

Witness Name: Peter Shaw

Statement No: WITN0411001

Dated: 18 February 2026

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF INSP PETER SHAW

I, Peter Shaw will say as follows: -

1. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (**the "Inquiry"**) with the matters set out in the Rule 9(1) Request dated 26th January 2026 (**the "Request"**).

BACKGROUND

2. I joined Nottinghamshire Police in April 2004. After an initial two weeks training course locally, I attended Tally Ho training Centre for fifteen weeks initial training which covered law inputs, officer safety and role plays, before coming back into force for a further two weeks training in local procedures. I was then posted to West Bridgford Police Station around August 2004 for 10 weeks tutoring at the end of which I was signed off for independent patrol on the same team as a Response Officer. As a Response Officer you are required to respond to calls for service and deal with daily business including processing detained persons, scene preservation and other such tasks.

3. In late 2005 I was posted to Operation Kingdom, a proactive uniformed role implemented in the wake of the arrests of high-profile Organised Crime Group nominals. In the following years, this team morphed into a team essentially fulfilling the same responsibilities but in a wider geographical area. During this time, I attended training courses in Standard and Advanced Driving, Surveillance and Public Order Public Safety (POPS). In 2012 I moved into the role of Neighbourhood Policing where I was the dedicated Police Officer for the Bestwood Beat. There was no bespoke training for this role.
4. On 10th March 2015 I passed the legal examination for the rank of Sergeant. In 2019 I was temporarily promoted to the rank of Sergeant, back in Response Policing. I received no training for this role and learned on the job, with support of peers and my Line Manager. This promotion was made substantive in September the same year after a process involving a written application and interview board. Following a posting process, I moved locations but in the same core role. The role involves supervision of a team of officers with a geographically defined area on a dedicated radio talk group. I was responsible for those officers, their wellbeing and workload whilst having responsibility for the outstanding demand in the form of calls for service, detained persons, missing person enquiries, initial command of serious incidents and scene preservation.
5. As part of the promotion process, I was required to undertake a level 4 certificate in Police First Line Management. This involved an assessment

by a qualified assessor whereby I had to evidence my dealings with a range of criteria such as attendance at incidents and investigations. This was demonstrated in the forms of recorded oral evidence, incident logs and written responses to questions. I received confirmation of my completion of this qualification in November 2020.

6. In October 2021 I passed the Legal Examination for the rank of Inspector. After a local interview process in 2022 I was temporarily promoted to the role of Response Policing Inspector (RPI) then known as Demand Management Inspector (DMI). There was no specific training given for this role, the only training I received was the generic input delivered on scheduled response training days and e-learning that was mandated.
7. At the time of the temporary promotion, I was one of two DMIs for the force on our rota. There were and still are five rotas for the response teams. I had geographical responsibility for the South of the County of Nottinghamshire consisting of three radio talk groups and seven teams each with a Sergeant and a varying number of constables.
8. Following another written application and interview board I was made substantive in this rank in July 2022 and remained in post. I was the Demand Management Inspector on the 12th of June 2023 to which this statement relates. I refer to the 12th of June as this was the date my duty commenced. The incident occurred in the early hours of the morning of the 13th. My duty time was 2200 on the 12th until 0700 hours on the 13th.

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9. I then completed level 5 in Police Line Management with a different assessor and criteria but in the same format as the previous qualification. I successfully passed this in February 2023.
 10. In July 2024 I moved into the Operational Support Department where my role includes supervision of the Operational and Emergency Planning Team, Resource Management Unit, Football Policing Unit, Public Order Training and Police Drone Team.
 11. Operational Support covers a wide range of policing specialties, such as Firearms, Territorial Support Group, Dogs, Roads Policing, Serious Collision Investigation.
 12. The Resource Management Unit deal with the whole organisation's duties management, including planning staffing for daily business across all areas, events that require policing such as football matches and protests, VIP visits, large scale incidents that require protracted scene preservation, overtime and payroll processes.
 13. Emergency Planning has responsibility for force plans for a multitude of scenarios and events both local and national. They are also involved in internal testing and exercising.

14. Operational planning work with event organisers and partners to plan and provide safe public events, they also get involved in the planning of visits and sit on Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs) across the County.
15. The Football Policing Team link into all three of the County's professional football clubs, sitting on their SAGs, working at football matches involving those clubs both home and away.
16. Public Order Training is responsible for organising and delivering the public order and public safety training to all ranks in force. This includes the initial training and CPD for Constables, Sergeants and Inspectors for level 3 and level 2 public order duties.
17. I also have ownership of the force structured debrief process. My team organises and conducts structured debriefs for identified incidents to a College of Policing recognised standard. The incidents included in this process are varied and whilst they can be put forward by any person, have to be authorised by and any actions owned by a rank of Superintendent or above. My role in that is oversight of the number of trained debriefers and ensuring they remain qualified by completing a minimum of 1 debrief per year. I also oversee the management of any recommendations and ensure these are communicated with the Senior Leadership Teams support staff to feed into force level processes for quality assurance and awareness.

18. My day-to-day role is to supervise these teams, their welfare and workload, to make decisions around working practices and inform Commanders across the force about issues that affect their areas of business.
19. In addition, I have been Public Order Public Safety (POPS) trained in each rank since 2009. Qualifying in 2024 as a POPS Bronze Commander and National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer (NILO). The POPS commander role involves having geographic or thematic responsibility at public order or public safety events, prime examples of these events are football matches, protests and events such as Nottingham Pride. When deployed to those events in this capacity I am required to write deployment plans in line with the National Decision Model for those events. Prior to the training I had to qualify as a POPS commander and hold that for a year prior to attendance at an Events Course and Bronze Commanders course totalling three weeks training and an assessment.
20. The NILO mentioned above is a national qualification centred on co-ordination and communication between different agencies, predominately at major incidents but can be used at any multi agency pre planned incident or response. All NILO's are security vetted.
21. This role involved a two-week course with a knowledge test and an assessed written plan at the end of the course to gain the qualification. The course involved several inputs from personnel from a range of organisations and disciplines from Emergency Services, Counter Terrorism

and Armed Forces. We were taught and eventually assessed on our ability to write a direct-action plan for our specific agencies in response to a scenario. The direct-action plan has many similarities to a Public Order Public Safety Bronze deployment plan in that it follows the National Decision Model and Joint Decision Model. The Joint Decision Model is almost the same as the National Decision Model except it is centred around the ethos of working together to save lives reducing harm rather than the Police Code of Ethics in the National Decision Model.

22. Both of these qualifications aid me in my day-to-day role as I can advise and guide my teams, other agencies, stakeholders and Police Commanders in operational decision making and interoperability between agencies. Both roles require CPD to remain qualified, there are yearly CPD sessions for POPs bronze commanders as well as operational deployments as required. The CPD for a NILO is bimonthly.

Role on 13th June in respect of the Incident involving Valdo Calocane

23. On the 13th of June 2023 I was in my role of Response Policing Inspector (RPI). That role is to be responsible for a team of officers covering a defined geographic area, much like the response Sergeant role except you have a team of Sergeants and their teams to supervise. The day-to-day responsibilities are to manage demand coming from the Force Control Room (FCR) and other internal departments whilst managing welfare and

workload management of the Constables and Sergeants and working with internal and external partners to resolve incidents.

24. The RPI would be informed of all serious incidents for oversight and tasking, review high risk domestic abuse cases, review risk levels of missing persons whilst also advising their teams around ongoing investigations and highlighting incidents of note for attendance.
25. Where a serious incident occurs the RPI would be involved in co-ordination of the initial response, liaising with and tasking the Sergeant to ensure key tasks are progressed, liaison with colleagues in other Police departments such as CID and Crime Scene Investigation to inform the tasks.
26. The Response Team's function on a 24 hour 7 days a week basis, during daytime hours they are readily supported by a number of functions. During the night shifts a lot of those functions and roles are reduced but available on an on-call basis. The core 24/7 role are response, Force Control Room, Custody, Firearms and Dogs and a Real Time Intelligence function also based in the Control Room. I believe that at the time of the night of 12th June there was also a nighttime Detective Inspector, but that role has also gone to an on-call function since.
27. My geographic responsibility was defined as the "South" which included the City Centre and some surrounding suburbs and the Rushcliffe areas South of the County. As standard that team consisted of 5 teams, each with a

Sergeant and a varying number of Constables. This area was run over two separate radio channels named talk groups 6 and 7. As RPI I would change channels depending on where I was or what was happening at that time, for example, if I was made aware of an incident I needed to monitor. The 5 teams were as follows,

Talk group 7 – Radford Road and Byron House

Talk group 6 – covering Rushcliffe, St Anns and Riverside;

28. I paraded on at Radford Road police station on 12th June at 21:38, I refer to the 12th of June as this was the date my duty commenced. The incident occurred in the early hours of the morning of the 13th of June. My duty time was 2200 hours on the 12th of June until 0700 hours on the 13th of June. This was the first of two night shifts and the fifth in the set of 6 working days before 4 rest days. The Response Shift pattern is 6 shifts of 2 day shifts, 2 afternoon shifts (usually 1500-0000 except Fridays and Saturdays which finished at 0200) and two night shifts.
29. Radford Road Police Station was my default as my kit, and the dedicated Police vehicle were based there. At the desktop computer within the RPI office I had access to the same dispatch system, SAFE, that the Control Room have. This gave me more insight into officer locations and their current commitments.
30. My usual routine, and it was no different that night, was to come on around an hour before my tour of duty to take a handover from the preceding

afternoon Inspector, review any emails I had received and review any incidents of note and outstanding high-risk offenders.

31. I cannot recall anything significant from that handover with the afternoon Inspector aside from an ongoing crime scene which I had to allocate staff to. When crime scenes are subject to ongoing investigation, there is a requirement to maintain their integrity for evidential continuity.
32. At 22.30 hours I had a briefing with my Sergeants who reported on their staffing levels, and we discussed any highlights from the handovers. At 22.45 hours I would then report, with the other Inspectors, to the Force Incident Manager (FIM). Both meetings are held over Teams and are not recorded.
33. My shift, Rota 4 used a shared excel document to report on staffing, crewing and commitments. This document only allows a review of changes in the last 180 days so I cannot see the version I would have used on 12th June 2023. I have however had a report produced from Duty Management System (DMS) which shows the staffing on duty that night. I will refer to this as NGPF0010387.
34. The report shows that Byron House had no Sergeant and 8 Constables. Radford Road had 1 Sergeant and 9 Constables. Riverside had 1 Sergeant and 4 Constables. St Anns had 1 Sergeant and 7 Constables. Rushcliffe had 1 Sergeant and 5 Constables. This night shift started like any other; I

reviewed emails, tasked out arrest attempts, ensured any missing from home enquiries were allocated and attended the briefings to obtain and disseminate the above staffing and demand picture. The staffing on the night for my area was 9 over the force set minimum staffing at that time.

35. At the time the force had moved to a 3 RPI model, this meant that instead of the two geographic areas being covered by two RPI's there were now three; North, South and West. I can see from our duties system both Inspectors responsible for the other two Force areas were on duty, so I was not required to cover any more than my usual area of responsibility (NGPF0010387).

Detail of my attendance at the scene

36. Immediately prior to the incident being passed by the FCR on 13th June 2023, I was at Byron House which is the Station for the City Centre team. I was in conversation with PCs Abid and Nunley. PC Abid was in the process of tutoring PC Nunley and there had been some performance issues that were in dispute, I was there to understand and discuss these matters.
37. PC Abid noted a call passed by the Control Room and relayed to me that there had been reports of a stabbing on Ilkeston Road. He asked if we could end the meeting so they could attend. I agreed and said I would join them

due to my proximity to the location. I travelled alone, utilising my emergency lighting and audible equipment.

38. From referring to incident log 0065_13062023 (URN: NGPF0006136) I can see an update from myself at 04:17 hours, approximately 13 minutes after the call was received in the control room. The update on the log says '2856 – 1 AMB HERE AT THE MINUTE'. 2856 is my collar number.
39. To attend the scene this soon after the call was not a default practice for me as ordinarily the local Sergeant would attend and take command in the first instance. The reason I attended was that I was so close having been at Byron House to speak with PCs Abid and Nunley who were also attending the incident.
40. At that time, I had not been dispatched by the Control Room and so had self-deployed. I can't recall whether I announced my attendance, but the control room would have been aware by virtue of my update at 04:17 hours.
41. I would estimate we arrived on the scene within minutes. I don't recall being passed or being aware of anything other than basic information about a stabbing prior to getting to the scene. I did not have an opportunity to review any information about the incident as I deployed immediately after being made aware of the incident by PC Abid. I had my radio on, so I could hear the transmissions but cannot recall on which channel. It was common

practice for the Control Room to reduce the number of radio channels in the latter part of a night shift due to the numbers of available Control Room Dispatchers. I cannot recall if or when this may have happened on this night. Ordinarily on a night shift Talk Group 7 would close and all officers would change their radio channel to Talk Group 6.

42. My initial thoughts whilst travelling were that there was not enough information to make any decisions, as I was within minutes I would have been able to assess the scene in person and guide, assist and instruct the officers present if any direction was required. Quite often the reality can be that an incident is not as reported and on occasions calls are either made in good faith by passersby or sometimes can be hoax calls which require attendance.

43. The primary role of the Police is to save life and limb. On arrival to the scene, I recall seeing Officers and Medical Professionals providing life support to Barnaby in the middle of the carriageway on Ilkeston Road. I cannot recall the exact timeline but soon after Grace O'Malley-Kumar was located by other officers on scene, I cannot recall specifically who, in the front garden of a residential property nearby and officers began to administer first aid to her. Due to where she was located, we were unaware of the exact circumstances of what happened, Officers therefore forced entry to establish any further injured parties within the property.

44. On arrival the local Sergeant for Radford Road and on that evening also Byron House, PS Ria Mobley, was already on scene and involved in the delivery of first aid to one of the victims. From memory she provided first aid to the person later identified as Barnaby Webber.
45. Due to the passage of time my recollection of the order of my actions and communications is limited, but I remember deciding that as there were sufficient officers engaged in life support to the two victims, I would coordinate the scene preservation and initial golden hour enquiries at the Ilkeston Road scene. This involved setting the scene parameters in terms of size and locations, ensuring officers were posted at any entry or exit points to that scene and that they had scene logs in order to record entry and exit of persons within the scene. I also tasked an Officer to conduct house to house enquiries in the vicinity of what I believed to be the offence location to gain further information that would assist us in establishing what had happened. I can't recall how many Officers were committed to each task, but I recall being satisfied that the number was appropriate.
46. Whilst this would normally be managed by either Constables or the Sergeant on the scene, I took this responsibility as I was present, and Sergeant Mobley was already engaged in medical interventions. The actions I took were in line with the Golden Hour principles.
47. The Golden Hour is detailed in the College of Policing's Approved Professional Practice for Investigations (NGPF0010388). It is summarised

as the period immediately following the report of an incident and highlights that everyone involved in investigating a crime or incident must help to preserve life, secure material, minimise the amount of material that could be lost to the investigation and maximise the chance of securing material that will be admissible in court.

48. Once I was satisfied appropriate assistance was being given to Medical Professionals, I utilised the remaining officers to appropriately secure the scene. I made my judgement based on the limited information available to me at that time. I expanded what was apparently the scene of the actual attack to some natural boundaries far away from that location, primarily to increase the chance of preservation of evidence discarded or dropped away from the main location of the attack and partly to aid the logistics of maintaining the integrity of the scene.
49. I recall most of my team based at Radford Road and Byron House being present, lots being involved in assisting medical provision, the rest were tasked to the scene management. I cannot remember who did what.
50. I was made aware, I can't remember exactly how, that Detective Inspector Dowson had been informed and was travelling to the scene. I remained at Ilkeston Road until she arrived and until I was asked to attend a joint emergency services briefing at around 10am in the morning. After Detective Inspector Dowson arrived, I remained near her, and relayed information from over the radio to her. This was because Detective Inspector Dowson

did not have a radio with her and was constantly on the phone to Major Crime and other parties.

51. Once the scene was established, which was before the further incidents came to our attention, no changes were made to the staffing of the scene. PC 1208 Brady-Johnson was the officer tasked with house to house and I believe the officer who made the enquiry leading to the dash cam footage from the taxi. I viewed this footage of the attack whilst Barnaby and Grace were still being treated. Aside from being able to visually confirm the direction of travel of the offender it did nothing to aid me in terms of my management of the scene.

52. This continued as the night's events developed, and we became aware of further incidents of a van running people over in the city centre and then the discovery of Ian Coates on Magdala Road in Mapperley. This was the order of my awareness of these incidents.

53. After Grace and Barnaby were transported in the ambulance Detective inspector Dowson and I remained at the scene, partly due to the fact other supervisors attended the other incident locations and partly due to the risk of cross contamination of evidence. East Midlands Ambulance Service (EMAS) and other medical staff were deployed via their own dispatch. I had no part in this and did not provide any first aid myself whilst at the scene.

54. In addition to my conversations with Detective Inspector Dowson, I recall a number of communications with the FIM Chief Inspector Mather; these were both by direct radio transmission and my personal telephone due to the practicalities of contacting him over the radio when there was a large amount of traffic with updates. Throughout the later incidents I was constantly changing radio channels to obtain information from the other scenes.
55. I remained at that scene location until I was released to go to a joint briefing with Emergency Service Partners. I recall this being around 1000 hours and being held at the Clock Tower at the Victoria Shopping Centre. I relayed what I knew from either hearing over the radio or what I had seen at the Ilkeston Road scene.
56. That meeting was one held in line with the Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Protocols (JESIP) which are designed to develop a joint understanding of risk and shared situational awareness. These protocols were established in 2012 following lessons learned from major incidents where lack of coordination between emergency services had severe consequences.
57. At approximately 10:30 hours I was released from the meeting and went to Radford Road Police Station. I don't know what time I finished my tour of duty. From looking at my booking this wasn't completed until some days later.

4. Observation to Chief Inspector Mather and reflections

58. I have been asked to comment on a radio conversation I had with Chief Inspector Mather, and it has been reported that I said, "We have some cops looking for the suspect...if not many." I have no recollection of this conversation. I have listened to a recording of the conversation to aid my memory. This recording is referred to as URN NGPF0007311.
59. Having listened to the recording the conversation appears to address resourcing and whether I had sufficient staff. I relayed the scene parameters and asked that mapping was checked to ensure there were no unseen access routes. This was because I was not familiar with the location in that level of detail.
60. With regard to the comment "We have got some cops looking for the suspect... if not many" I have no doubt that I said that due to the number of resources required to attend to Barnaby and Grace and establish an appropriately sized scene, based on the information available to us at the time. As I was located at the scene, I did not have sight of the commitments and locations of all the available resources, therefore I would not know who was conducting the area search for the suspect. My primary concern was securing the scene, directing initial house to house enquiries and allowing as many officers as were needed to assist in the medical interventions taking place.

61. The statement written within the statement request from The Nottingham Inquiry does not include that I say the words "haven't we?" before saying "if not many." I said this because I did not know. Chief Inspector Mather's response was that we had Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs), consisting of 2 Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs) in each, providing first aid and one more that's untrained to do something that I cannot hear properly on the audio recording. Chief Inspector Mather then remarks that the suspect is probably long gone now and to concentrate on those two people at the scene.
62. In answering the question, I was not specifically raising it as an issue, I was updating Chief Inspector Mather as to the current situation at the scene. I was not aware of the actions taking place around locating the suspect other than those I have already stated which were house to house and CCTV enquiries that I was directing at the scene. I do not recall my reactions to Chief Inspector Mather's response at the time. On reflection, I think it quite reasonable for him to ask me to concentrate on issues at the scene as he would be aware of the issues I would face in trying to address the task of suspect location. I do not recall having any further involvement in locating the suspect prior to the events developing resulting in the detention of Valdo Calocane later that night.
63. When fully staffed, the Control Room Top Desk, consists of, a FIM (Force Incident Manager), two Force Incident Supervisors (FIS) of the rank of Sergeant and two Control Room Managers who are Civilian Staff. The Top

Desk would ordinarily intervene and assist in more serious, complex incidents. I did not ask whether they were co-ordinating the search, but I presumed that would be the case and perhaps this is why I asked the question noted above.

64. I do not usually deploy myself to such incidents as a matter of course. This highlighted the benefit of me being in a position where I can see updates going onto the log that may have not been passed on the radio and also being able to see where other resources who are able to assist.
65. If I were not almost immediately at the scene, I would expect that I would be made aware of the incident either by overhearing the radio transmissions or being informed via a phone call or direct call to my radio to inform me and to start reviewing the incident. Normally, in these instances I would review the information available on the incident log and either supplement this with other sources of information, such as research on the suspects and victims involved, as well as reviewing linked contact records. Contact Records are usually made when other persons call in regarding the same incident but are essentially reporting the same thing. Contact Records are added to the main incident log but not always highlighted or communicated over the radio channel as this is left free for other radio transmissions and updates.

66. If the information allowed me to, I would liaise either directly with Officers travelling to or at the scene or through the Control Room Dispatcher. I would set actions and expectations, ask questions that may quickly be answered by Officers at the scene or the Control Room Staff regarding information which may not have been passed by public callers to the control room. Examples of this are injuries sustained, obvious CCTV, particularly Council owned cameras which can be reviewed 24/7, maps to be provided, ANPR enquiries, directions to debrief callers in quick time to expand on the information passed to the Control Room, the management of cross contamination issues, direct contact with other Sergeant and Inspectors for further resource, calls to local Hospitals to establish if there are people presenting with injuries if we suspect involved persons had already left the scene prior to Police arrival. This list is not exhaustive but highlights some of my considerations early on when dealing with incidents. These considerations, however, would very much depend on what I could see on the incident log.

67. Being at the scene and the lack of any other Supervisory Officers did impact on my ability to have that wider oversight and I did have to get involved in tasks that would ordinarily be co-ordinated by the Sergeant on scene, who was at that time involved in the medical interventions.

68. On reflection, it would have certainly been more beneficial for me to be at my desk during the early stages of the incident. It would have increased my

understanding of the incident, available resources and wider efforts being made to locate the offender.

5. Observations relating to the sufficiency of the search for Valdo Calocane

69. I am not aware of any set procedure or training, in relation to who co-ordinates the searches for suspects or high-risk persons, whether they are wanted in connection to an offence or missing/at risk of self-harm. Ordinarily it is a collaborative effort by officers at the scene, Sergeants, the RPI and the Control Room and depends on the availability of those people. In terms of Top Desk Supervision, they may be involved in other significant incidents across the force the same could be said in relation to other levels of supervision.
70. From recollection I do not remember any unambiguous direction or decision about who would be co-ordinating the search for the suspect in relation to this incident. Other than the recording I have listened to of my conversation with Chief Inspector Mather at 0432 hours on 13th of June 2023 I do not recall having any conversation about the search for Valdo Calocane. My focus was very much on the scene actions I have mentioned earlier.
71. There are always difficulties when incidents are subject to Firearms attendance with them being on a different radio channel. At times Officers are invited to go onto their dedicated radio channel and sometimes

channels are patched together to aid joint situational awareness. This is very much a changing situation and there are benefits and drawbacks to both variations. The decisions around this sit with the Control Room Staff.

72. The 13th June 2023 incident was very much led by the Control Room, as my attention and effort was put into the co-ordination of officers at the scene itself. As Firearms Officers often work on a separate radio channel, it results in communication and awareness issues for Officers on the ground and all those trying to manage the response.
73. The description of the suspect at that time was very scant, and we did not know who they were. As I was focussed on matters at the scene and without the usual benefit of all the written information I would have at my computer I did not get involved in the details of the search; I believed this was being co-ordinated from the Control Room.
74. Throughout the early stages of this event and after it developed, I became aware of the other two main incidents. It was very difficult to keep track of all the developments and the incoming information about the incidents, which made it difficult to be involved in the co-ordination of resources and manage overall collaboration with the Control Room's efforts.
75. In relation to this event and in writing the statement, I do believe that if I had not travelled to the scene immediately that I would have been able to have better oversight of the incident. However, it can't be said what detriment this

would have had to the scene management. The benefits of being there meant that there was supervision and ownership of the scene. On reflection, I could have requested one of the other Sergeants attend and handed over those responsibilities to allow me to revert to my normal role.

6. Involvement in Major Incidents involving a different approach

76. I have not been involved in any other incidents defined as a Major Incident and search for an offender. I have been involved in other serious incidents and searches for offenders. There are many varying factors to consider; including the details known about the suspects, the geography and the weather, which vastly influence the method used to search. Not knowing what decisions that were made in relation to this incident I cannot suggest any differences in approach that could have been taken.
77. I have been involved in numerous searches for people whether they are suspects following serious incidents or missing persons who are vulnerable due to reported intent to self-harm or by virtue of their physical condition, age or other vulnerabilities. In those incidents I would have ordinarily been at my desk and dictating, alongside liaising with specialist search officers, many of the actions I referred to earlier as well as others bespoke to the circumstances.

7. Further information relating to involvement of assistance to the inquiry

78. As the events continued and we became aware of what was happening in other locations across Nottingham it became increasingly difficult to keep up with the amount of information. This was compounded by the events taking place across different radio channels and me only having one handset. This meant I was "channel hopping" throughout and potentially missing key bits of information. I also missed the announcement of the declaration of Operation Plato, I do not know whether this was due to me being engaged in another conversation with someone present at the scene or being on a different radio channel at the time. I was conscious of the issue around having to change radio channel during my attendance, but I could not see an immediate resolution due to lack of available officers who were tasked with more important things.
79. As mentioned above, I think I could have mitigated some of the issues I faced by requesting relief from another Sergeant on duty to assume responsibility for the scene. Alternatively, I could have had a runner allocated to either myself or Detective Inspector Dowson or both to make enquiries and allocate tasks.
80. At the time of the incident there was a complete lack of training for Sergeants and Inspectors in the role in general but more pertinent to this incident, in Major Incident training. I am aware that this has been remedied as there is now a Leadership Academy and my current team are involved in delivery of Major Incident training for all officers up to Chief Officer level.

81. The fact that all the incidents were being run on different channels as well as the firearms channel was a hindrance but, in my opinion, one that isn't easily avoided as to combine them would mean too much radio traffic and updates would be missed. This is not ideal for Commanders, but I cannot suggest a solution to this at time of writing.
82. My recommendation would be that, subject to availability, an Inspector should be dispatched to the scene to manage actions and liaise with the Detective Inspector, but in that Inspectors place, one of the other RPIs should be allocated to have the oversight I believe I would have had if I was at my workstation. However, as there was no bespoke training given on promotion to this post, I cannot say that all Inspectors would have the same approach I would have had so consistency may be an issue.
83. The fact that I wasn't aware of the declaration of Op Plato until the early hours of the morning was not ideal as the ground Bronze Commander, but it was rescinded before it would have made a material difference to me. I am aware this has been debriefed and incorporated into the revised plan for Op Plato.
84. If I had been made aware of the Op Plato declaration on the night, I do not think I would have known my roles and responsibilities. I am aware of some e-learning packages having been mandated over the years but cannot say

when I completed them. I certainly had not benefitted from bespoke training, which would have been valuable.

85. Another issue was that nobody from my team on the night including myself were invited to contribute to the force debrief of the incident. The reasons for this are still unknown to me.
86. I believe the entire team returned and paraded for duty for the second night shift; this was despite having worked an extremely long shift the night before and no doubt suffering from the trauma of witnessing what they had the night before. From my perspective there was little welfare consideration given by the organisation in the immediate aftermath of the incident.
87. Police Officers continued their role, and some did have to cover the scene preservation once the overtime officers finished as it did not cover the entire shift.
88. In the coming days, a welfare provision was established, and Trauma Risk Management (TRIM) was provided to officers along with the offer of counselling. However, some of the team had been so disillusioned by the initial response from the organisation that they were unwilling to engage with anybody other than myself, meaning that I, willingly became the single point of contact for the officers in discussing all matters relating to their wellbeing and the effects of the incident on them.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed

GRO-B

Dated

18/02/2026

INDEX TO FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT INSPECTOR PETER SHAW

URN	Description
NGPF0010387	Duties system from 13/06/2023
NGPF0006136	Incident log 0065_13062023
NGPF0010388	College Of Policing APP Golden Hour
NGPF0007311	Recording of radio transmission with CI Mather