

Witness Name: HAYLEY DAWN WILLIAMS

Statement No: WITN0417001

Dated: 20 February 2026

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF HAYLEY DAWN WILLIAMS

I, HAYLEY DAWN WILLIAMS, will say as follows: -

INTRODUCTION

1. I am a retired Detective Superintendent (DSU), formerly of Nottinghamshire Police. At the time of the Nottingham Attacks (13th June 2023) I was Head of the Professional Standards Directorate (PSD) which includes the Complaints and Misconduct Unit, the Force Vetting Unit and the Counter Corruption Unit (CCU).
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the "Inquiry") with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 6th February 2025 (the "Request").

BACKGROUND

3. I have been asked:

- a. To outline my professional background and experience;
 - b. To consider the extracts I have been provided with from the Inquiry witness statement of Superintendent Kathryn Craner and state whether I agree with the facts as set out in these extracts and whether I have any comments or observations on the same. If I do not agree with anything I have been asked to explain my reasons why; and
 - c. Whether there is anything else I would like to draw to the attention of the Chair.
4. I am legally represented in this matter by Nottinghamshire Police.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

5. I retired on 9th October 2025 after 28 year's Police service, predominantly as a detective. I have a BSC (Hons) in Psychology from the University of York, a Post Graduate Certificate in Disaster Victim Identification from the University of Dundee and a Masters (Distinction) in Police Strategy, Leadership and Organisation from the University of Derby. I have a number of Divisional Commander, Chief Constable, Head of EMSOU and Crown Court Commendations, predominately for my leadership of murder investigations.
6. I worked on Major Crime teams (also referred to in the past as Major Investigation Teams (MIT) or Homicide Units) in West Midlands Police, Nottinghamshire Police and EMSOU (East Midlands Special Operations Unit) at Detective Constable (DC), Detective Sergeant (DS), Detective Inspector (DI) and Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) ranks. I was Head of the Nottinghamshire EMSOU Major Crime team for a number of years before being returned to a position in my home force in 2019 due to my 5 years tenure in that department approaching.

7. I was a Professionalising Investigations Programme (PIP) 3 Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and led several complex murder investigations across the East Midlands Region. In this role I have given evidence on several occasions at both His Majesty's Coroner's Court and various Crown Courts. In 2014, in order to qualify as a PIP 3 SIO, I attended a 3-week intensive SIO course at the College of Policing, followed later by an additional week - long Hydra course. A Hydra is a series of simulated events where delegates receive information about the event under investigation at various stages throughout the course (e.g. briefings, photographs, reports) and are required to respond to them as they would in a 'real life scenario'. The delegates then discuss their decisions with their peers and consider alternative viewpoints. The syllabus is constantly being updated, but the principles of ethical and auditable decision making still run throughout the course. All the prospective SIOs on the course received daily inputs on matters such as witness strategy, family liaison strategy, covert strategy, media strategy and numerous other areas but at the end of each session the focus was on how to appropriately construct and record our decision making and rationale in a timely manner.
8. Over the next 2 years I ran a number of complex murders and completed a comprehensive portfolio of evidence before being signed off as a qualified PIP 3 SIO by (now) Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) Rob Griffin, himself a highly experienced PIP 3 SIO. I continued to SIO complex investigations both in EMSOU and in Nottinghamshire Police for many years after my accreditation.
9. I was also a mentor and supported officers applying for promotion or seeking development, including those with aspirations to become Major Crime or Serious and Organised Crime SIOs. At the end of 2022 I was asked by Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) (Crime) Griffin to become the PIP 3 SIO portfolio assessor for Nottinghamshire Police.

10. I was subsequently asked by DCC Griffin to become a PIP 4 strategic advisor to other SIOs. This involved a further College of Policing course and annual 'Continuing Professional Development' (CPD) accreditation. In this role I acted as a 'critical friend' to other SIOs on the more complex investigations and it was my role to assist them with policy decisions and strategy and also to take ownership of areas of business (for example media appeals, CPS liaison, partnership meetings) to enable the SIO to focus directly on the investigation.

11. I was previously the tactical lead for Disclosure in Nottinghamshire Police and the former joint chair of the monthly Prosecution Team Performance Meeting together with the District Crown Prosecutor for Nottingham. As part of this role, I led on the delivery of the joint CPS/Police Action plan for Disclosure in the run up to the then most recent Director General's Guidelines.

12. On March 2021, on promotion to Detective Superintendent, I was posted initially to Public Protection, then moved to Head of PSD in March 2022 and subsequently trained as an 'Appropriate Authority' (AA).

13. The AA has delegated responsibility from the Chief Constable in relation to decision making in respect of breaches of the standards of professional behaviour by Police Officers or staff working within the policing environment.

14. One of the main roles of the AA is to carry out severity assessments, following an initial scoping of the readily available evidence, to assess, amongst other things, whether the conduct alleged would amount to misconduct or gross misconduct if proven. Once the investigation is complete the AA role is then to determine whether a chair of an independent misconduct meeting or hearing panel or accelerated case hearing could be entitled to reach the conclusion that the standards of professional behaviour have been breached at the standard of misconduct or gross misconduct. In Nottinghamshire Police PSD, it was most

common for one of my deputies (DI or DCI) to carry out the initial severity assessment and then for me to carry out the subsequent determination at the end of the investigation stage.

15. The AA is independent of the investigator, although they are responsible for ensuring that the investigator has the correct experience and independence to carry out the investigation. In complex misconduct cases, particularly ones which may involve potential criminality, where the Investigator may benefit from investigative advice and support from an experienced supervisor, a separate SIO is appointed to make strategic decisions that relate directly to the investigation. In the same way, in the interests of fairness, the Appropriate Authority should be as independent as possible from the person under investigation.

STATEMENT OF SUPERINTENDENT KATHRYN CRANER

16. I have now been provided with what the Inquiry feel are the relevant parts of Superintendent Kathryn Craner's statement [WITN0044001] and asked if I have anything to add. I wish firstly to state that where my opinion differs from Kathryn's or if I refer to additional evidence which I feel is relevant but does not appear in Kathryn's statement, this is in no way a criticism of Kathryn. I was Head of PSD at the time of the Nottingham attacks (13th June 2023) up until October 2023 when I was moved to another significant Operation which required a PIP 3 SIO. Common sense dictates that I will have better knowledge of PSD related matters than Kathryn in that time span as I was directly involved with or overseeing many of them.

17. In her statement [WITN0044001] Kathryn helpfully sets out a lot of matters which I do not dispute. I therefore will not rehearse her statement in its entirety

and will focus specifically on areas where I feel I have additional evidence of a different viewpoint that is directly relevant to the matters under review by the Inquiry that will help them to achieve their terms of reference.

18. I also wish to point out that at the time of writing I have not been privy to, or asked to see, any other officer's (or former officer's) statement apart from Kathryn's and, therefore, I accept that evidence I provide here may already be covered in the statements of other relevant witnesses, despite not being in Kathryn's.

19. For the ease of the reader I will address the points in the order that they appear in Kathryn's statement [WITN0044001] and then add anything further which I feel has not been covered at the end of my statement.

20. In paragraph 53 of her statement [WITN0044001], Kathryn refers to the material generated following the events of 13th June 2023 being predominantly held on the SAFE Command and Control System, NICHE, NICE Investigate and HOLMES. I would add that it later came to my attention that EMSOU officers were also storing highly sensitive material on the 'Big Job Drive' referred to as the BJD, a shared storage drive for officers to store their work. These drives were a legacy from before the Niche system was implemented but were still widely used for non-criminal matters such as storing shift patterns or officer/staff emergency contact numbers.

21. HOLMES is the only place that EMSOU officers should have been storing the material they gathered as part of their Homicide Investigation. Firstly, this has been protocol for years and HOLMES has the capacity to store huge amounts of information so there is no need in this case to have a separate storage system.

22. Secondly, for security reasons, access to each case managed on HOLMES is restricted to those working on the case. Different levels of access can be given to officers and staff depending on their roles and the system can be easily audited to see who accessed what material and when.
23. Most importantly, everything on HOLMES is reviewed by an officer manager to ensure it has been thoroughly dealt with before it is 'signed off' as complete. A Disclosure officer has an ongoing responsibility to review all material generated during the course of an investigation which is normally stored on the relevant HOLMES Operation (in this case Operation Hendrix). They ensure that all relevant material is marked up for disclosure to the court and the defence as appropriate in schedules which include a rationale as to why certain material has not been used in the case.
24. The material on HOLMES is also reviewed under 'Management of Police Information' (MOPI) principles and weeded according to dates set in national protocols.
25. In contrast the 'BJD' was a shared drive used by detectives on Nottingham City CID to store material relating to their respective local investigations. Access is gained by asking someone who already has access to the drive to raise a service request to the IT department to grant you access. After being granted access, you simply click on the Drive without having to enter a password and can view all material on there in anyone's folder.
26. As an experienced EMSOU Homicide SIO I was frankly astounded to learn that homicide material, including the CCTV of the attacks, was being stored on a relatively insecure drive that hundreds of officers and staff with no direct involvement in the Homicide investigation could access. I raised this matter at the Gold Group for Operation Hendrix (the Operational name given to the

Homicide Investigation) chaired by (then) ACC Rob Griffin on the 20th June 2023 (NGPF0007802). The SIO for Operation Hendrix T/DSU Leigh Sanders stated that this was partly due to necessity (which I strongly disagree with), but it would be discussed further to the Gold Group.

27. I recall personally contacting the then DCI for City CID, DCI Ruby Burrow, who had not been aware that EMSOU were using the BJD. DCI Burrow shared my concerns and promised to review the BJD and how it was being used and accessed. However, in terms of auditing, the damage was already done as my CCU team informed me that as no log on was required, it was virtually impossible to know who had viewed the file, CCTV and other confidential material on the BJD without a policing purpose.

28. As this was raised at Gold Group level I would hope that the learning from this has already been addressed in force however I am sure that (now) T/DCC Griffin will be able to cover this matter and reassure the Inquiry about the subsequent action taken more eloquently than I.

29. In paragraphs 56-63 of her statement Kathryn goes on to address the difficulties in restricting NICHE which are valid. I would also add that NICHE is used across several forces and not just Nottinghamshire so while my CCU team were auditing access to the Nottinghamshire system, officers in other forces could put the victim or offender's name into NICHE and view the associated documents without it flagging up to my CCU team. Therefore, any press leaks may not have necessarily originated within Nottinghamshire.

30. Where I have a stronger opinion than Kathryn is where in paragraph 74 [WITN0044001], she refers to the 'ambiguity' in supervisors asking officers to 'self-brief' which appears to have led to many officers and staff believing they had a right to essentially research the incident. I can state categorically that

every new starter or transferee that has access to police systems, receives a face-to-face input from members of PSD as to what a 'lawful policing purpose' is to look up information on police systems.

31. In addition to this all officers and staff had mandatory NCALT (online College of Policing lessons) training which provided a comprehensive overview of when sensitive operational information could be accessed. I personally gave an input to all Inspectors where this subject was revisited, and PSD ran several poster and internet campaigns on what a true policing purpose for accessing information was.

32. When officers/staff were sacked for accessing information they had no right to, this was sensitively publicised in order to ensure a 'declaratory' effect so that officers and staff knew the consequences of behaving in the same way.

33. In my professional opinion there is no reason for anyone to have viewed the incidents relating to the Nottingham attacks and certainly not the CCTV or Body Worn video (BWV) relating to the attacks unless they were directly involved in the homicide investigation, or subsequent PSD investigation. To simply state you did it because you were told to 'self-brief' is no excuse. Why would an officer standing on a cordon with no outstanding suspects need to view the CCTV to brief themselves as to what had happened? It is simply an affront to common sense especially as the likelihood is that the intelligence team would have put a sanitised briefing out in order to provide officers and staff with the information they required to do their job.

34. At this point, I would like to raise an issue which is not mentioned in Kathryn's statement [WITN0044001], but which I feel is relevant. At the original Strategic Command Group meeting chaired by ACC Griffin on the 13th June 2023 (NGPF0007788), there were a lot of partner organisations present either in

person or on Teams. The SIO gave quite a comprehensive update on the investigation, but the partner organisations weren't subject to any confidentiality agreement. It subsequently transpired that members of partner organisations had been sharing information about the investigation outside of the meeting and unless they did so in a manner that amounted to criminality (for example sharing sensitive information with the press), my PSD team had no power to hold them to account for it.

35. An example of this is when my team received an anonymous audio file on Crime Stoppers of someone sharing highly sensitive information about the investigation with persons unknown. My team managed to identify which partner agency the audio file related to and while their supervisors promised to 'have a word,' they refused our request to meet the employee directly to understand who they had shared the information with. The learning is clearly to be very careful about what operational details are shared at such meetings and ensure that all present sign a confidentiality agreement before the meeting commences. This learning may have been put in place already, but it is worth reinforcing nationally.

36. I can confirm that Kathryn is correct in paragraph 82 [WITN0044001] when she refers to Op Glint being set up as the CCU investigation into potential criminal disclosure and misconduct in relation to the Nottingham attacks. I retained the AA role in order to make independent misconduct determinations but, in order to assist DC Keeling, the PSD Investigating Officer (IO) with his investigation in the meantime, I appointed (then) DI Gareth Harding as the SIO. Kathryn correctly describes the approach DI Harding took as SIO in her statement.

37. I wish to clarify that the reason Operation Glint focused initially primarily on Niche, rather than unauthorised viewing of Body Worn Video or CCTV, which was not raised until some time later, was because on 14th June 2023, an article appeared in the Daily Mail which specifically related to information held on

Niche regarding a previous incident that the (at that time) suspect had been involved in in London prior to the Nottingham attacks. Niche was the only place to my knowledge at that time, that the specific information leaked to the Mail was stored and therefore the parameters of the inquiry were deliberately focused in order to try and trace the leak promptly and prevent any further unlawful disclosure to the press.

38. I note DI Harding's rationale around dealing with PC Small, the originator of the offensive text message, with an ethical interview rather than dealing with it as misconduct. I also understand that Kathryn, while not underplaying the unprofessionalism of the message, agrees with this decision (paragraph 102). I have to be absolutely honest and say that when I became aware of DI Harding's decision, after the ethical interview had taken place, I was surprised. My own view as a more experienced AA than DI Harding at that time, was that PC Small's actions could have amounted to misconduct and I would have personally commenced an investigation. It must be noted though that there is no formal 'bar' when it comes to severity assessments and there can be marginal, sometimes considerable, differences of opinion between AAs. The facts were that DI Harding had assessed PC Small's text message as not amounting to misconduct and had already dealt with it and provided a comprehensive rationale for his decision so any intervention by me after that point to overrule that, without any new aggravating evidence, would have clearly been seen by the Police Federation, and potentially any future Misconduct Panel chair, as an abuse of process.

39. In paragraph 107 [WITN0044001], Kathryn refers to the finalisation of the misconduct investigation into PC Gell. I feel I can add relevant information here in terms of the question as to ***'What steps were taken and when to ensure that the survivors and bereaved families were appropriately informed concerning any data breaches and the actions taken?'***

40. In my Appropriate Authority Determination (NGPF0005530) of 14 September 2023, in which I overruled the investigator and determined that PC Gell should face Gross Misconduct Proceedings rather than Misconduct only as suggested by the investigator, I stated:

'It is worth reminding ourselves that at some point, family liaison officers will have to share what PC Gell has done with the bereaved family members as it is inconceivable that they should first become aware of this information relating to their loved ones when PC Gell's actions are potentially reported on in the media.'

41. I go on to end my six page Appropriate Authority determination by stating:

'The matter should now progress to a misconduct hearing and all relevant parties should be updated'

42. For those who are not familiar with Police Misconduct hearings, it is worth me explaining that the decision as to whether PC Gell would be named and whether the misconduct hearing would be held in public and family members would be allowed to attend, is one that that would subsequently be made by the panel Chair, in this case a Legally Qualified Chair (LQC).

43. The default for such cases is that PSD would be the ones to inform 'interested parties' such as relatives and/or complainants that the matter would be going to a hearing and in due course the LQC would make the decision on naming and public attendance. In this case, however, as it related to an ongoing criminal prosecution, the correct course of action was for PSD to provide the Operation Hendrix Family Liaison Officers (FLOs), who were already well embedded with the affected families and surviving victims, with the information via the Family Liaison Advisor (FLA), in this case DCI Claire Gould. The normal route would then be for DCI Gould to write a strategy, including a form of words based on

the information provided by PSD about the hearing, and ensure that the same information was provided to the interested parties at the same time if possible. It would be quite usual for the FLA to liaise with the SIO (In this case T/DSU Leigh Sanders) around the timing of delivering this information. Leigh was an experienced Appropriate Authority having previously worked as a DCI on PSD for years and Claire had also been a DI on PSD for some years previously, so they understood misconduct hearings very well and I had no doubt that they both understood the importance of keeping the family members updated and letting them know that they may be able to attend the hearing.

44. With the above in mind, I contacted DCI Claire Gould (FLA) on 15th September 2023 and shared my full AA determination of Gross Misconduct for PC G (NGPF0005530) in relation to unauthorised systems access and sharing of insensitive WhatsApp messages to members of the public with her in its entirety and asked her to consider informing the Op Hendrix families as part of her FLA strategy (NGPF0010695).

45. In paragraph 152 of her statement [WITN0044001] Kathryn refers to an email chain on 20th September 2023 (I refer to this as NGPF0007483) in which DCI Gould updated 3 of the FLOs with a comprehensive form of words that she had put together following a discussion with me after having received my AA determination.

46. For transparency, it is so important to me that the families and surviving victims see exactly what was agreed to be released to the families and when so they are not under the illusion that there was any widespread deliberate cover up to keep them away from the hearing, and therefore I reproduce the wording of DCI Gould's email in its entirety below:

Morning all,

Just a quick update regarding the suspected 'leak' of information to the media in the early stages of the investigation. Whilst we have not identified the media leak – and I am certain there was one – we do have PC Matthew GELL who is now facing a GM hearing for misuse of force systems and disclosing information in relation to the investigation to his wife, a serving officer in WMP (Formerly Notts) and a friend outside of policing.

I have put together the following "form of words" so that the families can be updated of this. Whilst the hearing will be in private, I do not want any risk of them finding out, either now or in the future, about this and us not having told them. This has happened previously and so I feel being open and honest is the right way forward.

It doesn't need to be read verbatim but these are the facts :

Notts Police PSD commenced an investigation following concerns early in the investigation that there may be a leak to media outlets of information pertaining to the investigation, particularly details of Valdo Calocane.

PC Matthew GELL was identified as having accessed the investigation from force systems and no policing purpose could be ascertained. He was arrested and a criminal and misconduct investigation was conducted by the Counter Corruption Unit.

The criminal investigation concluded as there was NO evidence of any disclosure to any media outlet or other leak. He was found to have used police systems to review parts of the investigation which included the custody record of CALOCANE. He was also found to have shared information via Whatsapp relating to the incident. This was sent to his wife, another police officer and an acquaintance. He will face a gross Misconduct Hearing on a date to be determined.

The most severe sanction, if found proven at the level of GM, is dismissal. Other options include a Final Written Warning.

We will keep the family updated.

I do not intend to share the whatsapp as the first line says “2 students have been proper butchered”.

We can say that the information divulged did not include information regarding the suspect.

I will ascertain from Supt Williams when this can be shared.

Claire

47. DCI Gould forwarded the above email to me at 09:08 hrs on 20th September 2023 stating this was the information she intended to share with families and asked when she was able to do this.

48. I replied to DCI Gould at 11:23 hours the same day. I copied in the following people:

1. (Then) ACC Rob Griffin – Chair of the Operation Hendrix Gold Group
2. Stephen O’Connell – (Then) PSD Hearings and Meetings officer who would make arrangements for the misconduct hearing with the LQC.
3. Gareth Harding – (Then) DI on PSD and SIO for Operation Glint.
4. (Then) DCC Steve Cooper – My direct line manager and the command team officer with direct responsibility for PSD.
5. DCI Andy Reynolds – My deputy on PSD. A highly experienced Appropriate Authority who temporarily headed the department when I moved on the following month.

49. My email reply read as follows:

Hello Claire, (and Mr Griffin copied in from a Hendrix gold Group perspective).

I'm happy with this form of words apart from at this stage I think we should just say 'an officer' rather than 'PC Matt Gell.' The reason for this is that we hope to hold the hearing before the criminal trial so it will be in private, and the officer's name will not be released to the public.

A couple of 'if asked' bits by the family.

Can we attend the 'private' hearing as 'interested parties?' – Potentially yes with the agreement of the chair.

Can we provide statements making it clear how we feel about the officer looking at the material? – In this case the investigator chose NOT to approach the family for statements prior to the determination. As the matter has already been found suitable for a GM hearing even without these emotive statements, Fed may 'cry foul' to further statements being added. Again it may be a question for the LQC. What may be more acceptable is that if the panel find the case proven, at the point the Fed put lots of character references in for mitigation, the family could at that stage essentially provide the misconduct equivalent of a VPS as an aggravating factor.

Depending on the thoughts of others, providing Steve O'Connell confirms that the officer is fully aware that the matter is being progressed to a hearing then the timing of the disclosure to family is a matter for you and the Hendrix SIO.

It is probably worth you knowing that there is also an SC that has admitted unlawful access to a lot of the most distressing footage. He has admitted this in writing, was suspended and quickly resigned so it will be an AMH although the IO report is not ready for the AA yet. Not sure if you want to deal with that at the same time or drip feed the bad news?

Kind regards,

Hayley

50. At 12:20 hrs the same day, ACC Griffin replied to the same circulation group stating,

Thanks for sighting me on this.

Really e=to(sic) keen to ensure that the family always find out about these types of issues from us, rather than anywhere else...

So, it sounds like you have the green light Claire, from Hayley, so timing is one for you, but with the above parameter.

Thanks again

Rob Griffin.

51. At this stage I think it is fair to say that there was no doubt that a form of words had been agreed and had been approved for sharing with the Hendrix families by me as Appropriate Authority and by ACC Griffin as Gold Commander.

52. I moved on from PSD soon after. When anyone leaves PSD, their access to all PSD computer systems, and to the restricted areas is immediately removed due to the sensitivities of the investigations that department carries out. At the point of leaving, I was entirely satisfied that a form of words had been agreed and the families would be notified of any misconduct hearing involving PC Gell. I, DCI Gould and ACC Griffin had all stated how important it was for the families to hear this from us and not anyone else. I was therefore astounded to hear in due course that PC Gell's misconduct hearing had been held in public and contrary to the instructions given by someone as senior as ACC Griffin, the affected families had not been told.

53. I have no doubt that it would have been extremely distressing for them to hear about this through the media, rather than being given the information in a sensitive but transparent way by the FLOs.
54. At paragraph 156 of Supt Kathryn Craner's statement [WITN0044001] she refers to a policy decision dated 13th October 2023 by the Op Hendrix SIO not to tell the family about the PSD matters at that time as '***we simply have not had clarity as to the situation***'. I strongly disagree with the SIO's statement and was not informed of this decision by the SIO to overrule the instructions he had been given to share the information.
55. The learning from this appears obvious to me, however I would specifically recommend moving forward that when a crime SIO decides not to share information provided by PSD to the families they must inform the PSD Appropriate Authority so that they can make an informed decision whether to use PSD officers rather than FLOs to share the information pertaining to the PSD investigation.
56. As DCI Gould alluded to in her aforementioned email, this is not the first time something like this has happened. As SIOs, we are trained to make difficult decisions. However distasteful the information is that we may have to convey to bereaved families, nothing will be as distressing for the families as the day of the attacks and therefore we should not use 'protecting their feelings' as an excuse for not being honest with them but should work to ensure that the difficult information is delivered in a sensitive and compassionate way by highly trained FLOs, or in some cases, by the SIO themselves.
57. The primary purpose of the Police Misconduct System is to protect public confidence in, and the reputation of policing. In R(Green) v Police Complaints Authority (2004) Lord Carswell stated:

'Public confidence in the police is of great importance in the maintenance of law and order in the manner which we regard as appropriate in our society. If citizens feel that improper behaviour on the part of our police officers is left unchecked and they are not held accountable for it in a suitable manner, that confidence will be eroded.'

58. Similarly, if we deal with police misconduct in the correct manner but then withhold it from bereaved families, it can only erode their trust and confidence in us when they hear about it from third parties. I have, in the past, instructed FLOs and OICs to deliver the most distressing news to families and have been humbled by their resilience and even thanked for 'doing something that must have been really difficult for you.' In the case of the Nottingham attacks, by not ensuring that the families were told of misconduct hearings in a timely and transparent manner, we got it wrong and must learn from that.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed:

GRO-B

Dated: 20th February 2026

Index to First Witness Statement of Hayley Williams

No.	URN	Document Description
1	NGPF0007802	Gold Group 6 Minutes
2	NGPF0007788	SCG Meeting Minutes
3	NGPF0010695	Email H Williams to C Gould 15.9.23
4	NGPF0005530	Report dated 14/09/2023, compiled by DC Lee Keeling [NGPF], Re: Investigation Report Professional Standards Directorate
5	NGPF0007483	Email from Claire Gould [NGPF] to Fiona McVey [NGPF], Gina Farrell [NGPF] and Mark Kimberley [NGPF], re: Media Leak