

Witness Name: Christopher Sullivan

Statement No: WITN0427001

Dated: 9th March 2026

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF DETECTIVE SUPERINTENDENT CHRISTOPHER SULLIVAN

I, Christopher Sullivan, will say as follows: -

Introduction

1. I am Superintendent Christopher John Sullivan of Nottinghamshire Police and currently hold responsibility for Nottinghamshire Police's Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB), as the Director of Intelligence (DOI) and Authorising Officer (AO). I have held this position since 2023.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the "**Inquiry**") with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 13th February 2026 (the "**Request**").
3. I wish to make the Inquiry aware that Microsoft Copilot (AI) was used in the preparation of this document solely as an assistive tool.
4. The use of AI was supportive and non-determinative, and was limited to:
 - Assisting with drafting, structuring, and formatting of narrative text;
 - Improving clarity and coherence of material already known to, or authored by, the officer;

- Supporting the presentation of information for readability.
5. AI was not used to:
- Generate, access, analyse, or interpret intelligence, evidence, or sensitive operational data;
 - Connect to police systems, intelligence databases, or partner systems;
 - Make decisions, assessments, prioritisation judgements, or risk evaluations;
 - Replace professional judgement, command accountability, or decision-making.
6. All content has been reviewed, validated, and approved by the author, who retains full responsibility and accountability for the accuracy, interpretation, and use of the information.

Career Background

7. I have been a police officer since 2002 serving in a variety of frontline and leadership roles across operational policing. I hold a Post Graduate Diploma in Police Leadership, Strategy and Organisation from Derbyshire University (2022).
8. In my current role as DOI, I am responsible for the strategic leadership, governance and oversight of the Force Intelligence Department.
9. This includes setting the overall strategy for my department, ensuring appropriate governance and assurance arrangements are in place, and working with senior leaders to ensure the department is sufficiently

resourced to deliver clear and consistent intelligence products. These intelligence products are intended to inform operational, tactical and strategic decision making across the organisation.

10. In my role as an Authorising Officer (AO), I am responsible for considering and authorising the lawful use of specific police powers and tactics where such authority is required by legislation, national guidance or force policy. This includes assessing whether proposed activity is lawful, necessary and proportionate, and whether it complies with the Human Rights Act and relevant codes of practice.

11. I am a trained and qualified Specialist Tactical Firearms Commander (STFC). In my capacity as a STFC I am responsible for providing tactical command during firearms operations that are complex, protracted or high-risk in nature. The role involves assessing threat, harm and risk, authorising and directing the tactical deployment of armed officers, and ensuring that firearms operations are conducted in accordance with national armed policing guidance, force policy and the National Decision Model (NDM).

12. I have the following qualifications and relevant training:

Qualifications – relevant education

- Skills for Justice (SFJ) Awards L5 in Police Management - Work Based Assessor
- Post Graduate Diploma in Police Leadership, Strategy and Organisation
- Police Leadership Programme (PLP) L4 - Senior Leaders
- Long Service Award (20 years)

Training

- Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO) 2006-2013
- Advanced Driver 2006 – 2014
- Tactical Pursuit and Containment driver (TPAC) 2006 - 2014
- Specialist Firearms Officer – Dynamic Intervention (SFO) 2009 – 2013
- Explosive Method of Entry (EMOE) 2009 – 2013
- Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MAST officer) 2011 – 2013
- Surveillance and Firearms Integration Officer (SFIO) 2012 – 2013
- Hostage and Crisis Negotiator 2016 – 2021
- Hostage and Crisis Negotiator Red Centre 2017 – 2021
- Post Incident Manager (PIM) 2018 - 2021
- Initial Tactical Firearms Commander (ITFC) 2022 – Current
- Cadre Tactical Firearms Commander (CTFC) 2022 – Current
- Specialist Tactical Firearms Commander (STFC) 2022 – Current
- Accredited Assessor - Specialist Firearms Command 2022 – Current
- Authorising Officer (AO) 2023 – Current

13. I have held the following roles:

- September 2002 Joined Nottinghamshire Police
- Police Constable Neighbourhood Policing 2003 – 2004
- Police Constable Response Policing 2004 – 2006
- Operational Support, AFO 2006 – 2013
- Temporary Police Sergeant Response 2013 – 2014
- Police Sergeant Response Policing 2014 – 2016
- Temporary Demand Management Inspector (DMI) 2016 – 2017

- Demand Management Inspector 2017 – 2018
- Inspector Corporate Development / Projects 2018 – 2019
- Temporary Chief Inspector Force Incident Manager (FIM) 2019 – 2020
- Chief Inspector County Response 2020 – 2022
- Chief Inspector Contact Management Future Delivery 2022 – 2023
- Superintendent Force Intelligence 2023 – Current position

Information about the email inbox “fib@[redacted] NHPF”

14. I have been asked to provide information about who is responsible for monitoring the email [fib@\[redacted\] NHPF](mailto:fib@[redacted] NHPF)
15. The Force Intelligence Bureau email is an outlook mailbox managed by police staff Intelligence Officers (IOs), and Force Intelligence Police Sergeants (PS) within the Intelligence Development Unit (IDU).
16. The IDU is comprised of four teams providing intelligence support to Nottinghamshire Police.
17. An IDU team would typically comprise of one x PS, four x IOs, four x Force Intelligence Officers (FIOs), and three x Local Intelligence Officers (LIOs).
18. The IDU is overseen by a Detective Inspector (DI), with a Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) and Detective Superintendent forming the senior leadership team.
19. Monitoring emails sent to [fib@\[redacted\] NHPF](mailto:fib@[redacted] NHPF) is a key responsibility of IOs, overseen by IDU Police Sergeants.

20. This mailbox is predominantly accessed by Force Intelligence staff and officers, apart from support services who can access the email for reasons of technical support if needed. No other staff member, officer, or operational department outside of Force Intelligence (FI) has routine access.
21. Management of the email operates between 07.00 hrs – 22.00 hrs Monday to Friday and 07.00 hrs – 17.00 hrs Saturday to Sunday.
22. The FI email inbox provides a controlled point of receipt for slow time, non-urgent and non-critical intelligence, intelligence related information and requests and acts as a point of contact for both law enforcement partners and external partners (Probation, as an example).
23. It is used to receive, triage, assess, and appropriately disseminate intelligence and actions in line with national intelligence standards. The inbox supports secure information sharing with other police forces, law enforcement agencies and partner agencies.
24. This ensures consistent auditability, and prevents intelligence being received or actioned outside established governance arrangements for those partners who do not share the same information technology infrastructure as Nottinghamshire Police.
25. Information received into the inbox is varied. A significant proportion of the information that is received is material that relates to information sharing between UK Police Forces, including intelligence sent to or received from other Force Intelligence functions. This intelligence can often be updates on where persons of interest reside, operate or where an individual or group may present a risk across police force boundaries.

26. The email inbox receives requests for research and intelligence support ranging from straightforward checks to more detailed tasking.
27. External partners, such as probation or other criminal justice partners, routinely make requests for contact or information sharing through this email enabling controlled, auditable receipt of information and demand.
28. Mental health services are not directed nor expected to share information or intelligence through this email. It is rare that mental health services would use this means of contact into Nottinghamshire Police. The primary means of contact is largely facilitated through Contact Management (CM), Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPT), the Street Triage Team (STT) and established partnership structures and agreed pathways such as the Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) dependent on the risk posed and the nature of the information being shared.
29. Actions undertaken from the information received through this inbox include triaging and assessing the information received to determine its relevance, reliability and any associated threat, harm or risk.
30. Where appropriate, the information is developed into intelligence, researched further, or sanitised and recorded in accordance with national intelligence standards.
31. Intelligence is then disseminated to relevant officers, departments, partner agencies or other police forces, or referred onward where FI action is not required. In some cases, the inbox acts as a gatekeeping function, with information being redirected to the appropriate unit without further

development. This process ensures appropriate governance, auditability and compliance with handling codes and information sharing requirements.

32. In cases where the information or intelligence received requires recording on Nottinghamshire systems it will be passed to the Intelligence Support Unit (ISU).
33. Within the ISU an Intelligence Support Officer staff member (ISO) will perform an administrative process inclusive of triaging, assessing, managing, and disseminating intelligence submitted to the force. This ensures intelligence is handled lawfully, proportionately and in accordance with the Intelligence Management Code of Practice [URNs: NGPF0010726, NGPF0010724 and NGPF0010725].
34. The Intelligence Support Officer is responsible for processing and indexing intelligence accurately, including the creation, linking, merging and maintenance of entities such as nominals, locations, vehicles and other relevant records.
35. The Intelligence Support Officer is responsible for applying and managing handling codes and access restrictions, including the sanitisation of intelligence to protect sensitive sources, methods or tactics. Where required, intelligence is restricted to a need-to-know basis. The Intelligence Support Officer ensures that restricted intelligence is reviewed in line with force policy and that restrictions remain proportionate and justified.
36. The ISO disseminates intelligence to the wider force and, where appropriate, partner agencies. Intelligence is disseminated to relevant recipients and partners such as Neighbourhood Policing Teams, investigating officers, senior investigating officers and specialist units, ensuring that the information shared is suitable for the intended audience

and that any necessary redaction or sanitisation has taken place [URN: NGPF0010727 and URN: NGPF0010728]

37. In 2021 the ISU in Nottinghamshire Police processed 46,644 separate submissions, an average of 127 a day. Each submission requires triage, indexing and actioning as appropriate.
38. After receiving intelligence or information through the Force Intelligence inbox, staff and officers are enabled to assess, analyse and further develop the information to understand its relevance, reliability and any associated threat, harm or risk.
39. Where appropriate, the information may be used to direct investigative, safeguarding or enforcement activity, including the initiation of police attendance or the creation of incident logs. Intelligence may be recorded, developed and disseminated via force systems, shared with relevant departments, officers in charge of investigations, partner agencies, or forwarded to specialist units for further action.
40. Where intelligence is received from another police force using a national intelligence product, it is either recorded on force systems or referred to the Intelligence Support Unit to ensure compliance with national intelligence standards.
41. Not all information received results in operational action, in some cases, the information contributes to a wider intelligence picture or is redirected to a more appropriate department where Force Intelligence action is not required.

42. The Force Intelligence email inbox is used as a secure and controlled channel for the sharing and receipt of intelligence and information between Nottinghamshire Police, partner agencies and other UK police forces.
43. Intelligence is received from, and disseminated to, other Force Intelligence Bureaus where individuals, locations or activity are relevant across force boundaries.
44. Information is commonly shared using nationally recognised intelligence products, such as 3x5x2 intelligence reports, to ensure consistency, appropriate handling and auditability. The inbox enables Force Intelligence staff to assess, record and, where appropriate, disseminate intelligence to the relevant receiving force, ensuring compliance with national intelligence standards, handling codes and information sharing policies [URNs: NGPF0010726, NGPF0010724 and NGPF0010725].
45. This approach supports timely management of requests and proportionate intelligence sharing while maintaining governance and oversight.

Dissemination Report [METF0000006] and Body worn footage [WITN0003002, WITN0004002]

46. The email and dissemination report from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) [URN: METF0000006] was received in the FIB email inbox at 08.06 hrs on the 1st June 2021. This email was then forwarded to the ISU for indexing and triage at 08.08 hrs the same day.
47. On the 2nd June 2021, an ISO staff member, Adrian Terrey, created an intelligence report on Nottinghamshire Police's NICHE crime and

intelligence management system at 09.32. The Intelligence Occurrence was given the number IN21000100194 (URN: NGPF0000224).

48. It is not possible to confirm if the ISO reviewed the body worn footage or if there was an attempt made to do so. I can confirm that I have exhausted all technical methods possible to establish if the ISO reviewed the Body Worn Video footage. I have been unable to confirm either in the positive or negative. I can confirm that it was possible to review the footage through the link provided.
49. I have confirmed through records provided by Nottinghamshire Police Human Resources (HR) department that the ISO staff member (Adrian Terrey) who reviewed the Dissemination Report no longer works for Nottinghamshire Police. Adrian Terrey retired in 2022 after six years in the ISU. Prior to their role as a staff member, they were a Police Officer serving with Nottinghamshire Police between 5th September 1988 and 25th July 2016.
50. The same day (2nd June 2021) at 09.44 hrs the ISO updated the NICHE occurrence that the intelligence had been 'Indexed processed and released'.
51. Processing, triage, indexing and releasing intelligence by an ISO involves the receipt and assessment of the intelligence submitted, in this case a Dissemination Report from the MPS.
52. The intelligence is assessed for threat, risk, harm and vulnerability, with any immediate safeguarding or operational risk escalated appropriately. The ISO would then be expected to accurately record and index the intelligence by creating and linking relevant entities, managing duplicates and ensuring compliance with force conventions and retention rules. Entities relate to

persons, vehicles or locations in most cases, this ensures that a singular accurate record is maintained limiting the likelihood of duplicates.

53. Prior to release, the intelligence is reviewed for sensitivity, sanitised where necessary, and subject to appropriate handling codes or access restrictions before being disseminated on a need-to-know basis to suitable recipients to support operational decision making.
54. The intelligence report was graded as 1AP, correctly reflecting the nature of content provided. A 1AP intelligence report denotes intelligence assessed as originating from a reliable source (The MPS) providing information known directly to that source (the submitting MPS officer), and that lawful sharing is permitted (does not hold sensitive information), if necessary and appropriate.
55. A 1AP report remains intelligence rather than evidence, is subject to handling codes and action permissions, and may be used to inform risk assessment, tasking or further intelligence development [URNs: NGPF0010726, NGPF0010724 and NGPF0010725]. Because of the 1AP grading being applied to the intelligence entry, all law enforcement agencies had access to this report if required and its sharing with partners was permitted if necessary and appropriate.
56. On the 2nd June 2021 Valdo Calocane (VC) had three prior NICHE entries relating to three previous incidents: 20000261503 [URN: NGPF0000068] and 20000262821 [URN: NGPF0000082] and 20000359283 [URN: NGPF0000048]. Two of these incidents were linked and related to an allegation of assault and criminal damage reported on the 24th May 2020, with the third incident resulting in a s.136 Mental Health Act 1983 detention on the 13th July 2020.

57. The NICHE footprint for VC visible to the ISO on the 2nd June 2021 was limited. Two records were a year old with the most recent being ten- eleven months prior.
58. The ISO linked the intelligence report [URN: NGPF0000224] to VC's already established record on NICHE.
59. I have been asked whether any steps were taken to undertake a welfare check of VC. I can confirm that no steps were undertaken to complete a welfare check of VC, nor were steps taken to share the information with any healthcare services, including Liaison & Diversion (L&D) services and any other community health services.
60. Upon review, my working assumption on behalf of the ISO who is no longer employed by Nottinghamshire Police and retired in 2022, is that no welfare check or further referral was considered or requested based on the detail that was provided in the dissemination report.
61. VC is described by the MPS Police Officers who engaged with him in person at Thames House as, calm, compliant, coherent, capable, and that he did not display any unusual behaviour, nor make any unusual comments.
62. No criminal offences were identified, formally recorded or reported, nor was he subject to a stop and search procedure. VC was not described in any terms as violent, aggressive, abusive, argumentative, threatening, as suffering with or experiencing a mental health episode, crisis or as being under the influence of intoxicants such as alcohol or drugs.

63. My working assumption on behalf of the ISO is that no referral or onward dissemination was made as they did not identify any risk to mitigate in the report that would necessitate onward sharing.
64. A staff member ISO conducts a largely junior administrative role. In instances where police officers have been present at a reported incident (as in the case of the dissemination report by the MPS police officers), they are entitled to expect that the attending officers retain primacy and responsibility for any required follow up activity as a consequence of dealing with that incident or information. This follow up activity would include the onward referral of information to partners if appropriate. This does not preclude further actions being implemented by the ISO or any other person.
65. If the ISO had identified the dissemination report as being linked to mental health, they could have referred the intelligence to the Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) that covered the address given by VC. The NPT would then assess, review and consider if subsequent referrals to mental health services and partners are appropriate. If the dissemination report had been identified as containing either medium or high-risk information or intelligence and as such required immediate action to mitigate, the ISO could also have referred the matter to a supervisor within Force Intelligence, shared with the Street Triage Team (STT) or Contact Management (CM) for resourcing and actioning as appropriate.

Risk Assessment

66. There is no additional documented risk assessment evident in the NICHE occurrence completed by the ISO staff member beyond the triaging process referenced by the ISO [URN: NGPF0010727].

67. Underpinning this triage process ISOs are mentored and trained in the application of both the National Decision Model (NDM) [URN: HOMF0000051] and an Identity, Capability and Intent assessment, commonly referred to as an ICI. The use of both the NDM and ICI underpins the triaging and assessment of risk process by an ISO.
68. ICI is used to support risk assessment by considering an individual's or group's intent, capability, intent and the potential impact of harm, providing a structured basis for professional judgement and proportionate decision making [NGPF0010722 and NGPF0010723].
69. The NDM is the nationally recognised framework used by the police service to support lawful, proportionate, ethical and defensible decision making. It requires decision makers to assess threat, risk and harm, consider legal powers and policy, evaluate options and take action that is necessary and proportionate. The NDM is a continuous and dynamic process, reviewed as circumstances change, and provides a structured means of recording decisions and the rationale for them, enabling those decisions to be justified based on what was known at the time [URN: HOMF0000051, NGPF0010722 and NGPF0010723].

Policies in place regarding receiving and/or reviewing information or intelligence relating to an individual who is known to Nottinghamshire Police

70. Nottinghamshire Police have a range of policies that provide guidance and direct which steps an officer should take after receiving or reviewing information or intelligence relating to an individual, known or otherwise.
71. Safeguarding obligations within Nottinghamshire Police are principally governed by PD473-Managing Threats, Risk to Life and Vulnerable

Witnesses [URN: NGPF0010729], supported by context specific procedures such as the PD-084 Domestic Abuse Procedure [URN: NGPF0010730] and the PD 776 Stalking Procedure [URN: NGPF0007427].

72. I have considered those policies and models that govern decisions made by Intelligence Support Officers (ISOs) within the ISU and the wider Intelligence department.
73. Decisions are broadly governed by: The National Intelligence Model (NIM) [URN: NGPF0010732], Intelligence processing and dissemination procedures, Risk to Life and safeguarding policies, Lawful information sharing requirements, and Record management frameworks.
74. Action is required only where risk thresholds are met, and all decisions are taken based on the information known at the time.

The National Intelligence Model (NIM) [URN: NGPF0010732]

75. Nottinghamshire Police operate within the framework of the NIM. The NIM provides the overarching structure for how intelligence is recorded, assessed / graded, disseminated, escalated, and used to inform decision making.
76. Under the NIM, the receipt or review of intelligence relating to an individual does not automatically require operational action. Intelligence is assessed proportionately, taking account of threat, risk, and harm as understood at the time.

77. The NIM provides a governance framework rather than prescriptive operational instruction, leaving responsibility for decisions with the appropriate decision-maker at the time.

78. The NIM model is applied in Nottinghamshire Police's Intelligence Department and provides the governance and structure for informing wider County wide tasking priorities.

The National Decision Model (NDM) [URN: HOMF0000051, NGPF0010722 and NGPF0010723]

79. The NDM is the nationally recognised framework used by the police service to support lawful, proportionate, ethical, and defensible decision-making. It requires decision makers to assess threat, risk, and harm, consider legal powers and policy, evaluate options, and take action that is necessary and proportionate.

80. The NDM is a continuous and dynamic process, reviewed as circumstances change, and provides a structured means of recording decisions and the rationale for them, enabling those decisions to be justified based on what was known at the time.

81. All staff and officers are instructed in the use and application of the NDM either through formal training or delivered during mentorship dependent on the nature of the role.

Intelligence processing and dissemination procedures

82. Within Nottinghamshire Police, all incoming intelligence is processed by the Intelligence Support Unit (ISU). The ISU is responsible for processing and indexing intelligence reports, creating, linking, and maintaining entities such as nominals, locations and vehicles, applying intelligence grading and handling codes. Restrictions are applied where necessary and intelligence reports sanitised to protect sources, methods, or tactics. The ISU will disseminate intelligence to relevant policing functions where appropriate.
83. The ISU implements the Triage and Assessment process [NGPF0010727] which governs how intelligence submissions are initially reviewed following receipt by Nottinghamshire Police.
84. Intelligence submissions are received by Nottinghamshire Police Force Intelligence through designated Niche unit tasks, determined by the submitting officer at the point of submission. Submissions are categorised as either restricted or sensitive intelligence, with sensitive intelligence subject to handling codes and managed within Force Intelligence under the same triage principles. The receipt of intelligence into Force Intelligence does not, of itself, require operational action.
85. The triage process exists to support the early identification and management of risk through an initial review of intelligence content. Triage is deliberately limited in scope and is focused only on immediately apparent risks, rather than detailed analysis or investigation. The process determines priority, workflow, and escalation routes, and provides governance around how intelligence is progressed within the force.
86. Intelligence is assessed at triage stage and categorised according to defined risk criteria. These categories are intended to ensure that

intelligence indicating higher levels of risk is identified and reviewed promptly.

87. High Risk Intelligence is categorised as High Risk where it strongly indicates:
 - An immediate threat to life or serious harm,
 - An immediate significant safeguarding risk to a child or vulnerable adult,
or
 - The imminent commission of a serious offence.

88. Where intelligence is assessed as High Risk, it is prioritised for immediate processing and escalation within Force Intelligence governance structures. Such intelligence is flagged for discussion within established intelligence review forums, including the Force Daily Intelligence Meeting, to ensure appropriate oversight.

89. Medium Risk intelligence includes information that requires threat management, identifies significant safeguarding or vulnerability concerns, or is time critical in nature. Medium Risk intelligence is processed as a priority and may be escalated for review where appropriate but does not necessarily indicate an immediate threat to life.

90. Other Medium and Standard Intelligence that identifies lower-level risk, serious organised crime indicators, or local safeguarding concerns may be prioritised for processing without immediate escalation. Intelligence that does not meet defined risk thresholds is processed through standard intelligence workflows.

91. Where intelligence is assessed as High Risk or Medium Risk requiring escalation, it is referred for further review within Force Intelligence

governance arrangements. The triage process ensures that such intelligence is visible to appropriate decision-makers but does not determine the outcome of that review. The identification of risk through triage does not mandate specific operational actions.

92. Identified intelligence as presenting risk may be flagged for consideration at the Force Daily Intelligence Meeting (DIM). The purpose of DIM inclusion is to raise awareness of risk, support coordination, and enable informed decision-making. Intelligence that is assessed as “for information only,” or where risk has already been managed by another officer, unit or agency, does not require DIM inclusion.
93. The Force Intelligence Triage and Assessment Process provides a structured, proportionate mechanism for the early identification of risk within intelligence submissions. It determines prioritisation and escalation routes and supports governance and oversight. The process does not impose automatic duties to act and must be read alongside broader intelligence, safeguarding and Article 2 policies.

Risk to life, safeguarding policies and lawful sharing of information requirements

94. In 2021 and today the principal policy governing required action in response to intelligence indicating risk to life was and remains PD 473 – Managing Threats, Risk to Life and Vulnerable Witnesses [URNs: NGPF0010729 and NGPF0010733]. This policy reflects Nottinghamshire Police’s understanding of its obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
95. An Article 2 duty arises only where there is a real and immediate risk to life of which the police are aware. Officer’s must take reasonable measures

within their powers to mitigate such risk, judged on the information known at the time. The policy recognises that not every intelligence report or concern engages Article 2 obligations. Decisions must be reasonable and proportionate, taking account of operational realities and competing demands on resources.

The purpose of “dissemination reports”

96. Dissemination reports (also often referred to as intelligence reports) are a mechanism by which intelligence or information is shared between police forces, units or, where appropriate, partner agencies. Their purpose is to ensure that information which may be relevant to policing, safeguarding or risk management is made available to organisations that may hold responsibility for, or additional context about, the subject matter [URNs: NGPF0010726, NGPF0010724 and NGPF0010725].
97. The receipt of a dissemination report enables the information to be recorded, indexed and assessed alongside other information already known to the receiving organisation.
98. Dissemination reports do not direct operational activity and do not mandate further action; rather, they support professional judgement by enabling risk-based consideration of the information at the time it is received.
99. Dissemination reports support policing strategy by enabling intelligence to be shared and assessed within a wider policing context, consistent with the NIM, thereby supporting strategic awareness, cross force coordination and proportionate, risk-based decision-making.

Policies or protocols for information sharing with local mental health services

100. In my capacity as DOI the following information I have provided regarding the two areas of interest concerning policies or protocols for information sharing with local mental health services, and instances when Nottinghamshire Police can make a referral in such circumstances is based on my current understanding and assessment of what was the situation in Force Intelligence in 2021. I am unable to provide a holistic overarching assessment for the entirety of Nottinghamshire Police in either aspect, consequently there may be unintentional omissions on my part.

101. Where another police service shares intelligence or information about an individual known to Nottinghamshire Police who has a history of aggression or violence associated with an acute mental health issue, there are established policies and protocols governing information sharing with local mental health services.

102. In 2021 Information Sharing Agreements such as PS 186 Street Triage Team Joint Policy January 2021 [URN: NGPF0007439] and the Information Sharing Agreement August 2019 [URN: NGPF0010745] for the Street Triage Team (STT), and legislation such as the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) framework were in place.

103. GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 support lawful information sharing between police and partner agencies, including mental health services, by providing a legal framework that permits disclosure where necessary for policing, safeguarding, protection of life, or the exercise of official authority.

104. Where intelligence relates to an individual experiencing an acute mental health crisis, Nottinghamshire Police may share information with local mental health services through the STT [URN: NGPF0007439] and the Information Sharing Agreement August 2019 [URN: NGPF0010745] governs this process. This latter policy enables police officers and Mental Health Practitioners (MHPs) within STT to share relevant information lawfully to support: Risk assessment, safeguarding and decisions around referral, admission, or Mental Health Act powers.
105. This applies whether the information originates from Nottinghamshire Police, or another police force sharing intelligence about an individual known locally.
106. Where the STT is not the appropriate pathway, Nottinghamshire Police today can rely on a separate Information Sharing Agreement with Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust (excluding STT) that was first drafted in 2024. This governs sharing of information with Crisis teams, Community mental health services and other NHS mental health pathways. Information sharing remains case specific, necessary and proportionate, and is not automatic [URN: NGPF0010738].
107. In practice, when intelligence is received from another police service about an individual with a history of aggression/violence linked to acute mental health issues the information is assessed for threat, harm and risk. Where appropriate, it may be referred to the STT, Contact Management (CM) or Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPT) who will assess and share with crisis or community mental health services as appropriate to then inform decisions around Mental Health Act assessments.

Referrals

108. Nottinghamshire Police in 2021 and today can make a range of referrals where they receive information about an individual known to them who has a history of acute mental health crises.
109. These include referrals to the Street Triage Team for specialist assessment, referral to NHS crisis teams, and referral to Approved Mental Health Professional teams for consideration of a formal Mental Health Act assessment.
110. Where information raises safeguarding concerns, Police may submit a Public Protection Notice (PPN). A PPN is a mechanism by which police formally refer safeguarding concerns. A PPN is then assessed within the Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH). The MASH is a partnership arrangement through which Nottinghamshire Police and safeguarding partners share information and assess concerns relating to children and vulnerable adults. This enables information to be reviewed through multi-agency safeguarding arrangements, including adult or children's social care. Such referrals support early intervention and risk management, rather than enforcement.
111. Where legal thresholds are met, officers may also exercise Section 136 powers to facilitate urgent assessment at a place of safety.
112. Where information suggests an individual may be experiencing an acute mental health crisis, Nottinghamshire Police can refer the matter to the STT. STT is a joint police and NHS service staffed by a police officer and a Mental Health Practitioner. Formerly established in 2015 the team provides specialist advice, attends incidents where appropriate, and undertakes

initial mental health and risk assessments. STT can identify and initiate appropriate onward referral pathways to mental health services.

113. Where an officer believes an individual is suffering from a mental disorder and is in immediate need of care or control, Nottinghamshire Police may exercise Section 136 MHA powers.

114. Where Section 136 powers do not apply (if, for example, the individual is in a private dwelling), Nottinghamshire Police may refer the individual to local NHS crisis teams. These referrals are made through established NHS–Police information sharing arrangements, often via Street Triage.

115. If the individual refuses consent to engage with crisis services, Nottinghamshire Police can refer the matter to local authority AMHP teams. This allows for consideration of a formal Mental Health Act assessment. Where necessary, an AMHP may apply for a Section 135(1) warrant to enable entry. An AMHP team is a team of Approved Mental Health Professionals (AMHPs) employed by local authorities whose statutory role is to coordinate and make decisions about Mental Health Act (MHA) assessments.

Recommendations

116. In consideration of my statement and the questions posed I would respectfully recommend the remedying of effective information sharing challenges underpinned by the required adoption of shared information technology (IT).

117. Differing IT platforms, software and hardware between agencies inevitably frustrates the sharing of information, critical or otherwise, and frequently

proves to be a barrier to managing risk in the community in a variety of forms.

118. Interoperability between all police forces, and partner agencies is a key enduring challenge and should be in my humble view be a priority.

Improvements

119. In terms of improvements, I would respectfully suggest that due consideration is given to the issue of complex legislation across local and regional boundaries relating to information sharing agreements.

120. An agreed national position for all law enforcement bodies and health trusts nationally with the dissolving of complex and varied local arrangements, would in my view go a long way to resolve confusion and misunderstanding of the rules and regulations governing this often-complex legislative area.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

GRO-B

Signed:

Superintendent Christopher Sullivan

Dated: 9th March 2026

Index to First Witness Statement of D/Superintendent Christopher Sullivan

No.	URN	Document Description
1.	NGPF0010726	College of Policing – “Completing an intelligence report” – January 2026
2.	NGPF0010724	College of Policing – Overview – Intelligence management
3.	NGPF0010725	College of Policing – Intelligence management – latest changes
4.	NGPF0010727	Intelligence Triage – Force Intelligence Processes & Guidance
5.	NGPF0010728	ISO Job Description – February 2021
6.	METF0000006	Report dated 01/06/2021, compiled by Metropolitan Police, re: Dissemination Report
7.	WITN0003002	PC William Nash Body Worn Video recording of CAD 5103/31MAY21
8.	WITN0004002	PC Graham Foster Body Worn Video recording of CAD 5103/31MAY21
9.	NGPF0000224	Intelligence summary report dated 04/12/2023, compiled by [Unknown], Re: Arrest of Valdo Calocane
10.	NGPF0000068	Occurrence Details, 24/05/2020, Nottinghamshire Police Force
11.	NGPF0000082	Occurrence Details, dated 29/08/2023, Nottinghamshire Police.
12.	NGPF0000048	Occurrence details, 27/07/2020, Nottinghamshire Police
13.	HOMF0000051	Policy Document, re: National decision model, College of Policing
14.	NGPF0010722	College of Policing – National Decision Model Guidance Overview
15.	NGPF0010723	College of Policing – National Decision Model – Latest Changes
16.	NGPF0010729	PD473-Managing Threats, Risk to Life and Vulnerable Witnesses – March 2021

17.	NGPF0010730	PD-084 Domestic Abuse Procedure
18.	NGPF0007427	Policy document Re: Stalking Procedure of NGPF
19.	NGPF0010732	The National Intelligence Model (NIM) - College of Policing APP
20.	NGPF0010733	PD473-Managing Threats, Risk to Life and Vulnerable Witnesses – May 2025 (current)
21.	NGPF0007439	Policy Document, Re: Street Triage Team Joint Policy, NHFT and NGPF
22.	NGPF0010738	Information Sharing agreement between Nottinghamshire Police and Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust
23.	NGPF0010745	Information Sharing Agreement – August 2019 - Signed