

Witness Name: Andrew Wilkinson

Statement No: WITN0441001

Dated: 9th April 2026

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF PC ANDREW WILKINSON

I, Andrew Wilkinson, will say as follows: -

INTRODUCTION

1. I am Andrew Wilkinson and I am a member of Nottinghamshire Police currently serving in the rank of Police Constable.
2. This witness statement is made to assist the Nottingham Inquiry (the "**Inquiry**") with the matters set out in the Rule 9 Request dated 11th March 2026 (the "**Request**").

CAREER BACKGROUND

3. I have been asked to set out a summary of my career and relevant training.
4. I joined Nottinghamshire Police in May 2000. I started my career as a response officer based at Hucknall Police Station. I was a response officer for 7 years working across various areas including Mansfield, Ashfield and Radford Road.

5. In 2007 I joined the Armed Response Department as an Armed Response Vehicle Officer (ARVO). Whilst in the firearms department I have undertaken the below courses.
 - 2007 – Initial Firearms Course.
 - 2011 – Surveillance Firearms Integration Course.
 - 2020 – National Firearms Instructors Course.
 - 2021 – Firearms Tactical Advisors Course.
 - 2022 – Operational Firearms Commander Course.
 - 2023 – National Close Protection Officer Course.
 - 2026 – National Firearms Tactical Advisor Re-Accreditation.

6. Each year I complete mandatory refresher training in all areas of the National Police Firearms Training Curriculum.

7. In 2020 following the completion of the National Firearms Instructors Course I moved into the Firearms Training Department where I remain.

8. The Firearms Training Team work a Monday to Friday shift pattern between 0800 – 1800. My main duties within the Firearms Training Department are:
 - To plan and deliver firearms training packs to all ARVOs in Nottinghamshire Police. The training packs cover all firearms tactics within the National Police Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC).
 - To provide Firearms Tactical Advice to the Tactical Firearms Commander (TFC) or the Strategic Firearms Commander (SFC).

9. All Firearms Instructors within Nottinghamshire Police are Firearms Tactical Advisors; between 1800 - 0800 this is covered via an on-call system. Each Firearms Tactical Advisor covers a 24-hour period commencing at 0700 on their allocated shift. During the out of hours period Firearms Tactical Advisors take their Police radio and Police laptop home.

MY ROLE AND INVOLVEMENT ON 13th JUNE 2023

10. I have been asked about my role on 13th June 2023 in respect of the incident involving VC.
11. On the 12th June 2023 I was the on call Firearms Tactical Advisor. This was for a 24 hour period commencing at 0700. Between 0800 hours and 1800 hours I was delivering Firearms training. From 1800 hours, I returned home and covered the remaining on call hours from there. At the relevant times of the incident, I was at my home address.
12. The role of the Firearms Tactical Advisor is set out in Authorised Professional Practice (APP) Armed Policing (**NGPF0010086**) and listed below:
- A tactical advisor:
 - advises on the capabilities and limitations of the Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs) and other police resources being deployed
 - advises the SFC or TFC on the implication of any tactical parameters which have been set
 - advises on the viable tactical options for consideration by the SFC and TFC within the existing working strategy and any tactical parameters set
 - advises the firearms commanders on the tactical considerations, contingencies and implications for each tactical option
 - should be in a position to assist and advise the TFC at all stages of the operation
 - assists the TFC in developing the threat assessment where appropriate
 - provides tactical advice reflecting the existing threat assessment
 - ensures that advice given is recorded

13. The role of a Tactical Advisor is to advise and not to make command decisions. The responsibility for the validity and reliability of the advice lies with the advisor, but the responsibility for the use of that advice rests with the commander.
14. I have been asked to detail my involvement including when and how I was first alerted to the incident, the information I was provided with and the relevant timings.
15. At approximately 0531 on the 13th June 2023, I received a telephone call from one of the Control Room Sergeants. I was informed that the TFC, Chief Inspector Mather, had declared 'Operation Plato.'
16. Operation Plato is the national identifier for the multi-agency response to an ongoing Marauding Terrorist Attack (MTA).
17. I was informed that someone had been run over in Nottingham City Centre (**NGPF0005224**) and the subject vehicle was now being followed by Police. While being followed by Police the subject vehicle had swerved and collided with two more pedestrians.
18. In this case, the attack methodology appeared to be using a vehicle as a weapon. This type of attack is classed as a low sophistication attack.
19. My call with the Control Room Sergeant ended and my Police radio was on and monitoring talk group 1205; this is the talk group that firearms incidents are conducted on. I could hear communications from Chief Inspector Mather to ARVs and the Police Dog Handler, passing the location of the subject vehicle (**NGPF0008045**).

20. I could hear one of the ARVOs update that they were a couple of streets away. Chief Inspector Mather then updated ARVOs that the subject vehicle was on Bentinck Road, immediately afterwards the ARVO's updated they were on Bentinck Road. I could hear that the subject vehicle had come to a stop, and the sole occupant had been arrested by the ARVO. These updates lasted about 2 minutes.
21. At no point from the time the Control Room Sergeant contacted me to the time of the stop was I able to give any tactical advice to the TFC. This was due to the short amount of time from being first notified of the incident, to the detention of VC. I was unaware of any briefing that the ARVO's may have had prior to my involvement.
22. Ordinarily the TFC would assess a firearms incident, and if it met the criteria for the deployment of Armed Officers, they would contact the Firearms Tactical Advisor at an appropriate time.
23. The TFC would provide details of the incident within the format of the National Decision Model (NDM) (**HOMF0000051**). Based on this briefing from the TFC, the Firearms Tactical Advisor would advise on viable tactical options that best meet the working strategy set out by the TFC.
24. In this situation, it was impractical to do so at the time, due to the short time between the van being located and VC's detention. To have carried out the briefing between myself and the TFC at this point would have caused a delay to the response, which could have put more lives at risk.
25. At 0545 hours I requested a call from the TFC. Chief Inspector Mather called me and relayed the chronology of the incident and the fact that it was linked to the earlier murders on Ilkeston Road (**NGPF0005244**). This link was made by an attending ARVO due to the description of VC matching the

description of the offender from that earlier incident.

26. I was then informed that a male had been found on Magdala Road **(NGPF0002495)** who was believed to be deceased. He was later confirmed to be the owner of the subject vehicle VC had been detained in.

27. I asked Chief Inspector Mather if he thought the threat was dealt with; meaning that there was no further threat, and I asked him about the ongoing Operation Plato declaration. I asked this because my assessment of the circumstances was that it was a strange time of day for a MTA, whereby a vehicle had been used as a weapon. Historically these types of attack have happened during busier periods of the day when attackers have ready access to further victims.

28. I discussed this with him as outlined in the MTA Joint Operating Principles (JOP's) **(NGPF0005225)**: 'There may be occasions where the declaration of Operation Plato is not required as it is assessed that the incident can be effectively dealt with under business-as-usual arrangements. For example, it may be that the threat is not deemed as ongoing, or it is immediately clear that it is a single, small-scale incident.'

29. Chief Inspector Mather explained that he had declared Operation Plato but had scaled back some of the actions due to the male being detained. As there was limited information and intelligence he told me that he couldn't rule out any further attacks so was keeping the ARVs in the city at armed authority, as an operational contingency.

30. He informed the ARVO that all tactics were available to them, based on any new information that may come to light. I had discussions with Chief Inspector Mather around foreign force ARVs supplementing our own and he stated he would get them travelling over to Nottingham.

31. I mentioned briefing the ARVOs now that there was time to do so, and that other ARVO were coming on duty early and travelling to the City. The call ended at 0556.
32. The declaration of Operation Plato activates and co-ordinates the response from emergency service partners. Following the declaration of Operation Plato the Joint Operating Principles will be used.
33. The Principles are:
- Identification of a terrorist attack
 - Declaration of Operation Plato and confirmation of attack methodology
 - Control room actions
 - Mobilisation
 - On scene activity, including command and coordination, incident zoning and deployments for casualty and fire and hazard management
 - Tactical and strategic arrangements.
34. The above joint operating principles are guidance for emergency services in dealing with a MTA. They are designed to be adaptable and flexible to allow a scalable response for the varied methods of terrorist attack. These are a set of principles and not a plan. Some, all or none of the principles can be used depending on the specific incident. Low sophistication incidents may not require zoning or the use of all three zones. The decision to zone is dynamic and based upon the attack methodology and the threat.
35. I have been asked to provide details of discussions I had with PC Speeden and other officers in relation to developments on 13th June 2023.
36. At 0619 hours I made a telephone call to the Operational Firearms Commander (OFC), PC Speeden. My reasoning was to check that the team members were ok and that he understood that they were in the City as an operational contingency.

37. The TFC had informed them that all tactics were available and I wanted to check they understood that this would be assessed on any further information and intelligence. PC Speeden expressed concern to me that VC's address was still unknown and that there may be victims within. At 0620 hours I ended the call to receive a call from Chief Inspector Mather.
38. Chief Inspector Mather provided me with some clarity of the events that had earlier taken place and informed me that one of his considerations was to task officers with re-tracing any potential route of the subject vehicle to check for any potential victims.
39. Chief Inspector Mather stated that the morning ARVO shift had been contacted and several of them were already at the Headquarters gym prior to their duty commencement. He said that on being informed of the situation those officers immediately got changed, armed, and travelled towards the City to give extra ARV presence. Neighboring forces also sent over additional ARVs.
40. I had a discussion with Chief Inspector Mather about confirming VC's identity and suggested putting VC on the 'live scan' system. To the best of my knowledge, the live scan is a fingerprint scanner to obtain identification within the Custody Suite. I also suggested contacting Special Branch to see if he was known to them. The call ended at 0624 hours.
41. I immediately recontacted PC Speeden and informed him of my suggestions to the TFC.
42. PC Speeden asked if he was able to speak to me about any de-brief points. I told him that there would be a structured debrief but if there was anything needed passing to TFC then it was okay.

43. PC Speeden spoke about the earlier stabbing incident and that at the time he had concerns that it could happen to someone else. I replied, 'you have been proven right then.' I advised PC Speeden to bring the matter up at the structured de-brief that would take place at a later point.
44. I informed him that the day shift ARVs were coming on duty to support. At 0629 the call ended.
45. Following the telephone call, I left my address and travelled into Force Headquarters (FHQ). Once at FHQ I attended the Silver Suite. Chief Inspector Mather was speaking with the Specialist Tactical Firearms Commander, Superintendent Sullivan.
46. I was aware that others were making enquiries to establish the identity of VC
47. At 0730 hours I made a call to the oncoming Firearms Tactical Advisor PC Ashworth. He was en-route to work and at 0800 hours I handed over to him.
48. I remained in the Silvers Suite to assist with any administrative roles that were required.
49. I have been asked if I have any observations as to the sufficiency of the search for VC, including in respect of its rigour, management, coordination and effectiveness.
50. At the point I was notified, the subject vehicle had been located and the ARV was just getting behind it. In relation to the search for VC following the earlier murders I am unable to comment due to having no awareness of it.
51. The National Police Firearms Training Curriculum provides guidance on

armed area searches. Tactical options that can be used to search and locate subjects in open areas include:

- Searching the area on foot
- Searching the area in vehicles
- Searching by air support, supported with quick response teams
- Wide containment and wait for subject to emerge
- Observations e.g. CCTV, observation points and surveillance

52. The guidance on searching whilst in a vehicle at armed authority is to search based on current intelligence on the subject and their last location. Officers should have defined areas to search.

53. There are a variety of foot formations for searching through either urban or rural settings. Consideration should be made to using specialist support including air support, and Police dogs.

54. I have been asked to what extent, if any, I have been involved in a Major Incident involving a different approach to the search for an offender, and if I consider there to be any learning from any other experiences I have been involved in.

55. In my experience unarmed searching in vehicles follows the same format, officers search based on the last information given on the subject and areas the subject is likely to travel. This is usually managed within the team and/or with assistance from the control room. To the best of my knowledge, I have not been involved in a search following a Major Incident being declared.

56. Armed searching follows the same format however this is usually managed by the TFC and the OFC. A Firearms Tactical Advisor would not give direction about specific areas to search only the tactical options around searching.

57. Both armed and unarmed searches have the benefit of using specialist resources such as Drone, Dogs, CCTV and the National Police Air Service (NPAS). In my experience it can be difficult to receive support from NPAS during the night. The response time can vary dependent on their commitments and geographical location at the time. The fixed wing aircraft offers more versatility and has the ability to stay airborne for a number of hours whereby the helicopter only has a short flight time.

58. I have been asked to set out any further information as to my involvement in the events of 13th June 2023 which I consider would be of assistance to the Inquiry.

59. I have no further information that would be of assistance to the inquiry.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document with knowledge that it is false or without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed:

GRO-B

Dated: 09/04/2026

Index to First Witness Statement of Andrew Wilkinson

No.	URN	Document Description
1	NGPF0010086	Policy document, re: Armed policing reference material, College of Policing APP
2	NGPF0005224	Report, dated 13/06/2023, compiled by Nottinghamshire Police, re: Incident Report 0077_13062023
3	NGPF0008045	Notes re: Airwave Talk Group 1205 National Firearms Interoperable used by Notts for deployment of armed officers on 13/06/2023, NGPF
4	HOMF0000051	Policy Document, re: National decision model, College of Policing
5	NGPF0005244	Incident Report, 13/06/2023, Nottinghamshire Police
6	NGPF0002495	Incident Report dated 13/06/2023, Nottinghamshire Police
7	NGPF0005225	Guidance, re: RESPONDING TO A MARAUDING TERRORIST ATTACK: JOINT OPERATING PRINCIPLES FOR THE EMERGENCY SERVICES, JESIP