

Witness Name: Stephen Yallop

Statement No: WITN04200001

Dated: 25.2.2026

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF PC STEPHEN YALLOP

I, Stephen Yallop, will say as follows: -

Introduction

1. I am Police Constable Stephen Yallop of Nottinghamshire Police.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the "**Inquiry**") with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 11th February 2025 (the "**Request**").

Career Background

3. I have been asked to set out a summary of my career background along with any relevant education or training.
4. I have been a serving Police Officer with Nottinghamshire Police since July 2008. Upon completing my initial college course, I was based at Radford Road Police Station as a response officer. I completed my two-year probation period at this station and remained there until April 2016

5. During my time on response, I successfully completed two driving courses. The first was my three-week standard response driving course and later selected to attend the standard initial phase pursuit driving course. I became qualified in the initial pursuit of a vehicle which has failed to stop for Police, subject to a dynamic risk assessment, until further tactically trained vehicles arrived to take over management of the pursuit.

6. In April 2016 I attended an Initial Firearms Course after being successful through the selection process, to become an Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO) carrying the Armed Response Vehicle Officer (ARVO) profile. This selection process consisted of different phases including a written application, a two-day selection process, and an interview. The firearms course was ten weeks in length, and on successful completion I joined the Armed Policing Team based at Force Headquarters.

7. Throughout my time in the Armed Policing department, I was subject to regular training in all the tactical elements to maintain competency within the role. Whilst the training mostly relates to the implementation of firearms tactics, the ARVO role profile also carries the skill of being trained in enhanced first aid. This is a skill that is regularly tested and subject to annual assessments. This training is related to assisting with major trauma incidents and I consider this to be an incredible life skill to carry outside of the day-to-day role.

8. Whilst on Armed Policing there are opportunities to develop your skill sets and specialise. In early 2019 I successfully applied for the role of Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance and completed a two week National Surveillance Firearms Integration Course (SFIC) in August 2019, followed by a two week internal course on Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance in

December 2019 within our armed policing department. I passed both courses and became qualified as a Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance officer.

9. In November 2021 I completed a two week training course, qualifying as an Operational Firearms Commander (OFC). This led to me becoming an OFC in the armed policing department. The responsibilities within this role are for the management of the Armed Response Vehicles (ARV) on a day to day basis, along with achieving the Tactical Firearms Commanders (TFC) plan during armed deployments. Such roles include briefing the teams, assigning roles and responsibilities, leading the team, and additional units on the ground, whilst being responsible to the Tactical Firearms Commander.

10. In July 2017 I attended a four week advanced driving course, allowing me to drive marked and unmarked vehicles with a higher engine performance. On conclusion of this course, I then successfully completed a further course in the advanced initial phase of a police pursuit.

11. In July 2018 I completed the Tactical Phase and Containment driving course which trained me in tactics in safely concluding vehicle pursuits.

12. After serving eight years on the Armed Policing team, I moved into a non firearms role where I remain in post.

My Role and Involvement on 13th June 2023

13. I have been asked to detail my role on 13th June 2023 in respect of the incident involving VC.

14. On Monday 12th June 2023 I commenced a night shift at 23:00 hours.

During this shift I was crewed with PC 4550 Bower and we were assigned the call sign Oscar Foxtrot Four Eight (OF48). This call sign and vehicle was an Armed Response Vehicle (ARV) and on that night we were driving an unmarked Volvo XC90 registration MA72YMW. PC Bower was the driver, and I was the passenger.

15. The main patrol area for the OF48 call sign is the north of the county, predominantly Mansfield and the surrounding towns. However, this is subject to armed deployments or incidents which require our attendance, usually directed by the Force Control Room Chief Inspector or Sergeant, or the Operational Firearms Commander on the day. On that night, there were three ARVs on duty in total.
16. I have been asked to provide details about my attendance at the scene, to include when and how I was first alerted to the incident, the information I was provided with, the relevant timings along with a summary of my involvement.
17. At 04:04 hours on Tuesday 13th June 2023 I was aware, through radio transmission on the firearms talk group 1199 (TG1199), that the force had received a 999 call to Ilkeston Road, Nottingham. This initial report stated there had been a stabbing outside Marios Pizza. The caller stated there was a victim lying in the middle of the road, believed to be dead.
18. At the time that the call was received, we were patrolling around Kirkby-in-Ashfield, which is approximately 15 miles away from Nottingham City Centre.
19. Details of the incident were still being reported, with reports of a possible second victim; a female also seriously injured.

20. I was aware, from updates that were being passed on the radio, that multiple Response vehicles were travelling to the scene. These units included the other ARVs, who had tactical options to deal with any possible threat posed at the scene, and carry enhanced first aid equipment which they are trained to use when dealing with major trauma.
21. I was aware further calls were coming in about the incident on Ilkeston Road and, given the potential severity, I made the Force Control Room aware that we would travel towards the location to offer additional support. This was with the agreement of both the Force Control Room supervisor and Operational Firearms Commander.
22. At 04:11 hours, PC Bower and I began travelling from Kirkby-in-Ashfield, Nottinghamshire, travelling with our emergency lights and sirens activated.
23. During this journey PC Bower and I were receiving regular updates from the scene that were being passed over the talk group and were aware that further calls were being made into the Force Control Room from members of the public. The information from the scene was that two victims had been located, one male and one female, both of whom were in their early 20's and both of whom had significant life-threatening injuries. From the updates being passed on the talk groups, I was aware that Officers on scene were administering first aid within minutes of the first call being received.
24. A description of the offender was passed over the radio. This was that he was a black male in dark clothing, with his hood up. The offender was in possession of a knife and had a black bag with him, with some describing it as a 'man bag.' I understood this to mean a small bag/pouch that is carried at the front of their person, over their shoulders.

25. Information on the offender remained limited, and I was aware this incident was placing great demands on the teams on the ground and those in the control room from what I could hear whilst travelling. Whilst on patrol I had my force issue laptop and was reading through the incidents being called into the Force Control Room. To assist colleagues involved in the incident in obtaining further descriptions and vital evidence, I recall making a phone call to one of the multiple callers to the Police as the Incident log said that they had CCTV. I instructed the caller to make themselves known to Police on scene so that the CCTV footage could be viewed immediately and disseminated to officers. I then updated the officers on TG1199 of this **(NGPF0004745)**. This was a fast time action I thought I could increase our chances of identifying and locating the offender.

26. The motive of the attacker was not known. An initial caller suspected a robbery had taken place. Identification belonging to the victims had been found close to their person, which suggested they were students at one of the Nottingham Universities. Ilkeston Road, and surrounding areas, is known to be predominantly student housing. There is a large student footprint, with accommodation both privately rented and student blocks near the incident. Ilkeston Road is a significant arterial road in and out of Nottingham City Centre, and after mid-week student nights it is common, whilst on patrol, to see vast numbers of students walking to and from the City Centre via Ilkeston Road. I considered that robberies of students, particularly when walking alone, are a common trend. However, in my experience of attending reports of robberies, they are not typically as violent as what had occurred on this occasion, so I wasn't convinced this incident was a robbery as suggested.

27. Through monitoring the updates on the talk groups, both the local talk group and TG1199, officers on scene described both victims having multiple stab wounds of extreme severity. My consideration was that the motive for the

assault could be domestic violence related. My reason for this was based on my policing experience. In my experience, domestic violence related assaults and homicides can contain serious levels of violence, commonly through acts of rage. The updates I received over the radio describing the sustained nature of the assault made me believe that the victims and the offender may be known to one another and that it could be therefore motivated by domestic circumstances between them.

28. PC Bower and I travelled into Radford via the A60 Mansfield Road, turning right on to Gregory Boulevard. At that time, this would have been our most direct route towards the locality. By the time I arrived on scene, there was no name for the suspect, nor any further description. We arrived at approximately 04:25 hours, and I was conscious that this was 20 plus minutes from the initial call and last sighting of the offender. There was still no clear direction of travel for the offender.

29. On arrival, we were informed that there were no further resources required at the scene on Ilkeston Road. PC 35 Speeden was the OFC, and he updated that there was no further direction of travel for the offender and reiterated that the offender was believed to have last been seen going along Ilkeston Road towards the City Centre. I am of the belief this was based on information PC Speeden had been given.

30. Whilst the incident was not at armed authority at this time, incidents of this nature are typically led by the OFC within the tasking of their armed assets. There is no set policy or procedure on this, however this is often the case, as incidents such as this are dynamic and can develop into armed deployments. The OFC would therefore assume the control and tasking of their armed assets.

The Search

31. I have been asked to detail the instructions given in relation to the search for the attacker, VC, and explain any methodology I applied.

32. Under the direction of officers at the scene, PC Bower and I began to conduct a mobile area search of Ilkeston Road, and surrounding streets near to the City Centre, remaining in our vehicles so we could cover more ground. Whilst doing so, the Force Control Room Sergeant made us aware over the radio of an incident that had been called in approximately 5 minutes after the initial report of the stabbings on Ilkeston Road (**NGPF0004755**).

33. This call had been made by an off-duty Police Officer, who reported a female who could be heard screaming and shouting, telling someone to get off her, near to St Barnabas Cathedral on Derby Road. The Cathedral is only a 20-minute walk from the scene on Ilkeston Road, and the route would be from Ilkeston Road towards the City, which is the direction the suspect was said to have gone.

34. Given the locality of this 999 call and the timings of it, it was a working assumption that the two incidents may be linked. My belief is that there could have been a link between the incidents reported. As Police Officers we are guided on information and intelligence, and in the absence of any new information from the scene, it was logical to head towards the Cathedral location and continue the search.

35. During this time, I was still considering ways of identifying a potential suspect and motive, so I asked our Real Time Intelligence Unit (RTIU) to conduct open-source research into both victims, utilising social media accounts such as Facebook etc. The RTIU are members of police staff based within the

Force Control Room who can conduct checks on Police intelligence systems to help research information at the request of Officers or staff within the Control Room. No results came back from those checks that assisted.

36. I knew that other units had already attended the area of the Cathedral but, given the possible link between the incidents, a further search was requested by the Force Control Room Sergeant. I knew that a number of other resources were also being asked to attend, including a drone officer, a Police dog officer, and the ARV containing PC Speeden, once they had resumed from their responsibilities at the scene.
37. The caller had described the last known location of the screaming as coming from the Tunnel within The Park. The Park is a relatively small residential estate close to Nottingham City Centre. At that time of night, it usually has a very low pedestrian footfall with no vehicles driving around. The Park has only a few entrances and exits back onto the main arterial roads of Nottingham. PC Bower had spoken with response officers who were on scene at The Park and they informed us they had walked the Tunnel on foot.
38. To avoid duplication, PC Bower and I conducted a mobile drive around The Park looking for any persons on foot. With it only being a small area and with at least 4 other units in the area, I was confident all streets would and could be covered. There was no specific management of the search, and it was conducted through officers searching areas of their own accord. No specific responsibilities were issued, such as breaking the area down into quarters or geographical responsibilities and, on reflection, this is something that could have been done. However, as stated above, given the geographical location of The Park, I was confident it could be searched effectively in the way we were conducting the search.

39. Thirty minutes passed with no further sightings, nor any new information or intelligence passed to us, either from the scene at Ilkeston Road, the caller to Police near St Barnabas Cathedral or other forms of enquiries such as policing systems.
40. By 05:10 hours there was nothing further to suggest any other search areas to focus on or information on the offender. This was now over one hour since the first call to Police and the last sighting of the offender. A photograph of the offender obtained from the CCTV had been attached to the incident log **(NGPF0005244)**, but this did not shed any further light on the offender's identity.
41. In my experience, a person walking or perhaps running for one hour can cover some distance, and due to the sheer volume of side roads, housing estates and alleyways which the suspect could have taken, this search was challenging. It was also a consideration that there were a number of available opportunities to escape the area through public transport or taxi cabs.
42. Given the time that had elapsed, PC Bower and I began to travel back towards Force Headquarters and were close to that location when at approximately 05:25 we were requested by the Force Control Room Sergeant to travel towards Milton Street in Nottingham City Centre following reports of a white van that had deliberately run over a male. The driver was described as a black male. The pedestrian was described as severely bleeding from his head.
43. The offending vehicle was described as a white van registration FD64LUJ **(NGPF0002564)**.

44. Colleagues from Response were also travelling to the scene and at 05:30, I vividly remember hearing on the Police radio, the sound of an Officer who was behind the van on Parliament Street. The Officer described the van running two people over and then making off, leaving the scene. The Officer was directed by the Control Room to stop his vehicle and provide first aid to those injured members of the public.
45. The Force Control Room Chief Inspector declared Armed Authority and shortly after, this was updated to the declaration of Operation Plato. At this point, I activated my Body Worn Video (BWV).
46. Operation Plato is the coordinated response to a marauding terrorist attack. The Control Room Chief Inspector reiterated the details of the offending vehicle and the last known direction of travel, which was near Forest Road in Radford.
47. By the time this sequence of events had unfolded PC Bower and I were on Mansfield Road in Sherwood. I was aware through other talk group channels that I was monitoring that the offending van had been sighted and was potentially under observations by divisional colleagues who were providing updates on its location.
48. This was a dynamic incident unfolding and I considered my main priority at this time was to navigate our Police vehicle straight towards the van, so that the offender could be located and detained to prevent further injury to any members of public. Whilst listening to all updates from Officers providing the sightings, I was able to direct PC Bower to the area of Bentinck Road which was the last known sighting. The vehicle was described as in the middle of the road with no person seen to exit the van.

49. PC Bower and I arrived on Bentinck Road turning left from Radford Road. We passed a marked Police vehicle on the road and approximately 10 meters further up Bentinck Road was the white Vauxhall Vivaro as described. This vehicle was facing towards Noel Street.
50. PC Bower drove our vehicle alongside the van and I recall seeing the driver almost fixated, staring into the wing mirrors of the van. Whilst I cannot be certain, I believe the driver was staring at the marked Police vehicle behind and, in the process, did not register our unmarked vehicle to the side of him.
51. When alongside, I could see a dog officer, PC 1721 Whysall on the pavement approaching the van with his vehicle left in the middle of the road facing towards the van. The driver then registered our presence and I witnessed the driver raise his right hand above his shoulder. In his hand was a knife which I would describe as a dagger. I considered there to be a real and immediate threat to Officers dealing with the male, most notably PC 1721 Whysall, and I repeatedly shouted to Officers that the male was in possession of the knife.
52. My view of this was only a matter of meters away as my vehicle window was almost directly alongside that of the subjects' driver's side window. PC Bower had exited our vehicle to assist PC Whysall, and I could hear the shouts of 'Taser' from colleagues.
53. On joining colleagues at the passenger door of the van, I could see the suspect was slumped backwards with his feet closest to me. It was clear that the deployment of the taser had been successful. The knife was no longer in the suspect's hand and I assumed it would be somewhere within the cab.

54. I took the decision to extract the suspect out of the cab by pulling him by his boots, aided by either PC Bower or PC Whysall. The suspect was extracted straight out of the cab and onto the floor, facing upwards. His hands were presented towards me, so I handcuffed him immediately.

55. The male was in possession of a black backpack still on his person, so this was cut off. I am aware this was later searched, and a knife was located within. Ensuring there was no secondary threat, I then cleared the van for any other persons or weapons. I noted that on the floor within the van cab was the dagger I had seen the suspect in possession of when pulled alongside him.

56. I was present as the male was arrested by PC Bower on suspicion of murder. Conscious that there were forensic elements to the investigation I ensured no colleagues who had attended the scene at Ilkeston Road were present with the male. My interactions with the suspect were brief; however, I recall how the suspect lacked any emotion. He had a very cold expression, unfazed by any of the circumstances that he had been involved in. He had no obvious physical injuries, nor would I suspect he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs from the short time I was with him. The male would continually say words like 'FUCK OFF' when any questions were asked of him.

57. I have been asked to comment on any observations as to the sufficiency of the search for VC including its rigour, management, coordination and effectiveness.

58. The instruction to attend The Park Estate came via the Force Control Room Sergeant based on the 999 call reporting the incident at St Barnabas

Cathedral, and the working theory that the two incidents were linked. Following this, we deployed to the area remaining mobile in our vehicles to cover the most ground possible. From prior knowledge of The Park Estate, I believe that there were sufficient units assigned to the area to effectively cover the search, due to time of day, and size of the area. PC Bower liaised with Officers to ensure the Tunnel had been searched on foot. This specific area was described as where the female was heard to be screaming.

59. Whilst I believe that this search was effective, on reflection my thoughts are Officers on the ground would have benefited from a more structured search strategy, assigning geographical areas and boundaries to each unit to best ensure there was no duplication of areas searched, nor any specific areas were missed.

60. This could have been organised by Officers on the ground; however, I believe the management and coordination of the search was best suited to those in the Control Room, as staff there have access to area maps.

61. If this had happened then, whilst the search tactics would have had a structure, the search would have still focused on The Park Estate, as that is where the disturbance was heard, and due to its proximity to Ilkeston Road, it was considered to be connected to that incident.

Post Arrest of VC

62. I have been asked if I am aware of whether any consideration was given to drug and alcohol testing of VC on or at the time he was arrested.

63. The Operation Plato declaration had yet to be rescinded. The suspect from

the van was secure; however, we could not rule out the possibility that there was an additional threat. The TFC then informed us of a further call being received to the Control Room, and he immediately re-deployed us to the City Centre and told us to await further instruction, which we did.

64. Any evidential procedures required of the suspect when arrested were not under our consideration at that time, as there was significant reason to suppose there was a greater risk to other members of public and as such our redeployment was necessary to mitigate this risk. This is also the same case for forensic opportunities from the suspect while in custody. The suspect was left in the care of other Officers, and I requested a divisional supervisor to the scene to manage it.

65. Whilst at Armed Authority we relocated to the Market Square. The OFC had re-allocated each ARV to a location within Nottingham City Centre in the event of any further incidents. We remained within the Market Square until such time as we were relieved of our duties and upon doing so, returned to the force headquarters.

66. Of note, I believe it became apparent that the further call the TFC was assessing, whilst we were with the van on Bentinck Road, was reporting the victim on Magdala Road.

Resourcing of Operational Firearms Units

67. I have been asked to provide any observations on the sufficiency of the resourcing of the Operational Firearms Unit in Nottingham City Centre in the incident.

68. At the time of the incidents unfolding in the early hours of Tuesday 13th June 2023 there were three ARVs on patrol and available for deployments. Force ARV capability is determined by the ACC Armed Policing Portfolio Holder, informed by the Armed Policing Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (APSTRA). At the time of the incident three ARVs was the minimum requirement set out within these guidelines. This number is sufficient in conducting an initial response to any incidents involving Armed deployments and often enables all deployments to be successfully resolved.
69. In my opinion the same can be said for the events in the early hours of the 13th June 2023.
70. The authorisation of the deployment of armed officers sits with the Tactical Firearms Commander and is subject to their own decision making using the National Decision Model (NDM) (**HOMF000051**). This is therefore a subjective decision based on the TFC's own interpretation of the information and intelligence available to them.
71. After every Firearms deployment, we debrief as a team to reflect on the incident, identifying positives and learning outcomes.
72. On 11th July 2023, I attended a debrief in relation to this incident. During this, I raised that it was my belief that there had been a strong argument for the arming criteria to have been met earlier in the initial report of the incident. This was based on the information shared in the initial calls, and updates from the Officers on the scene, that the offender was in possession of a knife and had caused serious injuries to others. I also know that the OFC had asked the TFC to give this consideration at the time.

73. The priority on initial attendance was, and always will be, to save life. Correctly the ARVs were directed straight to the scene to administer enhanced first aid. However, in my opinion, once additional support had arrived from East Midlands Ambulance Service (EMAS), there could have then been consideration for Armed Criteria, and the ARV's that had been administering first aid, could resume to assist with the area search for the outstanding offender. Had the Armed Authority then been given the methodology of the search would have been led by the OFC; Pc 35 Speeden.

74. Based on my own experiences as an ARV officer and OFC, an OFC would set out instructions for a systematic search with the resources available to them. However, based on the information that was available to us at that moment, I am extremely confident that this search would have solely focused on The Park estate.

75. In this incident, had the Arming criteria been met, this would, at best, made only one further ARV available for the search. However, as they were committed with assistance at the scene at Ilkeston Road, their release from this commitment may have not been guaranteed.

76. Whilst the structure of the search may have differed, along with our ground tactics for the apprehension of the offender, had he been located, we now know the offender was not within The Park Estate, and therefore, we would not have located him despite being at Armed Authority.

77. On reflection of the night, I believe all officers worked to their absolute maximum, arriving at the scene on Ilkeston Road within minutes of the first call made, and administering first aid to the victims. Multiple units conducted an area search to try and locate the person responsible, however due to limited information on the offender's identity and description, his direction of

travel and no apparent motive, this hindered the search.

78. Over one hour passed between the last known sighting of the suspect, and the second sighting of the van. Within that time a person can cover significant ground and given the built up nature of the area there are a multitude of routes that could be taken, with access to public transport at all points. We also considered that the suspect could have travelled to and from the scene in their own vehicle or perhaps was in premises nearby.

79. Upon the Operation Plato declaration, the suspect was detained in handcuffs within approximately four minutes. The threat he presented to further members of the public, officers and himself was safely neutralized.

80. Communication between the team of firearms officers was conducted through various different talk groups. Firearms officers and other officers on Operation Support, such as dog units, will predominantly use their own talk group 1199. This channel is often monitored by either the Force Control Room Sergeant and Chief Inspector and is a talk group that offers direct communication between the units and management throughout the shift. From experience the team will use this talk group alongside listening to the 'local' talk group for the area they are patrolling, which will have local divisional colleagues on it. By using the different radio channels, it helps keep transmissions to a minimum, allowing for other pressing communications on the talk groups.

81. During a firearms operation, the firearms officers will then adopt another talk group. On the morning of the 13th June 2023, each vehicle was multi-tasking between listening to the information on the different talk groups. The passenger of each ARV is typically responsible for all communications, as well as navigation. On the night I believe that the entire team did their utmost

to relay all information available to them, in efforts to locate and detain the suspect.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed: **GRO-B**

Dated: 25.2.2016

Index to First Witness Statement of Stephen Yallop PC 3288

| <u>No.</u> | <u>URN</u> | <u>Document Description</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------|--|
| 1 | NGPF0004745 | Radio Transmission by PC 3288 Yallop |
| 2 | NGPF0004755 | Radio Transmission of additional call. |
| 3 | NGPF0005244 | Incident log 0065_13062023 |
| 4 | NGPF0002564 | Incident log 0077_13062023 |
| 5 | HOMF0000051 | National Decision Model (NDM) |