

Witness Name: Kate Meynell

Statement No: **WITN0371001**

Dated: 16 March 2026

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF CHIEF CONSTABLE KATE MEYNELL

I, Kate Meynell, will say as follows: -

Introduction

1. I am the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the "**Inquiry**") with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 26 November 2025 (the "**Request**").
3. I offer my sincere apologies to the Inquiry for the delay in submitting this statement. Last year I was diagnosed with cancer for which I continue to receive treatment. For a period of months I was incapacitated and unable to respond to the Inquiry's request for a statement. I am grateful for the Inquiry's understanding and remain entirely committed to providing all information required to assist its work.

4. When I was diagnosed with cancer, I had to step away from policing in order to focus fully on my treatment and recovery. As a consequence, I moved to an out-of-office status and have not returned to work for nearly a year. During that period, I necessarily disengaged from day-to-day policing matters and, over time, lost sight of developments both nationally and locally. Following my diagnosis, treatment and recovery, I reflected carefully on my ability to continue to perform the role of Chief Constable (CC) to the standard it requires. I concluded that I was no longer able to do so and consequently had no option but to retire. I returned to work on recuperative duties on 5 January 2026 in order to fulfil my obligations to the Public Inquiry. My retirement date is 17 March 2026.

5. While I am no longer able to perform the role of CC, I remain keen to continue working and I hope to commence a new role as Head of the East Midlands Special Operations Unit (EMSOU) Regional Review Unit on 6 April 2026. This will still be a role in policing but will carry significantly less responsibility than the role of a CC.

6. Before I respond to the questions posed by the Inquiry, I wish to acknowledge the catastrophic impact of the 13 June 2023 attacks. My sincere condolences are with the bereaved families, who have to live every day with the profound loss of their loved ones, Barnaby, Grace and Ian. My thoughts are also with the survivors, who continue to experience the enduring physical and emotional, consequences of VC's actions.

7. I recognise the importance of the Inquiry's work to assess how society (including the police service and National Health Service) can better manage the risks posed by a small number of paranoid schizophrenics and I wish to make clear from the outset that I have no expertise in that condition or its management.

Career Background & Relevant Education and Training

8. I was born in Nottingham and have lived there for most of my life. My family has strong and longstanding connections to the County.
9. I was educated locally in Nottingham, where I attained both O' and A' Levels. I subsequently studied Physical Education, Sports Science, and Social Science at Loughborough University, graduating with a 2:1 honours degree in June 1992. Following my graduation, I spent a short period travelling.
10. More recently, I furthered my academic development and was awarded an MSc in Police Leadership, Strategy and Organisation.
11. In May 1993 I joined NP and was initially posted to Bulwell Police station. I spent my two-year probation period in uniform, responding to incidents, investigating crime and supporting victims of crime. I spent a number of years in this role learning the basics of policing and the importance of serving our communities.
12. I was then seconded to a team proactively policing individuals on bail. This was a new initiative, and my role required me to develop working practices not only within policing but also with the Courts.

13. I spent a short time in the Corporate Development department reviewing and developing force policy in line with developments in policing, as well as our statutory obligations.
14. In 2000 I was promoted to Sergeant working in the City Centre. I was responsible for a team ensuring crime recording compliance and overseeing investigations.
15. In 2002, I worked on a project to implement measures introduced under the Youth and Criminal Justice Act 1999. These special measures were designed to support vulnerable and intimidated witnesses in giving their evidence.
16. In 2003 I worked as a staff officer for a Divisional Commander.
17. Having experienced a variety of roles, I decided I wanted to specialise in investigations and pursue a career as a detective. I completed the National Investigators Exam and subsequently attended the initial Criminal Investigation Department (CID) course in September 2003, completion of which resulted in my Professionalising Investigations Programme (PIP 2) accreditation.
18. I subsequently worked as a Detective Sergeant (DS) within the Child Abuse Investigation Unit (CAIU), where I investigated serious offences against children, including sexual and physical abuse. This role required close and effective partnership working with Social Services.
19. I was promoted to Inspector in 2004 and initially worked as the Staff Officer for the Chief Officer team. This involved working for both the Chief

Constable (CC) and with the Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) including working on a strategy for drug use reduction across the county ensuring treatment and education worked alongside law enforcement and public safety.

20. In 2005 I moved to become the Community Policing Inspector for local policing at Radford Road Police Station. I was responsible for leading a team of officers and police staff dedicated to community policing, focussing on community safety and crime reduction through partnership working and building links with communities. The role involved a broad spectrum of initiatives including targeting robberies and burglaries, local drug supply and anti-social behaviour (ASB).
21. In 2005 I worked as a Divisional Detective Inspector (DI) in Mansfield where I was responsible for leading serious crime investigations, including an investigation into the manslaughter of Mark Davie and an attempted murder where a male was shot in his home address.
22. In 2007 I attended a PIP3 Senior Investigators (SIO) Course. The course is designed to develop skills to lead homicide and major crime investigations. Following this I was posted as a Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) into the Major Crime (MC) unit.
23. In 2007 I became part of the strategic leadership team for the EMSOU-Major Crime unit (EMSOU-MC). This was a regional response to MC investigation with the five forces of the East Midlands collaborating regarding major crime investigations. EMSOU-MC consists of hubs in each of the five forces with strategic leadership at a regional level.

24. I was promoted to Detective Superintendent (DSU) in 2014 and whilst I remained in EMSOU-MC I was based in Leicestershire.
25. In 2014 I was appointed Head of EMSOU-MC where I oversaw a number of homicide, and kidnap and extortion offences.
26. In 2017 I served as Head of Crime in Northamptonshire Police where my responsibilities included Public Protection and Safeguarding, Specialist Crime and Intelligence and Local Investigations.
27. In 2018 I returned to NP as Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) Crime. In this role my responsibilities included Serious and Organised Crime, Public Protection and Safeguarding, Serious and Organised Crime, Intelligence, Firearms and Roads Policing.
28. In January 2021 I was appointed as Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) with Derbyshire Police where I was responsible for force performance, Professional Standards Department (PSD), Human Resources, Media and Communications and Information Management.
29. In December 2022 I was appointed as Chief Constable (CC) of NP. My role was to set a vision for the force. As CC I had overall responsibility for leading the force and setting the strategic direction.
30. In June 2022 I was appointed Chair of the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) Homicide Working Group (HWG). As Chair, I was determined to support SIOs and police forces in driving continuous improvement in homicide investigations.

31. We aimed to support one another with the challenges we faced and coordinate our activity, so we were as effective as possible. Specialists and practitioners from across the UK would discuss their challenges and share good practice.
32. Since 2021 there has been a significant focus on coordinating and developing the policing approach to Homicide reduction. Initially Homicide Reduction strategies were a response to the Conservative Governments Beating Crime Plan July 2021. Since this date, the HWG has worked with forces to develop and review their homicide reduction strategies, ensuring, where possible, that good practice is share.

Training

33. My training in relation to my investigative skills has seen me progress through the College of Policing (CoP) Professionalising Investigations Programme (PIP).
34. My initial CID training pre-dates the programme but I have received and been accredited in both PIP 3 and PIP 4.
35. The PIP 3 Senior Investigators (SIO) Course is designed to develop skills to lead homicide and major crime investigations.
36. In 2013 I attended the Strategic Management of Complex Cases “PIP 4” course. The PIP 4 role is designed to support and advise an SIO as well as linking in with the Gold Commander and strategic leaders in a homicide or major crime investigation.

37. In 2010 I was trained as a kidnap and extortion SIO.
38. I have also attended the Major Crime Review Officers' course, enhancing my ability to analyse and assess investigations.
39. The CoP leadership programme has informed and supported my development as a senior leader in policing.
40. Between 2006 and 2007 I completed the Senior Leadership Programme run by the College of Policing, which is designed to develop leadership skills, to lead in a complex environment, manage change, maximise performance, communicate effectively and understand organisational strategy.
41. In 2019 I completed the Strategic Command Course (SCC), also run by the CoP. This course was designed to develop skills and understanding to perform the role of a Chief Officer (ACC, DCC and CC). This course has been superseded by the Executive Leaders Programme (ELP)
42. In 2021 I completed the Multi-agency Gold Incident Command Course (MAGIC). This course develops the skills required to lead coordinated multi-agency responses to critical and major incidents.
43. In addition, I have also completed the following specialist training:
 - In 2008, I was trained as a Hostage Negotiator and subsequently as a Hostage Negotiator Coordinator, a role I undertook until 2015. This work primarily involved negotiating with individuals in acute crisis, many of whom were contemplating self-harm or suicide. On occasion, I was also deployed to incidents involving individuals being detained against their

will. This training and operational experience hopefully developed and enhanced my communication and negotiation skills, enabling me to manage high-risk, emotionally charged situations effectively and with sensitivity.

- In 2011 I was accredited as a Senior Identification Manager (SIM). This role is responsible for managing all aspects of the identification process following mass fatality incidents.
- In 2017 I achieved accreditation as a Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC), enabling me to lead firearms operations at a strategic level.
- In 2018 I attended the Gold Public Order Commanders course following which I was Gold Command for a number of planned public order operations including public protests in the City Centre.

44. As of 13 June 2023 I ceased performing the role of SFC or Gold Public Order. A decision had been made at Chief Officer Team (COT) level that neither of these roles would be performed by the CC due to the other commitments associated with the CC role.

Experience in responding to major or complex incidents prior to 13 June 2023

45. Between 2007 and 2017 I led numerous investigations into major or complex incidents as an SIO and PIP 4, including a number of homicides, as follows:

- The killing of Dwayne, Jade, John, Jack, Jesse and Jayden Philpott following a house fire. This was a high-profile investigation with significant local and national media interest. The investigation identified

an emerging circumstantial case against the parents and a family friend. This required a detailed FLO strategy as well as the use of covert tactics. A comprehensive forensic strategy ensured evidence of accelerants were recovered and analysed and were critical in securing a conviction.

- The linked murders of Anton Akpom and of Shehnila Taufiq, Zainab Taufiq, Muhammed Bilal Taufiq, and Muhammed Jamal Taufiq. Anton was fatally stabbed after being mistakenly believed to have been involved in an escalation of gang-related violence. In the aftermath of his death, eight of his associates, intent on seeking retribution, set fire to a house they believed to be the address of the individual responsible. Tragically, this belief was incorrect, and the arson attack resulted in the deaths of four members of the Taufiq family. This investigation was particularly complex, requiring the simultaneous management of two linked inquiries. It was essential to preserve the integrity of each investigation while enabling the appropriate sharing of relevant information between them. In parallel, a coordinated suspect strategy was developed to manage the arrest and interview of ten offenders, involving a significant number of suspects.
- The murder of Nigel Bacon, whose wife Susan Bacon and their son Michael hired a hitman to kill him. Whilst not immediately apparent, this required a detailed FLO strategy when it was suspected that family members were responsible. Evidence had to be secured linking the hitman to the scene as well his communications with Susan and Michael, and evidence of their planning the killing.

- The murder of Bernard Langton, who was shot in Nottingham city centre after fleeing a nightclub where an altercation had arisen between feuding organised crime gangs (OCG). Due to the link to OCG, many witnesses felt unable to provide a witness statement. The investigation necessitated forensic CCTV recovery and examination as well as witness strategies including anonymous witnesses.
- The murders of Edward Green, Amy Smith and Ruby Grace Gaunt, who died when the house in which they were staying was set on fire by Peter Eyre and his sons Simon and Anthony following a dispute over a stolen moped.
- The murder of Eunice Carr. Eunice was killed by her husband who was made subject to a Hospital Order under the Mental Health Act.
- The murder of Casey Brittle. Casey was killed by her boyfriend following an abusive relationship where she had been subjected to violent attacks. Following her boyfriend's conviction for murder in 2010, I supported Casey's family with an appeal against an unduly lenient sentence that was increased on appeal. Following this case, I sought the permission of Casey's mother to use Casey's story to educate NP regarding domestic violence and the importance of the police response. This work then linked into the White Ribbon campaign working to end violence against women and girls.
- The murder of Kayleigh Haywood, which involved the online grooming of a 15-year-old girl. After arranging to meet a man she believed to be

her boyfriend, Kayleigh was raped and murdered by an associate of the offender. She was initially reported missing, prompting a fast paced and intensive investigation focused on locating her safely. As the enquiry progressed, it became evident that Kayleigh had come to serious harm. An evolving and carefully coordinated search strategy was implemented, which ultimately led to the discovery of her body. Following Kayleigh's death, we worked with her parents to make her story available to warn of the dangers of online grooming.

- The murder of Jacqueline Bartlam by her son, Daniel Bartlam, who subsequently set fire to the family home in an attempt to destroy evidence. The investigation was particularly challenging, as it was initially inconceivable to many that Daniel could have committed such an offence. However, evidence recovered from his computer, together with witness testimony, ultimately established that this was, tragically, the case.
- The murder of Jill Goldsmith. Gill was killed by her husband Adrian, a serving police officer. The investigation was conducted in Northamptonshire, the force in which he served, creating challenges regarding preserving the integrity of the evidence gathered.

46. I have also been involved in major and complex incidents as a Chief Officer.

47. I was Gold Commander and Chair of the Strategic Coordination group (SCG) in both Nottinghamshire (2020-21) and then Derbyshire (2021-22) for Covid-19. This was an unprecedented time and necessitated

coordinating the force response alongside strategic partnership working across the Local Resilience Forum (LRF). Working practices had to be amended in line with emergency legislation.

48. I worked closely with the Communications cell ensuring consistent messaging with the public regarding the NP approach to policing the covid restrictions. Internal communications with the workforce required clear information regarding the changes in working practices as well as expectations in how NP would respond to individuals breaching the regulations.
49. Business continuity was challenging due to a reduced number of resources as well as restrictions on working practices and availability of personal protective equipment (PPE).
50. As CC I was Chair of Nottinghamshire Local Resilience Forum (LRF). The LRF coordinates emergency planning and response for major incidents across the County. The LRF is briefed regarding the Community Risk Register and ensures that there are appropriate plans in place to deal with any major incidents. Training and exercise are also reviewed at the LRF as well as planning for large scale exercises.
51. As ACC between 2018-2021, I was Gold lead for NP's response to knife crime. This included developing a knife crime strategy and working alongside a newly implemented Violence Reduction Unit (VRU), . The VRU brought together specialists from health, police and local government, probation and community organisations to identify ways to not only tackle crime but also the underlying causes of crime. The VRU successfully

improved partnership working across Nottinghamshire. A number of prevention programmes were delivered to young people; this included the Ben Kinsella "Choices and Consequences" exhibition at the National Justice Museum Nottingham. In 2023 the VRU changed its name to the Violence Reduction Partnership and continues to coordinate a partnership response to violence in Nottinghamshire.

52. I was responsible for management of a critical incident during an ongoing feud between Organised Crime Groups (OCG) in Nottingham and Manchester. Intelligence suggested that there would be retribution attacks involving firearms. One such attack had resulted in a murder. This was fast paced with a significant risk to individuals and the public. It required joint working with Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and also the National Crime Agency (NCA) as the OCGs were linked to individuals in Dubai. While NP were managing risks to life, there was also a need to ensure that the local community felt safe and was reassured by the NP activity.

53. I was Gold Commander following a potential Counter Terrorism (CT) incident in London. Initial enquiries indicated that the suspect was resident in Nottingham. While the investigation was led by the CT policing network, a number of significant enquiries needed to be progressed locally in Nottingham, including the execution of search warrants supported by armed officers. Inevitably, this activity generated considerable local interest. My role was to ensure that NP effectively supported the CT investigation while also reassuring the public and managing media interest. This was

particularly challenging in the early stages, as there was limited information that could appropriately be shared.

54. I was Gold Commander for a critical incident following the murder of Ezekiel Clarke, following which there were significant tensions in the local community. Work conducted ensured that the nature and extent of the tensions were understood and addressed whilst ensuring the investigation progressed.
55. I was Gold Commander in Nottinghamshire when a major incident was declared following flooding and a landslide in Mansfield, Nottinghamshire. A multi-agency response was coordinated to ensure public safety and the evacuation of residents from their homes. This incident understandably caused a significant amount of public concern and increased scrutiny of the Nottinghamshire LRF response by National Government.

Personal knowledge of police involvement with VC prior to 13 June 2023

56. I have been asked to provide details of my personal knowledge of any police involvement with VC prior to 13 June 2023.
57. Prior to the events on 13 June 2023 I had no knowledge of VC.
58. At the time of some of the previous NP interactions with VC I was not a serving officer in NP. I served as Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) with NP from 2 July 2018 to 10 January 2021. Following this I performed the role of Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) in Derbyshire Police. On 12 December 2022 I returned to NP as Chief Constable.

First awareness of the attacks on 13 June 2023

59. I have been asked when I first became aware of matters relating to the attacks by VC on 13 June 2023.
60. On the evening of 12 June 2023, I travelled to Harrogate Police Treatment Centre as I was due to attend a meeting the next day. I received a telephone call from ACC Griffin early in the morning of 13 June 2023. I recorded brief details of the call in my daybook (URN: NGPF0011112, page 2). I use this book daily as an aide-mémoire to document information provided to me. By reference to ACC Griffin's phone records (URN: NGPF0007786) I am able to confirm that the call took place at 06:00.
61. ACC Griffin informed me that two people had been stabbed on Ilkeston Road, Nottingham and that a further incident had occurred where a vehicle had been driven at and injured pedestrians in the city. He also stated that a PLATO incident had been declared and that there was a possibility the incident was Counter Terrorism (CT) related.
62. As ACC Griffin was the Chief Officer on call that day, his role was to provide a response to critical incidents, major incidents and any other incident deemed to require Chief Officer involvement. I had also set the expectation that the Chief Officer on call would notify me at the earliest opportunity if there was a critical or major incident.
63. Upon my return to NP in the role of CC, one of the matters I raised was the Chief Officer on-call arrangements. I was keen to ensure that, as a COT, , we adopted a consistent and shared approach. During these discussions, I made clear that, in my role as CC, I expected to be informed of Major and

Critical incidents at the point they occurred, rather than waiting until I was next on duty. This enabled me to gain an early understanding of significant issues affecting the force and to consider whether it was appropriate for me to return to work. This approach was consistent with that adopted by the previous CC and was therefore familiar to the COT.

64. A PLATO response is a protocol used for major incidents particularly where a marauding terrorist attack (MTA) is suspected. It ensures a coordinated response for emergency services and other partners. To the best of my knowledge a PLATO response has rarely been implemented in the UK. I knew that as Operation PLATO had been called this would constitute a Major Incident as defined in CoP's Major Incident Management APP (URN: NGPF0011113). It was obvious to me that this also met the criteria for a Critical Incident as defined in CoP's Critical Incident Management APP (URN: NGPF0011114), as follows:

- *“A major incident is an event or situation, with a range of serious consequences, which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agencies.”*
- *“A critical incident is any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community.”*

65. Although the details were still being established and I was aware that ACC Griffin was still in the process of coordinating the response and collating all the information, it was obvious that this was a very serious incident involving the loss of life and serious injury. This would clearly have a devastating impact on individuals directly affected and their families, as well as the wider

community. The nature of the incident was such that it would require a considerable policing response. Where incidents of such a grave nature occur, I firmly believe that the CC should be directly involved in our response. Accordingly, I made the decision to travel back to Nottinghamshire immediately.

66. As I was travelling back, I received a further call from ACC Griffin. He updated me that three people had lost their lives and that there was one male in custody. He stated that they were still unable to ascertain if the incident was CT related. I did not disrupt my journey to record this update, rather I made a retrospective entry in my daybook (URN: NGPF0011112 on page 3), when I arrived at force headquarters (FHQ). I am aware from ACC Griffin's phone records (URN: NGPF0007786) that this call was at 07:02.

Strategic Communications meeting on 13 June 2023

67. I have been asked about a meeting held at 08:15am on 13 June 2023 with ACC Griffin, Lyn Heath and Matthew Jarram, at which we discussed the approval of the proposed strategic communications approach, which I agreed. I have been asked what arrangements were put in place at that meeting, and subsequently, to communicate with other agencies, the media, the bereaved families, and the survivors of the attacks.
68. At 08:15 on 13 June 2023 I attended my first meeting regarding Operation Hendrix (the operational name assigned to these attacks by VC). I met with ACC Griffin, Lyn Heath and Matthew Jarram. Lyn Heath is Head of Corporate Communications and Matthew Jarram is a Senior Media and External Relations Manager.

69. The meeting began with ACC Griffin detailing his strategic approach, which was in accordance with the Gold, Silver, Bronze Command structure and was managed through Operation Hendrix.
70. I directed that ACC Griffin should remain in the role of Gold Commander. Considering the Chief Officer team at the time, I was confident he was the most appropriate person for the role. He is an experienced Chief Officer and a very capable investigator. This also meant the other Chief Officers could perform other roles in our response commensurate with their skills and experience.
71. I agreed with ACC Griffin that I would have a specific role regarding external engagement. Specifically, my role would relate to the media, Government, national agencies and external strategic partners in Nottinghamshire.
72. There was already a significant amount of media coverage of the attacks. NP needed to ensure we provided clear, consistent and accurate messaging to keep the public informed and reassured in relation to what was happening. From my experience in these circumstances, external communications are best delivered by the same person. The visible presence of a senior leader providing timely information about an incident reassures the public that it is being treated with appropriate seriousness and that senior leadership is actively involved. I believed due to the gravity of the situation it was my duty as CC to perform this role.
73. My role was referred to as Platinum and sat alongside the Gold Command structure described. ACC Griffin as Gold Commander was responsible for

communication with families, victims and communities utilising the Bronze leads.

74. My experience of Major Crime investigations meant I was aware that communication and the sharing of information with families and survivors would be managed through family liaison structures. ACC Griffin informed me that that Detective Superintendent (DSU) Leigh Sanders had been appointed as the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO). As Head of EMSOU–MC, he was the most senior SIO available to the force and was selected due to the seriousness and complexity of the incident. The roles and responsibilities for major investigations are defined within the Major Crime Investigation Manual (MCIM, 2021) (URN: NGPF0008898). The SIO is accountable for all aspects of the investigation, including family liaison.
75. ACC Griffin also informed me that Detective Inspector (DI) Claire Gould had been appointed as the Family Liaison Adviser (FLA), with responsibility for identifying and deploying Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) to support the families. I was assured that this FLO process was in hand, both from the updates provided to me and through my confidence in the capabilities of those undertaking these roles. Both roles sit within the Gold Command structure and were overseen by ACC Griffin.
76. ACC Griffin and I were clear that the families and survivors must always be prioritised when sharing information. Accordingly, I stipulated that all releases would be shared with the families and survivors prior to being shared with the media. This was intended to be done through the FLA and

FLOs and via the SIO. This was recorded in the Communication Strategy Summary produced by Lyn Heath (URN: NGPF0011115).

77. Another key area of communication focused on the communities of Nottinghamshire. Chief Inspector (CI) Chris Pearson was appointed as the Bronze Commander for community engagement. His role was to ensure communities were updated and any community tensions identified. As part of his responsibilities, he produced a Community Impact Assessment (URN: NGPF0011116), capturing the views and concerns of diverse communities across the city following the incident. This assessment assisted NP in understanding any emerging issues or tensions and ensured NP responded effectively in support of our communities. It was agreed that wherever possible media messages would be shared with key community members a short time before they were released to the media. This was overseen by Chief Superintendent Verma.
78. The work conducted by CI Pearson identified concerns among asylum seekers and members of the black community that they may be targeted because of social media speculation that VC was an illegal immigrant. CI Pearson sought the assistance of the Independent Advisory Group (IAG) to address these concerns. In Nottinghamshire, the IAG acts as a critical friend to NP and is often consulted during a critical incident.
79. On 13 June 2023 it was decided by the Gold Group to establish a Communications cell, consisting of representatives from external agencies affected by, or involved in, the response to the incident such as the University of Nottingham, NHS, Nottingham City Council, etc., as well as

the police. This was intended to ensure that partner agencies received consistent and timely messaging about developments in relation to the incident.

80. During the meeting with ACC Griffin, Lyn Heath and Matthew Jarram, we agreed on the approach to media communications. I was clear that all communications would be consistent, accurate and transparent. Nothing would be released that risked compromising the integrity of the criminal investigation. All media releases would need to be approved by myself and initially I would be the spokesperson for the force.

81. I was made aware that a media release had already been issued which detailed the number of road closures active in the city. This had been approved by CI Neil Humphris and was necessary in providing early information regarding police activity that would impact on the public (URN: NGPF0011117).

82. I agreed with ACC Griffin, Lyn Heath and Matthew Jarram that we would meet every morning for ACC Griffin to provide an update on the investigation and response. This information and any additional feedback from Corporate Communications was discussed to identify and agree the key messages for release that day. Media communications are intended to keep the public updated. The NP approach to communications was captured as follows in the Communication Strategy (URN: NGPF0011115):

“The embedded starting point for all Notts Police comms strategies, including Op Hendrix, is that we will inform the public through the media

and established channels about what is happening in our communities and provide an open, honest and transparent picture.”

83. If there was an additional briefing during the day we would hold another meeting. Likewise, if there were persistent media enquiries, I would discuss these with Corporate Communications and consider our response in light of my knowledge of the investigation or, where appropriate, discuss it with ACC Griffin.
84. Media releases would be prepared by Corporate Communications who would then share it with me for any amendments. Some of these releases were shared via e mail but I remember that a lot of them were discussed in person with Matthew Jarram. On occasions, I would print the draft and make amendments on a hardcopy before discussing with Matthew. I would then authorise the releases as and when I was content with them.
85. My focus for media releases was to keep the public updated with what was happening regarding the incident and to offer reassurance regarding the progress of the investigation and, more latterly, that it was safe to be in Nottingham.
86. This process was followed from 13 June 2023 until 16:36 on 16 June 2023 when a statement was released stating VC had been charged.

Charging announcement on 16 June 2023

87. I have been asked to describe the circumstances in which the announcement of 16 June 2023 was drafted, namely the statement that VC had been charged and that the charges “arise as a result of our thorough

The further three (?) charges of ???? relate to three members of the public struck by a van. Chief Constable Kate Meynell, of Nottinghamshire Police, said: ?These charges are a significant development and arise as a result of our thorough investigation into these shocking incidents that occurred in our city. Our thoughts remain with the families and friends of all those affected by these attacks, and we will continue to provide support and reassurance.

We are keenly aware of the deep emotion being felt surrounding these tragic events and the high level of public interest, not only in Nottingham and Nottinghamshire but also across the whole country. However, its extremely important there should be no reporting, commentary or sharing of information which could in any way prejudice these active criminal proceedings and create a real risk of families not getting the justice they deserve. We would also ask people to respect the families wishes for privacy at this difficult time. Suzanne Llewellyn, Chief Crown Prosecutor of CPS East Midlands, added: Following the shocking events in Nottingham on Tuesday 13 June 2023, the Crown Prosecution Service has today authorised Nottinghamshire police to charge Valdo Calocane after reviewing a file of evidence from Nottinghamshire Police. The Crown Prosecution Service's thoughts and sympathies is extended to the families and friends of all those involved in this tragic incident. The Crown Prosecution Service reminds all concerned that criminal proceedings are now active, and that Mr Calocane has a right to a fair trial. It is extremely important that there should be no reporting, commentary or sharing of information online which

could in any way prejudice these proceedings.
ENDS”

91. The draft contained several points for discussion as well as some gaps where information needed confirming. Following my discussions with the communications team a final version was produced which following my approval was published at 16:36 on 16 June 2023 (URN: NGPF0011119).

92. Again, for ease of reference I have included the text of the press release that I approved as follows:

“Police have charged a man with three counts of murder following the attacks in Nottingham on 13 June 2023. Valdo Calocane, aged 31, of no fixed address, is also charged with three counts of attempted murder. He will appear at Nottingham Magistrates’ Court on Saturday (17 June 2023).

The charges relate to University of Nottingham students Barnaby Philip John Webber and Grace Sashi O’Malley-Kumar, both aged 19, who were fatally stabbed in Ilkeston Road, just after 4am and Ian Robert Coates, aged 65, who was later found fatally stabbed in Magdala Road. The further three charges of attempted murder relate to three members of the public struck by a van. Chief Constable Kate Meynell, of Nottinghamshire Police, said: “These charges are a significant development and arise as a result of our thorough investigation into these horrific incidents that occurred in our city. Our thoughts remain with the families and friends of all those affected by these attacks, and we will

continue to provide support and reassurance. We would also ask people to respect the families' wishes for privacy at this difficult time to allow them to grieve. This has been an incredibly sad time for our city and county, and we stand united with our communities as we come to terms with the effects of what has happened. We are keenly aware of the deep emotion being felt surrounding these tragic events and the high level of interest, not only in Nottingham and Nottinghamshire but also across the whole country. However, posting prejudicial information online about an active case could amount to contempt of court and, in the most serious cases, have the potential to cause the collapse of a trial. Support is available for anyone affected by Tuesday's attacks. People can call Nottinghamshire Victim CARE on 0800 304 7575 or visit nottsvictimcare.org.uk. The helpline is open Monday to Friday, from 8am to 8pm, and Saturday, from 9am until 5pm."

93. Prior to authorising, I ensured the release was consistent with my approach to communicating with the media. That was to provide the public with clear information regarding VC's charges and, in doing so, to offer public reassurance, which is an important aspect of my role as CC. The fact that the man believed responsible was in custody and charged with three murders and three attempted murders was a significant event and signified the start of the criminal justice process.
94. In accordance with my stipulated approach, the FLOs shared the statement with families and survivors, and it was my understanding that their

agreement was secured prior to its release. I hoped that the fact VC had been charged would serve to provide some reassurance to them too.

95. Furthermore, in this case, I had specific concerns about the potential leaking of information from NP. The Communications team had received a number of enquiries about police information which should not have been in the public domain, including VC's visit to MI5. The latter piece of information was shared with NP as intelligence by the MPS and was not information intended to be shared externally. I was also aware enquiries had been made regarding the outstanding warrant for VC. I was concerned that if these two pieces of information entered the public domain it risked prejudicing any criminal proceedings relating to VC.
96. For those reasons, I included in my statement a clear warning regarding the posting of prejudicial material and the detrimental impact such behaviour could have on active criminal proceedings.
97. The draft media release contained a quote from Suzanne Llewellyn, Chief Crown Prosecutor CPS East Midlands. It was my understanding that it was not intended to be a joint press release from NP and CPS, rather NP and CPS had shared their proposed communications to ensure accuracy and consistency.
98. In addressing this matter, I have reflected on the extent to which consideration was given to addressing NP's previous involvement in, or investigation into, matters relating to VC.

99. I had been told of the outstanding FTA warrant by ACC Griffin at 13:00 on 13 June 2023 when he informed me verbally and I made a note in my workbook (URN: KML6.004, on page 3) of what I was told, as follows:

“FTA in Sept 2022 assault on a (sic) emergency worker”.

100. On 15 June 2023, ACC Griffin made me aware of previous incidents involving NP and VC. I made a note of these in my workbook (URN: NGPF0011120, on page 6) as follows:

“24/5/20 – trying to kick womans door in during MH episode – causing her to jump out of the window.

3/9/21 assault PC when executing S135 warrant 23/9/22 – discharged from early intervention for psychosis team for lack of engagem(ent)

3 admissions to MH facilities.”

101. This was an early indication of previous incidents and is clearly not the complete picture.

102. I believed at the time, and continue to believe, that it was not appropriate to share information relating to the outstanding FTA warrant or the previous incidents publicly at that time. The understanding of both the previous incidents and the circumstances surrounding the FTA warrant was still developing.

103. It has always been my approach that information connected to an investigation is shared with the families concerned. This is critical to ensuring transparency and ensuring that families receive information directly from us. Accordingly, it was my expectation, as part of standard

practices, that any information concerning either the previous incidents or the FTA warrant would be shared with the bereaved families prior to any public release.

104. When ACC Griffin informed me of the outstanding FTA warrant on 13 June 2023, I immediately stipulated to him that the bereaved families and survivors should be informed of its existence. I expected the delivery of this message to be coordinated by the SIO and FLA working together. I did not expect that the SIO would deliver the message personally, as the investigation was at an early stage and I understood that their focus needed to be on overseeing the investigation at that point.

105. I also did not expect the delivery of this message to be done immediately as, at that time, a significant volume of information was already being shared with the bereaved families and survivors while they were attempting to process the tragic events. It was, therefore, necessary for the SIO and the FLA to identify an appropriate point at which to share this further information. While there is never a 'right' time, a careful balance had to be struck between transparency and sensitivity. However, I was clear the information needed to be provided prior to the first court hearing for VC, where then it could be disclosed publicly as part of the court proceedings.

106. In my experience, a charge announcement would ordinarily just cover the name of the individual being charged, their address, and the specific offences for which they were being charged. This is to ensure that, given

the imminence of criminal proceedings, NP does not provide any information that may risk prejudicing those proceedings.

107. Accordingly, I did not feel it was appropriate to address NP's involvement in previous incidents with VC. The investigation was in its early stages, and it was not clear whether either the FTA warrant or the previous incidents would ultimately form part of the prosecution case. In those circumstances, wider disclosure at that point in my judgement carried a risk of prejudicing any future court proceedings and, accordingly the information could not be shared at that time.

108. Having reflected on this decision, I still believe it was the right thing to do; I could not risk prejudicing any criminal proceedings. The decision not to share the information publicly protected the integrity of the investigation but it did not preclude this information being shared with families and survivors. It was my expectation that all previous contact NP had with VC would be shared with the families and survivors and this would be managed by the SIO. I would have expected this to have been shared once the investigation had established a full understanding of the previous contact. Due to the nature of the information and the fact that there was a period of time following charge where the SIO could meet the bereaved families and survivors, I would expect this, where practicable, to be delivered personally by the SIO. The decision not to share information regarding the FTA warrant or the previous NP interactions with VC publicly was for the reasons outlined above; there was never any intention to conceal information.

109. I have also reflected on whether I considered that statement at the time to be (a) accurate, and (b) open and transparent, and whether my view on points (a) and (b) has remained the same or, if it has changed, when and why.
110. When I approved this public statement on 16 June 2023, I was aware that VC had been arrested at 05:35 on 13 June and was going to be charged in the afternoon of the 16 June 2023. A substantial amount of work had been undertaken by the investigation team and NP to reach this stage, and it is my view that this had been the result of a thorough investigation.
111. Although early evidence indicated that VC was responsible for the attacks and that he had acted alone, there was still a significant amount of investigative work done in advance of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) considering a charging decision. This work included the identification of victims and the establishment of appropriate family liaison arrangements; the completion of forensic examinations; the conduct of detailed searches; the identification, development and progression of primary lines of enquiry; witness identification and the taking of statements; the identification, recovery and review of CCTV footage; interviews with VC; and ongoing liaison with CT Policing.
112. ACC Griffin kept me regularly updated on the progress of the investigation, and I was confident that he was attending all relevant briefings. As an experienced SIO and Gold commander, I trusted ACC Griffin's professional judgement and his assessment of the investigation.

113. I am also an experienced SIO and personally attended a briefing by the SIO to the investigation team on 14 June 2023. During that briefing, I heard nothing that caused me any concern. On the contrary, I was reassured that the investigation was being conducted diligently, thoroughly, and professionally by DSU Sanders and his team.
114. When I authorised the media release, and for the reasons I have outlined, I was satisfied that the 16 June 2023 statement accurately reflected the thorough investigation that had led to the charges against VC.
115. I have been asked to consider whether my view regarding the investigation has changed or remained the same. After careful consideration, my view regarding the quality of the investigation has not changed. In coming to this conclusion I have given due consideration to the issues raised by the families that I understand they directly attribute to the quality of the investigation. I was not aware of these concerns at the time I made the statement and only became aware of them after VC was sentenced.
116. On 25 January 2024 I became aware of Dr Kumar's concerns regarding toxicology, when he provided his statement outside Nottingham Crown Court, which I will address in more detail below. My understanding is that he believes hair root samples should have been taken while VC was in police custody. I refer to an excerpt of Dr Kumar's statement taken from URN: NGPF0011121 as follows:

“Whilst we have never questioned this man's diagnosis, the lack of toxicology, contemporaneous mental health assessment, as well as

missed opportunities to divert his lethal path will forever play on our minds.”

117. I am also aware that DSU Sanders has subsequently acknowledged the failure to obtain a hair sample and apologised for the anxiety it has caused.
118. I am aware of the rationale provided by DSU Sanders for not taking these samples, which was based on there being no reasonable grounds to suspect that VC had ever used drugs. The most accurate way to determine drug use would have been through intimate samples, but consent to obtain these was refused by VC. There is no power for the police to take intimate samples by force, but head hair samples (being non-intimate) can be taken by force.
119. Forming a view on whether the absence of these head hair samples has adversely affected the overall quality of the investigation is not straightforward as this is a technically complex area.
120. When contemplating this issue, I have first considered if I would have taken the head hair root sample at the time VC was in custody. In doing so I am acutely aware that I have the benefit of hindsight, and I have tried to consider the issue objectively, albeit this is almost impossible when now I know of the significance attached to head hair samples by Dr Kumar.
121. I am unable to rely on experience as I cannot recall a case where intimate samples were refused. However, I have tried to consider the issue objectively and conclude that I would have ordered the compulsory taking of head hair root samples. At the stage samples were considered, VC was

in custody and the investigation was in its early stages. There was still a significant amount of information and evidence to be gathered. This may have included evidence to suggest VC was a drug user. Clearly intimate samples would have provided more detailed analysis of any drug use but, in the absence of intimate samples, I would have obtained non intimate samples, namely hair root samples to check for drug use.

122. The next question I must consider is whether this would have made any difference to the investigation, once all the evidence had been gathered. In considering this, I am cognisant of the fact that DSU Sanders is clear that there is no evidence to suggest VC was a drug user. It is my understanding that hair analysis cannot establish precise dates of drug use; it can only provide an estimate within broad timeframes. Consequently, it is my understanding that, if hair root samples had been taken, they would not have been able to determine if VC was under the influence of controlled drugs when he carried out the atrocious attacks.

123. Accordingly, I conclude that the value of hair root samples can only be determined by the impact it might have had on any psychiatric assessment about which I am not qualified to comment. .

124. I am mindful of the distress caused to the families by the inability to definitively determine whether VC had ever used controlled drugs and I conclude it is regrettable that the head hair samples were not compulsorily taken.

125. In further considering the quality of the investigation I have considered the peer review conducted by EMSOU Regional Review Unit (RRU) into the

investigation, which is a major case review self-inspection report (URN: NGPF0007817).

126. The review examined the initial response, noting that Deputy Senior Investigating Officers (DSIOs) were allocated to individual scenes. While this is not standard practice, it demonstrated a clear appreciation of the importance of securing scenes effectively in order to maximise opportunities for evidence recovery. It was acknowledged that this was particularly challenging given the number of scenes spread across the city, and that pressure to release scenes was appropriately resisted to allow for comprehensive forensic examination.
127. Specialist search advisers were deployed to coordinate activity across the multiple scenes. A Crime Scene Coordinator (CSC) was appointed, and forensic strategy meetings were held on a regular basis. Fast track actions were identified by the SIO and were consistent with the main lines of enquiry. The review identified an inconsistency between CT and EMSOU-MC working practices in relation to the recovery and viewing of CCTV material.
128. The review found that the SIO had adopted a clear and structured approach to the management of significant witnesses, with their evidence secured through video recorded interviews (VRI). The investigation's approach to family liaison was also considered, and it was noted that a Family Liaison Adviser (FLA) had been appointed.

129. The suspect strategy was reviewed with the allocation of a Tier 5 interview adviser to develop the interview strategy was recognised, alongside appropriate consideration of identification issues.
130. Having considered the findings of this review, there is nothing that raises any concerns for me regarding the overall quality of the investigation.
131. On 5 January 2024, upon my return to work, and in order to ascertain more details regarding the families' concerns, I reviewed ACC Griffin's Gold minutes dated 30 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007809). One item on the list was "the investigation (toxicology, searching for the Slazenger bag, family updates and referrals for support)."
132. I have not addressed the two areas relating to family updates and referrals for support in my assessment of the quality of the investigation, since, whilst I recognise that they are important issues, I do not believe they have a direct impact on the investigative process.
133. I have no direct knowledge of what work was conducted regarding the Slazenger bag and I am reliant on accounts of others. Enquiries revealed VC was in possession of the Slazenger bag when he travelled to Nottingham from London. CCTV footage showed him on 13 June 2023 at 00:23 walking towards Radford Road via Wilkinson Street carrying the Slazenger bag. It is not known where he went next, but at 01:17 VC was seen on Zulu Road where the Slazenger bag was not visible. This information is contained within the timeline of events over 12 and 13 June 2023 (URN: NGPF0007827).

134. I am aware that a number of addresses were searched but, due to the fact that VC's movements were not known between 00:23 to 01:17, searching for and locating the Slazenger bag was very difficult. However, from the information available to me I do not think the fact that the Slazenger bag was not found negatively impacted the quality of the investigation.

135. In conclusion, from the information made available to me and considering all the elements of the investigation, I believe that it was conducted thoroughly. However, this does not mean that I do not accept the concerns raised regarding toxicology, nor that there are not any opportunities for NP to improve or amend our working practices.

136. I am also aware from an email Emma Webber sent to me on 9 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007172) that she had concerns regarding what she had been told about VC's residence status, as follows:

"We were consistently told that Calocane had no fixed abode and was a sofa surfer. He had family and friends all over the UK. We had asked for details of where he had lived. We were only made aware that he had in fact been in a property in Nottingham right up until his eviction on the 11th of June in the 7th December. It was only in the e-mail on the 19th January with answers from Leigh Sanders that it confirmed he had a tenancy, had been there for six months and that the tenancy was in the name of Calocane."

137. When I authorised the media release on 16 June 2023, I had not realised that this was a contentious issue, but from information recently made available to me I am aware that VC's housemate Iulian GRO-B provided a

statement to the investigation team (URN: NGPF0002460) in which he confirmed VC had been evicted by their landlord on 12 June 2023. Consequently, I believe the statement that VC was of no fixed abode was accurate as of 13 June 2023.

Any further announcements or strategic communications

138. In the same way that I have considered the circumstances around the charging announcement on 16 June 2023, I have turned my thoughts to any other announcements and strategic communications that I was involved in drafting.
139. As described above, my role on 13 June 2023 was as Platinum where I was responsible for external engagement, specifically, my role related to media, Government, national agencies and external strategic partners in Nottinghamshire.
140. As mentioned above, the first media release was made on the morning of 13 June 2023 (URN: NGPF0011117). I would describe this statement as a holding statement: it informed the public that NP were responding to a serious incident and of a number of road closures were in place. It was made by CI Neil Humphris who works in the Force Control Room (FCR).
141. In the meeting at 08:15 on 13 June 2023, I discussed with ACC Griffin, Lyn Heath and Matthew Jarram what information would be released to the media. Based on the discussion we had and the need to provide more information to the public, Matthew Jarram was tasked with preparing a draft media release.

142. Following the meeting, I commenced a Major Incident Enquiry Officer's Workbook (URN: NGPF0011120). I routinely use these workbooks in all major crime investigations as an aide-mémoire, similar to my daybook, to record and reference information provided to me. The distinction is that this workbook was dedicated specifically to Operation Hendrix.
143. At 10:20 on 13 June 2023 I received a Microsoft Teams call from the Home Secretary, Suella Braverman. This call took me by surprise. The focus of the Home Secretary's call was whether or not the attacks had been a terrorist incident. I explained to her that we had a male in custody and provided his details and confirmed that three people had been killed. I stated that I could not say at this time if it was terrorist-related, but I was aware that there were some issues regarding VC's mental health (which ACC Griffin had told me prior to the meeting; I have not made a note of what I was told, but believe it related to the fact that VC had previously been detained under the Mental Health Act).
144. I made brief notes of my conversation with the Home Secretary in my workbook (URN: NGPF0011120, on page 2).
145. Following on from the briefing to the Home Secretary and to ensure local MPs were provided with information about the attacks, I held a briefing with MPs across Nottinghamshire at 13:30. Prior to the meeting I prepared brief notes of what information I would share, and these are contained within my workbook (URN: NGPF0011120). The notes are as follows:

"Calls received (+times)

Confirm deceased – appears been stabbed - do families know?

3 x injuries 1 x m seriously injured

x2 students Uni of Nottm

1 x person in custody

Work to understand his ideology

Working with CT Police

Name of suspect bel'd living in Nottm

1x male critical – Milton Street”

146. The reference to “*do families know?*” was a reminder to me to confirm that the bereaved families knew of the type of injuries sustained by Barney, Grace and Ian. Whilst I believed that to be the case, I sought to confirm the position, which I believe I did through ACC Griffin.
147. The briefing followed the points I had identified. There were questions at the end asking me to clarify details I had provided; for example, confirming the time of the first call to NP. I remember specifically being asked by one MP if VC was an illegal immigrant. I explained that this was not believed to be the case.
148. In my role as Platinum, between 13 and 16 June I was responsible for overseeing all of the media releases. During this period, the process as described earlier was followed for all of the releases.
149. On 13 June 2023 I also discussed with Lyn Heath and Matthew Jarram the possibility of a press conference, or something similar to provide further information regarding the incident and police response. It was decided that I would hold a press conference later in the day at Byron House Police Station.

150. At 15:36 on 13 June 2023, Matthew Jarram sent me a draft media release. I replied to this email at 16:04, having made a few minor amendments (URN: NGPF0011123). However, this was supplemented by a meeting with Matthew in person to discuss the media release.
151. That media release was only published when I knew that FLOs had been deployed to the families of Grace, Barney and Ian.
152. That press release contained only brief details relating to the incident. I expected that this information would have already been shared by the FLOs, as the families had been informed of the circumstances of the incident and this would have encompassed the key points contained within the press release.
153. Nevertheless, I sought confirmation from Matthew that this was in fact the case. He confirmed to me that the families were aware of the brief factual information we intended to place into the public domain.
154. The following written media release was published at 16:52 on 13 June 2023 I refer to this as (URN: NGPF0011124).

“A man has been arrested on suspicion of murder after three people were killed in the city. Police were called to Ilkeston Road just after 4am where two people were found dead in the street. Officers were then called to another incident in Milton Street where a van had attempted to run over three people. They are currently being treated in hospital. A man has also been found dead in Magdala Road. Police have arrested a 31-year-old man on suspicion of murder and he

remains in police custody. Chief Constable Kate Meynell said: "This is an horrific and tragic incident which has claimed the lives of three people. "We believe these three incidents are all linked and we have a man in custody.

"This investigation is at its early stages and a team of detectives is working to establish exactly what has happened. "We ask the public to be patient while inquiries continue. At this time, a number of roads in the city will remain closed as this investigation progresses."

The following roads are currently closed –

- Ilkeston Road,*
- Milton Street,*
- Magdala Road,*
- Maples Street,*
- Woodborough Road from junction of Magdala Road into the city,*
- Maid Marian Way junction of Parliament Street*

If you have any information on this mornings incident or are concerned about a family member or friend please call this dedicated line - 0800 0961011."

155. In addition to this, a further media release was published at 16:59 (URN: NGPF0011125), which expanded on the initial details provided and detailed the injuries of the pedestrians VC had attempted to run over. It is my understanding that the FLA confirmed via telephone with Matthew that this was information the families and survivors were all aware of. The text of the media release was as follows:

“Police are keeping an ‘open mind’ over the motive of a city attack which has left three people dead - but at this time believe there is no one else outstanding in connection with the incidents. Police were called to Ilkeston Road just after 4am (Tuesday 13 June) after two people had been killed. Officers were then called to another incident in Milton Street where a van had attempted to run over three people. One man is in hospital in a critical condition while two others are believed to have suffered minor injuries. A man was also found dead in Magdala Road shortly afterwards. Police have arrested a 31-year-old man on suspicion of murder and he remains in police custody. A number of major roads in the city centre will remain closed as a thorough police investigation is underway. Currently, police are not looking for anyone else in connection with the attacks. A team of dedicated detectives are investigating the circumstances surrounding the attacks. Chief Constable Kate Meynell said: “This is a tragic series of events which has led to the lives of three innocent people being taken and left another member of the public in a critical condition in hospital. “My thoughts are with all the families affected by this shocking incident, and we will be working extremely hard to understand exactly what has happened. “We are at the early stages of the investigation and need to determine the motives behind these attacks and will keep the public updated as soon as we are able to say more. “We are keeping an open mind as we investigate the circumstances surrounding these incidents and are working alongside Counter Terrorism Policing to establish the facts – as we would normally do in

these types of circumstances. "We do have a man in custody who has been arrested on suspicion of murder. Currently, we do not believe there is anyone else involved in this incident. "It is safe to go into the city centre but there are a number of streets that will remain closed including Ilkeston Road, Magdala Street, Milton Street and Maple Street. This is so officers can gather evidence in order to understand what has happened."

156. I then took time to prepare for the press conference. During the day Matthew Jarram and I spent a considerable amount of time discussing the content of the press conference. Again, this provided basic details of the incident and the police response. This combined the information from the two media releases made on 13 June 2023.

157. At approximately 17:45 on 13 June 2023, I read a statement to the media which I refer to as (NGPF0011126). Once I read the statement, I did not answer any questions. This was a conscious decision, because the investigation was fast paced and complex, and I wanted to be sure that any information I provided was accurate and had been shared with those affected before I delivered it, so I did not want to go off script. The statement I read out contained all the information I was prepared to share publicly at that stage. The full text of press release URN: NGPF0011126 was as follows:

"As you all know, today there has been a shocking and tragic series of events which has led to the lives of three innocent people being taken and left another member of the public in a critical condition in hospital.

My thoughts are with all the families affected by this horrific incident, and we are working extremely hard to understand exactly what has happened.

I can tell you that a 31-year-old man has been arrested on suspicion of murder and remains in police custody. We are not looking for anyone else in connection with the attacks and I can reassure the public that it is safe to visit the city centre – though there may be some road restrictions as we continue to establish what has happened. Police were first called to Ilkeston Road just after 4am after a member of the public reported that two people, aged 19, had been stabbed in the street and were unresponsive.

We had a further call to another incident in Milton Street where the driver of a stolen van had attempted to run over three people. As a result, one man is in hospital in a critical condition while two others are believed to have suffered minor injuries. The van was then stopped on Maple Street where a man was tasered and detained by officers on suspicion of murder. A man in his 50s was also found dead from knife injuries in Magdala Road by a member of the public. At the moment, we believe that the suspect had stolen this man's vehicle and driven it to Milton Street where he drove at members of the public. We are still in the early stages of the investigation and need to determine the motives behind these attacks. We are keeping an 'open mind' and are working alongside Counter Terrorism Policing to establish the facts – as we would normally do in these types of circumstances. The families of all of the victims have been informed and are being

supported by specially trained officers. Officers have also carried out a number of searches at addresses across the city to gather evidence, but no further arrests have been made. A dedicated team of detectives is investigating the circumstances surrounding these incidents and will continue to gather evidence over the coming days. I want to thank those who live and work in our city for their patience and understanding in incredibly difficult circumstances. We will, of course, keep the public updated as soon as we are able to say more. This is a very sad day for our city and we will do everything possible for the victims and their families.”

158. On 14 June 2023 I met again with ACC Griffin, Lyn Heath and Matthew Jarram. I did not record an exact time the meeting took place, but it would have been at approximately 08:15, as between 13 to 16 June 2023 this meeting was held at a similar time every day. ACC Griffin provided an update regarding the investigation and NP response and in the following discussions I recorded “key messages” in my workbook (URN: NGPF0011120) as follows:

“There were no related incidents reported to us (9pm)

Complex

Still working with CTP not been withdrawn

Can say been formally ID’d (this has to be signed off by the coroner)

PM today

Male remains in custody”

159. These “key messages” were identified by me as matters for potential media release. They were informed by updates I received from ACC Griffin regarding the investigation, alongside information intended to update the public and to address queries received from the media. This list was used to inform the content of any media release.
160. Having re-read my notes, I am not sure what the reference to 9pm means after the line “There were no related incidents reported to us”. “Complex” refers to the nature of the investigation, this included the significant amount of evidence to secure from different crime scenes, forensic examination and searches of a number of crime scenes. There was significant work to be completed regarding the movements of Calocane before and after the attacks; this would include CCTV recovery and viewing as well as telecommunications data. There was also work alongside CT policing to establish if this was in fact a CT incident. The question as to whether it could be announced that identification had been confirmed was that I was aware this could only be confirmed when HM Coroner is satisfied with the identification and I wanted to ensure that this was the case. “PM today” refers to the fact that the Home Office post mortems were due to take place that day. The key messages were not always issued; in some instances, this was because further information needed to be shared with the families first, or because, at that time, I judged it was not appropriate to place the information in the public domain.
161. As with the previous media releases, a draft was prepared by Matthew Jarram and shared with me by email at 11:15 (URN: NGPF0011127). He

and I discussed its content, following which I approved its release. This release was published at 13:56 on 14 June 2023 (URN: NGPF0011128). This statement was shared with DS Christopher Lill who was acting as support FLA whilst DI Gould was unavailable. The full text of the release was as follows:

“Police can provide a sequence of events that led to a man killing three people with a knife and then using a vehicle to attack three others. Detectives have spent countless hours piecing together the movements that led to three people losing their lives, which includes extensive CCTV coverage and eye-witness accounts. It is known that a man attacked two University of Nottingham students with a knife on Ilkeston Road on Tuesday 13 June. A call was made to police at 4.04am. Police quickly attended and found a male and female student, aged 19, in the street unresponsive. Investigations have then revealed that a man matching the description of the suspect had attempted to gain entry to a supported living complex in Mapperley Road but had been denied entry. This incident was not reported to the police at the time. Police believe the suspect has then attacked a man and stolen his van. A call was received by a member of the public and upon police attendance he was found deceased on Magdala Road with knife injuries. The stolen van was then used by the suspect to run over three members of the public in the Milton Street area. One man is in hospital in a critical condition while others are believed to have suffered minor injuries. A short while later, police managed to detain the suspect by using a taser when he abandoned the vehicle and approached officers with a knife.”

All three victims families are being supported by specially trained officers.

Detectives are still keeping an open mind on the motives of the attacks and a 31-year-old man is still in police custody. He has been arrested on suspicion of murder. There have been reports suggesting that police are no longer working with Counter Terrorism Policing. This is not the case, and Counter Terrorism Policing continues to work alongside Nottinghamshire Police. There have also been reports that other calls were made to Nottinghamshire Police about the suspect before he carried out the attacks in Ilkeston Road. This is not the case. Chief Constable Kate Meynell said: "First and foremost my thoughts are with all the families affected by this shocking series of events. "It is unimaginable to understand what they are going through. "I am very aware of the impact that these horrendous crimes will have had not only on Nottingham and Nottinghamshire but also across the whole country. "I am determined that we will work with community members, students from both universities and others impacted to reassure and support them. It is important that as a city we stand together.

"I would like to thank the public for their response to these tragic incidents. We have received a high number of calls with people offering information and support. Anyone with information can contact our casualty bureau on 0800 0961011."

162. On 14 June 2023 at 14:23, a media release (URN: NGPF0011129) was published confirming the identity of Grace, Barney and Ian as those who

had lost their lives. Much of this release was a tribute to Barney and Grace by their families. Through the FLOs, NP had asked the families if they wanted to share any information publicly regarding their loved ones. Historically, NP has supported families in sharing their tributes and assisted with a family media release. Ian Coates' partner, Elaine Newton, declined this offer, but a media statement was coordinated on behalf of the families of Grace and Barney. Accordingly, the families were aware of the contents of these media releases and the fact that Grace, Barney and Ian were going to be named.

163. Prior to this press statement being released, I checked that HM Coroner Miss Casey was content with the identification of the deceased.
164. The media release started with a police update that I approved, with the full text as follows:

“The heartbroken families of two students who died during yesterday’s attacks in Nottingham have paid tribute to them after they were formally identified today (Wednesday 14 June 2023). University of Nottingham students Barnaby Philip John Webber and Grace O’Malley-Kumar, both aged 19, were found in Ilkeston Road just after 4am on Tuesday having been stabbed. Ian Robert Coates, aged 65, was later found dead from knife injuries in Magdala Road after he was attacked and had his van stolen.

A 31-year-old man remains in custody after being arrested on suspicion of murder. Barnaby, of Taunton, Somerset, was a talented young cricketer who was studying history. In a statement, his family said:

“Complete devastation is not enough to describe our pain and loss at the senseless murder of our son. “Barnaby Philip John Webber was a beautiful, brilliant, bright young man, with everything in life to look forward to. He was a talented and passionate cricketer, who was over the moon to have made selection to his university cricket team. “At 19 he was just at the start of his journey into adulthood and was developing into a wonderful young man. “As parents we are enormously proud of everything he achieved and all the plans he had made.

“His brother is bereft beyond belief, and at this time we ask for privacy as a family to be allowed time to process and grieve. “We will not be making any further statements, particularly in relation to the police investigation. We are so proud to release this photograph, chosen by us as a family, of an amazing son, brother, grandson, nephew, and friend. “Thank you for your understanding, and to everyone who has supported us in this awful journey so far.” Grace, a first-year medical student, was a talented hockey player who was described as ‘a popular member of the England U16 and U18 squads’. She also played for the university. Her family said: “Grace was an adored daughter and sister; she was a truly wonderful and beautiful young lady. “Grace was not just a sister to James but his best friend. He is completely heartbroken. As parents, words cannot explain our complete and utter devastation. She will be so dearly missed. “We were so incredibly proud of Grace’s achievements and what a truly lovely person she was. She was resilient and wise beyond her years.

Grace was so happy in life fulfilling her ambition of studying to become a doctor whilst playing topflight hockey at university. "She leaves behind devastated extended family and friends. We request that all media outlets stop invading our privacy while we face this sorrow." Mr Coates' family has also asked media outlets to please respect their privacy at this difficult time."

165. At 08:30 on 15 June 2023 I met with ACC Griffin, Lyn Heath and Matthew Jarram. Upon reviewing my notes of this meeting (URN: NGPF0011120), I see that I noted on page 8 that: "*NP should announce that a referral has been made to the IOPC*". This concerned the fact just prior to VC colliding with two pedestrians (Sharon and Marcin) he had been followed for a short distance by a police vehicle driven by PC Dean Reynolds.
166. I also made a note on the same page that the media were reporting that VC had attended MI5 Headquarters and noted that we needed to contact the CT network regarding what we could say about this, as I was not aware of the full details, or what could be shared publicly.
167. The same process was followed as before. A draft was prepared for my authorisation. It included the fact that NP had applied to Nottingham Magistrates Court for an extension to VC's custody time. NP had been granted another 36 hours detention. It also provided details of the IOPC referral.
168. This press statement was published at 15:11 on 15 June 2023 (URN: NGPF0011130), following confirmation through the FLA and Matthew

Jarram that the families and survivors were aware of its content. The release was as follows:

“Detectives yesterday applied to the Magistrates’ Court and were granted another 36 hours to question a man held in connection with the murder of three people in the city. A 31-year-old man was arrested at around 5.30am on Tuesday 13 June after three people were tragically killed and three others injured. A team of dedicated detectives is continuing to question the suspect and building up a strong picture of what happened that morning. This has included CCTV gathering, forensics, eye-witness accounts and searching a number of properties in the city. We believe the suspect carried out the knife attacks on two University of Nottingham students, aged 19, just after 4am on Tuesday 13 June. Following the first attack in Ilkeston Road, the attacker then made his way by foot to a supported living complex in Mapperley Road but was denied entry. This was not reported to police at the time. The attacker then continued on foot to Magdala Road where he killed a 65-year-old man and stole his van. He then attempted to run over a man in the Milton Street area, who remains in a serious condition in hospital.

He then tried to run over two other pedestrians in the Sherwood Street area who are believed to have suffered minor injuries. We have referred this part of the incident to the IOPC, as a marked police car followed behind the suspect’s van for a short distance before it collided with the two pedestrians. Police then detained the suspect by using a taser when the vehicle was stopped. The families of all victims are being

supported by specially trained officers. We are still working alongside Counter Terrorism Policing and keeping an 'open mind' on the motives behind these attacks. The suspect is a former University of Nottingham student but at this time, it is not believed to be connected with the attack."

169. Finally, I approved a media release on 16 June 2023 (URN: NGPF0011119) confirming that VC had been charged.
170. In relation to all of the statements that I authorised between 13 and 16 June 2023 and which I have described above, I believed each one to be accurate and transparent at the time it was made. I provided the information that I believed kept the public properly informed about what was happening on a matter of intense public interest, while all the time balancing this against the need to ensure families and survivors were informed first and maintaining the integrity of the criminal investigation.
171. I did not feel it appropriate to share the information publicly about the outstanding FTA warrant or the previous incidents for the reasons outlined above. This rationale applied to all the media statements I approved between 13 June to 16 June 2023.
172. I have subsequently reflected on this decision and remain of the view that it was the correct course of action. For the avoidance of doubt, a decision not to place information in the public domain does not preclude information being shared with families and survivors. I offer my sincere and unreserved apology that NP did not provide all necessary information to the bereaved families and survivors in a clear, consistent, and timely manner.

173. All communications referenced were undertaken in my capacity as Platinum, up until the point at which VC was charged on 16 June 2023. Following charges a case is *sub judice*, and in my experience traditionally no further information regarding the case is released by the police. Accordingly, after VC was charged on 16 June 2023 there was no longer the need for the Platinum role. Consequently, at that time, I ceased to have an active role in Operation Hendrix.
174. As circumstances developed, it became necessary to review how NP was managing Operation Hendrix, and as a result my role adapted accordingly. I will now outline how the situation developed and the steps I took to amend my role in order to address these changes. These changes impacted on my involvement with strategic communications.
175. After 16 June 2023, ACC Griffin led the response and held operational responsibility for Operation Hendrix. He updated me periodically regarding the investigation, including prior to the sentencing hearings on 23 to 25 January 2024.
176. In October 2023, ACC Griffin informed me that VC had raised diminished responsibility as a potential defence. A few weeks later, ACC Griffin updated me that the psychiatrists were in agreement and that it was expected that a plea from VC to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility would be accepted. Both these updates were verbal and I did not make a formal record.
177. ACC Griffin stated that the families were strongly opposed to this plea and I understood why the families felt so strongly about this. In my experience

as an SIO, when an offender is convicted of manslaughter, families often experience a deep sense that justice has not been served. This is a natural reaction given the immense pain and loss they are suffering.

178. I was reassured when ACC Griffin informed me that the CPS and the SIO were meeting with the families to provide more detail and explanation to address their concerns. The decision to accept the plea of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility was made by the CPS and prosecuting Counsel. As such, they were best placed to explain the rationale for this decision to the families. I was also content that ACC Griffin was monitoring this as Gold Commander and did not feel it necessary for me to intervene.

179. As mentioned above, ACC Griffin had informed me of the outstanding FTA warrant for VC. At the time, I recognised that this information would inevitably cause significant distress to the families and survivors. Nevertheless, I was unequivocal in my position that it must be shared with them. This reflects both established practice and the fundamental requirement for NP to be honest and transparent. I emphasised to ACC Griffin that the timing of delivery of this information was critical, as the existence of the warrant could be raised at VC's first court hearing. It was, therefore, essential that the families received this information directly from NP before it entered the public domain. In doing so, I acted outside the usual command protocol, guided by the overriding principle that the families and survivors should be informed promptly and appropriately.

180. I was reassured by ACC Griffin that he shared my sentiment and that he was regularly speaking with the SIO who had ultimate responsibility for managing communications with the family. However, given the strength of my conviction that this needed to happen, I felt it was both necessary and appropriate to set out my views at the time ACC Griffin informed me about the FTA warrant.
181. As the investigation progressed, the bereaved families and the survivors should have been given full details of the outstanding warrant and the previous interactions between NP and VC in a clear and timely manner. This is well-established practice followed in every case. As a consequence I did not feel the need to check it had been completed. I sincerely regret that I did not check: whilst to have done so would have been outside of the established command structure, it would have resulted in the bereaved families and survivors getting the clear and timely information they were entitled to.
182. As described above, on 15 June 2023 ACC Griffin had outlined to me some of the previous incidents involving NP and VC. By the time of the sentencing hearings in late January 2024, I knew the investigation team would have a detailed understanding of all the previous incidents, as this would have been necessary for the prosecution case. Personally, I was not aware of the specific details nor the exact number of previous interactions between NP and VC but I believed there to be around eight, which were described to me by ACC Griffin as low level incidents.

183. I was assured that ACC Griffin was aware of all the circumstances and that all had been reviewed to establish if there had been an appropriate response from NP. It was ACC Griffin's view that, whilst there were some things that could have been done differently, there was nothing he needed to escalate to me at that time. I was also aware that a lot of these incidents ended with VC engaging with mental health services.
184. After VC was charged on 16 June 2023, I do not recall discussing media matters with ACC Griffin until shortly before the sentencing hearings in late January 2024, when it was agreed he would lead on media interviews. This decision reflected his continued role as Gold Commander for Operation Hendrix as he had a comprehensive operational understanding of the incident. Consequently, ACC Griffin managed all the media releases following VC's court hearings in late January 2024.
185. On Monday 22 January 2024, ACC Griffin contacted me by telephone, which I made a note of in my daybook (URN: NGPF0011131, on page 2). ACC Griffin stated he anticipated that the outstanding FTA warrant for VC would be reported in the media following the sentencing hearing. This was due to the fact he had mentioned it in a pre-recorded briefing with the BBC that was intended for release after the sentencing hearing. ACC Griffin recommended that an update regarding the circumstances of the warrant, and the fact that NP should have done more to ensure it was executed, was provided to the Policing Minister through the Home Office, which I did that morning over the telephone.

186. On 25 January 2024 VC was sentenced, following which Emma Webber, Dr Sanjoy Kumar and James Coates read their respective family statements outside Nottingham Crown Court (URN: NGPF0011121).

187. Emma Webber specifically addressed NP, as follows:

*“To Nottingham Police, we additionally have grave concerns regarding aspects of this investigation. Why were we repeatedly told through the summer that the offender was a sofa surfer and had no real abode? Not true. He did. One that was registered in his name in Nottingham, and one that he had been in for six months prior to his eviction on only the 11th of June last year. Why? It took repeated questioning from us to finally receive an answer late last Friday afternoon, to the question of his outstanding warrant, issued September 2022 for a vicious attack on a police officer, such a violent assault that he was tasered. To the Assistant Chief Constable, Rob Griffin, who finally released this information publicly yesterday, I say this **“You have blood on your hands.”** If you had just done your job properly, there's a very good chance my beautiful boy would be alive today. There is so much more to say and clearly serious questions regarding this case, and events leading up to this monster being out in society. But for today, our darling son, his dear friend Grace, and a wonderfully kind grandfather Ian, have been stolen from us forever and let down by the very system that should have been protecting them.”*

188. As I have stated above, I was aware of the outstanding FTA warrant and the fact that this would inevitably cause significant distress to the families

and survivors. As such I was not surprised to hear Emma Webber refer to it. However, it was my understanding that the families had been told about the warrant prior to VC being charged. I would also have expected further updates to be provided to the bereaved families and survivors as more information regarding the outstanding warrant was obtained.

189. Dr Kumar also made a statement following the sentencing hearing outside Nottingham Crown Court (URN: NGPF0011121), where he expressed his concern regarding the toxicology samples and that there were a number of missed opportunities, as follows:

“Whilst we have never questioned this man's diagnosis, the lack of toxicology, contemporaneous mental health assessment, as well as missed opportunities to divert his lethal path will forever play on our minds.”

190. I believed Dr Kumar was referring to the previous incidents when he referenced “missed opportunities.” I had not previously been made aware about his concerns regarding toxicology.

191. James Coates also made a statement outside Nottingham Crown Court (URN: NGPF0011121), where he expressed his concerns regarding the fact that VC was not convicted of murder. He also said as follows:

“The fails from the police, the CPS, the health service, have resulted in the murder of my father and these two innocent students. The NHS Mental Health Trust have to be held accountable for their failures, along with the police.”

192. While Mr Coates did not provide any further detail, I suspected he was referencing the areas Dr Kumar and Emma Webber described, albeit I wanted to try and understand exactly what these were.
193. Following these statements on 25 January 2024, there was significant media coverage over the subsequent days.
194. There had been significant media interest at the time of the attacks and prior to charge, but upon charge the interest had subsided. This was expected due to impending court proceedings. I should have better appreciated the high level of public interest there would be following VC's sentencing.
195. Whilst I was aware ACC Griffin had prepared a media release supported by media briefings pre-sentencing, I regret I did not have more detailed discussions with him about ensuring our media strategy was shared with the bereaved families and survivors. Whilst I acknowledge this would have been difficult to coordinate, this should not have prevented it from happening.
196. I travelled out of the country between 27 January 2024 and 4 February 2024 but remained in contact with both ACC Griffin and the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) Caroline Henry. During this period, two letters were issued to the bereaved families and survivors on my behalf, both of which I authorised. In light of the concerns being raised at that time, I considered it appropriate that the correspondence was issued in my capacity as Chief Constable.

197. The first was a letter sent to the bereaved families on 29 January 2024 and the survivors on 30 January 2024. The letter was my attempt to arrange to meet the bereaved families and survivors in order to try to better understand their concerns. The second, dated 2 February 2024, detailed the actions NP had taken to address the concerns raised by Grace and Barney's families and Ian Coates' sons in the media. I will provide more details of these letters later in this statement.
198. I contemplated how NP should respond to the various concerns raised by the families and survivors. I formed the view that a separate Gold Structure should be set up to address the post-trial concerns.
199. My view was that it was not appropriate for ACC Griffin to lead the post-sentencing response. The comments made by Emma Webber that ACC Griffin had "blood on his hands" (URN: NGPF0011121) demonstrated that his relationship with the families was compromised. I also believed that the impact of the concerns raised by the families was so significant that I as the CC should assume responsibility. I shared this view with ACC Griffin during our discussions whilst I was out of the country between 27 January and 4 February 2024.
200. Upon my return to force on 5 February 2024, I began work on the newly named Operation Chainlink to address post-trial concerns raised by the bereaved families in their statements following the sentencing hearing and subsequently in the media. Following discussions with DCC Cooper, I assumed the role of Gold for this Operation.

201. My priority was to reach out to the families in order to gain a full understanding of their concerns. However, I do not now completely understand the families' frustration with my approach, as they had raised these issues over a period of time and they believed they had not been addressed or escalated appropriately.

202. As Gold for Operation Chainlink, I assumed responsibility for external communications. NP had referred itself to the IOPC on 30 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0011132), regarding NP's previous interactions with VC i.e. the FTA warrant and the previous incidents. I had also asked for a referral to be made on 5 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011133), following concerns raised by Dr Kumar, as follows:

- Serious concerns regarding the quality of the investigation, including discussions regarding toxicology samples.
- Communication with the bereaved families about the police actions prior to the offences was contradictory.
- Conduct of officers viewing material related to the case.
- The force response to the allegations about officers viewing material relating to the investigation was inadequate.

203. The concerns raised by Dr Kumar were listed in an email I received from him on 2 February 2024, which I will address later in this statement.

204. In addition, I was aware that on 30 January 2024 PCC Caroline Henry had announced she would commission the College of Policing (CoP) to conduct an independent review into the NP response to the killings and attempted murders committed by VC on 13 June 2023 (URN: NGPF0007853).Both

the IOPC referrals and the CoP review impacted on what I could say publicly.

205. The joint protocol between the IOPC and NPCC “A Protocol for Media Relations During Investigations by the Independent Office for Police Conduct” states that:

“A referral ‘should not prevent the force from commenting or responding to the media,’ but ‘police forces should restrict their comments at this early stage to matters of fact.” (URN:

WITN0339013).

206. NP had released a statement on 25 January 2024, authorised by ACC Griffin (URN: NGPF0007936), that provided factual detail regarding NP previous interactions with VC. This included the previous incidents and the FTA warrant, and was as follows:

“Timeline of our contact with Valdo Calocane Nottinghamshire Police previously engaged with the defendant largely while supporting our colleagues in the NHS on a number of occasions. We have helped transport the defendant to Highbury Hospital for treatment because he was sectioned under the Mental Health Act. On each occasion, he was released by mental health services and his mental health managed by them within the community. In September 2021, we were requested to support mental health services with a Section 135 warrant to section the suspect under the Mental Health Act. We transported the suspect to Highbury Hospital and during this encounter he assaulted one of our police officers.

In January 2022, we were called to an incident where the defendant is alleged to have assaulted a flat mate. We did attend this incident, but because police action was not supported, we did not arrest the defendant on this occasion. However, the resultant mental health referral did result in him being detained once again in a mental health establishment.

In August 2022, he was reported for summons and was due to attend court on 22 September 2022 for the assault on our officer. He failed to appear on that occasion and a warrant for his arrest was issued in September 2022. He was never arrested for that warrant which was still outstanding at the point of his arrest in June 2023, when he brutally killed three people and seriously injured three others on the streets of Nottingham. After the June 2023 attacks, we followed the Independent Office of Police Conduct's guidance and, having shared details with them, we undertook professional discussions to establish whether the referral criteria was met over not executing the warrant for his arrest. Following advice that the criteria for referral was not met, we decided not to make a referral, but undertook an internal review of this matter ourselves. Assistant Chief Constable Rob Griffin, who has led the overall policing response to the events of June 13, said: "The devastating impact that the events of 13 June have had and continue to have for the families of those killed and those that survived these dreadful attacks are immeasurable. "I have personally reviewed this matter and we should have done more to arrest him. In my opinion it is highly unlikely that he would have received a custodial sentence

for the alleged assault. "Of course, an arrest may have triggered a route back into mental health services, but as we have seen from his previous encounters with those services, it seems unlikely that he would have engaged in this process."

"On June 13, we acted fast and efficiently to take this dangerous offender off the streets of Nottingham.

"We referred ourselves to the IOPC after his arrest. This was because in the minutes before his arrest he was being followed by a police vehicle and ran over two pedestrians.

"This is a standard procedure when a crime occurs while a defendant is being followed by police. The IOPC investigated this matter and said we followed all relevant guidelines. "This was one of the darkest days in our city's history and our officers will continue to support all those families affected by this horrific crime."

207. At that point, it was my honest belief that there was nothing more NP could say publicly.
208. On 9 February 2024, T/DSU Andy Reynolds (Head of PSD) sent me an email (URN: NGPF0011135) informing me that he had an early indication from the IOPC that they were going to take Dr Kumar's complaint as an independent investigation.
209. On 12 February 2024, the IOPC formally announced that it had commenced an investigation into NP's previous contact with VC and our handling of the subsequent investigation (URN: NGPF0011136). Once an IOPC

investigation begins, the IOPC assumes full responsibility for issuing any media statements relating to that investigation. In accordance with their protocols, there is a clear expectation that we do not discuss any aspect of the investigation with the media, in order to protect the integrity of their work. For ease of reference, I have reproduced the IOPC announcement here:

“The Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) has started an investigation into complaints about Nottinghamshire Police’s previous contact with Valdo Calocane and their handling of the murder investigation following the deaths of three people in Nottingham in June last year (2023).

The IOPC’s investigation follows a voluntary referral by the force of complaints they have received from the victims’ families. The complaints allege there were flaws in the handling of the murder investigation and missed opportunities by police to prevent the deaths. Allegations have also been made in respect of the non-execution of an outstanding warrant for Calocane’s arrest prior to the killings, and concerns raised about Nottinghamshire Police’s communication with the families.

IOPC Director of Operations, Steve Noonan, said: “Our sympathies are with the families of Barnaby Webber, Grace O’Malley-Kumar, and Ian Coates, and everyone else affected by the tragic events which took place on June 13 last year. We have now decided to investigate complaints made about Nottinghamshire Police’s involvement with Valdo Calocane.

Along with this we are investigating the actions and decisions of Leicestershire Police, which we announced last week.”

210. Accordingly, a form of words that would be used for all contact with journalists confirming the IOPC investigation was prepared. I refer to this as (URN: NGPF0011136), but for ease of reference have reproduced it here as follows:

“We voluntarily referred ourselves to the IOPC on the 5th of February regarding the concerns raised by the families. The IOPC have accepted our referral, which we welcome.”

211. Following the plea and sentencing hearing there was significant media scrutiny and requests for comment or response for NP regarding stories being published, these included:

- 24 January 2024: A request from the Sunday Express for details regarding the FTA (URN: NGPF0011137)
- 9 February 2024: The Telegraph offered NP the opportunity to comment on a story that VC links to a London based gang member (URN: NGPF0011138).
- 15 February 2024: Request from Daily Mail for information relating to PSD investigations (URN: NGPF0011139).
- 19 February 2024: Clarification from Andy Dolan (Daily Mail) whether my son viewed any material (URN: NGPF0011140)
- 20 February 2024: Request from Sky news for latest statement re WhatsApp messages (URN: NGPF0011141)

212. For the reasons outlined below, it was my belief that NP could not comment publicly. I regularly reflected on my position and that of NP, and each time I reviewed the situation I concluded that maintaining this position was necessary in order to:

- Avoid publicly challenging the families during an extremely distressing period.
- Protect the integrity of the ongoing investigation.
- Comply with the IOPC's request that we did not comment..

213. Throughout the ongoing OPC investigation, there were reports in the press that I was hiding behind the investigation. This included:

- **Good Morning Britain dated 15 May 2024** (URN: NGPF0010749) featuring an interview with members of the bereaved families in which presenter Ed Balls said:

“Notts Police we want to know – terrible failure. Tell us. The Chief Constable has said nothing; they are hiding behind this review. She should make a public statement rather than hiding behind the IOPC process. She should be on this programme.”

- **Daily Mail, 24 November 2024** (URN: NGPF0011143) published an article in which it was reported that I had held a private press briefing and asked journalists to sign non-disclosure agreements.
- **Nottingham Post 7 March 2024** (URN: NGPF0011144) published article reporting that *“The Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police is hiding away behind e mails.”*

214. I am extremely saddened that this is how my approach was perceived, as it was never my intention to hide any information from the families or the public, but I was concerned to preserve the integrity of the IOPC investigation.

215. On 16 May 2024 at 12:00 Matthew Jarram contacted the IOPC at my request via email (URN: NGPF0011146) to seek their support in answering requests received by NP to comment on information not in the public domain during an ongoing IOPC investigation.

216. Matthew's email stated:

"Hi Dylan, As discussed, our chief has been heavily criticised in the media and accused of 'hiding behind the IOPC investigation.' This of course is not the case. We do not want to prejudice the ongoing review or breach protocol. As this IOPC investigation is likely to be a lengthy process and we aren't going to be able to comment, we would request a line appears in your next press release (terms of reference release) which says: 'Nottinghamshire Police are not able to comment on the terms of reference because it would be prejudicial to our review and would breach protocol.' Is this something you would be able to do? I take your point that media will be aware of this but I think it needs stressing in a release for those not familiar with the process. Many thanks Matt"

217. On 17 May 2024 Dylan Evans of the IOPC responded to Matthew Jarram's email t (URN: NGPF0011146) as follows:

“Hi Matt, To confirm our conversation yesterday, we’re happy for you to direct any media requests for interviews with the CC about our investigation to us so that we can explain why that would be inappropriate. On reflection, I think we may have missed the boat with GMB unless they are in touch again. I discussed this here with Smyth, whose view was that as the lead on this we needed to provide some clarity.

That said, and for the reasons covered in my email yesterday, I still think we need to be very careful how that is framed, and particularly so in our forthcoming release. I will give that further consideration shortly but mentioning protocols could get messy, and may be better referenced as guidance.

Our lead investigator is now back and I’m hopeful ToRs will be finalised in the next day or two. Unless there have been substantial changes, it should be clear why senior officers giving interviews could compromise or prejudice our investigation. We will share our draft release with you in due course. Please note that I am on leave next week when all correspondence should be directed to Mark Pearson (copied in).

Regards

Dylan””

218. On 23 May 2024, I met with Rachel Watson (Director General - IOPC) and Steve Noonan (Acting Director of Operations - IOPC). Gary Godden (PCC) and Michelle Buttery (Chief Executive Nottinghamshire PCC) were also present.

219. I had requested the meeting to discuss the challenges NP were facing by not being able to comment publicly. I wanted to discuss the timeliness of the IOPC investigation and whether it could be expedited. I had prepared notes for the meeting which I read from, and I refer to as URN: NGPF0011147. Michelle Buttery also made notes (URN: NGPF0011148). At the beginning of the meeting, I explained that:

“The overriding priority was to get the answers to the questions posed by the families and as such I recognise the need for a thorough and comprehensive investigation.”

220. I stated that I was concerned regarding the timelines of the investigation, and that, whilst NP had reviewed its response, we were “marking our own homework” and there may be issues we were missing.

221. I explained that, since the sentencing hearing, there had been significant negative media coverage, and I had been told by the IOPC that due to the ongoing investigation I was unable to comment.

222. I deliberately did not go into any detail about the specific concerns raised by the families, as doing so risked compromising the integrity of the IOPC investigation. Instead, I requested that the IOPC expedite their investigation, in recognition of the significant impact the ongoing process was having on the force, particularly given the constraints placed on my ability to speak publicly about the matters raised by the families.

223. I also asked that the IOPC consider what they could do to support my position in the media as it was their direction that I should not comment which was preventing me responding to the media reporting. .

224. Following the meeting on 24 May 2024, I emailed Ms Watson (URN: NGPF0011149), sharing a montage of video clips of some of the media reporting (URN: NGPF0011422). I thanked her for the offer she had made to look at what the IOPC could do to support us with our media communications. Ms Watson replied that she would discuss the matter further with Steve Noonan.

225. As I had not received an update, I followed this up on 10 June 2024 (URN: NGPF0011149). Ms Watson responded on 11 June 2024 (URN: NGPF0011149), indicating that consideration was being given to sharing an agreed form of words along the following lines.

“We would stress to the media that the force is unable to comment publicly on matters which form a direct part of the investigation until its conclusion.”

226. Ms Watson further explained:

“This is of course still a draft and may be subject to some tweaks but the essence should remain.”

227. Following this, on 12 June 2024 (URN: NGPF0011150) Dylan Evans (IOPC) provided suggested wording for a media release as follows:

“In accordance with existing [NPCC/IOPC] protocol, Nottinghamshire Police is unable to comment directly on matters which are included in the IOPC’s ongoing independent investigation into complaints raised by the families of Valdo Calocane’s victims. This is to avoid possible prejudice to any future potential proceedings and is standard practice which applies to all police forces when cases are under investigation by the IOPC.”

228. I have considered whether I believe the statements I made between 5 and 12 February 2024 were accurate, open and transparent.

229. My position during this period was that, due to the ongoing IOPC investigation and the CoP review, I was unable to comment publicly. At the time, I believed this to be the correct position, based on my previous experience in previous cases and the direction I received from the IOPC, as detailed above.

230. I have since reflected on whether the decision not to comment publicly was the right approach. Notwithstanding the subsequent negative reporting this decision attracted, and the perception that it gave rise to allegations of a cover-up, I continue to believe that I had no alternative. This is due to the reasons I have outlined earlier in this statement; I still believe it would have been insensitive and wholly inappropriate to publicly challenge the families who were all attempting to deal with unimaginable grief and I wanted to protect the integrity of the investigation and comply with the IOPC request that NP did not comment, because it was important to me that the IOPC was able to carry out its important work without prejudice.

231. Two other media releases were approved by DCC Cooper in his role as the Chief Officer responsible for PSD, but I have included them for completeness, as follows:

- 18 February 2024 NP released a media statement (URN: NGPF0011151) following enquiries from the Daily Mail. This was authorised by DCC Cooper as the Chief Officer responsible for PSD:

“Superintendent Andrew Reynolds, head of Nottinghamshire Police’s Professional Standards Directorate, said: “We identified 22 people who had viewed material related to the Nottingham attacks case, also known as Operation Hendrix, which we had concerns about. “Following our thorough investigation, we narrowed this number down to 11 members of staff who did not have a legitimate reason to view some of the material in this case.

“Eight of these members of staff were handed non-disciplinary performance interventions, which is focused around learning, and three faced formal discipline – one member of staff has been sacked, one handed a final written warning and one is waiting for their misconduct hearing to be heard.

“We have taken these matters extremely seriously. Those who access material without any legitimate policing purpose can expect the harshest of sanctions, including dismissal from the organisation.”

Deputy Chief Constable Steve Cooper said: “Nottinghamshire Police’s Professional Standards Directorate (PSD) found one message posted on a Whatsapp group and took action immediately.

“Some of the words were crude and distasteful. One officer faced a gross misconduct hearing chaired by an independent legally qualified chair in January 2024.

“It was held in public at Nottinghamshire Police headquarters with both the media and members of the public in attendance. He was handed a final written warning by the independent legally qualified chair.

“After a thorough review by PSD, one other officer was subject to management intervention. No other officers were found to have committed misconduct.

“It is vitally important that the public are made aware of any action by an officer who falls below the extremely high standards we set and that is why these misconduct hearings are held in public. All officers have been reminded of the appropriate use of Whatsapp as a result of this misconduct hearing.”

“For clarity, the investigation has found that no one has ever shared any images or video in relation to these horrific attacks.

“A member of police staff is due to face a misconduct hearing for looking into Valdo Calacone on force systems. No information was shared. This misconduct hearing will happen in due course.

On 21 February 2024 a further media release was approved by DCC Cooper regarding the PSD investigations (URN: NGPF0011152):
“Deputy Chief Constable Steve Cooper said: “Nottinghamshire Police has carried out a thorough and extensive investigation into those who

viewed material related to the Nottingham attacks which had no policing purpose to do so.

“Two officers have faced misconduct hearings as a result.

“A special constable was sacked for viewing body cam footage of the incident in Ilkeston Road. He was immediately removed from the organisation by the Chief Constable following a misconduct hearing in December.

“None of this footage has ever been shared.

“This misconduct hearing was held in private so not to prejudice the upcoming court case of Valdo Calocane.

“A police officer was also given a final written warning by an independent legally qualified chair for viewing information about Valdo Calocane and sharing a single Whatsapp message.

“This misconduct hearing was held in January and the public and media did attend.

“The Whatsapp message contained two distasteful words.

“It did not contain any video or images.

“For clarity, the investigation has found that no one has ever shared any images or video in relation to these horrific attacks.

“A member of police staff is due to face a misconduct hearing for looking into Valdo Calacone (sic) on force systems. No information was shared.

This misconduct hearing will happen in due course.”

232. I believe that both media releases relating to the PSD investigations are accurate. While I am of the view that they are transparent, I am mindful of

the impact on perceptions of NP's transparency arising from the failure to inform families of the PSD investigations in a clear and timely manner.

Non Reportable Briefing

233. From 25 January 2024 onwards, there had been extensive media reporting which was critical of NP, which I accepted as the prerogative of the press. Due to the ongoing IOPC investigation, NP was unable to respond publicly and provide further information to the media to inform their reporting.

234. This was a particularly challenging set of circumstances for NP. I was acutely aware of the impact that the media reporting was having on the communities of Nottinghamshire and on public confidence in NP. This was evident in the questions I was being asked by members of the public..

235. In addition to this, our Communications team were being overwhelmed by requests for information from various media outlets. I formed the view that any approach to dealing with the issues being created should be supported by national advice to manage this challenging situation. Consequently, I sought advice from Chief Constable Gavin Stephens, Chair of the NPCC. I outlined our position to him in a phone call on 20 February 2024. He recommended that I speak with Hayley Equi, Head of Communications at the NPCC. I spoke with her on 20 February 2024 and asked her to speak directly with Lyn Heath.

236. Following their discussion, Lyn and Hayley advised me to hold a Non-Reportable Briefing (NRB) alongside a media interview. Their discussions are detailed in an email chain between Hayley Equi and Lyn Heath between 19:28 and 20:53 on 20 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011156).

237. Although I had not previously taken part in an NRB, I was familiar with their use through my experience as an SIO and had seen them applied in other investigations.

238. In addition, in the summer of 2023 I had worked with ACC Iain Raphael of the CoP who led a review into Nicola Bulley's disappearance on behalf of the CoP. I was asked to assist with the review as a result of my experience in investigations. The report published as a result of that review was called "*Independent External Review of Lancashire Constabulary's Operational Response to Reported Missing Person Nicola Bulley*" which I now refer to as (URN: **WITN0349015**).

239. Nicola Bulley was reported missing on 27 January 2023. There had been significant challenges for the Lancashire Police investigation as a result of extensive media reporting and scrutiny.

240. One of the recommendations from the CoP review, on page 71 of the report (URN: **WITN0349015**) related to consideration of holding an NRB, which I have reproduced below for convenience:

"The College of Policing and the NPCC should consider how confidence between the police service and the media can be rebuilt, so that, for example, appropriate non-reportable media briefings are actively encouraged where there is a policing purpose. The process will require a balanced and engaged approach from both policing and the media."

241. It was also my understanding, from page 69 of the above report (URN: **WITN0349015**) that NRB were viewed positively by the media:

“All national media journalists providing information to the review suggested that an early non-reportable briefing about the full background to Nicola Bulley’s disappearance would have set the context for the story and would have headed off much of the speculative reporting that ensued.”

242. Although, when the NRB was recommended to me, I was not aware of the exact wording of the recommendation, I distinctly remember from my work on the review that this was discussed and there was a sense that a non-reportable briefing should have been held.

243. The use of NRBs is also endorsed by the CoP’s Engagement and Communication APP which I refer to as (URN: NGPF0011158). This states that:

“Non-reportable information is provided to the media on the basis (by prior agreement) that it is for guidance only and not for publication or broadcast. It can be used to provide further context around a statement. This enables the police to have a dialogue with the media about serious or sensitive policing issues without generating publicity about them. Properly used, this may be a valuable resource in the context of an established, trusting and professional relationship.”

244. Furthermore, the advice I received verbally from Lyn Heath on 20 February 2024, and on 21 February 2024 from Hayley Equi and Lyn Heath recommended that an NRB would allow us to present the factual policing position and address areas where the media sought clarification.

245. In addition, in an email Hayley Equi sent on 20 February 2024 to Lyn Heath (URN: NGPF0011156) she said:

"As discussed we can support a non reportable press briefing on Thursday."

246. She went on to say:

"The aim of the briefing is to present the background with the current facts from a policing perspective, and to get the media to fact check their sources moving forward."

247. As CC, I rely on the knowledge and expertise of others to inform my decisions. I discussed these proposals with Lyn Heath, who had also consulted with Hayley Equi and Alan Woods (Head of Media and Public Affairs at the NPCC). I had no reason to doubt the advice to hold an NRB, and I was personally satisfied with the recommended approach.

248. On 22 February 2024 I was interviewed by BBC reporter Jeremy Ball regarding the issues being reported in the media.

249. Alongside the NRB, this course of action had been advised by Hayley Equi (NPCC) to provide additional information to the media . This advice was recorded in an email she sent to Lyn Heath on 20 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011156) in which she wrote:

"We agreed that it is likely there will be a need for the Chief to be interviewed before the review is finalised."

250. I have not had recent sight of the recording of this interview. Enquiries with the BBC revealed they no longer have a copy.

251. However, I have viewed a version available on YouTube from West Bridgford Wire, albeit I am unable to say if this is the full version (URN: NGPF0010751).

252. The beginning of the recording is unclear, and I am shown mid-sentence. I start the clip by clarifying that a special constable did view the incident on BWV footage, but there was no evidence to suggest that he shared those images. I stated that:

“This falls far below the standards I expect within this organisation.”

253. I went on to explain that this special constable had been dismissed, and I was asked how shocked I was by his actions. I responded that his actions were:

“Totally unacceptable as can be seen by the actions I have taken.”

254. In the interview I stated that I had dismissed him. However, he had actually resigned and my decision at his misconduct hearing was that had he still been a serving officer he *would* have been dismissed. I made the statement at the time without realising it was factually incorrect, but there was no intention to mislead.

255. Jeremy Ball then asked about PC Matthew Gell. I explained that he was found to have shared a WhatsApp message with a friend and with his wife.

I then explained that it appeared to be a WhatsApp group with a number of officers that work together and used for discussing work.

256. I stated that in the message there were two words used that I would describe as unprofessional and unacceptable. I was then asked if other things were going to emerge and I detailed the upcoming misconduct hearing for the police staff member, reiterating that there was no sharing of or viewing of images in that case.

257. I was then asked about the culture of the organisation. I responded that the vast majority of officers did *“a brilliant job and work hard to deliver.”* This comment was based on my honest belief having served in NP for over 27 years.

258. I was then asked what I would say to Emma Webber who was described as ‘horrified’ about these incidents. I replied:

“I am not going to try and pretend that I feel the same horror as she does but as Chief Constable of this organisation, I do feel horror that some members of my staff have behaved in that way; that is why we have dealt with them swiftly.”

259. Jeremy Ball then asked me about the outstanding FTA warrant for VC. I stated that I appreciated how desperate the families were to get the answers and that is why there was an independent review, and at that time it would be inappropriate for me to comment. When I answered that question I said, ‘independent review,’ I should have clarified that this was the CoP review and that there was also the IOPC investigation.

260. I was also asked about the toxicology, and I explained that this matter had been referred to the IOPC. At the time I was interviewed I did not have any further details to share regarding the IOPC investigation. The information I had at that time was that they were going to investigate NP previous contact with VC and its handling of the investigation.

261. I was asked what my key messages for the families were. I said the offer was still open for us to meet; I reassured them that the reviews will look at what NP did and hopefully give them the answers they were looking for. I explained further that I had apologised that they were not informed about the PSD investigation *"in a timely manner and weren't given sufficient detail."*

262. I stated the most important thing was for me to lead the organisation forward. I was then asked what I most regretted, to which I responded;

"I regret that the families feel like they haven't had the support of the organisation and I would one day like to try and understand, why that happened and what went wrong for them to feel that way."

263. I finished by saying that my thoughts remained with the families.

264. I have seen the associated media release by Mr Ball and Isaac Ashe. (URN: NGPF0011159). This was based on the media interview (URN: NGPF0010751)

265. The article repeated my explanation that a special constable had been sacked for viewing BWV footage, and the fact eight officers had received PSD interventions for their behaviour.

266. It also refers to my having detailed that a staff member was set to face misconduct hearings as they had accessed information regarding VC.

267. I continued with an explanation that two police officers were disciplined over the WhatsApp message including PC Gell who had received a final written warning. I explained that the force had referred itself to the IOPC over the handling of disciplinary issues.

268. During the interview I said the following:

"There's lots of things I can't say. And that's not because I don't want to, it's because there's the ongoing reviews into what happened."

269. The full text of the media release associated with the Jeremy Ball interview was as follows:

"A chief constable has said she feels "horror" at a special constable who viewed bodycam footage showing the aftermath of the Nottingham attacks.

Barnaby Webber, Grace O'Malley-Kumar and Ian Coates were killed on 13 June.

Nottinghamshire Police's Kate Meynell said the special constable had been sacked for viewing the footage.

She added eight others who had "low-level access" to material on the case had been given "professional standards interventions" for their behaviour.

Another staff member is set to face misconduct proceedings for looking

into killer Valdo Calocane on force systems, police added. Two police officers were also disciplined over a WhatsApp message, described as "crude and distasteful".

This included PC Matthew Gell, who shared the message with his wife and friend, and received a final written warning for accessing files on Calocane without authorisation.

And in an interview with the BBC, Ms Meynell said the force had referred itself to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) over its handling of disciplinary procedures.

The force is already being investigated by the IOPC, along with Leicestershire Police, following the case, which saw Calocane given a hospital order after admitting manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility.

Nottinghamshire Police Chief Constable Kate Meynell said staff had been dealt with "swiftly"

Ms Meynell said: "This is one of the most brutal and horrific incidents we've seen here in Nottingham, in our history. "There's lots of things I can't say. And that's not because I don't want to, it's because there's the ongoing reviews into what happened. "There is another case coming up. This relates to the police staff member who we know has access to systems around the offender in this incident. This is ongoing, so I can't say much else. But there is no sharing of images... in relation to this individual."

She called the actions of the special constable, who viewed bodycam footage of officers and paramedics providing assistance to Mr Webber and Ms O'Malley-Kumar, "totally unacceptable".

"I'm not going to try and pretend that I feel the same horror as the families," Ms Meynell said. "But as chief constable, I do feel horror that some members of my staff have behaved in that way. "That is why we have dealt with them swiftly." A court heard Valdo Calocane was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the killings

Nottinghamshire Police's involvement in the case is also being investigated by the College of Policing, in a review commissioned by the police and crime commissioner Caroline Henry.

The case has also prompted a series of reviews into the NHS, police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).

Speaking on Wednesday, Mr Webber's mother Emma told LBC: "We got a letter containing details because we've heard lots of varying versions of it.

"We've had an apology for us not being informed in advance, and then we had the detail of how seriously they take this, and officers are specially trained, lessons will be learned.

"But that doesn't really help with the pain of knowing that people were viewing the bodycam footage of my son in the street and I will never forgive them for that."

A spokesperson for the IOPC said: "Our investigation follows complaints from the families of Barnaby Webber, Grace O'Malley-Kumar, and Ian Coates about Nottinghamshire Police's handling of the murder investigation.

"Concerns were expressed about the force's communication with them over matters including an investigation into officers viewing details of the 13 June 2023 incident on police systems without any policing purpose. "We will be speaking with the families soon about their allegations before we finalise the terms of reference for our inquiries."

NRB Meeting 22 February 2024

270. At 12:30 on 22 February 2024 the NRB was held on Microsoft Teams with representatives from various media outlets attending. I refer to the transcript of the full NRB as (URN: NGPF0011160).

271. Alan Woods (NPCC) chaired the briefing. The NPCC provided me with an introductory statement (URN: NGPF0011161), which I subsequently read out verbatim, as follows:

"This meeting is to provide you with some guidance and support that I hope will aid in your reporting of the tragic murders of Barnaby Webber, Grace O'Malley Kumar and Ian Coates.

Today I will be speaking to you candidly to clarify details about some of the key areas of interest that are rightly attracting media interest, and to ensure that you are able to report on these accurately.

I'd also like to remind you that this briefing is non reportable. It's been provided to you for background purposes only."

272. I then outlined the restrictions that had prevented NP from sharing information at an earlier stage. I explained that VC had been charged on 16 June 2023, four days after the attacks, and that as a consequence NP had been constrained in what could be disclosed due to the legal limitations associated with ongoing criminal proceedings.

273. I went on to explain that once the court case concluded on 25 January 2024, there remained only a short period – until 5 February 2024 – before reviews and referrals to the IOPC were initiated. During this brief interval, I considered it important that the families were afforded the opportunity to articulate their concerns. It was evident that they wished to engage with the media to express their views regarding the events, the verdict, and their interactions with partner agencies. I made a conscious decision not to comment publicly during this period; however, the timeframe before the commencement of formal reviews and the IOPC investigation was limited.

274. I was advised by Lyn Heath and Hayley Equi to address a number of areas that they had identified as a result of persistent media enquiries and / or speculative reporting. For those reasons, the following areas were covered.

- i. Misconduct Hearings.
- ii. Ian Coates' sons finding out about their father's death.
- iii. Toxicology Reports.
- iv. The assault that led to the FTA warrant.
- v. Prior NP contact with VC.

- vi. Interactions with the families.
- vii. Referrals to the IOPC.
- viii. Contact that I as CC had with families.

275. Prior to the NRB, I had prepared notes for each of these areas based on the information available to me at the time (URN: NGPF0011162). In relation to the notes I had regarding the previous incidents involving VC, the toxicology, the IOPC Referrals and the assault on PC Pritchard, I confirmed in discussion with ACC Griffin that all material available to me had been shared with the families. I delivered the briefing using these notes in addition to my own knowledge of the matters under discussion.

i) Misconduct Hearings

276. I explained that we had identified eleven people who accessed systems without a legitimate policing purpose and that the conduct of eight of those individuals, who were police officers and police staff, was addressed by PSD intervention.

277. I then detailed the fact that a Special Constable (SC) who had worked with NP since May 2023 had viewed BWV footage of the incident, which included images of Barney and Grace being administered first aid and after they had passed away. I emphasised the point that there was no evidence to suggest that these images had been shared.

278. I stated that his conduct was "*abhorrent and something that I find totally unacceptable.*" I explained that the SC was required to attend an Accelerated Misconduct Hearing (AMH) that was chaired by myself, in

December 2023, where I dismissed him from the organisation and placed him on the barred list for policing.

279. I continued to describe the conduct of PC Gell, explaining he shared a WhatsApp message with his wife and a friend, and was also found to have researched VC on NP systems. I explained that he had attended a Gross Misconduct Hearing (GMH) in January 2024 which was chaired by an independent, legally qualified chair. I then informed the NRB that PC Gell was given a Final Written Warning (FWW) and that the meeting was held in public.

280. I stated that a member of police staff was found to have accessed information regarding VC on NP systems. I explained that she had accessed other unrelated information and that the investigation was ongoing.

281. I then went into more detail regarding the WhatsApp message as I was aware that it had been subject to what I referred to as *“a lot of conjecture and speculation.”* I explained that a WhatsApp message had been posted onto a group WhatsApp, the members of which were officers based at one station within Nottinghamshire.

282. I explained that an individual officer posted the message which was *“designed to tell his colleagues what has happened and to prepare them that they're going to have to stay on late duty.”* I stated that the text was quite long and also said *“it includes two words which I would describe as unprofessional and unacceptable.”*

283. I stated that the author of the text received a PSD intervention. I then clarified that NP PSD hadn't found any other concerns regarding the other members of that WhatsApp group in terms of what was said and what messages were passed.

284. I then informed the NRB that I had apologised to the families that we didn't let them know in good time about the PSD hearings. I explained that the PSD investigation and the criminal investigations were run independently, but I would expect the two to communicate. I explained that there was a delay in the information being shared with the families, and that this was because a decision was taken that it was not the right time to inform the families.

285. I continued:

"I've openly accepted and acknowledged we should have provided the families with more details at the time in relation to that hearing. And, and it's simply and it's simply unacceptable that we didn't."

286. I also clarified that the date for the gross misconduct hearing for PC Gell was not moved.

ii) Ian Coates' sons finding out about their father's death

287. I explained that once Ian Coates was identified, we informed his wife as his next of kin. I explained this was consistent with NP approach as *"we very much believe the family and friends would rather hear from their family than police officers."*

288. I explained that NP were unaware of the contact between Ian Coates and his sons and, therefore, they weren't informed in the manner we normally would do. I explained that, as soon as we knew about them, FLOs were deployed to all three of Ian Coates' sons.

iii) Toxicology Reports

289. In relation to the toxicology reports, I stated that I knew there were concerns raised that we hadn't taken some toxicology samples. I explained that the SIO was responsible for making that decision, and that VC had refused to provide intimate samples which we can't take by force.

290. I explained that the SIO made the decision not to take head hair as there was no evidence at that time to suggest that VC had taken drugs. I then stated that Cellmark noted that hair samples are rarely used and that they can't give an accurate time of when drugs have been taken.

iv) The assault that led to the FTA warrant

291. I provided details regarding the assault on the police officer that led to the FTA warrant being issued. I explained that the assault occurred when police officers were assisting mental health services, who were trying to execute a warrant in order to section VC. Police officers tried to take hold of VC who punched the officer in the side of the head and the face, I explained that VC had continued to lash out at the officer whilst they were trying to detain him. I stressed that no weapon was used by VC but that a taser had been used to assist in his detention.

292. When I have considered this section, upon reflection I should have provided more detail regarding the warrant.

293. I knew that details of the FTA warrant had been provided in ACC Griffins media release on 25 January 2024 where he had explained that:

“In August 2022, he was reported for summons and was due to attend court on 22 September 2022 for the assault on our officer. He failed to appear on that occasion and a warrant for his arrest was issued in September 2022. He was never arrested for that warrant which was still outstanding at the point of his arrest in June 2023.”

294. Despite this, I should have provided details regarding the FTA warrant again, as well as explaining that NP had been unable to evidence any activity in executing the FTA warrant for VC.

v) Prior Contact with VC

295. I outlined the previous incidents where NP had contact with VC.

296. I explained that the first occasion was in May 2020, when he had broken down the door to neighbour's flat. I stated he was arrested and taken into police custody, where it was decided he needed to be assessed at hospital, where it was deemed VC was fit to be detained. I went on to say VC was released under investigation to allow NP to make further inquiries, however on the same day following his release, he damaged another door in the same complex. NP attended and VC was taken to a police station and subsequently taken into mental health care, where he was sectioned.

297. I went on to detail the incident on 13 July 2020, explaining VC forced his way into a neighbour's flat, as a result he was arrested under section 136 of the Mental Health Act (MHA) and taken to custody and then on to Mental Health care.
298. I stated that in May 2021, he presented at Thames House at Millbank, where he rang the buzzer, asking to be arrested.
299. I detailed the incident in July 2021, where VC had an argument with a flatmate. I referred to this individual as Person A and explained he featured again in subsequent incidents. I described how VC was no longer at the address and Person A said he did not want to make a complaint, write a statement, or go to court.
300. I continued to say there were some speeding offences in August 2021 I then stated that I wasn't going to provide any more details in relation to these offences but if required I could
301. I referred to the incident in September 2021 and clarified this was the occasion where the police officer was assaulted.
302. I described an incident on 15 January 2022, where VC held one of his flatmates in a headlock. NP attended but the victim stated he did not wish to pursue a complaint. I explained that, as a result of that incident, the University referred VC to mental health services.
303. I also detailed that in April 2022, Person A reported seeing VC at his gym and stated that he was concerned that he was being stalked by him. I confirmed that although NP attended, Person A asked that the matter was

recorded but he did not know if there was any harmful intent; subsequently no further action was taken by NP.

304. I explained that in July 2022, Person A reported for a second time that he was being stalked by VC. I stated this matter was recorded as a crime, I then misread my notes and mistakenly informed the NRB that a stalking report had been submitted. This was incorrect, as no such report exists.

305. I concluded by informing the NRB that the final incident was in Leicestershire, and explained I was not in position to provide details of this incident.

vi) Interactions with the families

306. In relation to this area, I started by explaining the role of a FLO and that this included supporting the families and surviving victims all of whom have been allocated FLOs.

307. I continued to say that the FLOs had documented what information they provided to the families regarding VC's mental health. I referenced this as I knew of the families' anger regarding the acceptance of a plea to manslaughter, based on diminished responsibility. I was attempting to demonstrate that the possibility of mental health being a factor had been discussed. I was aware of this as I had seen entries on the FLO chronology / FLA log (URN: NGPF0010243). This included a discussion the SIO had with Dr Kumar on 22 August 2023 that "*mental health may well be raised as a defence*". This came from an entry in (URN: NGPF0010243, at page 30) stating that Emma and David Webber were told by the SIO on 12 September that mental health was likely to be raised. Upon reflection I

should have been clearer that the discussion regarding VC's mental health was in relation to his plea. I also said that we provided regular updates around the progress of the investigation as well as assisting with other areas such as funeral arrangements. I stated that we told them about the warrant that was outstanding. I am now aware that we did not provide this information in a timely and clear manner. I explained that contact is based on families wishes, therefore there may be periods when there is no contact.

308. I also stated that the families had been referred to other agencies for specialist support.

vii) Referrals to the IOPC

309. I outlined the referrals we made to the IOPC.

310. On 14 June 2023 NP made a self-referral (URN: NGPF0007852) based on the fact that we had been following VC in a police vehicle when he struck some pedestrians. I explained that this was an independent inquiry by IOPC and was completed on 27 September 2023. The IOPC concluded that:

"There was no indication any police officer may have behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings or committed a criminal offence." (URNs: NGPF0003040, NGPF0011164 and NGPF0011164)

311. However, I did not share these findings in the NRB.

312. I then outlined that NP had an informal discussion with the IOPC regarding VC's FTA warrant and whether it reached criteria for referral. I stated that we were informed by the IOPC that it didn't. Consequently, we conducted our own investigation into what had happened.
313. I informed the NRB that in June 2023, we referred ourselves to the IOPC regarding PC Gell's conduct (URN: NGPF0011166) and it was agreed this would be conducted as a local investigation, i.e. by NP PSD.
314. I continued to say that in July 2023 a referral was made regarding the police staff member (I was referring to Sarah Rutherford). I clarified that the SC was not referred as it did not meet the statutory referral criteria.
315. Following the referral in July 2023, I then explained that NP had referred itself to the IOPC on 30 January 2024 regarding the FTA warrant and the "missed opportunities." The referral was actually in relation to all missed opportunities in relation to previous police contact with VC. The IOPC did not take this referral, on the basis the Death or Serious Injury (DSI) criteria was not met..
316. I ended by stating that on 5 February 2024, I referred NP to the IOPC (URN: NGPF0011133) following concerns raised by the families. I then provided a summary of those concerns, as listed earlier.

vii) Contact I have had as CC with the families

317. This was the final area I covered. I described how I had written to all the families and surviving victims inviting them to a meeting. I stated that the invitation remained open, despite some families declining.

318. I updated the NRB that I had asked to meet the families regarding the PSD issues and that I had apologised in addition to providing more details to them.
319. I explained that I was regularly contacted by Dr Kumar and Emma Webber who were asking me specific questions, and that I would answer the questions that I could answer.
320. I emphasised that I was in a difficult position due to the fact that the ongoing IOPC investigation and the CoP review restricted the information I could share and that I took my duty very seriously not to compromise any of the ongoing investigations.

Questions from the NRB

321. Following my update, Alan Woods opened up the NRB for questions. The questions and my responses are detailed in the transcript (URN: NGPF0011160). Some of the questions sought further clarity about the information I had provided, while others challenged the NP position regarding sharing information. During these questions, I confirmed that the circumstances regarding all of the PSD investigations could be published.
322. I had a question from Hayley Compton (BBC) who queried whether Ian Coates' sons found out about their father's death from social media. I explained that I wasn't aware of the circumstances she outlined but I would come back to her with a response. I know that information was subsequently provided by Matt Jarram of the Corporate Communications Department on the 29 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011167).

323. I was asked a question by Will Bolton (Daily Telegraph) regarding the efforts NP had made to locate VC in relation to the FTA warrant. Regrettably, I did not have that information available and had to rely on what I could recall from previous updates from ACC Griffin.
324. I was aware that it had been difficult to establish what action had been taken to arrest VC, and that further work had been undertaken to clarify this. I recall feeling frustrated with myself for not having prepared more thoroughly for this line of questioning in advance of the meeting. I acknowledge that it was my responsibility to ensure I had an up to date understanding of the position, so I could provide a clear response during the NRB regarding what information NP could provide.
325. Following the NRB I made the decision that NP could not provide any further details regarding the FTA warrant so not to risk prejudicing the IOPC investigation. I have reflected on this decision, and I acknowledge that it was the wrong thing to do. I regret that I failed to provide further details that NP had been unable to evidence any activity in executing the FTA warrant for VC. Whilst I still believe this information could not be shared publicly, I should have taken steps to provide this information to the journalists who attended the NRB. I regret not doing so and offer my sincere apologies.
326. All the information from the NRB that could be shared by NP publicly was provided in two emails, sent to all attendees by Matthew Jarram on 22 and 23 February 2024. I refer to these as (URN: NGPF0011168).Vikram Dodd

(The Guardian) asked whether there had been “*a system failure here beyond policing*”. He also asked me what my reasoning was for not sharing the information, stating the actions were “*exactly the actions if you’re trying to cover it up.*”

327. I reiterated that NP had not deliberately covered up any information and was very clear that NP accepted its failings regarding the FTA warrant and the way we communicated with the families regarding the PSD investigations.

328. I went on to say that there were other agencies involved with VC and that a review would be necessary. Although I did not specify the agencies at the time, I was aware that VC had been engaged with mental health services, and it was those services to which I was referring.

329. In response to a question from Lisa Dowd (Sky News), I confirmed that my son was a member of the section WhatsApp group, and that he was on holiday when the message was sent. Prior to the NRB, Alan Woods and Hayley Equi had advised me that this question might be asked and made clear that it was a matter for my discretion whether I chose to answer it. I decided to do so, as I believed it was the most transparent course of action.

330. I was further questioned by Victoria Norris (BBC) regarding NP’s attempts to arrest VC following the issue of the FTA warrant. I reiterated my earlier position that I did not have the relevant information available at that time.

331. I have been asked to consider if my approach to the media interview and the NRB was accurate, open and transparent.

332. With reference to the accuracy, I will deal with each of the areas I updated at each paragraph below separately.
333. When I outlined the PSD investigations at the NRB, I utilised the letters I had sent to the bereaved families and survivors on 20 and 22 February 2024. This is discussed later in this statement. I had checked the accuracy of the letters with both DCC Cooper and Chief Inspector Harding of PSD.
334. I am aware of an inaccuracy in the update I provided to the NRB and in the letter to the families and survivors. I stated that I had “sacked” the special constable. As with the interview with Jeremy Ball of the BBC, I should have said that my decision on his sanction was that, had SC Skenderaj still been serving, he would have been dismissed without notice.
335. I also used my knowledge of the WhatsApp group which had been briefed to me by T/DSU Reynolds Head of PSD. This remains accurate.
336. I should have been more specific regarding the IOPC referral made on 30 January 2024, as directed by ACC Griffin. I stated that it related to “the warrant and the missed opportunities relating to that.” I should have at that point added that it was also the missed opportunities regarding the previous incidents involving NP and VC. Whilst this information was already in the public domain as a result of a media release by the IOPC on 12 February (URN: NGPF0011136), it was an error on my behalf not to provide a more comprehensive statement of the circumstances.

337. The notes I took into the meeting stated “30/01/2024- referral regarding DSI and potential missed opportunities relating to Op Hendrix.” (URN: NGPF0011132).
338. I added some handwritten notes and at the end of the text I wrote “warrant” (URN: NGPF0011162). I believe this was to remind me to mention the warrant at that point but instead I mistakenly limited the update to the FTA warrant. I take full responsibility for the error
339. If I had provided the additional information this would have demonstrated that the reason that NP had self-referred was much wider than the FTA warrant and included the previous incidents involving NP and that this referral was made with the intention of establishing if there had been any missed opportunities.
340. In relation to Ian Coates’ sons learning of their father’s death via the media, in preparation for the NRB I had spoken with DI Gould FLA who provided me a verbal update. I used this information in the NRB. Having reviewed the transcript (URN: NGPF0011160), I believe the information I provided at the time was and is still accurate.
341. Regarding my update on the toxicology, I reviewed an email that DSU Sanders had shared with ACC Griffin (URN: NGPF0011170). This email had been sent to the families and set out his rationale regarding toxicology samples. This was the source for my comments regarding Cellmark and the infrequency with which hair sampling is used, as well as DSU Sanders’ position that there was no evidential basis that VC had ever taken drugs.

342. The NRB was intended to explain the decision not to take hair samples. I was neither asked for, nor did I offer, my personal view at that time. I have subsequently provided my perspective following a period of reflection earlier in this statement. ACC Griffin had provided me with a summary of the details of the assault on PC Pritchard in the form of an e-mail from DC Beddoe (URN: NGPF0011171). This detailed the key elements of the assault and was taken from PC Pritchard's statement. I summarised the facts in the details I provided at the NRB, and I was satisfied that this was accurate and remains so.
343. I utilised a document entitled 'Police Incident Timeline with VC' (URN: NGPF0011172) to outline the incidents where NP had engaged with VC. I understood that this document was prepared as part of the murder investigation and as such I believe it to have been accurate at the time, and it remains so.
344. The purpose of sharing this information about VC's interactions with NP at the NRB was to demonstrate the number of occasions on which NP had been in contact with VC. Accordingly, I did not include every detail contained within the timeline; instead, I provided a summary of the document. This approach was taken to ensure that the timeline was clear, coherent, and demonstrated the actions taken by NP in relation to VC.
345. I have subsequently reviewed the statements I made at the NRB alongside the timeline and consider the summary provided to be accurate. However, upon reflection, I should have included further detail regarding the second

incident in May 2020, during which a woman jumped from her first-floor window.

346. In addition, I should have disclosed that, when VC assaulted his flatmate in January 2022, he prevented the victim from leaving the premises until the police arrived. Including these two pieces of additional information would have provided greater detail and enhanced transparency. I regret not doing so. I was attempting to summarise the incidents in a concise manner and there was certainly no intention to mislead or to conceal information.

347. In preparation for the input on "Interaction with families," I had asked DI Gould to send me details of the updates provided to families and also the support that had been offered. I received a document from DI Gould titled 'FLO Chronology/ FLA Log' that had excerpts from the FLO logs covering updates provided to the bereaved families and survivors (URN: NGPF0010243). I produced a document from this, in which I had grouped the entries under headings to assist with my understanding (URN: NGPF0011162). I used this document to inform my update.

348. I consciously decided not to provide dates and details of contact with the families as it was my belief that the NRB was looking for reassurance regarding how the families were kept updated. I did not think listing dates and times of contact was particularly helpful. I also did not feel it was appropriate to go into detail about conversations FLOs had with the bereaved families and survivors.

349. Rather I explained that that FLOs were allocated to the bereaved families and survivors and that contact was well documented in FLO logs. I believed

this update would provide reassurance that there was an established structure in place to engage with bereaved families and survivors and that there had been regular interaction with the families.

350. I specifically referenced that the FLOs had provided information regarding the outstanding FTA warrant and progress of the investigation. I added that contact is based on the families' desire to see their FLOs.

351. I had been provided with a document regarding referrals to the IOPC (URN: NGPF0011162, page 2). I provided this information to the NRB which was and remains accurate.

352. The update I provided regarding my interactions with the families was clearly based on my personal experience. I provided a brief summary which I believe was accurate at the time and remains so.

353. When considering openness and transparency I acknowledge that some of my actions were perceived as not being transparent and upon reflection I can see why this is the case and I accept full responsibility.

354. I fully understand why the NRB may have been perceived as an attempt to withhold information; however, this was not my intention. Information was shared with the caveat that, at that time, due to the ongoing proceedings, investigations and reviews, the media should not report on them. My approach was based on a desire to avoid speculation or the circulation of inaccurate information.

355. However, I acknowledge that failings on my behalf contributed to the NRB being viewed as an attempt by NP to withhold information.

356. I failed to notify the families that the NRB was taking place. To the best of my knowledge, there was no discussion at the time about informing the families that an NRB would be held. However, I am deeply disappointed in myself that I did not recognise this omission as, with hindsight, it clearly should have been discussed with them.
357. I particularly should have recognised this when at 10:58 on 22 February 2024, I received an email from Emma Webber shortly before the briefing began (URN: NGPF0001298). Emma had been informed about the NRB by members of the media and sought reassurance that I would provide her with prior notice of any announcements I intended to make. At 11:28 my staff officer responded on my behalf via email (URN: NGPF0007226), confirming that I would not be discussing any matters of which she was unaware. As detailed below I accept I should have examined in more detail what information had been shared with the bereaved families and survivors.
358. On reflection, my approach was naïve. I focused solely on whether the families were already aware of the information being shared at the NRB, rather than considering the importance of informing them that the NRB itself was taking place. I regret that I did not give this proper consideration, and I recognise that this was a failure on my part. I can only offer my apologies to the families and survivors for not having done this and, although I recognise that this apology may be characterised as hollow at this point, it is nonetheless heartfelt and genuine.
359. I also should have been more intrusive in understanding what information had previously been shared with the families and survivors.

360. Prior to the meeting ACC Griffin provided me with details of the previous incidents involving VC and NP, and details of the assault on PC Pritchard. As he handed me the documents (URN: NGPF0011162), I asked if the families were aware of all the information and he confirmed that they were.
361. In order to update on the misconduct issues, I referred to a letter I had sent to the families on 20 and 22 February 2024, and as such knew that they had been provided this information. However, I did not confirm that they had all read it prior to the NRB.
362. Likewise, I should have sought detailed clarification that all of the IOPC referrals had been shared. I was aware that I had shared the details regarding the referral made on 6 February 2024 with Dr Kumar and Emma Webber, but when I look at it now, I acknowledge that I wasn't certain this had been shared with the other bereaved families and survivors in the same detail.
363. I was aware from the SIO email that the information regarding the toxicology had been shared with David and Emma Webber and Dr Kumar and Dr O'Malley Kumar, but I failed to check who else was aware of the issues.
364. I have reflected carefully on these failures in an effort to understand why they occurred. In doing so, I recognise that I over relied on guidance from Alan Woods, Hayley Equi and Lyn Heath. I did not adequately plan or prepare personally for the event. I recall that the day was extremely demanding, with the NRB commencing immediately after the media interview and concluding shortly before a meeting with His Majesty's

Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) in relation to the Nottinghamshire Police Peel Inspection.

365. I fully acknowledge that this context does not excuse my lack of planning and preparation; I offer it only to explain the circumstances in which these shortcomings arose.
366. I should have prepared a briefing which I would have read verbatim at the NRB. Whilst I sought independent verification of the documents, I should have done this on a formal basis and ensured sign off for the written briefing from ACC Griffin, SIO, FLA, Corporate Communications and PSD. Once agreed, I should have ensured this document was shared with the bereaved families and survivors at the same time as informing them of the NRB.
367. With hindsight and for the reasons outlined above I regret holding an NRB and acknowledge it was a complete failure.
368. On 24 February 2024, an email was sent to all of the journalists who attended the NRB (URN: NGPF0011168). This was produced by Matthew Jarram and approved by DCC Cooper as it detailed elements of the PSD investigations. It was designed to provide further details to the journalists who had attended the NRB, clarifying what could be sent publicly. This was an email with many recipients that Matthew could 'reply to all' on and provide further information to all recipients at the same time, as many times as further messages needed sending.
369. The first message in the email chain at 15:39 on 22 February 2024 was as follows:

*“Thank you all for coming to the non-disclosable briefing today. As the chief stated there is a lot of things we can’t talk about pending the two independent reviews. However, I have attached the information which is the misconduct hearings. Many thanks
Matt*

Deputy Chief Constable Steve Cooper said: “Nottinghamshire Police has carried out a thorough and extensive investigation into those who viewed material related to the Nottingham attacks which had no policing purpose to do so.

“Two officers have faced misconduct hearings as a result. “A special constable was sacked for viewing body cam footage of the incident in Ilkeston Road. He was immediately removed from the organisation by the Chief Constable following a misconduct hearing in December.

“None of this footage has ever been shared. “This misconduct hearing was held in private so not to prejudice the upcoming court case of Valdo Calocane.

“A police officer was also given a final written warning by an independent legally qualified chair for viewing information about Valdo Calocane and sharing a single Whatsapp message.

“This misconduct hearing was held in January and the public and media did attend.

“The Whatsapp message contained two distasteful words. “It did not contain any video or images.

“For clarity, the investigation has found that no one has ever shared any images or video in relation to these horrific attacks.

“A member of police staff is due to face a misconduct hearing for looking into Valdo Calacone(sic) on force systems. No information was shared. This misconduct hearing will happen in due course.”
Superintendent Andrew Reynolds, head of Nottinghamshire Police’s Professional Standards Directorate, said: “We identified 22 people who had viewed material related to the Nottingham attacks case, also known as Operation Hendrix, which we had concerns about. “Following our thorough investigation, we narrowed this number down to 11 members of staff who did not have a legitimate reason to view some of the material in this case.

“Eight of these members of staff were handed non-disciplinary performance interventions, which is focused around learning, and three faced formal discipline – one member of staff has been sacked, one handed a final written warning and one is waiting for their misconduct hearing to be heard.

“We have taken these matters extremely seriously. Those who access material without any legitimate policing purpose can expect the harshest of sanctions, including dismissal from the organisation.”

370. A further email was added to the chain (URN: NGPF0011168) at 11:16 on 23 February 2024, providing more clarity regarding information in the public domain.

“Morning all I would like to once again thank you for attending yesterday’s non-disclosable briefing. I would like to keep this channel of communication open. We’ve had quite a few emails from journalists in attendance in relation to making some of the information in the non-disclosable briefing public. I would like to address this below. The reason we can’t talk about some of the information in the public domain is because it could prejudice the independent investigation by the IOPC and the review being conducted by the College of Policing. This includes the warrant and our past involvement with Valdo Calocane.

We cannot pre-empt these reviews by talking in the media about them and we have sought advice in relation to this. We have also contacted the IOPC.

After the court case concluded, and journalists asked questions about our involvement with Calocane, we did print a press release on our channels. Please see attached which was picked up by some media. <https://www.bing.com/search?q=timeline+of+our+involvement+with+valdo+calocane+nottinghamshire+police&qs=ds&form=OBRE>

Our Assistant Chief Constable also took part in pre-recorded television interviews with Channel 4, ITV, Sky News and BBC to be aired after the court case concluded.

Now these two reviews are firmly in place, we cannot comment any further. As soon as the reviews are published then of course we will be in a much better position to comment.

Another point that is being raised is about the misconduct hearings. We have decided not to publish the contents of the Whatsapp message. The families have requested this message and we have shared this with them. We think it is unfair to cause them any further distress by releasing this to the media. We are also not commenting on who was in the Whatsapp Group. None of the other officers in the group have done anything wrong and therefore it is highly unfair to bring them into the public arena when they are not subject to any misconduct proceedings. They simply received a text message in a group.

The Chief has explained in a BBC interview that it is a Whatsapp Group for officers talking about work and the officer who posted the message was informing his colleagues about what had happened before they began their shift. Two of the words in the message were deemed crude and distasteful and therefore the officer has been disciplined.

*The officer who shared this message to his wife and a friend has been given a final written warning by a legally qualified independent chair. No other officers in the group committed any misconduct. Hope this explains why we can't release some of the information above. Please come back to me if you have any questions. Thanks again for your time. Kind regards
Matt"*

371. When reviewing this email, I have identified that there is an error in that Matthew Jarram states that the officer who wrote the WhatsApp message

was disciplined. This is not the case and in fact PC Small was subject to an Ethical Interview and Intervention on 23 June 2023.

372. The update I provided regarding my interactions with the families was clearly based on my personal experience. I provided a brief summary which I believe was accurate at the time and remains so.

373. In relation to whether my NRB updates were open and transparent, I believe that, in terms of the information provided, they were. I provided a significant level of detail, particularly in respect of previous incidents and the PSD investigations. However, as acknowledged previously above in relation to the previous incidents I should have included mention of the fact that a woman had jumped out of a window in the second incident on 24 May 2020 and sustained injuries and that VC had prevented his flatmate from leaving the address during the incident on 15 January 2022.

374. I am acutely aware that, as this information was provided within an NRB setting and was therefore not reportable, some attendees perceived this as a lack of openness and transparency. With hindsight, I think the NRB was a poor idea, and I regret doing it. It completely backfired.

375. Following the NRB, on 23 February 2024 Nottinghamshire Live, published an article with the headline.

“Nottinghamshire Live prevented from publishing details around Nottingham attacks by police” (URN: NGPF0011173)

376. It then went on to say:

“We were asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement before a briefing with the Chief Constable.”

377. In relation to the NRB at 09.37 on 22 February 2024, Parmvir Singh, Media and Digital Communications Manager at the NPCC sent an invite to the media briefing, which stated:

“Nottinghamshire Police Chief Constable Kate Meynell will be hosting an off the record, non reportable briefing about this investigation today.”

378. The invite included a link for journalists to register for the briefing.

379. In addition to this Matthew Jarram sent an email invite to local media including Nottinghamshire Live, ITV and the local Sky TV reporter, as there were concerns from the Corporate Communications Department that they had not picked up the NPCC invite. This was sent at 10:06 on 22 February 2024, (URN: NGPF0011174). This email said:

“Morning all, The following non-disclosure briefing will be taking place today with the Chief Constable. You will need to confirm in writing that you agree that this is a non-disclosure briefing, none of the information in this briefing is for reporting. You won’t be invited into the meeting unless you can confirm and accept the above with an e mail. Many thanks – and looking forward to seeing you there. Kind regards, Matt

380. The use of the term non-disclosure briefing was incorrect, and NP acknowledge this created confusion. It is my understanding a non-disclosure agreement is not routinely used for an NRB.
381. When Nottinghamshire Live published their article on 23 February 2024 , Lyn Heath emailed Natalie Fahy, the editor of Nottinghamshire Live, at 19:19 on 23 February 2024. Lynn asked that the article was urgently amended and that it was not used in the Nottinghamshire Live printed version, the Nottingham Post.
382. Despite this, Nottinghamshire Live continued to report on matters from the NRB. For example, on 29 February 2024 the headline in Nottingham Post was "Reported twice for "stalking" before he went on to kill". This referred to previous incidents involving VC.
383. Hold the Front Page also published an article (URN: NGPF0011426) on 26 February 2024 that referenced the fact Natalie Fahy "claimed that before reporters were allowed into the call with chief constable Kate Meynell, they were made to sign a non-disclosure agreement, a move she described as 'unprecedented'".
384. It is extremely frustrating that the invite sent to Nottinghamshire Live used the term 'non-disclosure briefing.' The terms are very different, and this created unnecessary confusion following what had been an unsuccessful NRB.
385. The subsequent reporting by Nottinghamshire Live culminated in a complaint by NP to IPSO (URN: NGPF0011447). The decision to submit

the complaint was based on advice from and supported by the NPCC. Upon reflection, it was the wrong decision to pursue a complaint with IPSO and one that I ultimately take responsibility for, as it fuelled the narrative that I and NP were withholding information.

386. In an email to Lyn Heath on 23 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011175), Alan Woods of NPCC said:

“I think you should be complaining to the Editor of NottsLive in the strongest possible terms.”

387. At the end of that email in his draft for a complaint to Natalie Fahy (editor at Nottinghamshire Live), Alan Woods then wrote:

“I will have no hesitation in reporting the piece to IPSO under Clause 1 of the Editors’ Code, Accuracy, if the piece is not amended”.

388. It is my understanding that Alan was referring to the claim by Nottinghamshire Live that they had to sign a non-disclosure agreement as well as the description of the NRB as *“unprecedented.”* Alan also stated that at no point were Nottinghamshire Live asked not to publish anything, clarifying that they had attended a background media briefing and the whole concept was to brief journalists *“off the record with information that is helpful to assist their reporting.”*

389. On 3 April 2024 Alan Wood contacted Lyn Heath and offered to submit the complaint to IPSO on NP’s behalf (URN: NGPF0011176).

390. On 4 April 2024 NP accepted the offer of support (URN: NGPF0011177) and on 11 April 2024 NPCC submitted the complaint on behalf of NP. However, I do take ultimate responsibility for making this decision.
391. I raised several queries with Lyn Heath about the IPSO complaint and whether it is something we should be pursuing in light of the ongoing IOPC investigation. I was concerned that NP's position was contradictory in that we couldn't comment in the media for fear of prejudicing the IOPC investigations, yet we were submitting an IPSO complaint regarding the reporting of the NRB.
392. I raised this issue with Lyn Heath on 21 May 2024 who in turn sought further advice from NPCC as detailed below (URN: NGPF0011178).
393. On 22 May 2024 I received an email from Lyn Heath (URN: NGPF0011179). This email followed a conversation I had with Lyn about my concerns. I have reproduced this email below for ease of reference:

"I have now spoken to Hayley at NPCC re the potential to pause the IPSO complaint pending the IOPC review reporting. She is struggling to see why it is an issue, but I have told her that there is an anticipation that the NDA may be included in the terms of reference. She's going to have a couple of discussions and come back to us to confirm.

She thinks IPSO may take some time, in any case."

394. In this email Lyn referred to an NDA. I believe this was because she anticipated the IOPC would be investigating a complaint that media outlets had to sign an NDA.

395. I replied to Lyn's email (URN: NGPF0011179) as follows:

"Thanks Lyn, as discussed yesterday I do think that due to the fact that we now know IOPC may be looking at the off the record press briefing we should pause the IOPC referral."

396. My email says IOPC, but this was a mistake on my behalf. I was actually referring to the IPSO referral. In the subsequent email from Lyn (URN: NGPF0011181) it is clear that she understood I was referring to the IPSO referral.

397. On 4 June 2024 I was informed via email by Lyn Heath (URN: NGPF0011182 as above) that she had attended a meeting with NPCC:

"I had a meeting with the team at NPCC at the end of last week. Apparently it is not possible to pause the complaint, we would need to withdraw, and their view was that we should not do that."

398. The email continued to say:

"Hayley Equi was very surprised to hear that the IPSO complaint may come under the scope of the review and said the discussions would likely be with them rather than us because they submitted the complaint on our behalf and so it would be them talking about the result if successful."

She was due to have a meeting with the IOPC Head of Comms in any case this week and so is going to raise the question with him.”

399. The same day I had a further email from Lyn Heath (URN: NGPF0011183) as follows:

“Further to my email earlier, Hayley has confirmed that she has now spoken to Smyth at IOPC and, while it is possible that the NDA issue could be included, he does not feel that we should cancel the complaint that we currently have live with IPSO.”

400. As a result of reassurance provided to me by Lyn Heath, NPCC and IOPC, I made the decision not to withdraw the IPSO complaint. In retrospect, I regret making this decision. It was a mistake to pursue the complaint in the first place and subsequently not to withdraw it when I had my doubts. I also deeply regret not telling the bereaved or survivors that NP was making this complaint to IPSO. I sincerely apologise for this failure and appreciate the impact it had on the families' perception that NP was not being transparent.

401. On 19 September 2024, the IPSO rejected NP's complaint in full. I attach their ruling as (URNs: NGPF0011184 and NGPF0011186). This merely exacerbated the negative reporting.

402. When I took part in the NRB I honestly believed I was adopting an open and transparent position, based on expert communications advice from the NPCC. As stated above, the NRB and subsequent ill-conceived complaint to IPSO had exactly the opposite effect to what I had intended and further

fractured my and NP's relationship with the families, survivors and the media, which I very much regret.

403. I firmly believe that NRBs can be of value to investigations and the media outlets, but also importantly to victims and their families, in that they should ensure consistent and accurate reporting and thereby prevent unhelpful or distressing speculation.

404. I am saddened about the interpretation of my approach as not transparent, but I can see why this has happened and I blame myself. The NRB was a disaster, and I should not have listened to the advice about complaining to IPSO. I hope that this statement confirms my intention to ensure that the families and survivors were at the centre of our response and the importance of sharing information with them.

Other media releases

405. On 26 February 2024, an "if asked" statement was prepared (URN: NGPF0011187) in anticipation of enquiries about Nottinghamshire Live's claim that they were asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement. I authorised this prior to release, as follows:

"Nottinghamshire Police want to be clear - at no point were journalists made to sign a non-disclosure agreement. The off the record background briefing advised and facilitated by the NPCC is standard practice and is part of Authorised Professional Practice for Policing. These briefings are not unusual. The family have raised a number of concerns and the appropriate way for these to be resolved is through the

ongoing independent investigation by the IOPC as well as the review by the College of policing. Commenting further could prejudice these investigations.

We have written to the families of all those affected by this horrific crime it offered to meet them.”

406. On 28 February 2024, a statement was prepared by Lyn Heath and Matthew Jarram which was approved by me. The statement was designed to provide a clear and consistent response to the significant number of questions from the media (URN: NGPF0011188), as follows:

“The family have raised a number of concerns and the appropriate way for these to be resolved is through the ongoing independent investigation by the IOPC as well as the review by the College of Policing.

Commenting further could prejudice these investigations.

We have written to the families of all those affected by this horrific crime and offered to meet them.”

407. I approved this statement, understanding that it would be used to respond to media enquiries. When I said that further comment could prejudice the investigation, I was not seeking to avoid scrutiny or accountability. I was referring to the risk that commenting publicly, while the IOPC investigations were ongoing, could create unfairness in any subsequent disciplinary proceedings, could influence witness evidence or undermine the independence of the IOPC’s work. In relation to the statements released on 26 and 28 February 2024, I am satisfied both were accurate at the time. In

considering transparency I am acutely aware of the perception of my approach of not commenting publicly but I believed at the time this was my only viable option. Perhaps on reflection it was not. Perhaps I should have made more public commentary. I am not a media or communications expert.

408. On 7 March 2024, a press release was published in relation to the gross misconduct hearing for the front counter staff member; Sarah Rutherford (URN: NGPF0011189) as follows:

“A police staff gross misconduct hearing is being held on April 5 in relation to the following allegation. A member of police staff misused force systems and breached data protection by searching for and accessing information and evidence relating to recent homicide investigations. The investigation has shown that the police staff member accessed information on police systems and researched the offender, Valdo Calocane.

There is no evidence that she viewed any body-worn video or CCTV in relation to the case. Hearings relating to police staff misconduct are held in private and we do not publicise the findings.”

409. I believe this statement was accurate, open and transparent at the time and retrospectively. The outcome of the GM hearing is contained within (URN: NGPF0011447).

410. On 8 March 2024 NP issued a statement in response to an enquiry from The Sunday Express (URN: NGPF0011190) received on 5 March 2024.

This focussed on VC's FTA warrant which, as explained previously, was subject to investigation by the IOPC.

411. The journalist stated:

"Hi I have been informed that the reason for Valdo Calocane never being arrested on the bench warrant issued when he failed to attend court in September 2021 on the number of times police were called to incidents involving him subsequent to that but before the triple killings was down to a "system failure" within Notts police."

412. The journalist continued to say that:

"...this was due to a backlog of outstanding warrants in the Notts force area and the warrant for Calocane not properly being activated and circulated as a result - this meant that he was not shown as wanted on the PNC when officers subsequently came across him in Notts area and Leicestershire."

413. Matthew Jarram prepared a statement which both ACC Griffin and I authorised (URN: NGPF0011191). This was due to the fact that there was reference to the assault connected to the FTA warrant and ACC Griffin was better placed to comment on that aspect. The statement was worded as follows:

"In September 2021, we were requested to support mental health services with a Section 135 warrant to section Valdo Calocane under the Mental Health Act."

“We transported the suspect to Highbury Hospital and during this encounter he assaulted one of our police officers.

“Nearly one year later, in August 2022, he was reported for summons and was due to attend court on 22 September 2022 for the assault on our officer.

“He failed to appear on that occasion and a warrant for his arrest was issued in September 2022.

“Calocane was shown as wanted on PNC and was circulated on police systems.

“The families have raised a number of concerns including the warrant and the appropriate way for these to be resolved is through the ongoing independent investigation by the IOPC as well as the review by the College of Policing. “Commenting further could prejudice these investigations.

“We have written to the families of all of those affected by this horrific crime and offered to meet them.”

414. The assertion that VC had not been circulated as wanted on PNC was wholly incorrect and, as such, I considered it necessary to challenge it. This particular assertion about him not being circulated was potentially unfairly damaging to the force’s reputation and therefore required clarification.

415. Accordingly, on 6 March 2024, Matthew Jarram contacted the IOPC (URN: NGPF0011192), sharing NP’s proposed statement and seeking permission to publish the following line, which contained information not previously in the public domain:

“Calocane was shown as wanted on PNC and was circulated on police systems.”

416. It was clarified that VC was circulated as wanted on police systems. This maintained NP’s position as the information provided was already in the public domain and NP did not make any additional comments.

417. On 24 April 2024, the IOPC released a statement to the media (URN: NGPF0011193) which referred to a meeting the IOPC had with the families and the ongoing investigation. I approved our response which was also approved by the IOPC, as follows:

“It would be inappropriate to comment further due to the ongoing independent investigation by the IOPC, and the review by the College of Policing”

418. There were a number of requests for me to comment publicly, which I have set out earlier; however, my decision not to do so was in order to avoid compromising the IOPC investigation. This was reported as me hiding behind that investigation.

419. As discussed earlier, on 16 May 2024 Matthew Jarram contacted the IOPC to seek support with requests received by NP to comment publicly on information not in the public domain (URN: NGPF0011146).

420. On 17 May 2024 Dylan Evans of the IOPC responded to NP’s request (URN: NGPF0011146) saying that they were happy for any media requests for interviews with me about the IOPC investigation to be directed to them.

421. In addition to this on 12 June 2024 Dylan Evans then provided suggested wording for a media release, confirming that NP were unable to comment on matters relating to the ongoing IOPC investigation (URN: NGPF0011150).
422. On 12 June 2024 I authorised a statement for release to the media on 13 June 2024. This was intended to acknowledge the first anniversary of the devastating attacks (URN: NGPF0011194).

“On the morning of 13 June 2023, devastating events took place in our city which resulted in the loss of three innocent lives. My thoughts today are with the families and friends of Barnaby, Grace, Ian, and those that were seriously injured. On behalf of all of us at Nottinghamshire Police, I will be laying a wreath and lighting a candle in the city in their memory and paying my respects, alongside other local civic leaders. We will never forget this tragic loss of life.”

IOPC investigation: for background information In accordance with existing [NPCC/IOPC] protocol, Nottinghamshire Police is unable to comment directly on matters which are included in the IOPC’s ongoing independent investigation into complaints raised by the families of Valdo Calocane’s victims.

This is to avoid possible prejudice to any future potential proceedings and is standard practice which applies to all police forces when cases are under investigation by the IOPC. We are co-operating fully and supporting the IOPC with its enquiries.”

423. On 1 July 2024, a statement (URN: NGPF0011446) was released to Good Morning Britain (GMB) after presenter Ed Balls criticised NP and me personally, where he said on 15 May 2024:

“I’ve seen this before. This is leaders in the public services, in this case the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police, who’s hiding behind process, is refusing to engage and lead. She needs to be talking about what went wrong and talking about the lessons to be learned and engaging with the families. Of course she can’t pre-empt the investigations but this is so defensive, and its so damaging it persuades me that unless you have an overarching inquiry we aren’t going to get to the truth.” (URN: NGPF0010749).

424. Despite repeated media releases explaining why I couldn’t comment publicly, the narrative of me remaining unwilling to speak publicly remained. I felt very frustrated as I wanted to be as open and transparent as possible, but I was constrained by the fact of the IOPC investigation and their request that I not discuss matters under investigation. The statement shared with GMB was the one provided by the IOPC (URN: NGPF0011150). I met with Lyn Heath and Matthew Jarram, and we agreed from 1 July onwards this would be the statement NP would release.

425. On 20 September 2024 DCC Cooper authorised a statement following the IPSO result (URN: NGPF0011195), as follows:

“On the advice of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, we held a non-reportable briefing for the media following the Nottingham attacks in June 2023.

“These briefings are standard practice, facilitated by the NPCC and are held to help and inform media with their reporting.

“At no point did we ask any media organisation to sign a non-disclosure agreement, which is a legally binding document.

“The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) acknowledged this in their findings, admitting that Nottinghamshire Live “had not signed a legal document”, however they did not feel that their reporting on this matter was “significantly inaccurate”.

“For this reason, IPSO decided Clause 1 of the Editors’ Code of Practice, which is accuracy of reporting, had not been breached.

“We understand the vital role of the media in holding organisations to account. Submitting a formal complaint was not a decision that was taken lightly, however when we notice inaccuracies, it is only right that they are challenged.

“Despite being disappointed with the findings, we have decided not to appeal the decision.

“We remain fully committed to the IOPC investigation and it would not be appropriate to comment any further until this has been completed.”

426. Throughout this period of engagement with the media, I sought to act with openness, transparency, and accuracy in the information I provided to the public, but I obviously failed to gain public confidence in what I was saying or in the way I was saying it. On reflection, I remain satisfied that the information shared was accurate, save for the minor exceptions I have

noted above. However, I recognise that there is a perception that my communications were not sufficiently open or transparent and I bitterly regret that perception because it was emphatically not my intention and is against everything I stand for in terms of transparency with the public.

427. As described previously, at no point was there any intention to withhold information. Rather, my actions were guided by the need to protect the integrity of the criminal investigation and, subsequently, the IOPC investigation and the CoP review.

Contact with the bereaved families and survivors

428. I have been asked to provide details of all contact I had with the bereaved families and survivors in respect of the attacks on 13 June 2023.

429. I met the families of both Grace and Barney in person on 14 June 2023. I had asked via the FLOs if the families and survivors wished to meet me. This offer was predicated on my belief they should be afforded the opportunity to meet the head of the organisation directly. Whilst I knew they were being supported by dedicated FLOs I wanted them to be able to ask me any questions they needed to, and to hear anything they wished to know from me, first hand.

430. I have provided further details of these meetings later in this statement.

431. On 16 June 2023, I attended a vigil in Nottingham Market Square, where I had a brief chance encounter with Emma Webber. During this interaction, Emma informed me that the following day, both her family and friends, as well as those of Grace, intended to visit the location where Grace and

Barney had been killed. She requested that road closures be considered to facilitate this visit.

432. I advised her that I would make enquiries to establish whether this was feasible and confirmed that the FLOs would provide her with an update. No other matters were discussed during this encounter. The meeting took place in a public toilet and was not an appropriate setting for a more detailed conversation.

433. Following this and up to the date of the sentencing hearings in late January 2024, I did not have any contact with either the families or survivors. Communication with the families had been managed through the FLO structures.

434. Between 29 January and 5 February 2024 there was correspondence between me and the bereaved families and survivors. This was following the families' statements made on 25 January 2024 and covered a period where I worked alongside ACC Griffin until I implemented Operation Chainlink.

435. As described above, on 5 February 2024 I assumed the role of Gold Commander for Operation Chainlink. As such I was responsible for communications with the bereaved families and survivors.

436. I directed that all communication with the families was to be co-ordinated through me. I was acutely aware that communication and the timely provision of information had previously been a concern, and I believed that taking personal responsibility would ensure that all messages to the families

were consistent, accurate, and clear. Consequently, my role meant that during this time I had direct contact with the families and survivors.

437. To ensure information was, if at all possible, shared in a consistent and accurate manner updates were provided in letter form and sent to the following individuals

- Emma and David Webber
- Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley Kumar
- James Coates who was acting on behalf of the Coates family
- Elaine Newton
- Wayne Birkett
- Marcin Gawronski
- Sharon Miller

438. All letters were sent as attachments to an email; the FLOs would alert the families and survivors when an update had been provided.

439. On occasions, I received emails from families and survivors raising specific concerns. I responded to these directly, either by letter or by email.

440. On 4 February 2024 I commenced a timeline document, designed to record events, information being received and my decisions and rationale. Initially I made entries retrospectively dating back to 29 January 2024. I refer to this timeline as (URN: NGPF0011206).

441. After the sentencing hearing, with the exception of my meetings with Elaine Newton and Wayne Birkett, which I will outline later, the only contact I had with families and survivors was via letter or email.

Chronology of Correspondence

29 January 2024

442. On 29 January 2024 I caused a letter to be sent to the bereaved families. I was out of the country when this letter was issued; however, given the urgency of the situation, it was sent on my behalf to ensure timely communication with the families. I reviewed and approved the content prior to its release. From the records I can see that the families of Grace, Barney and Ian were sent the letter on 29 January 2024.

443. I refer to the above correspondence as follows:

- Email sent to both Emma and David Webber at 17:32pm on 29 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007176).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007176) addressed to Emma and David Webber (URN: NGPF0011219).
- Email sent to both Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley-Kumar at 17:36pm on 29 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007154).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007154) addressed to Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley-Kumar (URN: NGPF0011222).
- Email sent to James Coates at 17:39pm on 29 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007124).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007124) addressed to James Coates (URN: NGPF0011225).

444. The content of the letter was as follows:

"I am making contact with you following the sentencing hearing which concluded on Thursday 25th January to extend my deepest condolences, there are no words that can express the depth of sorrow and devastation you must be feeling. I know that in recent weeks you have had contact with the lawyers in the case, Family Liaison Officers, and Leigh Sanders. As the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police, I carry the responsibility of the actions of all staff and officers involved in the response to this tragedy. For this reason, I am keen to meet with you to hear your concerns about our management of the response, how you feel you should have been better supported and about how you believe we and our partners could do more to prevent such a terrible crime happening again. ACC Griffin and I can meet with you on any of the following days:

- Tuesday 30th January at a time to suit you. This meeting would be in person with ACC Griffin, and I would meet you online by Microsoft Teams.

- Any day between Monday 5th – Friday 16th February at a time to suit you. This meeting would be in person with me, and ACC Griffin would meet you online by Microsoft Teams.

- The morning of the 19th February or any time on Tuesday 20th February when both ACC Griffin and I can meet you in person. These meetings will be arranged at a location to suit you. I am committed to listening to your concerns with an open heart and mind, recognising the importance of your perspectives in shaping meaningful change. Please respond letting us know when would be best to meet."

445. The purpose of the letter was to invite the bereaved families to a meeting with myself and ACC Griffin as we wanted to fully understand their concerns, how they felt they could have been better supported as well as identifying learning for NP.

446. A number of dates were proposed, some of which would have required either me or ACC Griffin to attend via Microsoft Teams. This was necessary as, at various times, we were both out of the country. However, in recognition of the importance of meeting with the bereaved families, we sought to offer as many dates as possible.

30 January 2024

447. At 12:20 on 30 January 2024 an email was sent by my staff officer Insp Luke Waller to the bereaved families, informing them that NP had referred itself to the IOPC (URN: NGPF0011226). This referral related to all contact NP had with VC and arose directly from comments made by the bereaved families following VC's sentencing hearing, in which it was asserted that there had been missed opportunities. The email stated the following:

"To the families,

Further to my e-mail yesterday evening I wanted to inform you that Nottinghamshire Police have taken the pro-active step of referring ourselves to the IOPC this morning. This referral will cover all contact that Nottinghamshire Police had with Valdo Calcone [sic].

We are committed to accountability and transparency. This referral will ensure that the IOPC are given the opportunity to conduct an investigation

or review of Nottinghamshire Police's actions. You will be updated further once the IOPC have had the opportunity to review the referral and decide upon a course of action.

With thanks,"

448. Also on 30 January 2024, a further email was sent by Insp Luke Waller, this time to Ian Coates' partner Elaine Newton and the survivors of the attacks. The letter informed them that NP had referred itself to the IOPC and invited them to a meeting.

449. I now refer to the above correspondence as the following:

- Email sent to Elaine Newton at 12:35 on 30 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007210).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007210) addressed to Elaine Newton (URN: NGPF0011229).
- Email sent to Wayne Birkett at 12:47 on 30 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0011230).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0011230) addressed to Wayne Birkett (URN: NGPF0011232).
- Email sent to Sharon Miller at 12:49 on 30 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0011233).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0011233) addressed to Sharon Miller (URN: NGPF0011235).
- Email sent to Marcin Gawronski at 12:52 on 30 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007280).

- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007280) addressed to Marcin Gawronski (URN: NGPF0011238).

450. The letter sent to Elaine Newton was identical to those sent to the other bereaved families on 29 January 2024 up to the point where dates were suggested. At that point Elaine's letter read as follows:

"ACC Griffin and I can meet with you at a time and day to suit you week commencing Monday 19th February.

The meeting will be arranged at a location to suit you. I am committed to listening to your concerns with an open heart and mind, recognising the importance of your perspectives in shaping meaningful change. Please respond letting us know when would be best to meet. In addition, I wanted to inform you that Nottinghamshire Police have taken the pro-active step of referring ourselves to the IOPC this morning. This referral will cover all contact that Nottinghamshire Police had with Valdo Calcone [sic].

We are committed to accountability and transparency. This referral will ensure that the IOPC are given the opportunity to conduct an investigation or review of Nottinghamshire Police's actions. You will be updated further once the IOPC have had the opportunity to review the referral and decide upon a course of action."

451. The letter sent to the survivors on 30 January 2024 contained the same passage as described above, but began with the following:

“I am making contact with you following the sentencing hearing which concluded on Thursday 25th January. I know that in recent weeks you have had contact with the lawyers in the case, Family Liaison Officers, and Leigh Sanders. As the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police, I carry the responsibility of the actions of all staff and officers involved in the response to this tragedy.

For this reason, I am keen to meet with you and your family to hear your concerns about our management of the response, how you feel you should have been better supported and about how you believe we and our partners could do more to prevent such a terrible crime happening again.”

452. Also on 30 January 2024, at 14:29 I received an email from Elaine Newton accepting the invitation to meet on 22 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011260). Her email stated:

“Hello Kate, Thank you for offering to meet with me, I am available on Thursday 22nd of February if this date is convenient for you also, I am happy to travel to the police headquarters at the lodge, thanks again Elaine.”

453. My Staff Officer, Luke Waller, arranged a time on my behalf, confirming that the meeting would take place at 09:30 on 22 February 2024. Elaine Newton later replied to both me and Luke Waller by email at 18:55 and 18:58. I refer to these emails as (URNs: NGPF0011261 and NGPF0007283) respectively. Inspector (Insp) Luke Waller worked as my staff officer between 4 September 2023 and 21 July 2024. He worked closely with me

when I corresponded with the bereaved families and survivors. He would coordinate release of letters and emails as well as linking in with the Operation Hendrix Investigation team and PSD to ensure factual accuracy of information shared.

1 February 2024

454. On 1 February 2024 at 13:44 I received an email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0011263) which was sent in reply to (URN: NGPF0011226) sent on 30 January 2024 which stated:

“Thank you for this.

Please advise your response regarding the concerns raised about the investigation itself.

Thank you.

Emma Webber”

2 February 2024

455. On 2 February 2024, a letter to both the bereaved families and the survivors was sent on my behalf as I was still out of the country. Prior to sending, I approved the content, as follows:

“I am writing in order to respond to recent matters and concerns which have raised to me through the FLO or SIO, and I thought it would be beneficial to summarise what is currently underway. Nottinghamshire Police have made a referral to the Independent Office

of Police Conduct (IOPC) in relation to all previous contact Nottinghamshire Police had with Valdo Calocane. This includes matters relating to his previous arrests, detentions and the outstanding warrant. If any further complaints are received, we will of course review and speak with the IOPC.

The Police and Crime Commissioner for Nottinghamshire, Caroline Henry, has commissioned the College of Policing to undertake an independent review in relation to the investigation. I am aware that Commissioner Henry has written to you with regards to defining the terms of reference and has received a list of concerns about Nottinghamshire Police which are being passed to the College. Any concerns you raise with us will also be sent to the PCC for her to pass onto the College's review team.

My invitation to meet with you remains open in order that these and any further issues or questions you may have prior to any of the reviews reporting. Should you wish to meet you can contact me directly by e-mail on GRO-B”

456. The letter was sent to the families and survivors and was intended to summarise work currently underway, as a result of the concerns that had been raised. I now refer to this correspondence as the following:

- Email sent to both Emma and David Webber at 15:28 on 2 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007141).

- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007141) addressed to Emma and David Webber (URN: NGPF0011241).
- Email sent to both Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley-Kumar at 15:30 on 2 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007135).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007135) addressed to Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley-Kumar (URN: NGPF0011244).
- Email sent to James Coates 15:33 on 2 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007132).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007132) addressed to James Coates (URN: NGPF0011247).
- Email sent to Wayne Birkett 15:36 on 2 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007129).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007129) addressed to Wayne Birkett (URN: NGPF0011250).
- Email sent to Marcin Gawronski 15:39 on 2 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007126).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007126) addressed to Marcin Gawronski (URN: NGPF0011253).
- Email sent to Sharon Miller 15:43 on 2 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007138).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007138) addressed to Sharon Miller (URN: NGPF0011256).
- Email sent to Elaine Newton 15:45 on 2 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007284).

- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007284) addressed to Elaine Newton (URN: NGPF0011259).

457. The letter to Emma and David Webber (URN: NGPF0011241) had an additional paragraph to address the question Emma had raised to me by email on 1 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011263). The additional paragraph was as follows:

“In response to your e-mail on Thursday afternoon, I can assure you that any concerns regarding the investigation will be considered as part of the College of Policing review. The IOPC are currently considering our referral in relation to previous contact that Nottinghamshire Police had with Calocane prior to June 2023. Should you wish to make a formal complaint about the investigation itself you can do this by contacting the IOPC directly via their website or through our Professional Standards Directorate who will direct your complaint on to the IOPC. Should you wish to initiate your complaint through Nottinghamshire Police you can do this by contacting DS Gabriella Hennessey: [REDACTED] in our PSD.”

458. In the letter to Dr Kumar and Dr O'Malley-Kumar (URN: NGPF0011244) I addressed an issue Dr Kumar had raised via email with their FLO DC McVey regarding toxicology samples (URN: NGPF0011264). His email (dated 31 January 2024 at 01:10) stated the following:

“Dear Fiona,

Ironic no samples were taken from the perpetrator. I find this very very disturbing. For the record I find it very disturbing that our children and Ian were the subject to tissue sampling for toxicology; which is a invasive procedure whereas the force had the inability or lack of investigatory initiative to even take the full cache of even the non intimate samples from the perpetrator. Please relay my absolute disgust at this process to the chief Constable and the following IOPC investigation. Kind regards Sanjoy”

459. The additional paragraph intended to address the issue raised read as follows:

“I am aware that you have been in contact with DC McVey regarding toxicology samples and are considering raising this as a complaint matter which the IOPC would review in conjunction with our self-referral. I understand that DC McVey has let you know how to formally make such a complaint.”

460. At 16:24 on 2 February 2024 I received an email from Tracey Hodgson on behalf of her partner Wayne Birkett (URN: NGPF0011270) where she informed me that Wayne’s solicitor Greg Almond would be in contact to arrange a meeting, and provided her email address for future correspondence, as follows:

*“Good Afternoon,
Wayne's solicitor Greg Almond should be in contact with you to arrange a suitable date to meet. As you are aware Wayne suffered Traumatic*

Brain Injury so finds it difficult to communicate, so I am with permission from wayne writing this reply.

Tracey Hodgson (partner/appointee)."

461. Also on 2 February 2024, at 17:30 I received an email from Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011265), which was in response to the letter I had sent on 29 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007154). This email is discussed in more detail later in this statement.

462. I did not immediately respond to Dr Kumar's email as I was still out of the country and did not have sufficient information to address the issues he raised.

3 February 2024

463. On 3 February 2024 Dr Kumar sent an email (URN: NGPF0011266) to DC McVey and I requesting a copy of Professor Blackwood's report (URN: CPSE0000152). Dr Kumar's email was as follows:

"Dear Fiona,

Now that the hearing is over kindly forward me a copy of Dr [sic] Blackwood's report that he submitted and that you read out to us.

Thank you

Sanjoy"

4 February 2024

464. On 4 February 2024 at 09:34 I sent an email to Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011268). This coincided with my return from annual leave and was in direct response to email (URN: NGPF0011265).

465. Also on 4 February 2024, I sent an email (URN: NGPF0011269) acknowledging receipt of the email from Wayne Birkett's partner Tracey Hodgson (URN: NGPF0011270) on 2 February 2024, as follows:

"Good morning Tracey,

Thank you for your e mail I will wait to hear from Wayne's solicitor.

Kind regards. Kate"

6 February 2024

466. On 6 February 2024 I sent a letter to Dr Kumar, by email, in response to the email he had sent to me on 2 February (URN: NGPF0011265), as follows:

- Email sent to Dr Sanjoy Kumar at 15:25 on 6 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007148).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007148) addressed to Dr Sanjoy Kumar (URN: NGPF0011273).

Replacement of the FLOs

467. Upon commencement of my role as Gold, I was aware of the fact that some of the concerns raised by the bereaved families related directly to the role of the FLOs. These were recorded in the Gold minutes for Operation Hendrix on 30 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007809) as *"Family contact and FLO"*

468. I needed to consider, in light of these concerns, the CoP review and IOPC investigations, whether the allocated FLOs to the Webbers, the O'Malley-Kumars and the Coates family could continue in their role given the implicit criticism of them.
469. The position of the FLOs was discussed in the Gold meeting for Operation Chainlink on 6 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011276). The FLA DI Gould raised her concerns regarding the FLOs for the Webbers, the O'Malley-Kumars and the Coates family. she stated that the relationships are not strained but she believed were no longer tenable. This was due to the fact families were asking for information relating to the investigation that may be relevant to the CoP review and IOPC complaints.
470. This was not a decision I took lightly and was informed the SIO would seek advice from the National Family Liaison Advisor from the National Crime Agency (NCA). Det Supt Sanders sought the advice of Sian Lloyd-Williams. These conversations are recorded as having taken place over the telephone on 30 January 2024 and are documented in the SIO Policy Log (URN: NGPF0008791, policy decisions 116 and 117)

7 and 8 February 2024

471. On 7 February 2024, I made the decision to replace the FLOs assigned to the Webbers, the O'Malley-Kumar's and the Coates family.
472. I anticipated the FLOs would be interviewed as part of the CoP review and IOPC investigation. To ensure the investigation could proceed ethically and transparently, their replacement was regrettably necessary.

473. I was also concerned that it would be extremely challenging for the FLOs to maintain an effective relationship with the families when allegations had been made against them by those same families. I articulated my reasons for this decision in my timeline (URN: NGPF0011206):

“Letter prepared (following advice from National FL Advisor) stating that the FLO’s would be replaced for the OMK, Webbers and Coates boys. This was considered by RG in Op Hendrix Gold and he tasked some work to be completed. I have decided to progress this in his absence due to the fact families are still contacting the FLO’s and as such a decision needs to be made. I am of the opinion that a new FLO needs to be provided to the family we still wish to support the family through the next phase but need to ensure independent investigation can be carried out in an ethical and transparent manner.

The FLO’s will probably be interviewed as part of the review process. I am also conscious of the welfare of the FLO’s that have been raised to me by the FLA as well as the FLO’s themselves. There will be new FLO’s provided to the family. My decision is that the other FLO’s can remain in place as the rationale I have applied for replacing FLO’s does not apply to the other deployments.”

474. In making my decision to withdraw the FLOs I was also mindful of the welfare of the FLOs, a concern that had been raised with me by DI Gould. However, I made a deliberate decision not to reference their wellbeing in my communication with the families. I did not wish the bereaved families to feel that they were being held responsible for the impact on the FLOs, and

I fully recognised that the effect on the FLOs was in no way comparable to what the families themselves were enduring. I was also conscious of the need to respect the confidential nature of information relating to the FLOs.

475. I was clear that continued FLO support remained essential and stipulated that replacements were identified immediately. Accordingly, DC Kelly Rowbotham was identified as FLO for the Webbers and the Coates family, and Phil Cumberpatch (Police Investigation Officer) for the O'Malley-Kumars.

476. Accordingly, on 8 February 2024 I sent emails with letters attached dated 7 February 2024 to Dr Kumar and Dr O'Malley-Kumar, Mr and Mrs Webber and James Coates informing them that a new FLO will be appointed to them.

477. The email to Dr Kumar and Dr O'Malley-Kumar had a further letter attached which addressed the request from Dr Kumar, through his FLO, for a copy of a timeline that detailed VC's engagement with mental health services. DC McVey had forwarded this email to me on 6 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011274 and URN: HMCP0000534)

478. The emails and letters were as follows:

- Email sent to Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley-Kumar at 09.50 on 8 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007163).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007163), dated 8 February 2024 and addressed to Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley-

Kumar (URN: NGPF0011281). This letter addressed the request by Dr Kumar for the timeline.

- Second letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007163), dated 7 February 2024 and addressed to Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley-Kumar (URN: NGPF0011282). This letter addressed the FLO issue.

- Email sent to Emma Webber and David Webber at 09.54 on 8 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007157).

- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007157), dated 7 February 2024 and addressed to Emma Webber and David Webber (URN: NGPF0011285).

- Email sent to James Coates at 09.57 on 8 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007160).

- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007160), dated 7 February 2024 and addressed to James Coates (URN: NGPF0011288).

479. The letter about the FLOs contained the following:

"I am writing to you in relation to the Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) who have been supporting you over recent months. Now that Crown Court proceedings are finalised, enquiries now move from investigations into a review phase.

This means that your current FLO contact will cease and a newly appointed officer, independent to any future review or complaint process, will become your point of contact. In this way we can continue to support you and ensure that any review or independent investigation can be

carried out in an ethical and transparent manner. It is likely that the original FLOs will be interviewed as part of any such review process, as the various commissions now undertake their enquiries. As such, experienced officers with expertise in the area of multi-agency working will now be introduced to assist the various reviews that have been commissioned; simultaneously these officers will remain a contact for you in the future, to assist with any queries that you may have and to provide updates from Nottinghamshire Police.”

480. Each letter then contained details of the new FLO, Phil Cumberpatch in the case of the O'Malley-Kumars; Kelly Rowbotham in the case of the Webbers and the Coates family, and confirmation that any correspondence sent to the previous FLOs would be passed on.

481. In relation to the request from Dr Kumar for the timeline, I had established that this timeline had been produced by the SIO and captured incidents where VC had contact with mental health services (URN: NGPF0007824).

482. I sought guidance when considering this request, and this informed my response. My reply (URN: NGPF0011281) was worded as follows:

“Dear Sanjoy,

I am writing in response to your recent e-mails to DC McVey in which you have requested a copy of the timeline report which was read to you at Avon & Somerset Police Headquarters on 7th December 2023. As you will be aware this timeline not only contains information about contact Nottinghamshire Police had with Calocane but also that of other

agencies.

Whilst I am truly sympathetic to your request, I am also duty bound to ensure that I do not compromise any of the ongoing proceedings and reviews. As such I regret to inform you that Nottinghamshire Police will be unable to release a copy of the timeline to you. I have considered whether a redacted copy of the report could lawfully be released to you but the degree to which it would be redacted would mean it would have little value to you for your meeting with the CQC on Friday 9th February.

Please be aware that our refusal to provide you with a copy of the report does not stem from a lack of concern or willingness to help. We are committed to assisting you in any way and we will explore all lawful avenues to ensure that the CQC and any other relevant agencies receive the necessary information to conduct their comprehensive reviews. I can confirm that the CQC have already been in contact with our Legal Department to secure the release of similar information to that which is contained in the timeline.

For the same reasons we will be unable to release a copy of Dr Blackwood's report to you. However, I am confident that it will be made available to appropriate agencies in order that the ongoing proceedings and reviews will be effective. I appreciate that this news will cause you frustration for which I apologise but we are duty-bound to operate within the confines of the law and data protection guidelines."

483. Later, on 8 February 2024 at 13:57 I received an email from Dr Kumar, expressing his disappointment in my response (URN: HMCP0000535). His reply stated:

“Dear Kate,

This is a disappointing response from Nottinghamshire Police on both counts.

With regards to the FLOs, Dc Fiona McVey has been nothing but helpful to me and my family. She has always been impartial, factual and dealt with arrangements in Nottingham in a kind and empathic way. She has brought us an enormous amount of comfort at a time of great sadness. Removing her as our FLO seems a vindictive gesture. We have nothing but praise for our FLOs, (including Dc Gill Cutts). Fiona is an exemplary officer for the Nottinghamshire Police Force and subject to no inquiry from our point of view.

We were in fact going to recommend Fiona for a commendation after this terrible time in our lives was over. During this sad time for us the focus should be victim centered and this is yet another example of not thinking about victims of this horrendous crime. Sinead, James and I stand-by our previous FLOs and find this action a real set back for us.

Regards

Sanjoy, Sinead & James”

484. I responded to the above email (URN: HMCP0000535) at 16:14 the same day (URN: NGPF0007168) as follows:

“Sanjoy, Sinead and James,

I want to reassure you that my decision is in no way a vindictive one and I am sorry you feel that way. This is not a decision I took lightly, however I feel it is necessary in the circumstances.

As you are aware there is a review by the College of Policing and referrals have been made to the IOPC. Whilst this will be independent of the police I expect that all of the FLO's will be interviewed by the relevant commissioned bodies. I am duty bound to ensure that I do not compromise any of the ongoing proceedings and reviews. I am confident that the newly appointed FLO will support you over the coming months.

Regards. Kate”

485. The decision to replace the FLOs was taken for the reasons set out above. While I remain of the view that this was the correct decision, I have reflected on whether there was anything I could have done differently.

486. Regrettably, though understandably, the bereaved families did not wish to meet with me, and I was therefore unable to convey the message about the FLOs being replaced in person. In those circumstances, I considered that a written communication would ensure accurate and consistent messaging to all those affected and, for that reason, was preferable to a telephone call.

9 February 2024

487. On 9 February 2024 at 10:18 I received an email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0007172) within which she asked for clarification whether the decision regarding the change of FLO's was connected to future complaints. Emma also sought clarity regarding the CoP review and noted that NP have referred themselves to the IOPC.

488. Emma's email was as follows:

"Thank you for your recent letters sent via email from Kate. I'm sure you can appreciate how difficult and intense the past few weeks have been, so I have only been able to catch up with everything now and feel able to reply. I'm afraid it's by email as we are on our way to London and I don't have access to my laptop. I've numbered it and kept it as brief as possible.

1. *Noted that we no longer have our appointed FLOs. Is this standard practice post sentencing? I think I read that it's more likely because of future complaints and investigations and where their involvement and correspondence with us might be called into evidence?*

2. *note in your letter of the 30th January that Notts Police have referred themselves to the IOPC for contact prior to these attacks with Calocane.*

3. *note in your letter of the 2nd February that Caroline Henry has referred for the investigation itself to be reviewed by the college of policing. Am I correct that this is a learning process for police forces, not independent reviews of failures of concerns? Caroline has offered to meet us and it's likely that we will; providing it does not impede any future*

investigations.

4. *In your letter to Sanjoy of the 6th Feb you make note of the complaints made re the investigation itself. We concur with all of these and add:*

i. We were advised all interviews with Calocane in custody were audio only (part of our concern assessing his state of mind and capacity during and after the attacks). We have minutes taken by the FLOs that confirm this (following meeting on the 7th Dec). In the email to me dated 19th January (following my repeated requests for various answers) it states that due to it being a new custody suite video and audio were taken!

ii. We were consistently told that Calocane had no fixed abode and was a sofa surfer. He had family and friends all over the UK. We had asked for details of where he had lived. We were only made aware that he had in fact been in a property in Nottingham right up until his eviction on the 11th June in the 7th December. It was also only in the email of the 19th January with answers from Leigh Sanders that it confirmed he had a tenancy, had been there for six months and that the tenancy was in the name of Calocane.

iii. We received similar wooly [sic] responses when we asked throughout the summer with regards to his work history. We were also not made aware of the prior attacks to co-workers in only May 2023.

5. *I am disappointed in your letter to Sanjoy of the 8th February that you have refused to allow us access to the timeline that was presented at great length in our meeting in the 7th December and also that we are*

not able to have copies of Dr Blackwood's report; despite us having sat through all 66 pages being read out to us.

6. *In your letter of the 5th Feb to Sanjoy it is not clear if you have referred yourselves as the IOPC re the investigation or if they are aware of the complaints made and concerns raised. Can you confirm your position in this please?*

7. *I wish to formally ask you to note that the persistent comments made by your ACC regarding your failed opportunity to arrest this murderer when you had a chance, the unlikely outcome of a custodial sentence [sic] (would make no difference to outcome) and even more recently; perhaps mental health services may have intervened although unlikely he would comply with meds, is frankly insulting. I would ask you or ACC Griffen to put yourselves in our shoes for just a moment and think how that would feel hearing your murdered child dismissed in such a way. Missing the opportunity to arrest him is all that needed to be said!*

8. *Finally, thank you for the offer to meet. It's a shame we were not afforded this opportunity when we raised our concerns at the end of last year.*

We would like to meet with you but considering the situation with reviews/investigations etc we suspect it is probably something to do as and when this is finally resolved?

Best regards, Emma Webber"

489. I responded to Emma's email later that same day at 13:52 (URN: NGPF0007173) as follows:

Dear Emma,

Thank you for your e-mail, I can't even begin to imagine how devastating this has been for you and your family. This will have been exacerbated by the additional pressures you have endured over the last few weeks. I am pleased you feel able to contact me directly to address your concerns and have responded below to the issues you have raised. It is normal practice for the FLO to provide support to families until the Coroner's Inquest is completed. I can confirm that it was necessary for us to replace your current FLO support, as you are aware there is a review by the College of Policing and referrals have been made to the IOPC. Whilst this will be independent of the police I expect that all of the FLO's will be interviewed by the relevant commissioned bodies. I am confident that DC Kelly Rowbotham will continue to provide you with support over the coming months. In relation to the IOPC, I can confirm that we have now recorded a complaint matter which was initiated by Dr Kumar.

- Serious concerns regarding the quality of the investigation, including decisions regarding toxicology samples.*

 - Communication with the bereaved families about the police actions prior to the offences was contradictory.*

 - Conduct of officers viewing material related to the case.*
 - The force response to the allegations about officers viewing material relating to the investigation was inadequate.*
- We have referred these matters to the IOPC. This referral was initiated*

by Nottinghamshire Police, it was not the case that we were directed to make the referral by the IOPC. I will ensure that the additional points you raised are recorded as a complaint and that they are forwarded on to the IOPC. At this time, the IOPC are still considering the complaint matters raised by Dr Kumar. The IOPC will consider whether they wish to take this as an independent investigation but as of yet I am not aware a decision has been made. The Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) Caroline Henry has commissioned the College of Policing review. As such I would ask that any questions relating the review are directed to her.

I understand your frustration in relation to the requests for the release of Dr Blackwood's psychiatric report and the timeline Dr Kumar refers to. However, I am also duty bound to ensure that I do not compromise any of the ongoing proceedings and reviews. I can assure you that we will share information with all relevant agencies wherever it is lawful to do so in order that any review or investigation is effective. I agree that in light of the complaint matters which have been recorded it would be best to delay our meeting in order that the independence and integrity of the reviews and investigations are maintained. The offer to meet remains open and we will make arrangements to suit you and your family at the conclusion of the reviews.

I hope that this provides some clarity and while I appreciate that you won't be entirely satisfied with each response, I hope you will at least have insight into the reasons for our actions.

With thanks, Kate Meynell CC"

10 February 2024

490. On 10 February 2024 I received an email from Emma Webber at 12:20 (URN: NGPF0007174), in which she asked for the investigation itself to be referred to the IOPC, and sought to bring my attention to some reporting in the media about VC's alleged drug use. Her email was as follows:

"Hi Kate,

Sadly I feel obliged to write again following the article below that has been brought to my attention today. We are aware that there are a fair number of other articles already out in circulation and more due to follow relating to Calocane and his potential for drug use.

I am sure you will standardise your reply, as we've had previously, however I wish to ask that you consider once more referring the investigation itself to the IOPC. I'm aware that our complaints alongside the Kumar's have been forwarded them. It's now time to publicly call for action.

We are also aware of a number of stories regarding police communications during the attacks (particularly on my son and Grace) that are running next week.

The trauma this is causing our family is now at unfathomable and utterly unacceptable levels. We will also be publicly saying this. Article re drug contacts is below plus an except [sic] from your SIO response when questioned re toxicology samples."

491. The email went on to include a link to an article on the Telegraph website, followed by an excerpt from communication that had been sent by DSU Sanders.

492. I was not clear which stories Emma Webber was referring to when she stated that she was aware of a number of stories regarding police communications during the attacks that were planned for the following week. Consequently, I delayed my response to this email in order to seek clarity from Corporate Communications Department regarding any knowledge they may have of the media stories Emma Webber referred to.

12 February 2024

493. On 12 February 2024 I sent a letter via email to Elaine Newton, James Coates and the survivors informing them that I had received complaints from two families regarding the investigation and subsequent trial.

494. I refer to that correspondence as the following:

- Email sent to Elaine Newton on 12 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011293).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0011293), dated 12 February 2024 and addressed to Elaine Newton (URN: NGPF0011295).
- Email sent to James Coates on 12 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011296).

- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0011296), dated 12 February 2024 and addressed to James Coates (URN: NGPF0011298).
- Email sent to Wayne Birkett on 12 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011299).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0011299), dated 12 February 2024 and addressed to Wayne Birkett (URN: NGPF0011301).
- Email sent to Sharon Miller on 12 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011302).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0011302), dated 12 February 2024 and addressed to Sharon Miller (URN: NGPF0011304).
- Email sent to Marcin Gawronski on 12 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011305).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0011305), dated 12 February 2024 and addressed to Marcin Gawronski (URN: NGPF0011307).

495. My letter stated:

"I am making contact to inform you that formal complaints have been raised by two of the families affected by Calocane's crimes, the investigation and the trial which followed.

These matters have been recorded by Nottinghamshire Police and referred to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) who are currently considering whether they should conduct an independent investigation.

In light of this, I want to ensure that all those affected are given the opportunity to voice any grievances or concerns you have regarding the police handling of the incident or the investigation. You will be aware that the College of Policing have been commissioned to conduct a review into the investigation undertaken by Nottinghamshire Police. Investigation of any complaints would be recorded and investigated separately to this review. If you wish to make a formal complaint, please let us know. My aim is to ensure the process is fair, transparent and provides an opportunity for you to raise any concerns you may have regarding Nottinghamshire Police. This will ensure that any investigation will look into dissatisfaction raised by all those impacted by this tragedy. Please don't hesitate to make contact if you have any questions about the process or wish to discuss the matter further."

496. I wrote this letter as I wanted to ensure that all those affected were receiving the same information. I also wanted to give the recipients an opportunity to raise any concerns they may have had, to ensure that any investigation fully considered the dissatisfaction expressed by all those affected by the tragedy. I was acutely aware that a number of issues had been raised, and I wanted to be certain that we understood and examined each of them thoroughly. This was essential in order to respond appropriately, identify any learning, and ensure accountability.

497. On 12 February 2024 at 17:34 Elaine Newton wrote an email to my staff officer in relation to my letter regards families making complaints (URN: NGPF0007183). Her email stated the following:

*“Dear luke [sic], regarding your email you sent me about the to [sic] family's making complaints regarding the police. I have a meeting with Kate Mellynell [sic], on 22nd February to understand what is happening. I have been happy with the police with their investigation and all the information I was given by my police liaison officer Mark Kimberley I could not got through this with out his care and support he gave me. He gave me all the information what was happening in the investigation what he could. The only thing was not happy about that their [sic] was a warrant out for him for nine months I thought this was not acceptable for this man. Leigh Sanders sio. Was a great help he visited me and talked me through all he could tell me. I sat in all the court hearing and listen and understood what I could. I have no complaints regarding the police.
Elaine”*

13 February 2024

498. On 13 February 2024 at 16:52 I sent an update via email to Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0011309) regarding issues she had raised with me in a previous email on 10 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007174).

499. As she had requested, I clarified details regarding the IOPC referrals and reiterated that I had added the matters she had raised with me (URN: NGPF0007174) to the IOPC referral. My reply was as follows:

“Dear Emma,

I understand that yesterday you were informed by the IOPC that they will be conducting an independent investigation into Nottinghamshire Police following the concerns raised by the O’Malley-Kumar family and yourselves. Whilst the matter is now being managed by the IOPC, I wanted to respond to the queries you raised in your e mail to provide clarity regarding what referrals Nottinghamshire Police have made to the IOPC.

I can confirm that we have made referrals to the IOPC on two separate occasions. Our initial referral on Tuesday 30th January related to all contact that Nottinghamshire Police had with Calocane before the tragic events in June.

Following an e-mail from Dr Kumar on Friday 2nd February a further referral to the IOPC was made by Nottinghamshire Police was made on Monday 5th February. The matters contained in your e-mail to me on Friday 9th February were promptly forwarded to the IOPC to be added to the referral made about Dr Kumar’s complaint. This referral included the issues raised by Dr Kumar and yourself. I want to stress that Nottinghamshire Police pro-actively referred these matters to the IOPC as we welcome Independent oversight in the interest of transparency and openness.

Kind regards. Kate”

19 February 2024

500. On 19 February I wrote a letter to the families, which was sent via email, by FLO Phil Cumberpatch regarding the PSD investigations.

501. I refer to those emails and letters as follows:

- Email sent to Dr Sanjoy Kumar at 19:09 on 19 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0004217).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0004217), dated 19 February 2024 and addressed to Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley-Kumar (URN: NGPF0011319).
- Email sent to Emma Webber at 19:12 on 19 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0004213).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0004213), dated 19 February 2024 and addressed to David and Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0011322).
- Email sent to James Coates on at 19:12 19 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0004215).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0004215), dated 19 February 2024 and addressed to the Coates Family (URN: NGPF0011325).

502. I have detailed the circumstances surrounding this letter and its contents later in this statement..

503. Also on 19 February 2024, at 19:40 I received an email from Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0007207) asking for further details regarding the WhatsApp message.

20 February 2024

504. On 20 February 2024, an email was sent by my staff officer (URN: NGPF0007212) confirming receipt of Dr Kumar's email (URN: NGPF0007207) and stating we would respond later that day.
505. Also on 20 February 2024, at 15:53 Phil Cumberpatch, the FLO for the Webber family, forwarded to my staff officer an email Emma Webber had sent to him (URN: NGPF0011328) within which she requested information regarding the breach of data and misconduct hearings.
506. Whilst my preference had been to meet in person, both Dr Kumar and Emma Webber had previously stated that they did not wish to meet in person at that stage (URNS: NGPF0011265 and NGPF0007173 respectively), and I had not heard from James Coates. I was conscious of the importance of ensuring that the families received the information simultaneously and, in the absence of any communication from Mr Coates, I therefore decided to issue a letter setting out the details of the PSD investigations.
507. Later that day on 20 February 2024 I sent a letter to Emma and David Webber, Dr Kumar and Dr O'Malley Kumar and James Coates. This letter detailed all of the PSD investigations undertaken by NP, as follows:
- Email sent to Emma Webber at 21:29 on 20 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007219).

- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007219), dated 20 February 2024 and addressed to David and Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0011334).
- Email sent to Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley-Kumar at 21:27 on 20 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007213).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007213), dated 20 February 2024 and addressed to Dr Sanjoy Kumar and Dr Sinead O'Malley-Kumar (URN: NGPF0011337). The e-mail contained a response to the issues raised by Dr Kumar on 19 February 2024
- Email sent to James Coates at 21:28 on 20 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007216).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007216), dated 20 February 2024 and addressed to the Coates family (URN: NGPF0011340).

508. I discuss this correspondence in more detail below..

509. At 23:27 that same day I received an email from Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011341) in reply to my email from earlier that day. .

21 February 2024

510. On 21 February 2024 at 10:59 I received an email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0001235) in reply to my message from the previous evening (URN: NGPF0007219). .

511. Later that day I responded to Emma Webber's email (URN: NGPF0001235). This was written by me but sent from my staff officers email account (URN: NGPF0007223)
512. I then received a further email from Emma Webber at 14:55 asking some further questions (URN: NGPF0007224):
513. Later that same day at 16:33 I received another email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0004210) following media interviews undertaken by her earlier that day on LBC Radio.
514. This information surprised me as we had been very clear that one officer had watched BWV footage. This query was replied to, by email at 17:04 on 21 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011346), in my absence by one of our business support officers who, in consultation with DCC Cooper, ensured Emma Webber was updated that we had not denied this.
515. Emma Webber responded to this email at 17:16 on 21 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011347), clarifying what she had been told by the media.

22 February 2024

516. On 22 February 2024 at 10:58, I received an email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0001298) regarding the NRB.
517. After checking with me, my staff officer replied on my behalf (URN: NGPF0007226) at 11:38 on 22 February 2024.
518. I discuss both the above emails in more detail later in this statement.

519. At 14:28 on 22 February 2024, I sent another email to Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0007227) in response to the queries she raised the previous day in email (URN: NGPF0007224). I have included my full reply later in this statement.

520. On 22 February 2024 I sent another letter, this time to the survivors regarding the PSD investigations. This letter was identical to the letter sent to the families on 20 February (URNs: NGPF0007219 to NGPF0011340)

- Email sent to Wayne Birkett at 18:15 on 22 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007231).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007231), dated 22 February 2024 and addressed to Wayne Birkett (URN: NGPF0011353)
- Email sent to Sharon Miller at 18:17 on 22 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007234).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007234), dated 22 February 2024 and addressed to Sharon Miller (URN: NGPF0011356)
- Email sent to Marcin Gawronski at 18:18 on 22 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007237).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007237), dated 22 February 2024 and addressed to Marcin Gawronski (URN: NGPF0011359)

23 February 2024

521. On 23 February 2024 at 18:00 I received an email from Wayne Birkett's partner Tracey Hodgson (URN: NGPF0007144) acknowledging receipt of my letter (URN: NGPF0007231) the previous day. I detail this email and my reflections on the disparity in updates to the bereaved families and surviving victims later in this statement.

6 March 2024

On 6 March at 12:59pm I received an email from Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011364) in which he requested details of the agency the three partner agency staff identified as accessing information worked for.

7 March 2024

522. On 7 March I sent a letter to the families and survivors updating them regarding the police staff members Misconduct Hearing.

523. I refer to the above correspondence as the following:

- Email sent to Dr Sanjoy Kumar at 12:39 on 7 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0007246).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007246), dated 7 March 2024 and addressed to Sanjoy Kumar and Sinead O'Malley-Kumar (URN: NGPF0011367).
- Email sent to Dr Sinead O'Malley-Kumar at 12:40 on 7 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0007249). Additional information was provided in the e mail informing Dr Kumar that three partner agency staff worked for Nottingham City Council.

- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007249), dated 7 March 2024 and addressed to Sanjoy Kumar and Sinead O'Malley-Kumar (URN: NGPF0011370).
- Email sent to Emma and David Webber 12:51 on 7 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0007252).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007252), dated 7 March 2024 and addressed to Emma and David Webber (URN: NGPF0011373).
- Email sent to James Coates at 12:26 on 7 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0007255).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007255), dated 7 March 2024 and addressed to the Coates Family (URN: NGPF0011376).
- Email sent to Elaine Newton at 12:29 on 7 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0007261).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007261), dated 7 March 2024 and addressed to Elaine Newton (URN: NGPF0011379).
- Email sent to Marcin Gawronski at 12:33 on 7 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0007264).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007264), dated 7 March 2024 and addressed to Marcin Gawronski (URN: NGPF0011382).
- Email sent to Sharon Miller at 12:44 on 7 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0007267).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007267), dated 7 March 2024 and addressed to Sharon Miller (URN: NGPF0011385)

- Email sent to Tracey Hodgson at 12:48 on 7 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0007270).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0007270), dated 7 March 2024 and addressed to Wayne Birkett (URN: NGPF0011388).

11 March 2024

524. On 11 March 2024 at 19:32 I received an email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0010137). This email was sent in reply to my email from 7 March (URN: NGPF0007252).

12 March 2024

525. On 12 March at 15:39 Dr Kumar sent an email to me and D/Supt Leigh Sanders (URN: NGPF0011390) requesting the CCTV timeline in preparation for his meeting with the IOPC. It was also sent to Sinead O'Malley-Kumar, Emma and David Webber, James Coates and to Matthew Kophamel at the IOPC. Dr Kumar's email was as follows:

"Dear Kate & Leigh,

As you may know the IOPC have asked to meet us on 26th March. To help answer some questions that I have, I would like to get the script of the CCTV timeline that DC Asif Stevens-Garrib your CCTV expert had put together and presented to the Webbers, Sinead & myself. This was presented to us and shared in full at Avon & Somerset HQ. Due to the distress felt on the day, I was unable to take comprehensive and precise notes regarding the time, 'what happened when' and therefore request the 24hr timeline as presented and narrated to us

regarding Calocane's activities from when he first arrived in London to his arrest. This would help me piece together what happened and when to the minute as per the narration. As above, the purpose of my request is to prepare for the meeting with the IOPC. For the sake of transparency, I am including all families in this e mail so kindly reply to all.

Sincerely

Sanjoy"

526. I made enquiries with CPS as to whether this could be shared, and they stated that it could not (URN: NGPF0011391). Accordingly, I updated Dr Kumar regarding this (URN: NGPF0011395).

13 March 2024

527. On 13 March 2024 at 14:19 my staff officer sent my response (URN: NGPF0011396) to Emma Webber's email dated 11 March (URN: NGPF0010137). .

20 March 2024

528. On 20 March at 18:10 I received an email from Dr Kumar in relation to the WhatsApp message and the PSD investigations (URN: NGPF0011397). .

21 March 2024

529. On 21 March at 14:53 I received an email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0011398) within which she referred to Dr Kumar's email on 20 March, as a part of the same chain.

530. Later on 21 March 2024 at 16:41 I was copied into an email from Matthew Kophamel at the IOPC (URN: NGPF0011399). This email was sent to Emma Webber, Sinead O'Malley-Kumar and Sanjoy Kumar and related to the issue Emma had raised in her email regarding the IOPC investigation.

531. Finally, at 17:10 on 21 March 2024 I received an email (URN: NGPF0011406) from Emma Webber, which was also sent to Matthew Kophamel (IOPC) and copied to Sinead O'Malley-Kumar and Sanjoy Kumar. In this email Emma expressed that she fully expected to be given access to all information that she and David were legally permitted, and her determination to ensure nothing was left unexposed or not investigated.

22 March 2024

532. On 22 March 2024 at 15:32 my staff officer Insp Luke Waller sent a letter via email on my behalf to Dr Kumar addressing the points he raised in his email the previous day (URN: NGPF0011397). This correspondence was as follows:

- Email sent to Dr Sanjoy Kumar at 15:32 on 22 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0011407).
- Letter attached to email (URN: NGPF0011407), dated 22 March 2024 and addressed to Sanjoy Kumar (URN: NGPF0011409)

533. Later on 22 March 2024 at 16:09 I received an email from Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011410) in reply to my letter (URN: NGPF0011409).

25 March 2024

534. On 25 March 2024 at 09:06 I received an email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0007276) which was sent in reply to email (URN: NGPF0011396) on 13 March 2024.

535. Later that day at 12:08 I sent an email (URN: NGPF0011413) to Dr Kumar in reply to his email dated 22 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0011410).

26 March 2024

536. On 26 March 2024 at 16:10 I sent an email to Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0007278) which was a response to her email (URN: NGPF0007276).

21 May 2024

537. On 21 May 2024 at 16:41 I received an email from HCC Solicitors stating that they had been appointed legal representatives on behalf of the Webber family (URN: NGPF0011415).

24 May 2024

538. On 24 May at 17:53 I received an email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0001292) stating that they had appointed new legal representatives to replace HCC Solicitors.

28 May 2024

539. On 28 May 2024 I was made aware of an email Dr Kumar sent to DSU Leigh Sanders requesting that VC's fingernail samples be submitted for analysis. I instructed our Legal Services to make contact with the Solicitors acting on behalf of the O'Malley-Kumar family. Ultimately, it was established

that fingernail clippings had not been taken, rather it was scrapings from his fingernails. Consequently, these were not suitable for submission in the circumstances (URN: NGPF0011417).

Personal Meetings

540. On 22 February 2024 ACC Griffin and I met Ian Coates' partner Elaine Newton. Elaine was accompanied by her sister Carol Parlor. Understandably, Elaine was clearly concerned that VC had not been arrested in relation to the outstanding FTA warrant and she raised this in our meeting. ACC Griffin and I took time carefully to explain the previous incidents, the FTA warrant and the PSD investigations. Despite her understandable concerns, Elaine expressed appreciation for the support she had received from NP and spoke positively about how the investigation has been handled.

541. During the meeting Elaine handed to me a typed letter that I refer to as (URN: NGPF0011418). The letter stated:

"Dear Kate Meynell

I am writing this letter to express my appreciation for the professionalism and courtesy Nottingham Police Force have shown to me and my family during such a horrific and painful tragedy. Words cannot express the hurt of losing my partner Ian but what I want to try to put into words is my deep gratitude to the police in the outstanding level of support and care shown by all officers involved. In particular I would like to thank the uniformed officers who stayed by my side on the morning of Ian's death

for their kind caring professionalism, also Mark Kimberley our Family liaison Officer who has been an unwavering rock of support throughout everything we have had to do, from court appearances to visiting our home sometimes multiple times a day and late in the evenings, he has at all times been available and reliable in keeping me informed and delivering all information in a respectful and considered manner, Mark has worked tirelessly for our family and I am so grateful for his dedication and hard work, his conduct should be commended. Leigh Sanders (SIO) who also came to my home with Mark was also very professional and courteous, he explained everything in a respectful manner and was always happy to answer my questions and go over anything I did not understand. I am aware a lot of criticism has been directed at the police for their handling of the investigation but I want you to know I do not share in these views being expressed as I have at all times felt that everything was being done to serve justice and was done to a high standard.

If I have any complaint at all I will say it now as it weighs heavily on my mind as to why (Valdo C) was not arrested in the 9 months of an arrest warrant being issued for him, I cannot help but think that if he had been arrested he might have been referred earlier to the proper medical bodies and gotten the help he clearly needed, I feel that the NHS has let him down and the result is a tragedy that possibly could have been avoided. Nothing will ever bring Ian back to me but I am grateful to so many people for supporting and guiding me through such a difficult time, I am not used to dealing with the police or CPS but my experience while difficult and

*under tragic circumstances has been very positive,
Kind Regards, Elaine Newton”*

542. On 8 March 2024, I met with Wayne Birkett, his partner Tracey Hodgson, and their solicitor to discuss the case and the ongoing PSD investigations. During our conversation, Wayne and Tracey shared the significant personal impact these matters have had on him. It became even more clear to me how deeply this had affected them both, though I had always realised that Wayne’s injuries were dreadful.
543. Apart from the meetings with Elaine Newton on 22 February 2024 and with Wayne and Tracey on 8 March 2024, I did not meet any other family members or survivors to discuss the PSD issues.

Letter from Elias Calocane

544. On 9 February 2024, the SIO made me aware of the fact that VC’s brother Elias Calocane had sent a letter on behalf of his family to CPS and had asked that this be passed to the families and survivors (URN: NGPF0001153). I made the decision to delay notifying the families of this. They had just been provided details of all the PSD investigations, and they were clearly distressed. Also, the FLOs had recently been changed, and I wanted to allow time for relationships to be formed.
545. When entrusted with sensitive information, exercising judgement about when to share it is essential. In my view, there is rarely a single “right” moment to pass information on. Instead, careful consideration should be given to the wider context and what is unfolding at the time. While it may

not always be appropriate to share information immediately upon receipt, this must be weighed against the importance of ensuring that it is still shared in a timely and responsible manner.

546. On 20 February 2024 I asked that contact was made with the families and survivors to inform them of VC's brother's letter and to establish if they wished to receive it. It is my understanding that the bereaved families and survivors received notification from their FLOs informing them of the existence of the letter.

547. I am aware that there has been criticism about the lack of information I have shared, with the allegation that I was withholding information and not being transparent in my communications with the bereaved families and survivors. My response to those suggestions is that I have always aimed to provide the families and survivors with as much information as I possibly could in a timely manner.

548. There were a number of occasions where I believed I could not share the information and, on those occasions, I have attempted to explain why I was prevented in doing so. Predominantly this was due to the CoP review and the IOPC investigation restricting what I was able to share.

Vigil on 14 June 2023

549. I have been asked about my interactions with members of the bereaved families at the vigil held in Nottingham on 14 June 2023, and the suggestion that some family members were told that VC was going to be charged and/or convicted and/or sentenced for murder. This includes my account of

what was said, the specific words used, and the basis upon which any such statement was made.

550. As Chief Constable of NP, it was deeply important to me personally to offer to meet the families in person. Although I knew they were being supported throughout by dedicated FLOs, I felt they should also have the opportunity to meet the head of the organisation directly. I wanted them to be able to ask me any questions they needed to, and to hear anything they wished to know from me, first hand.

551. I had already spoken publicly through the media on 13 June 2023 (URNs: NGPF0011124, NGPF0011125 and NGPF0011126), but I was conscious that large organisations such as the Police can be perceived as impersonal. Meeting face to face felt like a way to put a human behind the uniform and to show that there is someone who genuinely cares, even though I knew I could never even begin to imagine what they were going through.

552. My intention was to reassure them that the police response was being taken with the utmost seriousness, that the investigation was structured and progressing, and that the support of their FLOs remained constant. Most importantly, I wanted them to know directly from me that both I and the organisation were fully committed to pursuing the investigation to the very best of our ability.

553. I am acutely aware and deeply saddened that this is not how the families ultimately feel about the investigation. Even so, I wanted to express honestly what my intentions were at the time.

554. The offer of the meeting was extended through the FLOs with both Barney's and Grace's family agreeing to meet me when they attended the Vigil at Nottingham University on 14 June 2023. Ian's partner and his sons declined my offer at this time which I fully respect.
555. As an SIO I had met many families of victims of dreadful crimes. I treat these meetings very seriously as I understand the importance of the information you share with families at such a tragic time. These meetings are for the families, and they set the pace, determine the timing, and choose the areas they wish to discuss. My role was to try and support them in whatever way I could.
556. Over time I developed a structure for the meetings I have with victim families, and I relied upon this when I met Barney's and Grace's families.
557. When I first meet bereaved families, I always begin by introducing myself and explaining my role in the investigation. On this occasion, I was clear that I was not directly involved in the operational aspects of the case. Instead, I wanted to meet them in my capacity as Chief Constable, to enable them to put a face to my name, and to offer them the opportunity to ask me any questions they felt were important.
558. I also make sure families understand that, going forward, their primary point of contact will be their FLOs since the FLOs are best placed to provide updates and respond promptly to any queries. I encourage families to direct their questions through their FLO, so they receive consistent and accurate information.

559. I then explain that I will answer all questions openly and honestly. There may be times when I simply do not know the answer, and if that happens, I will be clear about that and will do my best to find the information. There may also be questions that I am unable to answer. When this is the case, I will always try to explain why. This is most likely to be because answering could compromise the integrity of the ongoing investigation, or because the area being asked about is still developing and not yet fully understood.
560. I also take time to try and learn about the victim. It is paramount to me that the victim and their families are at the centre of all we do.
561. As an SIO, I would normally provide a clear summary of the investigation and outline the work being carried out. On this occasion, I chose not to do so because I was not the SIO such that I did not have a detailed enough understanding of the investigation to provide that level of clarity. I felt it would be wrong to give anything less than the accuracy the families deserved and expected.
562. Prior to these meetings both DC McVey (URN: NGPF0009384) and DC Piggott (URN: NGPF0009386) provided a briefing note outlining key details relating to Grace, Barney and their families to support my meeting with them.
563. Prior to the vigil I met with Barney's family at the Orchard Hotel at Nottingham University and mainly spoke with his parents David and Emma. I had intended to meet with the designated FLOs beforehand; however, upon arriving at the University where the meeting was due to take place, I arrived at the same time as Emma and David Webber and their son Charlie.

In the circumstances, I considered it appropriate to introduce myself at that point.

564. Staff from Nottingham University then led me and the Webber family to an allocated room. Whilst the FLOs were not present at this time it did not feel appropriate to delay our conversation until they arrived.
565. I did not make notes of the meeting; however, I am confident that I followed the structure outlined above, as this is an approach I have developed over a long time and have relied upon in numerous previous meetings. I recall asking about Barney and his involvement in cricket, and I also remember being told how much he had enjoyed his time studying at Nottingham University.
566. Understandably, the meeting was extremely emotional, and I recall reflecting on the unimaginable pain that Barney's family must have been experiencing. In such circumstances, I am extremely careful about what I say, as I am acutely aware of the potential impact on families should any information provided be inaccurate.
567. Although I was aware of the outstanding FTA warrant for VC, I did not raise this matter for two reasons. Firstly, I did not have sufficient detail to provide Emma and David Webber with the information they would have required. Secondly, family liaison is founded on the principle that a relationship is established between the family and the designated FLO, through whom information is appropriately conveyed. It would not have been appropriate for me to bypass those established structures.

568. Following the meeting I attended the vigil for Barney and Grace. This was an extremely emotional occasion, and the depth of pain felt by Grace and Barney's family was profoundly evident. The number of students and staff in attendance spoke volumes about how popular and loved Grace and Barney were, while the presence of their teammates was a powerful reflection of their sporting talent. It brought into sharp focus the devastating reality that two young lives, with so many opportunities ahead of them, had been tragically taken away.
569. Immediately after the vigil I spoke with DC McVey and DC Cutts who updated me regarding the information they had shared with Grace's parents. Following this I had a short meeting with Dr Kumar and Dr O'Malley-Kumar. Again, I used the structure described below and as such did not provide a summary of the investigation or discuss the FTA warrant. The pain of Grace's parents was tangible, and they said very little; it was my perception that they were, not surprisingly, overwhelmed by what was happening.
570. When information is shared with families it is important to be consistent, and I wanted to ensure that both Barney's and Grace's families received the same information from me. I do remember that I reassured both families that we were confident that VC, the man we had in custody, was the person responsible for attacking Barney and Grace. I was content to give this information as I was reiterating information already provided to the families and I was aware from the updates I had from ACC Griffin that VC had been

positively identified as the man responsible and that no one else was believed to be involved.

571. With regards to whether I said he would be charged with murder, I may have said this as it was my understanding at the time that this was the case and there was nothing to suggest otherwise.

572. I do not recall ever stating that he would be convicted and sentenced for murder, and it is unlikely that I would have done so. As an SIO, I have dealt with a number of investigations where initial murder charges were later amended to manslaughter.

573. One of the most significant examples is the Philpott case, in which Mick Philpott, his wife, and a friend set a fire at their home that tragically killed six children. The case attracted intense community and media interest, and when the defendants ultimately stood trial for manslaughter rather than murder, there was a widespread misconception that the charges had been “dropped to manslaughter.”

574. This misunderstanding had a profound impact on the families of the children who died. I spent a considerable amount of time with them, explaining the reasons behind the charging decisions and supporting them through the distress this caused. Having witnessed first-hand the emotional effect such misconceptions can have, I am committed to preventing similar experiences for other families wherever possible.

575. This Philpott experience has remained with me throughout my career. It reinforced how important it is to be clear, careful, and sensitive when

speaking with families who are already going through unimaginable circumstances. I am always mindful of the impact that misunderstandings around information provided can have, and I work hard to prevent avoidable distress.

576. I was aware that Dr Kumar recalled me making a similar statement as he referred to it in an email he sent on 20 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011341) where he stated:

“Your team and you stated we’ve got him and we will do him for murder.”

577. For the reasons outlined above, I do not believe I would have made this statement. Moreover, this is not language I would ever use when discussing a police investigation with a grieving family; it would be both insensitive and unprofessional.

578. I did not make any contemporaneous notes of the meeting. This is not something I would ordinarily do, as I consider that note taking can inhibit open and effective discussion. At the time, I did not believe it to be necessary, given the purpose of the meeting and my expectations as to the matters that would be discussed. My usual approach is to make a retrospective record where I consider that something evidential or otherwise significant has been said. Following the meetings, I did not consider that to be the case.

579. If I did inadvertently say anything that caused confusion or a perception that VC was going to be convicted of murder and added to the family’s upset, I am sincerely sorry. That would never have been my intention, and I remain

committed to ensuring families receive accurate information delivered with care and compassion.

Involvement with Family Liaison Advisor and Family Liaison Officers

580. I have been asked to provide an account of my involvement with the FLA and FLOs in relation to Op Hendrix.
581. The family liaison roles are part of the investigation structure with the SIO and FLA having responsibility for the FLO strategy and communications with the families. As described, my responsibility in the initial response related to external communications, the majority of which concerned media releases. Whilst I did not and should not have had direct contact with the FLA or FLO's at this time, I was aware that they were sharing media releases with the bereaved families and survivor's before they were published.
582. I have described earlier that I directed that the families be told about the outstanding warrant for VC. However, this was done through the Gold Commander. This was outside of the Gold structure but was founded on my strong belief that the families should be made aware of this issue.
583. I will describe later the interaction I had with DC McVey and DC Cutts as well as DC Farrell and DC Piggott prior to meeting Barney's and Grace's families. I also described that they had shared with me brief details about Barney and Grace (URNs: NGPF0009384 and NGPF0009386).

584. Other than this, prior to sentencing I was not involved in anyway regarding the FLO strategy and the communications shared with the families and survivors.
585. On 20 June 2023, following a court hearing, I invited all FLOs to attend a catch-up meeting. The purpose of this meeting was to check on their welfare following what had been a particularly demanding deployment. The role of the FLO is especially challenging, as they are responsible for facilitating the flow of information between bereaved families and the investigation team at an unimaginably traumatic time, and I wanted to formally thank them for their efforts to date.
586. I had very little direct contact with the FLA during Operation Hendrix. On 28 June 2023 I contacted DI Gould to ask whether the Coates brothers wished to meet with me. They had previously indicated, in passing, at the vigil in Nottingham Old Market Square that they would. I wished to ensure they understood that the offer remained open and would be progressed if still required. In contacting DI Gould, I acted outside the strict command protocol, which I acknowledge I should not have done. My intention, however, was to ensure that, following their comments, they did not believe I had overlooked the matter.
587. As explained earlier,, on 5 February 2024 I assumed the role of Gold commander for Operation Chainlink. During Operation Chainlink I wrote to the bereaved families and survivors on several occasions. Before any letter was issued, the FLOs would contact the recipients to let them know it was

forthcoming. This process was coordinated by my Staff Officer, who liaised directly with the FLA and the FLOs.

588. On 1 February 2024, DC McVey forwarded to me an email from Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011264).
589. On 3 February 2024 Dr Kumar emailed DC McVey and copied me into that email (URN: NGPF0011266). He was requesting a copy of Professor Blackwood's report.
590. I responded to this email on 4 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011268). Before doing so, I enquired whether the information in question had been agreed as suitable for sharing. I did so in ACC Griffin's absence, as he was on annual leave. I was keen to respond promptly to Dr Kumar's request and, had this been information that I could confirm had previously been shared, I would have been able to act immediately. However, this was not the case. I contacted DC McVey. My reason for contacting DC McVey directly was to obtain clarification at the earliest opportunity to expedite Dr Kumar's request where possible. DI Gould was copied into this email to ensure she was sighted on my request (URN: NGPF0011086).
591. On 6 February 2024 at 11:19 I received an email from DC McVey (URN: NGPF0011274) which was sent to myself and DI Gould. In the email, DC McVey detailed that, during a phone call, Dr Kumar had requested "*A copy of the mental health timeline he was provided verbally in meetings with the SIO at Bristol and subsequent teams meetings.*"

592. She continued to say that *“Dr Kumar and the Webber family were meeting the CQC and HMPCSI (sic) and he wanted the information for that meeting.”*
593. DC McVey confirmed the information had previously been provided verbally to Dr Kumar.
594. At 11:53 the same day DC McVey forwarded to me an email from Dr Kumar where he had put into writing his request for the timeline. (URN: HMCP0000534).
595. At 12:45 on 6 February 2024 I sent an email to DI Gould seeking clarification regarding the document Dr Kumar was requesting and who had produced it (URN: NGPF0011087).
596. I also made enquiries with Samantha Shallow (Head of East Midlands Complex Casework Unit CPS) via email (URN: NGPF0011088). I was seeking to establish if the timeline and Professor Blackwood’s report could be shared with Dr Kumar. At 16:02 I received an email from Ms Shallow (URN: NGPF0011088) in which she stated that the psychiatric report could not be shared whilst proceedings were ongoing. She clarified that proceedings were ongoing as there was an ‘unduly lenient sentence’ appeal with the Attorney General’s office for consideration. Ms Shallow also explained that the timeline was a document produced by the police.
597. Following this, I sought legal advice about whether the timeline could be shared with Dr Kumar. Based on the advice I received, I later informed Dr Kumar that it was not possible at that time (URN: NGPF0011281).

598. I met with the FLOs on 13 February 2024, primarily to inform them of my decision and rationale to replace some of the FLOs and to inquire regarding their wellbeing. During this meeting some of the FLOs were visibly upset; they felt that they had done all they could to support the families and were concerned that the families hadn't felt that this was the case.
599. I contacted DI Gould on 20 February 2024 requesting she provide me with details to assist with the NRB.
600. On 23 July 2024 I met with DC McVey at her request, as she was clearly troubled regarding her experience as a FLO on this case and felt that she had done as much as she possibly could. She was upset that, despite her efforts, it appeared that there were concerns with how she had performed her role.
601. This was not the first time DC McVey had mentioned this to me. She had spoken with me about this just after the sentencing hearing and was clearly very upset, as a result of which I confirmed with Claire Salter Head of People Services NP that welfare referrals had been made in relation to the FLOs.
602. I discussed with her what support she had received and what else NP could do to support her and her colleagues. Thereafter, I ensured the support we had provided her was reviewed.

Concerns regarding handling of case by the Family Liaison Advisor and Family Liaison Officers

603. I have been asked whether I have any concerns about the way in which the FLA and / or the FLOs handled their involvement in this case, and to provide details.
604. In the first instance I have considered the role of the FLO and FLA in the context of the contact I had with them.
605. The role of FLO is generally very demanding since they often work with bereaved families at a time of immense pain and grief and, unsurprisingly, these can be emotionally draining times for FLOs also. Despite this, in relation to the personal interaction I had with the FLOs, I did not have any concerns regarding their involvement in this case.
606. Upon reflection, it would have been preferable for the FLOs to have been present during my meeting with Graces and Barney's families on 14 June 2023. However, in relation to my meeting with Barney's family, this arose following an unplanned encounter and I did not consider it appropriate to delay the meeting. I also did not consider it necessary for the meeting to be formally recorded, and this further informed my decision for the meeting to proceed as it did.
607. The FLOs introduced me to Dr Kumar and Dr O'Malley-Kumar and could have remained present for the meeting; however, again, I did not consider this to be necessary. This was a decision taken by me, and I am fully accountable for it. It is not, in any way, a reflection on the actions or professionalism of the FLOs.

608. During the meetings I had with the FLOs on 20 June 2023 and 13 February 2024, they spoke about how impactful the case had been on them. The media scrutiny on 25 January following the sentencing hearing was something that they had not experienced before this, included the statement on the Court steps by Emma Webber on 25 January:

“To Nottingham Police, we additionally have grave concerns regarding aspects of this investigation. Why were we repeatedly told through the summer that the offender was a sofa surfer and had no real abode? Not true. He did. One that was registered in his name in Nottingham, and one that he had been in for six months prior to his eviction on only the 11th of June last year. Why? It took repeated questioning from us to finally receive an answer late last Friday afternoon, to the question of his outstanding warrant, issued September 2022 for a vicious attack on a police officer, such a violent assault that he was tasered.”

609. They were also aware of concerns raised by Dr Kumar which had resulted in a referral to the IOPC on 5 February 2024 relating to “Communications with the bereaved families about the police actions prior to the offences.”

610. They also referred to the families saying that they hadn't had sufficient support, I was not clear where they had heard that from but knew it had been discussed in the Operation Hendrix Gold Group on 30 January 2024.

611. This criticism had caused them a great deal of upset. They were extremely disappointed that despite their best efforts the bereaved families had felt that they hadn't been supported by them.
612. Aside from my personal involvement with the FLOs and FLA, I have also considered the concerns the family have raised following the sentencing hearing; these are recorded in the Gold minutes on 30 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007809) as "*General family updates and a lack of what families perceive to be adequate referrals in terms of support*"

Family Updates

613. I have considered the sharing of information regarding (i) the long-outstanding FTA warrant, (ii) the previous interactions between NP and VC, and (iii) the PSD investigations.
614. It is my assessment that the management of information sharing with bereaved families and survivors was complex, owing to the volume of information involved and the number of individuals who required notification. This complexity was compounded by the sensitive nature of the information and the significant emotional impact it was likely to have on those receiving it.
615. It is understandable that bereaved families and survivors would require time to process such information, and that appropriate systems needed to be established to support understanding and ensure clarity. The communication of this information therefore required careful coordination and, ideally, delivery at a time when all recipients were in a position to

receive and absorb it; however, identifying such a time would have been challenging.

616. I also consider that the significance and sensitivity of some of the information necessitated a proactive decision by NP to communicate it directly, rather than seeking consent for an update and, where this was declined, allowing the information to remain undisclosed. This approach would necessitate the bereaved families or survivors being notified that there was significant information to be shared and explaining the importance of NP sharing the information with them in a timely manner.
617. It is clear that delays occurred in providing the information for the reasons. As the sentencing hearing approached, the sharing of information became increasingly difficult to manage because of the significant pressures faced by the families, especially as the prospect of accepting a plea to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility became a realistic consideration.
618. I believe that the failure to provide the above three-strands of key information in a clear, consistent and timely manner was an organisational failing and not down to any one individual.
619. I have already outlined the issues regarding sharing the information regarding the PSD investigations with the bereaved families and survivors. The establishment of protocols between ACC Griffin and DCC Cooper would have ensured ACC Griffin was sighted on the PSD investigations and could have made an assessment about what information needed to be

shared with whom. It is my opinion that the oversight of informing the families should then have sat with Gold.

Referrals for Support

620. The CoP describe the role purpose of the FLO (URN: NGPF0008675) as follows:

“The primary purpose of a Family Liaison Officer (FLO) is that of an investigator. Their role is to gather evidence and information from the family to contribute to the investigation, preserve its integrity. The FLO also provides support and information, in a sensitive and compassionate manner, securing confidence and trust of families of victims of crime (primarily homicide), road fatality, mass disaster or other critical incident, ensuring family members are given timely information in accordance with the needs of the investigation.”

621. Whilst part of the role is to support the families of victims of crime, there are other specialist services, who are better equipped to provide specific support. Including the National Homicide Service and other organisations such as Embrace, Winstons Wish and Hundred Families as detailed below.

622. The CoP details the following among the key accountabilities of a FLO:

“Provide information regarding additional services available for families, including signposting to support agencies, and explain Criminal Justice and Coronial procedures, so that they can access all available services and support.”

623. There is an expectation that, in cases of murder or manslaughter, bereaved families will be given information about the National Homicide Service, which provides specialised support to families and witnesses affected by murder. This service can provide a dedicated caseworker to support families. The type of support provided is dependent on the family's needs but can be practical support like assistance with funeral planning or support through the Criminal Justice System.

624. The FLO logs recorded that referrals to National Homicide Service were discussed with the bereaved families

- This was discussed with the O'Malley- Kumar family on 16 June 2023 as detailed within the FLO log of DC McVey and DC Cutts (URN: NGPF0008746, page 12)
- This was detailed within an entry on the FLO log of DC Farrell on 16 June 2023 (URN: NGPF0008569, page 7)
- This was discussed with the Coates family on 17 June 2023 as stated within the FLO log of PC Baxter (URN: NGPF0008359, page 1)
- This was discussed with Elanie Newton on 15th June 2023 as stated within FLO log of Mark Kimberley (URN: NGPF0008774, page 11)

625. The records also show referrals were made to EMBRACE for Grace's (URN: NGPF0008746, pages 20 and 21) and Barney's families (URN: NGPF0008569, pages 8 and 11), in relation to their siblings. EMBRACE is dedicated to "improving outcomes for children and young people

traumatised as victims of crime.” On 4 July 2023 records were updated to say that Charlie was being supported by EMBRACE (URN: NGPF0008569, page 17).

626. The FLOs also passed onto Grace’s and Barney’s families the offer from Nottingham University of trauma and counselling support from Dr Stephen Regal, Trauma Associate Professor at UoN.
627. In addition to this, on 22 August DC McVey described how Dr Kumar and Dr O’Malley-Kumar both openly stated they were struggling. Following this conversation, DC McVey sought to find an alternative Homicide worker as both Dr Kumar and Dr O’Malley-Kumar felt that their allocated worker did not have sufficient experience in dealing with homicide support. Emma and David Webber reported a “good connection” with their worker.
628. DC McVey also suggested alternative support for James Kumar and suggested “Winston’s Wish” as James had previously been reluctant to engage. Winston’s Wish offers online grief support to children and young people.
629. Checks were made by the FLO in October 2023 regarding the support Dr Kumar and Dr O’Malley-Kumar were receiving, where Dr Kumar reported that he had a positive meeting with Professor Regal and their new Homicide Service worker.
630. The National Homicide Service caseworker instigated contact between Julian Hendy of Hundred Families following which Mr Hendy began supporting both Barney’s and Grace’s families. Hundred Families support

families who have lost loved ones killed by people with mental illness. This referral allowed the families to receive valuable bespoke specialist support.

631. These referrals seem to me to have been made in a timely manner, and appropriate follow-up was undertaken to confirm that support had been offered, with alternative options provided where necessary. Ultimately, and appropriately, the decision to accept or engage with this support rests with the individuals concerned. It is my view that the FLOs fulfilled their responsibilities in ensuring that appropriate support was made available to the families, although I accept that I do not have the same level of understanding of the detail of the contact as the FLA or FLOs.

CPS handling of the case

632. I have been asked whether I have any concerns regarding the way that the CPS handled the case, and to provide details.

633. As I have explained previously there was a clear command structure in place regarding our response to, and investigation into the attacks.

634. My role at the time meant that I did not have any direct contact with CPS nor did I need to. The SIO would manage all discussions with CPS. The structure allows for escalation of issues to the Gold Commander when needed.

635. I was not made aware of any concerns from a police perspective regarding the way in which CPS handled the case.

Internal Professional Standards Department investigation

636. I have been asked to provide details of any involvement I had with the PSD investigations related to this case.
637. In NP, the Deputy Chief Constable oversees all PSD investigations and associated decision making. The Police Reform Act 2002 identifies the Chief Constable as the appropriate authority for complaints, conduct matters, and DSI matters regarding officers and staff under their direction and control. Regulation 46 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 provides the mechanism to delegate these functions.
638. It is standard practice, nationally and at NP, for the Chief Constable to delegate PSD functions to the Deputy Chief Constable.
639. In practice this meant that the DCC would have overseen all IOPC referrals and PSD investigations, the details of which were consciously not shared with me to maintain their integrity should it be decided that they would be subject to an Accelerated Misconduct Hearing (AMH), where traditionally the Chief Constable would preside.
640. After my appointment as Chief Constable in December 2022 my only involvement in PSD matters was chairing AMHs. These hearings are designed to deal swiftly with gross misconduct cases where the evidence is incontrovertible thereby avoiding delays in removing such officers from policing.
641. In relation to Operation Hendrix, I was only aware of two investigations prior to the sentencing hearing on 25 January 2024; in June 2023 I received an

initial briefing regarding PC Matthew Gell, and on 11 December 2023 I chaired an AMH relating to former Special Constable (SC) Skenderaj.

642. Following the attacks on 13 June 2023 it became apparent that information from NP might have been leaked to the media. This included a report from the Sun Newspaper on 15 June 2023 (URN: NGPF0011090) stating that VC had been seen outside MI5 headquarters. This was police information and should not have been available publicly. Whilst NP were not the only law enforcement agency in possession of this information, I wanted to ensure that we did everything we could to establish if the leak was in fact from within NP. My motive in doing so was to minimise the risk of anything that might be said to prejudice the ongoing criminal investigation and inevitable prosecution.

643. I raised my concerns with DCC Cooper and the Head of PSD Detective Superintendent (DSU) Hayley Williams and asked them to establish whether there was any evidence indicating that the 'leakers' were employees of NP.

644. On 19 June 2023 DSU Williams informed DCC Cooper and me that enquiries had established PC Matthew Gell had accessed information concerning VC. This was shared with me because it remained unclear at that stage whether he was responsible for the leak, and they were aware of my determination to identify the source of any potential leak. I was advised that further investigations would be undertaken to establish the extent of PC Gell's actions and whether there was any evidence he had leaked information.

645. I cannot recall the date, but I know that at some point shortly after this I was further updated that PC Gell was not thought to be 'the leak.' I did not receive or seek any further update regarding PC Gell since, as per our working practices, DCC Cooper was overseeing the investigation.
646. On 11 December 2023 I chaired an AMH to deal with an allegation against former SC IIsadin Skenderaj. It was alleged that he had accessed police systems without a legitimate purpose. Included within this was an allegation that SC Skenderaj had accessed body worn video footage of Barney and Grace.
647. On 28 March 2024 I was contacted by Michelle Buttery, Chief Executive of the PCC's office. She informed me that the PCC (Caroline Henry) had met with Emma Webber and Dr Kumar on 25 March 2024 where they had raised concerns regarding ACC Griffin. I explained that I was on annual leave, but I would forward the email onto DCC Cooper, which I did at 19:48 28 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0011460).
648. I am now aware that DCC Cooper forwarded these concerns to PSD on 2 April 2024 (URN: NGPF0011461) and directed that the IOPC were made aware.

Personal involvement with disciplinary matters

649. I have been asked to set out what personal involvement I had with any assessment or decision making in any disciplinary matters connected to this case.

650. The only direct involvement I had with disciplinary assessment was as Chair of the AMH for SC Skenderaj.

651. DCC Cooper considered the case against SC Skenderaj on 12 October 2023 and determined that the special conditions were met resulting in the case being referred to an AMH.

652. These special conditions are that:

- There is sufficient evidence, in the form of written statements or other documents, to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the conduct of the officer concerned constitutes gross misconduct and,
- It is in the public interest for the officer concerned to cease to be a member of a police force or a special constable, without delay.

653. As Chair of the AMH, I received a bundle of papers (URN: NGPF0011091) detailing the allegations against SC Skenderaj and the subsequent investigation. I was aware at this stage that SC Skenderaj had resigned on 13 September 2023, had failed to engage with the misconduct process and was not expected to attend the AMH.

654. Throughout the AMH process I may also refer to CoP guidance on outcomes in police misconduct hearings (URN: **WITN0339009**) and Home Office Guidance on Conduct Efficiency and Effectiveness: Statutory Guidance in Professional Standards, Performance and Integrity in Policing (URN: NGPF0011093).

655. Prior to the hearing I was required to make a decision regarding whether the hearing should take place in public or private. There is an overriding presumption that hearings should be held in public.

656. In making this decision I considered representations from the Appropriate Authority ('AA') and SC Skenderaj; these representations were contained within the regulation 53 notice that I refer to as (URN: NGPF0011094).

657. The AA requested that:

"The matter is heard in private so as to ensure proceedings do not jeopardise or interfere with any criminal proceedings resulting from the ongoing criminal investigation. There also remains a Coroner's Inquest to be heard.

"Though the matter is requested to be heard in private there is no reason, the AA would respectfully suggest, that the former officer's name is excluded from publication."

658. PC Jasmine Chaplin is a Federation Representative, who made the following representations on behalf of SC Skenderaj:

"The Federation requests the matter is heard in private as per the additional submission attached."

659. In her submission (URN: NGPF0011095) PC Chaplain made representations that the hearing should be held in private, citing the ongoing criminal investigation under Operation Hendrix and the fact there were unrelated searches that related to other individuals.

660. In addition to the representations from the AA and SC Skenderaj, I utilised Home Office guidance (URN: NGPF0011093). The guidance provides relevant factors which may be taken into account in considering whether to hold a hearing in public or private.

661. My decision to hold the hearing in private was based on the following two factors:

- One of my primary considerations was the potential impact that a public hearing could have on the victims of SC Skenderaj's misconduct. This was particularly relevant in relation to the families of Barney and Grace, where he had viewed Body Worn Video (BWV) footage of both. I anticipated that, if held in public, the hearing would attract significant media attention and risk causing further distress to those already experiencing the most devastating circumstances.
- At the time, there was also an active criminal investigation into VC's actions. I was concerned that any reporting arising from the misconduct proceedings could jeopardise the criminal case – an outcome I was absolutely determined to avoid. My decision to hold the hearing in private did not, in itself, prevent the sharing of the allegations about SC Skenderaj with the families and survivors. Prior to the hearing, I did not explicitly check whether the families and survivors were aware of the specific actions attributed to SC Skenderaj; instead, I assumed that this information had already been shared with them. However, I did check that the families were aware after the AMH. On reflection, I fully appreciate how this decision to hold the hearing in private could be

interpreted as an attempt to conceal SC Skenderaj's actions from the public or to avoid public criticism of NP. That was certainly not my intention. My rationale for holding the hearing in private was as outlined. However, I acknowledge that I should have explored alternative options – for example, conducting parts of the hearing in public while limiting reporting – this would have allowed fuller details to be shared, and greater transparency achieved.

662. I was also required to decide if the notification of SC Skenderaj's AMH was to be published on NP website. On 5 December 2023 I was contacted by the Hearings Officer Stephen O'Connell via email (URN: NGPF0011456), he asked whilst the AMH was to be held in private if SC Skenderaj's name could be published. I responded to this email on 5 December 2022 and stated that NP could publish the SC name.

663. On 6 December 2023 Stephen O'Connell emailed Dean Thurman in Corporate Communications and asked that the following message was published on NP website (URN: NGPF0011457).

Former Special Constable IIsadin Skenderaj, is due to face a gross misconduct accelerated hearing relating to unauthorised access to information held on police systems without a policing purpose. This matter will be heard before the Chief Constable at 9am 11th December 2023 at Force Headquarters.

The standards of behaviour engaged are: -

Discreditable Conduct

Authority Respect & Courtesy

Orders & Instructions

Confidentiality

This Hearing will be held in private and the outcome will be reported on the force website.

664. I authorised this publication as I was content that none of this information risked prejudicing the Criminal proceedings regarding VC. This information is no longer available from the NP website however it is captured on Misconduct 999 website (URN: NGPF0011458)
665. At the time I authorised the publication of the AMH I did so in the belief that the families of Grace and Barney were aware of the SC actions. I am deeply disappointed this was not the case.
666. On 11 December 2023, the hearing took place at NP Headquarters. The AMH was recorded, and I refer to this recording as (URN: NGPF0010750). Present at the hearing were the following attendees:
- Liz Briggs Presenting Lawyer for the Appropriate Authority
 - Pc Chaplain – Federation friend for SC Skenderaj
 - Sue Howell – The Investigator
 - Stephen O’Connell – The Hearings Officer.
667. SC Skenderaj did not attend the hearing, and I was aware that he had failed to engage with the misconduct process. Hearings can go ahead in an officer’s absence. I thought it prudent to progress with the hearing and sanction of the officer.

668. I started the AMH by reading points 1-22 of a script that was prepared for me. I refer to this as (URN: NGPF0011096). Following this, I heard from Liz Briggs who referred to her opening note which had been provided to me before the AMH, I refer to this as (URN: NGPF0011097). Following this, PC Chaplain presented the officers case, again this had been provided to me prior to the meeting, and I refer to this as (URN: NGPF0011098).

669. Initially my task relating to the hearing is to determine the following

- The facts, based upon what is admitted by the officer or proven on the balance of probabilities.
- Whether, on the basis of those facts, the officer has breached the standards of professional behaviour.
- Whether the breaches found amount to gross misconduct or misconduct, or neither.

670. I provided written reasons for these determinations and read the same to the hearing which is recorded (URN: NGPF0011099).

671. In considering the above points, I concluded that SC Skenderaj had conducted checks and viewed BWV footage without any authorised or legitimate policing purpose, rather it was for his own curiosity and/or benefit. In doing so he had not only breached force policy, but he had also failed to treat information held by NP with respect and confidentiality.

672. I stated that there was an expectation that information held by NP would be treated in the strictest confidence, and his conduct was in sharp contradiction to this. I concluded that his conduct breached the following

standards of professional behaviour namely Authority, Respect and Courtesy, Confidentiality, Orders and Instructions and Discreditable Conduct.

673. Finally, I concluded that his conduct amounted to Gross Misconduct as his conduct would likely seriously damage the reputation of, and undermine public confidence in, the police service. Over a period of time SC Skenderaj had made a number of deliberate and repeated breaches of policy and access to police systems.

674. The actions of SC Skenderaj were abhorrent and I am personally appalled at his conduct. The BWV captured the ferocity of the attack and the final moments of Grace and Barney's lives. Such material is extremely sensitive and profoundly distressing and it must be treated with the utmost respect and integrity. My clear expectation is that it is used solely for legitimate policing purposes and never accessed or viewed to satisfy morbid curiosity

675. I was then required to consider the outcome. Again, I provided written reasons which I read out to the hearing. I refer to this written response as (URN: NGPF0011100).

676. Initially I assessed the severity of his conduct, where I considered culpability and harm, both of which I assessed as high. Specifically, here I noted that SC Skenderaj had failed to engage with the misconduct process and whilst initially he had notified PSD he had accessed police systems without a policing purpose he had minimised the extent to which he had accessed unauthorised material. His conduct was targeted and planned, and it would have been clear to him that the information was very sensitive and should

not have been accessed. He would have been aware of the nature of the information and the ongoing criminal investigation.

677. I am then required to consider aggravating factors where I noted that in this case there were multiple victims and multiple breaches. Whilst his motivation was not clear, he had accessed information about himself and his vehicles as well as viewing BWV. I stated that my expectation was that BWV would be treated with the upmost respect and integrity and not viewed to service a morbid curiosity.
678. I did not find any mitigating factors and assessed the overall conduct as very serious. I was then required to determine, based on the seriousness of the misconduct, the most appropriate sanction.
679. At the conclusion of the AMH, the sanction I decided upon was that, had SC Skenderaj still been serving, he would have been dismissed without notice. I also stated that he would be placed on the Barred List so that he cannot re-enter policing or law enforcement.
680. Immediately after the conclusion of the hearing, I clearly recall seeking reassurance from the Hearings Officer Stephen O'Connell that the families had been informed about the hearing. When I was told this could not be confirmed, I directed that, if they had not already been notified, they must be informed as soon as possible.
681. Following an AMH, it is normal practice to publish the Regulation 62 notice (URN: NGPF0005502). This document details my decisions as described above. There is also a requirement to provide this document to the officer.

Because of my concerns that the families had not been made aware of the hearing, I directed that the Regulation 62 notice was not to be provided to the officer until it was confirmed that the families had been fully informed.

682. I was subsequently made aware that Stephen O'Connell emailed DCI Andrew Reynolds and DCI Gareth Harding (PSD officers) (URN: NGPF0011102) to share the Regulation 62 notice (URN: NGPF0005502). In doing so he stated:

"The Chief has expressly asked that the families of the victims in Op Hendrix are informed of this matter prior to the former officer having the completed Reg 62. Clearly I have to have (sic) this to him and/or his representative by the 18th December, 2023."

683. I was aware that there was a time limit in which the Regulation 62 was to be served on SC Skenderaj and consequently I expected the families to be told of the AMH within those time scales. I was subsequently made aware that this did not occur. I am deeply disappointed and saddened that Grace and Barney's families were not informed of the AMH or the conduct of SC Skenderaj. I offer an unreserved apology for NP's failure to share this information and for the additional distress this will have caused.

684. It is standard practice to publish Regulation 62 notices on our intranet site. However, given my concerns about the potential impact on the families and the ongoing criminal investigation, I determined that the information should be published in a summarised form, while still naming the officer. I have made enquires as to whether this has happened and I am extremely

disappointed to say it hasn't. Supt Craner has informed me initially it was delayed until Barney and Grace's families were made aware. However, as a result of the length of time involved, the publication of the outcome was regrettably overlooked.

Contact with the families in respect of misconduct investigations

685. I have been asked to provide an account of the contact I had with the bereaved families and survivors in respect of the misconduct investigations, and in particular whether I consider that they were kept sufficiently updated and my reasons for thinking that.

686. Before setting out the chronology, I wish to offer my unreserved and sincere apology that the bereaved families and survivors did not receive the information to which they were entitled regarding the PSD investigations in a clear, coherent and timely manner. I fully recognise that this failing has caused anxiety and distress, and I am personally deeply sorry for the impact this has had.

687. As soon as I was fully aware of this failing I wrote to the families on 20 and 22 February 2024 acknowledging the hurt and anguish caused as well as apologising for not providing details of the PSD investigations.

2 February 2024

688. To the best of my recollection, the first time I was personally made aware of any concerns from the families regarding PSD matters was on 2 February 2024 at 17:30, when I received an email from Dr Kumar (URN:

NGPF0011265) setting out his concerns about the police response. Dr Kumar's email was as follows:

"Chief Constable Kate Meynell

Dear Kate,

I write to acknowledge your e mail letter dated 29th Jan 2024. We would like to meet you regarding our many concerns that we highlighted to the investigating team, time and time again and in writing. We have serious concerns about the investigation. We are concerned about the statement issued by the Nottinghamshire Police and the ACC regarding missed opportunities. The Force released statements quoting they 'could not have done anything more' to prevent this appalling crime and then within a few hours did a U-turn to 'more could have been done'. Additionally, we have serious concerns regarding reports of the conduct of officers on the force looking into case notes where apparently some 179 views were from officers with no involvement in the case. We are aware of only one suspension for misconduct.

Above are only some of our serious concerns. As victims, I would like my family to meet with the IOPC and our concerns heard as part of or before the IOPC investigation commences. I would kindly ask that my details are given to the IOPC Lead investigator. I am grateful for your invitation to meet but would like to have the investigation underway and conclude before our meeting. For the sake of transparency and respect, I am

copying the other families into this e mail. Kind regards Sanjoy.”

689. At the time Dr Kumar sent this email, I was on annual leave and was not in a position to respond immediately.

4 February 2024

690. On 4 February 2024 at 09:34, I replied to Dr Kumar’s message from 2 February 2024 and confirmed that I would look into the issues he had raised, (URN: NGPF0011268). My reply was as follows:

“Sanjoy,

Thank you very much for coming back to me. Regarding our meeting, I will be guided by you and your family as to when it would be the right time for you all. In order to provide a detailed response to the issues you have raised I will need to make some further enquires on Monday. I will also need to speak with the Police and Crime Commissioner to ensure I do not compromise the integrity of the forthcoming review. When I am in possession of the relevant information to update you, I will do so as soon as possible. I will also ensure that your details have been passed to the Lead Investigator for the IOPC and the fact you and your family wish to meet with them prior to the investigation commencing. Kind regards. Kate.”

691. On 5 February 2024 I returned to work at 07:30. I met with T/DSU Reynolds and asked him to record the complaints raised by Dr Kumar and then make

a self-referral to the IOPC regarding his concerns. This referral was made. One of the areas referred related to PSD investigations.

6 February 2024

692. On 6 February 2024, I wrote to Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011273) as part of a wider update to families and survivors. In that correspondence, I also addressed the issues he had raised with me on 2 February 2024 and informed him that the conduct of the officers had been referred to the IOPC. My letter (URN: NGPF0011273) contained the following:

“Dear Sanjoy,

As promised, I have made some further enquiries in relation to the issues you raised in your e-mail to me on Friday 2nd February. I can confirm that that all police contact between Notts Police and Valdo Calocane was referred to the IOPC last week as a “death or serious injury following police contact” referral. The IOPC are considering this referral and asked for more information at the end of last week. You will of course be informed once they have decided upon whether to conduct an independent investigation. I understand that you have been in contact with the Police and Crime Commissioner and raised a number of concerns. I am informed that the Commissioner will be in touch with you about the scope of the review she has commissioned which will be conducted by the College of Policing. Having considered the matters you raised to me in your e-mail I have directed that these matters be formally recorded as a complaint which have been summarised as follows:

- *Serious concerns regarding the quality of the investigation, including decisions regarding toxicology samples.*
- *Communication with the bereaved families about the police actions prior to the offences was contradictory.*
- *Conduct of officers viewing material related to the case.*
- *The force response to the allegations about officers viewing material relating to the investigation was inadequate.*

I have also ensured that these matters have been referred to the IOPC, who will consider how they should be dealt with; this includes whether the complaint should be subject to an independent investigation. The IOPC will take some time to consider the referral. Again, you will be informed of the outcome once the IOPC have made a decision. Should the IOPC direct that an independent investigation is to be conducted, it is important that any future communication is directed to the lead IOPC Investigator in order to ensure the integrity and impartiality of the investigation. I am aware that you are in contact with Barnaby and Ian's family. Please do share the details of this letter with them so they are informed of this additional referral to the IOPC. I am also aware that you have contacted DC McVey for further information today, Tuesday 6th February. I will look into your request and respond to you shortly."

693. The delay in the response was initially due to me not being at work and subsequently whilst I sought further information to address the issues he raised.

694. The final paragraph refers to a request Dr Kumar had made to DC McVey (URN: NGPF0011274) for a copy of a timeline regarding police contact with VC before 13 June 2023. I needed to understand whether that document could be shared before I responded to his request.

8 February 2024

695. On 8 February 2024 I updated Dr Kumar and advised that his complaint had been referred to the IOPC (URN: NGPF0007168).

9 February 2024

696. On 9 February 2024 at 10.18 I received an e mail from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0007172) this e mail included concerns she had regarding NP.

In your letter to Sanjoy of the 6th Feb you make note of the complaints made re the investigation itself. We concur with all of these and add:

i. We were advised all interviews with Calocane in custody were audio only (part of our concern assessing his state of mind and capacity during and after the attacks). We have minutes taken by the FLOs that confirm this (following meeting on the 7th Dec). In the email to me dated 19th January (following my repeated requests for various answers) it states that due to it being a new custody suite video and audio were taken!

ii. We were consistently told that Calocane had no fixed abode and was a sofa surfer. He had family and friends all over the UK. We had asked for details of where he had lived. We were only made aware that he had in fact been in a property in Nottingham right up until his eviction on the

11th June in the 7th December. It was also only in the email of the 19th January with answers from Leigh Sanders that it confirmed he had a tenancy, had been there for six months and that the tenancy was in the name of Calocane.

iii. We received similar wooly [sic] responses when we asked throughout the summer with regards to his work history. We were also not made aware of the prior attacks to co-workers in only May 2023.

5. I am disappointed in your letter to Sanjoy of the 8th February that you have refused to allow us access to the timeline that was presented at great length in our meeting in the 7th December and also that we are not able to have copies of Dr Blackwood's report; despite us having sat through all 66 pages being read out to us.

6. In your letter of the 5th Feb to Sanjoy it is not clear if you have referred yourselves as the IOPC re the investigation or if they are aware of the complaints made and concerns raised. Can you confirm your position in this please?

7. I wish to formally ask you to note that the persistent comments made by your ACC regarding your failed opportunity to arrest this murderer when you had a chance, the unlikely outcome of a custodial sentence [sic] (would make no difference to outcome) and even more recently; perhaps mental health services may have intervened although unlikely he would comply with meds, is frankly insulting. I would ask you or ACC Griffen to put yourselves in our shoes for just a moment and think how that would feel hearing your murdered child dismissed in such a

way. Missing the opportunity to arrest him is all that needed to be said!

8. *Finally, thank you for the offer to meet. It's a shame we were not afforded this opportunity when we raised our concerns at the end of last year.*

We would like to meet with you but considering the situation with reviews/investigations etc we suspect it is probably something to do as and when this is finally resolved?

Best regards, Emma Webber”

697. On 9 February 2024 I responded to Emma Webbers e mail and advised that Dr Kumar's complaint had been referred to the IOPC and that I would ensure her additional concerns were recorded as a complaint. (URN: NGPF0007173).

10 February 2024

698. On 10 February 2024 I received an email from Emma Webber at 12:20 (URN: NGPF0007174), in which she asked for the investigation itself to be referred to the IOPC, and sought to bring my attention to some reporting in the media about VC's alleged drug use. Her email was as follows:

“Hi Kate,

Sadly I feel obliged to write again following the article below that has been brought to my attention today. We are aware that there are a fair number of other articles already out in circulation and more due to follow relating to Calocane and his potential for drug use.

I am sure you will standardise your reply, as we've had previously, however I wish to ask that you consider once more referring the investigation itself to the IOPC. I'm aware that our complaints alongside the Kumar's have been forwarded them. It's now time to publicly call for action.

We are also aware of a number of stories regarding police communications during the attacks (particularly on my son and Grace) that are running next week.

The trauma this is causing our family is now at unfathomable and utterly unacceptable levels. We will also be publicly saying this. Article re drug contacts is below plus an except [sic] from your SIO response when questioned re toxicology samples."

12 February 2024

699. On 12 February 2024 I updated Ian's families and the survivors regarding the IOPC referrals by letter..

13 February 2024

700. On 13 February 2024 at 16:52 I sent an update via email to Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0011309) regarding issues she had raised with me in a previous email on 10 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0007174).

701. As she had requested, I clarified details regarding the IOPC referrals and reiterated that I had added the matters she had raised with me (URN: NGPF0007174) to the IOPC referral. My reply was as follows:

“Dear Emma,

I understand that yesterday you were informed by the IOPC that they will be conducting an independent investigation into Nottinghamshire Police following the concerns raised by the O’Malley-Kumar family and yourselves. Whilst the matter is now being managed by the IOPC, I wanted to respond to the queries you raised in your e mail to provide clarity regarding what referrals Nottinghamshire Police have made to the IOPC.

I can confirm that we have made referrals to the IOPC on two separate occasions. Our initial referral on Tuesday 30th January related to all contact that Nottinghamshire Police had with Calocane before the tragic events in June.

Following an e-mail from Dr Kumar on Friday 2nd February a further referral to the IOPC was made by Nottinghamshire Police was made on Monday 5th February. The matters contained in your e-mail to me on Friday 9th February were promptly forwarded to the IOPC to be added to the referral made about Dr Kumar’s complaint. This referral included the issues raised by Dr Kumar and yourself. I want to stress that Nottinghamshire Police pro-actively referred these matters to the IOPC as we welcome Independent oversight in the interest of transparency and openness.

Kind regards. Kate”

702. When I assumed the role of Gold for Operation Chainlink on 5 February 2024 as explained above, from reviewing the Gold minutes for Operation Hendrix I became aware that there were other concerns relating to the PSD

investigations. Namely, that it was not clear what details the families had been provided regarding the PSD investigations particularly the AMH for SC Skenderaj.

703. I established from the Gold minutes dated 30 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007809) that ACC Griffin had made a decision to delay informing the families about SC Skenderaj, as follows:

“ACC Griffin decided in the last Gold that there would be a delay in providing the information about the special constable case because of its proximity to sentencing. It is ACC Griffins view that this ought to have happened in September, (and had been informed it would have been) however, informing them in the lead up to sentencing would have been insensitive and at an inappropriate time in ACC Griffins opinion. RG takes responsibility for this. Important now that the comms to the families around all these matters are done in the right way, at the right time, by the right person.”

704. I had been clear at the time I chaired the AMH that the bereaved families should be updated as earlier described. Accordingly, I was adamant that this needed addressing as soon as possible and the families provided with a clear and comprehensive understanding of the PSD investigations. Whilst it appeared they had been given some details, it was not clear how much detail had been provided in relation to the PSD investigations. However, I first needed to understand ACC Griffin's rationale and decision making in communicating PSD investigations to the families, and at that point he was

on leave. I therefore decided to speak with him upon his return before taking any further action.

705. It would have been preferable to share this information without delay, however I was mindful that any update to the families needed to reflect what they had already been told, why that information was provided at the time, and the reasons other information had not been shared. To be able to achieve this I needed to speak with ACC Griffin.

18 February 2024

706. On the evening of Sunday 18 February 2024, I was contacted by the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC), Caroline Henry who had been asked for comment on an article The Daily Mail intended to publish regarding a WhatsApp group and a message that had been shared. It would also be reported that my son was a member of the WhatsApp group. To the best of my knowledge this was the first time I had been made aware of the WhatsApp group; I did not have any previous knowledge of my son being in the group.

707. I immediately called Matthew Jarram who confirmed there had been a request from the Daily Mail. I then rang DCC Cooper, who could not provide any further detail but said he would make some enquires with PSD.

708. A short time later he came back to me and confirmed that the matter related to a message posted in a WhatsApp group of which my son was a member. This was information he was not previously aware of.

709. I made it clear to DCC Cooper that Grace, Barney and Ian's families needed to be informed immediately. Given the personal connection between me and my son, I felt it was neither appropriate nor fair for me to manage the situation myself. It required independent oversight, so I asked DCC Cooper to take responsibility for this and he did so, ensuring the FLOs delivered the message. I was updated by DCC Cooper that the message was delivered by the FLOs over the phone on 18 February 2024
710. The imminence of a media report required that this information be shared without delay. Clearly it would have been preferable to provide all the information regarding the PSD investigations in a more timely, comprehensive and coordinated manner.
711. My intention had been to discuss the matter with ACC Griffin upon his return from leave the following day, to establish the full circumstances of what information had been shared. However, events overtook us at this point, and it was necessary to share details regarding the WhatsApp group before it was reported in the media.
712. It was not clear how this information was obtained by The Daily Mail. As mentioned earlier, I was concerned there was a leak in the organisation as this information was not in the public domain.
713. I am aware that once the bereaved families had been updated on 18 February 2024 by their FLOs, DCC Cooper authorised a media release in response to The Daily Mail's queries (URN: NGPF0011151).

714. On Monday 19 February DCC Cooper verbally updated me regarding the content of the WhatsApp message, which I was informed had been sent by PC Ashley Small to a shift WhatsApp group. It is my opinion that two of the words in the message are crude and distasteful and it lacks compassion. However, I do recognise that the message was intended for the officer's colleagues. It was intended to inform them that a serious incident had occurred and to convey that this incident was of a particularly grave nature beyond those to which they had previously been exposed.
715. It is recognised that police officers are exposed to a significant number of traumatic incidents during their careers, and that emotional desensitisation can sometimes occur as a result. While this does not excuse PC Small's conduct, it is relevant context that should be acknowledged.
716. I cannot begin to imagine the anguish that this WhatsApp message has caused Grace and Barney's families. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my apology for the content of the message and for the distress it has caused.
717. DCC Cooper informed me that he was satisfied that the WhatsApp message had been fully investigated by PSD. I did not probe any further as I knew that the complaints self-referred to the IOPC on 5 February 2024 were closely linked to this.
718. As such I anticipated that the IOPC would consider the WhatsApp group, and I did not want to compromise this investigation. In addition, I knew my son was a member of the WhatsApp group and I was determined that there

could be no suggestion I had tried to influence any processes, as I emphatically did not.

19 February 2024

719. On 19 February 2024, following ACC Griffin's return from leave, I reviewed with him the actions he had taken and the decisions he had made. ACC Griffin informed me that, despite his request for the families to be updated on the PSD investigations, this had not occurred in a consistent and timely manner. It was clear to me that ACC Griffin was extremely dissatisfied that the information regarding SC Skenderaj conduct had not been shared with Grace and Barney's families when he had initially directed that it should be. It is my understanding that shortly before the Sentencing Hearing in January 2024 ACC Griffin had become aware that the information had not been shared and whilst he was dissatisfied that it had not happened, he was of the opinion, that due to the proximity of the sentencing hearing the information should not be shared at that time. frustrated that this had not happened

720. It was clear to me that the bereaved families and survivors required a clear and comprehensive understanding of the relevant PSD matters. I considered how best to communicate the findings of the PSD investigations to them. Although I initially drafted a letter, I ultimately concluded that it would be more appropriate to approach the families directly and offer to meet with them in person, so that I could provide full details of the investigations and respond to any questions they might have.

721. I therefore wrote letters to the bereaved families inviting them to meet with me, so that I could clarify the work that had been undertaken by the PSD. The letters were sent on 19 February 2024 via email by FLO Phil Cumberpatch.

722. Each letter contained the following text:

“Following events and media reports over the weekend I would like to have the opportunity to clarify some details regarding what work has been conducted by Nottinghamshire Police’s Professional Standards Department (PSD), what these investigations have established and the action taken in relation to any officers and staff. Accordingly, I wish to meet you in person in order to establish your understanding of what has happened and ensure that we are open and transparent about the investigations we have undertaken. Therefore, I hope you would consider meeting me this week either in person, online or over the telephone at your convenience.”

723. The emails sent by FLO Phil Cumberpatch were individually written to each family following a phone call that he made in each case.

724. Email (URN: NGPF0004217) sent to Dr Kumar at 19:09 stated the following:

“Good Evening

Firstly apologies for calling without notice and outside office hours but I think it is best to deal with matters such as this as they arise. Please find attached the letter as read/discussed.

I fully appreciate your assertion that you do not wish to meet/speak with the Chief Constable.

I will also place in writing my assurance to you that I will forward the fact that you are writing directly to her requesting the full transcript of the WhatsApp / text messages and details of the hearing. I will also articulate your disappointment (even disgust) that you as families were not invited to the public hearing held in respect of these matters. Thank you again for taking my call. I do not wish to be rude at all when I ask this question, and I believe I know the answer, but just for complete clarity can you just drop me a line confirming you speak on behalf of your wife.

Please accept my apologies but unfortunately it is a question I always ask to ensure I can give my best to all.

Kind regards Phil"

725. It was therefore clear that Dr Kumar had stated to Phil Cumberpatch that he did not wish to either meet or speak with me.

726. Email (URN: NGPF0004213) sent to Emma Webber at 19:12 contained the following:

"Evening Emma

Firstly I hope you don't mind me using your first name, please don't hesitate to let me know how you'd like me to refer to you, I do not want to assume familiarity and have no wish to upset you. I have recently left you a voice mail regarding an invite from the Chief

Constable to meet either in person or over a call. I fully understand this may not be something you wish to do, but equally you may.

Can you let me know of your decision and I will either pass that message on, or assist you with making the necessary arrangements around time etc.

Finally I do not wish to be rude at all when I ask this question, and I believe I know the answer, but just for complete clarity can you just drop me a line confirming you speak on behalf of your husband. Please accept my apologies but unfortunately it is a question I always ask to ensure I can give my best to all. In addition to this which is the better of the two E Mail addresses to contact you on. Kind regards Phil"

727. Email (URN: NGPF0004215) sent to James Coates at 19:12 contained the following:

"James

Thank you for taking my call, I can only apologise at the timing of it again but believe these matters are best addressed as soon as I am aware. Please find attached letter as discussed. If this is something you wish to do then please let me know and I will help facilitate a date and time to suit.

I fully understand if it is not something you wish to do, but would respectfully request you let me know your decision either way. Kind regards Phil"

728. On 19 February 2024 at 19:40 I received an email from Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0007207) asking for a transcript of the WhatsApp message, a list of the officers involved and details of the hearing that the families were not told about. The email was copied to a list of recipients:

- Emma and David Webber
- James Coates
- Sinead O'Malley-Kumar
- Alex Simms (IOPC)
- Nick Bracken
- Anthony Rogers (HMCPSI)
- PSLAW Officers (Attorney General's Office)

729. The text of the email was as follows:

"Dear Kate,

*Further to the press reports today I would like transcripts of all the WhatsApp messages sent to the group of officers that were involved in the investigation and others who were on shift on the day. I would like a list of **all officers** involved and the transcript of **all** of the messages about our loved ones. This was apparently a public hearing that you neglected to inform the families about. The families would have liked to have been present at this so called independent disciplinary hearing.*

I am very disappointed that you neglected to inform us personally about this hearing. I look forward to you informing me about the above details of the hearing that has already taken place and the details that are

*present in the public domain. Can you reply to **all** in the e mails as above
Kind regards Sanjoy.”*

20 February 2024

730. On 20 February 2024 at 09:42 an email was sent by my staff officer (URN: NGPF0007212) confirming receipt of Dr Kumar’s email the previous day (URN: NGPF0007207) and stating we would respond later that day. The email was as follows:

“Dr Kumar,

I just wanted to confirm receipt of your e-mail regarding the WhatsApp messages and the Misconduct hearing. We are currently compiling the material and Chief Constable Meynell will respond to you later today,

Regards,

Luke”

731. Also on 20 February 2024 at 15:53, Phil Cumberpatch, the FLO for the Webber family, forwarded to my staff officer an email Emma Webber had sent to him (URN: NGPF0011328) within which she requested information regarding the breach of data and misconduct hearings,

732. The email from Emma Webber was sent at 15:12, and was as follows:

“Hi Phil,

I’m in the car on my way to Manchester with Charlie so would rather not discuss in front of him. Text or email is best way to communicate with me. As you can imagine there’s a great deal going on at the moment.

Assume you have a letter from the family and are asking to pass it over to us? If yes, then we are ok to receive it. We do not wish to meet or speak with them though.

Also, coming back on your offer for us to meet with Kate. I appreciate the offer however given the imminent meeting we have with the IOPC it's probably better put on hold for now?

I would like in writing however clarification of the details relating to the breach of data and following misconduct hearings. We have been given various different accounts of this and would ask for the following please:

What data was accessed

When was the data accessed

How many staff accessed the data

How many staff were not directly involved in the case

How many groups (WhatsApp or similar) discuss the attacks/case

How many inappropriate messages were sent

Who were these messages sent to

Were any images at all shared

How many officers/staff in the WhatsApp group that has been reported about

How many staff/officers received disciplinary

What is the timeline for all of the above

Why were we not informed

Is there any further investigation taking place regarding this

Thanks for your help and look forward to hearing back from you in due course.

Best,

Emma”

733. Whilst my preference was to meet in person, both Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0004217) and Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0011328) had now stated that they did not wish to meet me. I did not hear back from James Coates. I was conscious of the importance of ensuring that the families received the information simultaneously if at all possible and, in the absence of any communication from Mr Coates, I therefore decided to issue a letter setting out the details of the PSD investigations. It was imperative that the information was shared expeditiously since information was being provided to the media and it was critical that the bereaved families and survivors received an accurate update regarding the PSD investigations.
734. DI Gareth Harding (PSD) was provided with a draft of this letter to ensure factual accuracy. DI Harding responded via email (URN: NGPF0011329) with a checked draft (URN: NGPF0011331).
735. Later that day on 20 February 2024 I sent letters via email to Mr and Mrs Webber, Dr Kumar and Dr O'Malley Kumar and James Coates, as listed earlier in this statement.

736. The contents of the letter sent to Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011337) were as follows:

"In light of your decision not to meet me I am writing to you to detail what work has been conducted by Nottinghamshire Police's Professional Standards Directorate (PSD), what these investigations have established and the action taken in relation to any officers and staff who have accessed information without a legitimate policing purpose. I will provide a separate response to your e mail where you raise specific issues that are not addressed in this letter. I want to start by apologising for the fact that you were not provided the details of our PSD investigations or details regarding the hearings. This should not have happened. I also wish to acknowledge the hurt and anguish these ongoing matters will be causing you and your family. I am aware that you have been provided some information by the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) about a PSD investigation, but I feel it is important to provide further detail and clarity. I would have preferred to have had the opportunity to discuss these matters with you in person, but I understand your reasons for not wishing to meet. Whilst I appreciate that receiving this information by letter is by no means ideal, I feel it is the best way to ensure you are updated as soon as possible and in a consistent manner.

PSD conducted an audit of all members of staff who viewed material relating to the tragic events on 13th June 2023. There were 179 individuals in total. From the 179, PSD identified 22 officers and staff who

may have accessed material without a legitimate policing purpose. Of the 22, 11 were spoken to and were able to provide an explanation which met the criteria for a valid policing purpose. Accordingly, 11 were identified as having no policing purpose to access the information and were subject to further action. Of these 11, 3 members of staff were dealt with under Police Misconduct Regulations.

Only one individual was found to have accessed Body Worn Video (BWV) footage, and there was no evidence of any images or videos being downloaded or shared. The officer who watched the BWV was a Special Constable. He was dealt with by means of an Accelerated Misconduct Hearing Chaired by myself. This was held in private to ensure we did not prejudice active criminal proceedings at the time. He worked for us on a voluntary basis having joined Nottinghamshire Police on 9th May 2023. As a result of the misconduct hearing, I made a decision to dismiss him from Nottinghamshire Police and he was barred from working as a police officer.

The investigation established that he had viewed the BWV footage on 31st August 2024 using his Police laptop and viewed footage relating to officers and paramedics providing medical assistance to Barnaby and Grace at the scene, and after they had passed away. The second incident relates to Pc Gell, who was arrested after he was found to have shared a single WhatsApp message with his wife and 2 friends. This message had originally been posted by a colleague in a group WhatsApp where it described what had happened, with some of

the words used being crude and distasteful. During the investigation it was found that Pc Gell accessed police systems without proper policing purpose seven times, with every search relating to Valdo Calocane.

PC Gell attended a Gross Misconduct Hearing in January 2024 which was held in public and chaired by an Independent Legally Qualified Chair. Following the hearing the Chair made the decision that Pc Gell would receive a Final Written Warning.

The officer who posted the original WhatsApp message was found to have acted unprofessionally and received management intervention. The officers who were simply in receipt of the message were subject to a PSD investigation but found not to have breached the standards of professional behaviour. I can clarify that the content of the WhatsApp message, whilst inappropriate in terms of tone and content, did not contain any photographs or images of any kind. Whilst I have not shared the exact wording of the message in this letter, it is included in the e-mail accompanying this letter to you.

The third investigation remains an ongoing Gross Misconduct Investigation regarding a member of Front Counter Staff who has accessed evidence on Police Systems when she had no legitimate policing purpose to do so. The investigation has established that she had accessed systems in relation to a number of high-profile incidents that have happened in Nottinghamshire and this included the deaths of Ian, Barnaby and Grace. This individual has been arrested and

interviewed in relation to these matters and the investigation is ongoing. As such it is not possible to share any more detail at this time, but this will be shared as soon as possible with yourselves. Further to these three specific cases, eight officers and staff were found to have accessed information relating to the investigation without the proper permissions. This included viewing the incident record, crime records and intelligence records, and the information accessed was at a lower level of sensitivity. As a consequence of their actions;

- Three officers were subject to PSD interventions.*
- Three partner agency staff were subject to interventions with relevant senior managers.*
- One officer and one staff member had management interventions and negative performance records.*

As you are aware the manner in which all of these matters were assessed has been referred by us to the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) and they will consider whether Nottinghamshire Police including our PSD handled these matters appropriately. I can only apologise that the full details of the PSD investigations have not been shared with you previously. Should you require further detail on any aspect of these investigations or copies of the Investigating Officer's Report, please let me know and I will endeavour to share any additional information where possible. I would welcome any communications from you regarding additional concerns you may have but must consider whether I or the IOPC would be best placed to respond to you.

My previous offers to meet with you in person remains open and I wish to stress that Nottinghamshire Police welcomes the independent oversight being provided by the IOPC and the College of Policing.

Yours sincerely'

737. While preparing this statement, I have been checking the information I was provided with at the time of issuing my correspondence. In relation to the letter of the 20th February 2024, despite asking at the time for the accuracy of the content to be checked by PSD, I have now ascertained that the details contained in it were not completely accurate:

- PC Gell was arrested because he had been accessing police systems without authority and his phone was seized, which is when the WhatsApp message was discovered;
- I was told that one officer and one staff member had management interventions and negative performance records; I now understand that there were three and all were police officers.

738. The contents of the letters sent to the Webbers (URN: NGPF0011334) and the Coates family (URN: NGPF0011340) were identical except that the letter above mentions replying to a specific question Dr Kumar had asked in the first paragraph, and both the Webbers and the Coates family were offered the opportunity to be given the content of the WhatsApp message if they wanted it, rather than it being sent to them in the email to which the letter was attached.

739. As stated above, the email sent to Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0007213) contained the content of the WhatsApp message, as follows:

“Dear Sanjoy.

Please find attached a letter which details the actions taken by Nottinghamshire Police in relation to staff and officers who inappropriately accessed information relating to the investigation. In relation to the specific points you have raised in your most recent e-mail, there has only been a single message which involved the inappropriate sending of social media messages. The details of the investigation and outcomes for the officers involved are detailed within the attached letter. Whilst a number of officers received this message there was no evidence that they further shared the message and nothing to suggest that these officers may have breached the standards of professional practice. As such I am unable to provide you with the personal details of those officers who were not subject to misconduct proceedings. I have included in the letter the details of the officer who had a case of misconduct proven against him. The details of the unprofessional and unacceptable message is detailed below. The investigation did not uncover any further messages which made reference to Grace:

“So 2 students on Ilkeston road have been proper butchered, 4 section turned up and tried to hold their inners in. Suspects then made off and attacked a man in a car on magdala and stabbed him to death, He’s then made off towards town and ran over 4 other people who are

in hospital now. He's then made his way back to radford and been stopped and tasered on spot. He's refused his details pulled his prints at custody and he's wanted on Derbyshire and Leics. He lives in Birmingham but also has an address in Mapley. There are 32 cops covering 5 scenes at the minute all on TG7 the whole of city not involved in on TG4. 4 section have just left with some going up to trim. Half aren't going to be working tonight so be prepared to be asked to stay on."

I wish to further apologise for the nature of this message and for the distress it will inevitably cause, With thanks"

740. On 20 February 2024 at 23:27 I received email (URN: NGPF0011341) from Dr Kumar. He was writing in response to my email from earlier that evening (URN: NGPF0007213) but had actually forwarded my email with the letter still attached to the following list of people:

- Sinead O'Malley-Kumar
- Anthony Rogers (HMCSPI)
- Alex Simms (IOPC)
- Kunal Patel (Cabinet Office)
- James Cleverley MP (Home Secretary at that time).

741. Dr Kumar's email stated the following:

"Dear Kate,

I am appalled by the actions of your force and ultimately your burden of responsibility for their actions as you have stated before.

You say that there is no evidence that they further shared the message and nothing to suggest that these officers may have breached the standards of professional practice. I have no confidence in your 'independent' investigation. As such you are unable to provide us with the personal details of those officers who were not subject to misconduct proceedings. I don't want personal details but names and I gather your son was part of the WhatsApp group and whilst the FLO has acknowledged this, you have not.

You also admit you did not inform us about the misconduct hearings. This is a serious issue and a breach of trust between you and us. The message in itself is disgusting, unprofessional and well below the standard expected from a police officer. It undermines confidence in the Notts police and as such in you as you represent the force. Unfortunately as events have unfolded and as you have not kept us informed of this investigation and not supplied me with timelines as I had requested before I met with the HMCPSI & CQC, I have no confidence in your leadership of the Nottinghamshire Police force, nor your judgement.

I shall be speaking to the Home Secretary about this. The investigation and the CPS build up and acceptance has been misleading, your team and you stated "we've got him and we'll do him for murder"... that is what you and the SIO stated to all the families. The incompetence that followed is unfathomable, from not challenging psychiatry reports to not obtaining the basic forensic samples; under your watch these mistakes are unacceptable. They point at poor leadership and as such do not

deserve the public's confidence and are not fit for purpose. I remain very disappointed at the handling of the investigation, the case build up and the conduct of the officers at the Nottinghamshire Police force. Ultimately you bear the responsibility for this as chief constable. Furthermore your ACC admitted your force could have done more which was a U-turn to his previous statement where he stated the force could not have done anymore. As such, there can be no public confidence in your leadership of your officers. This whole episode has brought us as a family nothing but extreme pain, which has been exacerbated by your force and your actions.

Regards Sanjoy"

742. When I discovered on 18 February 2024 that my son was part of the WhatsApp group, I made it clear that the families needed to be informed immediately. Given that this officer was my son, I felt it was neither appropriate nor fair for me to manage the situation myself. It required independent oversight, so I asked DCC Cooper to take responsibility for this, and he did so, ensuring the FLOs delivered the message.

21 February 2024

743. On 21 February 2024 at 10:59 I received email (URN: NGPF0001235) from Emma Webber in reply to my message from the previous evening (URN: NGPF0007219), in which she described how the WhatsApp message had "utterly broken my heart" and understandably questioned why she had not been told about it.

744. Emma's email read as follows:

"Thank you for the letter and for supplying the details. I have also now read the WhatsApp message that you sent to Sanjoy. It has utterly broken my heart. How can this possibly happen. It is astonishing that we were not told about this properly and not a coincidence that the misconduct hearing was brought forwards to almost coincide with the sentencing. I'm afraid this cannot stop here. I will be publicly calling for resignations or sackings. I honestly did not think I could be any more disgusted.

Imagine the outcry when the words butchered and innards spilling out are made public?

Can you advise if any other messages were sent?"

745. At 14:09 on 21 February 2024 I responded to Emma Webber's email (URN: NGPF0007223). I reiterated my apology that she had not been provided information regarding the PSD investigations. I also reminded her that the IOPC were reviewing our response to the WhatsApp messages. I explained that the hearing date for PC Gell's hearing had not been bought forward nor had the date changed. My email was as follows:

"Emma,

Firstly, I want to apologise again for the fact that you were not provided the details of our PSD investigations and the misconduct hearings. There was no intention to keep these matters hidden from you, this should not have happened, and you should have been kept informed.

I have made enquiries with our PSD this morning and we have established that the hearing was not brought forward, or the dates changed.

I can only imagine the anguish that seeing the WhatsApp message will have caused you. The behaviour fell far below the standard expected of officers and staff in Nottinghamshire Police. I can only reiterate that the conduct was dealt with, with the utmost seriousness and the sanction determined by the Independent Legally Qualified Chair. The IOPC will review how these matters were dealt with and consider whether our response was appropriate.

For clarity and as per my letter, our PSD Investigation identified only one WhatsApp message which referenced Grace or Barnaby on the group chat. This message was subsequently shared by Pc Gell. Your strength of feeling is entirely understandable, and I can assure you that we will continue to engage with the IOPC and College of Policing. We welcome their independent oversight and will accept any findings or recommendations they make in the future.

Yours Sincerely”

746. At 14:55 on 21 February 2024 I received another email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0007224). This email asked several questions, as follows:

“Thank you for your prompt reply. I do have a few extra questions please?

-How many staff were in the WhatsApp group?

-Was it an existing group or set up at the time of this attack?

*-Was there dialogue/comment from any other group members?
-I have seen the disgusting initial message. I cannot believe this individual (a Police Officer allegedly employed and trained to protect the public) has only received management intervention. Why has (he?) not been named?*

*-I wish to find a way to make contact with/message the whole group of officers in the group. Especially the individual who wrote the initial comment. Would you be able to facilitate that?
I am trying my very best to be as balanced as I possibly can here given the horrendous situation we are in; and also my utter disgust and disappointment at how badly we (and Barney) have been let down. There's huge press and public interest in this particular failing. I do not wish to be needlessly vengeful, however I will stop at nothing to ensure that there is proper accountability and outcomes that we can eventually live with. If you can furnish me with the above, I would be very grateful.*

Thank you. Emma”

747. I then received another email from Emma Webber at 16:33 on 21 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0004210) following media interviews that Emma had been doing that day. The content of her email was as follows:

“Hi again Kate, I've been contacted by a couple of media outlets to advise that the Notts Police have 'strongly' rejected that officers watched any body cam footage. I believe I referred to this in one radio interview this morning.

For clarity I have sent this back to them. Would you please ensure your communications team are made aware? I'd really rather not enter into a public battle. I've enough on my plate as it is.

.....

There's no body cam footage of the incident as the police were obviously not there! I was referring to the first responders. Here's the snip directly from the CC to me yesterday re my enquiries about the data breaches.

COPY:

"The investigation established that he had viewed the BWV footage on 31st August 2024 using his Police laptop and viewed footage relating to officers and paramedics providing medical assistance to Barnaby and Grace at the scene, and after they had passed away."

748. This assertion surprised me as we had been very clear that one officer had watched BWV footage (that being SC Skenderaj).

749. Emma's email was replied to at 17:04 on 21 February 2024 in my absence by one of our business support officers (URN: NGPF0011346) who, in consultation with DCC Cooper, ensured Emma Webber was updated that we had not denied this. The email did clarify that we had corrected some of the reporting that claimed images and videos were shared between members of the organisation, as follows:

"Good afternoon Mrs Webber,

The Chief Constable is currently away from HQ and in a meeting and I am unable to make contact with her. Appreciating that you would want

an early response, I have spoken with our DCC. He has made enquiries and confirmed that we have not denied that a Special Constable has viewed the footage and we have updated the press association that the said Special Constable was dismissed in December 2023. We have contacted the press association to correct some of their reporting as they reported that images and videos were shared between members of the organisation and as the Chief reported to you last night, we have never found this to be the case.

The DCC has spoken with our Comms team to make sure that they continue to respond to any further enquiries appropriately.
Regards.

Katy Lewis

750. Emma Webber replied to the above email at 17:16 on 21 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011347), clarifying what she had been told by the media. Her email stated:

“Thank you for the email. I’ve checked what the comment was and have been advised it’s “push back” to my interview on LBC this morning. That was live radio. It was “the police are very strongly rejecting the suggestion anyone viewed body cam footage“. It was a member of staff who I understand was dismissed following the hearing. The email received yesterday evening makes that clear. Just one part of the serious and very upsetting breaches that we finally and belatedly know about. Please do ensure that your communication team are aware. This matters [sic] is no way yet resolved as far as the families are

*concerned and I await clarification on a few other matters.
Thank you.”*

22 February 2024

751. On 22 February 2024 at 10:58 I received an email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0001298) regarding the NRB which stated:

“Hi Kate,

*I am aware that you have called an off the record media briefing at 12.30 today. A large number of the media have already made me aware. If you feel that you might be making any announcement or comments that we would want to hear about, I would be grateful for prior notice. Also, would you be able to provide me with the outstanding answers from my email of yesterday regarding the WhatsApp group.
Thank you, Emma Webber.”*

752. After checking with me, my staff officer replied on my behalf (URN: NGPF0007226).

*“Good morning Emma, Chief Constable Meynell has asked me to respond to you whilst she is committed this morning. She is working on a response to your most recent e-mail, it will be with you later today. She also wants to reassure you that she won't be raising or discussing any issues which you are not already aware of. Regards,
Luke.”*

753. At 14:28 on 22 February 2024, I sent a further email to Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0007227) which was in response to the queries she raised the previous day in email (URN: NGPF0007224). In my email I clarified that, as previously stated, there was a single message identified that related to Grace and Barney and the content of this message had been shared previously. I reiterated that we had already shared the name of the officer sanctioned for sharing the WhatsApp message. In her email sent on 21 February 2024 Emma Webber had asked me to facilitate making contact with the “whole group of officers” in the WhatsApp group. I explained that we couldn’t share the details of the other officers for the following reasons:

- The IOPC were investigating the manner in which NP dealt with the PSD investigations. I explained that I anticipated that this would include examining the WhatsApp messages and contact with any officers around that issue runs the risk of prejudicing the IOPC investigation.
- I also explained that the IOPC had a statutory responsibility to update her regarding the investigation and if I updated them separately it ran the risk of interfering with how they were managing their enquiry.

754. . My email stated:

“Emma,

I am sorry but I will be unable to respond to any further questions you raise in relation to the WhatsApp Group and any messages which were sent. As I stated in my letter of 20th February, our PSD Investigation has only identified a single message which related to Grace or Barnaby and this has been shared with you. We have already provided you with the

name of the officer who was sanctioned for sharing the WhatsApp message further. We will be unable to provide any further names or details of officers to you for a number of reasons. The manner in which Nottinghamshire Police dealt with the issues arising in this case is the subject of an independent IOPC investigation. This means that the IOPC will be looking into a range of events and my expectation is that it will include the WhatsApp messaging and matters ancillary to that. Contact with any officers around that issue runs a risk of prejudice to the IOPC enquiry and would therefore be inappropriate. In addition to this, the IOPC have a statutory responsibility to update you in relation to that their investigation and it risks interfering with how they are managing their enquiry for me to provide you with information separately.

Whilst I remain committed to openness and transparency, I am unable to release any further details of officers or the messages to you. I can also confirm that our media team has been updated in line with previous e-mail.

Yours sincerely”

755. On 22 February 2024 ACC Griffin and I met Ian Coates' partner Elaine Newton, who was accompanied by her sister Carol Parlor. Part of these discussions included the PSD investigations where I provided all of the information contained in the letter to the other bereaved families to Elaine.

756. Later on the evening of 22 February 2024, I wrote a letter to the surviving victims to inform them of the PSD investigations. The content of the letter was identical to that sent to the bereaved families on 20 February 2024.

23 February 2024

757. On 23 February 2024 at 18:00 I received an email from Wayne Birkett's partner Tracey Hodgson (URN: NGPF0007144) acknowledging receipt of my letter (URN: NGPF0007231) the previous day. Regrettably, she had seen reports of the PSD issues on social media. She also asked that, due to Wayne's injuries, letters in the post were the best way to correspond with him. Tracey also questioned whether I or the force remembered that there were three survivors as they seemed to have been forgotten. Tracey's email read as follows:

"To Miss Meynel [sic],

*From Tracey Hodgson (Wayne Birketts Partner/Appointee)
Thank you for your email yesterday 22nd February at 18.15.
Unfortunately this information was old news. Literally word for word had already been on social media and this shouldn't be the way we find out.
I would guess you have been made aware Wayne Birkett suffered Traumatic Brain Injury, but yet you sent an email to him to correspond with you. Wayne's Brain Injury means he is totally incapable of replying to you. Also do you or any of the Force remember that there are three other victims of the 13th June 2023 attacks? Wayne, Sharon & Marcin all seem to be forgotten because they are survivors of this horrendous crime that was committed by Valdo Calocane. Please could you respect*

and remember to keep us informed by POST and more importantly before it reaches the media.

Tracey Hodgson"

758. When I reflect on my contact with the families and survivors, I recognise and regret that I did not inform them all about the PSD investigations at the same time. After Tracey raised this with me, I ensured that updates were then provided concurrently.

759. I have spent time considering why this failure to advise all bereaved and survivors simultaneously happened. I believe it was primarily due to the Special Constable's conduct and the WhatsApp message being directly related to Grace and Barney. In addition, by this stage Grace and Barney's families were raising the majority of concerns, queries and complaints, and were regularly expressing their concerns publicly. As a result, my focus became centred on them, and the updates to survivors followed two days later. Regrettably, I also did not anticipate the extensive media and social media coverage and speculation.

760. Upon reflection I acknowledge that all parties should have been informed at the same time. I fully accept Tracey's criticism and apologise for the delay in updating the survivors regarding the PSD issues.

6 March 2024

761. On 6 March 2024 at 12:59 I received an email from Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011364) in which he requested details of the agency the three

partner agency staff identified as accessing information worked for. His email read as follows:

"Dear Kate,

I am in receipt of your letter dated 20th Feb 2024, sent by e mail. On page 3, bullet point 2, as I have cut and pasted below: 'Three partner agency staff were subject to interventions with relevant senior managers.'

Could you please expand on which exact partner agency you are referring to; as partner agency involvement and the requirement of any disciplinary action has not been mentioned before and this is the first instance that we have been informed of partner agency staff, who were subject to interventions with relevant senior managers. This is of further concern to us and I would be grateful for additional information as per your offer of sharing information transparently. Yours sincerely

Sanjoy"

7 March 2024

762. On 7 March 2024 I wrote to all the families and survivors. The letters were sent via email on my behalf by my staff officer Insp Luke Waller.
763. I wrote the letter to inform everyone that a date had been set for a Police Staff Gross Misconduct Hearing (Rutherford). They had been made aware this individual was being investigated in my original letter detailing the PSD

investigations. I provided details of the allegation and explained that all hearings relating to police staff misconduct are held in private.

764. The content of the letter sent to all parties was as follows:

“As you will be aware from our previous correspondence, there is a member of Nottinghamshire Police Staff who is awaiting a Misconduct Hearing. I am writing to inform you that this member of Police Staff is due to attend a Police Staff Gross Misconduct Hearing on 5th April 2024 in relation to the following allegation:

That they have misused Nottinghamshire Police Force Systems and breached data protection by searching for and accessing information and evidence relating to recent homicide investigations and cases linked to her own family between the 22/03/2023 and 08/07/2023 without a lawful excuse or policing purpose. The investigation has shown that the police staff member accessed information on police systems and also researched the offender, Valdo Calocane. There is no evidence that she viewed any Body Worn Video or CCTV in relation to the case. Hearings relating to Police Staff misconduct are held in private, and we do not publicise the findings. However, I will provide you with the outcome once known. Please advise me if you do not wish to receive this information.

Yours sincerely”

765. The email sent to Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0007246) with the above letter attached (URN: NGPF0011367) also informed Dr Kumar that the three

partner agency staff were employees of Nottingham City Council. This was in response to his query on 6 March 2024, and was worded as follows:

“Sanjoy,

Please see the attached letter for you from Chief Constable Meynell. In response to the additional information you requested via e mail on 6th March, the three partner agency staff were members of the City Council Community Protection Service who work alongside Nottinghamshire Police in Neighbourhoods Teams.

With thanks.”

766. The email sent to Wayne Birkett’s partner Tracey Hodgson (URN: NGPF0007270) was worded as follows:

“Tracey,

As promised, I’m sending over a letter for Wayne from Chief Constable Meynell.

We’ll have a hard copy for Wayne when we see you both tomorrow,

Regards,

Luke”

767. This email acknowledged that I was due to meet with Wayne and Tracey the following day and would deliver a hard copy of the letter as had been previously requested by Tracey for all future correspondence (URN: NGPF0007144).

11 March 2024

768. On 11 March 2024 at 19:32 I received email (URN: NGPF0010137) from Emma Webber. She asked if there had been only two misconduct hearings; I believed she was referring to the one for the police staff member and the one for PC Gell. Emma again made reference to PC Gell's misconduct hearing being brought forward.
769. Emma asked me to clarify in writing why I wouldn't facilitate her making contact with the officers involved in the WhatsApp group. She stated that if I refused to permit this, she would do it through the "*live national media*."
770. She continued to say that she planned to write to Nottingham City Council regarding their staff members. She explained that she would discuss all the aforementioned issues with the IOPC and that she remained "*utterly disappointed that we have remained largely ignored and overlooked throughout the process of the investigations*."
771. The content of Emma's email was as follows:

"Thank you for this update. All noted. Please correct me if wrong but the only official misconduct hearings have been for this individual and PC Gell (that was brought forward to the 19th January)? I am aware that you have declined to provide me with any further information regarding the WhatsApp group, or other failures in the conduct of your officers regarding the accessing and discussion of sensitive material regarding the murder of my son, citing the IOPC investigation.

However I wanted to ask for you to clarify, in writing please, that you will not facilitate me making contact, through a relevant and acceptable

medium, with the officers involved in the WhatsApp group. In particular addressing the officer that wrote the initial and detailed description of injury to my son and Grace?

To be clear, I do not seek their personal details; however I am not prepared to allow this to go without me being afforded the chance to address attitudes such as these that appear to be prevalent in not just your constabulary but across the nation. I would prefer not to do this through live national media; however should you refuse to permit this then please be aware that I will. Again, without naming of officers; but with reference to the content of the one message you have chosen to share.

Please also be aware that we will be writing to the leadership of Nottingham Council with regards to the latest revelations that three members of staff employed by them to support your force were also subject to management interventions.

Whilst we will be discussing all of this aforementioned with the IOPC in detail shortly, I remain utterly disappointed that we have remained largely ignored and overlooked throughout the process of the investigations into these grievous and distressing events.

I understand I may come across as relentless in my pursuit of justice and the truth; however this is all that I am now able to do in the honour of Barney and his legacy.

Thank you,

Emma Webber

13 March 2024

772. On 13 March 2024 at 14:19 my staff officer sent my response (URN: NGPF0011396) to Emma Webber's email dated 11 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0010137).

773. I clarified that there had been three misconduct hearings, detailing who each one related to. I then reiterated that PC Gell's hearing had not been moved nor brought forward.

774. I then explained that the IOPC investigation was examining how PSD had dealt with the misconduct matters and that any contact with these officers potentially could interfere with the IOPC investigation

775. I also expressed my concern that she felt she had been overlooked and asked for the opportunity, when appropriate to discuss with her, to try to understand what had happened.

776. My full reply was as follows:

"Dear Emma,

Thank you for your e-mail dated 10th [sic] March. To clarify there will have been three Misconduct Hearings. The first for PC Gell, though the date of this hearing was not moved or brought forward in any way. The second is in relation to the Police Staff member whose hearing will be on 5th April 2023. The third related to the Special Constable who viewed body worn video footage.

As you are aware the IOPC are conducting an independent investigation into how the Professional Standards Directorate (PSD) dealt with the potential misconduct matters relating to the events of June 2023. Arranging communication with these officers has the potential of interfering with the IOPC investigation, it would therefore not be appropriate for Nottinghamshire Police to facilitate contact between you and PC Gell or any other officers at this time. Whilst it is not possible to work with you now I would welcome further discussions or meetings with you at the conclusion of the investigations and reviews to explore how we could work together in the future to address the issues that you have raised.

It concerns me that you feel you have been overlooked throughout the investigation. As you are aware the level of support and communication the families received throughout the investigation will also form part of the IOPC investigations. Again I would like the opportunity to discuss this with you when appropriate to understand what has happened.

Your Sincerely,"

20 March 2024

777. On 20 March 2024 at 18:10 I received email (URN: NGPF0011397) from Dr Kumar which was copied to Sinead O'Malley-Kumar and Matthew Kophamel at the IOPC and began a chain of emails which continued into 21 March 2024.

778. Dr Kumar had replied to an email sent by my staff officer Insp Luke Waller from 20 February at 21:27 (URN: NGPF0007213) which contained the text of the WhatsApp message.
779. In the latest email (URN: NGPF0011397), Dr Kumar expressed the impact the WhatsApp message had caused.
780. He stated that all police officers should be aware, due to previous episodes, the serious distress WhatsApp messages can cause. Dr Kumar stated that he had not been told about the PSD investigations rather he had to read about it in the newspapers. He then sought clarity on some of the terminology in the WhatsApp message as well as an explanation regarding the statement in the WhatsApp message that VC was wanted in Derbyshire and Leicestershire.
781. Dr Kumar asked for the number of officers in the WhatsApp group and whether WhatsApp was a method officers should use to communicate professionally.
782. The full details of his email were as follows:

“Dear Kate,

I am in receipt of your e mail of 20 Feb 2024, 21:27 and attached letter.

I would like to convey the dismay, the enormous hurt, pain and distress this matter has additionally caused my family. We do not deserve to be treated like this especially after the loss of our daughter. It would be ignorant of every officer in every force and every rank to not know that previously known episodes of sending WhatsApp messages

and photos have caused serious distress to families and eroded the trust that the public have in the Police forces up and down the country. Nottinghamshire Police have added to this distrust in so many ways right from the beginning when we were not informed about the PSD disciplinary panels and outcomes. We had to learn this from reading the newspapers.

Notwithstanding the disciplinary actions that has been taken against officers, in other forces; it seems lessons have not been learnt, certainly not by the Nottinghamshire Police force. A force that should have kept our daughter safe and prevented this terrible attack from happening. All this additionally has been so disheartening and disappointing. I would like to clarify parts of the text message that you have sent to us, as below:

- '4 section turned up' - does this refer to a special unit ?*
- 'He's refused his details pulled his prints at custody and he's wanted on Derbyshire and Leics' - **He is wanted on Derbyshire and Leics, could you clarify this officer's assertion that Calocane was wanted in Derbyshire and Leicestershire?***
- He lives in Birmingham but also has an address in Mapley - 'Details of his addresses were known in Brimingham and Mapley'?*
- There are 32 cops covering 5 scenes at the minute all on TG7 the whole of city not involved in on TG4.*

4 section have just left with some going up to trim

- 5 scenes on TG7 ? whole city in on TG4?, 4 section have just left with some going to trim?

- what does this relate to and what do these acronyms (TG7 & TG4) mean?

We note that whilst an officer has been disciplined, for sending this message to people outside of the force, the author of the message remains unnamed. We have also not been informed how many officers were in this WhatsApp group and hence received this distressing message.

Should WhatsApp be used as a method for officers to communicate professionally?

I would be grateful for the answers to the questions above and will confirm that these messages have inevitably caused an enormous amount of distress to us all.

Sincerely

Sanjoy”

21 March 2024

783. On 21 March 2024 at 14:53 I received email (URN: NGPF0011398) from Emma Webber which continued from Dr Kumar’s email from 20 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0011397), which was apparent had been shared with her.

784. She began by thanking Dr Kumar for sharing his email and his concerns, and that she echoed every part of his email.

785. She then stated that she could not understand how the IOPC investigation was a genuine reason for my not allowing her to address the officers in the WhatsApp group. She stated that she would ensure this issue was addressed "in another medium."
786. She explained that she was meeting the IOPC and had been assured that all the information denied by me would be made available by them.
787. Emma also stated that I would be contacted by the media the following week and asked that I clarify that it was not appropriate to meet with me at this time, but that they would want to meet upon the conclusion of investigations into NP.
788. The full content of Emma's email was as follows:

*"Thank you for sharing your email and concerns with us Sanjoy.
Kate,*

We echo every part of the email. The trauma and stress that the dealings with your force have caused us is unimaginable. The constant lack of clarity and misleading information has caused us to lose faith and respect in every aspect. I note your continued refusal to allow me to address the WhatsApp group officers. Even though I have not asked for any names or details; I cannot fathom how your excuse of the IOPC investigation can be a genuine reason. So sadly I will ensure it is addressed in another medium.

As you will be well aware we have our meeting with the aforementioned IOPC next week and we have been assured that the information denied to us by yourself will be made available. We have this week received a

letter of apology from the leader of Nottingham council with regards to the council employed staff who also accessed files with no just cause. Too little too late! We have not yet replied as we have concerns with the timeline and how this misconduct has been handled between yourselves, the council and PSD. We are taking legal advice with regards to next actions.

No doubt you will be contacted by the media next week (I'm aware that all FOI requests from the media have also been denied so far). Can I please ask that you clarify your much used comment that you 'have offered to meet the families.' Instead please clarify what we have agreed already that it is not appropriate to meet you yet due to the numerous investigations into your force, however following the conclusion of these we will want to meet in person.

I would also like to be copied in to your reply to Sanjoy with regards to his queries regarding detail in the text message.

Thank you,

Emma”

789. Later in the afternoon on 21 March 2024 at 16:41 I was copied into an email from Matthew Kophamel at the IOPC (URN: NGPF0011399). This email was sent to Emma Webber, Sinead O'Malley-Kumar and Sanjoy Kumar and related to the issue Emma had raised in her email (URN: NGPF0011398) regarding the IOPC investigation. This email stated:

“Hi Emma,

I'd like to just pick up something in this letter to CC Kate Meynell. In the paragraph which says 'As you will be well aware we have our meeting with the aforementioned IOPC next week and we have been assured that the information denied to us by yourself will be made available.' I may have misunderstood the meaning of this paragraph, and apologies if I have, but I'd like to clarify that during the course of the investigation the IOPC will be accessing a large amount of material, that in typical investigations would not be shared with our complainants. In some circumstances we do share material but this is not the norm. Again, this is something that can be discussed at our meeting next Tuesday.

Kind Regards

Matt"

790. Finally, at 17:10 on 21 March 2024 I received email (URN: NGPF0011406) from Emma Webber, which was also sent to Matthew Kophamel (IOPC) and copied to Sinead O'Malley-Kumar and Sanjoy Kumar. In this email Emma expressed that she fully expected to be given access to all information that she and David were legally permitted, and her determination to ensure nothing was left unexposed or not investigated. She also appeared to be making reference to previous correspondence between herself and Matthew Kophamel.

791. The full text of Emma's email was as follows:

"Thank you for clarifying Matt. It was not clear from your earlier email sadly. All noted. However, be assured that David and I fully expect access to information that we are legally permitted to see. Especially

given the circumstances and (in our opinion) the appalling management and communication we have had thus far with Nottingham police force. Without the tenacity of the three families and media, I have no doubt that very many of these issues would never have come to light. I do not apologise in my determination to ensure nothing is left unexposed or not investigated in this process; and my utter lack of faith in the 'openness and transparency' we had been promised by the SIO of the case and latterly the Chief Constable. If there is information we wish to see, that you are not able to show, we can discuss at the relevant time. On a personal note. We should not, in any way, be in the position that we are forced into now. It is utterly exhausting and the thought of the intensity and additional emotional trauma that the meetings we are forced to attend next week will bring is beyond comprehension. I have noted your request for relevant ID from all attending and will ensure we do that. I also note your comments regarding 'cross over' of complaints with the CPS, CQC, amongst others. It's not for us to have to consider this. Agencies must make sure they join up where appropriate. If that is not possible then ensure this picked up at Ministerial level. We have already had assurance from Laura Farris MP, that she will personally liaise with each organisation to ensure this happens. We will see you next Tuesday.

Regards,

Emma Webber"

22 March 2024

792. On 22 March 2024 at 15:32 my staff officer Insp Luke Waller sent a letter on my behalf (URN: NGPF0011409) to Dr Kumar addressing the points he raised in his email the previous day (URN: NGPF0011397).

793. My letter stated the following:

“Dear Sanjoy,

Thank you for your e-mail sent yesterday afternoon. I am truly sorry for the ongoing anguish these matters are causing you. It is not my intention to cause continued distress, but the ongoing release of information relating to the live IOPC investigation and College of Policing review has the potential to prejudice matters.

In relation to the questions you have raised, I can provide the following information.

‘4 Section’ refers to a particular shift of uniformed response officers. Each station will have five shifts who work a rotating shift pattern in order to provide 24-hour cover to a particular policing area. They are front line ‘first responders,’ they are not a special unit.

I can confirm that Calocane was not wanted in Derbyshire. I am unable to comment on the circumstances relating to Leicestershire due to the ongoing IOPC investigation. The IOPC would be best placed to answer this question.

Similarly, I am unable to comment upon the details of the addresses related to Calocane. Again, the circumstances of the outstanding warrant are subject to an IOPC investigation.

TG4 and TG7 relate to radio 'talkgroups'. These are the radio talkgroups used by officers and the control room to communicate with one another. Due to the geographic size of the city and the number officers on duty at any time, each talkgroup covers a particular geographic area. TG7 covers the City Centre and TG4 covers the North of the City.

'5 scenes on TG7' will therefore mean that there were five separate crime scenes that required preserving in the City Centre area. 'Trim' refers to Trauma Risk Incident Management and is a welfare procedure for officers who have been involved in traumatic incidents. This is carried out away from the area that the incident occurred and after the immediate risk to the public has been minimised. In relation to the use of WhatsApp messages, Officers should not use WhatsApp to send operational material and there is no facility to install WhatsApp on work phones. Officers are allowed to use WhatsApp on their personal phones and can use this for the purposes of organising social events, overtime and rostered duties.

Yours sincerely'

794. At 16:09 on 22 March 2024 I received an email from Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011410) intended as a reply to my letter from earlier that day (URN: NGPF0011409). It was sent to me and copied to my staff officer Insp Luke Waller and to Matthew Kophamel at the IOPC. It was a forward of Dr

Kumar's own email from 20 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0011397), but written in such a way that it acknowledged my letter from earlier that day

795. This email chain therefore contained details of the content of the WhatsApp message, and the list of questions that Dr Kumar asked for clarification on as a result of that message. It did not therefore include the details of my latest reply, but Dr Kumar acknowledged that reply in his email.

796. Dr Kumar's latest email was as follows:

"Dear Kate,

Thank you for clarifying the acronyms used in the radio conversations and for other questions as far as is possible for you at this time. I would agree with your response that officers should not use WhatsApp to send operational material and there is no facility to install WhatsApp on work phones. Officers are allowed to use WhatsApp on their personal phones and can use this for the purposes of organising social events, overtime and rostered duties.

Unfortunately the attacks in Nottingham were none of the above. Could I seek clarity on questions in my original e mail; as this information will be known from the PSD enquires and disciplinary hearings. Has the author of this appalling and very distressing message been named in the public domain? How many officers were in this WhatsApp group?

Sincerely

Sanjoy"

25 March 2024

797. On 25 March 2024 at 09:06 I received email (URN: NGPF0007276) from Emma Webber which was sent in reply to email (URN: NGPF0011396) from 13 March 2024.
798. In this email Emma was asking questions about misconduct, particularly in relation to the WhatsApp group and the PSD investigations.
799. The text of her email was as follows:

“Kate,

Are you able to confirm what your force policy is please for officers and their duty to report on matters when they have concerns with regards to the conduct of others? I refer mainly to your officers in the WhatsApp group, from which PC Gell was named and received a public misconduct. We wish to ensure, and be reassured, that officers behaved in accordance to expectations in their role and know what actions they took. Would you also confirm the date that the special Constable had his misconduct hearing and dismissal? Are the procedures the same for a special Constable as for a full time officer?

And finally, we note that the third misconduct is set for April as per your letter. Can you advise why this is to be held privately. The only reference to public misconduct that I have found relates to PC Gell. Finally, I am confused as to why a reference to an address and Birmingham and to Calocane being wanted in Derbyshire come up on the WhatsApp message; directly following the statement of him having

his prints 'pulled.' No doubt the outstanding warrant with your force was also visible; however I seek clarification as why this this reference came up. It must have come from somewhere?

Being advised he was not wanted in Derbyshire will not suffice. As an example; during the hearing he was lauded to have a clean report and no profile. This is down to lack of appropriate action via the police; not his law abiding ways. We have all too tragically been made aware of the worrying number of attacks and offences that he carried out and the missed opportunities to stop him.

I apologise for the short notice but if you are able to advise asap I would be grateful

Thank you,

Emma Webber"

800. At 12:08 on 25 March 2024 I sent an email to Dr Kumar (URN: NGPF0011413) in reply to his email dated 22 March 2024 (URN: NGPF0011410).

801. I stated that I was unable to share any more information with him, but that the IOPC would address the points he had raised in his previous email.

802. My email was as follows:

"Dear Sanjoy,

My previous e-mail contains all of the information I am able to share without fear of prejudicing the ongoing College of Policing Review and IOPC Investigation. I understand that you are meeting with the IOPC on 26th March, I am informed that they will address with you the matters you have raised.

Yours sincerely, Kate”

26 March 2024

803. On 26 March 2024 at 16:10 I sent an email to Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0007278) which was a response to her email (URN: NGPF0007276).
804. My email contained the following:

“Dear Emma,

I am unable to answer some of the questions you posed due to the ongoing IOPC investigation. However I can confirm that the date for the hearing for the Special Constable was 11th December 2023. The regulations apply to Special Constables as they would for a regular Police Officer. This was held in private to ensure we did not prejudice active criminal proceedings at the time. The final misconduct case relates to a Police Staff Member and it is scheduled for 5th April. As the matter involves a police staff member the rules are different and the Misconduct meetings are held in private. Whilst the standards we expect them to uphold and the misconduct proceedings are in many ways very similar, this is one of the differences. This is due to the fact that Police Staff members are employees and subject to employment law which

dictates that the meetings should be private. However, these Misconduct meetings do have the power to dismiss the individual. I am unable to comment on the circumstances relating to Leicestershire due to the ongoing IOPC investigation. The IOPC would be best placed to answer this question. It is not clear why the officer made reference to being wanted in Derbyshire because this is not accurate. Similarly, I am unable to comment upon the details of the addresses related to Calocane. Again, the circumstances of the outstanding warrant are subject to an IOPC investigation.

Kind regards"

805. I have reflected on my communication with the bereaved families and the surviving victims during this period about the misconduct matters.
806. My response to the numerous requests for the names of officers remained consistent. I explained that, while a number of officers had received the WhatsApp message, there was no evidence to suggest that they had shared it further, nor any indication that they had breached the standards of professional behaviour. I have subsequently reflected on this comment and from information now available to me I should have been more accurate and said it was not a breach of the standards of professional behaviour that was so serious to justify disciplinary action, as per the assessment of DI Gareth Harding. I also made clear that I was unable to disclose personal information about officers who were not subject to misconduct proceedings.

807. Whilst I was receiving requests for the details of officers, I was also being advised by the IOPC that I should not be sharing any information as it was subject to an ongoing investigation.

808. Emma Webber also asked whether if she wrote a message that it be passed on to the author of the message and the officers in the group. I declined to do this due to the ongoing IOPC investigation but, I did suggest:

“Whilst it is not possible to work with you now I would welcome further discussions or meetings with you at the conclusion of the investigation and reviews to explore how we could work together in the future to address the issues that you have raised.”

809. Both Dr Kumar and Emma Webber sought clarity regarding terms used in the WhatsApp message (URNs: NGPF0011397 and NGPF0011398) and the force’s position regarding WhatsApp. In responding (URN: NGPF0011407) I explained that officers should not use WhatsApp to send operational material and there is no facility to install WhatsApp on work phones. Officers are permitted to use WhatsApp on their personal phones and can use this for the purpose of organising social events, overtime and rostered duties. The use of WhatsApp is covered within the Social and Digital Media Policy 2022 (URN: NGPF0011459).

810. Emma Webber and Dr Kumar also sought clarification regarding the fact the message stated VC was wanted in Derbyshire. I updated Dr Kumar by letter and Emma Webber by email. I stated that VC was not wanted in Derbyshire. T/DSU Reynolds had made enquires on my behalf with DC Neil Beddoe who was a member of the Operation Hendrix investigation team.

DC Beddoe stated that VC was not wanted or circulated by Derbyshire. T/DSU Reynolds provided me with this information in an email on 21 March 2024.

811. As a result of this update I made the assumption that PC Small passed on incorrect information. Once I had established that VC was not wanted in Derbyshire, I informed the families of that fact (URN: NGPF0011407).
812. Although I was limited in the information I could share with the families. I was reassured by the fact that our decision making regarding the WhatsApp messages was subject to an independent investigation by the IOPC.
813. Additional communications and clarity of guidance was provided to the organisation, via the Force Intranet regarding the use of WhatsApp. Due to a recent upgrade of NP Force Intranet this communication is no longer available. However, this was based on the Social and Digital Media Policy.
814. CC Cooper wrote to all the bereaved families and survivors on 5 April 2024 updating them on the outcome of the hearing .
815. I have been asked to reflect upon whether I consider the families were kept sufficiently updated throughout the investigation.
816. I am in no doubt that the bereaved families and the survivors should have been made fully aware of the PSD investigations conducted by NP and in a timely and clear manner. They were not and I sincerely apologise for that omission on behalf of NP. I refer to the GMH for PC Gell (including the

WhatsApp message), the AMH for SC Skenderaj and the Misconduct Hearing for Sarah Rutherford (NP staff member).

817. This perspective draws on my experience as an SIO and senior officer, and on the fundamental importance of transparency. Experience demonstrates that a failure to share such information at the appropriate time can result in significantly greater pain and anguish and can create a perception that the organisation is seeking to conceal information detrimental to NP.
818. It is also essential to ensure that information shared is fully understood, acknowledging that families may find it difficult to process such information, given the inevitable distress it will cause.
819. Through the Family Liaison structures there are established processes in place to deliver information to victims' families. In my experience a message of this serious nature would be delivered by the SIO with the FLOs present to facilitate communication. However, this would have needed to be balanced against the need to coordinate the sharing of information to ensure that bereaved families and survivors found out at a similar time.
820. To ensure that relevant information was shared in a timely and consistent manner, strategic oversight was required. At the time, NP processes were not sufficiently robust to provide this assurance. Representatives from the PSD attended ACC Griffin's Gold Group meetings and provided updates on PSD investigations relating to formal misconduct matters. However, updates were not routinely provided on investigations that sat outside the formal misconduct process. Notably, this included the investigation relating

to the officer who authored the WhatsApp message. However, the message and its content were relevant to the PC Gell investigation.

821. Quite rightly, detailed information regarding the PSD investigations was not shared during the Operation Hendrix Gold Group meeting, as doing so would have risked compromising the integrity of those investigations. These investigations were overseen outside of the Gold meeting by DCC Cooper, the delegated appropriate authority.

822. DCC Cooper and ACC Griffin should have established clear and agreed protocols to ensure that they were both appropriately sighted on the progress and scope of the PSD investigations, and that there was a shared understanding of what information would be disclosed to bereaved families and survivors, and when.

823. The absence of such processes resulted in ACC Griffin not having a full understanding of the PSD investigations, limiting his ability to direct what information needed to be shared and with whom. Consequently, there was insufficient oversight of both the content of the information being shared and whether it was being shared in a timely manner.

824. Ultimately, responsibility for sharing information with bereaved families and survivors rested with the SIO. Prior to any disclosure, the SIO must be satisfied as to the accuracy of the information. Once this assurance is obtained, an appropriate time for disclosure must be identified.

825. This investigation was complex in terms of coordinating communication with bereaved families and survivors, to ensure that all parties received

information in a timely and appropriate manner. While it is accepted that there is never an entirely “right” time to share such information, it is clearly preferable to identify a point at which families and those bereaved were as prepared as possible to receive further updates. This proved particularly challenging as the possibility of accepting pleas to manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility emerged, which understandably became the central focus for those bereaved and affected.

826. I am firmly of the view that there was no intention at any point to conceal the PSD investigations from the bereaved or survivors. Minutes of the Gold Group dated 30 January 2024 (URN: NGPF0007809) clearly demonstrate at Item 6 that ACC Griffin had expected details to have been given to the families in September 2023 and had been told that would be the case. I am now aware that discussions subsequently took place between DI Gould and DSU Hayley Williams regarding what information could appropriately be disclosed (URN: NGPF0007813). DSU Sanders and T/DSU Reynolds also reached agreement on the information that could be shared with families, albeit with the caveat that it was considered not to be an appropriate time to deliver that message (URN: NGPF0007931). In addition, following the AMH in respect of SC Skenderaj, I had stipulated that the bereaved families should be informed of both the hearing and its outcome.

827. I consider that the failures to communicate this information to the bereaved and survivors prior to my letters of 20 and 22 February 2024 arose from weaknesses within NP’s processes in how relevant information regarding PSD investigations is shared with the Gold Group and the Criminal

Investigation, alongside the challenges associated with identifying an appropriate time to provide the information. I have provided these details as an explanation as to why the bereaved families and survivors were not kept sufficiently updated. However, this does not, and should not, detract from my unreserved and sincere apology for this undoubted failing.

828. As Gold Commander for Operation Chainlink from 5 February 2024 I had oversight of all communications with the bereaved families and survivors. I have provided a chronology of that contact, together with the rationale underpinning my responses. There was a delay in providing information relating to the PSD investigations to the bereaved families and survivors while I sought to obtain a full and proper understanding of the circumstances. It is my view that the letters issued in late February 2024 accurately reflected all information known, and that any subsequent updates or responses to queries from the bereaved and survivors were provided in a comprehensive and timely manner.

Referrals to the IOPC

829. I have been asked to set out my involvement in any referrals made to the IOPC.

Referral 13 June 2023

830. In his role as Gold Commander ACC Griffin made me aware of an IOPC referral at 13:00 on 13 June 2023. This was in relation to the fact that when VC struck two pedestrians he was being followed by a police vehicle. (URN: NGPF0007852).

831. I was also aware that ACC Griffin had sought advice from PSD regarding a referral in relation to the outstanding warrant for VC. T/DSU Reynolds made contact with the IOPC and was advised that it didn't meet the criteria for referral (URN: NGPF0007818).

832. I did not have any direct involvement in these referrals.

Referral 30 January 2024

833. Following the sentencing hearing I had discussions with ACC Griffin regarding referring to the IOPC all previous NP contact with VC prior to 13 June 2023. I was in full agreement with ACC Griffin that this should be done. On 30 January 2024 ACC Griffin directed that PSD make this referral to the IOPC (URN: NGPF0007809, page 3).

Referral 5 February 2024

834. On 5 February 2024 I assumed Gold command for Operation Chainlink. At 07:30 that day I met with T/Detective Superintendent (T/DSU) Andy Reynolds, who at this time was head of PSD. I discussed with him the concerns that the families had raised in the media and the email I had received from Dr Kumar on 2 February 2024 (URN: NGPF0011265).

835. In this email Dr Kumar raised concerns, which he said had been *"highlighted to the investigation team "time and time again and in writing."* He also stated *"that these were only some of our serious concerns"*

836. The concerns raised by Dr Kumar included the following:

- A statement issued by NP and ACC Griffin regarding missed opportunities. He stated that NP released statements quoting *“they could not have done anything more to prevent his appalling crime.”* He then said there was a u turn to *“more could have been done.”*
- Serious concerns regarding conduct of officers accessing case notes. Dr Kumar stated *“apparently some 179 views were from officers with no involvement in the case. We are aware of only one suspension for misconduct.”*

837. Following my meeting with him on 5 February 2024, I asked T/DSU Reynolds to confirm exactly what had been referred to the IOPC and the current position. T/DSU Reynolds updated me via email at 08:03 the same day verifying that a referral had been made regarding NP contact with VC prior to 13 June 2023. This had been referred as a Death or Serious Injury (DSI) following police contact case (URN: NGPF0007818). T/DSU Reynolds advised that the IOPC were considering this referral, and he would update me as soon as he received a response.

838. T/DSU Reynolds then confirmed that, following our discussion, he would record and refer to the IOPC the following complaints (URN: NGPF0011104):

- Serious concerns regarding the quality of the investigation, including discussions regarding toxicology samples
- Communications with the bereaved families about the police actions prior to the offences.
- Conduct of officers viewing material related to the case

- The force response to the allegations about officers viewing material relating to the investigation.
839. I felt it was important in the interests of transparency these concerns were referred to the IOPC as soon as possible. I had discussed with T/DSU Reynolds that it was clear to me that some of the families had lost trust and confidence in NP and, as such, a request was to be made to the IOPC that they take the investigation as an independent investigation.
840. On 7 February 2024 T/DSU Reynolds informed me via email (URN: NGPF0011105) that the IOPC had returned our referral regarding police contact with VC as invalid. He continued to say the referral made in respect of Dr Kumar's complaint was still under consideration.
841. On 9 February 2024 I received an email from Emma Webber (URN: NGPF0007172). Within this she stated that she was in agreement with the complaints made by "*Sanjoy of the 6th Feb*".
842. These additional points were forwarded to the IOPC by T/DSU Reynolds (URN: NGPF0011106), which contains a copy of (NGPF0011104) and a summary of allegations (URN: NGPF0011110) I informed Mrs Webber this had been done in an email I sent to her on 13 February 2024 (URN: NGPF00111309)
843. On 12 February 2024, the IOPC formally announced that it had commenced an investigation into NP's previous contact with VC and our handling of the subsequent investigation (URN: NGPF0011136) in respect of the following:

“The IOPC’s investigation follows a voluntary referral by the force of complaints they have received from the victims’ families. The complaints allege there were flaws in the handling of the murder investigation and missed opportunities by police to prevent the deaths. Allegations have also been made in respect of the non-execution of an outstanding warrant for Calocane’s arrest prior to the killings, and concerns raised about Nottinghamshire Police’s communication with the families.”

Reflections on additional actions

844. I have been asked to reflect on whether I consider there were any additional actions that I or others could have taken in respect of the attacks, and to set them out in detail.
845. I have interpreted this to mean the attacks on 13 June 2023, the investigation and NP subsequent interaction with the bereaved families and survivors.
846. Accordingly, I have reflected on NP actions in relation to these are and what additional actions could have been taken.
847. The failure to communicate information to the bereaved families and survivors clearly and in a timely manner has had continuing and far-reaching implications, contributing to a perception that NP was seeking to withhold information. In light of this, I have reflected on what measures I could have taken to strengthen oversight of communications and have

concluded that the appointment of a PIP 4 investigator would have been beneficial in providing additional scrutiny, assurance, and support.

848. On 13 June 2023, I discussed the PIP 4 strategic advisor role with ACC Griffin. At that time, aside from ourselves, there was no individual available to fulfil this function. Consideration was given to drawing on regional resources; however, we were reassured by the fact that the command structure put in place was effectively delivering the core functions that a PIP 4 investigator would ordinarily provide.

849. I now acknowledge that this assessment was incorrect. The appointment of a PIP 4 investigator would have provided additional oversight and strategic support to the investigation, including greater assurance around the management and sharing of information with bereaved families and survivors.

850. I also believe a second FLA should have been appointed to assist with coordinating all the FLOs and the provision of the relevant information.

851. The establishment of protocols between Gold and PSD would have enabled an informed assessment to be made regarding the sharing of information. It is my opinion that the oversight of informing the families should then have sat with Gold.

852. From my personal experience I am disappointed that I failed to anticipate the impact the media would have on the investigation. Communications following the attack up to the point of charge were managed appropriately, and during this period NP relationships with the media were mainly positive.

853. However, following the sentencing hearing on 23-25 January 2024 and the statements made by Emma Webber, Dr Kumar and James Coates on the steps of the court, the media reporting became extremely critical of NP. As described above, the NRB was ineffective with some media outlets perceiving that NP was indeed withholding information.

854. I believe an NRB earlier in the investigation may have been more informative for the media and might have assisted with the perception of transparency. This, of course would only have been possible if all the relevant information had been shared with the bereaved families and survivors prior to the NRB.

855. I am aware that new Authorised Professional Practice (APP) from the CoP has recently been published in February 2026. (URN: NGPF0011111). I believe it is paramount that all forces Communications teams utilise this, and additional support through the CoP or NPCC is made available if required.

856. The EMSOU-RRU peer review (URN: NGPF0007817) referenced differences in working practices between EMSOU-MC and CT. This was in reference to the recovery and viewing of CCTV.

857. On 13 June 2023 at 11:10 I spoke with Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) Tim Jacques, the Senior National Coordinator (SNC) for CT, as there had been a number of media enquiries querying if the attacks were being treated as a CT incident. He stated that there needed to be a further understanding of VC's mindset. We agreed that NP would continue to lead on the investigation supported by CT. It was also agreed that we would

confirm this with the media. This is recorded in my daybook (URN: NGPF0011112).

858. However, it took time to establish VC's motivation. Consequently, it was necessary for NP to lead the investigation, with support from CT, until VC's motivation was better understood. This required working practices to align effectively, and it is disappointing that this was not immediately achieved in relation to CCTV recovery.

859. I have acknowledged my mistake in not appointing a PIP 4 and I believe that the role could have assisted in addressing working practices as well as communications between NP and CT.

860. I am aware that ACC Griffin has addressed concerns regarding NP approach to debriefs, by implementing changes to the NP approach. Consequently, NP has now improved IT support for debriefs and implemented the CoP debrief training.

Structural issues

861. I have been asked whether I think there are any structural issues in terms of policies, training, procedures or methodology that may have contributed to any issues I have identified.

862. Clearly the NP approach to executing and managing FTA warrants was a major structural issue. In September 2022 when the FTA warrant was issued for VC, the process in NP was ineffective; there were inconsistent working practices and a lack of supervisory oversight.

863. The management of warrants was managed locally, with warrants being allocated by virtue of the defendant's home address. This was done by the warrants team who, upon receipt of a warrant from the Crown Court or Magistrates Court, would enter it onto NICHE and PNC.
864. The warrant would then be sent via NICHE. NICHE is a policing software system used by NP to record operational information. This includes detailed records of reported crimes, investigations and custody data.
865. NICHE guidance stated that the warrant should be sent to the most appropriate Neighbourhood Police Unit NICHE, in practice warrants were allocated to the area where the defendant was believed to be living.
866. The Neighbourhood Policing Inspector (NPI) was responsible for allocating the warrant; however, the NICHE in boxes were disorganised, as they were cluttered with tasks created when a warrant was allocated. This made prioritisation difficult as well as establishing what enquiries had been undertaken. Following the attacks in June 2023, the NP warrants system was subject to a review. This was undertaken by Detective Chief Superintendent (DCS) Leona Scurr and was tasked from Operation Hendrix Gold meeting on 15 June 2023 by ACC Griffin. Following the review NP have introduced a new process for warrant management as follows; (URN: NGPF0011419) and associated warrants process map (URN: NGPF0011420).When a warrant is issued the warrants officers grade the warrants A, B, C according to the NPCC warrant matrix as well as overlaying an intelligence-based risk matrix that could elevate the grading to prioritise certain subjects.

867. The Cambridge Crime Harm Index (CCHI) is then applied, this generates a score that reflects the severity and societal impact of crimes rather than focussing on the number of crimes.
868. Day to day management of warrants remains with NPIs. In addition, the Officer in the Case (OIC) is also notified if a warrant has been issued.
869. NP has introduced a warrants dashboard into its suite of Power BI. Power BI collects and presents data in a manner that makes it easier to view. Warrant data is now presented in dashboards and filters can be applied to the data. For example, a NPI can apply filters to display the number of active warrants in their area and the number of days since it was issued assisting in management and prioritisation.
870. Activity regarding execution of warrants is managed through NICHE Record Management System (RMS). An occurrence is created and attached to the defendant's nominal record when an FTA warrant is issued. Updates are then entered onto occurrence enquiry logs (OELs) detailing what work has been undertaken to execute the FTA warrant.
871. Improvements have been made regarding scrutiny, with performance analysed at Divisional Performance Meetings (Chaired by Divisional Commanders), Force Improving Investigations Meeting, (Chaired by Superintendent) Criminal Justice Board (Chaired by ACC Crime) and Improving Outcomes Board (Chaired by DCC).
872. Documents NGPF0011419 and NGPF0011420I have already detailed my assessment of the sharing of information regarding PSD investigations with

the families. I am aware that work has been conducted by ACC Griffin and DSU Craner to address this issue with a clearly defined role for the PSD representative at Gold groups.

Recommendations

873. I have been asked whether there are any recommendations I would make that could help prevent any of the issues I have identified.

Recommendation 1

874. To ensure the effective management of risk to individuals and the wider public, the processes for information sharing between the police and mental health services requires major review and enhancement. Police Liaison Operations Groups (PLOGs), led by mental health services, currently operate within Nottinghamshire; however, it is likely that approaches vary across the UK.

875. There is a clear need for these arrangements to be formalised in order to achieve national consistency. Furthermore, consideration should be given to placing such mechanisms on a statutory footing to ensure clarity of responsibility and statutory compliance across all relevant agencies.

Recommendation 2

876. Since 2011, there has been a statutory duty to conduct a Domestic Homicide Review (DHR) following the death of a person aged 16 or over

where the death has resulted, or appears to have resulted, from domestic abuse, violence, or neglect.

877. The DHR process adopts a multi-agency approach to establish a comprehensive understanding of the circumstances surrounding the death, identify any failures on the part of local agencies, and make recommendations aimed at improving safeguarding and preventing future deaths.

878. I recommend that a comparable review process be introduced on a statutory footing for homicides in which the offender is believed to have been suffering from a mental health condition. Such a process would support continued learning across agencies and contribute to a deeper understanding of the systemic and operational issues involved.

Recommendation 3

879. Following the homicide of a loved one, families understandably require timely and accurate information from the police, alongside significant support as they navigate their grief.

880. NP approach to family liaison has rightly been subject to significant scrutiny, and the following recommendation is in no way intended to detract from that focus. I have fully acknowledged the shortcomings within NP in this regard. However, this scrutiny does highlight a broader issue concerning the scope and clarity of the family liaison role.

881. FLOs play an important role in facilitating the flow of information between the investigative team and bereaved families. However, the parameters of

the FLO role are not always sufficiently clearly defined, which can lead to a gradual drift into activities beyond their intended responsibilities. This is understandable, as those who volunteer for family liaison duties are typically highly committed and compassionate individuals who are motivated to provide the best possible support to the families they serve.

882. This goodwill can, however, result in a degree of role expansion or mission creep, with FLOs undertaking tasks that fall outside their formal remit. It is therefore essential that a FLA is appointed and remains actively engaged in overseeing deployments, ensuring that FLOs are appropriately tasked and protected from undertaking duties that sit outside their role, however well-intentioned those actions may be.

883. At present, a national curriculum for family liaison training exists, comprising learning objectives for each role and provided by the CoP. Individual forces are then responsible for embedding these objectives within their own training programmes. This approach carries a risk of misinterpretation and inconsistency in how the role is understood and delivered across forces.

884. I therefore recommend that the CoP reviews the role profiles for family liaison and that the training provision is enhanced to include a formal accreditation process.

885. Consideration must also be given to the provision of support beyond the scope of Family Liaison, including whether existing arrangements are sufficient and what additional support could be made available. Through my work with Family Liaison and Coordination of Support Services (FLACSS),

I am aware of a number of highly effective charities that provide specialist support to bereaved families.

886. At present, engagement with these organisations is largely dependent on referrals made by FLOs or through self-referral by families. This approach is inconsistent and can result in variable access to support. It would therefore be appropriate to consider formalising referral pathways to these organisations to ensure a more consistent and equitable approach to the provision of specialist support.

Recommendation 4

887. Providing timely communication to the bereaved families and survivors presented significant challenges. In conjunction with relevant support agencies, up-to-date guidance should be developed on how such information is conveyed.
888. I strongly believe that, wherever possible, communication of this nature should take place in person; however, it must be acknowledged that this will not always be feasible. There are a number of technological solutions that may assist in facilitating timely communication in such circumstances. Any alternative approach must, however, be applied consistently and be informed by established research on the effective delivery of sensitive information to individuals experiencing trauma.

Recommendation 5

889. Whilst NP has amended its working practices regarding the intersection between criminal investigations and PSD investigations, consistency needs to be achieved across UK policing. This would be facilitated by clear guidance following consultation with CoP, IOPC and other national policing bodies including NPCC.

890. Also, amendments to the training and operational guidance for PIP 3 and PIP 4 and PSD investigators.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed:

GRO-B

Dated: 16 March 2026

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2	NGPF0007786	NGPF0007786 - Timeline of phone calls	KLM4.002
3	NGPF0011113	CoP Major incident management APP	KLM4.003
4	NGPF0011114	CoP Critical incident management APP	KLM4.004
5	NGPF0008898	MCIM - Nov-2021	KLM5.001
6	NGPF0011115	Comms strategy log (June 23 - Feb 24) for Hendrix	KLM5.002
7	NGPF0011116	Community Engagement Strategy CInsp Pearson	KLM5.003
8	NGPF0011117	Initial media release approved by C/Insp Humphris	KLM5.004
9	NGPF0005254	NGPF0005254 Simon Cotton email re VC charge press release	KLM6.001

10	NGPF0011118	15.06.23 17.51 RE_ Op Hendrix potential charging press release	KLM6.002
11	NGPF0011119	Media release 7 of 7_16 June 2023 1636	KLM6.003
12	NGPF0011120	Green book Major Inc Enq workbook	KLM6.004
13	NGPF0011121	Court steps transcript	KLM6.005
14	NGPF0007817	NGPF00007817 - Self Inspection report Op Hendrix	KLM6.006
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184	NGPF0011307	Letter from CC Meynell - MG - 12.02.24	KLM8.137
185	NGPF0007183	Email from EN to LW - dated 120224 21:05	KLM8.138

186	NGPF0011309	Email from CC to EW - dated 13022024 response to 090224	KLM8.139
187	NGPF0004217	CC Meynell - SKSOMK - 19.02.24	KLM8.141
188	NGPF0011319	CC Meynell - SKSOMK - 19.02.24 letter	KLM8.142
189	NGPF0004213	CC Meynell - EWDW - 19.02.24	KLM8.143
190	NGPF0011322	CC Meynell - EWDW - 19.02.24 letter	KLM8.144
191	NGPF0004215	CC Meynell - JC - 19.02.24	KLM8.145
192	NGPF0011325	CC Meynell - JC - 19.02.24 letter	KLM8.146
193	NGPF0007207	SK re WhatsApp messages	KLM8.147
194	NGPF0007212	LW to SK re Request for Information	KLM8.148
195	NGPF0011328	EW FW_ request for call email	KLM8.149
196	NGPF0007219	Letter Regarding PSD Matters Webbers	KLM8.150

197	NGPF0011334	CC Meynell - Webber Family - 20.2.24	KLM8.151
198	NGPF0007213	Letter Regarding PSD Matters OMK family	KLM8.152
199	NGPF0011337	CC Meynell - OMK Family - 20.2.24	KLM8.153
200	NGPF0007216	Letter Regarding PSD Matters Coates	KLM8.154
201	NGPF0011340	CC Meynell - Coates Family - 20.2.24	KLM8.155
202	NGPF0011341	SK email to CC 20.02.24 23.27 Re_ Letter Regarding PSD Matters	KLM8.156
203	NGPF0001235	Re_ Letter Regarding PSD Matters EW	KLM8.157
204	NGPF0007223	RE_ Letter Regarding PSD Matters CC to EW	KLM8.158
205	NGPF0007224	Re_ Letter Regarding PSD Matters EW to CC	KLM8.159

206	NGPF0011346	21.02.24 1704 KL on CC behalf RE Body Cam footage and reply	KLM8.161
207	NGPF0011347	21.02.24 17.16 EW and CC Re_ Body Cam footage Chain	KLM8.162
208	NGPF0007227	LW to EW RE_ Letter Regarding PSD Matters	KLM8.165
209	NGPF0007231	Letter from CC Meynell WB	KLM8.166
210	NGPF0011353	CC Meynell - WB - 22.2.24	KLM8.167
211	NGPF0007234	Letter from CC Meynell SM	KLM8.168
212	NGPF0011356	CC Meynell - Sharon Miller - 22.2.24	KLM8.169
213	NGPF0007237	Letter from CC Meynell MG	KLM8.170
214	NGPF0011359	CC Meynell - MG - 22.2.24	KLM8.171
215	NGPF0007144	Re_ Letter from CC Meynell TH	KLM8.172
216	NGPF0011364	Email chain re letter Regarding PSD Matters	KLM8.173
217	NGPF0007246	Letter from CC Meynell OMK	KLM8.174

218	NGPF0011367	CC Meynell - Misconduct Update - OMK	KLM8.175
219	NGPF0007249	Letter from CC Meynell SOMK	KLM8.176
220	NGPF0011370	CC Meynell - Misconduct Update - SOMK	KLM8.177
221	NGPF0007252	Letter from CC Meynell Webbers	KLM8.178
222	NGPF0011373	CC Meynell - Misconduct Update - Webber Family	KLM8.179
223	NGPF0007255	Letter from CC Meynell Coates	KLM8.180
224	NGPF0011376	CC Meynell - Misconduct Update - Coates Family	KLM8.181
225	NGPF0007261	Letter from CC Meynell EN	KLM8.182
226	NGPF0011379	CC Meynell - Misconduct Update - EN	KLM8.183
227	NGPF0007264	Letter from CC Meynell MG	KLM8.184
228	NGPF0011382	CC Meynell - Misconduct Update - MG	KLM8.185
229	NGPF0007267	Letter from CC Meynell SM	KLM8.186

230	NGPF0011385	CC Meynell - Misconduct Update - SM	KLM8.187
231	NGPF0007270	Letter for Wayne from CC Meynell WB	KLM8.188
232	NGPF0011388	CC Meynell - Misconduct Update - WB	KLM8.189
233	NGPF0010137	EW to CC 11.03.24 1604 Re_ Letter from CC Meynell	KLM8.190
234	NGPF0011390	SK Timeline of events as presented at Avon & Somerset HQ 7_12_23	KLM8.191
235	NGPF0011391	CC Enquiries RE_ Dr Kumar's e- mail	KLM8.192
236	NGPF0011395	140324 response from CC to Dr Kumar re CCTV timeline	KLM8.193
237	NGPF0011396	13.03.24 14.19 Response to email of 10th March	KLM8.194
238	NGPF0011397	Email from SK to CC, copied to IOPC and SOMK - dated 20022024 at 1809pm	KLM8.195

239	NGPF0011398	Email from EW to CC, copied to SK, SOMK and IOPC - dated 21022024 at 1453pm	KLM8.195a
240	NGPF0011399	Email from IOPC to EW and CC, copied to SK and SOMK - dated 21022024 at 1641pm	KLM8.195b
241	NGPF0011406	Email from EW to IOPC and CC, copied to SK and SOMK - dated 21022024 at 1710pm	KLM8.195c
242	NGPF0011407	Letter from CC Meynell OMK 22.03.24	KLM8.196
243	NGPF0011409	CC Meynell - Dr Kumar 22nd March	KLM8.197
244	NGPF0011410	Dr Kumar email 22.03.24 at 1609 Re_ Letter from CC Meynell	KLM8.198
245	NGPF0007276	EW to CC 25.03.24 Re_ Response to e-mail of 10th March	KLM8.199
246	NGPF0011413	CC to SK 25.03.24 RE_ Letter from CC Meynell	KLM8.200

247	NGPF0007278	CC response to EW 26.03.24 1610 RE_ Response to email of 10th March	KLM8.201
248	NGPF0011415	Death of Barnaby Webber - 13 June 2023	KLM8.202
249	NGPF0001292	EW to CC 24.05.24 re Representation	KLM8.203
250	NGPF0011417	RE Request for further Forensic Testing (NOT001.10452)	KLM8.203a
251	NGPF0011418	Letter Elaine Newton handed to CC 22.02.24	KLM8.204
252	NGPF0001153	NGPF0001153 Letter to families from Elias Colocane	KLM8.205
253	NGPF0009384	14 June vigil FLO briefing notes OMK NGPF0009384	KLM9.100
254	NGPF0009386	14 June vigil FLO briefing notes Webber NGPF0009386	KLM9.101
255	NGPF0011086	SK request for Dr Blackwoods report	KLM10.100

256	NGPF0011087	060224 Email Chain re request from SK for timeline	KLM10.101
257	NGPF0011088	060224 CC and CPS email chain re SK req for timeline	KLM10.102
258	NGPF0008675	CoP FLO practice advice Management Structure FLO	KLM11.100
259	NGPF0008746	FLO LOG OMK NGPF0008746	KLM11.101
260	NGPF0008569	FLO LOG WEBBER NGPF0008569	KLM11.102
261	NGPF0008359	FLO LOG COATES NGPF0008359	KLM11.103
262	NGPF0008774	FLO LOG ELAINE NEWTON	KLM11.104
263	NGPF0011090	Report from sun newspaper (15 June 2023)	KLM13.010
264	NGPF0011460	Email MB to CC re family concerns 28.03.24	KLM13.01 1
265	NGPF0011461	Email DCC to MB and PSD re family concerns	KLM13.012
266	NGPF0011091	SC Skenderaj AMH Bundle	KLM14.010

267	WITN0339009	CoP Guidance on Policing Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct hearings	KLM14.011
268	NGPF0011093	Home Office Guidance on Conduct Efficiency and Effectiveness	KLM14.012
269	NGPF0011094	Reg 53 - Notification on Public Private Hearing - CC decision	KLM14.013
270	NGPF0011095	Reg 53 Notice form PC Jas Chaplain	KLM14.014
271	NGPF0010750	Skenderaj AMH hearing recording, includes outcome recording	KLM14.015
272	NGPF0011096	Introduction for Chair AMH - Skenderaj	KLM14.016
273	NGPF0011097	Opening Note SC Skenderaj -AA	KLM14.017
274	NGPF0011098	Regulation 54 Response SPC Skenderaj	KLM14.018
275	NGPF0011099	Written CC response to Skenderaj AMH.	KLM14.019

276	NGPF0011100	Written CC response to Skenderaj AMH determination	KLM14.020
277	NGPF0005502	Regulation 62 Notice SC Skenderaj	KLM14.021
278	NGPF0011102	11 Dec 23 Email from Steve O'Connell to DCI's Reynolds and Harding	KLM14.022
279	NGPF0011456	Email chain 05.12.23 between Hearings officer and CC re AMH publication.	KLM14.022 a
280	NGPF0011457	SO to MJ 06.12.23 re notification of upcoming AMH - Skenderaj	KLM14.022 b
281	NGPF0011458	Misconduct hearing online Skenderaj	KLM14.023
282	NGPF0011329	Email re draft letter sent to PSD prior to transmission to bereaved families	KLM8.149a
283	NGPF0011331	Draft letter	KLM8.149b
284	NGPF0011459	Social Media Policy 2022	KLM15.002

285	NGPF0007818	ACC Griffin sought advice from IOPC via PSD regarding outstanding warrant	KLM16.001
286	NGPF0011104	IOPC referral CO13424	KLM16.002
287	NGPF0011105	7 Feb Email A Reynolds to CC re SK complaint still being under consideration	KLM16.003
288	NGPF0011106	Email Exchange DSU Reynolds and IPOC re SK complaint	KLM16.004
289	NGPF0011110	Summary of allegations	KLM16.005
290	NGPF0011111	CoP APP engagement and communication guidance overview	KLM17.001
291	NGPF0007817	NGPF0007817 Self Inspection report Op Hendrix Master	KLM17.002
292	NGPF0011419	Warrants Protocol 2022 NPCC	KLM18.001
293	NGPF0011420	Warrants Process Map	KLM18.002

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