

Witness Name: Colin Michael Wilderspin

Statement No: WITN0224001

Dated: 19 NOVEMBER 2025.

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF COLIN MICHAEL WILDERSPIN

I **Colin Michael Wilderspin** c/o Nottingham City Council, Loxley House, Station Street, Nottingham NG2 3NG **will say** as follows: -

- 1 This witness statement is served in response to the Rule 9 Request dated 3 June 2025 directed to Nottingham City Council in relation to unauthorised access and disclosure.
- 2 I confirm that I am employed by Nottingham City Council as the Strategic Director of Communities and have held that position since December 2023.
- 3 In my current role as Strategic Director of Communities I am responsible for all community services, heritage sites, and most relevant for this issue, the Community Protection Team, including Anti-Social Behaviour Officers ("ASB Officers"). The Community Protection Team deal with a wide range of

regulatory and enforcement functions to include anti-social behaviour, housing and closure order issues.

- 4 I have worked in my current role as Director of Communities since December 2023. Prior to that in April 2023 I was Interim Director of Communities. Before that I was employed as a Consultant Contractor by Nottingham City Council as a Community Safety Consultant. At the same time, I also worked as interim Head of Community Safety and Neighbourhoods at Brent Council.
- 5 I have worked for local authorities since joining the LGA Graduate Scheme in 2008 and have specialised in community safety since 2011. I am experienced in partnership working with external organisations.
- 6 At the outset, I would like to take this opportunity to apologise for the actions of the three ASB Officers who accessed information related to the perpetrator of the tragic events which occurred in our city on 13 June 2023. Two of the ASB Officers did so with a genuine intention and also a professional curiosity to seek to identify risks arising to the public and also personally. The third one accessed the information inadvertently and immediately closed down the record once accessed. It was open for a matter of seconds.
- 7 Despite saying that, I am absolutely clear that they should not have done this. They subsequently went through a police investigation and an internal disciplinary warning has been placed upon their HR files and also their police vetting status. All three ASB Officers are devastated by their actions, and I

sincerely apologise on behalf of Nottingham City Council for their actions. This simply should not have happened.

- 8 I think it would be helpful to explain the make-up of the ASB team within the Council. That team is made up of 15 individuals. Of those 15, 3 are senior ASB Officers and 12 are ASB Officers. Each of those 12 are vetted by the Police to undertake work in conjunction with the Police. They work with the Police, and other partner agencies, particularly in anti-social behaviour dealing with both victims and perpetrators. They work in conjunction with the police and deal with regulatory enforcement action, to include closure orders and issues relating to mental health and drug abuse.
- 9 The Community Protection Team are essentially the front door within the Council into other partner agencies. They co-ordinate the approach as between the Council and other partner agencies.
- 10 In order to undertake their close work with the police, they have access to part of the police computer system known as Niche. Access to that system is controlled entirely by the police. Nottingham City Council have no control over what individual ASB Officers can access, I myself, for example, do not have access to those systems. Access is fully controlled by the police, as are the boundaries and extent of access within that police system.
- 11 All training in relation to how to access the police system was undertaken by the police. As I have said, Nottingham City Council do not have access to that,

and it is maintained by Nottinghamshire Police. The system itself is known as the Niche technology system.

- 12 I attach to this statement extracts of the three ASB Officers training records confirming the training undertaken by them prior to the tragic events in June 2023 [NOCC0000006] (**GRO-B** GDPR training record) [NOCC0000007] (**GRO-B** GDPR training record) [NOCC0000008] (**GRO-B** Information Security training record) [NOCC0000009] (**GRO-B** **GRO-B** Information Security training record) [NOCC0000010] (**GRO-B** **GRO-B** Information Security training record) [NOCC0000011] (**GRO-B** **GRO-B** GDPR records).

- 13 As part of their induction process, they would have undergone training in relation to data protection and information management issues. They are all longstanding employees, and they commenced employment prior to introduction of the GDPR. When the GDPR was introduced, initial training and then annual refresher training was introduced within the Council which required employees to go through an online course to include a questionnaire/assessment at the end. I attach confirmation for each of the three officers that they undertook those courses [NOCC0000013] (**GRO-B** **GRO-B** GDPR refresher certificate) [NOCC0000015] (**GRO-B** **GRO-B** GDPR refresher certificate) [NOCC0000014] (**GRO-B** **GRO-B** GDPR refresher certificate).

- 14 Failure to complete those training courses leads to escalation to line manager, Head of Service and thereafter Director of Service.
- 15 I also attach the council's policies in relation to data protection [NOCC0000001] (Data Protection Policy) and its policy on asset management [NOCC0000002] (IT Acceptable Use Policy). Those policies are available for all employees to access on the council intranet system.
- 16 I will now address each of the specific questions raised by the Inquiry within the Rule 9 Request.
- 17 I confirm that the sensitive information as referred to was never the possession of Nottingham City Council. It remained upon Nottinghamshire Police's system which the three ASB Officers accessed via that police system. The sensitive information, at no stage, was held by Nottingham City Council. We are unaware as to the precise nature of what was viewed by the ASB Officers, and we only have generic information descriptions from the Police as to what was accessed.
- 18 The ASB Officers are based at Byron House in Nottingham which is joint police and Nottingham City Council building. They work on computer equipment provided by the police and utilise the Nottinghamshire Police network within Byron House. I therefore confirm that no sensitive data, or information, relevant to the issues covered by the Inquiry's first Rule 9 Request to Nottingham City Council, has been in the possession of the

Council at any time, including the Community Protection Service. It was the three ASB Officers, using their Nottinghamshire Police granted access, in order to access the police systems, that lead to them viewing the material in an unauthorised way.

19 There is a distinction to be drawn here between information/documents, and CCTV footage. I confirm that CCTV footage was held by Nottingham City Council in connection with these events. The council operates and manages a CCTV control room which is a local authority service run by Nottingham City Council in partnership with Nottinghamshire Police. That control room is operated 24 hours a day 7 days a week. There are multiple cameras across the City Centre areas and also across the wider Nottingham City Council area. A minimum of four officers are working within the control room at all times, monitoring the screens showing information from the cameras across the City Council area.

20 There is in place between Nottinghamshire Police and Nottingham City Council is an information sharing agreement for the CCTV footage. This permits access to that information by the Police if they make a formal request in writing. Once it is requested and sent across to the Police, the CCTV footage is deleted in accordance with our policy. This complies with British standard BS7958. I attach to this statement a copy of the information sharing agreement [NOCC0000005] (Nottingham City Council and Nottinghamshire Police Information Sharing Agreement) and the specific annex dealing with

CCTV footage [NOCC0000004] (Information Sharing Annex – CCTV Neighbourhood Safety Operations).

- 21 Generally, there is a 30-day retention period on CCTV footage held by the Council [NOCC0000012].

- 22 Surveillance audits are undertaken by the Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board (SSAIB). These audits assess compliance with the 12 Guiding Principles set out by the Surveillance Camera Commissioner and the BS 7958 on CCTV management and operation. The 12 Guiding Principles are as follows:
 - a Use of a surveillance camera system must always be for a specified purpose which is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to meet an identified pressing need.

 - b The use of a surveillance camera system must take into account its effect on individuals and their privacy, with regular reviews to ensure its use remains justified.

 - c There must be as much transparency in the use of a surveillance camera system as possible, including a published contact point for access to information and complaints.

- d There must be clear responsibility and accountability for all surveillance camera activities including images and information collected, held and used.
- e Clear rules, policies and procedures must be in place before a surveillance camera system is used, and these must be communicated to all who need to comply with them.
- f No more images and information should be stored than that which is strictly required for the stated purpose of a surveillance camera system, and such images and information should be securely deleted once their purposes have been discharged.
- g Access to retained images and information should be restricted and there must be clearly defined rules on who can gain access and for what purpose such access is granted; the disclosure of images and information should only take place when it is necessary for such a purpose or for law enforcement purposes.
- h Surveillance camera system operators should consider any approved operational, technical and competency standards relevant to a system and its purpose and work to meet and maintain those standards.

- i Surveillance camera system images and information should be subject to appropriate security measures to safeguard against unauthorised access and use.

- j There should be effective review and audit mechanisms to ensure legal requirements, policies and standards are complied with in practice, and regular reports should be published.

- k When the use of a surveillance camera system is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and there is a pressing need for its use, it should then be used in the most effective way to support public safety and law enforcement with the aim of processing images and information of evidential value.

- l Any information used to support a surveillance camera system which compares against a reference database for matching purposes should be accurate and kept up to date.

23 I confirm that we have had “good” ratings in relation to those audits on the following dates: 14/06/2022, 21/06/23, 14/06/24, with the most recent being 30/06/25 [WITN0224002] (SSAIB Audit Report dated 14 June 2022) [WITN0224003] (SSAIB Audit Report dated 21 June 2023) [WITN0224004] (SSAIB Audit Report dated 14 June 2024) [WITN0224005] (SSAIB Audit Report dated 30 June 2025).

- 24 In terms of the specific request made by the Police for access to the CCTV footage, I confirm that on 13 June 2023, radio contact was received by the CCTV control room at 04:38 hours from the Police. The Police asked by way of the police radio system, Airways, for access to CCTV footage. This was logged on our records as event 105 – 87 [WITN0224006] (CCTV Incident Report dated 13 June 2023). That footage was viewed and accessed by the CCTV operative and the request closed off on our system at 04:42 hours.
- 25 Subsequent requests were received at 05:37 hours. The Police had requested access informally, but in accordance with the information sharing agreement, a written request was made by Nottinghamshire Police for access to all of the CCTV footage [WITN0224008] (CCTV Media Request dated 13 June 2023). That was dealt with and provided in accordance with the documents attached above [NOCC0000005] [NOCC0000004].
- 26 We had a further 7 media requests from the Police up to and including the 15th July [WITN0224008] [WITN0224007] (CCTV Media Request and W/S dated 13 June 2023) [WITN0224009] (CCTV Media Request dated 14 June 2023) [WITN0224010] (CCTV Media Request dated 15 June 2023) [WITN0224011] (Witness Statement for Release of CCTV dated 19 June 2023) [WITN0224012] (CCTV Media Request dated 29 June 2023) [WITNO224013] (CCTV Media Request dated 3 July 2023) [WITN0224014] (Witness Statement for Release of CCTV dated 5 July 2023). I confirm that there was no viewing or sharing of the CCTV footage held by Nottingham City Council beyond this. As I have said in accordance with our policy, once it was provided to the police, footage held in

relation to these tragic events was deleted, and it no longer remains in the possession of Nottingham City Council.

27 As I have indicated already, the information which the three ASB Officers accessed was not Nottingham City Council data at any point. Nottingham City Council do not and did not hold any data which was unlawfully accessed on their systems. The information the three ASB Officers accessed was Nottinghamshire Police information accessed via Nottinghamshire Police's computer system.

28 What we have now put into place is an audit process which individuals have to complete when they have accessed the police system. That was put into place in Autumn of 2023. ASB Officers now accessing the police system have to also complete a log on our own system so that there is an audit trail as to when and why they accessed that particular system. Until we were told by the police of the alleged unlawful accessing information on the 4 July, we had no knowledge that they had done so. This new audit system would provide us with an audit trail to show access to the police system. Clearly if individuals were then not completing it and audits were undertaken by the police, then issues would be raised with employees at that time.

29 I am not aware of anyone sharing any information by way of inappropriate telephone messaging within Nottingham City Council in connection with this information.

- 30 As I have already indicated, there were two employees within the CCTV control room who processed requests from the police to access the CCTV footage.
- 31 Three ASB Officers accessed the police computer system, inappropriately.
- 32 Nottingham City Council does not know the precise nature of the information accessed. We know from the police investigation that it related to the perpetrator, rather than the victims. Nottingham City Council did not control the information accessed by the ASB Officers. That was a police system and the Officers accessed it using police log in details. Nottingham City Council do not have the admin rights in order to control or restrict access to that system.
- 33 The CCTV system is Nottingham City Council system, and the access to that was controlled and dealt with appropriately.
- 34 We have looked in great depth as to how we can tighten up our processes in a scenario like this. The three officers were spoken to by the anti-corruption team within Nottinghamshire Police following the police audit identifying their unlawful accessing of the information. Subsequently, no further action was taken against them by the Police. The investigation process and the entirety of this process has affected two of those individuals extremely badly. A warning was placed upon the three Officer's HR files. The police lead, upon the investigation into these individuals, and the council ultimately sent a letter

to the families affected in March 2024, explaining that it had happened and apologising for the actions [WITN0224015] (Letter from Chief Executive to the Coates family dated 18 March 2024) [WITN0224016] (Letter from Chief Executive to the O'Malley-Kumar family dated 18 March 2024) [WITN0224017] (Letter from Chief Executive to the Webber family dated 18 March 2024).

35 I think with hindsight, that letter could have been more detailed in order put the accessing of that information by the ASB Officers into full context around the issues I have set out within this statement. I think it would have been helpful to include an explanation as to the context of the accessing of the information, with the genuine of intentions of two of the officers, and the inadvertent accessing of one of them, and the fact that at no stage was the information accessed held by Nottingham City Council.

36 As I said above, the council could have been clearer in correspondence with the families. However, there was a police investigation into the information access, and the police had primacy over that. I confirm though that I stand by the actions taken at the time and would take the same steps again.

37 I am not aware of any other investigations or incidents involving alleged unlawful accessing of information or any malicious communications.

38 In terms of any distinction between high- and low-profile cases, it is very difficult for the Council to make such distinction. We have a policy covering

CCTV accessing and sharing with the police and we followed that and continue to follow that.

39 Finally, I simply wish to reiterate the apology already made to those affected individuals for what happened. I do, however, confirm that the three individual ASB Officers entered the police system mistakenly thinking that access was entirely appropriate and necessary. They wanted to assess whether the perpetrator was known to the team as an open case and also wanted to undertake a risk assessment process in relation to possible site visits. This should not have happened and the systems here did work to identify that the individuals accessed that system.

Statement of truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed: **GRO-B**
Print name: **GRO-B**
Dated: *19 NOVEMBER 2025*

Index to the First Witness Statement of Colin Michael Wilderspin

No.	Inquiry URN	Document Description
1	NOCC0000006	Report dated 17/06/2025, re: Record of Learning for GRO-B Previous Completions for GDPR Refresher
2	NOCC0000007	Report dated 17/06/2025, re: Record of Learning for GRO-B Previous Completions for GDPR Refresher
3	NOCC0000008	Report dated 17/06/2025, re: Record of Learning for GRO-B Previous Completions for Information Security Refresher
4	NOCC0000009	Screengrab of Record of Learning for GRO-B GRO-B Previous Completions for Information Security Refresher undated
5	NOCC0000010	Screengrab of Record of Learning for GRO-B GRO-B Previous Completions for information security refresher undated
6	NOCC0000011	Record of Learning for GRO-B Previous Completions for GDPR Refresher
7	NOCC0000013	CERTIFICATE of ACHIEVEMENT: This is to certify that GRO-B has completed the course: GDPR Refresher
8	NOCC0000015	CERTIFICATE of ACHIEVEMENT for GRO-B GRO-B compiled by Nottingham City Council Learning Zone dated 14/06/2024
9	NOCC0000014	CERTIFICATE of ACHIEVEMENT for GRO-B GRO-B compiled by Nottingham City Council Learning Zone dated 24/03/2025
10	NOCC0000001	Policy Document Re: Data Protection Policy, Nottingham City Council
11	NOCC0000002	Policy Document Re: Nottingham City Council: IT Service: IT Acceptable Use Policy, Nottingham City Council

12	NOCC0000004	Policy document, Re: Information Sharing Annex - Neighbourhood Safety Operations (CCTV), Nottingham City Council and Nottinghamshire Police
13	NOCC0000005	Policy Document Re: Information Sharing Agreement v 0.4, Nottingham City Council and Nottinghamshire Police
14	NOCC0000012	Policy Document Re: Nottingham City Council: CCTV Policy, Nottingham City Council
15	WITN0224002	SSAIB Audit Report dated 14 June 2022
16	WITN0224003	SSAIB Audit Report dated 21 June 2023
17	WITN0224004	SSAIB Audit Report dated 14 June 2024
18	WITN0224005	SSAIB Audit Report dated 30 June 2025
19	WITN0224006	CCTV Incident Report dated 13 June 2023
20	WITN0224007	Witness Statement for Release of CCTV dated 13 June 2023
21	WITN0224008	CCTV Media Request dated 13 June 2023
22	WITN0224009	CCTV Media Request dated 14 June 2023
23	WITN0224010	CCTV Media Request dated 15 June 2023
24	WITN0224011	Witness Statement for Release of CCTV dated 19 June 2023
25	WITN0224012	CCTV Media Request dated 29 June 2023
26	WITN0224013	CCTV Media Request dated 3 July 2023
27	WITN0224014	Witness Statement for Release of CCTV dated 5 July 2023
28	WITN0224015	Letter from Chief Executive to the Coates family dated 18 March 2024
29	WITN0224016	Letter from Chief Executive to the O'Malley-Kumar family dated 18 March 2024
30	WITN0224017	Letter from Chief Executive to the Webber family dated 18 March 2024