

Witness Name: Leona Scurr

Statement No: **WITN0440001**

Dated: 7th April 2026

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF T/ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE LEONA SCURR

I, Leona Scurr, will say as follows:

1. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the **"Inquiry"**) with the matters set out in the Rule 9 request dated 20 March 2026 (the **"Request"**).
2. I am Temporary Assistant Chief Constable Leona Scurr of Nottinghamshire Police. I have been asked to provide an overview of how arrest warrants issued by the court were executed at Radford Road Police Station during the period September 2022 to June 2023 (the relevant period) and, in particular, to provide details of: the individual(s) responsible for ensuring that warrants were executed generally and, in particular, the name(s) of the individual(s) responsible for ensuring the warrant for VC was executed; the process in place to monitor

whether warrants were being executed and the escalation process if this was not being done in a timely manner.

3. During the relevant period, I served as Head of Crime for Nottinghamshire Police with responsibility for Criminal Justice, Public Protection, Serious and Organised Crime, Intelligence and Operational Support. I was also responsible for delivering investigative capability aligned to the Professionalising Investigations Programme and ensuring the quality of investigations met national standards.

Background

4. During the relevant period there was no forcewide policy or procedure in place which explicitly detailed a uniform process across Nottinghamshire Police to monitor warrant activity; identified whether warrants were being executed; or provided a clear escalation process if this was not achieved or being done expeditiously. Responsibility for the management of warrants in this manner sat with Neighbourhood Policing Inspectors (NPIs), who were required to implement a local process for the execution of warrants for their area. The NPI responsible for Radford Road Police Station at the relevant time was Inspector Ben Lawrence. Inspector Lawrence has left policing.
5. The National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) guidance entitled Fail to Appear Criminal Warrants Protocol, May 2022 [NGPF0007409] provided an outline of the combined procedures between the courts, police and CPS. Annex A of that protocol provided guidance for the grading of fail to appear warrants aligned

against Home Office offence gradings. During the relevant period Nottinghamshire Police had not adopted Annex A into its policy or procedures. As a consequence, there was no risk based method of prioritising warrants for execution or escalation. The NPCC protocol did not provide a procedure or process to be followed for the execution, management and escalation of warrants in police forces. This was a matter for police forces to design and implement around their existing structures.

6. I can say that warrants were notified from court to the police warrants officers within the Criminal Justice Department. A Warrants Officer would create a warrant occurrence on the subject's NICHE record. NICHE is a crime record management system. It was the responsibility of the warrants officer to send a task through NICHE to the neighbourhood policing area that covered the defendant's home address, notifying that a new warrant was in existence.
7. The responsibility for enforcement sat with the neighbourhood policing area because, over the lifetime of a warrant, the original officer investigating the case (OIC) might change for a number of reasons. .
8. The warrant for Valdo Calocane (VC) was sent as a task to the City Central Neighbourhood Policing NICHE warrant inbox on 23 September 2022. This inbox includes the Radford Road Police Station policing area. The OIC was also notified via a NICHE task to their personal NICHE inbox that a warrant had been issued for the defendant in their case. This was the case for the VC warrant.

9. The document “How to Manage Warrants on NICHE” outlines the process in place at the relevant time for managing warrants [NGPF0007395]. This is a step-by-step guide explaining how supervisors allocate warrant tasks through NICHE to officers for them to complete the necessary enquiries to locate and arrest the subject. The guide explains that officers should update the occurrence entry log (OEL) with all relevant information, enquiries undertaken and arrest attempts. The guide does not detail the role of the NPI in this process. The term supervisor is not defined. The guide is a tactical guide for those supervisors and investigators operationally working in the NICHE inbox allocating and completing the warrant tasks.

10. High level warrant management information was available at the relevant time. This was contained in a Daily Performance Report (DPR) available to the organisation. The automated report was posted daily in the performance and insight section of the force intranet. The report contained crime performance data, victim code of practice compliance data and several other metrics. The warrant section of the report consisted of a front summary page that detailed how many warrants were in each neighbourhood policing NICHE warrant inbox.

11. Superintendent Kathryn Craner worked with the Management Information team to develop this report further to enable NPIs to see what activity had or had not been undertaken on the warrants for their area. Superintendent Craner was the Divisional Commander for the City Division and the second line manager for Inspector Ben Lawrence. This report was published in October 2022 and included a second page which contained a list of all the force warrants in reverse chronological order showing the date the warrant was created, owning

neighbourhood policing area, name of subject, summary of the reason for the warrant and the update on the last OEL. The date of the last OEL was not shown.

12. In October 2022 Superintendent Craner sent instructions to the NPIs and their line managers to ensure there was a clear process in place for their area for managing the NICHE warrant inbox and that everyone was aware of who would do this for their team. The detail of how this would be done and who exactly was responsible is not recorded. I am able to say that in November 2022 Inspector Lawrence reported to Superintendent Craner that he had tasked the Operation Reacher team to execute warrants in the City Central NICHE warrant inbox in addition to their core duties.

13. Operation Reacher was a proactive team that formed part of the Neighbourhood Policing model. Each NPI had an Operation Reacher team consisting of a Sergeant and six constables. The teams had numerous responsibilities such as policing football, policing the night time economy, searching premises and proactive operations. Executing warrants was not explicitly in the role profile for Operation Reacher teams however they were deployed to this at the discretion of the NPI around their other duties.

14. I am unable to say exactly how the Operation Reacher officers would have worked in the City Central NICHE Warrant inbox at the relevant time. I am unable to say if the Operation Reacher Sergeant was given responsibility for managing all the warrant tasks in the inbox or if Beat Manager Sergeants were also

involved in managing warrant tasks in the inbox. It is therefore not possible now to identify who had responsibility for allocating the VC warrant.

15. The Local Operation Meeting (LOM) was a fortnightly performance meeting chaired by the neighbourhood policing Chief Inspector. The agenda had been agreed by the Force strategic Neighbourhood Policing Board. The NPIs would report into this meeting. The management of warrants was not covered as an agenda item in the LOM meeting meaning there was no formal scrutiny or escalation route for their management in this forum.

16. Another route for the escalation of warrant activity would have been through the Divisional Senior Leadership Team meeting (SLT) chaired by the Divisional Commander every Monday morning. There was no set agenda item or methodology for scrutinising the allocation, execution and updating of warrants at this meeting. They were discussed by Superintendent Craner at her SLT meeting during the relevant time. Superintendent Craner would have been reliant on the Chief Inspector raising issues of concern or asking specific questions to identify risks.

17. At the relevant time, the management of warrants was not scrutinised or supported at any force level strategic performance meeting. The expectation placed on NPI's and their first- and second-line managers to manage warrants lacked a clear process for escalating issues. The Force lacked a grading mechanism to prioritise risk and thus prioritising the execution of warrants. NICHE was not an adequate system for managing warrant performance. Whilst the DPR provided some assistance it was not the solution and has been

replaced by a PowerBi dashboard. I am unable to evidence if and how the warrant management information that was available at the relevant time was used by the NPI to monitor whether warrants were being executed for the City Central area.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed: 

Dated: 7 April 2026

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No.	URN	Document Description
1	NGPF0007409	Fail to Appear Criminal Warrants Protocol (including Warrants in First Instance), 01/05/2022, NPCC, CPSE and HMCTS
2	NGPF0007395	Niche Warrants Process, 01/03/2017, NGPF

