

Witness Name: Leigh Sanders

Statement No: WITN0359003

Dated: 28/07/2026

THE NOTTINGHAM INQUIRY

THIRD WITNESS STATEMENT OF LEIGH SANDERS

I, Leigh Sanders, will say as follows: -

1. This witness statement is the third completed to assist the Nottingham Inquiry with matters as set out in the most recent Rule 9 request, originally dated 23 June 2026 and updated on 16 July 2026.
2. As a retired Detective Superintendent with over 30 years' service, I do not have direct access to case materials. As such, all correspondence and requests for material since my retirement in May 2025 have been through the dedicated Police Liaison Team. This response should be considered both in that context and in conjunction with my previous submissions and comprehensive updates as already provided to the Inquiry team. They include:

- My first witness statement (WITN0359001) dated 12 January 2026 in response to the Rule 9 requests dated 26 September and 9 October 2025.
 - My second witness statement (WITN0359002) dated 24 February 2026 in response to the Rule 9 request dated 11 February 2026.
 - Live oral evidence (audio and video recorded) to the Inquiry at Mary Ward House, Tavistock Place, London, dated 18 March 2026.
3. This response deals with additional questions from the Inquiry team received via a Rule 9 request dated 23 June 2026, received on the 25 June 2026 and further supplementary questions on a Rule 9 request dated 16 July 2026.
 4. I have been asked to consider the search record produced and completed by Pc 513 Mosley on the 16 June 2023 in respect of 165 Burford Road (NGPF0008920). To the best of my recollection, I did not have any contact with Pc Mosley. Consequently, there is no record of any discussion with this officer. I did not have any direct contact with any of the officers involved in the search at 165 Burford Road. Operational decisions surrounding the conduct of this search would have been made by the individual officers conducting the search in consultation with their supervisor following briefings. From reading the statement of Pc Mosley and the relevant search record, I can see that his supervisor was also a Police Search Adviser (PoISA) trained officer, Sergeant Toombes, who

was present throughout and would likely have delivered a pre-search briefing to his team.

5. Post search, information about the results would have been fed back to me during briefings from the team leader, in this case most likely Ps Toombes, and submitted into the Major Incident Room (MIR). Exhibits of real probative value would have been highlighted during those briefings / debriefings and brought to my attention as the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and also to the attention of the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) receiver, so that consideration could be given to any fast-track actions (where appropriate in accordance with Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP – NGPF0008979)) which were required.
6. My role as SIO was to provide strategic and tactical direction for the homicide investigation, part of which was to ensure *"it was adequately staffed with people with the correct skills and ability to cover key investigative roles"* (WITN0359001, Paragraph 12 and NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 5). This included search strategies.
7. As SIO I provide autonomy for effective decision making on the ground to operational commanders who have the relevant prerequisite skill sets to progress my identified key lines of enquiry (WITN0359001); they retain that delegated authority as the most appropriately skilled and trained

officer to deliver those results, *"in accordance with (their) skills sets so that evidence regarding the criminal investigations can be secured"* (NGPF0008791, Decision 21). Any instructions to the search officers as to search conduct would have been made by the supervisory PolSA.

8. Such was the volume of work within this investigation (this location was one of 14 addresses identified, visited and searched regarding VC) (NGPF0008804, NGPF0008805 and WITN0359001, Paragraph 169), the extraordinary decision was made to attach three PolSA supervisors to this investigation (WITN0359001, Paragraph 38 and NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 21); consequently any discussions with search teams would have been through the PolSA and most likely via one of my deputy SIO's who I retained to assist with the investigation (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 16). These decisions and contacts are clearly recorded on the HOLMES account to which the Inquiry team have access.
9. The All Premises, Section 8 Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) Search Warrant application for 165 Burford Road and subsequent warrant authority was secured through the Intelligence Cell / Fusion Teams. One of my primary functions when setting up the incident room was the establishment of intelligence cells (NGPF0008791, Policy Decisions 4, 7 and 14) to establish VC's movements, contacts and associations (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 11). Liaison officers were established with a Counter Terrorism (CT) SIO also allocated: (NGPF0008791, Policy

Decision 21) *"to ensure that resources ...be deployed appropriately and effectively to secure and preserve evidence...(so that the investigation).. be directed effectively and in accordance with skills sets, so that evidence regarding the criminal investigation be secured"*.

10. For context, the motive for the attacks remained undetermined during the early stages of the investigation, including the real possibility of it being a terrorist attack (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 9). Thus, a liaison with CT resources, dynamic risk assessments (including the deployment of firearms officers) to establish the involvement of others and in turn prevent any further loss of life (WITN0359001, Paragraph 161 and NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 20) were key considerations. Intelligence reports were considered (NGPF0002068_04) and risk assessments generated (NGPF0008809) as part of this process (see paragraph 109).
11. I made a policy decision to search 165 Burford Road at 10:00 hours on 16 June 2023 (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 52). This would have been communicated to colleagues for progress during the briefing and debriefing process (NGPF0003635) in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures that govern the management of homicide investigations (The Major Crime Investigation Manual (MCIM) NGPF0008898 and MIRSAP, NGPF0008979). The warrant to search this address was authorised by Detective Inspector (DI) James Oakton (intelligence cell) at 10:50 hours on 16 June 2023. The grounds and aim

for the search are clearly noted thereon (NGPF0008806). This warrant was then executed by the search teams at 13:30 hours that same day (NGPF0008920). These documents are referenced in the documentary index to my first witness statement (WITN0359001).

12. The decision, purpose and objective of searching 165 Burford Road has been extensively covered in my previous witness statement (WITN0359001) and the associated documentary exhibits referenced therein; my policy log (NGPF0008791, Policy Decisions 11, 14, 22, 34, 49 and 52). I draw attention to the relevant sections of my previous statement (WITN0359001, Paragraphs 41 - 46, Paragraphs 130 - 134, Paragraphs 139 - 144, Paragraphs 157 - 175 and Paragraphs 214 - 217).
13. I am asked when I first saw this search record and what action I took to consider the evidential value of items that were recovered at the address. After three years since this incident, I can no longer remember when I first saw the search record for 165 Burford Road (NGPF0008920) or the search records for the other addresses searched and visited during the investigation (NGPF0008805 and WITN0359001, Paragraphs 130 - 138 and 169 - 173).
14. I have reviewed the search log for 165 Burford Road (NGPF0008920) and what the PoISA described as a 'basic address'. It appears that 5 exhibits are listed as having been recovered from this multi-occupancy property.

Two items were recovered from bedroom 5 and 3 items from a communal green bin in the rear garden. For completeness, I note that images and a video of the search were recorded and I understand these have been disclosed to the Inquiry.

15. Key lines of enquiries for progression at this time (16 June 2023) included (but were not limited to) the recovery of VC's Slazenger Bag and forensic, CCTV and telephony strategies (NGPF0008791, Policy Decisions 37, 41, 44, 45, 48, 49 and 52). The 5 recovered items were not listed as high priority actions for progression, nor would they be from the updates I received at briefing. I have again reviewed the briefing document (NGPF0003635) and the chronology of events is clear. At 17:00 hours 16 June 2023, during the force wide debrief that I chaired, I received the following update from the search team:

- Update at 17:00 hours, 16 June 2023. Warrants:
165 Burford Road - recovered a holdall. Occupants: suspect staying there 5/6 months, moved out either Sunday / Monday. Left holdall with flatmates. Clothes, knife sharpener, SIM cards, paperwork re 6 Maud Street and 209 Ilkeston Road and 20 Billington Close.
- *Slazenger holdall still missing.*
- *Paperwork re Pure Gym - not receptive. Bag stashed there? Doesn't have firm address. Burford Road is his last address.*

16. There are 851 exhibits listed on HOLMES and detailed on the Operation Hendrix exhibits spreadsheet (NGPF0002109). In relation to the 5 actual exhibits recovered from 165 Burford Road I note the following:
17. Exhibit DAV 1001: Holdall Containing Items. The bag appears subject to a cursory search 'in situ' as is seen from the briefing update at 17:00 hours, 16 June 2023 and direction given by the PolSA to stop the continued search. Nothing was identified during the debrief that would progress the early stages of the homicide investigation. It was established that this was not the Slazenger bag identified on CCTV which VC brought to Nottingham from London, St Pancras (WITN0359001, Paragraph 146 - 159). From the 1008 total actions raised and listed on HOLMES, no fast-track actions were raised by the HOLMES receiver regarding the holdall. The exhibit itself, whilst referenced in the prosecutions opening note (NGPF0007825, Paragraph 89) was of limited value and was listed on the unused schedule by the exhibits officer to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) during Phase 1 disclosure, dated 16 August 2023. Subsequently Action 837 (NGPF0001674) was created by the HOLMES reader to examine the contents of Police exhibit DAV 1001, on 13 September 2023.
18. Exhibit DAV 1002: Wetstone sharpener. From the 1008 total actions raised and listed on HOLMES, no fast-track actions were raised by the receiver. Enquiries conducted with Amazon by Financial Investigators established that it was purchased by VC on 30 December 2021

(NGPF0000452). Although mentioned in the prosecutions opening note (NGPF0007825, Paragraph 89), the exhibit itself was of limited value and was listed on the unused schedule by the disclosure officer, submitted to CPS during Phase 1 disclosure dated 16 August 2023.

19. Exhibit DAV 1003: SIM Card Packaging. Although mentioned in the prosecutions opening note (NGPF0007825, Paragraph 89), the exhibit itself was of limited value. No fast-track action was created, and any details would have been superseded by existing enquiries that accurately and quickly identified mobile telephone numbers in use by VC. These were subject to comprehensive analysis throughout the relevant time periods and would establish key lines of enquiries pertaining to VC's movement, contacts and communications. These have been discussed at length in my previous two statements (WITN0359001, Paragraphs 41, 43, 73, 76 - 103, 198 - 199 and 208 - 279) and (WITN0359002, Paragraphs 2 - 17). Although Action 838 (NGPF0001675) was raised by the reader to review the SIM card packaging and allocated to the Telephone Liaison Officer (TLO); ultimately this action was deferred. The exhibit is listed on the unused schedule by the disclosure officer, disclosed to CPS during Phase 1 disclosure, dated 16 August 2023.

20. Exhibit DAV 1004: Documentation. No fast-track actions were raised by HOLMES to review the documentation. Although mentioned in the prosecutions opening note (NGPF0007825, Paragraph 89), the exhibit

itself was of limited value. Action 839 (NGPF0001677) was later raised by the HOLMES reader on the 13 September 2023 and allocated to Police Staff Investigator (PSI) Julious. His review was undertaken and submitted to the MIR in his report (NGPF0003748). This report was reviewed by the Deputy SIO, Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) Clare Dean who, on 15 November 2023, filed both the report and action on the HOLMES account as no further action required. DAV 1004 was listed on the unused schedule by the disclosure officer and sent to the CPS during Phase 1 disclosure dated 16 August 2023.

21. Exhibit DAV 1005: Ripped papers. No fast-track actions appear raised by the HOLMES receiver surrounding the exhibit. Although mentioned in the prosecutions opening note (NGPF0007825, Paragraph 89), this exhibit was again of limited value so was also listed on the unused schedule by the exhibits officer to CPS during Phase 1 disclosure dated 16 August 2023.

22. In my opinion as SIO, exhibits DAV 1001 - DAV 1005 were correctly discounted as high priority actions and they would not (and did not) supersede other key lines of enquiry already in existence. For completeness, the search record notes under 'forensic strategy' that consultation was to take place with the Crime Scene Investigator (CSI) and SIO if there were any 'significant finds'. Outside of the debriefing process, I do not recall any contact with PolSA which again suggests that

there was nothing identified as significant or considered for fast-track action regarding the search. I do not know if there was any contact between the search team and Crime Scene Coordinator.

23. I am directed to the witness statement of Pc Vasper dated 16 June 2023 (NGPF0002455) and specifically his reference to Ps Toombes instructing him to stop his search of the holdall at the property. In relation to this instruction, I am asked where, in the chain of command has this order come from and what the rationale was behind it. As SIO I have already identified throughout my written and oral evidence that I take full responsibility for the leadership, set up and direction for this homicide investigation (WITN0359001, Paragraphs 12 and 23). That leadership included the effective delegation to others with the relevant skill sets, experience and ability to make effective operational decisions on the ground to secure and preserve evidence in accordance with my policy framework. That was the position with the specially trained PolSA officers. Indeed, often I take advice from tactical advisors to drive my strategic decision making.

24. Whilst a clear 'chain of command' existed within rank, with strategy and direction provided by me as SIO to PolSA during briefings, within that framework they retained the autonomy as specialists to operate. Consequently, there were no direct orders provided by me. Skill set and not rank structures (based on old fashioned concepts pertaining to

command and control, top-down autocratic leadership styles) in my experience secure best evidence; consequently, whilst the provision of my policy provided strategic direction and framework; the tactical blueprint to deliver search strategy was best provided by the expert - the POLSA.

25. The decision to halt the search of the holdall bag was taken by the POLSA Sergeant in accordance with the delegated leadership provided. I have no recollection of ever providing instructions (as an untrained search advisor), to halt the search of the holdall.

26. Within policy (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 19) I provided the following strategic framework around search strategy. On 13 June 2023 at 11:30 hours, I recorded that: *"POLSA to be consulted regarding search strategy and they are to link in (with) Tess Buxton (CSI), TFC (Tactical Firearms Commander) and the MIR so that relevant scenes can be searched in a way that secures evidence, but in a way that is cognisant of public and officer safety. Three POLSA's have been allocated to the enquiry. TSG and CT resources have been allocated to undertake searches. Risk assessments will be carried out by the SIU (Sensitive Intelligence Unit), and they will link in with the silver suite".*

27. The reason that I give for this direction, being to *"secure best management of resources so that those with relevant training can provide a sequential approach that is intelligence led so as to secure and preserve*

evidence in a safe and appropriate manner". Thereafter at 19:00 hours that same evening I recorded as a key line of enquiry (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 34) that*"the SIU (to develop) intelligence picture on suspect, family and associates"* and to liaise with the *"CT Fusion Cell"*. Then on 16 June 2023 (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 52) I then record how I was to liaise with *"POLSA regarding searches for (the) outstanding Black Slazenger Bag"* (at 165 Burford Road) with a view to establishing where the bag may be and the movements of VC.

28. My strategic decision making and the process and structures for its delivery are clearly set out in my policy. My strategic direction was clear; to locate and find the Slazenger Bag, but to do so in a way that is cognisant of potential forensic evidence regarding the murder and wider consideration surrounding officer and public safety. As noted, there was also a requirement to determine if others were involved in the commissioning of the offences under investigation (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 9). However, outside of that strategic direction, the actual tactical delivery on that strategy is a matter for the operational expert on the ground, namely the PolSA and search teams.
29. Whilst I cannot answer or speculate on the PolSA's behalf, I would suggest that he may have suspended the search of the holdall, having established VC as the owner, to consider wider forensic considerations and prevent potential loss of evidence. This is completely consistent with

other actions within the enquiry. For example, the partial examination of the stolen vehicle before full recovery and later search; or the partial examination of VC's rucksack found at the scene of his arrest before a later forensic search and considerations (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 28). All of these are examples where specialists make effective operational decisions on the ground within the strategic direction given.

30. In terms of when the holdall was first opened and all the items contained in it examined, it appears that officers at 165 Burford Road did a cursory search of DAV 1001 at the scene. No significant information from that search was provided at the force briefings (NGPF0003635). Consequently, further examination of the holdall (left behind by VC following his eviction) was not considered at that time a high priority action in accordance with the Indexers Policy Guide (NGPF0003618).

31. The HOLMES and indexers guide provided clear instruction on raising actions, action classes, and action management (WITN0359001, Paragraphs 22 and 434 - 435). Actions raised were placed into one of 3 queues, indicated on documentation by the HOLMES Receiver as High, Medium or Low. High priority actions require attention within 24 hours. Medium priority actions require attention within 48 hours. Low priority actions require attention anytime from 28 days (perhaps longer).

32. In accordance with MIRSAP (NGPF0008979), the HOLMES reader reviews in slower time all material submitted into the MIR. As a fully indexed investigation, having read material, any possible and reasonable enquiries are created and considered. Thus, an enquiry action (NGPF0001674) was generated from the search record (NGPF0008920) for allocation on 13 September 2023. PSI Julious was allocated the enquiry on the 13 of September 2023 to search, separate, review and record the contents of the holdall (Police Exhibit DAV 1001).

33. This action was undertaken, and PSI Julious submitted a statement to the enquiry team (NGPF0002916) on 14 September 2023. His statement was typed and registered on the HOLMES system on 15 September 2023. I record below the contents of the bag as listed by PSI Julious:

- Hi-Vis tabard from Sky Recruitment.
- One pair of black socks.
- Packet of condoms.
- Packet of Bic Biro.
- Packet of dental sticks.
- Tom Tom Sat nav with lead and box.
- Indoor Wi-Fi security camera.
- DBS Certificate dated 31/10/2021.
- Book titled, "Thermodynamic and Transport Properties of Fluids."

- Sketch pad.
 - 2 x Notebooks.
 - A4 Notebook.
 - Correspondence from Nottingham Magistrates Court regarding disqualification from driving.
 - Letter from Dr Tuhina LLOYD, Consultant Psychiatrist addressed to Valdo CALOCANE
 - A white spectacle box containing: 30ml spectacle cleaning spray; Aldi Employee card; Boots Employee Card; Portugal Driving licence, Valdo AMISSAO Mendes CALOCANE; Covid vaccination card for Valdo CALOCANE, dated 14/07/2021; Robin Hood student card; Dr Mobile loyalty card; Sim packet [VC phone number 40] – Vodafone; Sim packet [VC phone number 41] – Vodafone; Sim packet [VC phone number 28] – Vodafone; Sim packet [VC phone number 32] – EE; Sim packet [VC phone number 23] – 02.
 - A Brown wallet containing: Giff Gaff sim card; EE Top up card; CBF Gym card; Birmingham Library card; White pass card; HFS Warehouse Operative card; Portuguese Tax card; Portuguese Health card; Ear plug case.
34. From the HOLMES account no specific actions appear to have been raised regarding the two notebooks, the A4 Notebook and the Sketch pad. The later assessment of the Deputy SIO and office manager DCI Dean on

receipt of the material on 15 November 2023 was one of no further action required.

35. The search record also refers to "documentation" and "ripped paper" that was found in a green bin in the rear yard (Police Exhibits DAV 1004 and DAV 1005 respectively). I have been asked to provide information about what evidential review was undertaken of this material and when, enclosing any documentation which refers to such a review. I have no recollection of any specific review regarding the five exhibits recovered from 165 Burford Road. That includes any review of DAV 1004 and DAV 1005.

36. The Deputy SIO undertook the role of office manager within the HOLMES room and provided a final assessment for material within the MIR. As SIO my role did not include the review of voluminous amounts of unused material unless a reason arose, or if any matters were brought to my attention to do so. The fact that I have no recollection or relevant HOLMES reference, leads me to believe that nothing was brought to my attention following assessments within the MIR.

37. To comply with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA), any material generated as part of the investigation is listed on HOLMES, either as evidence or unused material. Police Exhibits DAV

1004 and DAV 1005 appear on the unused schedules having been assessed as holding no evidential value.

38. DAV 1004 and DAV 1005 would have been reviewed by those within the HOLMES room during the natural flow of information within the MIR in accordance with MIRSAP (NGPF0008979). These documents, along with the search record, associated actions (NGPF0001674 and NGPF0001677) and associated materials generated, would have been assessed by the Action Receiver, the HOLMES reader, Office Manager and ultimately the disclosure officer for sign off.

39. Regarding specific reviews, this has been answered in Paragraph 41. But for clarity:

- Exhibit DAV 1004: Documentation (from the Green Bin). Following the review by the HOLMES reader of the search record (NGPF0008920), Action 839 (NGPF0001677) was raised by the reader on the 13 September 2023 and allocated to PSI Julious on 14 September. That review was undertaken and submitted to the MIR in report NGPF0003748 where the officer states "this exhibit contained nothing of any relevance towards the investigation". This action and report was received by the Sergeant, reviewed by the Deputy SIO, DCI Clare Dean, who on 15 November 2023 filed both the report and action on the HOLMES account as complete: "satisfied no further action is required". No further actions were therefore created; the material was considered not of evidential

value. NGPF0003748 was listed on the phase 2 disclosure schedules, sent to CPS by the disclosure officer dated 17 November 2023.

- Exhibit DAV 1005: Ripped papers: No separate action appears to have been created to review the ripped papers from the green bin. The fact that no specific action was raised to consider any further evidential review for Exhibit DAV 1005 means their assessment through the HOLMES process was one where the material was assessed of no value. Consequently, the item was listed as an unused exhibit/material in accordance with CPIA and via the disclosure officer, submitted to CPS during phase 1 disclosure, dated 16 August 2023.

40. For the purposes of this statement, I have now reviewed the photographs of both the 'documentation' and 'ripped papers'. Following my examination, I concur with the assessment of the Deputy SIO - these items have no evidential value. Although mentioned in the prosecutions opening note (NGPF0007825, Paragraph 89), the exhibits themselves illustrate VC's association to the address, as opposed to progressing the investigation. It was correct that they were regarded as unused material and scheduled accordingly.

41. To illustrate, I briefly include my summary of DAV 1004 and DAV 1005:

Exhibit DAV 1004: Documentation (from Green Bin in the rear yard at 165 Burford Road)

The images of the 'documentation' supports material amounting to 210 pages (the first page detailing where documentation was found). It consists of a complete mixture of loose leaf documents batched together including receipts, names and addresses on sticky labels, old Lloyds Bank Statements (between 22 December 2010 to 06 March 2014), travel receipts (nothing relevant to the date of the index offences), an envelope with the word password thereon and receipts with writing thereon within it, various EE documentation including PIN and PUK code details, various employment agency literature and employment contracts (Ambitions personnel, Brakes Group / warehouse operative) - all consistent with VC's lifestyle surrounding low end / part time recruitment work - a list of named employees for a set of Arvato Warehouse 2 - 10pm shifts (dated 02/05 - 05/05), numerous dawdling's and ramblings of no coherence, understanding or value, a pure gym receipt (dated February 2023), a dental appointment for February 2023 in Narborough, Leicestershire, numerous grocery and travel receipts, further doodlings and notes around mathematical and engineering equations, AI, and notes about diet and fitness.

Exhibit Dav 1005: Ripped paper from bin. (Green Bin in the rear yard at 165 Burford Road)

Images of the 'ripped paper' show a mixture of loose papers that amount to a 74-page document. A summary of material includes names on paper (the paper is ripped so there are only partial names or addresses visible at points), location doodlings on piece of paper relating to Newark / Waterloo, further doodlings with equations, notes relating to gym/muscle growth, various names and addresses alongside equations- some addresses are in Nottinghamshire, some elsewhere. Paper relating to finances / sports betting, a piece of paper with what appears to be a car registration on, tram tickets, notes relating to chemical experiments and a card for a Frank Innes lettings negotiator with writing on relating to Bluetooth.

42. It must be noted that some content within these exhibits is illegible, incoherent and makes little sense. It is therefore hard to describe and as such this should not be seen as an exhaustive list or summary, but rather my summation of the materials as I see them.
43. In my opinion it was correct that exhibits DAV 1001 - DAV 1005 were not regarded as high priority actions and would not (and did not) supersede other key lines of enquiry already in existence. I do not recall any contact with the PolSA or search teams about items found in the green bin or inside the property, which again suggests that there was nothing identified as a significant find.

44. I refer to the witness statement of Police Staff Investigator (PSI) Jeff Julious (NGPF0002916) and his officers report (NGPF0003748) when considering the holdall (Police Exhibit DAV 1001) recovered from 165 Burford Road detailed above.
45. Whilst a cursory search of the holdall clearly took place by Pc Mosley on the 16 June 2023, a further search and review of the contents did not take place until 13 September 2023. A further review was not assessed as a High Priority Action or Key Line of Enquiry to progress the investigation. Therefore, a later action was raised by the HOLMES reader when the search material was reviewed within the MIR process.
46. My objectives were clearly identified in my earlier statement (WITN0359001, Paragraphs 12 – 15) and (NGPF0008791, Policy Decisions 13,14,15 and 17). High priority actions were raised and undertaken to meet those objectives. A further and immediate search of either this bag or other items recovered from the rear bin were not high priority actions.
47. This was based on:
- The information known to the inquiry team at that moment from other enquiries (clear and unequivocal CCTV and forensic evidence was being progressed to illustrate that VC was responsible for the attacks.

- The progression of other key lines of enquiry already listed (witnesses, telephone analysis) were prioritised and took precedence.
- The limited description of items listed within the bag during debriefing did not identify anything remarkable to progress the enquiry.
- The weapon(s) used in the murders had already been recovered from VC's rucksack, sent for forensic analysis and were not outstanding.
- This bag was not the outstanding Slazenger Bag being sought which was a High Priority.
- This holdall appeared to have been left by VC at his former address and was clearly not with him in London, immediately pre murders, at the time of any murder, or post attacks when arrested. The same cannot be said about VC's attitude regarding the Slazenger bag (the whereabouts of which remains unknown).
- There was no information in existence to suggest any imperative or urgent need to have prioritised the review of the holdall any sooner against other time-critical actions.
- It was established that having been evicted from this address on 11 June 2023, he had not returned and had therefore not deposited anything therein, either pre or post murders following his arrival back in Nottingham from London.

48. With no fast-track actions identified, the search record (NGPF0008920) would have been registered by the HOLMES indexers with material subsequently scanned and / or typed onto the HOLMES database. Following typing, all material is read by the HOLMES reader who

graphically marks the document, with all links established for cross referencing to all other categories. HOLMES indexers will have reviewed the document in accordance with the document readers instructions. In this instance, this would have included the generation of the Action Report A837 (NGPF0001674) which was to conduct a search of the holdall. That action would have been created and generated following review of the search record. The search carried out by PSI Julious was therefore conducted at a later stage in accordance with the above rationale; the generation of the action was in accordance with the MIRSAP process and the flow of information within the MIR.

49. The HOLMES database provides an effective infrastructure to administratively manage large and complex investigations in a structured and co-ordinated manner; the administrative input (in this case, the review of the search record of 165 Burford Road) has to be typed and placed on the system before an action can be generated from it.
50. The timing of the input and of the subsequent generation of an action was affected by the fact that the EMSOU personnel were also involved in dealing with other concurrent homicide investigations. (WITN0359001, Paragraph 35).

51. I recorded the unprecedented levels of demand within my first statement to the Inquiry (WITN0359001) and my Policy Log (NGPF0008791, Policy Decisions 26 and 43).
52. Operation Hendrix was one of 12 homicide and suspicious death investigations undertaken by EMSOU Major Crime during the 18-day period, between 11 June 2023 and 28 June 2023.
53. In the period of time between June 2023 and September 2023, EMSOU Detectives had an additional 31 homicide investigations and suspicious deaths throughout the region. Within this level of demand, SIO's can only operate when they effectively delegate to others in order to deliver their strategic priorities.
54. In relation to the two notebooks, an A4 notebook and a sketch pad being found in the holdall (Police Exhibit DAV 1001) by PSI Julious, I have no recollection of any discussions, or of being informed about those items being found in the holdall recovered from 165 Burford Road. No actions appear to have been raised on the HOLMES account to review the same.
55. In response to HOLMES A837 (NGPF0001674) PSI Julious provided a statement to the MIR outlining the holdall search (NGPF0002916). His action and statement were received into the MIR. It was reviewed and assessed by the Deputy SIO DCI Clare Dean on 15 November 2023, and

no further action was considered necessary by the Deputy SIO - who filed the action A837 as complete. Under these circumstances there would be no reason to inform me about the contents of the holdall as there would be nothing of significance to update.

56. For context, any review of materials in September 2023 would be in relation to proving the murders of Barnaby Webber, Grace O'Malley Kumar and Ian Coates.
57. In terms of evidential review, I have not considered or undertaken any review of the notebooks and sketch pad. I cannot find on the HOLMES account any reference to any action or exhibit reference to suggest that they should have been. Clearly, they have been assessed in relation to the homicides at the time of the initial examination as being of no evidential value. The reference to these materials on the HOLMES account appears in the statement of PSI Julious (NGPF0002916).
58. On the 15 September 2023, the HOLMES receiver secured the statement of PSI Julious within the MIR where the statement was reviewed, indexed and typed onto the system. Clearly some assessment of items within the holdall was considered with actions generated to pursue what were considered lines of enquiry that could progress the murder investigation. The assessment made at that time regarding the notebooks and sketch

pad must therefore have been made and discounted as a line of enquiry to progress on review of the contents.

59. Consequently, no actions were created by the HOLMES supervisor. The statement of PSI Julious was registered along with the action (NGPF0001674) and filed as resulted i.e. completed.
60. As aforementioned, on 15 November 2023 Deputy SIO DCI Clare Dean, finalised the material during her review as office manager stating no further actions were required.
61. I did not discuss the notebooks or sketch pads with the CPS, nor to my knowledge was I privy to any conversations regarding them. These were not evidential items and so did not form part of my discussions. Items are revealed to CPS as material becomes generated during the investigation.
62. In relation to the disclosure schedules, I can say that the statement by PSI Julious where he notes the contents of the holdall (NGPF0002916), including the notebooks and sketch pad, appeared in the phase 2 disclosure (on the MG6C) to the CPS on the 17 November 2023. No specific actions were raised to review the notebooks and sketchpad; so, other than within the statement of PSI Julious, these items do not appear on the HOLMES account. No new material was ever generated within the HOLMES account for any such disclosure to occur.

63. For completeness and in relation to the disclosure of the existence of Police Exhibit DAV 1001: Holdall containing items to the CPS, it was listed during Phase 1 disclosure, dated 16 August 2023. Therefore, the disclosure of the holdall and the contents was undertaken as they featured within the HOLMES account.
64. I have been asked to now consider the notebooks and sketch pad and consider whether they contain information relevant to Operation Hendrix.
65. **The Pukka Pad Jotta Notebook (NGPF0011504)** consists of 87 pages of handwritten notes, predominantly mathematical equations, interspersed infrequently with incoherent ramblings between the math. The following entries are noted:
66. On page 59, an entry states "Either I'm somewhat observant, intuitive or I have become super paranoid. Which one I'd rather ? Paranoid because it can be cured. The cure for the other is repayment. Fuck it ! Repay, that's our name, Avenger (followed by mathematical equations).
67. Page 69 then has the following extract "mea culpa, illegal actions 2013 / 2014. defied lockdown. Often one attributes little value to the moral high

ground because it can ...by anyone power however we respect for 2 reasons - the immediate and for reverence because of the cost".

68. With regards to commentary, there appears no direct reference to the investigation throughout the notebook, or to any specific reference one could parallel as relevant to the attacks Modus Operandi (MO). The above extracts (entries prepared in NGPF0011499) appear incoherent ramblings, consistent with VC's mental health diagnosis. Although undated, reference is made to potentially breaking lockdown rules (which were imposed in March 2020 until May 2020, November 2020 until December 2020 and January 2021 until March 2021), which is a period over two years before the Nottingham attacks.

69. The author (believed to be VC) claims he is '*mea-culpa*' (guilty) of illegal actions in 2013 / 2014 (circa 10 years before the index offences) although no information exists to corroborate what this could be. The use of the Latin term, 'I am guilty' could be interpreted that VC has awareness and knows the difference between right and wrong, suggestive of insight as to his actions.

70. The information around insight could be relevant to Operation Hendrix in as much that insight is integral to the defence of diminished responsibility. I recorded in my Policy Log (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 74) on 31 October 2023 that reviews surrounding VC should concentrate on

specified previous incidents as it may assist with "understanding (the) actions of VC leading up to the attacks" and assist investigators "with understanding motive, establishing if VC is bad, mad or both".

71. In my opinion, the often-incoherent ramblings in the notebook are difficult to understand; as an operational Police Officer (and with hindsight), there could possibly be things within the ramblings loosely associated to Operation Hendrix regarding mens rea; but nothing appears inconsistent with materials identified elsewhere within the investigation. This reference would not have changed any of my policy decisions.
72. The presence of mathematical equations are suggestive that these comments were possibly made as a student (most likely University of Nottingham). On page 62 there is a written date – '*11th April 2020*' which would equally corroborate VC's time as a student in Nottingham and is the most likely time stamp for when this material was written.
73. **Sketch - A4 Pad (NGPF0011501)** consists of 106 pages with numerous pages containing handwritten doodles and sketches.
74. In relation to commentary, there appears to be no direct reference to the investigation herein. Again, in my opinion as the SIO, there appears nothing new that would have changed my policy decisions or generated a key line of enquiry.

75. **The Pukka Pad Jotta Notebook (NGPF0011502)** consists of 69 pages. Within are handwritten notes of incoherent ramblings, again consistent with VC's mental health diagnosis and other materials discovered within the investigation. The notes themselves appear undated. They are difficult to read and follow.
76. In relation to the commentary, again, there appears no direct reference to the investigation and there does not appear any references to dates or events that allow the handwritten entries to be time and date stamped. I have read the material. It is difficult to understand, itself having the appearance of incoherent ramblings making little or no sense. In my opinion as the SIO, there appears nothing new regarding these ramblings, and commentary appears consistent with other materials within the investigation. This material would not have changed my policy decisions.
77. **Black and Red Oxford Notebooks (NGPF0011505 and NGPF0011506)** Which consist of 70 and 72 pages, respectively. Within are handwritten notes of incoherent ramblings regarding dreams, people being targeted by AI, technology telepathy, and how VC believes he is being targeted by surveillance and MI6. Again, consistent with VC's mental health diagnosis and other materials discovered within the investigation. References are made by VC to a previous arrest. From separate enquiries, this can be determined as the two Brook Court incidents in Nottingham on 24 May

2020. VC seems to be dissecting and self-reflecting within the notes on the incidents, posing a list of questions (dated 24 May 2020) to ask Gail (believed Pc Gail Collins the investigating officer).

78. Whilst there appears no direct reference to the homicide investigation, VC does appear to have made notes concerning his previous arrest and detention treatment, including a list of questions (dated 24 May 2020) in which he proposes 'to ask' Gail (regarding the arrest and associated commentary surrounding his mental health). For clarity, on the 24 May 2020 'Gail' (Pc Gail Collins) had interviewed VC regarding the first instance of criminal damage. Thereafter again when VC attended the Bridewell. The assumption held is that these may be preparation notes made by VC for his subsequent interview (IE to ask Gail). This information could be relevant to Operation Hendrix and my policy log entry (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 74) regarding pre-cursor incidents. This information however is paralleled elsewhere within the investigation (NGPF0003743 and NGPF0001759) including research made into the timeline of previous incidents.

79. Having read the material, I would say much of it is difficult to understand and makes little sense. In my opinion as the SIO, there appears nothing within the notebook which appears inconsistent with other materials obtained elsewhere within the investigation that is suggestive of anything other than a man suffering with internal turmoil and mental health issues.

80. For the avoidance of doubt, I have now considered in hindsight the whole of the notebooks. In my opinion as the SIO, there appears to be nothing within this material that would have changed my policy decisions, had any detrimental impact on investigations or the final prosecution outcomes that presented.
81. In relation to the contents of the notebooks and sketch pads being brought to the attention of the CPS. I refer you to paragraphs 63 and 64 above. Whilst the existence of the notebooks and sketch pad was disclosed, the actual contents of, and any assessment of the same do not appear as if they were.
82. I have been asked to consider the officer's report compiled by PSI Jeff Julious (NGPF0003748) and whether I consider his description '*Numerous notes of a mathematical nature*' to be accurate.
83. Although it is not inaccurate to describe the material in the report as containing '*Numerous notes of a mathematical nature*', that description alone does not provide sufficient detail to support a more in-depth assessment.

84. A fuller description would have been helpful and would have enabled the reader/receiver to make a better-informed assessment. It may not have changed opinions, but it would have provided a clearer rationale for the decision-making outcome. For example, additional detail may have prompted the reader/receiver to require each item reviewed to be listed separately. Each listed item could then have been individually linked on HOLMES, rather than treated collectively. This would have allowed each item to be assessed individually, rather than through the overarching collective assessment that resulted in the conclusion of no evidential value.
85. For context, it is worth noting that the volume of material generated and received into the MIR, both during and after the investigation, was considerable.
86. I have been asked to consider the Investigation Management Document (IMD) (CPSE0000113). I explain below why there is no reference to the notebooks, sketch pad or letters found both within the holdall or in the bin at 165 Burford Road.
87. The IMD refers to research concerning 165 Burford Road and the subsequent execution of the warrant.

88. At 17:00 hours on 16 June 2023, the IMD records the recovery of the holdall and lists associated items, including clothing, a knife sharpener, SIM cards, gym receipts and paperwork. The IMD also confirms that the recovered bag was not the Slazenger bag, which remained a high-priority action.
89. On that basis, I would not have classified the holdall as a high-priority matter or key line of enquiry. This may explain why it is not referred to further in either the IMD or my policy log. At that stage, investigations categorised as high priority were being progressed and are listed in the relevant records. Those matters would have preoccupied both me and the wider investigation team, which is reflected in the IMD and policy log. This also explains why Action A837 (NGPF0001674) was generated later to examine and review the bag.
90. The IMD was signed off on 1 August 2023. The review of the search record, (NGPF0008920) which led to Action A837 (NGPF0001674) being created to examine the holdall, took place on 13 September 2023, after the IMD had been finalised.
91. In relation to why a warrant to search 165 Burford Road was not obtained until 16 June 2023, I refer to paragraphs 4 to 12 and paragraphs 23 to 29. Additionally, this was a complex investigation involving multiple victims and scenes, with a dynamic picture still unfolding. My policy decisions,

detailed in my Policy Log (NGPF0008791, Policy Decisions 1 - 51) set out my actions, key lines of enquiry and considerations between 13 June 2023 and 16 June 2023. Building the intelligence picture from the key lines of enquiry (including telephony and CCTV) is not instantaneous and takes time. Obtaining that picture, securing the warrant and then executing it within the listed timeframe, in my opinion, does not appear unreasonable in the circumstances facing investigators.

92. Intelligence cells were established to help identify VC's movements. Enquiries established that VC had returned to Nottingham carrying a black Slazenger bag; before the murders, his full movements and the location of that bag were unknown (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 49 and WITN0359001, paragraphs 118 - 129 and NGPF0008836).
93. A narrative of VC's movements was drawn from intelligence, CCTV and telephony. Those enquiries identified 165 Burford Road, along with other addresses, as a possible location for that bag.
94. Liaison with a PolSA took place (NGPF0008791, Policy Decision 52), and the Intelligence Team secured a warrant for execution once the intelligence picture had been verified.
95. I have been asked to consider all police schedules of relevant non-sensitive unused material.

96. I refer to paragraphs 17 - 21, 38 - 39 and 63 - 64 above. I cannot assist further with this and would respectfully defer this question to the disclosure officer. As the SIO I would not normally review all unused disclosure schedules.
97. I have been asked to consider what efforts were made, if any, to create separate exhibits for the contents of the holdall (Police Exhibit DAV 1001) and the other documents, cards and items that were recovered at 165 Burford Road.
98. As the strategic lead I would not have this level of operational input. Outside of the explanations provided above I cannot assist further.
99. I can only assume that exhibit references were created for those items that were assessed as being able to progress the investigation by the relevant searching officers.
100. The Public Inquiry has requested a copy of the digital images taken during the search at 165 Burford Road and the video footage as referred to in the search record (NGPF0008920).

101. I understand that the images and the video footage have been provided to the Inquiry.

102. I have been asked by the Inquiry to provide disclosure of all documents, certificates and cards found at 165 Burford Road (whether in the property or outside in the yard) including, for example, letters, identification cards, employment cards and other cards. I understand that copies of images of all of these documents have been provided to the Inquiry by Nottinghamshire Police.

103. I have been asked to set out the measures taken by me as SIO to ensure the Inquiry was expeditiously given copies of the notebooks, sketchbooks and all the other exhibits recovered from Burford Road, and why the notebooks and sketchpad were not disclosed until 1 June 2026 without a request having been made. My response is that I retired as a Police Officer in May 2025 and I have had no part in providing disclosure to the Inquiry. Consequently, I am unable to provide an explanation.

104. In relation to a further Rule 9 request dated 16 July 2026, I have been asked to explain why the mobile phone recently discovered in police exhibit DAV 1001 was not recorded as an exhibit by the original investigation team. My response is that I was not aware of the existence of the mobile phone. I understand that PSI Julious will provide a statement on the subject.

105. I have been made aware that the phone was discovered by Nottinghamshire Police on 2 July 2026 in DAV 1001. I understand that Nottinghamshire Police has provided copies of examination reports to the Inquiry, but I have not had access to them.
106. I am asked to refer to the video footage taken by officers when they attended 165 Burford Road (NGPF0014197) and to state what search, if any, was undertaken by officers of the area around the stairs leading down to the cellar and the cellar itself. I have not been able to review this footage.
107. I can see from the search record (NGPF0008920, Page 7) that the cellar was searched by team 4 and there were no exhibits seized from that area. I can also see from the sketch plan (Page 11) that the cellar is clearly documented. From the search record alone, I am satisfied that the attending officers searched the cellar and in doing so I am in no doubt that they would have searched the stairs leading down to the cellar whilst doing so.
108. I have also been asked to refer to NGPF0002068 and NGPF0008809 which relate to intelligence reports in respect of 209 Ilkeston Road and advise as to whether this intelligence was considered as part of the investigation of VC and if so how.

109. I can confirm that this intelligence was considered when assessing VC's lifestyle, movements, the identification of his home / former addresses and the recovery of items that could assist the investigation. Please refer to my first witness statement (WITN0359001, Paragraph 169) and the Exhibits book (NGPF0001454).

110. During the early stages of the investigation, there was also a requirement to determine who and how many people were responsible for the attacks, whether this was a single person or multiple person attack. I recorded this in my policy log at 09:50 hours on the 13 June 2023 (NGPF0008791, Policy Decisions 9, 11 and 20) I recorded "at this time it is not clear as to exact circumstances. Pursuance of all enquiries will help formalise hypothesis". Namely whether the attacks were random acts of terrorism, or acts of criminality committed by a single offender, or a group of offenders.

111. Intelligence held on all identified addresses was considered and Police Incident Log 0128_13062023 (NGPF0008809) was created. Whilst creating that incident log consideration was also being given to Op Plato. The intelligence material gathered was assessed by Counter Terrorism Authorised Firearms Officers (CTAFOs) as part of their initial and dynamic risk assessments. The incident log was a running command and control log kept in 'real time' when CT Teams were conducting rolling firearms

deployments at addresses linked to VC. At the time the log acted as a list of dynamic risk assessments undertaken by the officers attending the addresses. 209 Ilkeston Road is detailed as an address attended and intelligence relating to firearms is a feature.

112. I have been asked, if this material was not considered, to explain why. As addressed within paragraphs 109 to 111 above, the intelligence was considered as part of the investigation into VC.

113. I have been asked whether this material was disclosed to the Crown Prosecution Service and Professor Blackwood and if not, to explain why.

114. I can confirm that the material NGPF0002068 (D428) was disclosed to the CPS during Phase 2 disclosure, dated 17 November 2023. Professor Blackwood was instructed by the CPS, and I am unable to say what material was provided to him.

115. I have been asked about comments made in the statement of Iulian GRO-B which refers to VC being in possession of a laptop on 9 June 2023. In his statement (CPSE0004722) GRO-B states "It seemed strange to me that he had managed to get himself a laptop, even though he could not keep up paying the rent".

116. I have been asked what efforts, if any, were made to locate VC's laptop.
- Despite extensive reviews, VC was not seen on any CCTV in possession of a laptop in the period leading up to, and after, the attacks.
117. Property searches undertaken (NGPF0008805) did not result in the recovery of a laptop as detailed in my previous statement (WITN0359001, Paragraph 169). A Briefing and Tasking System (BATS) appeal (NGPF0008836) did not generate any new information. The inference I drew was that, along with VC's personal effects, any laptop (if indeed his) had been packed by him ahead of leaving 165 Burford Road, and before his travel to London, in the Slazenger bag (WITN0359001, Paragraph 144).
118. Extensive enquiries were taken to locate and retrieve the Slazenger bag by analysing VC's movements both pre and post murders as detailed in my previous witness statement (WITN0359001, Paragraphs 169, 175 and 207) and a BATS appeal was circulated (NGPF0008836).
119. No Slazenger bag was recovered, and VC answered 'no comment' in his interviews when questioned about the Slazenger bag (WITN0359001, Paragraph 139).
120. As stated within paragraphs 116 to 119 above, efforts were made to establish the whereabouts of VC's property including the laptop.

121. As a laptop was not recovered, no analysis was carried out of any of the contents.

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I believe the content of this statement to be true. I understand that proceedings may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief of its truth.

Signed:

GRO-B

Dated: 28/07/2026

Index to Third Witness Statement of Leigh Sanders

No.	URN	Document Description
1	WITN0359001	First Witness Statement of Leigh Sanders, Nottinghamshire Police (NGPF)
2	WITN0359002	Second Witness Statement of Leigh Sanders, Nottinghamshire Police
3	NGPF0008920	Search Record dated 16/07/2023, [NGPF]

4	NGPF0008979	Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP 2021), November 2021 [NPCC]
5	NGPF0008791	Report dated 13/06/2023- 12/03/2024, compiled by [NGPF] Re: Decisions and policies log by DSU Sanders
6	NGPF0008804	Search Record dated 11/07/2023, [NGPF]
7	NGPF0008805	Report, compiled by NGPF, Re: Operation Hendrix - identified addresses
8	NGPF0002068	Investigation Notes including incidents linked to VC residential addresses, 13/06/2023, Unknown Institution,
9	NGPF0008809	Incident Details dated 13/06/2023, [NGPF]
10	NGPF0003635	Initial Briefing Document for briefing on 13/06/2023, dated unknown, NGPF
11	NGPF0008898	Major Crime Investigation Manual (MCIM 2021), November 2021 [NPCC]
12	NGPF0008806	Application for Search Warrant from Kelly Haining [NGPF] re: Operation Hendrix, dated 16/06/2023
13	NGPF0002109	Incident Exhibits, dated [unknown], [police force unknown]
14	NGPF0007825	Rex v Valdo Calocane (AKA Adam Mendes) Prosecution Opening Note, 15/01/2024 and Karim S. Khalil KC (Drystone Chambers) and Peter Ratliff (6KBW).
15	NGPF0001674	Action Record and Log Print, Re: Officer to search, separate, review and record contents of bag DAV1001 dated 08/02/2024, Nottinghamshire Police
16	NGPF0000452	Police document from EM CTP Investigations - OP HENDRIX Action 207, 15/06/23, EM CTP
17	NGPF0001675	Action Record and Log Print, Re: Officer to search, separate, review and record contents of bag DAV1003 dated 26/02/2025, Nottinghamshire Police
18	NGPF0001677	Action Record and Log Print, Re: Officer to search, separate, review and record contents of bag DAV1004 dated 17/06/2025, Nottinghamshire Police
19	NGPF0003748	OFFICERS REPORT - OPERATION HENDRIX, [unknown date], East Midlands Special Operations Unit
20	NGPF0002455	Witness statement of Daniel Vasper, Nottinghamshire Police

21	NGPF0003618	Other Document - INDEXING POLICY GUIDE, 23/05/2025, Nottinghamshire Police
22	NGPF0002916	Witness Statement of Jeff Julious dated 14/09/2023
23	NGPF0011504	Notes by VC, Re: Electricity and magnetism equations, passwords and contact details
24	NGPF0011499	Notes by VC, re: General journal, including mentions to paranoia
25	NGPF0011501	Notes, re: Sketchpad drawings
26	NGPF0011502	Notes by VC, Re: general journal including thoughts on love, war, dying
27	NGPF0011505	Notes by VC, Re: English class and DVND notes
28	NGPF0011506	Notes by VC, Re: Personal thoughts including thoughts about sexual dynamics from the male perspective
29	NGPF0003743	Letter from DC to SIO Op Hendrix re: Op Hendrix Review of download from JR/11- , Data extraction, JR/11/EXT2
30	NGPF0001759	Mobile Phone/Sim Card Review Log re: Mobile Phone from JR/9, Operation Alcuinian, dated 16/06/2023 [Unknown Police Force]
31	CPSE0000113	Report dated 01/08/2023, compiled by NPCC, Re: Investigation Management Document - Valdo Calocane
32	NGPF0008836	Police document re: URGENT: Assistance required in locating a bag connected to Op Hendrix
33	NGPF0014197	Video footage taken by officers when they searched 165 Burford Road
34	NGPF0001454	Exhibits Book - Operation Hendrix Re: 209 Ilkeston Road NG7 3FW, 13/06/2023, National Police Chiefs' Council.
35	CPSE0004722	Witness Statement of Iulian GRO-B dated 22/08/2023