

Witness Name: Matthew Bower

Statement No: WITN0419001

Dated: 23 February 2026

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF PC MATTHEW BOWER

I, Matthew Bower, will say as follows: -

Introduction

1. I am Matthew Bower and I am a member of Nottinghamshire Police currently serving in the rank of Police Constable.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the “**Inquiry**”) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 5th February 2026 (the “**Request**”).

Career Background

3. I have been asked to set out a summary of my career background and any relevant education and training.
4. I was a Royal Marines Commando from 2012 until 2018. I joined Nottinghamshire Police on 29th March 2018. I joined with the ambition of

working on the firearms department having knowledge and experience that I hoped would assist as an Armed Response Vehicle Officer (ARVO).

5. My initial police training was completed at Hucknall training school, and I was then based at Radford Road Police Station for the first 10 weeks whilst completing my tutored period.

6. In November 2018 I began working as a response officer in Nottingham City Centre, based at Byron House on Maid Marian Way for approximately 2 ½ years.

7. In December 2020 I applied to join the Firearms Department and in April 2021 I started the Initial Firearms Course (IFC) which was a 13 week course, training in all aspects of work as an ARVO.

8. The course includes training in a variety of firearms, equipment and vehicles including; Heckler and Koch G36 carbine, Glock 17 self-loading pistol, Attenuating Energy Projectile launcher (AEP), Taser, advanced first aid, shields and Method of Entry. We also trained in various firearms tactics in classroom and scenario-based training. The tactics are split into four areas which are vehicle tactics, foot tactics, building tactics and open area tactics.

9. On completing the IFC I joined Firearms Team 4 and a few weeks later I completed a four-week advanced driving course. I was on Team 4 and worked as an ARVO up until this incident. I stayed up to date on the regular cycle of training that covers everything in the course, repeated every year broken down into two-day blocks approximately every 5 weeks.

10. In November 2023 I left the police for 4 months to pursue another career as the range manager of a firearms club and training facility before returning as an ARVO in March 2024. When rejoining I had to complete multiple training phases that I had missed in order for my qualifications to be in date and to be able to return to active duties as an ARVO.

11. My original collar number was 4550. Upon rejoining my collar number is now 4881.

13th June 2023

12. I have been asked to explain my role on 13th of June 2023 in respect of the incident involving Valdo Calocane and I have been asked why I was in that role.

13. On the 13th of June 2023 I was on Team 4 in Nottinghamshire Firearms Department working as an ARVO and driver of the Northern Armed Response Vehicle (ARV), callsign OF48 (Oscar Foxtrot 48) crewed with PC

3288 Yallop. I was driving an unmarked police Volvo XC90 that was fully equipped with lights and sirens. The vehicle registration was MA72YMW.

14. There were 3 ARVs on duty in total at that time and my supervisor was PS 755 Hallam.
15. The three ARVs are generally spread across the County to reduce response times for a single ARV to attend an incident. As the Northern ARV we would usually patrol around Mansfield/Ashfield/Sutton in Ashfield but will respond to other areas as required.
16. Each ARV is double crewed as this is one of the requirements of an ARV and all vehicle tactics require at least two police occupants per vehicle.
17. This is my daily role, and we are all trained to be both drivers and passengers in the ARVs. We usually do a full shift as one or the other before swapping over the following shift. The patrol area and callsign is designated by supervisors each shift.

Attendance at the scene

18. I have been asked to set out the detail of my attendance at the scene, including when and how I first became alerted to the incident and the

information I was provided with, the relevant timings and a broad summary of my involvement.

19. I was alerted to the initial incident by the control room asking units to attend a report of a stabbing. I believe this was on our talk group 1199 at approximately 04:05 am.
20. I do not recall if we were specifically asked to travel to this incident or if we volunteered after hearing other closer units being dispatched.
21. When incidents of this nature are reported we, as firearms officers, would almost always travel towards the area to assist in first aid or in apprehending the suspect due to our higher level of training in first aid and dealing with armed suspects. We also have additional first aid equipment and personal protective equipment. We could then be cancelled en route if it is established that we are not required, but at least we have reduced the travelling time if we are needed.
22. 1199 is the Operational Support talk group used by firearms and roads policing teams for radio communication. On 1199 the control room will dispatch ARVs directly to an incident. It is also the talk group that will run all pursuits and is accessible by other forces for cross border crimes. This talk group isn't area specific, unlike local talk groups. In our vehicle we will usually have our car radio set to the local area that we are in, and our

personal radios remain on 1199. This means that we can be available to receive information on 1199 but also be aware of what is going on around us. This ensures that we can help out with incidents that we are close to and help local officers with incidents when we are available.

23. At the time the incident came in I was in Kirkby in Ashfield and had visited Ashfield fire station to use the facilities.

24. I drove the ARV containing PC Yallop and I to Ilkeston Road, Nottingham using our emergency lights and sirens to allow us to attend as soon as possible. On the journey I heard updates relating to the victims' injuries and that the offender was not on scene. I was aware my colleagues were at the scene providing first aid. I am unsure if PC Yallop responded to any of these radio updates but as I was the driver I focussed on driving and do not recall using my radio.

25. At 04:27 we arrived from St Peters Street, went over Ilkeston Road and onto Faraday Road. As we crossed Ilkeston Road I could see that ambulances were already in attendance and I was aware that we would not be required for first aid due to the ambulance service being able to help the officers already performing first aid with more equipment and more specific training than ourselves. I believe we were then tasked with an area search for the suspect by PC Speeden. As ARVOs we regularly task each other when things need doing. This may be when our supervisor is unavailable

or just because one member of the team is more informed and more aware of what needs doing due to their location. This is common and expected as we work closely together and trust each other's decision making.

26. In this type of incident it is common that we would search the area for the suspect whilst other officers conducted first aid if we were not also needed for immediate first aid. It also made sense for us not to physically interact with the scene or colleagues providing first aid, to remain forensically clean and avoid cross contamination if we did locate and arrest the suspect.

27. I drove our ARV around the surrounding streets, up towards Canning Circus and around 'The Park' area of Nottingham as information from the scene suggested the suspect had gone up Ilkeston Road towards the city and this is the general area that would lead to. We performed the area search in the usual manner, both looking out of the windows, paying attention to smaller side roads and alleyways. As I was the driver I focussed more on the right side of the road and PC Yallop as passenger focussed more on the left side of the road.

28. I believe there was also a dog officer and drone officer in the area searching in a similar location.

29. At 04:44 I was made aware that a call came in a short while earlier suggesting a woman had been heard screaming near to St Barnabas

Cathedral on Derby Road, not far from where we were. The control room asked us to go over to that area and search. Nothing suspicious was found. At the time we thought that this may be linked to the incident on Ilkeston Road and thought that someone else may have been attacked, so this focussed our search on that location.

30. After searching for between 30 and 40 minutes without any sign of the suspect and no further sightings or updates suggesting a location or direction of travel, I knew the search area was ever increasing as time passed and the suspect could now be a long distance away in any direction, even if travelling only by foot.

31. At approximately 05:15 hours we travelled back towards Force Headquarters as we needed to complete the usual tasks before handing over to the morning team. These tasks would include re-fuelling and cleaning the cars and putting our equipment and firearms back into the armoury. We also anticipated that the other ARV's would benefit from some help replenishing the first aid kits in the vehicles that would be required back out with the day shift at 07:00am.

Observations regarding evidence from Detective Superintendent Sanders

32. I have been asked to consider and provide observations about the following from evidence that has been provided by Detective Superintendent Sanders: "At 0425hrs (TG1199) PC 3288 Yallop and PC 4550 Bower

(OF48) arrive in the area. The OFC PC 35 Speeden tasks them with an area search for the offender and confirms last known direction of travel is up Ilkeston Road towards the city. PC 3288 Yallop confirms they are commencing an area search and will head towards Canning Circus area. I note this update from the OFC does not include the information from PC 3809 Marshall (OD42) that the possible direction of travel was toward Hopedale Close (NGPF0004751).

33. I am now aware that PC Speeden was at the scene and did an initial search for the suspect including inside a property. He then told us to start searching the area for the suspect and informed us that he had been told that the direction of travel was up Ilkeston Road towards the City.
34. PC Speeden was later the Operational Firearms Commander (OFC) once armed authority was granted for the van.
35. I have listened to NGPF0004751 and it is clear that PC Speeden had been informed by someone that the suspect was last seen on Ilkeston Road going towards the City. He relayed that information to us which caused us to search in that direction.
36. At any incident like this we would always search the area for the suspect. We would usually establish the last known location and the direction of

travel and then begin the search with the most obvious routes. We would then widen the area as time passes.

37. We travelled up Derby Road towards Canning Circus and searched numerous streets between Derby Road, Canning Circus and The Park. As well as the initial direction passed for the suspect, we have most likely focussed on this area due to the report of a female screaming near the Cathedral on Derby Road. At the time this was suspected to be connected to the same incident.

38. I do not recall any mention of Hopedale Close.

Instructions received regarding the search

39. I have been asked to set out the instructions I recall receiving as to where to search for the attacker and any methodology I applied.

40. We were asked to search by PC Speeden, and this would always be a priority in a situation where a violent attack had occurred.

41. He told us that he was informed that the suspect was last seen travelling up Ilkeston Road towards the City. I drove towards Canning Circus and we searched numerous streets between Ilkeston Road, Canning Circus and The Park.

42. NGPF0008785 is a map based on the vehicle telematics showing various locations and related timings of the vehicle I was driving. This appears to match up with my memory.
43. We were not at armed authority and the other ARV's were committed on Ilkeston Road. I now know that PC Hallam and PC Graham were performing first aid and PC Speeden and PC Goddard were helping with first aid and making further enquiries after the initial property search for the suspect. I believe this left only our single ARV searching. I can't comment on other local resources in the area, I cannot recall if I was aware of them searching or not.
44. I had seen numerous local officers managing the scene when we passed Ilkeston Road so I knew the number of officers available to assist with the search would be limited.
45. After a while I became aware of a drone officer and a dog officer also searching for the suspect. I do not recall if we physically saw them or if it was just via radio transmissions informing us of their locations.

46. I wasn't aware of any more information that could assist in finding the offender and the additional call regarding a female screaming near to the Cathedral on Derby Road focussed our attention in that area for a while.
47. I considered the amount of time since the attacks had occurred and widened the search as time increased. As time was passing, the search area was increasing and no new information had been received about the suspects direction of travel, therefore this remained unknown.

Observations regarding the sufficiency of the search

48. I have been asked if I have any observations as to the sufficiency of the search for VC, including in respect of its rigour, management, coordination and effectiveness.
49. I believe the search was sufficient, based on the resources and information available at the time.
50. Had we been at armed authority, we usually take a more structured approach and divide areas up to ensure every single road in each zone is checked between the ARVs that are on duty. This is sometimes done by vehicles in pairs and sometimes individually depending on the threat and dependent on the OFC's decision. There is still always a chance that a suspect could double back and be missed or be hidden.

51. In this instance, even if we were at armed authority it is unlikely we would have been able to use the other two ARVs as they were both committed to providing first aid to the victims on Ilkeston Road. Trying to save life will always come before an area search, unless we know there is definitely a continued immediate threat towards future victims.
52. It also seems that the call relating to a female screaming on Derby Road altered our search and the Control Room have focussed resources in that area rather than other areas. Although no female was located, we still do not know whether that woman was connected to this incident.
53. I am not aware of any changes in practices or learning identified as a result of this search.

Circumstances of finding the van

54. As the arresting officer, the Inquiry has asked that I set out the circumstances by which I found the van that VC was driving.
55. We were nearly back at Force Headquarters, when at 05:26 hours we were made aware by the control room that there had been a hit and run incident involving a white van on Milton Street in the City Centre and we were asked by our control room to go back to the City to locate the van. Shortly after

turning around and activating my emergency equipment we heard on the local talk group that an officer was now driving behind the van and that it had mounted the pavement and was deliberately driving into people.

56. At some point during the first few minutes of this incident occurring, I remember a description being passed and the driver was said to be a black male dressed in black with facial hair. I do not recall if this description was from the Control Room or from the first officer to see the van. This matched the description I remember being given at the earlier incident on Ilkeston Road. I was aware, I believe from a radio communication, after the first incident that at least one of the victims was now deceased. With the descriptions of the suspect and the similarities in the levels of extreme and unprovoked violence I believed this was the same male in the van as the male that had carried out the attacks on Ilkeston Road earlier.

57. At this point, the Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) Chief Inspector Mather, granted armed authority and declared Operation Plato. When armed authority is granted, we would usually be given a brief that includes a threat assessment, driving actions and a specific tactic to be used. We would also take more equipment out of the on-board car safe such as our G36 carbines and the AEP launcher to give more options alongside our Taser and Pistol that are always carried on our person. We also change Talk Group from 1199 to 1205 for firearms operations. Whilst this was

happening, we were also receiving updates on the local Talk group (talk group 6).

58. Operation Plato is the police response to a marauding terrorist attack.
59. I knew this was a serious incident and we had to do anything we could to stop this man. Due to this we did not stop to extract other equipment or firearms from the car safe and I did not change my radio to 1205; instead, I drove as fast as was safely possible to intercept the van in any way possible before he could continue to injure or kill anyone else.
60. The first officer behind the van stopped to provide first aid to persons hit by the van but shortly after, another local officer had got behind the van and followed it to Bentinck Road in Radford.
61. It is a 15 to 20 minute drive from where we were when we were made aware of the van injuring people to the vans final resting place. We completed that journey in approximately 6 minutes.
62. At some point during this journey I activated my body worn video.
63. I arrived at Bentinck Road and saw the van, stationary with a marked police car 50 metres behind. The officer in the marked police car was aware that

this was now an armed deployment and rightly, held back at a safe distance from the van. I noticed a dog officer's car was also stopped a similar distance ahead of us.

64. I drove the ARV from the rear of the van, to the offside and positioned my ARV to block the occupant's door and limit the vans movement. As I pulled alongside, I could see a black male with black clothing and facial hair as the only occupant, he was sat in the driver's seat. He was looking straight ahead and had a large knife in his hand, held pointing upwards in front of him.
65. Unfortunately, my positioning delayed my passenger PC Yallop from exiting as he had to climb over my side, but I continued to exit our vehicle and ran to the rear of the van with the intention of detaining VC from the passenger door.
66. The van lurched backwards slightly so I decided, not wanting to be run over, it would be safer to observe the driver whilst passing the van in order to react accordingly if it moved. I took my taser out of its holster, knowing he was holding a knife. I ran around the front of the van and joined PC Whysall, a dog officer, who was at the passenger door.
67. Knowing he was in possession of a large knife and intent on causing harm I fired my taser at VC. It was effective, his muscles contracted making him

rigid in his seat. I shouted at him, "DO NOT MOVE, KEEP YOUR HANDS WHERE I CAN SEE THEM, GET OUT OF THE VAN." PC Yallop, PC Whysall and I then dragged him out of the van and onto the floor. I took hold of one of his legs and pulled until he was laying on his back on the road next to the van.

68. PC Whysall was to my left and PC Yallop to my right. Someone placed VC in handcuffs, and I said to VC "YOU ARE UNDER ARREST FOR MURDER" and cautioned him. His only replies were the words "FUCK YOU."
69. VC was wearing a backpack; I cut the straps off to remove it whilst he was in handcuffs. I'm aware that other officers found another knife in this backpack. I then stood VC against a wall and with help from other officers moved his handcuffs to the rear for officer safety. I then searched VC and passed his ID card to another local officer to give his details to the control room so that they could conduct checks for any details held about him on police systems.
70. We were still at armed authority; aware Op Plato had been called and after the arrest we heard that another person had been found deceased in St Anns. We could not rule out the possibility that there were multiple attackers, and we were told to get to the City Centre Market Square and await further taskings.

71. I'm unsure who requested that we go to the Market Square, but I believe it will have come from either the OFC or TFC. We left VC with local officers who transported him to Custody. ARVs generally do not transport prisoners, in part due to the equipment and limited space in the ARV but also because of the limited number of ARVs required to cover the whole County. It would not be sensible to be committed at the Custody Suite rather than be available for deployment.
72. After this incident I wrote an MG11 witness statement relating to my involvement (URN: NGPF0002650) and completed a Use of Force document (URN: NGPF0002058). I have referred to these documents and also to my body worn video (URN: NGPF0008930R) whilst providing this statement.

Consideration of drug or alcohol testing

73. I have been asked if I am aware of any consideration being given to drug or alcohol testing of VC at or around the time he was arrested.
74. My answer to this question would be: no, this isn't something I considered, as there was an ongoing armed deployment and my priority was as an ARVO. I would not have been able to accompany VC to Custody for further testing and he was handed to local officers. I am unsure whether it was discussed between anyone else at the scene of the arrest, but my main concern was redeploying in our ARV and being able to react to any further

threats. Soon after I made the arrest we were redeployed to the Market Square due to the nature of the incident and the possibility of further attackers.

75. In my opinion, VC did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, he was quiet and focussed. The few words he did speak were clear and coherent, although only the words "FUCK YOU" were used. I do not remember smelling any alcohol or drugs.

Further information of involvement

76. I have been asked to set out any further information as to my involvement in the events of 13 June 2023 that I consider would be of assistance to the Inquiry.
77. I was involved in an Operational debrief held at Force Headquarters in relation to this incident. I believe the debrief was led by the Chief Firearms Instructor at the time, Chris Jones. This debrief was audio recorded. There were a lot of topics discussed relating to the Operational Support Department, Firearms Department and the general command of the incident. I do not recall any more specifics. I cannot think of any other involvement that I have had that would be of any assistance to the Inquiry.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed: **GRO-B**

Dated: 23/02/2026

Index to First Witness Statement of PC Matthew Bower

No.	URN	Document Description
1.	NGPF0004751	Audio from Nottinghamshire Police, Talk Group 1199, Timestamped 04.24.06hrs, re: Searching offender in Ilkeston Road
2.	NGPF0008785	Intelligence Analysis Operation Chainlink, date unknown, NGPF
3.	NGPF0002650	First Witness Statement of Matthew Bower, Nottinghamshire Police [NGPF]
4.	NGPF0002058	Use Of Force Report of VALDO CALOCANE (04/09/1991), dated 18/06/2023, NPF.
5.	NGPF0008930R	Video recording re body worn camera footage of Matthew Bower [NGPF] arresting VC