO-B Madison Court,
- Scene 9: Wayne Birkin (Milton Street - critical condition),
- Scene 10: VC in custody,
- Scene 11: Milton Street / Parliament Street.

302. I record my rationale for this decision as one where I use expert advice for *“the best opportunity to secure best and most fresh forensic evidence (so as to prove or disprove the hypothesis set) and to drive further lines of enquiry to assist with the investigation”*.

303. The forensic strategy for VC was completed by an experienced CSC, with considerable experience in MC investigations. Additional input from scientists was sought, as and when required, as illustrated for example, in the minutes for the forensic management team meeting on Wednesday 21 June 2023, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0008886.

304. VC’s suspect strategy was written by CSC Buxton and agreed by me as SIO. This strategy was referred to as the Evidence Recovery Plan, and I now refer to it as URN: NGPF0008888. The strategic aim of that plan was to secure maximum forensic evidence from VC whilst he was in custody and establish forensic links between the victim, suspects and crime scenes.

305. To implement that strategy Crime Scene Investigator (“CSI”) Cano-Flatt attended custody with DC Beddoe. The CSI would secure full body length photography, head and shoulder photography, hand photography (front and back photography) and then assist detectives in taking the following non-intimate samples; swabs from areas that contained visible bloodlike

substances, hand swabs, nail scrapings, a DNA 17 sample for comparison (mouth swab), before the sequential recovery of clothing (which was to be photographed prior to packaging). In addition, VC would thereafter have a set of fingerprints taken by custody staff. I refer to the corresponding statement of DC Beddoe as URN: NGPF0002621. I refer to the statement of CSI Cano-Flatt as URN: NGPF0002777 and the notes that accompany that statement as URN: NGPF0002697.

306. The assistance of the Health Care Professional (“HCP”) was required regarding other aspects of the evidence recovery plan (URN: NGPF0008888) including the body mapping of injuries, and to secure intimate samples with regards blood and urine (both of which were requested from VC)
307. This strategy was provided verbally and e-mailed to those involved at 01:54 hours on 14 June 2023. This email was titled Suspect ERP – Operation Hendrix EM296, and which I now exhibit as URN: NGPF0008892. For the avoidance of doubt, a sample of head hair was not requested as seen in the CSI worksheet report (URN: NGPF0002697). Additionally, CSI Cano-Flatt provided a statement of the examination of VC (URN: NGPF0002777).
308. At policy decision 18, I reinforced the requirement to secure suspect evidence by appointing a Tier 5 manager (initially DS 202 Pollard, later DS Blyth) to oversee investigative issues under PACE. Duties included documenting requests for forensic samples (including progression of the forensic recovery plans). Relevant matters were recorded on the custody

record (reference C23034379), which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0007773.

309. The forensic recovery plan (URN: NGPF0008888) included a mixture of intimate and non-intimate samples. Intimate samples require both the consent of the PACE Inspector and the detainee (VC) before they can be obtained by the HCP. Non-intimate samples (including for example head hair samples) do not require the consent of the detainee and can be taken by force, if necessary, by a police officer.
310. At 10:05 hours on 13 June 2023 both DC Beddoe and CSI Cano-Flatt attended Custody and requested photographs and hand swabs. VC shook his head indicating “no” (without actual comment). Arrangements were made for additional officers to attend and assist with force, if required. Officers PC 854 Murphy, PC 346 Brough, PC 3581 Stackhouse and PC 3882 Price attended custody in full personal protective equipment (“PPE”). I refer to the statement of PC 3581 Stackhouse as URN: NGPF0002429, I refer to the statement of PC 3882 Price as URN: NGPF0002321.
311. CSI Cano-Flatt, and DC Beddoe wore masks, double gloves, hair net, over suit and over shoes (as outlined in URN: NGPF0002621 and URN: NGPF0002777), and secured the specified non-intimate samples from a passive aggressive VC. Actual force was not required.
312. The request for blood and urine was clearly made and endorsed on the custody record (C23034379 – URN: NGPF0007773). These were declined.
313. Analysis of a blood or urine sample can determine what, if anything (in terms of drugs or alcohol), may or may not be present in a suspect's system,

at that particular moment in time. Any sample of head hair taken at that time for toxicological analysis would not have assisted investigators come to that conclusion, though it might have indicated whether VC had taken controlled drugs in recent weeks or months.

314. The custody record, (URN: NGPF0007773) notes that the request for blood and urine was made, both in accordance with the strategy and also PACE 1984 legislation; the request was authorised by the PACE Inspector, but declined by VC, as was his lawful right.
315. Several non-intimate samples listed within the strategy were secured and taken without the consent of the suspect. That forensic strategy did not include a sample of head hair, and it was not considered as a fast-track action.
316. The advice I received outlined a lack of purpose, either in terms of providing a forensic link between the victims, VC and crime scenes (over and above that obtained by the DNA 17 sample taken) or in terms of determining any toxicological findings, then and there, for the presence of drugs or alcohol within VC's system at the time when the attacks were committed.
317. The method to secure such a "then and there" toxicology result would have been via blood and urine analysis. Hence the request for blood and urine.
318. At the time of his arrest, it is my understanding that any drug taken on that day would not have had the required time to circulate hair follicles and become incorporated within any hair sample taken. That would only present and become incorporated in the hair matrix during the growth period in the following weeks.

319. The scientific advice I had received was that hair analysis would not be able to provide any date as to when drugs or alcohol would have been used or if they were present in the person's system, at a specific time when offending took place.
320. Whilst VC was in police custody between 13 and 16 June 2023, I did not consciously turn my mind to the potential partial defence to murder of diminished responsibility. With hindsight, I wish I had directed the taking of a head hair sample from VC whilst he was in police custody, if necessary, by force.
321. Had I done so, it seems clear from the evidence that any such sample would very likely have shown that VC did not take controlled drugs. However, by establishing that fact, it would have eliminated the anxieties felt by the families that VC's paranoid schizophrenia might have been self-induced through taking of controlled drugs. I regret my oversight in this respect and wish to apologise for it and the anxiety it has caused.
322. I take full responsibility for the decision not to take a head hair sample from VC in custody.
323. With multiple fatalities, although open minded, I had placed a lot of emphasis on the possibility of this being a terrorist attack. By the 16 June 2023 VC was charged with murder, appearing before magistrates on the 17 June 2023 before his committal to the Crown Court where he gave no indication of plea. Terrorism had been ruled out as a motive by this juncture. Only later when notified of a Psychiatric report by the CPS did the issue of diminished responsibility become fully apparent.

324. This relates to the psychiatric report received by CPS from Dr McSweeney dated 25 August 2023 but not served on the prosecution until 2 October 2023. This was the same day it was shared with the investigation team (Electronic message EM1117 refers, which I now refer to as URN: CPSE0002937). This is the correspondence later referred to in my policy log dated 13 October 2023.
325. On 13 October 2023 I record in my policy file at decision 73 that the defence had sought a psychiatric assessment which had been received by the CPS. In short it stated that VC was fit to plead, the defence of insanity was not available, but the partial defence of diminished responsibility (concerning the murders charged) was available. I noted at that time how that position was not acceptable to the Crown and as such CPS would instruct experts to consider the position. A meeting with the FLOs was arranged so that a consistent update could be provided to the families regarding this position.
326. Following receipt of Dr Blackwood's report on behalf of the prosecution on 21 November 2023 (EM1165 refers, which I now refer to as URN: CPSE0001066), I recorded in my policy file at decision 79 that I had now received the psychiatric reports, all of which were in agreement that the partial defence of diminished responsibility was available. This was communicated to the families via the FLOs.
327. This position caused stress and anxiety for the families. They raised the possibility of VC's paranoid schizophrenia being self-induced through drug abuse. In hindsight, had I directed the taking of a head hair sample whilst VC was in custody, if necessary, by force, this could have been sent for

examination. And despite the absence of any evidence to suggest drug or alcohol use by VC, an examination of head hair may have gone some way towards eliminating the anxieties felt by the families by addressing the issue of self-induced schizophrenia through drug abuse. It was never my intention to cause stress and anxiety to the families and if I have done that I sincerely and unreservedly apologise.

328. The forensic samples that were obtained formed part of a forensic submissions strategy; with the items fast-tracked for forensic analysis, forensic work request reference FWR2300021955, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008896, securing unequivocal evidence implicating VC as the offender for all the attacks.
329. I regularly undertook assessments of investigative decisions to reflect on decisions made, including VC's position regarding the refusal of samples. The written scientific advice I received on 17 January 2024 reinforced the earlier position. This advice was in the form of an email from CSC Buxton which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008897.
330. I conducted various forensic strategy meetings throughout the duration of this investigation, often including scientific input. Numerous policy decisions made and listed throughout can be referenced at policy decisions 11 (fast track forensic opportunities), decision 12 (forensic strategy), decision 18 (prisoner process including intimate and non-intimate samples), decision 22 (fast track forensic work around the van and knife), decision 28 (a forensic review / mature assessment of items for fast track submissions), decision 34 (review of main lines of enquiry), decision 37 (forensic analysis

– Chorley laboratory), decision 45 (suspect status – mature assessment), decision 56 (forensic case management meeting with scientists) decision 66 (Forensic Management Team meeting with scientists), decision 70 (forensic strategy and the stolen vehicle), decision 71 (Mature assessment - Forensic Strategy for fatalities - Further FMT meeting), decision 88 (Forensic strategy. To review toxicology position regarding VC following queries made Portishead meeting), decision 102 (forensic strategy and family queries regarding toxicology) decision 105 (Forensic Review / Toxicology), decision 118 (Policy Decision 118: Family Strategy: Toxicology decision to be referred to PSD and complaints procedure). Whilst scientific evidence ultimately secured overwhelming evidence to link VC to all the attacks, toxicological analysis regarding VC never featured in any forum or discussion, never being an issue of contention until the family meeting at Bristol on 7 December 2023.

331. FLOs were deployed and engaged in regular contact with next of kin. Logs of their contacts were made. The FLA contact log, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008900, is an overarching log giving a full overview relating to FLO contact with families. Additionally, individual logs were created with regards to specific individuals / families. A FLO log was created specific to Ian Coates children, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008901; The FLO log created for Elaine Newton, partner of Ian Coates, I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002519; The FLO log created for the Webber family I now refer to as URN: NGPF0002496 and the FLO log created for the O'Malley-Kumar family I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008904.

332. Understandably, it became clear that families did not want specific details surrounding the investigation; rather they would let the enquiry team know when the time was right for them to have specific details. This position was reiterated personally to me by Dr Sanjoy Kumar at his home address on 22 August 2023 as documented in the FLO log (URN: NGPF0008904) and later by Mrs Emma Webber at her home address on 12 September 2023, as documented in the FLO log (URN: NGPF0002496). This position will be recorded regarding other family members within the FLO logs maintained for them.
333. In addition, I too would have recorded relevant decisions within my policy log reflective of this position. By means of example, that would include decision 76 (Investigations - New Timetable), decision 78 (Investigations - Meeting between Police, Prosecutors and Family to update as to psychiatric reports and legal position: scheduled 24 November 2023), decision 81 (Mature Assessment following family meeting with prosecutors 24 November 2023), policy decision 85 (CPS to consider commission of further psychiatric report to address family concerns) decision 87 (SIO to visit families with FLO and CPS. Meeting arranged at Avon and Somerset HQ, Portishead for 12:30 hours 7 December 2023) for O'Malley-Kumar and Webber families) to name a few.
334. On 24 November 2023, a meeting was held with members from the O'Malley-Kumar and Webber families along with police colleagues, CPS representatives and Counsel (FLO Log Webber Family, URN: NGPF0002496 and FLO Log O'Malley-Kumar Family, URN: NGPF0008904). At this meeting the represented families were informed in

detail of psychiatric reports received and the possible defence of diminished responsibility (other families who did not want to meet counsel at this juncture were provided this information via the FLOs).

335. This meeting led to a series of queries and challenges by the represented families and therefore a follow up meeting with the same family members was arranged at Avon and Somerset Police Headquarters for 7 December 2023.
336. On 7 December 2023, police and CPS met with the O'Malley-Kumar and Webber families at Avon and Somerset Police headquarters. The purpose of the meeting was to go through in detail aspects of the investigation including VC, his background, the investigation, psychiatric reports plus an opportunity to share a CCTV SOE chart which outlined VC's movements and interaction with the victims (URN: NGPF0010192). With ever-shortening criminal justice timeframes (the timeframe that had been set by the court for the service of evidence and provisional trial date for the case), it was by then imperative that the family be told specific details. Detailed minutes of the meeting were taken by FLO's, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008905. The minutes were shared with the families.
337. During this meeting Dr Kumar raised issues with the psychiatric assessments and the taking of forensic samples (the type of samples taken and not taken, including blood and urine). The families were informed that VC had refused blood and urine samples, but they would be given a full list of samples that were secured.

338. On 8 December 2023 I had telephone contact with FLO DC Cutts, following her contact with Dr Kumar. This being documented in the O'Malley-Kumar Family FLO Log (URN: NGPF0008904). I relayed information verbally to DC Cutts around which samples were taken, and that I would send her, in writing, my decisions which could be shared with families. Again, this is recorded within my policy log (policy decision 88).
339. To ensure no missed opportunities, the contact prompted a self-imposed review regarding the toxicology position. I contacted CSC Buxton for her views and through her, the scientific position. Following those discussions, I remained content and confident with the initial position and a full policy decision was made reflecting this matter on 8 December 2023 (policy decision 88).
340. Examination of the FLO logs identify that at 14:15 hours on 15 December 2023 a document titled 'Information for family -questions and answers' was sent to Dr Kumar by the FLO's, which I now refer to as URN: CPSE0009084. Specific to the issue of toxicology were again answers to the following questions:
- Q 4. What toxicology and samples were taken in custody? 4a. Non-intimate samples were taken at 11.15 on 13/06/23. No toxicology was taken due to lack of consent from the defendant whilst in custody. The psychologist reports all state the defendant denies illicit drug taking. All the hospital/medical notes detail there is no evidence of drug use. Notes from HMP Manchester document continuing psychosis whilst provided with the relevant medication and he would have no opportunity to acquire illicit drugs there either.

- Q 8. Can hair sampling be done of the defendant now to determine any drug use?

8a. SIO – No this will not be done. The defendant has no history of drug abuse”.

341. As stated above, and with hindsight, I could have asked for compulsory head hair sampling whilst VC was in police custody. Any negative test result would have assisted in eliminating controlled drugs as being a possible cause of his paranoid schizophrenia.

342. On 13 December 2023 the FLOs had a joint TEAMS meeting with the O'Malley-Kumar and Webber families, so that, as agreed at Avon and Somerset on 7 December 2023, the families could go through the psychiatric reports in detail and raise any further questions. I was informed by the FLOs that Dr Kumar had again asked about urine samples and that hair samples now needed to be taken so that toxicology screening could take place through hair sampling.

343. Minutes were taken of that meeting, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0004150. The families were clearly concerned about the psychiatric reports, with a belief that VC could manipulate the system.

344. Dr Kumar stated that accurate assessment of his mental health diagnosis at the time of the index offence could have negated the issue of diminished responsibility. Dr Kumar's suggestion was that the sampling and analysis of VC's head hair could assist matters and further negate the defence of diminished responsibility being put forward by the defence. On the 15 December 2023 I received an email from FLO, DC MCVEY, which I refer to

as URN: NGPF0004148, containing three documents; Information for Family (URN: CPSE0009084); Notes of the meeting on 13 December 2023 (URN: NGPF0004150) and Notes of the meeting on 7 December 2023 (URN: NGPF0008905).

345. I scheduled a meeting for 19 December 2023 between myself, CPS and the O'Malley-Kumar and Webber families to take place in London at Romford Police Station: the aim being to discuss this and other matters which the families wished to raise directly in person. Again, an entry was made in my policy log (policy decision 96) regarding this matter.
346. CPS lawyer Sam Shallow had agreed to attend with myself in person. The meeting was, however, cancelled by the attending families.
347. On 18 December 2023 I had a meeting with CPS and the FLOs. At this meeting I was informed that CPS would be accepting the pleas of diminished responsibility, and the court would be informed of this fact in writing the following day – 19 December 2023. The pleas however would not be formally accepted by the court until it next sat (scheduled for 16 January 2024). Letters regarding the CPS decision would be hand delivered by the FLOs.
348. This occurred on the 19 December 2025 as documented in the O'Malley-Kumar family FLO Log (URN: NGPF0008904). The families informed the FLOs that they did not want any further contact with police and CPS until the new year, but would welcome a meeting with prosecution Counsel during the new year. I refer to the letters to each family as follows: URN: NGPF0003181 - CPS Letter to O'Malley-Kumar family; URN:

NGPF0008914 - CPS Letter to Webber family and URN: NGPF0008915 - CPS Letter to Coates family.

349. Understanding that families were dealing with a range of very challenging issues at that time, as well as their bereavement, their request for space was complied with. The FLO's informed the families that should that requirement change, they should make contact.
350. On 19 December 2023 at 00:57 hours, I along with Sam Shallow at the CPS received e-mail correspondence from Dr Kumar titled 'Concerns about Psychiatric reports'. The Webber family were copied into this correspondence which I now refer to as URN: NPGF0004156.
351. A document was also attached to the e-mail, CPS Concerns Document, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008916. Relevant to the issue of samples are the following extracts:
- "As far as I know Dr Blackwood has simply taken the defendant's word on the use of drugs as in his report with regards to Cannabis, he noted 'tried it, didn't like it'. Did Dr Latham suggest that to cement this line of inquiry of use of drugs, which is a well-known cause of exacerbation of paranoid schizophrenia we use a hair & root non-intimate sample to send for toxicology to determine drug use. This method can also provide approximate dates of drug use which directly influences a plea. The fact that Dr Blackwood simply takes the medical history from many months before and from the defendant's statement on this matter shows should be backed up by scientific evidence to support the clinical

truth about drug use. How can he simply rely on the defendant's words in a serious homicide case as this?"

- "To my knowledge even after we have suggested hair sampling, a sample of hair has not been sent for toxicology, we have simply been told that intimate samples of blood and urine were refused on the day."
- "So for the sake of investigative robustness, why has hair still not been analysed for drug use?"

352. Whilst I accept that it was not their task, I note that neither Dr Blackwood nor Dr Latham suggested the analysis of head hair samples within the enquiry. I again discussed hair samples with the CSC who reaffirmed that it would not be possible to give an exact date from hair analysis as to when drugs were taken, how often they were taken or their quantity. The CSC stated that hair sampling might provide an indication as to any historic drug use, but it would reflect the position at a time weeks before the attacks. And even then, it is not an exact science. This advice seems to have reinforced my mistakenly held belief that being able to show the presence of drugs only at the time the offence was committed was the only way forensic analysis, with regards diminished responsibility, could be of value. This could have resulted in my adoption of a dogmatic approach surrounding the matter. This is where the benefit of an independent PIP 4 advisor could have brought value. Equally it could have eliminated the possibility of controlled drug use by VC in the months leading up to his attacks on 13 June 2023.

353. For reasons outlined (mistaken or otherwise), samples of head hair were not taken from VC, and they would not be pursued retrospectively. Apart

from the evidential limitations now surrounding VC's continuity, the potential contamination issues and in my knowledge at least, the absence of any statutory basis for doing so, the advice I was in receipt of now seems to have reinforced my mistakenly held beliefs surrounding toxicology and its uses. This decision not to take samples had been relayed to the O'Malley-Kumar and Webber families by the FLOs on several occasions. Those dates include 8 December 2023, 15 January 2024 and 17 January 2024.

354. On the 15 January 2024 a Teams meeting was held between myself, the FLO's and the O'Malley-Kumar and Webber families. Minutes from the meeting were documented, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008917.
355. On the 16 January 2024, FLO DC Cutts again made me aware of a communication between herself and the O'Malley-Kumar family surrounding intimate and non-intimate samples. This was followed up by e-mail correspondence by the FLOs where again the families were sent the list of samples undertaken, informed once more of the agreed forensic strategy and again reiterating the fact that head hair samples would not be obtained from VC for analysis following SIO decisions. I now refer to that email chain as URN: NGPF0008918.
356. The correspondence reiterated previous messages provided to the families at Bristol on 7 December 2023 (as detailed in the minutes of that meeting, URN: NGPF0008905) and the written and verbal updates from the FLOs on 15 December 2023 (URN: NGPF0004148).
357. In response to that communication only later did I notice a further e-mail sent directly to myself and CPS lawyer Sam Shallow at 02:06 hours on 16

January 2024 from Dr Sanjoy Kumar, (email chain URN: NGPF0008918). The message copies in the Webber family and while it is addressed to myself and Sam Shallow at the CPS, it uses my first name when addressing the points within. It reads as follows:

358. *'Dear Leigh, I am reading the e mail below with some shock & horror. In a case of serious assault/GBH let alone serious multiple homicide a full cache of non-intimate samples are taken. This was my own forensic practice for all serious assaults let alone murder. A non-intimate hair sample can be sent for forensic splicing and drug use ascertained in no time and with forensic accuracy. Forensic Health Services can do this analysis rapidly. The defendant and his lifestyle that you described yourself is most definitely congruent with someone who uses drugs. The statement 'The psychologist reports all state the defendant denies illicit drug taking' is naive. Lets not abuse anyone's intelligence and say that a manipulative defendant would actually confirm he uses drugs. The fact that the investigating team believe this and did not follow it up is unbelievable and a very large gap in the investigation. Dr Blackwood interviewed the defendant some 4 months after the index offences. Dr Blackwood will himself know that a vast number, if not majority, of mental health patients use drugs and in many cases the drugs actually exacerbate their condition. To not suggest a drug test in a serious case of multiple homicide is unreconcilable from a forensic and clinical standpoint. Non-intimate hair root samples would very accurately inform us of drug use. I am unable to come to terms with the fact that hair root samples were not taken. I will go further and say that hair samples can*

still be taken and analysed quite accurately and quickly. A forensic scientist can attest to the timeline of drug use with accuracy. 8. Can hair sampling be done of the defendant now to determine any drug use? 8a. SIO – No this will not be done. The defendant has no history of drug abuse. The most important fact being that drug use at the time would not allow the defendant the defense [sic] of being diminished. I would kindly ask for you to revisit this as soon as possible as there is still time for hair sampling. Kind regards, Sanjoy’.

359. At 14:55 hours on 16 January 2024, in response to this e-mail, correspondence was also received from David Webber (Barnaby’s father) (email chain URN: NGPF0008918). His e-mail also copied in the O’Malley-Kumar family, the CPS and some of the FLOs. The e-mail also included a hyperlink to a Daily Mail article dated 16 June 2023, titled ‘Nottingham ‘killer’ Valdo Calocane ‘used to sit out the back of house with his top off, smoking and drinking’ - as he tried to get work as a computer programmer’. For ease of reference, the e-mail from David Webber is included below.

360. *‘ Hi all, just to say I’m slightly gobsmacked as well, it seems to be well reported that he did take drugs and was evicted with housemates for doing it around September 2022, a very brief google search shows the Daily Mail reporting it. Seems you are relying on his word which is madness in such a serious case! David’*

361. It was clear that the families were critical of the prosecution position around diminished responsibility. Their understandable position was this was a case of murder that required a sentence amounting to a lifetime in prison.

The communication led to a natural review of my decision making surrounding this matter, and a further policy entry on 16 January 2024 (policy decision 102).

362. I asked for the scientific advice that I had received to be sent in writing. That written advice came in an email from Nicola Anderson (reporting team leader - Toxicology, Cellmark Forensic Services) forwarded to me by CSC Buxton dated 17 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0008897).

363. That review did not result in a change of decision at that time as to whether samples of head hair should have, or whether they should now be obtained and submitted in order to determine whether or not VC had ever taken any drugs. As stated, my belief was that unless it could be proven that VC was under the influence of drugs at the time of the attacks, then any counter narrative to his partial defence of diminished responsibility through voluntary intoxication could not be negated. The numerous enquiries undertaken and the absence of reference or link to drugs served to unconsciously reinforce my position. I had not been presented with any evidence justifying to a contrary position. Policy decision 102 was titled Forensic and Family Strategy. In essence it was completed to review and respond to questions posed by Dr Sanjoy Kumar regarding toxicology and hair sampling. I recorded my rationale surrounding the decision not to undertake head hair analysis in (policy decision 102) as follows:

364. *"This information has already been provided to SK by the FLO's (having liaised with me) on previous occasions. For ease of reference, I will provide a response directly to the families as there is a clear implied*

criticism as to my forensic strategy by SK which is now bleaching out to other families. This has the ability to undermine confidence as court approaches and there is a clear need to assist the FLO's manage the needs and expectations of the families and maintain their relationships. A copy of the questions and answers will be submitted to the MIR for record; but for the absence of doubt I will not be taking hair for toxicology from VC in relation to drug testing. As an experienced SIO, I deal with facts and evidence which I follow to undertake reasonable lines of enquiry. There is no evidence of drug taking or misuse by the defendant throughout this investigation. Intimate sample requests for blood and urine have already been refused by the suspect and his solicitor whilst in custody. Regarding toxicology and head hair sampling, there is simply no evidential basis that provides any reasonable grounds to suspect the suspect has ever taken drugs; genesis to which includes: A 1000 lines of individual enquiries (actions) undertaken . Over 400 statements taken from a variety of witnesses and professionals. (A minimum of) 12 property searches that relate directly to the defendant and interviews with fellow students / 'roommates'. University enquiries. Numerous CCTV investigations undertaken. The intelligence enquiries undertaken by sensitive networks. The medical records and interaction between the defendant and medical professionals over time. Interview and statements from the defendant's family members. An in-depth analysis of extracted telephony records. Financial Investigations. Of the 837 recovered exhibits, nothing which could remotely be considered as being linked to drug use. Of the blood samples taken and examined post arrest

within the prison establishment, no evidence of any illegal drug substances (although granted, this may be a snapshot in time, but a telling one nevertheless given the easy accessibility of drugs within prison establishments for 'likeminded' individuals). Thus, it remains my position that head hair sampling will not be pursued, despite the contrary view (without evidence) held by SK and DW. In arriving at this conclusion, I have secured local and national forensic advice. Empirical evidence supports my proposition. Cellmark (FSS provider) receive circa 30 samples annually for hair toxicology sampling regarding all criminal cases, a negligible figure when one notes the entire volume of crimes that occur nationally. This is because (even if there were any inference whatsoever that inferred VC was involved in drugs) it is not possible to determine exactly when a drug was taken, how much was taken or how many times a drug was used. Each section of hair tested would represent a time period roughly associated with the length of that section (e.g. 1 centimetre of hair will cover approximately 1 month). Thus, to find a drug within that hair section would indicate that the drug could have been used at any point or even multiple occasions within that time period. Either way there would be an accessible delay; certainly it would have been a completely pointless task taking a hair sample 'then and there' when in custody; again it explains the reason why blood and urine were requested (although subsequently refused as is the defendants legal right). The results of my strategy and decision making here are self-explanatory, been put to test by defence teams and formed the basis of a full facts guilty plea regarding the actions of the defendant. Throughout

this investigation there has been a complete absence of any inference as to drug taking or misuse by the defendant from friends, family, associates, University, previous medics, technical work, telephone analysis, financial enquiries or from any of his arrests, agency interactions or mental health detentions (as above). So a clear absence of any reasonable ground to suspect that the defendant is involved in drug-misuse by any rational and reasonable standard exists. It is not a reasonable line of enquiry to pursue, and the family informed accordingly. In arriving at this conclusion, I have not only drawn on my own experiences as an SIO but sought the opinions of others to arrive at balanced and evidenced conclusions to follow reasonable lines of enquiry. The actions undertaken here were reasonable and proportionate. The family may not agree but I have full confidence in the forensic strategy developed and pursued, as is clear from the forensic evidence ultimately secured (notwithstanding the acceptance of the facts by the defendant and his legal team based on that very strategy). As such I do not share the family concerns or have I been shown any scientific evidence to the contrary. The only way to secure a "then and there" toxicology result would have been via blood and urine. He had legal advice and refused that sample (as is his right). I do not agree with the position that hair for toxicology would therefore be a standard fall-back position, that is simply not accurate; and that is borne out in the scientific community that were engaged'.

365. The policy entry provides a clear and honest reflection of my thoughts at the time in which it was made. My interpretation of the law regarding the

defence of diminished responsibility and the degree to which VC's actions, including any voluntarily abuse of drugs, and their contribution to the seriousness (or otherwise) of his mental disorder, extended only to their use and influence **at the time of the actual offence itself**. Only under these circumstances did I believe that any voluntary use of drugs or alcohol could be used as a means to negate the partial defence of diminished responsibility (by increasing his own responsibility for his actions). The scientific advice I had received informed me that sampling head hair taken at the time when VC was in custody, would not answer that question. If my interpretation of the defence of diminished responsibility and the application of the science in relation to it is incorrect, then I apologise. Equally if advances in medical science identified lines of enquiry (of which I was unaware) which if pursued could have negated this issue, then of course I would have progressed them diligently. If nothing else, I do concede that hair sampling could have been useful, if only to eliminate the possibility of controlled drugs having played a part in these attacks. I accept that this would have brought comfort to the families. That said, scientific advice surrounding hair sampling is not exact and the absence of a positive drug indication from any such sampling, I have been informed would not necessarily mean a person had not taken drugs. Clearly this is not a straightforward but a complex and challenging topic.

366. My intention had been to send the families a copy of my policy log decision in response to their e-mail queries. I had informed ACC Griffin as Gold Commander of the e-mails received and sent him a draft copy of my policy. My decisions were likely to have wider organisational impact regarding trust

and confidence. I informed him of my intention to send the families a copy of my policy log (decision 102) as a means of reply on 16 January 2024. I refer to this email sent to ACC Griffin as URN: NGPF0007826. That proposed response was described by ACC Griffin as being incredibly blunt. As such I decided to consider his feedback with a view to responding to the families, having slept on the matter, the following day.

367. Having considered matters, I then wrote the following reply directly to the families in my capacity as SIO. It was sent at 11:17 hours, 17 January 2024. I include the body of that e-mail response for ease of reference. (email chain URN: NGPF0008918).

368. *“Good morning everybody and thank you for your e-mails. I have noted the comments made. I am slightly confused by the Daily Mail Article as it makes no reference to drugs (on the contrary it supports the proposition of no drug taking) but that is another matter. As an experienced SIO, I deal with facts and evidence which I follow to undertake reasonable lines of enquiry. There is no evidence of drug taking or misuse by the defendant throughout this investigation (which itself, at my instruction, has been subjected to independent review, with outcomes tested by the courts, legal teams and judicial process). Regarding toxicology and head hair sampling, yes I am aware of what can and can't be done. There is no evidential basis that provides any reasonable grounds to suspect the suspect has ever taken drugs. It remains my position that head hair sampling will not be pursued. As an aside, Cellmark (FSS provider) receive only 30 samples annually for toxicology hair sampling regarding all criminal cases, a negligible figure when one notes the entire volume*

of crimes that occur. This is because (even if there were any inference to suggest the defendant took drugs or was even involved with them) it is not possible to determine exactly when a drug was taken, how much was taken or how many times a drug was used. Each section of hair tested would represent a time period roughly associated with the length of that section (e.g. 1 centimetre of hair will cover approximately 1 month). Thus, to find a drug within that hair section would indicate that the drug could have been used at any point or even multiple occasions within that time period. Either way there would be an accessible delay, certainly it would have been a completely pointless task taking a hair sample then and there when in custody; it explains the reason why blood and urine were requested (and subsequently refused as is his legal right on the advice of his solicitor). I am completely content with my forensic strategy, having local and national forensic advice throughout. The results of that strategy are self-explanatory, been presented to the court and formed the basis of a full facts guilty plea regarding the actions of the defendant - which he nor his legal team do not dispute. Throughout this investigation there has been a complete absence of any inference as to drug taking or misuse by the defendant from friends, family, associates, University, previous medics, technical work, telephone analysis, financial enquiries or from any of his arrests, agency interactions or mental health detentions. So a clear absence of any reasonable ground to suspect that the defendant is involved in drug-misuse by any rational and reasonable standard. As such it is not a reasonable line of enquiry to pursue. So, to conclude in reference to the

points made, we do not nor have we relied on the word of a single individual as is suggested, nor press speculation (who often have a vastly different agenda). Instead, we rely on the basis of all attributable facts uncovered as part of the investigation. The facts speak for themselves and have underpinned all decisions made in this case. Hopefully this clarifies my position as the Senior Investigating Officer. The FLO's will be in touch to provide you with the opportunity to go through those facts (all of which are attributable) as presented in the opening note; equally the police press coverage, which as promised, we will disclose first to yourself before we release to the media. If you would like us to add anything else to any media releases, please let us know. That can also include copies / extracts of your VPS after you have delivered them to the court should you so wish to do so. Please be advised that future correspondence will be via the FLO's in accordance with the protocol. Simply because that way nothing will get missed as often I am indisposed with other investigations across the East - Midlands region. Best wishes to you all during this difficult time and I will catch up with you in person next week. Leigh".

369. On reflection, even this modified response appears terse and defensive on my behalf. It remained blunt and lacks, in hindsight, an appreciation of the strain and grief the families were under as the sentencing hearing approached. Whilst I do not necessarily agree with the points that the families raised, the reasons behind my decision making not to analyse head hair could have been communicated far better. Indeed, it might have been better, with hindsight, simply to have taken head hair samples by force, to

provide greater reassurance around the question whether controlled drugs were in VC's system or not.

370. On Tuesday 23 January 2024 VC appeared at Nottingham Crown Court for the prosecution's opening of the case and subsequent sentencing regarding the submission of his guilty plea to six offences, all committed on the morning of Tuesday 13 June 2023, namely:

- The manslaughter of Barnaby Webber
- The manslaughter of Grace O'Malley-Kumar
- The manslaughter of Ian Coates
- The attempted murder of Wayne Birkett
- The attempted murder of Sharon Miller
- The attempted murder of Marcin Gawronski

371. Both the prosecutions opening notes (URN: NGPF0007825) and the sentencing remarks by the judge (URN: CPSE0000486) are now public record and I do not propose to reiterate them here.

372. After sentencing, further contact was received from Dr Kumar again regarding non-intimate samples. Focus had now shifted from hair sampling to fingernails, as a means of securing toxicology analysis for VC. Despite the finalisation of court proceedings, on 28 May 2024 I received an e-mail from Mr Kumar marked with high importance Titled 'Toxicology - finger nails'. I now refer to this email as URN: NGPF0007583. Also copied into this e-mail were the following people:

- Emma Webber
- James Coates

- Sinead O'Malley Kumar
- Derrick Campbell, (IOPC)
- Matthew Kophamel (IOPC)
- PSLAW Officers, Attorney General's Office ("AGO")
- Laura Farris (Home Office)
- James McSweeney, Quinn Emanuel (Law firm)
- Paul Baker, Quinn Emanuel (Law firm).

373. The content of the e-mail I incorporate here. *"Leigh Sanders, Detective Superintendent, Good morning. At the time of arrest of Valdo Calocane in the early hours of 13 June 2023 and subsequent detention in custody, Calocane refused intimate samples after taking direction from his duty solicitor. We understand your officers did not take the full cache of non-intimate samples but did obtain nail clippings. We the family of victims write to request that the nail samples be sent for drug analysis immediately especially as it is now widely known and reported by the press that Calocane visited a close friend in London the night before the attacks and this friend was a known drug dealing gang member, whose profile was known on the police national computer systems; PNC/NSPIS. Drugs are one of the main causes of Psychosis in a person with a previous history of Schizophrenia. The analysis for drugs in this case will go some way in completing an investigation as thoroughly as possible and will help satisfy the families of victims in that samples that were taken were investigated to their maximum potential".*

374. Two hyperlinks relating to a study by an Oxford student about the detection of drugs in nails were included in the email.

375. The e-mail then continues: *"If funding is an issue, we will undertake the charge for the finger nail drug analysis ourselves. To maintain the chain of evidence please send the nail clippings for drug testing immediately. We see absolutely no reason as to why this cannot be done for all the families of victims involved. Sincerely Sanjoy Dr S Kumar MBE, BSc, MBBCh, BAO, LRCS&PI, DFFP, DMJ, MRCGP, PGCAP, FHEA, DSEM"*
376. Evidence from reasonable lines of enquiries were explored and put before the judge in January 2024. It was accepted that VC was solely responsible for all attacks on 13 June 2023, acted alone, was not influenced by others or part of any wider conspiracy (whether ideological or otherwise). Rather, as expressed in the unanimous opinion of the medical experts retained by the prosecution and the defence, the offender was suffering from an acute form of paranoid schizophrenia at the time when he committed the attacks.
377. The issues surrounding diminished responsibility have been fully explored. Having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature of the offence, the character and antecedents of the offender, and all other available information available, nothing was identified within any evaluation that provides a contrary view to the defence of diminished responsibility.
378. Again, I felt compelled to consider the latest family communication as SIO. That review again saw me seek advice from the CSC and scientists. They include; Nicola Anderson - lead toxicology scientist at Cellmark, Christopher Madden - toxicology scientist at Cellmark and James Nutt - Laboratory Operations Manager, Cansford Laboratories. Following my review I again

determined that I would not be sending either fingernail cuttings or scrapings for further analysis.

379. My e-mails and decision making around this matter were, for transparency, communicated to the Chief Officer Team ("COT") on 21 June 2024, and again on 26 June 2024, both emails titled 'The analysis of nail clippings for drugs - urgent advice please', which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008921 and URN: NGPF0008922. That correspondence incorporated some of the scientific evidence that had been secured, again to deal with questions raised regarding non-intimate samples but this time in relation to the submission and analysis nail clippings.
380. The scientific reply regarding nail analysis concludes that you would not be able to determine on what specific day a drug was used, only that they have used/been administered at some point during the period that the nail growth related to. Again, this offered no progression with regards being able to determine if VC had drugs in his system at the time when the attacks took place.
381. Scientific advice that I sought on 26 June 2024, contained in the email chain (URN: NGPF0008921), commented that *'if the use of 'a substance' is required to be determined, then we would not recommend the use of a nail sample. Analysis of nail samples is recommended to determine regular use of a drug. The difficulty with using nail analysis is that it is an integrated average of the total period covered by the test, therefore, low level/one-off use can effectively be 'diluted' by periods of non-use. Nails can stably accumulate substances for long periods of time, thus providing*

retrospective information regarding drugs of abuse and pharmaceutical use. The incorporation of substances into nails mainly occurs through diffusion from the rich blood supply, which deposits substances to both the germinal matrix and the nail bed on the underside of the nail plate, thus allowing incorporation in both a vertical and horizontal way during nail formation. Nails grow at a continuous rate. The average growth rate of fingernails is 3.0 mm per month, while toenails grow at an average rate of 1.1 mm per month. When we report results from nail analysis, we do not provide a time period, however, the analysis of fingernails is estimated to represent an approximate 6-month time period and toenails an approximate 12-month time period. There are many factors that affect levels of drugs and metabolites in nails. For example, differences in metabolism, purity and frequency of drug consumed as well as the effect of cosmetic treatments. Anything that damages the outer layers of the nail will reduce levels of drugs in nail".

382. With regards to submitting nail scrapings for drugs analysis it would not be likely to secure any meaningful data because of the wide potential for contamination with potential for drugs contamination from areas that VC was exposed - both before and after the incident taking place; for example, public transport, back of the Police van and custody buildings etc.
383. In email correspondence with CSC Buxton, which I refer to as URN: NGPF0008922, I have reflected on whether hair samples should be taken as a matter of course. This was not my experience. She stated in e-mail correspondence *'At the time of the forensic examination of VC in custody, the objective was to link him to the offence and injured persons; so the*

priority was looking to link him directly to Grace, Barnaby and Ian. This was done successfully for all three by the submission of blood samples taken direct from the hands of VC and his outer clothing. Looking at his lifestyle in the months preceding the event is not something that we would usually explore forensically unless there was a specific necessity to do so in direct relation to the offence. For example, we might take hair samples to look at potential long term poisoning cases or child neglect cases where ingestion of drug was a concern. As stated previously though these samples would have to be taken some time after the suspected offence. Hair a minimum of 6 weeks is advised and for what I have found on the academic paper in existence for the analysis of nail clippings, the period of time for the nail bed to grow above the nail is considered to be 3-6 months in duration'.

384. The families remained unhappy regarding my decision making with regards non-intimate samples and the position adopted surrounding toxicology.
385. On 30 January 2024 the family were again asked if they would like a copy or extracts from the Home Office Pathology Reports - including toxicology (policy decision 113). In the subsequent e-mail to FLO's dated 31 January 2024, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0004164, Dr Kumar outlined his "absolute disgust" that tissue sampling for toxicology was taken from his child during postmortem "*whereas the force had the inability or lack of investigatory initiative to even take the full cache of even the non-intimate samples from the perpetrator. Please relay my absolute disgust at this process to the chief Constable and the following IOPC investigation*".

386. My position has remained transparent, clear and consistent throughout this enquiry with regards to toxicology: I have sought scientific advice to come to reasoned decisions. In the absence of scientific support to provide a counter narrative, at the time when the decisions I made were taken, I was content that the decision not to secure hair samples and send either them or nail clippings for toxicological analysis was the correct decision. My decisions were not financially driven, rather scientifically based at that time to determine what would be a reasonable line of enquiry to pursue (or not). I was more than happy to amend my position if a clear scientific basis presented, at that time, in order to do so.
387. I communicated my position via email to the COT, which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0004170. For transparency on 31 January 2024 I made a policy decision (policy decision 118) that all queries regarding toxicology within Operation Hendrix should now be referred to the PSD so that an independent body in a transparent manner could review and scrutinise my decision making and advise family members accordingly; that would include the progression of any relevant complaints process surrounding such matters, or an independent liaison / referral with the IOPC. I recorded my rationale in my policy log as follows. The FLO *"has informed me that SK wants to express his views with regards the lack of non-intimate samples taken in relation to (the) forensic strategy surrounding VC (IE non- intimate samples & head hair for toxicology). I have already informed SK of the clear reason for this decision. SK wants the CC and IOPC to be aware. FLO has informed the CC. However, PSD informed and stated that it doesn't meet conduct referral for police / IOPC referral by them. I have therefore asked*

(the) head of PSD to write a form of words that can be communicated by the FLO's to SK for him to pursue this matter in the appropriate forum. It would not be ethical for me to pursue this as I am central to his grievances (nor a large extent for the FLO). SK will not be aware how to make a formal complaint, and he should be advised how he could do that should he wish. This detail can thereafter be provided by the head of PSD, communicated by the FLO and then all contact can be direct between SK and the relevant appeal body to progress. This is ethical and appropriate and would enable the FLO to manage the family expectations of a reply whilst maintaining ethical standards of policing".

Issue 5: Items found in VC's rucksack

388. For context, the rucksack worn by VC (police exhibit JR/9) was found on his person when he was arrested on Bentinck Road, in the stolen Van (FD64LUJ) taken from Ian Coates. Prior to his arrest he had used that same vehicle as a weapon, to knock down people in Nottingham City Centre.
389. As per the CCTV SOE (URN: NGPF0010192) at 04:02 hours VC can be seen on CCTV after the first deadly attacks making his way along Ilkeston Road with the rucksack clearly in his hands. It was also with him later between 04:21 – 04:22 as he walked from Ilkeston Road to Mapperley Road and again with him between 05:01 – 05:12 at Seely Hirst House, Mapperley.
390. The body worn video of the arresting officers showed VC was wearing that same rucksack (Police exhibit JR/9) over his shoulders at the time of his arrest. In his statement, PC Matt Bower noted that he 'believed the driver of this van to be the same person as the suspect from the stabbing'. I refer

to the body worn video of PC Bower as URN: **NGPF0008930R** and I refer to the statement of PC Bower as URN:NGPF0002650. VC made no reply after caution; the officer noted that at the time of his arrest that VC was still wearing the black rucksack on his back. He had been handcuffed with it on, so a seatbelt cutter was used to cut the straps from the rucksack and remove it from him. The officer then placed the bag on the floor adjacent to the side door of the van as he took VC into custody.

391. The rucksack remained in situ on Bentinck Road under guard so that it could be part of the wider forensic recovery. It was photographed in situ as part of one big crime scene by CSI Rana. The images taken by CSI Rana were originally produced by her as police exhibit JR1 – I now refer to those images as URN: NGPF0010240.

392. To that end it is not just what was found in JR/9 that is of importance; equally, items of significance were found within the White Van that undoubtedly belonged to VC and were previously in the rucksack.

393. In his statement, PC Whysall was travelling on Mount Hooton Road when he saw the white van with a single occupant - VC. He had what PC Whysall described as a large dagger in his hand. I refer to PC Whysall's body worn video as URN: **NGPF0008932R** and his statement as URN:NGPF0002474.

394. In his statement, PC Yallop, who caused the van to stop, also saw the driver produce a dagger. All officers had witnessed the driver in possession of a knife, reinforcing the issue that vehicle contents were likely to be equally as important as the rucksack. I now refer to PC Yallop's body worn video as URN: **NGPF0008934R**, and his statement as URN:NGPF0002483.

395. CSI Jatinder Rana outlined in her statement, which I now refer to as URN:NGPF0002386, how she attended Bentinck Road to forensically examine the van in situ (including adjacent rucksack, police exhibit JR9) before recovering the rucksack (JR9) and the following items from within it:

- JR10 – O2 sim card from within JR9
- JR11 – Mobile from JR9
- JR11C – 8 X cards from within JR11
- JR13 – memory USB sticks from JR9 (X3)
- JR14 – B&M bag from JR9
- JR15 – Metal pole from JR14
- JR16 – Knife sheath from JR9
- JR17 – Knife from JR9
- JR18 – Trespass Albus 30 rucksack from JR9
- JR19 – Knife in sheath from JR18
- JR20 – Donnay T- Shirt (grey) from JR18

396. Relevant photography accompanied the forensic examination of this designated scene including the Rucksack (JR9) and its contents (URN: NGPF0010240).

397. The statement of CSI Samuel Baxter, which I now refer to as URN:NGPF0002615, outlined his recovery from the Vauxhall Vivaro Van of (police exhibit SJB/1 - Boker Dagger) from the front offside footwell of the van. This is likely to have been the large knife seen by the aforementioned officers. This dagger had the appearance of red staining thereon. It was sent for fast-track forensic examination to the laboratory.

398. The forensic examination by scientists of police exhibit SJB/1, the report of which I now refer to as URN:NGPF0008938 (HOLMES reference D299) found that it had thereon aerated blood identified to Ian Coates (last victim) and blood from Grace O'Malley-Kumar on the ridged area near the handle. Blood sampled from the oval ridged section on one side of the blade was also sent for DNA profiling, with results indicating a mixture of DNA from at least three contributors. This included the DNA profile of Grace O'Malley-Kumar with statistical findings in excess of one billion (one thousand million) times more likely that Grace O'Malley-Kumar was a contributor to this mixed DNA profile than not. Equally, all of the DNA profile of Ian Coates was found in the same mixture, in a manner as the scientist would expect if he too had also contributed DNA to this mixture, with statistical findings in excess of one billion (one thousand million) times more likely that Ian Coates was also a contributor.
399. In addition, blood attributed to Ian Coates was found within an aerated run of blood from the dagger and from blood sampled from the tip of the dagger.
400. No blood or DNA was found on police exhibit SJB/1 that could be attributed to the first victim attacked, Barnaby Webber.
401. In summary, the forensic findings are what one would expect if this weapon (police exhibit SJB/1) was used to commit the murders. The forensic findings for examination of this exhibit are contained in streamlined forensic reports ("SFR") dated 21 June 2023 (D485, URN: NGPF0002128) and 7 July 2023 (D482, URN: NGPF0002123).

402. Whilst no blood attributable to Barnaby Webber was found on dagger/knife (police exhibit SJB/1), it was the opinion of the scientist that it is possible that the knife used, could injure an individual without the transfer of blood. Equally and as corroborated by CCTV analysis, it should be noted that in this particular case, given that Barnaby Webber was the first victim stabbed, any blood / DNA initially transferred from him to the knife could have been masked or removed by any subsequent transfer of blood from other individuals - namely Grace O'Malley-Kumar and thereafter Ian Coates (both attacked after Barnaby Webber, and in that order). For completeness, it should be noted that blood from Barnaby Webber was found on VC's clothing, thus linking VC forensically to the killing of Barnaby in that way; SFR (D481 URN: NGPF0002122) dated 7 July 2023, which refers to the examination of black long sleeved top NJB23.

403. Finally, CCTV analysis illustrates that the same knife was used to attack both Barnaby Webber and Grace O'Malley-Kumar. The irresistible inference is that the same weapon was used by VC on all three people who were killed by him. That blood from all three victims was found on the clothing of VC (D675) – SFR report dated 14 August 2023) serves only to reinforce that inference. I now refer to that SFR as URN:NGPF0002747.

404. Regarding the forensic examination and analysis of other weapons and miscellaneous items recovered from police exhibit JR/9 was:

- Police exhibit JR/14 – B & M bag and police exhibit JR/15 – Metal Pole. Both are seen on CCTV at Seely Hirst House between 05:11 and 05:12 hours as VC attempts to gain access to the property. He hits the window four times with the metal pole (police exhibit JR/15) that is wrapped in

the orange B&M carrier bag (police exhibit JR/14). He then leaves Seely Hirst House for the final time. That aside, these exhibits were of no further value to the progression of the homicide investigation.

- Police exhibit JR/16 - Knife sheath from (police exhibit JR/9) The knife sheath was examined for the presence of fatty material, skin tissue and visible blood; none were found (URN: NGPF0002122). The analysis did not progress the homicide investigation, save for the fact that the sheath was eliminated as having had a weapon 'used' in the attacks.
- Police exhibit JR/17: Knife from police exhibit JR/9. The knife was found to contain fingerprints thereon belonging to VC. As documented on SFR D473 dated 13 July 2023, which I now refer to as URN:NGPF0008940. It was sent for further forensic examination. No forensic link to the attacks was established, with forensic swabs taken providing a negative reaction to a presumptive chemical test for blood. Enquiries did not progress the homicide investigation and this weapon was also excluded from having been used in the actual attacks.
- Police exhibit JR/19: The knife and sheath (Gerber Brand) from inside Police exhibit JR/18 -The Trespass Albus 30 rucksack from within JR/9). A combat style knife in a sheath. This was sent for forensic examination (see URN: NGPF0002122). No forensic links to the attacks was established, with forensic swabs taken providing a negative reaction to a presumptive chemical test for blood. These enquiries did not progress the homicide investigation and this weapon was also excluded from having been used in the attacks.

- Police exhibits JR/18 - Trespass Albus 30 rucksack and JR /20 - Donnay T- Shirt (grey) from police exhibit JR/18 were not considered for further analysis as the actions would not progress the homicide investigation over and above the forensic returns already listed.
405. Regarding the examination and analysis of digital media and telephone related items taken from police exhibit JR/9, nothing of value was found or used to progress the homicide investigation by the TLO.
406. DC Rowbotham (TLO) (statement URN: NGPF0002398) and colleagues at CT analysed and reviewed extracted data from the following exhibits:
- Police exhibit JR/10 – O2 SIM card. This was extracted and confirmed to be attributed to telephone number VC phone number 14. Nothing of value was found by CT to progress the homicide investigation. Three reports refer to the examination of police exhibit JR/10, (URN: NGPF0002732) which refers to D661 – exhibit [KPR/6] Review of SIM card extraction report for JR/10 by DC Rowbotham) and two further reports which I now refer to as URN:NGPF0002729 (D659 – contemporaneous notes taken during SIM card extraction) and URN:NGPF0002730 (D660 – automatically generated extraction report for JR/10).
 - JR/11: Motorola mobile phone handset (including the two SIM cards recovered from the same handset). Examined by CTPNE on 14 June 2023. This handset was a dual SIM phone and contained two SIM cards, SIM0 and SIM1. Nothing of value was found from the extraction reports to progress the homicide investigation. I refer to D184, a review of JR/11 mobile phone as URN:NGPF0001483. I refer to D427, an Artefacts Review Log which lists all documents saved on handset JR/11

as URN:NGPF0008944. I refer to D168 extraction review of JR/11, which contains information such as auto-fill data used as attribution, as URN:NGPF0001463. Document D761 (KPR/16, URN: NGPF0003001 contains a review of the timeline report from the extraction of exhibit JR/11, which contains material from that phone between the dates of 11 June to 13 June 2023 only.

- Exhibit JR/13. Memory sticks x 3. These were examined by CTPNE. Nothing of value was found on them to progress the homicide investigation. Documents D172/ D176 / D180 / D187 relate to the various data and extraction reports, if required. I refer to D172 a review of USB JR/13 as URN:NGPF0001468. I refer to D176 a review of USB sticks from JR/19 as URN:NGPF0001472. I refer to D180 JR13/MEM2/EXT1, an artefacts review log of JR/13 as URN:NGPF0001478. I refer to D187 JR/13/MEM/2, a further artefacts review log of JR/13 as URN:NGPF0001487.

407. Following forensic examinations, the van stolen from Ian Coates was also subject to search (search record URN: NGPF0008804 and analysis by vehicle examiners in relation to the road traffic collisions involving Wayne Birkett, Marcin Gawronski and Sharon Miller. I refer to the notes made by Sgt Mewis as URN:NGPF0003106. I refer to the vehicle examiners' report notes made 13 June 2023 as URN:NGPF0003122 and I refer to the vehicle examination notes made 19 June 2023 as URN:NGPF0008953.

408. HOLMES action 210, which I now refer to as URN:NGPF0000341 was raised to contact the names found written on a scrap piece of paper which was found inside VC's rucksack. It was found by DC Beddoe (statement –

URN: NGPF0002623) on inspecting the rucksack (police exhibit JR/9), from within an inside zipped pocket. Described as a piece of paper with names on (Police exhibit NJB/85), the names written on the small piece of paper being Ryan [GRO-B], Cris [GRO-B], and Sam [GRO-B]. An image of which I now refer to as URN:NGPF0007359. PC Eddy provided a report, which I now refer to as URN:NGPF0000437, regarding contact with the University. These three names all relate to students at the University of Nottingham; they lived together at a house containing 6 students which was one of the addresses linked to VC, namely [GRO-B] Maddison Court, Raleigh Park, Nottingham. I refer to the information the University sent to PC Eddy as URN:NGPF0008958.

409. VC was one of the students living at this property, residing there with those named from September 2021 until July 2022. The three named students describe VC as messy and aggressive. They described an altercation taking place between [GRO-B] (see statement of [GRO-B] URN: NGPF0002490) and VC that was video recorded by another student. Police were called on 15 January 2022 and liaised with [GRO-B] he declined to take matters further and signed a pocket notebook URN: NGPF0007841 to that effect. After the Nottingham attacks, [GRO-B] subsequently sold this story and the video recording (police exhibit CMY/1, which I now refer to as URN:NGPF0002332, of that alleged altercation between him and VC) to the Daily Mail. Both his story and the video were published online by the Daily Mail dated 13 August 2024. I now refer to that article as URN:NGPF0008960.

410. Statements were also taken from Sam [GRO-B] whose statement I refer to as URN:NGPF0002628 and Ryan [GRO-B] whose statement I now refer to as URN:NGPF0002884. Both provide further background context regarding VC as a flatmate and his general demeanor; but nothing of significance that progressed the homicide investigation came from the three names listed on the piece of paper.

OneNote Entries & Policy Log.

411. NGPF0003630 relates to an e-mail sent to the HOLMES manager Ms. Sharron Hather on 27 October 2023. It consisted of a copy from my force issue laptop of my OneNote policy entries which I requested her, in her capacity as HOLMES manager, to copy and update onto the HOLMES account. This enabled my rolling policy log to be updated without me personally having to individually sit within the MIR and type each policy log entry on to the HOLMES account. This request was made to save time and effort.

412. HOLMES management can be a timely administrative function. Sharron Hather as the local HOLMES manager and expert would be best placed to navigate systems and progress this administrative function on my behalf. The e-mail sent contained my policy decisions 43 to 66, (URN: NGPF0008791) inclusive, as recorded on my laptop. Both the e-mail sent 27 October 2023 and my OneNote entries upon the force laptop are themselves time and date stamped and retrievable through force IT systems.

413. The policy entries subsequently placed on the HOLMES account mirrored those within the e-mail sent and are therefore true and accurate reflections of the decisions I had made. The entries placed by Ms Sharron Hather on the HOLMES account are also time and date stamped. D2 (URN: NGPF0008791) refers to all policy decisions made throughout Operation Hendrix and this document has been exhibited accordingly.

Operation Hendrix Resourcing

a. **Policy Decision 43.**

414. At 15:00 hours on 15 June 2023 I recorded in my policy log (policy decision 43, URN: NGPF0008791) that I will *"review the regional staffing on Operation Hendrix in accordance with MIRSAP guidance for complex homicides"*. I make mention in my rationale for doing so as *"although SIO for Operation Hendrix, as Head of Homicide...I have commitments to the rest of the region (East Midlands). Earlier today I was informed of another complex homicide having taken place in Leicester which is also in need of resourcing (Operation Aspen - murder of an OCG nominal). In addition, I have further competing commitments in the form of murder trials, namely operations Holyhead, Hebden (a further triple homicide) and Honeycomb (all at Notts Crown Court). Staff will need to be allocated with support from Heads of Crime for all investigations to ensure an effective response, whilst making plans for usual operational business commitments and on-call cover. Competing demands are high"*.

415. Demand for EMSOU MC teams was very high; yet Operation Hendrix was adequately and appropriately staffed to undertake the investigative actions

and challenges it faced. The above entry dated 15 June 2023, is made 2 days into Operation Hendrix. Ironically the challenges that I faced were not centred on Operation Hendrix, rather the void created by the overwhelming response to support the Operation Hendrix Investigation which indirectly contributed to the regional challenges faced elsewhere.

416. From the outset the Operation Hendrix investigation was heavily engaged within national media coverage. The attacks had understandably outraged and shocked the community which wanted to help in any way they could. The Hendrix operation had therefore naturally drawn resources to it, including the majority of the detectives within Nottinghamshire Police and the Regional MC units (especially at the early stages).

417. The inclusion of MC within the ROCU meant that through the EMSOU senior leadership team I could quickly brief the Head of EMSOU and mobilise staff from the other EMSOU disciplines. I recorded in my policy log at 06:20 hours on 13 June 2023 (policy decision 3) *"I have briefed Chief Supt Mayo at EMSOU ...to ensure that a) EMSOU SLC are aware and b) an adequate response across all EMSOU disciplines (be secured). As already noted, this incident has been declared as both a critical and major incident with potential links to CT. EMSOU SLC will be the initial conduit into the CT network"*. I recorded my rationale for doing so *"To ensure adequate resourcing across the region and the various disciplines. so as to provide an effective response to a major and critical incident"*.

418. With the potential link to terrorism, my resources were quickly supplemented with assistance from regional and national CT networks,

including EMSOU CT detectives, Northeast CT detectives and resources from SO15 at the MET. At 06:00 hours and 08:50 hours 13 June 2023, I had spoken with ACC Griffin; he was already mobilising resources to support both me and the investigation (policy decisions 1 and 4). That support was later reflected in my policy log where I note at 12:30 hours on 13 June 2023 that *“Gold have ensured that a CT contingent will work within the MIR. The following officers have been made available, and I will deploy accordingly. X 3 DS's, X 17 DC's, X 6 IRAT team (deployed to CCTV), X 3 FLO”*.

419. I had sufficient staffing numbers to pursue all key lines of enquiries. However, the large volume of staff allocated to the enquiry brought different challenges: the constant briefing and debriefing of ‘new’ staff entering the investigation, along with the ‘unknown factor’ surrounding skill sets and capabilities meant valuable time taken up in briefings and assessing officer skill sets to the set actions.
420. Different teams also have different methods of operating and practices. Whilst core investigative principles remain the same, CT investigations are different to MC investigations and CT operators worked differently to MC teams and on occasion this resulted in duplication of work and caused tension.
421. To combat this, at 08:55 hours 13 June 2023 I allocated a resources manager (policy decision 16); as noted in my policy *“DCI Dean (is to) collate all staff from regional, local and national resources. Regarding CT assistance, the CTSIO (Counter Terrorist Senior Investigating officer)*

allocated, who will act as CT go-between and partner agencies will be DI Chris Brett". The reason for doing so I recorded as "to ensure that resources can be deployed appropriately and effectively to secure and preserve evidence. A vast number of resources have been thrown at this investigation, but this must be directed effectively and in accordance with skills sets so that evidence regarding the criminal investigations can be secured in the most effective and appropriate manner". Not all resources would work from the MIR and so arrangements were required to establish effective briefing and debriefing systems to gather feedback; this resulted in a combination of 'in person' and wider 'TEAMS briefings' being established.

422. Therefore, I found the greater challenge as regional homicide lead was not necessarily Operation Hendrix, rather the resourcing of other regional commitments across the East Midlands. In particular, the resourcing of other homicides during the immediate post attack period (refer to paragraph 33).
423. To maintain both local and regional business continuity, I allocated other SIO's from across the regional cadre to cover on-call duties, both within Nottinghamshire and the region. Senior detectives allocated to Operation Hendrix would remain for the immediacy within the Investigation. This decision was recorded in my policy log (policy decision 5) where at 08:00 hours, 13 June 2023, I record that SIO's (DCI Dean / Det Insp Gibson / Det Insp Smithson / Det Insp Savage (SCIU) would be retained under my command to provide control, oversight and decision making for their respective scenes.

424. The Gold structure was finalised. With ACC Griffin allocated Gold Commander he reaffirmed the allocation of a CT SIO – Det Insp Chris Brett to assist; Deputy Chief Constable (“DCC”) Cooper would become the Strategic Firearms Commander (“SFC”) who along with Supt Sullivan (Tactical Firearms Commander [“TFC”]) would assume responsibility for all decisions regarding threat / firearms assessments using the silver suite established at Force Headquarters, adjacent to the casualty bureau that was also established. The Gold structure was supportive, providing a clear link for me into the COT.
425. Gold assistance extended beyond Nottinghamshire; ACC communications across forces with other designated ACC Crimes and Heads of Crime removed internal barriers to secure in-force support to backfill abstractions for MC detectives deployed on Operation Hendrix. To illustrate, Operation Aspen was a Leicestershire homicide that occurred on 15 June 2023 and led directly to the policy decision. That enquiry was led by the hub lead (DCI Mark Sinski) but with minimal MC staff due to Operation Hendrix commitments; key roles aside, with the assistance of the Leicester Head of Crime, that investigation was backfilled with divisional CID teams until resources could be released from Operation Hendrix. Regarding court commitments, only minimal levels were retained, with flexibility provided to secure witness evidence.
426. In terms of wider commentary, the resourcing of investigations requires careful consideration; not only during the initial stages of serious investigations, but throughout the life-cycle of enquiries. Investigations have never been more difficult and complex. With strict statutory time limits

imposed regarding post-charge service of evidence, greater pressure than ever is now placed on case officers and other key roles including FLO's; that pressure seeps out to other business areas, for example forensic science providers that results in unrealistic expectations. The huge influx of staff that comes at the start of any investigation, not just Operation Hendrix, usually dissipates post charge. With ideology or political affiliation negated as to motive, CT resources were extracted for their 'daily-duties'. MC detectives deploy to the next homicide (as seen in paragraph 33 – Operations Mill Meadow and Micro Stone). Many detectives deployed would not have had time to decompress before their immediate deployment to other homicides; and so the cycle continues. Therefore, the pressures that exist during the case management phase of investigations are easily overlooked. Gold Groups were continued throughout the life-cycle of this investigation so that an avenue to seek further support always existed.

427. This highly complex investigation, from the commencement date of the attacks (13 June 2023) to the concluding remarks by the sentencing Judge (24 January 2024) had a duration of just over 7 months.

428. In conclusion, I am satisfied that I had sufficient time and resources for Operation Hendrix.

b. Policy Decision 49 - CCTV Priorities.

429. I refer to the commentary made within paragraphs 164 – 168 above.

430. Policy decision 49 was recorded in my policy log (URN: NGPF0008791) on the 15 June 2023 at 19:00 hours. By this time, voluminous amounts of material were being obtained and processed within the MIR. I noted

“Nottingham CCTV enquiries (were) to concentrate efforts on suspect movements between 23.23 hours Monday 12 June 2023 and time of first attack on Ilkeston Road”. That decision itself would have been based on my assessment of that same material being received within the MIR.

431. The establishment of VC’s movements and the recovery of the Slazenger bag were assessed as key lines of enquiry (a high priority) which has already been discussed at length above. Within the rationale for policy 49 I recorded *“resources are stretched and there is even a need to prioritise within high priority actions”*.
432. At that time resources were stretched (and starting to tire). Responsibility for key roles must always remain within EMSOU / MIR and cannot easily be outsourced to attached officers. There were a competing number of high priority areas to progress, not just CCTV. The CCTV trawl would be important, as I know from experience, often a time-critical function due to systems override. The dilemma however was whether this high priority action was as important as others – for example property searches, submission of seized items for forensic analysis, telephone enquiries - all high priority actions and competing demands.
433. Sufficient resources had existed to progress high priority actions. But this was a dynamic enquiry with material constantly entering the MIR for assessment and review. This would reshape priorities and therefore refocus the resources in a real-time fashion to other priority areas.
434. New material coming into the MIR generated actions (or enquiries) within HOLMES; those actions would be graded as high, medium or low (based

on the assessment by the receiver) and allocated out. Thereafter, assessments would often change enquiry focus and shift the importance of some of those enquiries; thus, some actions within the same assessment category (for example high priority actions) could secure greater relevance than others.

435. That assessment strategy was covered within HOLMES (D1). It provided what was known as the indexers guide; under the heading Action Management it outlined that *“all actions when raised will be placed into one of 3 queues and will be indicated (as such) on the documentation by the Receiver. High priority: Actions requiring attention within 24 hours. Wherever possible these will be allocated on day of creation. Medium priority: Actions requiring attention within 48 hours. Wherever possible these will be allocated once high priorities have been allocated. Low priority: Actions requiring attention within 28 days. Wherever possible these will be allocated once other actions have been allocated.”*

436. My experiences surrounding 'straightforward' investigations is that the ratio of High Priority actions as a percentage of all overall actions generated is often relatively low. The complexity associated with Operation Hendrix resulted in a greater number of actions being generated and a greater number placed in the higher priority brackets. This itself required triage necessitating choices to be made as to which actions to progress within the high priority category. That was the nature of the concern documented in policy decision 49. This did not mean other actions were not important, several remained high; rather, dynamic assessments undertaken to re-prioritise the importance of some over others naturally occurred. That would

ultimately come down to my assessment as SIO; what areas to progress, when, and in what order to secure the best chances of gathering evidence (as exemplified in paragraphs 164 – 168). This would result in redeployment of resources.

437. Any 'gaps', therefore, that existed in some of the CCTV coverage of VC were not down to the absence of a CCTV strategy or a search for material, nor the determined efforts of detectives or search teams to capture VC's movements. It is entirely possible that cameras simply did not exist for the locations in which VC was not found, or that those cameras that did exist, simply did not capture VC. Equally it could represent a missed opportunity where a private CCTV camera or Ring doorbell was not discovered during the police trawl, always a possibility. Either way, any CCTV absence was not due to a resourcing issue, but circumstance. It is impossible to say why periods of time surrounding VC's movements were not captured on CCTV.

438. It was a balancing act managing so many resources to progress competing priority areas. I did not require additional resources (for Operation Hendrix), rather I needed to ensure that the resources that I had were maximised to their full potential. If more resources were required at any stage within the investigation, then I would have requested it and I have no doubt extra resources would have been provided.

Policies, procedures and criteria for governance of Operation Hendrix.

439. My role was the SIO. My management of the investigation followed nationally recognised guidelines for homicide and MC investigations and to

the best of my ability I operated within this framework. Those guidelines included:

- NPCC (2021) MCIM (URN: NGPF0008898)
- MIRSAP (2021) (URN: NGPF0008979)

440. Procedures and statute also featured heavily in determining several decisions. They included:

- PACE Act 1984.
- Murder, contrary to common law.
- CPIA 1996 and associated guidance.
- Director General Guidance on charging decisions (DG 6) 2020.

441. My objectives were as follows:

- To conduct an ethical investigation to ascertain who was responsible for the attacks on 13th June.
- If an attacker(s) were identified, to secure their arrest and determine with CPS whether or not they should be charged with criminal offences.
- If charged, to ensure reasonable and proportionate lines of enquiry were progressed to determine the guilt or otherwise of the person(s) charged.

442. In accordance with the guidelines, I put in place an effective structure to manage the complex series of attacks. I set up the MIR and Casualty Bureau, with sufficient resources to manage what I declared as a Category A homicide. Key roles were identified for the MIR and appropriately trained personnel were identified to undertake important functions.

443. MIRSAP (URN: NGPF0008979) procedures and the HOLMES account were commenced to enable investigators to carry out their designated duties; simultaneously the process enabled investigators to effectively record the material and the information gathered to comply with CPIA requirements.
444. A Gold structure providing oversight was established to support myself as SIO. I maintained a policy log to outline the strategic decisions I made (and did not make) with a full rationale behind the decisions.
445. Key and relevant investigative strategies were identified (Family liaison: Intelligence strategy: Suspect strategy: Witness Strategy: Search Strategy: Forensic Strategy: Digital Strategy. Passive data) to pursue reasonable lines of enquiries so as to prove or disprove the involvement of the suspect(s) responsible for the attacks.
446. With the investigative strategies set, evidence was secured using the building blocks and “golden hour” principles, indicating that VC alone was responsible for the attacks.
447. The attacks occurred on the 13 June 2023 with VC arrested the same day. I invited CPS to consider the evidence. They applied the threshold test, and on 16 June 2023 VC was charged with three counts of murder and three counts of attempted murder. He appeared before Nottingham Magistrates Court 17 June 2023, when his case was sent to the Crown Court. VC was remanded into custody. As he provided no indication as to plea, all reasonable lines of enquiry were pursued to gather evidence to establish his guilt.

448. I retained the MIR structure with appropriate staffing levels to pursue investigative strategies (policy decision 69, URN: NGPF0008791). On 28 November 2023, in the Crown Court at Nottingham, VC pleaded guilty to three counts of manslaughter, and three counts of attempted murder. The prosecution commissioned further psychiatric assessment to determine the acceptance (or otherwise) of the plea to Manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility.
449. A further psychiatric report was commissioned from Dr Latham. Following receipt of that report on 19 December 2023, the prosecution team indicated that the offender's pleas of not guilty to murder but guilty to manslaughter were acceptable and matters were adjourned for sentence at Nottingham Crown Court. Families were informed.
450. On 24 January 2024, VC was sentenced to a hospital and restrictions order (pursuant to ss. 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983) for each offence, to run concurrently. The unanimous and unambiguous opinion of all medical experts was that VC suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.
451. The scrutiny applied to the investigative process and the evidence gathered was considerable. The sentencing outcome reached its conclusions based on that evidence. As noted by Mr Justice Turner during his sentencing (case number U20231322) *"the investigation into this case was both lengthy and complex, and those who played their part are to be commended for the extremely professional and skilful way in which they carried out their duties"*. The adopted framework enabled those investigative duties to be undertaken objectively and the objectives to be met.

452. That the sentencing determination was not universally accepted by many commands my deepest sympathies. The absence of hair and fingernail analysis has been cited as an investigative deficiency on the purported basis that the investigation team had not excluded the possibility of VC's abnormality of mental functioning during the attacks arising from voluntary or recreational drug use. For the reasons outlined above, that was my position at the time. The samples requested and obtained were done in accordance with PACE. The samples not secured (blood / urine) had no lawful basis for being secured. It was my belief that unless it could be proven that drugs or alcohol were present in VC system at the time of actually committing the attacks (and a sample of head hair would provide an accessible delay) then there would be no scientific basis to necessitate any seizure of head hair whilst in custody. After charge and latterly post-conviction, I am not aware of any statutory framework that would enable such samples retrospectively to be lawfully requested or analysed. I am deeply saddened that some members of the bereaved families feel that this aspect of the investigation was deficient because everything I did was driven by a desire to secure justice for VC's victims and their families.

453. As SIO, I thoroughly explored the defence of diminished responsibility after it was first raised by the defence following the opinion of the psychiatrists. Eventually, unanimous medical opinion recognised VC's abnormality of mental functioning during the attacks was because of a recognised medical condition (schizophrenia). Dr Blackwood went further, stating that VC suffered from 'pure' psychosis, the sole identified cause for the attacks.

454. As SIO, I operated within the framework of relevant legislation and guidelines to secure the evidence presented to experts and the court. Through that lens, the guidance surrounding the effective management of homicide and MC investigations has been met. I accept that this view is not shared by families who apart from having to deal with the terrible loss of their loved ones under such horrific circumstances, also had to deal with the complicated world that is the criminal justice system.

Concerns in respect of the police's, CPS's or other third parties' actions.

Police concerns: The Professional Standards Directorate:

455. Throughout the enquiry I felt a disconnect with the PSD of Nottinghamshire Police. It appeared that information known to the enquiry team was appearing in the press 24 hours after its discovery. That included the identity of VC and his family (policy decision 51, URN: NGPF0008791). I believed there to be three possibilities. Media reporting had been incredibly intrusive throughout; so, option one concerned investigative journalists securing information directly from source. There is evidence of this, with journalists obtaining witness accounts, CCTV and mobile footage ahead of investigation teams.

456. The second option was that information was directly provided to the media by families. This was the case during the latter stages of the enquiry but in my opinion, this did not take place during the early stages of the investigation (policy decision 108).

457. The third option was a leak to the media from within law enforcement or an external agency. I informed chief officers of my concerns during a Chief

Officer update at 17:00 hours, 16 June 2023 (policy decision 58). At 14:40 hours on 19 June 2023 I record as sensitive policy (policy decision 63) that a “ *Professional Standards Directorate (PSD) referral (is) to be made to review the investigation*”. I recorded as my rationale that “*there appear to be details of the investigation appearing in the press, for example suspect identity, family location. This could be through investigative interviewing or through conscious or unconscious leaks to media outlets. DS Buxton to liaise with DI Gareth Harding at the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU)*”.

458. There was a requirement to ensure information was not being leaked within the organisation. I understood the need for firewalls between PSD and the wider organisation to maintain investigative integrity surrounding internal investigations. But very little information was thereafter fed back to me as the SIO from PSD. As such I did not know if there were issues surrounding operational security; or whether any information needed to be shared with families or other agencies.

459. At 17:25 hours 13 October 2023, I undertook an assessment with the FLO’s so that there could be a consistent update to all families. (policy decision 73). Concerning PSD updates, I recorded in policy that “*...until I get any further direction and information as SIO, there will be no dialogue with families surrounding PSD matters; we simply have not had clarity as to the situation. In all good conscious [sic], I am not aware of any press leaks by employees as previously thought (and rumoured), (or) if officers have looked at material without a policing purposeuntil formal notification to the contrary, there is simply nothing further to add or update families about*”.

460. A cloak of secrecy existed within PSD which inhibited effective communication and enquiry progression. On the 24 November 2023 I recorded in my policy log (policy decision 83) that following my attendance at the Gold Group, I had been informed by PSD that there were no matters that required their further attention. I therefore recorded in my policy log that *“PSD are of the belief that there are no further PSD /IOPC issues that need addressing. IE all matters are closed and there appear to be no issues”*. The minutes were to be submitted to the MIR.

461. Despite those assurances on 14 December 2023, I attended a meeting with the head of PSD and was informed of a number of misconduct matters (policy decision 92) that were under investigation regarding Operation Hendrix by PSD. I was informed of three investigations:

- Officer G. A constable had been arrested and suspended for accessing police data regarding the suspect without a policing purpose. He faced a Gross Misconduct meeting in January 2024.
- Staff member R. A counter assistant who had accessed police data without a policing purpose.
- Officer S. A special Constable who had already been dismissed at an accelerated misconduct hearing under police regulations by the Chief Constable (CC) for unauthorised access to police data (body worn video).

462. The adjudication by the CC at dismissal proceedings for the Special Constable were that the families be informed of the PSD outcome. PSD wanted those updates to be provided by the FLOs. I made representations regarding the position. I saw the notification by PSD as a tick box exercise,

devoid of all emotional awareness and wider context of the investigation. It was correct that families be engaged and informed, but as evident in the FLO logs and my policy log (policy decision 92) this notification was already delayed and would *“come at a very difficult time for families, already overload with psychiatric reports and CPS considerations, surrounding acceptance of pleas for Manslaughter. The FLOs have raised concerns about (these) matters which I share regarding contextual understanding of the issues being managed by them”*.

463. I was completely dissatisfied with the situation. I record in my policy the following issues that presented:

- *“Any decision to inform families must come with full details of the case and after careful consideration. This should not be delivered by the FLOs”*.
- *“What safeguards have the organisation put in place to prevent this happening again. OpSy (Operational Security).”*
- *“The FLOs will insist on a form of words from organisational leaders which can be delivered to the families in a consistent message”*.
- *“Family welfare considerations”*.
- *“That somebody senior from PSD / COT be available to answer questions and concerns directly with families. I would seek guidance as to whether it is appropriate to wait until the conclusion of all PSD matters before families are informed of all PSD outcomes”*.

464. At this time a fourth psychiatric report had been received from Dr Latham. Confirming previous medical diagnosis, CPS would now certainly accept pleas to diminished responsibility the following week. The FLOs were

updating the families as to this position. I took on board FLO feedback about being trauma led. With Christmas approaching and the volume of complex information the families were having to digest, the FLOs questioned the requirement and wisdom of informing families at that time. I shared that opinion and informed Gold (ACC Griffin) of my concerns. This led to a difference of opinion but ultimately ACC Griffin accepted the position that the families could be informed of relevant PSD matters in the new year. That corresponded with family requests for police contact in the new year, when a meeting with CPS and Counsel would then be welcomed.

465. My view was that the FLOs should not be the individuals to provide initial PSD updates. This could have the ability to undermine existing relationships with the families.

466. A family meeting with police, CPS and counsel had been arranged for 15 January 2024 to speak to the Webber and O'Malley-Kumar families. That meeting was by TEAMS. I informed both the Webber and O'Malley-Kumar families at this meeting (policy decision 101) that Officer S had been sacked at a misconduct hearing before Christmas for unauthorised access to police materials. This was also captured within CPS notes taken during the meeting (D965 – URN: NGPF0008917). I had previously informed James Coates (Ian's son) of this decision when an opportunity presented at a family meeting on 17 December 2023 (policy decision 95). Elaine Newton (Ian's partner) had asked for a visit in the new year, and I spoke with her and her sister regarding these matters on the 4 January 2024 (FLO log URN: NGPF0002519).

467. On 26 November 2023, FLO DC Johal had contacted Wayne Birkett and his partner Tracey Hodgson, Sharon Miller and Marcin Gawronski. All were offered the opportunity to engage but declined, preferring contact at sentencing.
468. PSD actions and communication (or lack of) brought confusion, caused unnecessary burden and took both effort and focus away from the investigation team. This did not assist with Gold / SIO relationships and more importantly it did not assist with police / family relationships. The very nature of the Murder v Manslaughter debate saw that relationship starting to strain. The PSD confusion seemed a completely avoidable position that could have been avoided with clear briefings and planned contact with families. It is my view that PSD managers at that time lacked grip and their insular working practices left the PSD devoid of wider organisational awareness, causing unnecessary angst and distractions for everyone connected to the enquiry.

Police concerns: Absence of a PIP 4 strategic advisor

469. This investigation would have benefitted from a PIP 4 Strategic Investigator / Advisor. A PIP4 strategic investigator is not the SIO or the Gold Commander. They are an experienced, independent senior detective (usually Supt rank) that provide support surrounding the strategic management of an investigation and the overall police response. They support both the Gold Commander and the SIO to achieve their set objectives. They provide a bridging function between the investigation and the COT.

470. The support I received from the COT was excellent. They were visible, attended briefings and debriefings and took away my requests or concerns. Both ACC Griffin and CC Meynell were experienced detectives and also PIP 4 qualified. But they had distinct roles and functions within the investigation and wider force. At that time there were no senior detectives in Nottinghamshire qualified to perform the PIP 4 role.

471. In my opinion it is not possible to 'double hat' and perform the role of PIP 4 and Gold Command. Consciously or unconsciously, there will always be conflicts within decision making, no matter how well intended. ACC Griffin undertook the pseudo function of a PIP 4 in the absence of an available option. My relationship with Gold Command was good; whilst there was no detrimental impact to the investigation itself, on occasion there were tensions that would have benefitted with a mediator between myself and Gold; clear examples include decisions based around charge, media, family engagement and PSD involvement.

Third party concerns: Independent Office of Police Conduct (IOPC)

472. The IOPC have an incredibly important role to play in the maintenance of police accountability and standards. Operation Hendrix (and several aspects within it) was sent to the IOPC as a voluntary referral on 14 June 2023 (URN: NGPF0007852). As the SIO I accept and understand that the role I perform should be subject to scrutiny. On 12 March 2024 I recorded in my policy (policy decision 130, URN: NGPF0008791) that the IOPC could have direct access to the HOLMES account and all materials within it to assist them investigate and draw up their terms of reference.

473. The timeliness and apparent incapability of the IOPC to review and report upon the referral, the investigation and key personnel within an acceptable and reasonable timeframe, can only be described as lamentable. This had and continues to have a negative impact on families, police investigators and the wider maintenance of public confidence in the police service. This must be addressed as it attacks the very concept of policing by consent, generating distrust in the Constabulary through no fault of the Constabulary. The lack of alacrity by the IOPC, perceived or otherwise, and the absence of a balanced communications strategy reinforced a largely negative media messages surrounding this enquiry. A Google search of news content provides clear illustration.
474. The investigative timeline for the attacks, commencement to sentencing conclusion, had a duration period just over 7 months. It is now approaching 2 ½ years but there is still no resolution or report from the IOPC surrounding Nottinghamshire police actions.
475. In February 2024 the IOPC website recorded it had commenced “*an investigation into complaints about Nottinghamshire Police’s previous contact with Valdo Calocane and their handling of the murder investigation*” that there “*were flaws in the handling of the murder investigation and missed opportunities by police to prevent the deaths*”. I have preserved a copy of this article which I now refer to as URN: NGPF0008963.
476. Following the IOPC referral, the ability of the Constabulary (and those within it), to provide any counter narrative to media allegations (regardless of accuracy) became effectively nullified; it did much to undermine public trust

and confidence in the constabulary. This is a completely unfair and unacceptable position for the Constabulary to find itself in. The inability of the IOPC to progress their investigation had, and continues to have, a huge impact on the Constabulary to challenge both unbalanced and, on occasion, inaccurate reporting that presented. For as long as IOPC investigations continue, the Constabulary is not afforded its own voice or opinion. The IOPC reporting of the referral itself contained inferred negativity without qualification. This had, and continues, to have a negative and demoralising impact on those who worked within the enquiry. It cannot be acceptable that any lack of capacity or capability for an organisation to undertake and maintain its core function, can impact so negatively on another on the maintenance of public trust and confidence.

477. As an SIO I work to timelines and parameters, concepts that appear absent from the accompanying IOPC investigation. The lack of IOPC urgency will challenge the police service's ability to recruit into specialist roles, whilst undermining the very reason behind the IOPC's very existence, the maintenance of public confidence in policing.
478. A working protocol should be explored where regular updates from the IOPC are maintained and reported upon. Where joint communications strategies can be agreed between IOPC directors and Chief Constables, this can fill the negative void that often exists and is left to fester as elongated enquiries continue unabated. The stock comment without qualification of 'referrals being made' and 'continuing investigations into conduct' should no longer be seen as an acceptable position.

479. IOPC delayed adjudications serve to drive public uncertainty and reinforce prevailing negative headlines surrounding what are seen (by officers at least) as a constant media attack upon this investigation (and therefore the integrity of those that worked within it). The IOPC must approach voluntary referrals with an attitude of balance and progress them diligently so as to ethically control the media narrative.
480. An ethical question emerges from the circumstances surrounding the public enquiry. Is it fair or proper that officers subject to IOPC investigation be asked for witness statements at a time when potential enquiries into their conduct have not been finalised. Officers are being asked for open and transparent interaction with an enquiry at a time when the very IOPC enquiry into them has not furnished its findings, proceedings or provided updates. This does not appear procedurally, ethically or morally fair. It could also inhibit the honest, transparent dialogue, the very pillars upon which stand an effective and meaningful public enquiry.

Third party concerns: Media Intrusion

481. Media intrusion throughout was intense, with media outlets undertaking their own investigations. Reporters interviewed witnesses and secured accounts ahead of police liaison; they secured CCTV (through payment or otherwise) that was aired on various media outlets; they identified the suspect and ran stories regarding his identity and doorstepped VC's family who became fearful for their own safety (policy decision 51, URN: NGPF0008791).

482. On 13 June 2023, the FLOs reference the media intrusions with local and national media outlets stating they were to name the victims. On 14 June 2023 a police media release was made asking for media outlets not to invade the privacy of the families. The reporting was incessant, having such impact that at 20:30 hours 16 June 2023 I liaised with the Matt Jarram, Head of Corporate Communications to ascertain “*what covenants can be imposed on the press to prevent family intrusion andanxiety caused by inaccurate reporting and bullying tactics*” (policy decision 59).
483. Media intrusion adversely impacted on the investigation and decisions I made. This included the decision to charge. The COT team had been contacted by press outlets regarding VC and an outstanding arrest warrant surrounding his mental health. I felt the media lacked all respect for due process and, despite appropriate engagement, were intent on reporting matters before they had been fully investigated or the families informed. As the SIO my efforts should have been concentrated on my investigative strategies, securing and preserving evidence surrounding the horrific attacks that had taken place in our city. Instead, my focus was now being taken up by the media and COT teams and the accuracy (or otherwise) of proposed media reporting (policy decision 53).
484. Press intrusion invariably had an impact on my investigation strategy and decision to charge when I did. Once *sub-judice*, press discussion of matters pertaining to the case would, in theory, be curtailed to prevent influencing of legal outcomes. This would also provide time for FLOs to engage and update families with the important investigative developments and not learn about matters in the press.

485. Prior to charge, at approximately 14:00 hours 16 June 2023, I contacted the FLA Det Insp Gould and told her of the requirement to engage with families and inform them that charges would be brought against VC. She coordinated contact by the FLOs who engaged with families and informed them about VC's impending charges and his outstanding warrant.
486. Social media also had a huge bearing on the investigation. The reporting in social media led families and concerned relatives to undertake their own investigations regarding loved ones. Find My Phone applications (or variations) enabled tracking by family members of mobile telephones and their placement at locations of reported crime scenes. I recorded the issue in my policy log at 13:40 hours on 13 June 2023 (policy decision 30).
487. Families contacted the Casualty Bureau leading to initial notifications regarding the possible deaths of loved ones by telephone (as opposed to routes regarding research, identification and local officer deployments for notification). Barnaby Webber's parents had seen the media coverage whilst on holiday in Cornwall before contacting the Casualty Bureau. Dr Sanjoy Kumar had seen the media coverage and rang, wanting to know if his daughter Grace was involved. He asked to be told over the phone before immediately driving with his wife and son to Nottingham from London. It is now entirely feasible for victims' families to quickly establish the death of loved ones before the police service, regardless how quickly FLO deployments take place. Social media commentary and phone applications now provide advance notification before a FLO strategy has even been considered.

Consideration of possible additional actions that could have been taken in respect of the investigation.

488. The police have a duty of candour. This explained the early dialogue that occurred between officers and some family members over the telephone. These were not easy conversations for all concerned. There was never a concern or apprehension regarding that duty of candour, but that duty was clearly influenced by grief-stricken families who only wanted to know information when they wanted to know it. This adversely impacted the investigation in the latter stages, as families later started to question policing decisions (toxicology, samples, VC's mental health, the Slazenger bag) with concerns further amplified when disagreements surfaced surrounding psychiatric reports.
489. The FLOs reference decision making that is trauma informed. Their engagement and information sharing with the families was based on their desire to know. I supported that position and it appeared a logical and easy position to understand. It has been referenced in my policy log, URN: NGPF0008791) and the FLO logs throughout. I understood why some family members did not want any information whilst others did. Everyone had their own coping mechanism to get them through the difficult time.
490. Such coping mechanisms explain why the Webber family left the Avon and Somerset meeting, 7 December 2023 well in advance of the O'Malley-Kumar family. It was not a reflection of non-engagement, but I suspect they had hit saturation point in both grief and the information they wanted to hear.

491. The position advanced within the review by His Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate ("HMCPSI") of a 'joined up' family meeting is on this point misconceived. The FLOs deployed on the basis of providing a bespoke service for individual families and their needs. Individual family dynamics are themselves complex, often fragmented. By means of example, Elaine Newton (Ian Coates' partner) did not get on with Ian's estranged children. It would not be practicable or harmonious to suggest a combined family meeting for the single family under such circumstances. I too would have questioned any such advice if received.
492. All families would, and were, extended the same courtesy on an individual basis. The CPS / Counsel meetings referenced were offered by the FLOs to other family members but declined. Furthermore, the volume of affected families for the Nottingham attacks did not necessitate the requirement for group meetings or a group family liaison strategy, as for example, seen with the Manchester Arena bombings.
493. It was purely happenstance that the O'Malley-Kumar and Webber families naturally gravitated together. In life, as in death their children were friends. They were students at the University, and both families attended the University vigils. There was never any suggestion that other families be invited to the joint Webber, O'Malley-Kumar meetings. Indeed, those two families were offered independent meetings but undertook most together, drawing support from each other. James Coates' interaction with both families only appears to have progressed after sentencing.

494. As the enquiry continued, I noted in my policy log (URN: NGPF0008791) how it became harder to provide meaningful updates. To illustrate, on 7 December 2023, it proved difficult to update both the Webber and O'Malley-Kumar families with details surrounding the psychiatric reports when they knew little actual detail of the case itself. This was a position I shared with Sam Shallow at the CPS. Being trauma-led obviously had its limitations. Ultimately there is never a good time to hear the circumstances relating to the murder of a loved one, but that was the position that had to be addressed at the 7 December 2023 meeting.
495. Not everybody at that meeting wanted to hear case details. All bar Dr Sanjoy Kumar left at the point when timelines for the attack were presented by DC Stevens-Garrib. The conclusion I draw, on reflection, is whether as SIO I could have written letters containing details about the investigation. Delivered either by myself or the FLOs, those sealed letters would come with an appropriate and sensitive verbal warning, yet provide families with informed opportunities to secure case information at a time of their choosing. This would have further empowered them, been consistent with trauma-led concepts, yet maintain the important duty of candour required of investigators. Written confirmation of updates and separate dialogue did occur and is evident in policy, FLO logs, minutes of meetings and in e-mail conversations with the families. This measure would have codified all those efforts in a clear series of written communications that could later be referenced to aid understanding at a time of immense grief.
496. Finally, I would wish to apologise if my interpretation of the law regarding the defence of diminished responsibility was incorrect. Namely the degree

to which a person's voluntarily actions around drug and alcohol use and the ability to challenge any defence of diminished responsibility, extend beyond the timeframes of when the actual offence takes place. This was my honestly held belief which has been clearly recorded throughout my policy log and relayed within communications. At no stage has anybody within the enquiry suggested that this position was anything other than correct. Thus, the scientific advice that sampling head hair at the time when VC was in custody, would not assist with the position of toxicology. I again reiterate that if my interpretation of the defence of diminished responsibility and the application of the science in relation to it is incorrect, then I apologise.

Consideration of any possible contributory structural issues (regarding police policies, procedures, methodology, training etc.)

497. The clear limitations of remote working. Technology has many benefits that need to be embraced. But in terms of operational security, the details that you share, how you share them and more importantly being able to verify that those at the other end all have a policing purpose to do so is not an easy one. I have no evidence of any security breaches over and above the original suspicions that I raised with COT that resulted in a PSD referral and enquiry. But it is a matter of fact that it is harder to manage the volume of material you share in these circumstances.

498. The volume of intelligence material entering the MIR was enormous. The Force Intelligence Bureau ("FIB"), the SIU at the ROCU, the Fusion Cell at CTPNE, the Covert Authorities Bureau ("CAB") office processing communications data applications, plus the various products being

interpreted by analysts, at some point all these data processors were engaged, producing product for different managers but perhaps failing to filter their material through a single point of contact to easily digest the intelligence. A mistake that I made was not to designate an intelligence manager to undertake that function and to review all the material being received into the MIR. This would have taken pressure away from both myself and the HOLMES receiver who were in receipt of the information. This sometimes led to duplication of work and tasking which could have been avoided.

499. Horrific attacks such as this series are rare, (though seemingly becoming more common, noting the triple murders perpetrated by Kyle Clifford on 9 July 2024, by Axel Rudakubana on 29 July 2024 and by Nicholas Prosper on 13 September 2024). Very few SIOs have experience of, or availability to work alongside CT resources. Joint training to understand roles and responsibilities would prove beneficial for both CT and MC SIOs.

500. Also, the NPCC (2021) MCIM (URN: NGPF0008898) should be reviewed to determine whether there are specific excerpts or additions that require inclusion with reference to specific consideration regarding 'joint' operations.

Recommendations.

501. Clarity around the law pertaining to homicide. Confusion reigned amongst colleagues and bereaved families as to why a defence of diminished responsibility existed for murder but not in relation to attempted murder. This was not an easy explanation for police officers to deliver, or for

bereaved families to understand. The Law Commission's 2004 declaration regarding murder legislation being 'a mess' perhaps explained why outcomes were hard for families to digest. Simplification of the law would make it easier for practitioners and communities. I now refer to that report as URN: NGPF0008964.

502. Specifically in relation to the definition of diminished responsibility the law commission in 2006 (Law COM No 304) stated that "the definition of 'diminished responsibility' should be modernised, so that it is both clearer and better able to accommodate developments in expert diagnostic practice". Also to enable easy understanding and thereafter its application by practitioners who are not lawyers using their best endeavours. As society, the complexity of criminal investigations and medical science progress, a corresponding need to review and simplify the concept of diminished responsibility and homicide legislation should keep in step. My contention is that this needs to occur to ensure that the public in today's fragmented and post covid society, can remain well protected from what appears to be an increasing number of mentally disordered offenders who pose similar threats to our communities.

503. This links to wider issues regarding family engagement (especially for serious crimes). The HMCPSI inspection report into VC's case, dated March 2024 (URN: NGPF0007828) outlined aspects, where in their opinion, CPS engagement with families could be improved. It referenced CPS engagement with families through the conduit of a police FLO. The report highlighted shortcomings in the case where CPS utilisation of FLOs led to concerns regarding timeliness of correspondence, knowledge of (and

therefore explanation of) legal terms and also legal process. Thus the *“importance of a proactive and probing approach...taken by both the CPS and FLOs when communicating with each other.”*

504. I provide the caveat that the primary role of a FLO, is first and foremost, as a police investigator. As noted in NPCC guidelines *“their role is to gather evidence and information from the family to contribute to the investigation and preserves its integrity. The FLO also provides support and information, in a sensitive and compassionate manner and secures the confidence and trust of families”*. There are also practical differences when one organisation seeks to deploy and utilise the resources of another organisation over whom it has no control, or vice versa.

505. The HMCPSI report (URN: NGPF0007828) recommended CPS review their bereaved families strategy. With the FLO identified as *“the conduit through which all CPS engagement is handled,”* again a situation presents where the resources of one organisation are attempted to be controlled and tasked by another. Therefore, due consideration should be given to the introduction of CPS FLOs at the point of charge. This would eradicate what the HMCPSI report highlighted as deficiencies around inconsistent FLO tasking and management, standardise service and importantly provide skilled individuals with a legal basis and understanding of terminology who could provide information around definitions (diminished responsibility), process (Murder v Manslaughter) and support families throughout the legal process (consult or inform). This could commence and continue from the point of charge until the finalisation of CJ process. Police FLOs would deploy in the usual sense at the point of crime; but at the point of charge

there could be introduced a 'CPS FLO' who could together jointly address issues as a dual Police/CPS FLO deployment. That could negate what the report recognised as the disconnect which is the reality of being in the system and the support that is actually available within the system. Other agencies have FLOs – the Prison Service, NCA, IOPC, so why not the CPS?

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed:

GRO-B

Dated: 12 January 2026

Index to First Witness Statement of Leigh Sanders

No.	URN	Document Description
1	NGPF0008791	SIO Policy Log - D2
2	NGPF0008898	MCIM Nov-2021
3	NGPF0003635	Report re: Initial Briefing Document
4	NGPF0008979	Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP 2021), November 2021 [NPCC]
5	NGPF0008990	Role of a CSC

6	NGPF0009000	Report dated 13/06/2023, compiled by Unknown, re: LIMDIS OFFICAL-SENSITIVE OFFENDER PROFILE: Op PLATO Declaration in Nottingham, Tuesday 13 June 2023
7	NGPF0009009	Financial Investigation note by Financial Investigation Unit re: [Financial Intelligence Assessment (v1) Money Laundering / Fraud / Terrorist Financing Investigation
8	NGPF0000216	Report on VC dated 13/06/2023
9	NGPF0002690	Diagram undated RE: OP Alcuinian by Nottinghamshire Police
10	NGPF0002712	Operation Alcuinian diagram in relation to VC, undated, Nottinghamshire Police
11	NGPF0008801	Memo from J Lundie [NGPF] to CTP EM JAT, Re: Op Alcuiniac, Incident in Nottingham City Centre, 13/06/2023
12	NGPF0000450	Letter from Mark Cronshaw [EMCTP] to Clare Gibson, Re Op Hendrix - VC Landlord
13	NGPF0008823	Report dated 01/01/1900, compiled by Unknown Author, re: Full transaction data of VC from 18/09/2020 to 13/06/2023
14	NGPF0000482	Officers Report, DC 2204 Glen Finbow re: Investigations into Valdo Calocane payee, Aruna Jayakody, 15/06/2023, Nottinghamshire Police, CTP-EM
15	NGPF0008845	Nottinghamshire FIB Intelligence Package PND, NGPF
16	NGPF0008856	Address note by unknown re [VC previous addresses, associates with those addresses and any other relating information]
17	NGPF0002080	Letter from Tracey, HMRC Risk & Intelligence Service, Gateway Exchange Team to Nicola, re: Request for HMRC Information under S19 ATCSA 2001
18	NGPF0000393	Action record and log print re: Contact Aruna JAYALKODY, 16/06/2025 Nottingham Police
19	NGPF0008887	Cell Site Analysis 4852 & 6166 - D705
20	NGPF0002383	Witness Statement of Akhil [GRO-B] dated 24/07/2023
21	NGPF0002455	Witness statement of Daniel Vasper, Nottinghamshire Police 16/06/2023
22	NGPF0008920	SR [GRO-B] Burford Road - RM1001
23	NGPF0002460	MG11 Iulian [GRO-B] - S246 (English)
24	NGPF0002461	Witness Statement of Iulian [GRO-B] (Foreign Language Version), dated 22/08/2023
25	NGPF0001671	POI - Person of Interest re: Bil Monteiro, 15/06/2023, EMSOU

26	NGPF0005989	POLICE PRINT OF PNC RECORD, 15/06/2023, NPF
27	NGPF0010186	EM405.docx
28	NGPF0010187	D202 Analysis of call data for: VC phone number 7 .docx
29	NGPF0002282	Witness Statement of Bil Monteiro dated 17/06/2023
30	NGPF0009221R	Sig Wit Interview Bil Monteiro
31	NGPF0008965	MG15 SigWit Bil MONTEIRO
32	NGPF0001831	WhatsApp Notes by Valdo Calocane re: Portuguese Conversation
33	NGPF0001832	WhatsApp Notes by Valdo Calocane re: Portuguese Conversation
34	NGPF0001817	WhatsApp Messages between Unknown and Valdo Calocane re: Portuguese Conversation
35	NGPF0001819	WhatsApp Notes by Unknown re: Portuguese Conversation with Bill
36	NGPF0001820	WhatsApp Notes by Unknown re: Portuguese Conversation with Bill
37	NGPF0001826	WhatsApp Notes by Unknown re: Portuguese Conversation
38	NGPF0001828	WhatsApp Notes by Unknown re: Portuguese Conversation
39	NGPF0001829	WhatsApp Notes by Unknown re: Portuguese Conversation
40	NGPF0001830	WhatsApp Notes by Unknown re: Portuguese Conversation
41	NGPF0001815	Audio and Video of WhatsApp text messages between VC and unknown individual.
42	NGPF0008977	MG11 DC BRENNAN - S56
43	NGPF0002283	Witness Statement of Bil Figueiredo Arauja Monteiro dated 26/06/2023
44	NGPF0002389	Witness Statement of Andrew Reid, Nottinghamshire Police 23/06/2023
45	NGPF0002778	Witness Statement of Paula Carvalho dated 22/06/2023
46	NGPF0008982	Por to Eng transcripts WhatsApp messages
47	NGPF0008983	MG11 Innocencii SUCUMA
48	NGPF0008984	MG11 Herickson MONTEIRO
49	NGPF0008985	MG11 Carlos MONTEIRO
50	NGPF0003818	OFFICIAL ACTION RECORD AND LOG PRINT: SIO to consider TST from Witness 1 wife of Witness 2, dated 08/02/2024, NGPF
51	NGPF0008987	Witness Statement of Elias Amissao Mendes Calocane dated 13/06/2023
52	NGPF0008988	Witness Statement of Elias Amissao Mendes Calocane dated 13/06/2023

53	NGPF0004065	Email from Joanne De Waele (Northamptonshire Police) to Spencer Bailey (Northamptonshire Police) and Matthew Bly (Northamptonshire Police) Re: FW: corrupted file
54	NGPF0000127	Action record and log print, 16/06/2025 Nottingham Police
55	NGPF0000126	Action record and log print, 16/06/2025 Nottingham Police
56	NGPF0003735	Op Hendrix - obtaining statement/ information from Parents of Suspect, 14/06/2023, East Midlands Special Operations Unit
57	NGPF0008993	Op Hendrix - obtaining statement/ information from Parents of Suspect, 14/06/2023, East Midlands Special Operations Unit
58	NGPF0008994	SAFE Incident Log 0264_130623
59	NGPF0002310	Witness Statement of Ali Parvez, Sky Recruitment (Avarto Warehouse) dated 13/06/2023
60	NGPF0002205	Email from Ali Parvez, SRS, to Demi Robertson, NGPF. Re: Photo of VC's Passport
61	NGPF0002259	MG11 [GRO-B] - S42 (Romanian)
62	NGPF0002258	Witness statement of [GRO-B] dated 14/06/2023
63	NGPF0002257	Witness statement of [GRO-B] dated 14/06/2023
64	NGPF0002256	Witness statement of [GRO-B] dated 14/06/2023
65	NGPF0000443	Officer's Report dated 13/06/2023 - Re Op Hendrix
66	NGPF0003746	Op HENDRIX - A174, [unknown date], East Midlands Special Operations Unit
67	NGPF0002854	Witness Statement of Dr Donald Giddings dated 02/10/2023
68	NGPF0002775	Witness Statement of Alastair Campbell-Ritchie, University of Nottingham, dated 17/10/2023
69	NGPF0009006	Report dated 16/06/2023, compiled by Andy Dyson / Joe Pringle - Analysts CTPNE, re: Op ALCUINIAN Police (HENDRIX) Timeline V4 DRAFT 16/06/2023 OFFICIAL SENSITIVE - Details of Events
70	NGPF0001493	C BOULBY Review log re exhibit JR/1 1 extraction 2, 23/06/2023, Counter Terrorism Policing
71	NGPF0009008	Report dated 16/06/2023, compiled by C Boulby, re: Mobile Phone / SIM Card Review Log
72		KPR14 - JR11 - Full Report BST.xlsx
73	NGPF0003002	Report dated 06/09/2023, compiled by Cellebrite. Re: Extraction Report - Google Android Full File system
74	NGPF0008789	X735 KPR15 - JR11 - Timeline Report 11.06-13.06.xlsx
75	NGPF0002732	Exhibit KPR/6 18/08/2023
76	NGPF0003001	Report dated 11/06/2023 - 13/06/2023, compiled by DC 653 Rowbotham Re: Operation Hendrix Review of timeline extraction report for Exhibit

77	NGPF0009012	Analyst Report - 8978 - Bil MONTEIRO - D268
78	NGPF0000222	Intelligence Report dated 15/06/2023, Nottinghamshire Police
79	NGPF0009014	Analyst Report for 1237 - D133
80	NGPF0009015	Analyst Report for 4852 - D289
81	NGPF0009016	VC III Report V1 - D701
82	NGPF0002374	Phone DRAFT EXHIBIT JAR30072023 - D595
83	NGPF0003021	Exhibit JAR1.2 - R v Calocane Attribution of [VC phone number 3] to Valdo Calocane: 31/05/2023 - 13/06/2023
84	NGPF0009020	Op ALCUINIAN Timeline V2 - D639
85	NGPF0002941	Op [pre-existing redaction]/ALCUINIAN (HENDRIX) Timeline DRAFT v6 26/06/2023 OFFICIAL SENSITIVE, 19/06/2023
86	NGPF0009022	Digital Device Strategy Document - D774
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88	NGPF0002968	Report dated 22/08/2023, compiled by DC 753 Rowbotham, East Midlands Special Operations Unit
89	NGPF0009025	Analyst Report for 1237 -D110
90	NGPF0010192	ASG-507 V2 CCTV Storyboard Redacted
91	NGPF0001788	Photos (CCTV images) of convenience store
92	NGPF0009028	Financial Transactions VC- D653
93	NGPF0009030	AR GRO-B Sneinton Dale Address - A512
94	NGPF0002070	Search Record, Police Exhibit No. JFA901, 14/06/2023, NPF
95	NGPF0002488	Witness statement of Scott Yerby, 22/06/2023
96	NGPF0009033	SR GRO-B Fordel Road - D158
97	NGPF0009034	Email from Met re Monterio 18.06.23 - EM592
98	NGPF0000442	Officer's Report dated 16/06/2023 - Re Op Hendrix
99	NGPF0002842	Witness Statement of Charles Ferguson, Lincolnshire Police dated 10/08/2023
100	NGPF0002862	Witness Statement of PC Helen Halfyard, Lincolnshire Police dated 14/06/2023
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102	NGPF0008793	CCTV Master Spreadsheet - D463
103	NGPF0002877	Witness Statement of DC Barry Hitchings dated 16/06/2023
104	NGPF0002308	Witness Statement of Hans Pakpahan dated 09/08/2023
105	NGPF0002306	Witness Statement of Patrick Owens dated 14/06/2023
106	NGPF0002322	Witness Statement of James Primrose, Nottinghamshire Police, dated 14/06/2023
107	NGPF0002123	Report dated 07/06/2023, compiled by Cheryl Robinson, Streamlined Forensic Report (SFR1)

108	NGPF0002128	MG22B, Streamlined Forensic Report (SFR1) for Valdo Calocane.
109	NGPF0002122	Report dated 07/06/2023, compiled by Cheryl Robinson [Cellmark Forensic Services], re: Streamlined Forensic Report (SFR1)
110	NGPF0002457	Witness statement of Shilpa Venugopal, 13/06/2023
111	NGPF0008803	Record of Interview (Form MG15) for Adam Mendes (Valdo Calocane), dated 15/06/2023
112	NGPF0008804	SR Van FD64LUJ - AR1101
113	NGPF0008805	Identified Addresses to Search - D977
114	NGPF0008806	Application for Search Warrant from Kelly Haining [NGPF] re: Operation Hendrix, dated 16/06/2023
115	NGPF0001653	Applicant's Occupiers copy: Warrant to enter and search premises, 16/06/2023 by DJ G Young, Nottinghamshire Magistrates' Court.
116	NGPF0001658	Applicant's Occupiers copy: Warrant to enter and search premises, re: [GRO-B]Burford Road, 16/06/2023 by DJ G Young, Nottinghamshire Magistrates' Court.
117	NGPF0008809	SAFE Incident Log 0128_130623
118	NGPF0001662	Applicant's Occupiers copy: Warrant to enter and search premises, re: [GRO-B]Exeter Road, 16/06/2023 by DJ G Young, Nottinghamshire Magistrates' Court.
119	NGPF0000452	Police document from DC Mark Cronshaw, EM CTP Investigations to Steven Eley, Adam Cooper, Matt Bly and another. Re: OP HENDRIX Action 207
120	NGPF0001693	Notes by Storage King re Self Storage Licence Agreement
121	NGPF0003137	Report, dated 31/08/2023, compiled by Storage King Nottingham. Re: Statement
122	NGPF0001454	Exhibits Book re: Operation Hendrix 209 Ilkeston Road, NG7 3FW, 13/06/2023, National Police Chiefs' Council.
123	NGPF0008816	Search Record, Operational Support, Tactical Support Group, 13/06/2023, Nottinghamshire Police
124	NGPF0008817	Witness Statement of James Atkinson, [NGPF], 24/07/2023
125	NGPF0002781	Witness Statement of Andrew Cawar, Nottinghamshire Police, dated 23/07/2023
126	NGPF0008819	SR North Sherwood St - BWP401
127	NGPF0008820	Witness Statement of Barnaby Pritchard, [NGPF], 14/07/2023
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129	NGPF0008822	SR Magdala Road Scene - MT501
130	NGPF0008824	Witness Statement of Matthew Thompson, [NGPF], 13/06/2023
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132	NGPF0008826	Witness Statement of Adam Shane, [NGPF], 13/06/2023
133	NGPF0008827	Witness Statement of Alexander J Harvie, [NGPF], 13/06/2023
134	NGPF0008828	Witness Statement of James William Wilde, [NGPF], 13/06/2023
135	NGPF0008829	Operational Support Tactical Support Group Search Record, 13/6/2023 and NGPF
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137	NGPF0008831	SR Parliament Street - AS101
138	NGPF0008832	SR Auckland Close - BWP801
139	NGPF0008833	Crime Scenes & Major Incident Log Book, 13/6/2023 and NGPF
140	NGPF0002156	Operation HENDRIX Multiple Homicide 13.06.2023, Undated, EMSOU
141	NGPF0008836	Investigation to locate Slazenger bag - D513
142	NGPF0008837	MG15 ROTI CALOCANE 1019 hrs 14.06.23 #1
143	NGPF0000307	Record of Interview for Adam Mendes, dated 14/06/2023.
144	NGPF0000308	Record of Interview for Adam Mendes, dated 15/06/2023
145	NGPF0008840	MG15 ROTI CALOCANE 1817 hrs 15.06.23 #4
146	NGPF0000311	Record of Interview for Adam Mendes, dated 16/06/2023
147	NGPF0008842	Officer notes - Bil Monterio
148	NGPF0008843	OR DS Yerby
149	NGPF0000466	Officer Report titled [GRO-B] Maud Street for Operation Hendrix, 06/08/2023, East Midlands Special Operations Unit
150	NGPF0003989	Action Record and Log Print Re: Ensure any unit still in control of accused at Storage King searched, Nottinghamshire Police 02/08/2024
151	NGPF0002289	Witness Statement of Michael Munro dated 20/07/2023
152	NGPF0004104	Email from John Fairley to Karl Aram RE: FW:
153	NGPF0002925	Witness Statement of Sebastian [GRO-B] dated 22/09/2023
154	NGPF0002490	Witness statement of Christopher [GRO-B] 10/07/2023
155	NGPF0002400	Witness Statement of Kelly Rowbotham, Nottinghamshire Police 16/08/2023
156	NGPF0002403	Witness Statement of Jonathan Rushen, East Midlands Special Operations Unit 17/09/2023
157	NGPF0002404	Witness Statement of Jonathan Rushen, East Midlands Special Operations Unit 18/10/2023
158	NGPF0003008	Report dated 14/06/2023, compiled by Unknown Author, re: EE Confidential Law Enforcement

		Agencies Disclosures request report, VC phone number 3
159	NGPF0003023	Exhibit reference: JAR30072023 dated [unknown]
160	NGPF0008857	Exhibit A/I/I, 14/06/23
161	NGPF0002529	Exhibit Label of English Translation of Portuguese "Update.odt"
162	NGPF0002818	Witness Statement of Eloisa Galluzzi Dos-Santos dated 14/06/2023
163	NGPF0008860	Document Record Print_EM304
164	CPSE0006754	Post-Mortem Examination Report for Barnaby Webber dated 21 July 2023, compiled by Dr M Biggs (Pathologist), Dr S J Hamilton (Review Pathologist), M Casey (Coroner), Nottinghamshire Police, DSI L Sanders (Senior Investigating Officer) and N Harris (Exhibit Officer) for East Midland Forensic Pathology Unit, University of Leicester
165	NGPF0002635	Post-Mortem Report dated 21/07/2023
166	NGPF0002445	Witness statement of Mahamat Abdel-Diabar Terab, 13/06/2023
167	NGPF0002458	Witness statement of Shilpa Venugopal, 13/06/2023
168	NGPF0002297	Witness Statement of Declin O'Connell dated 13/06/2023
169	NGPF0008867	SFR 150623 Prints from Seely Hirst House - D222
170	NGPF0002326	Witness Statement of Trevor Proverbs dated 13/06/2023
171	NGPF0000320	Record of Interview for Ivan GRO-B dated 13/06/2023
172	NGPF0003014	CCTV Exhibit Holmes Ref, 13/06/2023
173	NGPF0008871	Exhibits officer exhibits list
174	NGPF0003757	OFFICER REPORT, 30/06/2023, East Midlands Special Operations Unit
175	NGPF0003737	OFFICER REPORT - CCTV trawl in the area of Radford, 30/06/2023, East Midlands Special Operations Unit
176	NGPF0000460	OP Hendrix, 16/06/2023, Nottinghamshire Police, City Division CID
177	NGPF0000462	OP Hendrix: CCTV Enquiries, 21/06/2023, Nottinghamshire Police, City Division CID
178	NGPF0001856	Updated SMTPGW01 dated 14/06/2023, Nottingham Police
179	NGPF0000463	Report, dated 13/06/2023, compiled by DC Owens, CTPNE. Re: Officer report DC 5435 OWENS (CTPNE)
180	NGPF0000500	Officer Report, Operation Name: Hendrix-Enquiries conducted on ILKESTON ROAD, NOTTINGHAM on 13/06/2023 by DC 5272 BAIRD (CTP NE), 13/06/2023, East Midlands Special Operations Unit

181	NGPF0003741	Officers Report dated 29/06/2023, compiled by Daniel Akehurst, Re: Operation Hendrix, officers report DC 2750 Daniel Akehurst
182	NGPF0000485	City Division CID, 16/06/2023, Nottinghamshire Police
183	NGPF0003731	OFFICER REPORT - CCTV TRAWL COMPLETED BY DC 2119 GRAY AND PC 1511 WELDON, 30/06/2023, East Midlands Special Operations Unit
184	NGPF0003732	OFFICER REPORT - CCTV TRAWL COMPLETED BY DC 2119 GRAY AND DC 3064 WONG, 07/07/2023, East Midlands Special Operations Unit
185	NGPF0003733	OFFICER REPORT - CTV TRAWL COMPLETED BY DC 2119 GRAY AND DC 3064 WONG, 06/07/2023, East Midlands Special Operations Unit
186	NGPF0008885	Exhibit list 0065, 0077 and 0079, dated 01/01/1900
187	NGPF0008886	Forensic Management Team Meeting 210623 - D486
188	NGPF0008888	Op Hendrix Suspect Evidence Recovery Plan
189	NGPF0002621	Witness Statement of Neil Beddoe dated 13/06/2023
190	NGPF0002777	Witness Statement of Luke Cano-Flatt, Nottinghamshire Police, dated 17/08/2023
191	NGPF0002697	Report dated 13/06/2023 RE: CSI Worksheet Summary Report on Valdo Calocane by Luke Cano-Flatt
192	NGPF0008892	EM296 FW: Suspect ERP - Op Hendrix
193	NGPF0007773	Custody Record, 14/03/2025 and Nottinghamshire police
194	NGPF0002429	Witness Statement of Bailey Stackhouse, Nottinghamshire Police, 13/06/2023
195	NGPF0002321	Witness Statement of PC Benjamin Price, Beeston Police Station, dated 05/07/2023
196	CPSE0002937	Email from Alan Murphy to Neil Beddoe, Anthony Mason and Alan Murphy, re: Op Hendrix - defence psychiatric report
197	CPSE0001066	Email from Alan Murphy to Neil Beddoe, Anthony Mason, Alan Murphy RE: Calocane - pros psychiatric report
198	NGPF0008896	Forensic Work Request - D219
199	NGPF0008897	Email from Tess Buxton 17.01.24 re hair samples
200	NGPF0008900	Official FLA Log, date unknown, police force unknown
201	NGPF0008901	FLO LOG Ian COATES with sons - D424
202	NGPF0002519	Family Liaison Log and Associated Documents Re: Ian Robert Coates, 13/06/2023 - 24/10/2023, NPF
203	NGPF0002496	Family Liaison Log and Associated Documents Re: Barnaby Webber, 19/12/2023, NPF
204	NGPF0008904	FLO Log for O'Malley-Kumar Family - D5
205	NGPF0008905	Family Meeting Minutes 07.12.23 - D922

206	CPSE0009084	Information for family - answers to questions undated
207	NGPF0004150	Minutes of Meeting re: Meeting held with bereaved families on 13/12/2023 to discuss Dr Blackwood and Dr Latham psychiatric reports, Nottinghamshire Police
208	NGPF0004148	Email from Leigh Sanders [LEPF] to Sharron Hather [NGPF] Re: FW: Notes from Family Meetings and Question and Answer Document
209	NGPF0003181	Letter from Janine Mckinney to Sanjoy Kumar and Sinead O'Malley-Kumar RE: Decision making
210	NGPF0008914	Letter from CPS to Mr and Mrs. Webber, re: personal condolences and CPS decision to accept partial defence of diminished responsibility
211	NGPF0008915	Letter from CPS to James Coates, Lee Coates and Darren Coates re: personal condolences and CPS decision to accept partial defence of diminished responsibility
212	NPGF0004156	Email from Dr Kumar 19.12.23 - T61
213	NGPF0008916	Attached CPS Concerns Document 19.12.23 - D953
214	NGPF0008917	CPS Teams Meeting with families - 15.01.24 - D965
215	NGPF0008918	LS Response VC samples query 17.01.24
216	NGPF0007826	LS to ACC Draft Response
217	NGPF0007825	Prosecution Opening Notes 15.01.24
218	CPSE0000486	Prosecution Sentencing Note 15.01.24
219	NGPF0007583	Email from Sanjoy Kumar to Kate Meynell [NGPF], Neil Hudgell [Hudgell Solicitors], Tim Moloney [Doughty Street Chambers], and others, re: Toxicology - fingernails
220	NGPF0008921	Email Chain - EM1313
221	NGPF0008922	Email from Leigh Sanders [LEPF] to Kate Meynell CC [NGPF], Malcolm Turner [NGPF], re: FW: The analysis of nail clippings for drugs - urgent advice please.
222	NGPF0004164	Email from Leigh Sanders to Sharron Hather and Phil Cumberpatch, Re: FW: Toxicology - Grace
223	NGPF0004170	Email from Leigh Sanders to Sharron Hather, Re: Toxicology - Grace
224	NGPF0008930R	BWV PC 3550 Bower - D1102
225	NGPF0002650	Witness Statement of Matthew Bower dated 13/06/2023
226	NGPF0010240	Images JR1 by CSI Rana
227	NGPF0008932R	BWV of PC 1721 Whysall - D1103
228	NGPF0002474	Witness statement of Martin Jonathan Whysall, 14/06/2023
229	NGPF0008934R	BWV of PC 3288 Yallop - D1101
230	NGPF0002483	Written statement of Stephen Yallop, 13/06/2023

231	NGPF0002386	Witness Statement of Rana Jatinder, Nottinghamshire Police, 07/09/2023
232	NGPF0002615	Witness Statement of Samuel Baxter dated 28/08/2023
233	NGPF0008938	Email from Craig Bevan [Cellmark] to Noel Pearson [emsou-fs police], EMSOU Case Queries Update [emsou-fs police], Cheryl Robinson [Cellmark] and others, re: [CJSM] [Official]URGENT RESULTS - Op Hendrix - 23000360085 - CFS/981714/23
234	NGPF0002747	Report, dated 14/08/2023, compiled by Cheryl Robinson [Cellmark Forensic Services], re: Streamlined Forensic Report (SFR1) relating to VC
235	NGPF0008940	SFR 13.07.23 - D473
236	NGPF0002729	Forensic Analysis Contemporaneous Notes dated 15/06/2023 RE: Operation Hendrix/Alcuinian by DCI Greenwood
237	NGPF0002730	Exhibit JR/10 - SIM/USIM Examination Report Properties, dated 15/06/2023
238	NGPF0001483	S Gain Review log re: exhibit JR/11 extraction 2, 23/06/2023, Counter Terrorism Policing
239	NGPF0008944	Report dated 19/06/2023, compiled by Amanda Malsbury, re: Artefacts Review Log of VC (Official Sensitive (Operational))
240	NGPF0001463	Operation: Alcuinian - Title: A CLARKE Review log re exhibit JR/11 extraction 2, 23/06/2023, Counter Terrorism Policing North East
241	NGPF0001468	Operation: Alcuinian, Title: A MALSBURY Review log re exhibit JR/13 extraction 1 (memory USB Stick), 23/06/2023, Counter Terrorism Policing North East
242	NGPF0001472	Report dated, 23/06/2023, compiled by C Boulby Re: Review Log re: JR/13 extraction 1, 23/06/2023, Counter Terrorism Policing
243	NGPF0001478	M TEUA Review log re: exhibit JR/13 extraction 1, 23/06/2023, Counter Terrorism Policing
244	NGPF0001487	S GAINS Review log re exhibit JR/13 extraction 1, 23/06/2023, Counter Terrorism Policing
245	NGPF0003106	Diagram dated 14/05/2023 RE: Vehicle diagram
246	NGPF0003122	Report dated 13/06/2023 RE: Vehicle Scene Notes
247	NGPF0008953	Report dated 19/06/2023, compiled by Unknown at Richards Cossall, re: Car Examination at Scene, Forensic Collision Investigation Network
248	NGPF0000341	Action Record and Log Print re: Conduct Welfare Check on Christopher GRO-B , 08/02/2024, Nottinghamshire Police
249	NGPF0002623	MG11 DC 2828 BEDDOE - S51G
250	NGPF0007359	Piece of paper with names thereon - NJB85

251	NGPF0000437	Officer Report dated 15/06/2023, Re Op Hendrix - action A210
252	NGPF0008958	Nottingham University Security Enquiries - D69
253	NGPF0007841	PNB Christopher [GRO-B] Redacted
254	NGPF0002332	CMY1 - Video of Valdo headlock - D556
255	NGPF0008960	Daily Mail Article 13.08.2024
256	NGPF0002628	Witness Statement of Samuel dated 10/07/2023
257	NGPF0002884	Witness Statement of Ryan dated 28/07/2023
258	NGPF0003630	OneNote entries by LS
259	NGPF0007852	IOPC Referral Op Hendrix - D65
260	NGPF0008963	IOPC News Article 12.02.24
261	NGPF0008964	The Law Commission - Annual Report - 39th Annual Report of the Law Commission
262	NGPF0007828	HMCPSI Report 21.03.24 - D983